registry.redhat.io/ansible-automation-platform-24/ee-supported-rhel8

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ID	Age	Component	Trivy Severity	Grype Severity	Red Hat Severity	Scandy Opinion
CVE-2024-45338	169	podman-remote	High	High	Important
CVE-2025-32728	57	openssh openssh-clients	Medium	Medium	Moderate	Removable
CVE-2025-32414	59	libxml2	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-26465	109	openssh openssh-clients	Medium	Medium	Moderate	Removable
CVE-2025-25724	96	libarchive	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-22872	50	golang.org/x/net podman-remote	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-5278	10	coreutils-single	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-4802	21	glibc glibc-common glibc-langpack-en glibc-minimal-langpack	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-4373	31	glib2	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-57970	110	libarchive	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-56433	162	shadow-utils shadow-utils-subid	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-52533	207	glib2	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-45336	140	git-lfs podman-remote stdlib	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-35325	358	libyaml	Medium		Moderate
CVE-2024-35255	340	azure-identity	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-34397	395	glib2	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-24791	339	git-lfs stdlib	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-24790	367	git-lfs stdlib	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-12086	142	rsync	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-9355	248	git-lfs podman-remote	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-8676	191	podman-remote	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-6505	337	qemu-img	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-2236	457	libgcrypt	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-51767	530	openssh openssh-clients	Medium	Medium	Moderate	Removable
CVE-2023-48795	536	golang.org/x/crypto paramiko	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-40403	618	libxslt	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-39322	639	git-lfs	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-39321	639	git-lfs	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-5455	512	krb5-libs krb5-workstation libkadm5	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-0466	801	openssl openssl-libs	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2022-23990	1227	expat	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2022-4899	1055	libzstd zstd	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2022-4122	927	podman-remote	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2021-38561	1394	podman-remote	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2021-33294	689	elfutils-default-yama-scope elfutils-libelf elfutils-libs	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2021-3682	1418	qemu-img	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2020-10761	1824	qemu-img	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2019-17543	2151	lz4-libs	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2019-12904	2152	libgcrypt	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2019-8905	2300	file-libs	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2019-6110	2394	openssh openssh-clients	Medium	Medium	Moderate	Removable
CVE-2018-1000021	2708	git-core	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2018-20839	2212	systemd systemd-libs systemd-pam	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2018-19217	2398	ncurses-base ncurses-libs	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2018-15919	2474	openssh openssh-clients	Medium	Medium	Moderate	Removable
CVE-2005-2541	7246	tar	Medium	Medium	Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-32415	50	libxml2	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2025-30258	79	gnupg2	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2025-30163	73	podman-remote	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2025-30162	73	podman-remote	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2025-27113	108	libxml2	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2025-3360	60	glib2	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2025-1795	97	platform-python python3-libs python39 python39-chardet python39-libs python39-lxml python39-pip python39-pip-wheel python39-pysocks python39-pyyaml python39-setuptools python39-setuptools-wheel	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2025-1632	101	libarchive	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2025-0725	120	curl libcurl	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2024-52006	142	git-core	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2024-50349	142	git-core	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2024-46901	178	libserf subversion subversion-libs utf8proc	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2024-41996	283	openssl openssl-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2024-34459	394	libxml2	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2024-25260	472	elfutils-default-yama-scope elfutils-libelf elfutils-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2024-8612	259	qemu-img	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2024-8354	279	qemu-img	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2024-4741	374	openssl openssl-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2024-2511	424	openssl openssl-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2024-0727	501	openssl openssl-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2024-0232	603	