scandy

ID	Age	Component	Trivy Severity	Grype Severity	Red Hat Severity	Scandy Opinion
CVE-2025-22077	9	kernel-headers	High		Important	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22056	9	kernel-headers	High		Important	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21927	24	kernel-headers	High		Important	Ignorable
CVE-2024-41091	274	kernel-headers	High		Important	Ignorable
CVE-2024-41090	274	kernel-headers	High		Important	Ignorable
CVE-2024-41071	270	kernel-headers	High		Important	Ignorable
CVE-2022-49657	58	kernel-headers	High		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2022-49611	58	kernel-headers	High		Important	Ignorable
CVE-2025-39989	7	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-39688	7	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-37860	7	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-37785	7	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-32728	15	openssh openssh-clients	Medium	Medium	Moderate	Removable
CVE-2025-32414	17	libxml2	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-29768	42	vim-filesystem vim-minimal	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-29481	18	libbpf	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-26465	67	openssh openssh-clients	Medium	Medium	Moderate	Removable
CVE-2025-25724	54	bsdtar libarchive	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-24528	453	krb5-libs	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-23138	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-23137	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-23136	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-23134	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-23133	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-23132	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-23131	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22126	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22125	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22124	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22121	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22117	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22113	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22106	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22104	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22097	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22090	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22085	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22075	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22063	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22058	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22057	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22055	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22053	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22050	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22044	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22029	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22026	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22023	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22021	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22020	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22017	17	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22016	17	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22015	17	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22013	17	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22005	22	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21999	22	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21997	22	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21993	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21991	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21986	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21980	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21979	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21975	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21974	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21973	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21971	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21970	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21969	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21966	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21964	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21963	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21962	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21961	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21959	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21951	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21948	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21938	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21936	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21929	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21928	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21926	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21920	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21919	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21908	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21905	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21900	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21899	24	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21892	29	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21890	29	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21887	29	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21886	29	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21885	29	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21883	29	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21875	29	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21874	29	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21864	44	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21863	44	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21862	44	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21861	44	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21858	44	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21857	44	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21856	44	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21855	44	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21854	44	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21853	44	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21852	44	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21848	44	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21846	44	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21844	44	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21839	49	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21838	49	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21837	49	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21836	49	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21828	50	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21826	50	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21817	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21816	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21815	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21814	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21809	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21806	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21796	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21795	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21791	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21790	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21787	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21786	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21772	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21768	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21767	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21766	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21765	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21764	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21763	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21762	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21761	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21760	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21759	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21758	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21756	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21750	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21746	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21745	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21739	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21738	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21732	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21731	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21729	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21728	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21726	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21725	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21724	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21714	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21712	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21709	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21707	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21706	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21705	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21704	62	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21702	66	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21700	71	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21699	72	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21696	72	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21693	74	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21692	74	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21691	74	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21689	74	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21683	84	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21682	84	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21681	84	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21673	84	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21672	84	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21671	84	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21670	84	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21669	84	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21668	84	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21666	84	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21664	94	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21659	94	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21653	96	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21649	96	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21648	96	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21647	96	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21646	96	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21633	96	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21631	96	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-3576	10	krb5-libs	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-2312	165	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-0938	83	python3 python3-libs	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-0395	92	glibc glibc-common glibc-devel glibc-headers glibc-langpack-en glibc-locale-source glibc-minimal-langpack	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-58097	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58096	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58093	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58092	9	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58088	44	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58083	50	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58077	50	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58075	50	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58074	50	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58072	50	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58071	50	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58069	50	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58064	50	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58062	50	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58061	50	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58060	50	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58057	50	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58053	50	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58017	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58015	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58014	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58013	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58007	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58005	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57998	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57996	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57995	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57993	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57990	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57989	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57988	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57987	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57986	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57985	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57982	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57981	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57980	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57979	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57977	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57974	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57951	72	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57948	84	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57946	94	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57940	94	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57938	94	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57932	94	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57929	96	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57924	96	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57903	100	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57898	100	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57894	100	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57890	100	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57888	100	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57884	100	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57882	100	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57879	104	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57875	104	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57849	104	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57843	104	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57809	104	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57798	104	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57795	100	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57793	104	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57791	104	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56786	107	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56783	107	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56779	107	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56772	107	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56770	107	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56765	109	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56763	109	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56760	109	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56757	109	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56751	117	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56739	117	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56729	117	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56727	117	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56726	117	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56725	117	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56718	117	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56716	117	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56709	117	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56703	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56693	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56690	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56688	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56679	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56678	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56677	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56675	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56667	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56664	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56663	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56662	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56658	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56654	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56648	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56647	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56645	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56644	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56642	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56640	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56638	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56637	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56636	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56633	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56623	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56616	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56615	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56614	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56611	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56609	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56606	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56605	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56604	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56603	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56602	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56601	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56600	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56591	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56590	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56589	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56570	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56569	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56566	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56562	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56558	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56551	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56544	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56535	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56369	104	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-55642	104	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-54683	104	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-54680	104	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-54460	104	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-54456	57	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53920	149	emacs-filesystem	Medium	Medium	Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53681	100	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53680	104	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53241	128	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53240	128	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53239	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53237	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53236	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53229	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53224	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53222	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53219	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53216	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53213	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53209	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53208	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53207	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53206	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53203	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53196	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53195	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53194	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53190	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53185	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53179	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53178	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53177	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53176	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53174	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53173	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53170	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53169	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53168	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53167	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53166	119	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53160	122	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53156	122	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53152	122	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53147	122	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53146	122	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53144	129	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53142	140	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53141	140	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53140	142	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53138	142	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53136	142	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53135	142	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53134	142	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53124	144	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53123	144	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53121	144	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53120	144	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53119	144	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53118	144	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53117	144	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53114	144	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53110	144	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53109	144	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53105	144	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53103	144	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53102	151	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53100	151	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53099	151	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53096	151	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53095	155	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53093	155	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53091	155	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53090	155	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53085	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53082	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53079	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53074	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53073	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53070	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53066	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53060	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53059	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53057	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53055	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53054	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53052	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53050	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53048	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53045	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53044	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53042	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-52533	165	glib2	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-52332	104	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-52005	99	git git-core git-core-doc perl-Git	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-50304	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50303	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50301	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50299	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50294	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50282	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50279	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50278	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50277	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50274	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50272	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50271	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50268	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50267	157	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50261	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50259	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50258	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50256	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50250	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50237	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50236	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50235	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50228	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50219	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50216	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50215	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50209	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50207	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50200	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50199	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50197	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50195	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50191	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50189	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50186	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50185	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50183	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50182	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50179	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50172	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50169	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50167	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50165	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50164	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50162	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50160	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50158	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50157	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50155	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50153	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50152	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50151	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50150	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50147	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50146	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50145	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50143	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50141	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50139	169	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50136	171	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50135	171	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50131	171	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50128	171	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50127	171	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50126	171	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50121	171	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50117	171	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50114	171	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50109	171	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50106	171	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50102	171	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50095	171	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50083	178	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50081	178	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50078	178	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50077	178	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50076	178	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50075	178	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50074	178	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50073	178	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50067	179	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50064	186	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50063	186	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50060	186	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50058	186	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-22077

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

No description is available for this CVE.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-22015

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/migrate: fix shmem xarray update during migration
A shmem folio can be either in page cache or in swap cache, but not at the
same time. Namely, once it is in swap cache, folio->mapping should be
NULL, and the folio is no longer in a shmem mapping.
In __folio_migrate_mapping(), to determine the number of xarray entries to
update, folio_test_swapbacked() is used, but that conflates shmem in page
cache case and shmem in swap cache case. It leads to xarray multi-index
entry corruption, since it turns a sibling entry to a normal entry during
xas_store() (see [1] for a userspace reproduction). Fix it by only using
folio_test_swapcache() to determine whether xarray is storing swap cache
entries or not to choose the right number of xarray entries to update.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/Z8idPCkaJW1IChjT@casper.infradead.org/
Note:
In __split_huge_page(), folio_test_anon() && folio_test_swapcache() is
used to get swap_cache address space, but that ignores the shmem folio in
swap cache case. It could lead to NULL pointer dereferencing when a
in-swap-cache shmem folio is split at __xa_store(), since
!folio_test_anon() is true and folio->mapping is NULL. But fortunately,
its caller split_huge_page_to_list_to_order() bails out early with EBUSY
when folio->mapping is NULL. So no need to take care of it here.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-22013

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Unconditionally save+flush host FPSIMD/SVE/SME state
There are several problems with the way hyp code lazily saves the host's
FPSIMD/SVE state, including:
* Host SVE being discarded unexpectedly due to inconsistent
configuration of TIF_SVE and CPACR_ELx.ZEN. This has been seen to
result in QEMU crashes where SVE is used by memmove(), as reported by
Eric Auger:
https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-68997
* Host SVE state is discarded *after* modification by ptrace, which was an
unintentional ptrace ABI change introduced with lazy discarding of SVE state.
* The host FPMR value can be discarded when running a non-protected VM,
where FPMR support is not exposed to a VM, and that VM uses
FPSIMD/SVE. In these cases the hyp code does not save the host's FPMR
before unbinding the host's FPSIMD/SVE/SME state, leaving a stale
value in memory.
Avoid these by eagerly saving and "flushing" the host's FPSIMD/SVE/SME
state when loading a vCPU such that KVM does not need to save any of the
host's FPSIMD/SVE/SME state. For clarity, fpsimd_kvm_prepare() is
removed and the necessary call to fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state() is
placed in kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(). As 'fpsimd_state' and 'fpmr_ptr'
should not be used, they are set to NULL; all uses of these will be
removed in subsequent patches.
Historical problems go back at least as far as v5.17, e.g. erroneous
assumptions about TIF_SVE being clear in commit:
8383741ab2e773a9 ("KVM: arm64: Get rid of host SVE tracking/saving")
... and so this eager save+flush probably needs to be backported to ALL
stable trees.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21999

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
proc: fix UAF in proc_get_inode()
Fix race between rmmod and /proc/XXX's inode instantiation.
The bug is that pde->proc_ops don't belong to /proc, it belongs to a
module, therefore dereferencing it after /proc entry has been registered
is a bug unless use_pde/unuse_pde() pair has been used.
use_pde/unuse_pde can be avoided (2 atomic ops!) because pde->proc_ops
never changes so information necessary for inode instantiation can be
saved _before_ proc_register() in PDE itself and used later, avoiding
pde->proc_ops->... dereference.
rmmod lookup
sys_delete_module
proc_lookup_de
pde_get(de);
proc_get_inode(dir->i_sb, de);
mod->exit()
proc_remove
remove_proc_subtree
proc_entry_rundown(de);
free_module(mod);
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
if (de->proc_ops->proc_read_iter)
--> As module is already freed, will trigger UAF
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff80a702b
PGD 817fc4067 P4D 817fc4067 PUD 817fc0067 PMD 102ef4067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 2667 Comm: ls Tainted: G
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:proc_get_inode+0x302/0x6e0
RSP: 0018:ffff88811c837998 EFLAGS: 00010a06
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0538140 RCX: 0000000000000007
RDX: 1ffffffff80a702b RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffc0538158
RBP: ffff8881299a6000 R08: 0000000067bbe1e5 R09: 1ffff11023906f20
R10: ffffffffb560ca07 R11: ffffffffb2b43a58 R12: ffff888105bb78f0
R13: ffff888100518048 R14: ffff8881299a6004 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f95b9686840(0000) GS:ffff8883af100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: fffffbfff80a702b CR3: 0000000117dd2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
proc_lookup_de+0x11f/0x2e0
__lookup_slow+0x188/0x350
walk_component+0x2ab/0x4f0
path_lookupat+0x120/0x660
filename_lookup+0x1ce/0x560
vfs_statx+0xac/0x150
__do_sys_newstat+0x96/0x110
do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[adobriyan@gmail.com: don't do 2 atomic ops on the common path]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21991

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/microcode/AMD: Fix out-of-bounds on systems with CPU-less NUMA nodes
Currently, load_microcode_amd() iterates over all NUMA nodes, retrieves their
CPU masks and unconditionally accesses per-CPU data for the first CPU of each
mask.
According to Documentation/admin-guide/mm/numaperf.rst:
"Some memory may share the same node as a CPU, and others are provided as
memory only nodes."
Therefore, some node CPU masks may be empty and wouldn't have a "first CPU".
On a machine with far memory (and therefore CPU-less NUMA nodes):
- cpumask_of_node(nid) is 0
- cpumask_first(0) is CONFIG_NR_CPUS
- cpu_data(CONFIG_NR_CPUS) accesses the cpu_info per-CPU array at an
index that is 1 out of bounds
This does not have any security implications since flashing microcode is
a privileged operation but I believe this has reliability implications by
potentially corrupting memory while flashing a microcode update.
When booting with CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y on an AMD machine that flashes
a microcode update. I get the following splat:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c:X:Y
index 512 is out of range for type 'unsigned long[512]'
[...]
Call Trace:
dump_stack
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds
load_microcode_amd
request_microcode_amd
reload_store
kernfs_fop_write_iter
vfs_write
ksys_write
do_syscall_64
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
Change the loop to go over only NUMA nodes which have CPUs before determining
whether the first CPU on the respective node needs microcode update.
[ bp: Massage commit message, fix typo. ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21986

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: switchdev: Convert blocking notification chain to a raw one
A blocking notification chain uses a read-write semaphore to protect the
integrity of the chain. The semaphore is acquired for writing when
adding / removing notifiers to / from the chain and acquired for reading
when traversing the chain and informing notifiers about an event.
In case of the blocking switchdev notification chain, recursive
notifications are possible which leads to the semaphore being acquired
twice for reading and to lockdep warnings being generated [1].
Specifically, this can happen when the bridge driver processes a
SWITCHDEV_BRPORT_UNOFFLOADED event which causes it to emit notifications
about deferred events when calling switchdev_deferred_process().
Fix this by converting the notification chain to a raw notification
chain in a similar fashion to the netdev notification chain. Protect
the chain using the RTNL mutex by acquiring it when modifying the chain.
Events are always informed under the RTNL mutex, but add an assertion in
call_switchdev_blocking_notifiers() to make sure this is not violated in
the future.
Maintain the "blocking" prefix as events are always emitted from process
context and listeners are allowed to block.
[1]:
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.14.0-rc4-custom-g079270089484 #1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
ip/52731 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem);
lock((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
3 locks held by ip/52731:
#0: ffffffff84f795b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x727/0x1dc0
#1: ffffffff8731f628 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x790/0x1dc0
#2: ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0
stack backtrace:
...
? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_switchdev_port_attr_set_deferred+0x10/0x10
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0
switchdev_port_attr_notify.constprop.0+0xb3/0x1b0
? __pfx_switchdev_port_attr_notify.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0
? switchdev_deferred_process+0x11a/0x340
switchdev_port_attr_set_deferred+0x27/0xd0
switchdev_deferred_process+0x164/0x340
br_switchdev_port_unoffload+0xc8/0x100 [bridge]
br_switchdev_blocking_event+0x29f/0x580 [bridge]
notifier_call_chain+0xa2/0x440
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6e/0xa0
switchdev_bridge_port_unoffload+0xde/0x1a0
...

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21974

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: bnxt: return fail if interface is down in bnxt_queue_mem_alloc()
The bnxt_queue_mem_alloc() is called to allocate new queue memory when
a queue is restarted.
It internally accesses rx buffer descriptor corresponding to the index.
The rx buffer descriptor is allocated and set when the interface is up
and it's freed when the interface is down.
So, if queue is restarted if interface is down, kernel panic occurs.
Splat looks like:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000000000b240
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 1563 Comm: ncdevmem2 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2+ #9 844ddba6e7c459cafd0bf4db9a3198e
Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021
RIP: 0010:bnxt_queue_mem_alloc+0x3f/0x4e0 [bnxt_en]
Code: 41 54 4d 89 c4 4d 69 c0 c0 05 00 00 55 48 89 f5 53 48 89 fb 4c 8d b5 40 05 00 00 48 83 ec 15
RSP: 0018:ffff9dcc83fef9e8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffffffffc0457720 RBX: ffff934ed8d40000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 000000000000001f RSI: ffff934ea508f800 RDI: ffff934ea508f808
RBP: ffff934ea508f800 R08: 000000000000b240 R09: ffff934e84f4b000
R10: ffff9dcc83fefa30 R11: ffff934e84f4b000 R12: 000000000000001f
R13: ffff934ed8d40ac0 R14: ffff934ea508fd40 R15: ffff934e84f4b000
FS: 00007fa73888c740(0000) GS:ffff93559f780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000b240 CR3: 0000000145a2e000 CR4: 00000000007506f0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x20/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x460
? exc_page_fault+0x6e/0x180
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? __pfx_bnxt_queue_mem_alloc+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en 7f85e76f4d724ba07471d7e39d9e773aea6597b7]
? bnxt_queue_mem_alloc+0x3f/0x4e0 [bnxt_en 7f85e76f4d724ba07471d7e39d9e773aea6597b7]
netdev_rx_queue_restart+0xc5/0x240
net_devmem_bind_dmabuf_to_queue+0xf8/0x200
netdev_nl_bind_rx_doit+0x3a7/0x450
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd9/0x130
genl_rcv_msg+0x184/0x2b0
? __pfx_netdev_nl_bind_rx_doit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
...