sqlite-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2023-50495	542	ncurses-base ncurses-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2023-45918	497	ncurses-base ncurses-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2023-45322	653	libxml2	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2023-39804	543	tar	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2023-36191	714	sqlite-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2023-32665	905	glib2	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2023-32636	905	glib2	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2023-32611	905	glib2	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2023-29499	905	glib2	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2023-27534	809	curl libcurl	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2023-24056	867	libpkgconf pkgconf pkgconf-m4 pkgconf-pkg-config	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2023-4156	718	gawk	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2023-2650	738	openssl openssl-libs	Low	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-0465	801	openssl openssl-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2023-0464	807	openssl openssl-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2022-41409	689	pcre2	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2022-27943	1168	libgcc libstdc++	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2022-3219	995	gnupg2	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2022-0530	1222	unzip	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2022-0529	1229	unzip	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2021-39537	1767	ncurses-base ncurses-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2021-24032	1576	libzstd zstd	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2021-20193	1601	tar	Low	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2021-4217	1239	unzip	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2021-4209	1262	gnutls	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2021-3997	1243	systemd systemd-libs systemd-pam	Low	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2021-3735	1382	qemu-img	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2021-3527	1498	qemu-img	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2020-35512	1802	dbus dbus-common dbus-daemon dbus-libs dbus-tools	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2020-25084	1808	qemu-img	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2020-21674	1987	libarchive	Low	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2020-19190	2226	ncurses-base ncurses-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2020-19189	2226	ncurses-base ncurses-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2020-19188	2226	ncurses-base ncurses-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2020-19187	2226	ncurses-base ncurses-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2020-19186	2226	ncurses-base ncurses-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2020-19185	2226	ncurses-base ncurses-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2020-15469	1815	qemu-img	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2020-14394	1634	qemu-img	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2020-13659	1849	qemu-img	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2020-10717	1863	qemu-img	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2019-19244	2023	sqlite-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2019-14250	2128	libgcc libstdc++	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2019-13164	2170	qemu-img	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2019-13118	2168	libxslt	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2019-13117	2168	libxslt	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2019-9937	2272	sqlite-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2019-9936	2272	sqlite-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2019-9923	2347	tar	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2019-8906	2346	file-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2018-1000880	2390	libarchive	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2018-1000879	2390	libarchive	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2018-1000654	2490	libtasn1	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2018-20657	2362	libgcc libstdc++	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2018-20225	1865	python3-pip-wheel	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2018-19211	2413	ncurses-base ncurses-libs	Low	Low	Low
CVE-2016-20012	3407	openssh openssh-clients	Low	Low	Low	Removable
CVE-2023-44487	605	golang.org/x/net google.golang.org/grpc stdlib		High	Important
CVE-2023-45288	429	golang.org/x/net stdlib		Medium	Important
CVE-2024-45337	176	golang.org/x/crypto		Critical	Important
CVE-2024-23653	492	github.com/moby/buildkit		Critical	Important
CVE-2024-21626	491	github.com/opencontainers/runc		High	Important
CVE-2024-23652	492	github.com/moby/buildkit		Critical	Important
CVE-2022-23648	1192	github.com/containerd/containerd		High	Important
CVE-2023-49569	514	github.com/go-git/go-git/v5		Critical	Critical
CVE-2021-41091	1341	github.com/docker/docker		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2020-8945	1968	podman-remote		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-41110	318	github.com/docker/docker		Critical	Critical
CVE-2023-28841	794	github.com/docker/docker		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-24784	458	stdlib		High	Moderate
CVE-2024-7264	310	curl libcurl		Low	Low
CVE-2023-24531	?	stdlib		Critical
CVE-2025-0938	125	platform-python python3-libs python39 python39-libs		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2019-9674	2279	platform-python python3-libs		Low	Low