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21973

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: bnxt: fix kernel panic in the bnxt_get_queue_stats{rx | tx}
When qstats-get operation is executed, callbacks of netdev_stats_ops
are called. The bnxt_get_queue_stats{rx | tx} collect per-queue stats
from sw_stats in the rings.
But {rx | tx | cp}_ring are allocated when the interface is up.
So, these rings are not allocated when the interface is down.
The qstats-get is allowed even if the interface is down. However,
the bnxt_get_queue_stats{rx | tx}() accesses cp_ring and tx_ring
without null check.
So, it needs to avoid accessing rings if the interface is down.
Reproducer:
ip link set $interface down
./cli.py --spec netdev.yaml --dump qstats-get
OR
ip link set $interface down
python ./stats.py
Splat looks like:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 1680fa067 P4D 1680fa067 PUD 16be3b067 PMD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1495 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc4+ #32 5cd0f999d5a15c574ac72b3e4b907341
Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021
RIP: 0010:bnxt_get_queue_stats_rx+0xf/0x70 [bnxt_en]
Code: c6 87 b5 18 00 00 02 eb a2 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 01
RSP: 0018:ffffabef43cdb7e0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc04c8710 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffffabef43cdb858 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8d504e850000
RBP: ffff8d506c9f9c00 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: ffff8d506bcd901c
R10: 0000000000000015 R11: ffff8d506bcd9000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffabef43cdb8c0 R14: ffff8d504e850000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f2c5462b080(0000) GS:ffff8d575f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000167fd0000 CR4: 00000000007506f0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x20/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x460
? sched_balance_find_src_group+0x58d/0xd10
? exc_page_fault+0x6e/0x180
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? bnxt_get_queue_stats_rx+0xf/0x70 [bnxt_en cdd546fd48563c280cfd30e9647efa420db07bf1]
netdev_nl_stats_by_netdev+0x2b1/0x4e0
? xas_load+0x9/0xb0
? xas_find+0x183/0x1d0
? xa_find+0x8b/0xe0
netdev_nl_qstats_get_dumpit+0xbf/0x1e0
genl_dumpit+0x31/0x90
netlink_dump+0x1a8/0x360

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21970

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Bridge, fix the crash caused by LAG state check
When removing LAG device from bridge, NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER event is
triggered. Driver finds the lower devices (PFs) to flush all the
offloaded entries. And mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb is checked, it returns
false if one of PF is unloaded. In such case,
mlx5_esw_bridge_lag_rep_get() and its caller return NULL, instead of
the alive PF, and the flush is skipped.
Besides, the bridge fdb entry's lastuse is updated in mlx5 bridge
event handler. But this SWITCHDEV_FDB_ADD_TO_BRIDGE event can be
ignored in this case because the upper interface for bond is deleted,
and the entry will never be aged because lastuse is never updated.
To make things worse, as the entry is alive, mlx5 bridge workqueue
keeps sending that event, which is then handled by kernel bridge
notifier. It causes the following crash when accessing the passed bond
netdev which is already destroyed.
To fix this issue, remove such checks. LAG state is already checked in
commit 15f8f168952f ("net/mlx5: Bridge, verify LAG state when adding
bond to bridge"), driver still need to skip offload if LAG becomes
invalid state after initialization.
Oops: stack segment: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 23695 Comm: kworker/u40:3 Tainted: G OE 6.11.0_mlnx #1
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: mlx5_bridge_wq mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work [mlx5_core]
RIP: 0010:br_switchdev_event+0x2c/0x110 [bridge]
Code: 44 00 00 48 8b 02 48 f7 00 00 02 00 00 74 69 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08 48 8b a8 08 01 00 00 48 85 ed 74 4a 48 83 fe 02 48 89 d3 <4c> 8b 65 00 74 23 76 49 48 83 fe 05 74 7e 48 83 fe 06 75 2f 0f b7
RSP: 0018:ffffc900092cfda0 EFLAGS: 00010297
RAX: ffff888123bfe000 RBX: ffffc900092cfe08 RCX: 00000000ffffffff
RDX: ffffc900092cfe08 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffa0c585f0
RBP: 6669746f6e690a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888123ae92c8
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff888123ae9c60
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffc900092cfe08 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88852c980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f15914c8734 CR3: 0000000002830005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0x1a/0x60
? die+0x38/0x60
? do_trap+0x10b/0x120
? do_error_trap+0x64/0xa0
? exc_stack_segment+0x33/0x50
? asm_exc_stack_segment+0x22/0x30
? br_switchdev_event+0x2c/0x110 [bridge]
? sched_balance_newidle.isra.149+0x248/0x390
notifier_call_chain+0x4b/0xa0
atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20
mlx5_esw_bridge_update+0xec/0x170 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work+0x19/0x40 [mlx5_core]
process_scheduled_works+0x81/0x390
worker_thread+0x106/0x250
? bh_worker+0x110/0x110
kthread+0xb7/0xe0
? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21969

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix slab-use-after-free Read in l2cap_send_cmd
After the hci sync command releases l2cap_conn, the hci receive data work
queue references the released l2cap_conn when sending to the upper layer.
Add hci dev lock to the hci receive data work queue to synchronize the two.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in l2cap_send_cmd+0x187/0x8d0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:954
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880271a4000 by task kworker/u9:2/5837
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5837 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Workqueue: hci1 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602
l2cap_build_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:2964 [inline]
l2cap_send_cmd+0x187/0x8d0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:954
l2cap_sig_send_rej net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5502 [inline]
l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5538 [inline]
l2cap_recv_frame+0x221f/0x10db0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6817
hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3797 [inline]
hci_rx_work+0x508/0xdb0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4040
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa66/0x1840 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Allocated by task 5837:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x243/0x390 mm/slub.c:4329
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:901 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1037 [inline]
l2cap_conn_add+0xa9/0x8e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6860
l2cap_connect_cfm+0x115/0x1090 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7239
hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2057 [inline]
hci_remote_features_evt+0x68e/0xac0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3726
hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7473 [inline]
hci_event_packet+0xac2/0x1540 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7525
hci_rx_work+0x3f3/0xdb0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4035
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa66/0x1840 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
Freed by task 54:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:582
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x59/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2353 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4613 [inline]
kfree+0x196/0x430 mm/slub.c:4761
l2cap_connect_cfm+0xcc/0x1090 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7235
hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2057 [inline]
hci_conn_failed+0x287/0x400 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1266
hci_abort_conn_sync+0x56c/0x11f0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5603
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x22b/0x400 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa66/0x1840 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entr
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21961

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: bnxt: fix truesize for mb-xdp-pass case
When mb-xdp is set and return is XDP_PASS, packet is converted from
xdp_buff to sk_buff with xdp_update_skb_shared_info() in
bnxt_xdp_build_skb().
bnxt_xdp_build_skb() passes incorrect truesize argument to
xdp_update_skb_shared_info().
The truesize is calculated as BNXT_RX_PAGE_SIZE * sinfo->nr_frags but
the skb_shared_info was wiped by napi_build_skb() before.
So it stores sinfo->nr_frags before bnxt_xdp_build_skb() and use it
instead of getting skb_shared_info from xdp_get_shared_info_from_buff().
Splat looks like:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at net/core/skbuff.c:6072 skb_try_coalesce+0x504/0x590
Modules linked in: xt_nat xt_tcpudp veth af_packet xt_conntrack nft_chain_nat xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink xfrm_user xt_addrtype nft_coms
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2+ #3
RIP: 0010:skb_try_coalesce+0x504/0x590
Code: 4b fd ff ff 49 8b 34 24 40 80 e6 40 0f 84 3d fd ff ff 49 8b 74 24 48 40 f6 c6 01 0f 84 2e fd ff ff 48 8d 4e ff e9 25 fd ff ff <0f> 0b e99
RSP: 0018:ffffb62c4120caa8 EFLAGS: 00010287
RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: ffffb62c4120cb14 RCX: 0000000000000ec0
RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffffa06e5d7dc000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: ffffa06e5d7ddec0 R08: ffffa06e6120a800 R09: ffffa06e7a119900
R10: 0000000000002310 R11: ffffa06e5d7dcec0 R12: ffffe4360575f740
R13: ffffe43600000000 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000002
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa0755f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f147b76b0f8 CR3: 00000001615d4000 CR4: 00000000007506f0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? __warn+0x84/0x130
? skb_try_coalesce+0x504/0x590
? report_bug+0x18a/0x1a0
? handle_bug+0x53/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? skb_try_coalesce+0x504/0x590
inet_frag_reasm_finish+0x11f/0x2e0
ip_defrag+0x37a/0x900
ip_local_deliver+0x51/0x120
ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x64/0x70
ip_sublist_rcv+0x179/0x210
ip_list_rcv+0xf9/0x130
How to reproduce:
<Node A>
ip link set $interface1 xdp obj xdp_pass.o
ip link set $interface1 mtu 9000 up
ip a a 10.0.0.1/24 dev $interface1
<Node B>
ip link set $interfac2 mtu 9000 up
ip a a 10.0.0.2/24 dev $interface2
ping 10.0.0.1 -s 65000
Following ping.py patch adds xdp-mb-pass case. so ping.py is going to be
able to reproduce this issue.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21959

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conncount: Fully initialize struct nf_conncount_tuple in insert_tree()
Since commit b36e4523d4d5 ("netfilter: nf_conncount: fix garbage
collection confirm race"), `cpu` and `jiffies32` were introduced to
the struct nf_conncount_tuple.
The commit made nf_conncount_add() initialize `conn->cpu` and
`conn->jiffies32` when allocating the struct.
In contrast, count_tree() was not changed to initialize them.
By commit 34848d5c896e ("netfilter: nf_conncount: Split insert and
traversal"), count_tree() was split and the relevant allocation
code now resides in insert_tree().
Initialize `conn->cpu` and `conn->jiffies32` in insert_tree().
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in find_or_evict net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:117 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __nf_conncount_add+0xd9c/0x2850 net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:143
find_or_evict net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:117 [inline]
__nf_conncount_add+0xd9c/0x2850 net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:143
count_tree net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:438 [inline]
nf_conncount_count+0x82f/0x1e80 net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:521
connlimit_mt+0x7f6/0xbd0 net/netfilter/xt_connlimit.c:72
__nft_match_eval net/netfilter/nft_compat.c:403 [inline]
nft_match_eval+0x1a5/0x300 net/netfilter/nft_compat.c:433
expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:240 [inline]
nft_do_chain+0x426/0x2290 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:288
nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x1a5/0x230 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:23
nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline]
nf_hook_slow+0xf4/0x400 net/netfilter/core.c:626
nf_hook_slow_list+0x24d/0x860 net/netfilter/core.c:663
NF_HOOK_LIST include/linux/netfilter.h:350 [inline]
ip_sublist_rcv+0x17b7/0x17f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:633
ip_list_rcv+0x9ef/0xa40 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:669
__netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5936 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x15c5/0x1670 net/core/dev.c:5983
__netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:6035 [inline]
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1085/0x1700 net/core/dev.c:6126
netif_receive_skb_list+0x5a/0x460 net/core/dev.c:6178
xdp_recv_frames net/bpf/test_run.c:280 [inline]
xdp_test_run_batch net/bpf/test_run.c:361 [inline]
bpf_test_run_xdp_live+0x2e86/0x3480 net/bpf/test_run.c:390
bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xf1d/0x1ae0 net/bpf/test_run.c:1316
bpf_prog_test_run+0x5e5/0xa30 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4407
__sys_bpf+0x6aa/0xd90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5813
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5902 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5900 [inline]
__ia32_sys_bpf+0xa0/0xe0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5900
ia32_sys_call+0x394d/0x4180 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_32.h:358
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0xb0/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:387
do_fast_syscall_32+0x38/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:412
do_SYSENTER_32+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/common.c:450
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4121 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4164 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x915/0xe10 mm/slub.c:4171
insert_tree net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:372 [inline]
count_tree net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:450 [inline]
nf_conncount_count+0x1415/0x1e80 net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:521
connlimit_mt+0x7f6/0xbd0 net/netfilter/xt_connlimit.c:72
__nft_match_eval net/netfilter/nft_compat.c:403 [inline]
nft_match_eval+0x1a5/0x300 net/netfilter/nft_compat.c:433
expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:240 [inline]
nft_do_chain+0x426/0x2290 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:288
nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x1a5/0x230 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:23
nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline]
nf_hook_slow+0xf4/0x400 net/netfilter/core.c:626
nf_hook_slow_list+0x24d/0x860 net/netfilter/core.c:663
NF_HOOK_LIST include/linux/netfilter.h:350 [inline]
ip_sublist_rcv+0x17b7/0x17f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:633
ip_list_rcv+0x9ef/0xa40 net/ip
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21951

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bus: mhi: host: pci_generic: Use pci_try_reset_function() to avoid deadlock
There are multiple places from where the recovery work gets scheduled
asynchronously. Also, there are multiple places where the caller waits
synchronously for the recovery to be completed. One such place is during
the PM shutdown() callback.
If the device is not alive during recovery_work, it will try to reset the
device using pci_reset_function(). This function internally will take the
device_lock() first before resetting the device. By this time, if the lock
has already been acquired, then recovery_work will get stalled while
waiting for the lock. And if the lock was already acquired by the caller
which waits for the recovery_work to be completed, it will lead to
deadlock.
This is what happened on the X1E80100 CRD device when the device died
before shutdown() callback. Driver core calls the driver's shutdown()
callback while holding the device_lock() leading to deadlock.
And this deadlock scenario can occur on other paths as well, like during
the PM suspend() callback, where the driver core would hold the
device_lock() before calling driver's suspend() callback. And if the
recovery_work was already started, it could lead to deadlock. This is also
observed on the X1E80100 CRD.
So to fix both issues, use pci_try_reset_function() in recovery_work. This
function first checks for the availability of the device_lock() before
trying to reset the device. If the lock is available, it will acquire it
and reset the device. Otherwise, it will return -EAGAIN. If that happens,
recovery_work will fail with the error message "Recovery failed" as not
much could be done.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21948

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: appleir: Fix potential NULL dereference at raw event handle
Syzkaller reports a NULL pointer dereference issue in input_event().
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in _test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in is_event_supported drivers/input/input.c:67 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in input_event+0x42/0xa0 drivers/input/input.c:395
Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000028 by task syz-executor199/2949
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2949 Comm: syz-executor199 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00076-gf097a36ef88d #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:602
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0xef/0x1a0 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
_test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]
is_event_supported drivers/input/input.c:67 [inline]
input_event+0x42/0xa0 drivers/input/input.c:395
input_report_key include/linux/input.h:439 [inline]
key_down drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c:159 [inline]
appleir_raw_event+0x3e5/0x5e0 drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c:232
__hid_input_report.constprop.0+0x312/0x440 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2111
hid_ctrl+0x49f/0x550 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:484
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x389/0x6e0 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1650
usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x396/0x450 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1734
dummy_timer+0x17f7/0x3960 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1993
__run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1739 [inline]
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x20a/0xae0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1803
hrtimer_run_softirq+0x17d/0x350 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1820
handle_softirqs+0x206/0x8d0 kernel/softirq.c:561
__do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:595 [inline]
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:435 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0xfa/0x160 kernel/softirq.c:662
irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:678
instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 [inline]
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x90/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702
__mod_timer+0x8f6/0xdc0 kernel/time/timer.c:1185
add_timer+0x62/0x90 kernel/time/timer.c:1295
schedule_timeout+0x11f/0x280 kernel/time/sleep_timeout.c:98
usbhid_wait_io+0x1c7/0x380 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:645
usbhid_init_reports+0x19f/0x390 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:784
hiddev_ioctl+0x1133/0x15b0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:794
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:892 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x190/0x200 fs/ioctl.c:892
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
This happens due to the malformed report items sent by the emulated device
which results in a report, that has no fields, being added to the report list.
Due to this appleir_input_configured() is never called, hidinput_connect()
fails which results in the HID_CLAIMED_INPUT flag is not being set. However,
it does not make appleir_probe() fail and lets the event callback to be
called without the associated input device.
Thus, add a check for the HID_CLAIMED_INPUT flag and leave the event hook
early if the driver didn't claim any input_dev for some reason. Moreover,
some other hid drivers accessing input_dev in their event callbacks do have
similar checks, too.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21938

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix 'scheduling while atomic' in mptcp_pm_nl_append_new_local_addr
If multiple connection requests attempt to create an implicit mptcp
endpoint in parallel, more than one caller may end up in
mptcp_pm_nl_append_new_local_addr because none found the address in
local_addr_list during their call to mptcp_pm_nl_get_local_id. In this
case, the concurrent new_local_addr calls may delete the address entry
created by the previous caller. These deletes use synchronize_rcu, but
this is not permitted in some of the contexts where this function may be
called. During packet recv, the caller may be in a rcu read critical
section and have preemption disabled.
An example stack:
BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/2/0/0x00000302
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117 (discriminator 1))
dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:124)
__schedule_bug (kernel/sched/core.c:5943)
schedule_debug.constprop.0 (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:33 kernel/sched/core.c:5970)
__schedule (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27 include/linux/jump_label.h:207 kernel/sched/features.h:29 kernel/sched/core.c:6621)
schedule (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:84 kernel/sched/core.c:6804 kernel/sched/core.c:6818)
schedule_timeout (kernel/time/timer.c:2160)
wait_for_completion (kernel/sched/completion.c:96 kernel/sched/completion.c:116 kernel/sched/completion.c:127 kernel/sched/completion.c:148)
__wait_rcu_gp (include/linux/rcupdate.h:311 kernel/rcu/update.c:444)
synchronize_rcu (kernel/rcu/tree.c:3609)
mptcp_pm_nl_append_new_local_addr (net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:966 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1061)
mptcp_pm_nl_get_local_id (net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1164)
mptcp_pm_get_local_id (net/mptcp/pm.c:420)
subflow_check_req (net/mptcp/subflow.c:98 net/mptcp/subflow.c:213)
subflow_v4_route_req (net/mptcp/subflow.c:305)
tcp_conn_request (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:7216)
subflow_v4_conn_request (net/mptcp/subflow.c:651)
tcp_rcv_state_process (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6709)
tcp_v4_do_rcv (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1934)
tcp_v4_rcv (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2334)
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 (discriminator 1))
ip_local_deliver_finish (include/linux/rcupdate.h:813 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234)
ip_local_deliver (include/linux/netfilter.h:314 include/linux/netfilter.h:308 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254)
ip_sublist_rcv_finish (include/net/dst.h:461 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:580)
ip_sublist_rcv (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:640)
ip_list_rcv (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:675)
__netif_receive_skb_list_core (net/core/dev.c:5583 net/core/dev.c:5631)
netif_receive_skb_list_internal (net/core/dev.c:5685 net/core/dev.c:5774)
napi_complete_done (include/linux/list.h:37 include/net/gro.h:449 include/net/gro.h:444 net/core/dev.c:6114)
igb_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c:8244) igb
__napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6582)
net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6653 net/core/dev.c:6787)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:553)
__irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:588 kernel/softirq.c:427 kernel/softirq.c:636)
irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:651)
common_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:247 (discriminator 14))
</IRQ>
This problem seems particularly prevalent if the user advertises an
endpoint that has a different external vs internal address. In the case
where the external address is advertised and multiple connections
already exist, multiple subflow SYNs arrive in parallel which tends to
trigger the race during creation of the first local_addr_list entries
which have the internal address instead.
Fix by skipping the replacement of an existing implicit local address if
called via mptcp_pm_nl_get_local_id.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21929

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: intel-ish-hid: Fix use-after-free issue in hid_ishtp_cl_remove()
During the `rmmod` operation for the `intel_ishtp_hid` driver, a
use-after-free issue can occur in the hid_ishtp_cl_remove() function.
The function hid_ishtp_cl_deinit() is called before ishtp_hid_remove(),
which can lead to accessing freed memory or resources during the
removal process.
Call Trace:
? ishtp_cl_send+0x168/0x220 [intel_ishtp]
? hid_output_report+0xe3/0x150 [hid]
hid_ishtp_set_feature+0xb5/0x120 [intel_ishtp_hid]
ishtp_hid_request+0x7b/0xb0 [intel_ishtp_hid]
hid_hw_request+0x1f/0x40 [hid]
sensor_hub_set_feature+0x11f/0x190 [hid_sensor_hub]
_hid_sensor_power_state+0x147/0x1e0 [hid_sensor_trigger]
hid_sensor_runtime_resume+0x22/0x30 [hid_sensor_trigger]
sensor_hub_remove+0xa8/0xe0 [hid_sensor_hub]
hid_device_remove+0x49/0xb0 [hid]
hid_destroy_device+0x6f/0x90 [hid]
ishtp_hid_remove+0x42/0x70 [intel_ishtp_hid]
hid_ishtp_cl_remove+0x6b/0xb0 [intel_ishtp_hid]
ishtp_cl_device_remove+0x4a/0x60 [intel_ishtp]
...
Additionally, ishtp_hid_remove() is a HID level power off, which should
occur before the ISHTP level disconnect.
This patch resolves the issue by reordering the calls in
hid_ishtp_cl_remove(). The function ishtp_hid_remove() is now
called before hid_ishtp_cl_deinit().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21919

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/fair: Fix potential memory corruption in child_cfs_rq_on_list
child_cfs_rq_on_list attempts to convert a 'prev' pointer to a cfs_rq.
This 'prev' pointer can originate from struct rq's leaf_cfs_rq_list,
making the conversion invalid and potentially leading to memory
corruption. Depending on the relative positions of leaf_cfs_rq_list and
the task group (tg) pointer within the struct, this can cause a memory
fault or access garbage data.
The issue arises in list_add_leaf_cfs_rq, where both
cfs_rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list and rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list are added to the same
leaf list. Also, rq->tmp_alone_branch can be set to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
This adds a check `if (prev == &rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list)` after the main
conditional in child_cfs_rq_on_list. This ensures that the container_of
operation will convert a correct cfs_rq struct.
This check is sufficient because only cfs_rqs on the same CPU are added
to the list, so verifying the 'prev' pointer against the current rq's list
head is enough.
Fixes a potential memory corruption issue that due to current struct
layout might not be manifesting as a crash but could lead to unpredictable
behavior when the layout changes.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21908

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFS: fix nfs_release_folio() to not deadlock via kcompactd writeback
Add PF_KCOMPACTD flag and current_is_kcompactd() helper to check for it so
nfs_release_folio() can skip calling nfs_wb_folio() from kcompactd.
Otherwise NFS can deadlock waiting for kcompactd enduced writeback which
recurses back to NFS (which triggers writeback to NFSD via NFS loopback
mount on the same host, NFSD blocks waiting for XFS's call to
__filemap_get_folio):
6070.550357] INFO: task kcompactd0:58 blocked for more than 4435 seconds.
{---
[58] "kcompactd0"
[<0>] folio_wait_bit+0xe8/0x200
[<0>] folio_wait_writeback+0x2b/0x80
[<0>] nfs_wb_folio+0x80/0x1b0 [nfs]
[<0>] nfs_release_folio+0x68/0x130 [nfs]
[<0>] split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x362/0x840
[<0>] migrate_pages_batch+0x43d/0xb90
[<0>] migrate_pages_sync+0x9a/0x240
[<0>] migrate_pages+0x93c/0x9f0
[<0>] compact_zone+0x8e2/0x1030
[<0>] compact_node+0xdb/0x120
[<0>] kcompactd+0x121/0x2e0
[<0>] kthread+0xcf/0x100
[<0>] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40
[<0>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
---}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21899

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix bad hist from corrupting named_triggers list
The following commands causes a crash:
~# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/rcu/rcu_callback
~# echo 'hist:name=bad:keys=common_pid:onmax(bogus).save(common_pid)' > trigger
bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
~# echo 'hist:name=bad:keys=common_pid' > trigger
Because the following occurs:
event_trigger_write() {
trigger_process_regex() {
event_hist_trigger_parse() {
data = event_trigger_alloc(..);
event_trigger_register(.., data) {
cmd_ops->reg(.., data, ..) [hist_register_trigger()] {
data->ops->init() [event_hist_trigger_init()] {
save_named_trigger(name, data) {
list_add(&data->named_list, &named_triggers);
}
}
}
}
ret = create_actions(); (return -EINVAL)
if (ret)
goto out_unreg;
[..]
ret = hist_trigger_enable(data, ...) {
list_add_tail_rcu(&data->list, &file->triggers); <<<---- SKIPPED!!! (this is important!)
[..]
out_unreg:
event_hist_unregister(.., data) {
cmd_ops->unreg(.., data, ..) [hist_unregister_trigger()] {
list_for_each_entry(iter, &file->triggers, list) {
if (!hist_trigger_match(data, iter, named_data, false)) <- never matches
continue;
[..]
test = iter;
}
if (test && test->ops->free) <<<-- test is NULL
test->ops->free(test) [event_hist_trigger_free()] {
[..]
if (data->name)
del_named_trigger(data) {
list_del(&data->named_list); <<<<-- NEVER gets removed!
}
}
}
}
[..]
kfree(data); <<<-- frees item but it is still on list
The next time a hist with name is registered, it causes an u-a-f bug and
the kernel can crash.
Move the code around such that if event_trigger_register() succeeds, the
next thing called is hist_trigger_enable() which adds it to the list.
A bunch of actions is called if get_named_trigger_data() returns false.
But that doesn't need to be called after event_trigger_register(), so it
can be moved up, allowing event_trigger_register() to be called just
before hist_trigger_enable() keeping them together and allowing the
file->triggers to be properly populated.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21892

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix the recovery flow of the UMR QP
This patch addresses an issue in the recovery flow of the UMR QP,
ensuring tasks do not get stuck, as highlighted by the call trace [1].
During recovery, before transitioning the QP to the RESET state, the
software must wait for all outstanding WRs to complete.
Failing to do so can cause the firmware to skip sending some flushed
CQEs with errors and simply discard them upon the RESET, as per the IB
specification.
This race condition can result in lost CQEs and tasks becoming stuck.
To resolve this, the patch sends a final WR which serves only as a
barrier before moving the QP state to RESET.
Once a CQE is received for that final WR, it guarantees that no
outstanding WRs remain, making it safe to transition the QP to RESET and
subsequently back to RTS, restoring proper functionality.
Note:
For the barrier WR, we simply reuse the failed and ready WR.
Since the QP is in an error state, it will only receive
IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR. However, as it serves only as a barrier we don't
care about its status.
[1]
INFO: task rdma_resource_l:1922 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc7+ #1626
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:rdma_resource_l state:D stack:0 pid:1922 tgid:1922 ppid:1369
flags:0x00004004
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x420/0xd30
schedule+0x47/0x130
schedule_timeout+0x280/0x300
? mark_held_locks+0x48/0x80
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xe5/0x1a0
wait_for_completion+0x75/0x130
mlx5r_umr_post_send_wait+0x3c2/0x5b0 [mlx5_ib]
? __pfx_mlx5r_umr_done+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_ib]
mlx5r_umr_revoke_mr+0x93/0xc0 [mlx5_ib]
__mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x299/0x520 [mlx5_ib]
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40
? wait_for_completion+0xfe/0x130
? rdma_restrack_put+0x63/0xe0 [ib_core]
ib_dereg_mr_user+0x5f/0x120 [ib_core]
? lock_release+0xc6/0x280
destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x1d/0x60 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x58/0x1d0 [ib_uverbs]
uobj_destroy+0x3f/0x70 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x3e4/0xbb0 [ib_uverbs]
? __pfx_uverbs_destroy_def_handler+0x10/0x10 [ib_uverbs]
? __lock_acquire+0x64e/0x2080
? mark_held_locks+0x48/0x80
? find_held_lock+0x2d/0xa0
? lock_acquire+0xc1/0x2f0
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xcb/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? __fget_files+0xc3/0x1b0
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe7/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xcb/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1b0/0xa70
do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f99c918b17b
RSP: 002b:00007ffc766d0468 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc766d0578 RCX:
00007f99c918b17b
RDX: 00007ffc766d0560 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI:
0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffc766d0540 R08: 00007f99c8f99010 R09:
000000000000bd7e
R10: 00007f99c94c1c70 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
00007ffc766d0530
R13: 000000000000001c R14: 0000000040246a80 R15:
0000000000000000
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21890

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: fix checksums set in idpf_rx_rsc()
idpf_rx_rsc() uses skb_transport_offset(skb) while the transport header
is not set yet.
This triggers the following warning for CONFIG_DEBUG_NET=y builds.
DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(!skb_transport_header_was_set(skb))
[ 69.261620] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 0 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3020 idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll (include/linux/skbuff.h:3020) idpf
[ 69.261629] Modules linked in: vfat fat dummy bridge intel_uncore_frequency_tpmi intel_uncore_frequency_common intel_vsec_tpmi idpf intel_vsec cdc_ncm cdc_eem cdc_ether usbnet mii xhci_pci xhci_hcd ehci_pci ehci_hcd libeth
[ 69.261644] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Tainted: G S W 6.14.0-smp-DEV #1697
[ 69.261648] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [W]=WARN
[ 69.261650] RIP: 0010:idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll (include/linux/skbuff.h:3020) idpf
[ 69.261677] ? __warn (kernel/panic.c:242 kernel/panic.c:748)
[ 69.261682] ? idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll (include/linux/skbuff.h:3020) idpf
[ 69.261687] ? report_bug (lib/bug.c:?)
[ 69.261690] ? handle_bug (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:285)
[ 69.261694] ? exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:309)
[ 69.261697] ? asm_exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:621)
[ 69.261700] ? __pfx_idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_txrx.c:4011) idpf
[ 69.261704] ? idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll (include/linux/skbuff.h:3020) idpf
[ 69.261708] ? idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_txrx.c:3072) idpf
[ 69.261712] __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:7194)
[ 69.261716] net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7265)
[ 69.261718] ? __qdisc_run (net/sched/sch_generic.c:293)
[ 69.261721] ? sched_clock (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:84 arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c:288)
[ 69.261726] handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:561)

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21886

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix implicit ODP hang on parent deregistration
Fix the destroy_unused_implicit_child_mr() to prevent hanging during
parent deregistration as of below [1].
Upon entering destroy_unused_implicit_child_mr(), the reference count
for the implicit MR parent is incremented using:
refcount_inc_not_zero().
A corresponding decrement must be performed if
free_implicit_child_mr_work() is not called.
The code has been updated to properly manage the reference count that
was incremented.
[1]
INFO: task python3:2157 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7+ #1633
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:python3 state:D stack:0 pid:2157 tgid:2157 ppid:1685 flags:0x00000000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x420/0xd30
schedule+0x47/0x130
__mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x379/0x5d0 [mlx5_ib]
? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
ib_dereg_mr_user+0x5f/0x120 [ib_core]
? lock_release+0xc6/0x280
destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x1d/0x60 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x58/0x1d0 [ib_uverbs]
uobj_destroy+0x3f/0x70 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x3e4/0xbb0 [ib_uverbs]
? __pfx_uverbs_destroy_def_handler+0x10/0x10 [ib_uverbs]
? lock_acquire+0xc1/0x2f0
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xcb/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x116/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? lock_release+0xc6/0x280
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe7/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xcb/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1b0/0xa70
? kmem_cache_free+0x221/0x400
do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f20f21f017b
RSP: 002b:00007ffcfc4a77c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcfc4a78d8 RCX: 00007f20f21f017b
RDX: 00007ffcfc4a78c0 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffcfc4a78a0 R08: 000056147d125190 R09: 00007f20f1f14c60
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffcfc4a7890
R13: 000000000000001c R14: 000056147d100fc0 R15: 00007f20e365c9d0
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21885