CVE-2024-24787	?	stdlib		Medium
CVE-2023-28842	794	github.com/docker/docker		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2022-0391	1510	python39 python39-libs		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-28840	794	github.com/docker/docker		High	Important
CVE-2024-23651	492	github.com/moby/buildkit		High	Moderate
CVE-2024-24783	458	stdlib		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-45289	458	stdlib		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-45290	458	stdlib		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-0397	354	platform-python python3-libs python39 python39-libs		Low	Low
CVE-2024-24786	458	google.golang.org/protobuf		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-45287	549	stdlib		High	Moderate
CVE-2022-41723	839	git-lfs		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-49568	530	github.com/go-git/go-git/v5		High	Important
CVE-2023-39325	605	golang.org/x/net		High	Important
CVE-2021-43816	1248	github.com/containerd/containerd		High	Important
CVE-2022-23471	911	github.com/containerd/containerd		Medium
CVE-2021-20206	1582	podman-remote		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-34156	272	stdlib		High	Important
CVE-2024-7592	291	platform-python python3-libs python39 python39-libs		Low	Low
CVE-2024-24785	458	stdlib		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2020-28362	1667	podman-remote		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-3727	393	github.com/containers/image/v5		High	Moderate
CVE-2024-11079	207	ansible-core		Low	Moderate
GHSA-mq39-4gv4-mvpx	442	github.com/docker/docker		Medium
CVE-2023-27561	837	github.com/opencontainers/runc		High	Moderate
CVE-2022-29162	1120	github.com/opencontainers/runc		Medium	Low
CVE-2021-43784	1278	github.com/opencontainers/runc		Medium	Low
CVE-2021-32760	1418	github.com/containerd/containerd		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-11053	177	curl libcurl		Low	Low
CVE-2025-21613	150	github.com/go-git/go-git/v5		Critical	Important
CVE-2022-24769	1171	github.com/docker/docker		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-25153	842	github.com/containerd/containerd		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-21614	150	github.com/go-git/go-git/v5		High	Important
CVE-2024-24788	394	git-lfs		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-2253	758	github.com/docker/distribution		High	Moderate
CVE-2023-39323	610	stdlib		High	Moderate
CVE-2024-34158	272	stdlib		High	Moderate
CVE-2021-41103	1341	github.com/containerd/containerd		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2022-31030	1095	github.com/containerd/containerd		Medium
CVE-2023-3978	674	golang.org/x/net		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-34155	272	stdlib		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-23650	492	github.com/moby/buildkit		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2021-28544	1167	subversion subversion-libs		Low	Low
CVE-2023-45285	548	stdlib		High	Moderate
CVE-2023-24536	794	git-lfs		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2020-28852	1616	podman-remote		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-22869	100	golang.org/x/crypto		High	Important
CVE-2023-39318	639	stdlib		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-39319	639	stdlib		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2022-41725	842	git-lfs		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-24557	491	github.com/docker/docker		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-24534	794	git-lfs		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-39326	548	stdlib		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2021-3114	1598	podman-remote		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2022-32149	969	podman-remote		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-0690	505	ansible-test		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-30204	76	github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4		High	Important
CVE-2025-22871	58	git-lfs podman-remote stdlib		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-8775	265	ansible-core		High	Moderate
CVE-2022-36109	995	github.com/docker/docker		Medium	Low
CVE-2024-45341	140	git-lfs podman-remote stdlib		Low	Low
CVE-2023-25173	842	github.com/containerd/containerd		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-13176	136	openssl openssl-libs		Low	Low
CVE-2022-41724	842	git-lfs		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2021-41089	1341	github.com/docker/docker		Low	Moderate
CVE-2023-25809	800	github.com/opencontainers/runc		Low	Moderate
CVE-2022-4123	927	podman-remote		Low	Low
CVE-2024-24789	367	stdlib		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2023-28642	800	github.com/opencontainers/runc		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-22870	85	git-lfs golang.org/x/net podman-remote		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-22866	119	git-lfs podman-remote stdlib		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-40635	80	github.com/containerd/containerd		Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-51744	213	github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4		Low	Low
CVE-2024-45310	275	github.com/opencontainers/runc		Medium	Low
GHSA-7ww5-4wqc-m92c	534	github.com/containerd/containerd		Medium
GHSA-jq35-85cj-fj4p	584	github.com/docker/docker		Medium
GHSA-xmmx-7jpf-fx42	360	github.com/docker/docker		Medium
GHSA-5j5w-g665-5m35	1295	github.com/containerd/containerd		Low
GHSA-c9cp-9c75-9v8c	387	github.com/containerd/containerd		Low
GHSA-vp35-85q5-9f25	938	github.com/docker/docker		Low
GHSA-77vh-xpmg-72qh	1295	github.com/opencontainers/image-spec		Low