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/bnxt_re: Fix the page details for the srq created by kernel consumers
While using nvme target with use_srq on, below kernel panic is noticed.
[ 549.698111] bnxt_en 0000:41:00.0 enp65s0np0: FEC autoneg off encoding: Clause 91 RS(544,514)
[ 566.393619] Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
..
[ 566.393799] <TASK>
[ 566.393807] ? __die_body+0x1a/0x60
[ 566.393823] ? die+0x38/0x60
[ 566.393835] ? do_trap+0xe4/0x110
[ 566.393847] ? bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0x1d4/0x580 [bnxt_re]
[ 566.393867] ? bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0x1d4/0x580 [bnxt_re]
[ 566.393881] ? do_error_trap+0x7c/0x120
[ 566.393890] ? bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0x1d4/0x580 [bnxt_re]
[ 566.393911] ? exc_divide_error+0x34/0x50
[ 566.393923] ? bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0x1d4/0x580 [bnxt_re]
[ 566.393939] ? asm_exc_divide_error+0x16/0x20
[ 566.393966] ? bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0x1d4/0x580 [bnxt_re]
[ 566.393997] bnxt_qplib_create_srq+0xc9/0x340 [bnxt_re]
[ 566.394040] bnxt_re_create_srq+0x335/0x3b0 [bnxt_re]
[ 566.394057] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 566.394068] ? __init_swait_queue_head+0x4a/0x60
[ 566.394090] ib_create_srq_user+0xa7/0x150 [ib_core]
[ 566.394147] nvmet_rdma_queue_connect+0x7d0/0xbe0 [nvmet_rdma]
[ 566.394174] ? lock_release+0x22c/0x3f0
[ 566.394187] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
Page size and shift info is set only for the user space SRQs.
Set page size and page shift for kernel space SRQs also.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21883

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Fix deinitializing VF in error path
If ice_ena_vfs() fails after calling ice_create_vf_entries(), it frees
all VFs without removing them from snapshot PF-VF mailbox list, leading
to list corruption.
Reproducer:
devlink dev eswitch set $PF1_PCI mode switchdev
ip l s $PF1 up
ip l s $PF1 promisc on
sleep 1
echo 1 > /sys/class/net/$PF1/device/sriov_numvfs
sleep 1
echo 1 > /sys/class/net/$PF1/device/sriov_numvfs
Trace (minimized):
list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffff8882e241c6f0), but was 0000000000000000. (next=ffff888455da1330).
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29!
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0xa6/0x100
ice_mbx_init_vf_info+0xa7/0x180 [ice]
ice_initialize_vf_entry+0x1fa/0x250 [ice]
ice_sriov_configure+0x8d7/0x1520 [ice]
? __percpu_ref_switch_mode+0x1b1/0x5d0
? __pfx_ice_sriov_configure+0x10/0x10 [ice]
Sometimes a KASAN report can be seen instead with a similar stack trace:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_add_valid_or_report+0xf1/0x100
VFs are added to this list in ice_mbx_init_vf_info(), but only removed
in ice_free_vfs(). Move the removing to ice_free_vf_entries(), which is
also being called in other places where VFs are being removed (including
ice_free_vfs() itself).

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21875

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: always handle address removal under msk socket lock
Syzkaller reported a lockdep splat in the PM control path:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6693 at ./include/net/sock.h:1711 sock_owned_by_me include/net/sock.h:1711 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6693 at ./include/net/sock.h:1711 msk_owned_by_me net/mptcp/protocol.h:363 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6693 at ./include/net/sock.h:1711 mptcp_pm_nl_addr_send_ack+0x57c/0x610 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:788
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6693 Comm: syz.0.205 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2-syzkaller-00303-gad1b832bf1cf #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 12/27/2024
RIP: 0010:sock_owned_by_me include/net/sock.h:1711 [inline]
RIP: 0010:msk_owned_by_me net/mptcp/protocol.h:363 [inline]
RIP: 0010:mptcp_pm_nl_addr_send_ack+0x57c/0x610 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:788
Code: 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc e8 ca 7b d3 f5 eb b9 e8 c3 7b d3 f5 90 0f 0b 90 e9 dd fb ff ff e8 b5 7b d3 f5 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 3e fb ff ff 44 89 f1 80 e1 07 38 c1 0f 8c eb fb ff ff
RSP: 0000:ffffc900034f6f60 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: ffffffff8bee3c2b RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000080000
RDX: ffffc90004d42000 RSI: 000000000000a407 RDI: 000000000000a408
RBP: ffffc900034f7030 R08: ffffffff8bee37f6 R09: 0100000000000000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100bcc62e4 R12: ffff88805e6316e0
R13: ffff88805e630c00 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88805e630c00
FS: 00007f7e9a7e96c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b2fd18ff8 CR3: 0000000032c24000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mptcp_pm_remove_addr+0x103/0x1d0 net/mptcp/pm.c:59
mptcp_pm_remove_anno_addr+0x1f4/0x2f0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1486
mptcp_nl_remove_subflow_and_signal_addr net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1518 [inline]
mptcp_pm_nl_del_addr_doit+0x118d/0x1af0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1629
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0xb1f/0xec0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210
netlink_rcv_skb+0x206/0x480 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1322 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7f6/0x990 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1348
netlink_sendmsg+0x8de/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:733
____sys_sendmsg+0x53a/0x860 net/socket.c:2573
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2627 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x269/0x350 net/socket.c:2659
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f7e9998cde9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f7e9a7e9038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7e99ba5fa0 RCX: 00007f7e9998cde9
RDX: 000000002000c094 RSI: 0000400000000000 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007f7e99a0e2a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f7e99ba5fa0 R15: 00007fff49231088
Indeed the PM can try to send a RM_ADDR over a msk without acquiring
first the msk socket lock.
The bugged code-path comes from an early optimization: when there
are no subflows, the PM should (usually) not send RM_ADDR
notifications.
The above statement is incorrect, as without locks another process
could concur
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21864

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: drop secpath at the same time as we currently drop dst
Xiumei reported hitting the WARN in xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit while
running tests that boil down to:
- create a pair of netns
- run a basic TCP test over ipcomp6
- delete the pair of netns
The xfrm_state found on spi_byaddr was not deleted at the time we
delete the netns, because we still have a reference on it. This
lingering reference comes from a secpath (which holds a ref on the
xfrm_state), which is still attached to an skb. This skb is not
leaked, it ends up on sk_receive_queue and then gets defer-free'd by
skb_attempt_defer_free.
The problem happens when we defer freeing an skb (push it on one CPU's
defer_list), and don't flush that list before the netns is deleted. In
that case, we still have a reference on the xfrm_state that we don't
expect at this point.
We already drop the skb's dst in the TCP receive path when it's no
longer needed, so let's also drop the secpath. At this point,
tcp_filter has already called into the LSM hooks that may require the
secpath, so it should not be needed anymore. However, in some of those
places, the MPTCP extension has just been attached to the skb, so we
cannot simply drop all extensions.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21862

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drop_monitor: fix incorrect initialization order
Syzkaller reports the following bug:
BUG: spinlock bad magic on CPU#1, syz-executor.0/7995
lock: 0xffff88805303f3e0, .magic: 00000000, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: 0
CPU: 1 PID: 7995 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G E 5.10.209+ #1
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x119/0x179 lib/dump_stack.c:118
debug_spin_lock_before kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:83 [inline]
do_raw_spin_lock+0x1f6/0x270 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:112
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:117 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x70 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
reset_per_cpu_data+0xe6/0x240 [drop_monitor]
net_dm_cmd_trace+0x43d/0x17a0 [drop_monitor]
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x22f/0x330 net/netlink/genetlink.c:739
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:783 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x341/0x5a0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:800
netlink_rcv_skb+0x14d/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2497
genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:811
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1322 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x54b/0x800 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1348
netlink_sendmsg+0x914/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1916
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x157/0x190 net/socket.c:663
____sys_sendmsg+0x712/0x870 net/socket.c:2378
___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170 net/socket.c:2432
__sys_sendmsg+0xea/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2461
do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x62/0xc7
RIP: 0033:0x7f3f9815aee9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f3f972bf0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3f9826d050 RCX: 00007f3f9815aee9
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020001300 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007f3f981b63bd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000006e R14: 00007f3f9826d050 R15: 00007ffe01ee6768
If drop_monitor is built as a kernel module, syzkaller may have time
to send a netlink NET_DM_CMD_START message during the module loading.
This will call the net_dm_monitor_start() function that uses
a spinlock that has not yet been initialized.
To fix this, let's place resource initialization above the registration
of a generic netlink family.
Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center
(linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21861

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/migrate_device: don't add folio to be freed to LRU in migrate_device_finalize()
If migration succeeded, we called
folio_migrate_flags()->mem_cgroup_migrate() to migrate the memcg from the
old to the new folio. This will set memcg_data of the old folio to 0.
Similarly, if migration failed, memcg_data of the dst folio is left unset.
If we call folio_putback_lru() on such folios (memcg_data == 0), we will
add the folio to be freed to the LRU, making memcg code unhappy. Running
the hmm selftests:
# ./hmm-tests
...
# RUN hmm.hmm_device_private.migrate ...
[ 102.078007][T14893] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7ff27d200 pfn:0x13cc00
[ 102.079974][T14893] anon flags: 0x17ff00000020018(uptodate|dirty|swapbacked|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[ 102.082037][T14893] raw: 017ff00000020018 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff8881353896c9
[ 102.083687][T14893] raw: 00000007ff27d200 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 102.085331][T14893] page dumped because: VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_FOLIO(!memcg && !mem_cgroup_disabled())
[ 102.087230][T14893] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 102.088279][T14893] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14893 at ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:726 folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.090478][T14893] Modules linked in:
[ 102.091244][T14893] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 14893 Comm: hmm-tests Not tainted 6.13.0-09623-g6c216bc522fd #151
[ 102.093089][T14893] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
[ 102.094848][T14893] RIP: 0010:folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.096104][T14893] Code: ...
[ 102.099908][T14893] RSP: 0018:ffffc900236c37b0 EFLAGS: 00010293
[ 102.101152][T14893] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffea0004f30000 RCX: ffffffff8183f426
[ 102.102684][T14893] RDX: ffff8881063cb880 RSI: ffffffff81b8117f RDI: ffff8881063cb880
[ 102.104227][T14893] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 102.105757][T14893] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffffc900236c37d8
[ 102.107296][T14893] R13: ffff888277a2bcb0 R14: 000000000000001f R15: 0000000000000000
[ 102.108830][T14893] FS: 00007ff27dbdd740(0000) GS:ffff888277a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 102.110643][T14893] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 102.111924][T14893] CR2: 00007ff27d400000 CR3: 000000010866e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[ 102.113478][T14893] PKRU: 55555554
[ 102.114172][T14893] Call Trace:
[ 102.114805][T14893] <TASK>
[ 102.115397][T14893] ? folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.116547][T14893] ? __warn.cold+0x110/0x210
[ 102.117461][T14893] ? folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.118667][T14893] ? report_bug+0x1b9/0x320
[ 102.119571][T14893] ? handle_bug+0x54/0x90
[ 102.120494][T14893] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x50
[ 102.121433][T14893] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 102.122435][T14893] ? __wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x76/0xd0
[ 102.123506][T14893] ? dump_page+0x4f/0x60
[ 102.124352][T14893] ? folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.125500][T14893] folio_batch_move_lru+0xd4/0x200
[ 102.126577][T14893] ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10
[ 102.127505][T14893] __folio_batch_add_and_move+0x391/0x720
[ 102.128633][T14893] ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10
[ 102.129550][T14893] folio_putback_lru+0x16/0x80
[ 102.130564][T14893] migrate_device_finalize+0x9b/0x530
[ 102.131640][T14893] dmirror_migrate_to_device.constprop.0+0x7c5/0xad0
[ 102.133047][T14893] dmirror_fops_unlocked_ioctl+0x89b/0xc80
Likely, nothing else goes wrong: putting the last folio reference will
remove the folio from the LRU again. So besides memcg complaining, adding
the folio to be freed to the LRU is just an unnecessary step.
The new flow resembles what we have in migrate_folio_move(): add the dst
to the lru, rem
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21858

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
geneve: Fix use-after-free in geneve_find_dev().
syzkaller reported a use-after-free in geneve_find_dev() [0]
without repro.
geneve_configure() links struct geneve_dev.next to
net_generic(net, geneve_net_id)->geneve_list.
The net here could differ from dev_net(dev) if IFLA_NET_NS_PID,
IFLA_NET_NS_FD, or IFLA_TARGET_NETNSID is set.
When dev_net(dev) is dismantled, geneve_exit_batch_rtnl() finally
calls unregister_netdevice_queue() for each dev in the netns,
and later the dev is freed.
However, its geneve_dev.next is still linked to the backend UDP
socket netns.
Then, use-after-free will occur when another geneve dev is created
in the netns.
Let's call geneve_dellink() instead in geneve_destroy_tunnels().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in geneve_find_dev drivers/net/geneve.c:1295 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in geneve_configure+0x234/0x858 drivers/net/geneve.c:1343
Read of size 2 at addr ffff000054d6ee24 by task syz.1.4029/13441
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 13441 Comm: syz.1.4029 Not tainted 6.13.0-g0ad9617c78ac #24 dc35ca22c79fb82e8e7bc5c9c9adafea898b1e3d
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
show_stack+0x38/0x50 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:466 (C)
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xbc/0x108 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x16c/0x6f0 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0xc0/0x120 mm/kasan/report.c:602
__asan_report_load2_noabort+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:379
geneve_find_dev drivers/net/geneve.c:1295 [inline]
geneve_configure+0x234/0x858 drivers/net/geneve.c:1343
geneve_newlink+0xb8/0x128 drivers/net/geneve.c:1634
rtnl_newlink_create+0x23c/0x868 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3795
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3906 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x1054/0x1630 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4021
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x61c/0x918 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6911
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6938
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1322 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x618/0x838 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1348
netlink_sendmsg+0x5fc/0x8b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:713 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x410/0x6f8 net/socket.c:2568
___sys_sendmsg+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:2622
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2654 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2659 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2657 [inline]
__arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x12c/0x1c8 net/socket.c:2657
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x90/0x278 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0x13c/0x250 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x54/0x70 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x4c/0xa8 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:744
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:762
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600
Allocated by task 13247:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x30/0x68 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x44/0x58 mm/kasan/generic.c:568
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4298 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_noprof+0x2a0/0x560 mm/slub.c:4304
__kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x9c/0x230 mm/util.c:645
alloc_netdev_mqs+0xb8/0x11a0 net/core/dev.c:11470
rtnl_create_link+0x2b8/0xb50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3604
rtnl_newlink_create+0x19c/0x868 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3780
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3906 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x1054/0x1630 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4021
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x61c/0x918 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6911
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6938
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_n
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21855

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ibmvnic: Don't reference skb after sending to VIOS
Previously, after successfully flushing the xmit buffer to VIOS,
the tx_bytes stat was incremented by the length of the skb.
It is invalid to access the skb memory after sending the buffer to
the VIOS because, at any point after sending, the VIOS can trigger
an interrupt to free this memory. A race between reading skb->len
and freeing the skb is possible (especially during LPM) and will
result in use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ibmvnic_xmit+0x75c/0x1808 [ibmvnic]
Read of size 4 at addr c00000024eb48a70 by task hxecom/14495
<...>
Call Trace:
[c000000118f66cf0] [c0000000018cba6c] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xe8 (unreliable)
[c000000118f66d20] [c0000000006f0080] print_report+0x1a8/0x7f0
[c000000118f66df0] [c0000000006f08f0] kasan_report+0x128/0x1f8
[c000000118f66f00] [c0000000006f2868] __asan_load4+0xac/0xe0
[c000000118f66f20] [c0080000046eac84] ibmvnic_xmit+0x75c/0x1808 [ibmvnic]
[c000000118f67340] [c0000000014be168] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x150/0x358
<...>
Freed by task 0:
kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
kasan_save_track+0x2c/0x50
kasan_save_free_info+0x64/0x108
__kasan_mempool_poison_object+0x148/0x2d4
napi_skb_cache_put+0x5c/0x194
net_tx_action+0x154/0x5b8
handle_softirqs+0x20c/0x60c
do_softirq_own_stack+0x6c/0x88
<...>
The buggy address belongs to the object at c00000024eb48a00 which
belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224
==================================================================

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21854

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sockmap, vsock: For connectible sockets allow only connected
sockmap expects all vsocks to have a transport assigned, which is expressed
in vsock_proto::psock_update_sk_prot(). However, there is an edge case
where an unconnected (connectible) socket may lose its previously assigned
transport. This is handled with a NULL check in the vsock/BPF recv path.
Another design detail is that listening vsocks are not supposed to have any
transport assigned at all. Which implies they are not supported by the
sockmap. But this is complicated by the fact that a socket, before
switching to TCP_LISTEN, may have had some transport assigned during a
failed connect() attempt. Hence, we may end up with a listening vsock in a
sockmap, which blows up quickly:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000120-0x0000000000000127]
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 56 Comm: kworker/7:0 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1+
Workqueue: vsock-loopback vsock_loopback_work
RIP: 0010:vsock_read_skb+0x4b/0x90
Call Trace:
sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0xa4/0x2e0
virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1ca8/0x2acc
vsock_loopback_work+0x27d/0x3f0
process_one_work+0x846/0x1420
worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80
kthread+0x35a/0x700
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
For connectible sockets, instead of relying solely on the state of
vsk->transport, tell sockmap to only allow those representing established
connections. This aligns with the behaviour for AF_INET and AF_UNIX.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21852