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-45337

Description:

Applications and libraries which misuse connection.serverAuthenticate (via callback field ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback) may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key. Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/cry...@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth. Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance.

Locations:

/usr/bin/oc

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-28841

Description:

Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*.
Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.
The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.
When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.
An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation.
Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees.
It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is no longer guaranteed.
Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.
Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.

Locations:

/usr/bin/oc

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-28842

Description:

Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*.
Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.
The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.
When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.
The `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate.
Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration.
Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.
Some workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.

Locations:

/usr/bin/oc

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-28840

Description:

Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*.
Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.
The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.
When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.
Two iptables rules serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded.
The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network.
Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.
Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.

Locations:

/usr/bin/oc

References:

Security Advisory: GHSA-mq39-4gv4-mvpx

Description:

Moby's external DNS requests from 'internal' networks could lead to data exfiltration

Moby is an open source container framework originally developed by Docker Inc. as Docker. It is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. As a batteries-included container runtime, Moby comes with a built-in networking implementation that enables communication between containers, and between containers and external resources.

Moby's networking implementation allows for creating and using many networks, each with their own subnet and gateway. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters, and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the --internal flag is used to designate a network as internal. The internal attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network internal, and other API clients may specify the internal parameter as well.

When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses (typically from a non-routable RFC 1918 subnet). The root network namespace (hereafter referred to as the 'host') serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs.

Containers on an internal network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly.

In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking, dockerd directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery (looking up other containers on the network by name), and resolution of names from an upstream resolver.

When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver (by default, the host's configured resolver). This request is made from the container network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself.

As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to internal network(s) will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved.

Many systems will run a local forwarding DNS resolver, typically present on a loopback address (127.0.0.0/8), such as systemd-resolved or dnsmasq. Common loopback address examples include 127.0.0.1 or 127.0.0.53. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device.

To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address, dockerd will detect this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host/root network namespace. The loopback resolver will then forward the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected.

Impact

Because dockerd will forward DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, internal networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver.

By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. For example, if the domain evil.example was registered, the authoritative nameserver(s) for that domain could (eventually and indirectly) receive a request for this-is-a-secret.evil.example.

Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address.

Patches

Moby releases 26.0.0-rc3, 25.0.5 (released) and 23.0.11 (to be released) are patched to prevent forwarding DNS requests from internal networks.

Workarounds

Run containers intended to be solely attached to internal networks with a custom upstream address (--dns argument to docker run, or API equivalent), which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container network namespace.

Background

yair zak originally reported this issue to the Docker security team.
PR https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/46609 was opened in public to fix this issue, as it was not originally considered to have a security implication.
The official documentation claims that "the --internal flag that will completely isolate containers on a network from any communications external to that network," which necessitated this advisory and CVE.

Locations:

/usr/bin/oc

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-24536

Description:

Multipart form parsing can consume large amounts of CPU and memory when processing form inputs containing very large numbers of parts. This stems from several causes: 1. mime/multipart.Reader.ReadForm limits the total memory a parsed multipart form can consume. ReadForm can undercount the amount of memory consumed, leading it to accept larger inputs than intended. 2. Limiting total memory does not account for increased pressure on the garbage collector from large numbers of small allocations in forms with many parts. 3. ReadForm can allocate a large number of short-lived buffers, further increasing pressure on the garbage collector. The combination of these factors can permit an attacker to cause an program that parses multipart forms to consume large amounts of CPU and memory, potentially resulting in a denial of service. This affects programs that use mime/multipart.Reader.ReadForm, as well as form parsing in the net/http package with the Request methods FormFile, FormValue, ParseMultipartForm, and PostFormValue. With fix, ReadForm now does a better job of estimating the memory consumption of parsed forms, and performs many fewer short-lived allocations. In addition, the fixed mime/multipart.Reader imposes the following limits on the size of parsed forms: 1. Forms parsed with ReadForm may contain no more than 1000 parts. This limit may be adjusted with the environment variable GODEBUG=multipartmaxparts=. 2. Form parts parsed with NextPart and NextRawPart may contain no more than 10,000 header fields. In addition, forms parsed with ReadForm may contain no more than 10,000 header fields across all parts. This limit may be adjusted with the environment variable GODEBUG=multipartmaxheaders=.

Locations:

git-lfs-3.4.1-4.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-41725

Description:

A denial of service is possible from excessive resource consumption in net/http and mime/multipart. Multipart form parsing with mime/multipart.Reader.ReadForm can consume largely unlimited amounts of memory and disk files. This also affects form parsing in the net/http package with the Request methods FormFile, FormValue, ParseMultipartForm, and PostFormValue. ReadForm takes a maxMemory parameter, and is documented as storing "up to maxMemory bytes +10MB (reserved for non-file parts) in memory". File parts which cannot be stored in memory are stored on disk in temporary files. The unconfigurable 10MB reserved for non-file parts is excessively large and can potentially open a denial of service vector on its own. However, ReadForm did not properly account for all memory consumed by a parsed form, such as map entry overhead, part names, and MIME headers, permitting a maliciously crafted form to consume well over 10MB. In addition, ReadForm contained no limit on the number of disk files created, permitting a relatively small request body to create a large number of disk temporary files. With fix, ReadForm now properly accounts for various forms of memory overhead, and should now stay within its documented limit of 10MB + maxMemory bytes of memory consumption. Users should still be aware that this limit is high and may still be hazardous. In addition, ReadForm now creates at most one on-disk temporary file, combining multiple form parts into a single temporary file. The mime/multipart.File interface type's documentation states, "If stored on disk, the File's underlying concrete type will be an *os.File.". This is no longer the case when a form contains more than one file part, due to this coalescing of parts into a single file. The previous behavior of using distinct files for each form part may be reenabled with the environment variable GODEBUG=multipartfiles=distinct. Users should be aware that multipart.ReadForm and the http.Request methods that call it do not limit the amount of disk consumed by temporary files. Callers can limit the size of form data with http.MaxBytesReader.

Locations:

git-lfs-3.4.1-4.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-45310

Description:

runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. runc 1.1.13 and earlier, as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier, can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host filesystem by sharing a volume between two containers and exploiting a race with `os.MkdirAll`. While this could be used to create empty files, existing files would not be truncated. An attacker must have the ability to start containers using some kind of custom volume configuration. Containers using user namespaces are still affected, but the scope of places an attacker can create inodes can be significantly reduced. Sufficiently strict LSM policies (SELinux/Apparmor) can also in principle block this attack -- we suspect the industry standard SELinux policy may restrict this attack's scope but the exact scope of protection hasn't been analysed. This is exploitable using runc directly as well as through Docker and Kubernetes. The issue is fixed in runc v1.1.14 and v1.2.0-rc3.
Some workarounds are available. Using user namespaces restricts this attack fairly significantly such that the attacker can only create inodes in directories that the remapped root user/group has write access to. Unless the root user is remapped to an actual
user on the host (such as with rootless containers that don't use `/etc/sub[ug]id`), this in practice means that an attacker would only be able to create inodes in world-writable directories. A strict enough SELinux or AppArmor policy could in principle also restrict the scope if a specific label is applied to the runc runtime, though neither the extent to which the standard existing policies block this attack nor what exact policies are needed to sufficiently restrict this attack have been thoroughly tested.

Locations:

/usr/bin/oc

References:

Security Advisory: GHSA-7ww5-4wqc-m92c

Description:

containerd allows RAPL to be accessible to a container

/sys/devices/virtual/powercap accessible by default to containers

Intel's RAPL (Running Average Power Limit) feature, introduced by the Sandy Bridge microarchitecture, provides software insights into hardware energy consumption. To facilitate this, Intel introduced the powercap framework in Linux kernel 3.13, which reads values via relevant MSRs (model specific registers) and provides unprivileged userspace access via sysfs. As RAPL is an interface to access a hardware feature, it is only available when running on bare metal with the module compiled into the kernel.