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: Add rx_skb of kfree_skb to raw_tp_null_args[].
Yan Zhai reported a BPF prog could trigger a null-ptr-deref [0]
in trace_kfree_skb if the prog does not check if rx_sk is NULL.
Commit c53795d48ee8 ("net: add rx_sk to trace_kfree_skb") added
rx_sk to trace_kfree_skb, but rx_sk is optional and could be NULL.
Let's add kfree_skb to raw_tp_null_args[] to let the BPF verifier
validate such a prog and prevent the issue.
Now we fail to load such a prog:
libbpf: prog 'drop': -- BEGIN PROG LOAD LOG --
0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
; int BPF_PROG(drop, struct sk_buff *skb, void *location, @ kfree_skb_sk_null.bpf.c:21
0: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +24)
func 'kfree_skb' arg3 has btf_id 5253 type STRUCT 'sock'
1: R1=ctx() R3_w=trusted_ptr_or_null_sock(id=1)
; bpf_printk("sk: %d, %d\n", sk, sk->__sk_common.skc_family); @ kfree_skb_sk_null.bpf.c:24
1: (69) r4 = *(u16 *)(r3 +16)
R3 invalid mem access 'trusted_ptr_or_null_'
processed 2 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 0 peak_states 0 mark_read 0
-- END PROG LOAD LOG --
Note this fix requires commit 838a10bd2ebf ("bpf: Augment raw_tp
arguments with PTR_MAYBE_NULL").
[0]:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
PREEMPT SMP
RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_5e21a6db8fcff1aa_drop+0x10/0x2d
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x1f/0x60
? page_fault_oops+0x148/0x420
? search_bpf_extables+0x5b/0x70
? fixup_exception+0x27/0x2c0
? exc_page_fault+0x75/0x170
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? bpf_prog_5e21a6db8fcff1aa_drop+0x10/0x2d
bpf_trace_run4+0x68/0xd0
? unix_stream_connect+0x1f4/0x6f0
sk_skb_reason_drop+0x90/0x120
unix_stream_connect+0x1f4/0x6f0
__sys_connect+0x7f/0xb0
__x64_sys_connect+0x14/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x47/0xc30
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21839

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Load DR6 with guest value only before entering .vcpu_run() loop
Move the conditional loading of hardware DR6 with the guest's DR6 value
out of the core .vcpu_run() loop to fix a bug where KVM can load hardware
with a stale vcpu->arch.dr6.
When the guest accesses a DR and host userspace isn't debugging the guest,
KVM disables DR interception and loads the guest's values into hardware on
VM-Enter and saves them on VM-Exit. This allows the guest to access DRs
at will, e.g. so that a sequence of DR accesses to configure a breakpoint
only generates one VM-Exit.
For DR0-DR3, the logic/behavior is identical between VMX and SVM, and also
identical between KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED (userspace debugging the guest)
and KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT (guest using DRs), and so KVM handles loading
DR0-DR3 in common code, _outside_ of the core kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_run() loop.
But for DR6, the guest's value doesn't need to be loaded into hardware for
KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED, and SVM provides a dedicated VMCB field whereas
VMX requires software to manually load the guest value, and so loading the
guest's value into DR6 is handled by {svm,vmx}_vcpu_run(), i.e. is done
_inside_ the core run loop.
Unfortunately, saving the guest values on VM-Exit is initiated by common
x86, again outside of the core run loop. If the guest modifies DR6 (in
hardware, when DR interception is disabled), and then the next VM-Exit is
a fastpath VM-Exit, KVM will reload hardware DR6 with vcpu->arch.dr6 and
clobber the guest's actual value.
The bug shows up primarily with nested VMX because KVM handles the VMX
preemption timer in the fastpath, and the window between hardware DR6
being modified (in guest context) and DR6 being read by guest software is
orders of magnitude larger in a nested setup. E.g. in non-nested, the
VMX preemption timer would need to fire precisely between #DB injection
and the #DB handler's read of DR6, whereas with a KVM-on-KVM setup, the
window where hardware DR6 is "dirty" extends all the way from L1 writing
DR6 to VMRESUME (in L1).
L1's view:
==========
<L1 disables DR interception>
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640961: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
A: L1 Writes DR6
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640963: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff1
B: CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640967: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT intr_info 0x800000ec
D: L1 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640969: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640976: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
L2 reads DR6, L1 disables DR interception
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640980: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
L2 detects failure
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640987: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason HLT
L1 reads DR6 (confirms failure)
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640990: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
L0's view:
==========
L2 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
L2 => L1 nested VM-Exit
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit_inject: reason: DR_ACCESS ext_inf1: 0x0000000000000216
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21816

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hrtimers: Force migrate away hrtimers queued after CPUHP_AP_HRTIMERS_DYING
hrtimers are migrated away from the dying CPU to any online target at
the CPUHP_AP_HRTIMERS_DYING stage in order not to delay bandwidth timers
handling tasks involved in the CPU hotplug forward progress.
However wakeups can still be performed by the outgoing CPU after
CPUHP_AP_HRTIMERS_DYING. Those can result again in bandwidth timers being
armed. Depending on several considerations (crystal ball power management
based election, earliest timer already enqueued, timer migration enabled or
not), the target may eventually be the current CPU even if offline. If that
happens, the timer is eventually ignored.
The most notable example is RCU which had to deal with each and every of
those wake-ups by deferring them to an online CPU, along with related
workarounds:
_ e787644caf76 (rcu: Defer RCU kthreads wakeup when CPU is dying)
_ 9139f93209d1 (rcu/nocb: Fix RT throttling hrtimer armed from offline CPU)
_ f7345ccc62a4 (rcu/nocb: Fix rcuog wake-up from offline softirq)
The problem isn't confined to RCU though as the stop machine kthread
(which runs CPUHP_AP_HRTIMERS_DYING) reports its completion at the end
of its work through cpu_stop_signal_done() and performs a wake up that
eventually arms the deadline server timer:
WARNING: CPU: 94 PID: 588 at kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1086 hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x289/0x2d0
CPU: 94 UID: 0 PID: 588 Comm: migration/94 Not tainted
Stopper: multi_cpu_stop+0x0/0x120 <- stop_machine_cpuslocked+0x66/0xc0
RIP: 0010:hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x289/0x2d0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
start_dl_timer
enqueue_dl_entity
dl_server_start
enqueue_task_fair
enqueue_task
ttwu_do_activate
try_to_wake_up
complete
cpu_stopper_thread
Instead of providing yet another bandaid to work around the situation, fix
it in the hrtimers infrastructure instead: always migrate away a timer to
an online target whenever it is enqueued from an offline CPU.
This will also allow to revert all the above RCU disgraceful hacks.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21809

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc, afs: Fix peer hash locking vs RCU callback
In its address list, afs now retains pointers to and refs on one or more
rxrpc_peer objects. The address list is freed under RCU and at this time,
it puts the refs on those peers.
Now, when an rxrpc_peer object runs out of refs, it gets removed from the
peer hash table and, for that, rxrpc has to take a spinlock. However, it
is now being called from afs's RCU cleanup, which takes place in BH
context - but it is just taking an ordinary spinlock.
The put may also be called from non-BH context, and so there exists the
possibility of deadlock if the BH-based RCU cleanup happens whilst the hash
spinlock is held. This led to the attached lockdep complaint.
Fix this by changing spinlocks of rxnet->peer_hash_lock back to
BH-disabling locks.
================================
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
6.13.0-rc5-build2+ #1223 Tainted: G E
--------------------------------
inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage.
swapper/1/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes:
ffff88810babe228 (&rxnet->peer_hash_lock){+.?.}-{3:3}, at: rxrpc_put_peer+0xcb/0x180
{SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
mark_usage+0x164/0x180
__lock_acquire+0x544/0x990
lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
_raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker+0x144/0x440
process_one_work+0x486/0x7c0
process_scheduled_works+0x73/0x90
worker_thread+0x1c8/0x2a0
kthread+0x19b/0x1b0
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
irq event stamp: 972402
hardirqs last enabled at (972402): [<ffffffff8244360e>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2e/0x50
hardirqs last disabled at (972401): [<ffffffff82443328>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x18/0x60
softirqs last enabled at (972300): [<ffffffff810ffbbe>] handle_softirqs+0x3ee/0x430
softirqs last disabled at (972313): [<ffffffff810ffc54>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x44/0x110
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by swapper/1/0:
#0: ffffffff83576be0 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x7/0x30
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G E 6.13.0-rc5-build2+ #1223
Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x80
print_usage_bug.part.0+0x227/0x240
valid_state+0x53/0x70
mark_lock_irq+0xa5/0x2f0
mark_lock+0xf7/0x170
mark_usage+0xe1/0x180
__lock_acquire+0x544/0x990
lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
_raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
rxrpc_put_peer+0xcb/0x180
afs_free_addrlist+0x46/0x90 [kafs]
rcu_do_batch+0x2d2/0x640
rcu_core+0x2f7/0x350
handle_softirqs+0x1ee/0x430
__irq_exit_rcu+0x44/0x110
irq_exit_rcu+0xa/0x30
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x7f/0xa0
</IRQ>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21806

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: let net.core.dev_weight always be non-zero
The following problem was encountered during stability test:
(NULL net_device): NAPI poll function process_backlog+0x0/0x530 \
returned 1, exceeding its budget of 0.
------------[ cut here ]------------
list_add double add: new=ffff88905f746f48, prev=ffff88905f746f48, \
next=ffff88905f746e40.
WARNING: CPU: 18 PID: 5462 at lib/list_debug.c:35 \
__list_add_valid_or_report+0xf3/0x130
CPU: 18 UID: 0 PID: 5462 Comm: ping Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7+
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0xf3/0x130
Call Trace:
? __warn+0xcd/0x250
? __list_add_valid_or_report+0xf3/0x130
enqueue_to_backlog+0x923/0x1070
netif_rx_internal+0x92/0x2b0
__netif_rx+0x15/0x170
loopback_xmit+0x2ef/0x450
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x103/0x490
__dev_queue_xmit+0xeac/0x1950
ip_finish_output2+0x6cc/0x1620
ip_output+0x161/0x270
ip_push_pending_frames+0x155/0x1a0
raw_sendmsg+0xe13/0x1550
__sys_sendto+0x3bf/0x4e0
__x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0
do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The reproduction command is as follows:
sysctl -w net.core.dev_weight=0
ping 127.0.0.1
This is because when the napi's weight is set to 0, process_backlog() may
return 0 and clear the NAPI_STATE_SCHED bit of napi->state, causing this
napi to be re-polled in net_rx_action() until __do_softirq() times out.
Since the NAPI_STATE_SCHED bit has been cleared, napi_schedule_rps() can
be retriggered in enqueue_to_backlog(), causing this issue.
Making the napi's weight always non-zero solves this problem.
Triggering this issue requires system-wide admin (setting is
not namespaced).

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21796

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: clear acl_access/acl_default after releasing them
If getting acl_default fails, acl_access and acl_default will be released
simultaneously. However, acl_access will still retain a pointer pointing
to the released posix_acl, which will trigger a WARNING in
nfs3svc_release_getacl like this:
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 3199 at lib/refcount.c:28
refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
Modules linked in:
CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 3199 Comm: nfsd Not tainted
6.12.0-rc6-00079-g04ae226af01f-dirty #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
Code: cc cc 0f b6 1d b3 20 a5 03 80 fb 01 0f 87 65 48 d8 00 83 e3 01 75
e4 48 c7 c7 c0 3b 9b 85 c6 05 97 20 a5 03 01 e8 fb 3e 30 ff <0f> 0b eb
cd 0f b6 1d 8a3
RSP: 0018:ffffc90008637cd8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff83904fde
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88871ed36380
RBP: ffff888158beeb40 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520010c6f56
R10: ffffc90008637ab7 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff888140e77400 R14: ffff888140e77408 R15: ffffffff858b42c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88871ed00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000562384d32158 CR3: 000000055cc6a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
? __warn+0xa5/0x140
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
? report_bug+0x1b1/0x1e0
? handle_bug+0x53/0xa0
? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? tick_nohz_tick_stopped+0x1e/0x40
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
nfs3svc_release_getacl+0xc9/0xe0
svc_process_common+0x5db/0xb60
? __pfx_svc_process_common+0x10/0x10
? __rcu_read_unlock+0x69/0xa0
? __pfx_nfsd_dispatch+0x10/0x10
? svc_xprt_received+0xa1/0x120
? xdr_init_decode+0x11d/0x190
svc_process+0x2a7/0x330
svc_handle_xprt+0x69d/0x940
svc_recv+0x180/0x2d0
nfsd+0x168/0x200
? __pfx_nfsd+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x1a2/0x1e0
? kthread+0xf4/0x1e0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...
Clear acl_access/acl_default after posix_acl_release is called to prevent
UAF from being triggered.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21790

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: check vxlan_vnigroup_init() return value
vxlan_init() must check vxlan_vnigroup_init() success
otherwise a crash happens later, spotted by syzbot.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000002c: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000160-0x0000000000000167]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7313 Comm: syz-executor147 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1-syzkaller-00276-g69b54314c975 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:vxlan_vnigroup_uninit+0x89/0x500 drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_vnifilter.c:912
Code: 00 48 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b b0 98 41 00 00 49 8d 86 60 01 00 00 48 89 c2 48 89 44 24 10 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 4d 04 00 00 49 8b 86 60 01 00 00 48 ba 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000cc1eea8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff8672effb
RDX: 000000000000002c RSI: ffffffff8672ecb9 RDI: ffff8880461b4f18
RBP: ffff8880461b4ef4 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000020000
R13: ffff8880461b0d80 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 00007fecfa95d6c0(0000) GS:ffff88806a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fecfa95cfb8 CR3: 000000004472c000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
vxlan_uninit+0x1ab/0x200 drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c:2942
unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x12d6/0x1f30 net/core/dev.c:11824
unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:11866 [inline]
unregister_netdevice_queue+0x307/0x3f0 net/core/dev.c:11736
register_netdevice+0x1829/0x1eb0 net/core/dev.c:10901
__vxlan_dev_create+0x7c6/0xa30 drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c:3981
vxlan_newlink+0xd1/0x130 drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c:4407
rtnl_newlink_create net/core/rtnetlink.c:3795 [inline]
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3906 [inline]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21787

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
team: better TEAM_OPTION_TYPE_STRING validation
syzbot reported following splat [1]
Make sure user-provided data contains one nul byte.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in string_nocheck lib/vsprintf.c:633 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in string+0x3ec/0x5f0 lib/vsprintf.c:714
string_nocheck lib/vsprintf.c:633 [inline]
string+0x3ec/0x5f0 lib/vsprintf.c:714
vsnprintf+0xa5d/0x1960 lib/vsprintf.c:2843
__request_module+0x252/0x9f0 kernel/module/kmod.c:149
team_mode_get drivers/net/team/team_core.c:480 [inline]
team_change_mode drivers/net/team/team_core.c:607 [inline]
team_mode_option_set+0x437/0x970 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1401
team_option_set drivers/net/team/team_core.c:375 [inline]
team_nl_options_set_doit+0x1339/0x1f90 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2662
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x1214/0x12c0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210
netlink_rcv_skb+0x375/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
genl_rcv+0x40/0x60 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1322 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xf52/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1348
netlink_sendmsg+0x10da/0x11e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:733
____sys_sendmsg+0x877/0xb60 net/socket.c:2573
___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2627
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2659 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2664 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2662 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x212/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2662
x64_sys_call+0x2ed6/0x3c30 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21756