By 2019, it was realized that in some cases unprivileged access to RAPL readings could be exploited as a power-based side-channel against security features including AES-NI (potentially inside a SGX enclave) and KASLR (kernel address space layout randomization). Also known as the PLATYPUS attack, Intel assigned CVE-2020-8694 and CVE-2020-8695, and AMD assigned CVE-2020-12912.

Several mitigations were applied; Intel reduced the sampling resolution via a microcode update, and the Linux kernel prevents access by non-root users since 5.10. However, this kernel-based mitigation does not apply to many container-based scenarios: * Unless using user namespaces, root inside a container has the same level of privilege as root outside the container, but with a slightly more narrow view of the system * sysfs is mounted inside containers read-only; however only read access is needed to carry out this attack on an unpatched CPU

While this is not a direct vulnerability in container runtimes, defense in depth and safe defaults are valuable and preferred, especially as this poses a risk to multi-tenant container environments. This is provided by masking /sys/devices/virtual/powercap in the default mount configuration, and adding an additional set of rules to deny it in the default AppArmor profile.

While sysfs is not the only way to read from the RAPL subsystem, other ways of accessing it require additional capabilities such as CAP_SYS_RAWIO which is not available to containers by default, or perf paranoia level less than 1, which is a non-default kernel tunable.

References

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8694
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8695
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-12912
https://platypusattack.com/
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=949dd0104c496fa7c14991a23c03c62e44637e71
https://web.eece.maine.edu/~vweaver/projects/rapl/

Locations:

/usr/bin/oc

References:

Security Advisory: GHSA-jq35-85cj-fj4p

Description:

/sys/devices/virtual/powercap accessible by default to containers

While this is not a direct vulnerability in container runtimes, defense in depth and safe defaults are valuable and preferred, especially as this poses a risk to multi-tenant container environments running directly on affected hardware. This is provided by masking /sys/devices/virtual/powercap in the default mount configuration, and adding an additional set of rules to deny it in the default AppArmor profile.

References

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8694
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8695
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-12912
https://platypusattack.com/
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=949dd0104c496fa7c14991a23c03c62e44637e71
https://web.eece.maine.edu/~vweaver/projects/rapl/

Locations:

/usr/bin/oc

References:

Security Advisory: GHSA-c9cp-9c75-9v8c

Description:

containerd started with non-empty inheritable Linux process capabilities

Impact

A bug was found in containerd where containers were incorrectly started with non-empty inheritable Linux process capabilities, creating an atypical Linux environment and enabling programs with inheritable file capabilities to elevate those capabilities to the permitted set during execve(2). Normally, when executable programs have specified permitted file capabilities, otherwise unprivileged users and processes can execute those programs and gain the specified file capabilities up to the bounding set. Due to this bug, containers which included executable programs with inheritable file capabilities allowed otherwise unprivileged users and processes to additionally gain these inheritable file capabilities up to the container's bounding set. Containers which use Linux users and groups to perform privilege separation inside the container are most directly impacted.

This bug did not affect the container security sandbox as the inheritable set never contained more capabilities than were included in the container's bounding set.

Patches

This bug has been fixed in containerd 1.5.11 and 1.6.2. Users should update to these versions as soon as possible. Running containers should be stopped, deleted, and recreated for the inheritable capabilities to be reset.

This fix changes containerd behavior such that containers are started with a more typical Linux environment. Refer to capabilities(7) for a description of how capabilities work. Note that permitted file capabilities continue to allow for privileges to be raised up to the container's bounding set and that processes may add capabilities to their own inheritable set up to the container's bounding set per the rules described in the manual page. In all cases the container's bounding set provides an upper bound on the capabilities that can be assumed and provides for the container security sandbox.