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: Keep the binding until socket destruction
Preserve sockets bindings; this includes both resulting from an explicit
bind() and those implicitly bound through autobind during connect().
Prevents socket unbinding during a transport reassignment, which fixes a
use-after-free:
1. vsock_create() (refcnt=1) calls vsock_insert_unbound() (refcnt=2)
2. transport->release() calls vsock_remove_bound() without checking if
sk was bound and moved to bound list (refcnt=1)
3. vsock_bind() assumes sk is in unbound list and before
__vsock_insert_bound(vsock_bound_sockets()) calls
__vsock_remove_bound() which does:
list_del_init(&vsk->bound_table); // nop
sock_put(&vsk->sk); // refcnt=0
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __vsock_bind+0x62e/0x730
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88816b46a74c by task a.out/2057
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90
print_report+0x174/0x4f6
kasan_report+0xb9/0x190
__vsock_bind+0x62e/0x730
vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0
__sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0
__x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Allocated by task 2057:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x85/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x131/0x450
sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220
sk_alloc+0x2c/0x870
__vsock_create.constprop.0+0x2e/0xb60
vsock_create+0xe4/0x420
__sock_create+0x241/0x650
__sys_socket+0xf2/0x1a0
__x64_sys_socket+0x6e/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 2057:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70
kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x590
__sk_destruct+0x388/0x5a0
__vsock_bind+0x5e1/0x730
vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0
__sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0
__x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2057 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150
__vsock_bind+0x66d/0x730
vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0
__sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0
__x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2057 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150
vsock_remove_bound+0x187/0x1e0
__vsock_release+0x383/0x4a0
vsock_release+0x90/0x120
__sock_release+0xa3/0x250
sock_close+0x14/0x20
__fput+0x359/0xa80
task_work_run+0x107/0x1d0
do_exit+0x847/0x2560
do_group_exit+0xb8/0x250
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50
x64_sys_call+0xfec/0x14f0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21750

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: Check the return value of of_property_read_string_index()
Somewhen between 6.10 and 6.11 the driver started to crash on my
MacBookPro14,3. The property doesn't exist and 'tmp' remains
uninitialized, so we pass a random pointer to devm_kstrdup().
The crash I am getting looks like this:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f033c669379
PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
PF: error_code(0x0001) - permissions violation
PGD 8000000101341067 P4D 8000000101341067 PUD 101340067 PMD 1013bb067 PTE 800000010aee9025
Oops: Oops: 0001 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 827 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.11.8-gentoo #1
Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookPro14,3/Mac-551B86E5744E2388, BIOS 529.140.2.0.0 06/23/2024
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x4/0x30
Code: f7 75 ec 31 c0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 89 f8 c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa <80> 3f 00 74 14 48 89 f8 48 83 c0 01 80 38 00 75 f7 48 29 f8 c3 cc
RSP: 0018:ffffb4aac0683ad8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000ffffffea RBX: 00007f033c669379 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000cc0 RSI: 00007f033c669379 RDI: 00007f033c669379
RBP: 00000000ffffffea R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000c0ba916a
R10: ffffffffffffffff R11: ffffffffb61ea260 R12: ffff91f7815b50c8
R13: 0000000000000cc0 R14: ffff91fafefffe30 R15: ffffb4aac0683b30
FS: 00007f033ccbe8c0(0000) GS:ffff91faeed00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f033c669379 CR3: 0000000107b1e004 CR4: 00000000003706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x23/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x149/0x4c0
? raw_spin_rq_lock_nested+0xe/0x20
? sched_balance_newidle+0x22b/0x3c0
? update_load_avg+0x78/0x770
? exc_page_fault+0x6f/0x150
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
? __pfx_pci_conf1_write+0x10/0x10
? strlen+0x4/0x30
devm_kstrdup+0x25/0x70
brcmf_of_probe+0x273/0x350 [brcmfmac]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21739

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Fix use-after free in init error and remove paths
devm_blk_crypto_profile_init() registers a cleanup handler to run when
the associated (platform-) device is being released. For UFS, the
crypto private data and pointers are stored as part of the ufs_hba's
data structure 'struct ufs_hba::crypto_profile'. This structure is
allocated as part of the underlying ufshcd and therefore Scsi_host
allocation.
During driver release or during error handling in ufshcd_pltfrm_init(),
this structure is released as part of ufshcd_dealloc_host() before the
(platform-) device associated with the crypto call above is released.
Once this device is released, the crypto cleanup code will run, using
the just-released 'struct ufs_hba::crypto_profile'. This causes a
use-after-free situation:
Call trace:
kfree+0x60/0x2d8 (P)
kvfree+0x44/0x60
blk_crypto_profile_destroy_callback+0x28/0x70
devm_action_release+0x1c/0x30
release_nodes+0x6c/0x108
devres_release_all+0x98/0x100
device_unbind_cleanup+0x20/0x70
really_probe+0x218/0x2d0
In other words, the initialisation code flow is:
platform-device probe
ufshcd_pltfrm_init()
ufshcd_alloc_host()
scsi_host_alloc()
allocation of struct ufs_hba
creation of scsi-host devices
devm_blk_crypto_profile_init()
devm registration of cleanup handler using platform-device
and during error handling of ufshcd_pltfrm_init() or during driver
removal:
ufshcd_dealloc_host()
scsi_host_put()
put_device(scsi-host)
release of struct ufs_hba
put_device(platform-device)
crypto cleanup handler
To fix this use-after free, change ufshcd_alloc_host() to register a
devres action to automatically cleanup the underlying SCSI device on
ufshcd destruction, without requiring explicit calls to
ufshcd_dealloc_host(). This way:
* the crypto profile and all other ufs_hba-owned resources are
destroyed before SCSI (as they've been registered after)
* a memleak is plugged in tc-dwc-g210-pci.c remove() as a
side-effect
* EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ufshcd_dealloc_host) can be removed fully as
it's not needed anymore
* no future drivers using ufshcd_alloc_host() could ever forget
adding the cleanup

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21732

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix a race for an ODP MR which leads to CQE with error
This patch addresses a race condition for an ODP MR that can result in a
CQE with an error on the UMR QP.
During the __mlx5_ib_dereg_mr() flow, the following sequence of calls
occurs:
mlx5_revoke_mr()
mlx5r_umr_revoke_mr()
mlx5r_umr_post_send_wait()
At this point, the lkey is freed from the hardware's perspective.
However, concurrently, mlx5_ib_invalidate_range() might be triggered by
another task attempting to invalidate a range for the same freed lkey.
This task will:
- Acquire the umem_odp->umem_mutex lock.
- Call mlx5r_umr_update_xlt() on the UMR QP.
- Since the lkey has already been freed, this can lead to a CQE error,
causing the UMR QP to enter an error state [1].
To resolve this race condition, the umem_odp->umem_mutex lock is now also
acquired as part of the mlx5_revoke_mr() scope. Upon successful revoke,
we set umem_odp->private which points to that MR to NULL, preventing any
further invalidation attempts on its lkey.
[1] From dmesg:
infiniband rocep8s0f0: dump_cqe:277:(pid 0): WC error: 6, Message: memory bind operation error
cqe_dump: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
cqe_dump: 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
cqe_dump: 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
cqe_dump: 00000030: 00 00 00 00 08 00 78 06 25 00 11 b9 00 0e dd d2
WARNING: CPU: 15 PID: 1506 at drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/umr.c:394 mlx5r_umr_post_send_wait+0x15a/0x2b0 [mlx5_ib]
Modules linked in: ip6table_mangle ip6table_natip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_mangle xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_umad ib_ipoib ib_cm mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core fuse mlx5_core
CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 1506 Comm: ibv_rc_pingpong Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7+ #1626
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5r_umr_post_send_wait+0x15a/0x2b0 [mlx5_ib]
[..]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5r_umr_update_xlt+0x23c/0x3e0 [mlx5_ib]
mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x2e1/0x330 [mlx5_ib]
__mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1e1/0x240
zap_page_range_single+0xf1/0x1a0
madvise_vma_behavior+0x677/0x6e0
do_madvise+0x1a2/0x4b0
__x64_sys_madvise+0x25/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21729

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: fix race between cancel_hw_scan and hw_scan completion
The rtwdev->scanning flag isn't protected by mutex originally, so
cancel_hw_scan can pass the condition, but suddenly hw_scan completion
unset the flag and calls ieee80211_scan_completed() that will free
local->hw_scan_req. Then, cancel_hw_scan raises null-ptr-deref and
use-after-free. Fix it by moving the check condition to where
protected by mutex.
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000088-0x000000000000008f]
CPU: 2 PID: 6922 Comm: kworker/2:2 Tainted: G OE
Hardware name: LENOVO 2356AD1/2356AD1, BIOS G7ETB6WW (2.76 ) 09/10/2019
Workqueue: events cfg80211_conn_work [cfg80211]
RIP: 0010:rtw89_fw_h2c_scan_offload_be+0xc33/0x13c3 [rtw89_core]
Code: 00 45 89 6c 24 1c 0f 85 23 01 00 00 48 8b 85 20 ff ff ff 48 8d
RSP: 0018:ffff88811fd9f068 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88811fd9f258 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000011 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000089
RBP: ffff88811fd9f170 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff88811fd9f108 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88810e47f960
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881d6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007531dfca55b0 CR3: 00000001be296004 CR4: 00000000001706e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x61/0x73
? __die_body+0x20/0x73
? die_addr+0x4f/0x7b
? exc_general_protection+0x191/0x1db
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30
? rtw89_fw_h2c_scan_offload_be+0xc33/0x13c3 [rtw89_core]
? rtw89_fw_h2c_scan_offload_be+0x458/0x13c3 [rtw89_core]
? __pfx_rtw89_fw_h2c_scan_offload_be+0x10/0x10 [rtw89_core]
? do_raw_spin_lock+0x75/0xdb
? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
rtw89_hw_scan_offload+0xb5e/0xbf7 [rtw89_core]
? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x24
? __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x40c/0x471
? __pfx_rtw89_hw_scan_offload+0x10/0x10 [rtw89_core]
? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x13/0x1f
? mutex_lock+0xa2/0xdc
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
rtw89_hw_scan_abort+0x58/0xb7 [rtw89_core]
rtw89_ops_cancel_hw_scan+0x120/0x13b [rtw89_core]
ieee80211_scan_cancel+0x468/0x4d0 [mac80211]
ieee80211_prep_connection+0x858/0x899 [mac80211]
ieee80211_mgd_auth+0xbea/0xdde [mac80211]
? __pfx_ieee80211_mgd_auth+0x10/0x10 [mac80211]
? cfg80211_find_elem+0x15/0x29 [cfg80211]
? is_bss+0x1b7/0x1d7 [cfg80211]
ieee80211_auth+0x18/0x27 [mac80211]
cfg80211_mlme_auth+0x3bb/0x3e7 [cfg80211]
cfg80211_conn_do_work+0x410/0xb81 [cfg80211]
? __pfx_cfg80211_conn_do_work+0x10/0x10 [cfg80211]
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x1f
? psi_group_change+0x8bc/0x944
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x22
? mutex_lock+0x8e/0xdc
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___radix_tree_lookup+0x10/0x10
cfg80211_conn_work+0x245/0x34d [cfg80211]
? __pfx_cfg80211_conn_work+0x10/0x10 [cfg80211]
? update_cfs_rq_load_avg+0x3bc/0x3d7
? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x1a
? sched_clock+0x10/0x24
? sched_clock_cpu+0x7e/0x42e
? newidle_balance+0x796/0x937
? __pfx_sched_clock_cpu+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_newidle_balance+0x10/0x10
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x1f
? psi_group_change+0x8bc/0x944
? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x24
? raw_spin_rq_unlock+0x47/0x54
? raw_spin_rq_unlock_irq+0x9/0x1f
? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x347/0x586
? __schedule+0x27bf/0x2892
? mutex_unlock+0x80/0xd0
? do_raw_spin_lock+0x75/0xdb
? __pfx___schedule+0x10/0x10
process_scheduled_works+0x58c/0x821
worker_thread+0x4c7/0x586
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x1f
kthread+0x285/0x294
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x29/0x6f
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21725

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix oops due to unset link speed
It isn't guaranteed that NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO::LinkSpeed will always
be set by the server, so the client must handle any values and then
prevent oopses like below from happening:
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1323 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41
04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs] Code: 00 00 48
89 df e8 3b cd 1b c1 41 f6 44 24 2c 04 0f 84 50 01 00 00 48 89 ef e8
e7 d0 1b c1 49 8b 44 24 18 31 d2 49 8d 7c 24 28 <48> f7 74 24 18 48 89
c3 e8 6e cf 1b c1 41 8b 6c 24 28 49 8d 7c 24
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001817be0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811230022c RCX: ffffffffc041bd99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000567 RDI: ffff888112300228
RBP: ffff888112300218 R08: fffff52000302f5f R09: ffffed1022fa58ac
R10: ffff888117d2c566 R11: 00000000fffffffe R12: ffff888112300200
R13: 000000012a15343f R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff888113f2db58
FS: 00007fe27119e740(0000) GS:ffff888148600000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe2633c5000 CR3: 0000000124da0000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
? die+0x2e/0x50
? do_trap+0x159/0x1b0
? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
? do_error_trap+0x90/0x130
? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
? exc_divide_error+0x39/0x50
? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
? asm_exc_divide_error+0x1a/0x20
? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa39/0x1460 [cifs]
? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
? seq_read_iter+0x42e/0x790
seq_read_iter+0x19a/0x790
proc_reg_read_iter+0xbe/0x110
? __pfx_proc_reg_read_iter+0x10/0x10
vfs_read+0x469/0x570
? do_user_addr_fault+0x398/0x760
? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10
? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0
? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
ksys_read+0xd3/0x170
? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
? __rcu_read_unlock+0x50/0x270
? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe271288911
Code: 00 48 8b 15 01 25 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd e8
20 ad 01 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d b5 a7 10 00 00 74 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d
00 f0 ff ff 77 4f c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec
RSP: 002b:00007ffe87c079d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000040000 RCX: 00007fe271288911
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007fe2633c6000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffe87c07a00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fe2713e6380
R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000040000
R13: 00007fe2633c6000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Fix this by setting cifs_server_iface::speed to a sane value (1Gbps)
by default when link speed is unset.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21714

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix implicit ODP use after free
Prevent double queueing of implicit ODP mr destroy work by using
__xa_cmpxchg() to make sure this is the only time we are destroying this
specific mr.
Without this change, we could try to invalidate this mr twice, which in
turn could result in queuing a MR work destroy twice, and eventually the
second work could execute after the MR was freed due to the first work,
causing a user after free and trace below.
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 12178 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x12b/0x130
Modules linked in: bonding ib_ipoib vfio_pci ip_gre geneve nf_tables ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 ipip tunnel4 ib_umad rdma_ucm mlx5_vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_iommu_type1 mlx5_ib vfio ib_uverbs mlx5_core iptable_raw openvswitch nsh rpcrdma ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: ib_uverbs]
CPU: 2 PID: 12178 Comm: kworker/u20:5 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1_net_next_mlx5_58c644e #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound free_implicit_child_mr_work [mlx5_ib]
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x12b/0x130
Code: 48 c7 c7 38 95 2a 82 c6 05 bc c6 fe 00 01 e8 0c 66 aa ff 0f 0b 5b c3 48 c7 c7 e0 94 2a 82 c6 05 a7 c6 fe 00 01 e8 f5 65 aa ff <0f> 0b 5b c3 90 8b 07 3d 00 00 00 c0 74 12 83 f8 01 74 13 8d 50 ff
RSP: 0018:ffff8881008e3e40 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000027
RDX: ffff88852c91b5c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88852c91b5c0
RBP: ffff8881dacd4e00 R08: 00000000ffffffff R09: 0000000000000019
R10: 000000000000072e R11: 0000000063666572 R12: ffff88812bfd9e00
R13: ffff8881c792d200 R14: ffff88810011c005 R15: ffff8881002099c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88852c900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f5694b5e000 CR3: 00000001153f6003 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? refcount_warn_saturate+0x12b/0x130
free_implicit_child_mr_work+0x180/0x1b0 [mlx5_ib]
process_one_work+0x1cc/0x3c0
worker_thread+0x218/0x3c0
kthread+0xc6/0xf0
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21709

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kernel: be more careful about dup_mmap() failures and uprobe registering
If a memory allocation fails during dup_mmap(), the maple tree can be left
in an unsafe state for other iterators besides the exit path. All the
locks are dropped before the exit_mmap() call (in mm/mmap.c), but the
incomplete mm_struct can be reached through (at least) the rmap finding
the vmas which have a pointer back to the mm_struct.
Up to this point, there have been no issues with being able to find an
mm_struct that was only partially initialised. Syzbot was able to make
the incomplete mm_struct fail with recent forking changes, so it has been
proven unsafe to use the mm_struct that hasn't been initialised, as
referenced in the link below.
Although 8ac662f5da19f ("fork: avoid inappropriate uprobe access to
invalid mm") fixed the uprobe access, it does not completely remove the
race.
This patch sets the MMF_OOM_SKIP to avoid the iteration of the vmas on the
oom side (even though this is extremely unlikely to be selected as an oom
victim in the race window), and sets MMF_UNSTABLE to avoid other potential
users from using a partially initialised mm_struct.
When registering vmas for uprobe, skip the vmas in an mm that is marked
unstable. Modifying a vma in an unstable mm may cause issues if the mm
isn't fully initialised.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21707

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: consolidate suboption status
MPTCP maintains the received sub-options status is the bitmask carrying
the received suboptions and in several bitfields carrying per suboption
additional info.
Zeroing the bitmask before parsing is not enough to ensure a consistent
status, and the MPTCP code has to additionally clear some bitfiled
depending on the actually parsed suboption.
The above schema is fragile, and syzbot managed to trigger a path where
a relevant bitfield is not cleared/initialized:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __mptcp_expand_seq net/mptcp/options.c:1030 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mptcp_expand_seq net/mptcp/protocol.h:864 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ack_update_msk net/mptcp/options.c:1060 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mptcp_incoming_options+0x2036/0x3d30 net/mptcp/options.c:1209
__mptcp_expand_seq net/mptcp/options.c:1030 [inline]
mptcp_expand_seq net/mptcp/protocol.h:864 [inline]
ack_update_msk net/mptcp/options.c:1060 [inline]
mptcp_incoming_options+0x2036/0x3d30 net/mptcp/options.c:1209
tcp_data_queue+0xb4/0x7be0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5233
tcp_rcv_established+0x1061/0x2510 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6264
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x7f3/0x11a0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1916
tcp_v4_rcv+0x51df/0x5750 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2351
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2a3/0x13d0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x336/0x500 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
ip_local_deliver+0x21f/0x490 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254
dst_input include/net/dst.h:460 [inline]
ip_rcv_finish+0x4a2/0x520 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:447
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
ip_rcv+0xcd/0x380 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:567
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5704 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x319/0xa00 net/core/dev.c:5817
process_backlog+0x4ad/0xa50 net/core/dev.c:6149
__napi_poll+0xe7/0x980 net/core/dev.c:6902
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6971 [inline]
net_rx_action+0xa5a/0x19b0 net/core/dev.c:7093
handle_softirqs+0x1a0/0x7c0 kernel/softirq.c:561
__do_softirq+0x14/0x1a kernel/softirq.c:595
do_softirq+0x9a/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:462
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x9f/0xb0 kernel/softirq.c:389
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:919 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2758/0x57d0 net/core/dev.c:4493
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3168 [inline]
neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:523 [inline]
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:537 [inline]
ip_finish_output2+0x187c/0x1b70 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:236
__ip_finish_output+0x287/0x810
ip_finish_output+0x4b/0x600 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:324
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]
ip_output+0x15f/0x3f0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:434
dst_output include/net/dst.h:450 [inline]
ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:130 [inline]
__ip_queue_xmit+0x1f2a/0x20d0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:536
ip_queue_xmit+0x60/0x80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:550
__tcp_transmit_skb+0x3cea/0x4900 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1468
tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1486 [inline]
tcp_write_xmit+0x3b90/0x9070 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2829
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0xc4/0x380 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3012
tcp_send_fin+0x9f6/0xf50 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3618
__tcp_close+0x140c/0x1550 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3130
__mptcp_close_ssk+0x74e/0x16f0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2496
mptcp_close_ssk+0x26b/0x2c0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2550
mptcp_pm_nl_rm_addr_or_subflow+0x635/0xd10 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:889
mptcp_pm_nl_rm_subflow_received net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:924 [inline]
mptcp_pm_flush_addrs_and_subflows net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1688 [inline]
mptcp_nl_flush_addrs_list net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1709 [inline]
mptcp_pm_nl_flush_addrs_doit+0xe10/0x1630 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1750
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 [inline]
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21706

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: pm: only set fullmesh for subflow endp
With the in-kernel path-manager, it is possible to change the 'fullmesh'
flag. The code in mptcp_pm_nl_fullmesh() expects to change it only on
'subflow' endpoints, to recreate more or less subflows using the linked
address.
Unfortunately, the set_flags() hook was a bit more permissive, and
allowed 'implicit' endpoints to get the 'fullmesh' flag while it is not
allowed before.
That's what syzbot found, triggering the following warning:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6499 at net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1496 __mark_subflow_endp_available net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1496 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6499 at net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1496 mptcp_pm_nl_fullmesh net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1980 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6499 at net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1496 mptcp_nl_set_flags net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:2003 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6499 at net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1496 mptcp_pm_nl_set_flags+0x974/0xdc0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:2064
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6499 Comm: syz.1.413 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00172-gd1bf27c4e176 #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:__mark_subflow_endp_available net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1496 [inline]
RIP: 0010:mptcp_pm_nl_fullmesh net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1980 [inline]
RIP: 0010:mptcp_nl_set_flags net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:2003 [inline]
RIP: 0010:mptcp_pm_nl_set_flags+0x974/0xdc0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:2064
Code: 01 00 00 49 89 c5 e8 fb 45 e8 f5 e9 b8 fc ff ff e8 f1 45 e8 f5 4c 89 f7 be 03 00 00 00 e8 44 1d 0b f9 eb a0 e8 dd 45 e8 f5 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 17 ff ff ff 89 d9 80 e1 07 38 c1 0f 8c c9 fc ff ff 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d307240 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff8bb72e03 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88807da88000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc9000d307430 R08: ffffffff8bb72cf0 R09: 1ffff1100b842a5e
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100b842a5f R12: ffff88801e2e5ac0
R13: ffff88805c214800 R14: ffff88805c2152e8 R15: 1ffff1100b842a5d
FS: 00005555619f6500(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020002840 CR3: 00000000247e6000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0xb14/0xec0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2542
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1321 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7f6/0x990 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1347
netlink_sendmsg+0x8e4/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1891
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:726
____sys_sendmsg+0x52a/0x7e0 net/socket.c:2583
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2637 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x269/0x350 net/socket.c:2669
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f5fe8785d29
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff571f5558 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f5fe8975fa0 RCX: 00007f5fe8785d29
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000480 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007f5fe8801b08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f5fe8975fa0 R14: 00007f5fe8975fa0 R15: 000000
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21705

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: handle fastopen disconnect correctly
Syzbot was able to trigger a data stream corruption:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9846 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:1024 __mptcp_clean_una+0xddb/0xff0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1024
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9846 Comm: syz-executor351 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2-syzkaller-00059-g00a5acdbf398 #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/25/2024
RIP: 0010:__mptcp_clean_una+0xddb/0xff0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1024
Code: fa ff ff 48 8b 4c 24 18 80 e1 07 fe c1 38 c1 0f 8c 8e fa ff ff 48 8b 7c 24 18 e8 e0 db 54 f6 e9 7f fa ff ff e8 e6 80 ee f5 90 <0f> 0b 90 4c 8b 6c 24 40 4d 89 f4 e9 04 f5 ff ff 44 89 f1 80 e1 07
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000c0cf400 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff8bb0dd5a RBX: ffff888033f5d230 RCX: ffff888059ce8000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc9000c0cf518 R08: ffffffff8bb0d1dd R09: 1ffff110170c8928
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed10170c8929 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff888033f5d220 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8880592b8000
FS: 00007f6e866496c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6e86f491a0 CR3: 00000000310e6000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__mptcp_clean_una_wakeup+0x7f/0x2d0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1074
mptcp_release_cb+0x7cb/0xb30 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3493
release_sock+0x1aa/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:3640
inet_wait_for_connect net/ipv4/af_inet.c:609 [inline]
__inet_stream_connect+0x8bd/0xf30 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:703
mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x2a2/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1755
mptcp_sendmsg+0x1884/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1830
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:726
____sys_sendmsg+0x52a/0x7e0 net/socket.c:2583
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2637 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x269/0x350 net/socket.c:2669
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f6e86ebfe69
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 b1 1f 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f6e86649168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f6e86f491b8 RCX: 00007f6e86ebfe69
RDX: 0000000030004001 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f6e86f491b0 R08: 00007f6e866496c0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6e86f491bc
R13: 000000000000006e R14: 00007ffe445d9420 R15: 00007ffe445d9508
</TASK>
The root cause is the bad handling of disconnect() generated internally
by the MPTCP protocol in case of connect FASTOPEN errors.
Address the issue increasing the socket disconnect counter even on such
a case, to allow other threads waiting on the same socket lock to
properly error out.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21696

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: clear uffd-wp PTE/PMD state on mremap()
When mremap()ing a memory region previously registered with userfaultfd as
write-protected but without UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_REMAP, an inconsistency in
flag clearing leads to a mismatch between the vma flags (which have
uffd-wp cleared) and the pte/pmd flags (which do not have uffd-wp
cleared). This mismatch causes a subsequent mprotect(PROT_WRITE) to
trigger a warning in page_table_check_pte_flags() due to setting the pte
to writable while uffd-wp is still set.
Fix this by always explicitly clearing the uffd-wp pte/pmd flags on any
such mremap() so that the values are consistent with the existing clearing
of VM_UFFD_WP. Be careful to clear the logical flag regardless of its
physical form; a PTE bit, a swap PTE bit, or a PTE marker. Cover PTE,
huge PMD and hugetlb paths.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21693

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug
In zswap_compress() and zswap_decompress(), the per-CPU acomp_ctx of the
current CPU at the beginning of the operation is retrieved and used
throughout. However, since neither preemption nor migration are disabled,
it is possible that the operation continues on a different CPU.
If the original CPU is hotunplugged while the acomp_ctx is still in use,
we run into a UAF bug as some of the resources attached to the acomp_ctx
are freed during hotunplug in zswap_cpu_comp_dead() (i.e.
acomp_ctx.buffer, acomp_ctx.req, or acomp_ctx.acomp).
The problem was introduced in commit 1ec3b5fe6eec ("mm/zswap: move to use
crypto_acomp API for hardware acceleration") when the switch to the
crypto_acomp API was made. Prior to that, the per-CPU crypto_comp was
retrieved using get_cpu_ptr() which disables preemption and makes sure the
CPU cannot go away from under us. Preemption cannot be disabled with the
crypto_acomp API as a sleepable context is needed.
Use the acomp_ctx.mutex to synchronize CPU hotplug callbacks allocating
and freeing resources with compression/decompression paths. Make sure
that acomp_ctx.req is NULL when the resources are freed. In the
compression/decompression paths, check if acomp_ctx.req is NULL after
acquiring the mutex (meaning the CPU was offlined) and retry on the new
CPU.
The initialization of acomp_ctx.mutex is moved from the CPU hotplug
callback to the pool initialization where it belongs (where the mutex is
allocated). In addition to adding clarity, this makes sure that CPU
hotplug cannot reinitialize a mutex that is already locked by
compression/decompression.
Previously a fix was attempted by holding cpus_read_lock() [1]. This
would have caused a potential deadlock as it is possible for code already
holding the lock to fall into reclaim and enter zswap (causing a
deadlock). A fix was also attempted using SRCU for synchronization, but
Johannes pointed out that synchronize_srcu() cannot be used in CPU hotplug
notifiers [2].
Alternative fixes that were considered/attempted and could have worked:
- Refcounting the per-CPU acomp_ctx. This involves complexity in
handling the race between the refcount dropping to zero in
zswap_[de]compress() and the refcount being re-initialized when the
CPU is onlined.
- Disabling migration before getting the per-CPU acomp_ctx [3], but
that's discouraged and is a much bigger hammer than needed, and could
result in subtle performance issues.
[1]https://lkml.kernel.org/20241219212437.2714151-1-yosryahmed@google.com/
[2]https://lkml.kernel.org/20250107074724.1756696-2-yosryahmed@google.com/
[3]https://lkml.kernel.org/20250107222236.2715883-2-yosryahmed@google.com/
[yosryahmed@google.com: remove comment]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21692

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: fix ets qdisc OOB Indexing
Haowei Yan <g1042620637@gmail.com> found that ets_class_from_arg() can
index an Out-Of-Bound class in ets_class_from_arg() when passed clid of
0. The overflow may cause local privilege escalation.
[ 18.852298] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 18.853271] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/sched/sch_ets.c:93:20
[ 18.853743] index 18446744073709551615 is out of range for type 'ets_class [16]'
[ 18.854254] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1275 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.12.6-dirty #17
[ 18.854821] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 18.856532] Call Trace:
[ 18.857441] <TASK>
[ 18.858227] dump_stack_lvl+0xc2/0xf0
[ 18.859607] dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[ 18.860908] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xa7/0xf0
[ 18.864022] ets_class_change+0x3d6/0x3f0
[ 18.864322] tc_ctl_tclass+0x251/0x910
[ 18.864587] ? lock_acquire+0x5e/0x140
[ 18.865113] ? __mutex_lock+0x9c/0xe70
[ 18.866009] ? __mutex_lock+0xa34/0xe70
[ 18.866401] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x170/0x6f0
[ 18.866806] ? __lock_acquire+0x578/0xc10
[ 18.867184] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
[ 18.867503] netlink_rcv_skb+0x59/0x110
[ 18.867776] rtnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x30
[ 18.868159] netlink_unicast+0x1c3/0x2b0
[ 18.868440] netlink_sendmsg+0x239/0x4b0
[ 18.868721] ____sys_sendmsg+0x3e2/0x410
[ 18.869012] ___sys_sendmsg+0x88/0xe0
[ 18.869276] ? rseq_ip_fixup+0x198/0x260
[ 18.869563] ? rseq_update_cpu_node_id+0x10a/0x190
[ 18.869900] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x5a/0xd0
[ 18.870196] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x220
[ 18.870547] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x150
[ 18.870821] ? __memcg_slab_free_hook+0x69/0x290
[ 18.871157] __sys_sendmsg+0x69/0xd0
[ 18.871416] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1d/0x30
[ 18.871699] x64_sys_call+0x9e2/0x2670
[ 18.871979] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150
[ 18.873280] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x150
[ 18.874742] ? lock_release+0x7b/0x160
[ 18.876157] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x5ce/0x8f0
[ 18.877833] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xc2/0x210
[ 18.879608] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0
[ 18.879808] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70
[ 18.880023] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70
[ 18.880223] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70
[ 18.880426] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 18.880683] RIP: 0033:0x44a957
[ 18.880851] Code: ff ff e8 fc 00 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 8974 24 10
[ 18.881766] RSP: 002b:00007ffcdd00fad8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[ 18.882149] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcdd010db8 RCX: 000000000044a957
[ 18.882507] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffcdd00fb70 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 18.885037] RBP: 00007ffcdd010bc0 R08: 000000000703c770 R09: 000000000703c7c0
[ 18.887203] R10: 0000000000000080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 18.888026] R13: 00007ffcdd010da8 R14: 00000000004ca7d0 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 18.888395] </TASK>
[ 18.888610] ---[ end trace ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21682

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: bnxt: always recalculate features after XDP clearing, fix null-deref
Recalculate features when XDP is detached.
Before:
# ip li set dev eth0 xdp obj xdp_dummy.bpf.o sec xdp
# ip li set dev eth0 xdp off
# ethtool -k eth0 | grep gro
rx-gro-hw: off [requested on]
After:
# ip li set dev eth0 xdp obj xdp_dummy.bpf.o sec xdp
# ip li set dev eth0 xdp off
# ethtool -k eth0 | grep gro
rx-gro-hw: on
The fact that HW-GRO doesn't get re-enabled automatically is just
a minor annoyance. The real issue is that the features will randomly
come back during another reconfiguration which just happens to invoke
netdev_update_features(). The driver doesn't handle reconfiguring
two things at a time very robustly.
Starting with commit 98ba1d931f61 ("bnxt_en: Fix RSS logic in
__bnxt_reserve_rings()") we only reconfigure the RSS hash table
if the "effective" number of Rx rings has changed. If HW-GRO is
enabled "effective" number of rings is 2x what user sees.
So if we are in the bad state, with HW-GRO re-enablement "pending"
after XDP off, and we lower the rings by / 2 - the HW-GRO rings
doing 2x and the ethtool -L doing / 2 may cancel each other out,
and the:
if (old_rx_rings != bp->hw_resc.resv_rx_rings &&
condition in __bnxt_reserve_rings() will be false.
The RSS map won't get updated, and we'll crash with:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000168
RIP: 0010:__bnxt_hwrm_vnic_set_rss+0x13a/0x1a0
bnxt_hwrm_vnic_rss_cfg_p5+0x47/0x180
__bnxt_setup_vnic_p5+0x58/0x110
bnxt_init_nic+0xb72/0xf50
__bnxt_open_nic+0x40d/0xab0
bnxt_open_nic+0x2b/0x60
ethtool_set_channels+0x18c/0x1d0
As we try to access a freed ring.
The issue is present since XDP support was added, really, but
prior to commit 98ba1d931f61 ("bnxt_en: Fix RSS logic in
__bnxt_reserve_rings()") it wasn't causing major issues.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21681