Workarounds

The entrypoint of a container can be modified to use a utility like capsh(1) to drop inheritable capabilities prior to the primary process starting.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Open an issue
Email us at security@containerd.io if you think you’ve found a security bug

Locations:

/usr/bin/oc

References:

Security Advisory: GHSA-vp35-85q5-9f25

Description:

Container build can leak any path on the host into the container

Description

Moby is the open source Linux container runtime and set of components used to build a variety of downstream container runtimes, including Docker CE, Mirantis Container Runtime (formerly Docker EE), and Docker Desktop. Moby allows for building container images using a set of build instructions (usually named and referred to as a "Dockerfile"), and a build context, which is not unlike the CWD in which the Dockerfile instructions are executed.

Containers may be built using a variety of tools and build backends available in the Moby ecosystem; in all cases, builds may not include files outside of the build context (such as using absolute or relative-parent paths). This is enforced through both checks in the build backends, and the containerization of the build process itself.

Versions of Git where CVE-2022-39253 is present and exploited by a malicious repository, when used in combination with Moby, are subject to an unexpected inclusion of arbitrary filesystem paths in the build context, without any visible warning to the user.

This issue was originally reported by Wenxiang Qian of Tencent Blade Team, and the root-cause analysis was performed by Cory Snider of Mirantis, with assistance from Bjorn Neergaard of the same. The issue was then reported to the Git project, and Taylor Blau led the process resolving the root issue in Git.

Impact

This vulnerability originates in Git, but can be used to violate assumptions that may have security implications for users of Moby and related components. Users may rely on the fact that a build context ensures that outside files cannot be referenced or incorporated using multiple enforcement mechanisms, or expect a warning if this does not hold true. A maliciously crafted Git repository exploiting CVE-2022-39253 can violate this assumption, and potentially include sensitive files that are subsequently uploaded to a container image repository, or disclosed by code inside the resulting container image.

As this issue cannot be triggered remotely, except by users who already have full control over the daemon through the API, and it requires exploiting a vulnerability in Git by convincing a user to build a maliciously crafted repository, the impact in Moby is considered low.

Patches

Moby 20.10.20, and Mirantis Container Runtime (formerly Docker Enterprise Edition) 20.10.14 will contain mitigations for CVE-2022-39253 when a Git clone is performed by Moby components (on either the daemon or API client side). However, as these mitigations only apply to certain scenarios (build of git+<protocol>://... URL contexts) and cannot protect against a malicious repository already on disk, users should update to a version of Git containing patches for CVE-2022-39253 on all their systems running both API clients and daemons.

Specifically, patches in Moby (including patches incorporated from BuildKit) protect against the following:

docker build with the legacy builder (e.g. DOCKER_BUILDKIT unset or set to 0) of a Git URL context. Note that depending on available API versions and the CLI version, the Git clone operation can take place on either the client or the daemon side. Both must be updated (or have Git updated) to fully protect this build method.
docker build with the BuildKit builder (e.g. DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1) of a Git URL context.
docker buildx build with BUILDKIT_CONTEXT_KEEP_GIT_DIR=1 of a Git URL context.

Patches in BuildKit incorporated into Docker Compose protect against CVE-2022-39253 during Compose-driven builds of Git URL contexts.

Patches in Moby and related projects such as BuildKit, the Docker CLI, and Docker Compose cannot fully protect against CVE-2022-39253, as it may be triggered by a malicious repository already on disk that a unpatched Git client has interacted with (specifically, commands that check out submodules such as git clone --recursive, git submodule update, etc. may have already triggered the Git vulnerability).

Workarounds

While this behavior is unexpected and undesirable, and has resulted in this security advisory, users should keep in mind that building a container entails arbitrary code execution. Users should not build a repository/build context they do not trust, as containerization cannot protect against all possible attacks.

When building with BuildKit (e.g. docker buildx build or docker build with DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1), this issue cannot be exploited unless --build-arg BUILDKIT_CONTEXT_KEEP_GIT_DIR=1 was also passed, as by default BuildKit will discard the .git directory of a Git URL context immediately after cloning and checking out the repository.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Open an issue
Email us at security@docker.com

Locations:

/usr/bin/oc