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: fix lockup on tx to unregistering netdev with carrier
Commit in a fixes tag attempted to fix the issue in the following
sequence of calls:
do_output
-> ovs_vport_send
-> dev_queue_xmit
-> __dev_queue_xmit
-> netdev_core_pick_tx
-> skb_tx_hash
When device is unregistering, the 'dev->real_num_tx_queues' goes to
zero and the 'while (unlikely(hash >= qcount))' loop inside the
'skb_tx_hash' becomes infinite, locking up the core forever.
But unfortunately, checking just the carrier status is not enough to
fix the issue, because some devices may still be in unregistering
state while reporting carrier status OK.
One example of such device is a net/dummy. It sets carrier ON
on start, but it doesn't implement .ndo_stop to set the carrier off.
And it makes sense, because dummy doesn't really have a carrier.
Therefore, while this device is unregistering, it's still easy to hit
the infinite loop in the skb_tx_hash() from the OVS datapath. There
might be other drivers that do the same, but dummy by itself is
important for the OVS ecosystem, because it is frequently used as a
packet sink for tcpdump while debugging OVS deployments. And when the
issue is hit, the only way to recover is to reboot.
Fix that by also checking if the device is running. The running
state is handled by the net core during unregistering, so it covers
unregistering case better, and we don't really need to send packets
to devices that are not running anyway.
While only checking the running state might be enough, the carrier
check is preserved. The running and the carrier states seem disjoined
throughout the code and different drivers. And other core functions
like __dev_direct_xmit() check both before attempting to transmit
a packet. So, it seems safer to check both flags in OVS as well.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21673

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix double free of TCP_Server_Info::hostname
When shutting down the server in cifs_put_tcp_session(), cifsd thread
might be reconnecting to multiple DFS targets before it realizes it
should exit the loop, so @server->hostname can't be freed as long as
cifsd thread isn't done. Otherwise the following can happen:
RIP: 0010:__slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
Code: 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc 4c 89 de 4c 89 cf 44 89 44 24 08 4c 89
1c 24 e8 fb cf 8e 00 44 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 1c 24 e9 5f fe ff ff <0f>
0b 41 f7 45 08 00 0d 21 00 0f 85 2d ff ff ff e9 1f ff ff ff 80
RSP: 0018:ffffb26180dbfd08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffff8ea34728e510 RBX: ffff8ea34728e500 RCX: 0000000000800068
RDX: 0000000000800068 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ea340042400
RBP: ffffe112041ca380 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 6170732e31303000 R11: 70726f632e786563 R12: ffff8ea34728e500
R13: ffff8ea340042400 R14: ffff8ea34728e500 R15: 0000000000800068
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ea66fd80000(0000)
000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffc25376080 CR3: 000000012a2ba001 CR4:
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? __reconnect_target_unlocked+0x3e/0x160 [cifs]
? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
? die+0x2b/0x50
? do_trap+0xce/0x120
? __slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
? __slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
? __slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? __slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
? extract_hostname+0x5c/0xa0 [cifs]
? extract_hostname+0x5c/0xa0 [cifs]
? __kmalloc+0x4b/0x140
__reconnect_target_unlocked+0x3e/0x160 [cifs]
reconnect_dfs_server+0x145/0x430 [cifs]
cifs_handle_standard+0x1ad/0x1d0 [cifs]
cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x592/0x730 [cifs]
? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
kthread+0xdd/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21672

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix merge preference rule failure condition
syzbot reported a lock held when returning to userspace[1]. This is
because if argc is less than 0 and the function returns directly, the held
inode lock is not released.
Fix this by store the error in ret and jump to done to clean up instead of
returning directly.
[dh: Modified Lizhi Xu's original patch to make it honour the error code
from afs_split_string()]
[1]
WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller-00209-g499551201b5f #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------
syz-executor133/5823 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
1 lock held by syz-executor133/5823:
#0: ffff888071cffc00 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:818 [inline]
#0: ffff888071cffc00 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}-{4:4}, at: afs_proc_addr_prefs_write+0x2bb/0x14e0 fs/afs/addr_prefs.c:388

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21670

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/bpf: return early if transport is not assigned
Some of the core functions can only be called if the transport
has been assigned.
As Michal reported, a socket might have the transport at NULL,
for example after a failed connect(), causing the following trace:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a0
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 12faf8067 P4D 12faf8067 PUD 113670067 PMD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 1198 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2+
RIP: 0010:vsock_connectible_has_data+0x1f/0x40
Call Trace:
vsock_bpf_recvmsg+0xca/0x5e0
sock_recvmsg+0xb9/0xc0
__sys_recvfrom+0xb3/0x130
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
So we need to check the `vsk->transport` in vsock_bpf_recvmsg(),
especially for connected sockets (stream/seqpacket) as we already
do in __vsock_connectible_recvmsg().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21668

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pmdomain: imx8mp-blk-ctrl: add missing loop break condition
Currently imx8mp_blk_ctrl_remove() will continue the for loop
until an out-of-bounds exception occurs.
pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : dev_pm_domain_detach+0x8/0x48
lr : imx8mp_blk_ctrl_shutdown+0x58/0x90
sp : ffffffc084f8bbf0
x29: ffffffc084f8bbf0 x28: ffffff80daf32ac0 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffffffc081658d78 x25: 0000000000000001 x24: ffffffc08201b028
x23: ffffff80d0db9490 x22: ffffffc082340a78 x21: 00000000000005b0
x20: ffffff80d19bc180 x19: 000000000000000a x18: ffffffffffffffff
x17: ffffffc080a39e08 x16: ffffffc080a39c98 x15: 4f435f464f006c72
x14: 0000000000000004 x13: ffffff80d0172110 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: ffffff80d0537740 x10: ffffff80d05376c0 x9 : ffffffc0808ed2d8
x8 : ffffffc084f8bab0 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : ffffff80d19b9420 x4 : fffffffe03466e60 x3 : 0000000080800077
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
dev_pm_domain_detach+0x8/0x48
platform_shutdown+0x2c/0x48
device_shutdown+0x158/0x268
kernel_restart_prepare+0x40/0x58
kernel_kexec+0x58/0xe8
__do_sys_reboot+0x198/0x258
__arm64_sys_reboot+0x2c/0x40
invoke_syscall+0x5c/0x138
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
el0_svc+0x38/0xc8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198
Code: 8128c2d0 ffffffc0 aa1e03e9 d503201f

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21649

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hns3: fix kernel crash when 1588 is sent on HIP08 devices
Currently, HIP08 devices does not register the ptp devices, so the
hdev->ptp is NULL. But the tx process would still try to set hardware time
stamp info with SKBTX_HW_TSTAMP flag and cause a kernel crash.
[ 128.087798] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000018
...
[ 128.280251] pc : hclge_ptp_set_tx_info+0x2c/0x140 [hclge]
[ 128.286600] lr : hclge_ptp_set_tx_info+0x20/0x140 [hclge]
[ 128.292938] sp : ffff800059b93140
[ 128.297200] x29: ffff800059b93140 x28: 0000000000003280
[ 128.303455] x27: ffff800020d48280 x26: ffff0cb9dc814080
[ 128.309715] x25: ffff0cb9cde93fa0 x24: 0000000000000001
[ 128.315969] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000194
[ 128.322219] x21: ffff0cd94f986000 x20: 0000000000000000
[ 128.328462] x19: ffff0cb9d2a166c0 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 128.334698] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffcf1fc523ed24
[ 128.340934] x15: 0000ffffd530a518 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 128.347162] x13: ffff0cd6bdb31310 x12: 0000000000000368
[ 128.353388] x11: ffff0cb9cfbc7070 x10: ffff2cf55dd11e02
[ 128.359606] x9 : ffffcf1f85a212b4 x8 : ffff0cd7cf27dab0
[ 128.365831] x7 : 0000000000000a20 x6 : ffff0cd7cf27d000
[ 128.372040] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 000000000000ffff
[ 128.378243] x3 : 0000000000000400 x2 : ffffcf1f85a21294
[ 128.384437] x1 : ffff0cb9db520080 x0 : ffff0cb9db500080
[ 128.390626] Call trace:
[ 128.393964] hclge_ptp_set_tx_info+0x2c/0x140 [hclge]
[ 128.399893] hns3_nic_net_xmit+0x39c/0x4c4 [hns3]
[ 128.405468] xmit_one.constprop.0+0xc4/0x200
[ 128.410600] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x54/0xf0
[ 128.415556] sch_direct_xmit+0xe8/0x634
[ 128.420246] __dev_queue_xmit+0x224/0xc70
[ 128.425101] dev_queue_xmit+0x1c/0x40
[ 128.429608] ovs_vport_send+0xac/0x1a0 [openvswitch]
[ 128.435409] do_output+0x60/0x17c [openvswitch]
[ 128.440770] do_execute_actions+0x898/0x8c4 [openvswitch]
[ 128.446993] ovs_execute_actions+0x64/0xf0 [openvswitch]
[ 128.453129] ovs_dp_process_packet+0xa0/0x224 [openvswitch]
[ 128.459530] ovs_vport_receive+0x7c/0xfc [openvswitch]
[ 128.465497] internal_dev_xmit+0x34/0xb0 [openvswitch]
[ 128.471460] xmit_one.constprop.0+0xc4/0x200
[ 128.476561] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x54/0xf0
[ 128.481489] __dev_queue_xmit+0x968/0xc70
[ 128.486330] dev_queue_xmit+0x1c/0x40
[ 128.490856] ip_finish_output2+0x250/0x570
[ 128.495810] __ip_finish_output+0x170/0x1e0
[ 128.500832] ip_finish_output+0x3c/0xf0
[ 128.505504] ip_output+0xbc/0x160
[ 128.509654] ip_send_skb+0x58/0xd4
[ 128.513892] udp_send_skb+0x12c/0x354
[ 128.518387] udp_sendmsg+0x7a8/0x9c0
[ 128.522793] inet_sendmsg+0x4c/0x8c
[ 128.527116] __sock_sendmsg+0x48/0x80
[ 128.531609] __sys_sendto+0x124/0x164
[ 128.536099] __arm64_sys_sendto+0x30/0x5c
[ 128.540935] invoke_syscall+0x50/0x130
[ 128.545508] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x10c/0x124
[ 128.551205] do_el0_svc+0x34/0xdc
[ 128.555347] el0_svc+0x20/0x30
[ 128.559227] el0_sync_handler+0xb8/0xc0
[ 128.563883] el0_sync+0x160/0x180

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21631

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block, bfq: fix waker_bfqq UAF after bfq_split_bfqq()
Our syzkaller report a following UAF for v6.6:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfq_init_rq+0x175d/0x17a0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6958
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881b57147d8 by task fsstress/232726
CPU: 2 PID: 232726 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.6.0-g3629d1885222 #39
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x66/0x300 mm/kasan/report.c:364
print_report+0x3e/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:475
kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0 mm/kasan/report.c:588
hlist_add_head include/linux/list.h:1023 [inline]
bfq_init_rq+0x175d/0x17a0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6958
bfq_insert_request.isra.0+0xe8/0xa20 block/bfq-iosched.c:6271
bfq_insert_requests+0x27f/0x390 block/bfq-iosched.c:6323
blk_mq_insert_request+0x290/0x8f0 block/blk-mq.c:2660
blk_mq_submit_bio+0x1021/0x15e0 block/blk-mq.c:3143
__submit_bio+0xa0/0x6b0 block/blk-core.c:639
__submit_bio_noacct_mq block/blk-core.c:718 [inline]
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x5b7/0x810 block/blk-core.c:747
submit_bio_noacct+0xca0/0x1990 block/blk-core.c:847
__ext4_read_bh fs/ext4/super.c:205 [inline]
ext4_read_bh+0x15e/0x2e0 fs/ext4/super.c:230
__read_extent_tree_block+0x304/0x6f0 fs/ext4/extents.c:567
ext4_find_extent+0x479/0xd20 fs/ext4/extents.c:947
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x1a3/0x2680 fs/ext4/extents.c:4182
ext4_map_blocks+0x929/0x15a0 fs/ext4/inode.c:660
ext4_iomap_begin_report+0x298/0x480 fs/ext4/inode.c:3569
iomap_iter+0x3dd/0x1010 fs/iomap/iter.c:91
iomap_fiemap+0x1f4/0x360 fs/iomap/fiemap.c:80
ext4_fiemap+0x181/0x210 fs/ext4/extents.c:5051
ioctl_fiemap.isra.0+0x1b4/0x290 fs/ioctl.c:220
do_vfs_ioctl+0x31c/0x11a0 fs/ioctl.c:811
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:869 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xae/0x190 fs/ioctl.c:857
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x70/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2
Allocated by task 232719:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x87/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:328
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:188 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:768 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3492 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1b8/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:3537
bfq_get_queue+0x215/0x1f00 block/bfq-iosched.c:5869
bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split+0x167/0x5f0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6776
bfq_init_rq+0x13a4/0x17a0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6938
bfq_insert_request.isra.0+0xe8/0xa20 block/bfq-iosched.c:6271
bfq_insert_requests+0x27f/0x390 block/bfq-iosched.c:6323
blk_mq_insert_request+0x290/0x8f0 block/blk-mq.c:2660
blk_mq_submit_bio+0x1021/0x15e0 block/blk-mq.c:3143
__submit_bio+0xa0/0x6b0 block/blk-core.c:639
__submit_bio_noacct_mq block/blk-core.c:718 [inline]
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x5b7/0x810 block/blk-core.c:747
submit_bio_noacct+0xca0/0x1990 block/blk-core.c:847
__ext4_read_bh fs/ext4/super.c:205 [inline]
ext4_read_bh_nowait+0x15a/0x240 fs/ext4/super.c:217
ext4_read_bh_lock+0xac/0xd0 fs/ext4/super.c:242
ext4_bread_batch+0x268/0x500 fs/ext4/inode.c:958
__ext4_find_entry+0x448/0x10f0 fs/ext4/namei.c:1671
ext4_lookup_entry fs/ext4/namei.c:1774 [inline]
ext4_lookup.part.0+0x359/0x6f0 fs/ext4/namei.c:1842
ext4_lookup+0x72/0x90 fs/ext4/namei.c:1839
__lookup_slow+0x257/0x480 fs/namei.c:1696
lookup_slow fs/namei.c:1713 [inline]
walk_component+0x454/0x5c0 fs/namei.c:2004
link_path_walk.part.0+0x773/0xda0 fs/namei.c:2331
link_path_walk fs/namei.c:3826 [inline]
path_openat+0x1b9/0x520 fs/namei.c:3826
do_filp_open+0x1b7/0x400 fs/namei.c:3857
do_sys_openat2+0x5dc/0x6e0 fs/open.c:1428
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1443 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1454 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x148/0x200 fs/open.c:1454
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_6
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-58088

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix deadlock when freeing cgroup storage
The following commit
bc235cdb423a ("bpf: Prevent deadlock from recursive bpf_task_storage_[get|delete]")
first introduced deadlock prevention for fentry/fexit programs attaching
on bpf_task_storage helpers. That commit also employed the logic in map
free path in its v6 version.
Later bpf_cgrp_storage was first introduced in
c4bcfb38a95e ("bpf: Implement cgroup storage available to non-cgroup-attached bpf progs")
which faces the same issue as bpf_task_storage, instead of its busy
counter, NULL was passed to bpf_local_storage_map_free() which opened
a window to cause deadlock:
<TASK>
(acquiring local_storage->lock)
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3d/0x50
bpf_local_storage_update+0xd1/0x460
bpf_cgrp_storage_get+0x109/0x130
bpf_prog_a4d4a370ba857314_cgrp_ptr+0x139/0x170
? __bpf_prog_enter_recur+0x16/0x80
bpf_trampoline_6442485186+0x43/0xa4
cgroup_storage_ptr+0x9/0x20
(holding local_storage->lock)
bpf_selem_unlink_storage_nolock.constprop.0+0x135/0x160
bpf_selem_unlink_storage+0x6f/0x110
bpf_local_storage_map_free+0xa2/0x110
bpf_map_free_deferred+0x5b/0x90
process_one_work+0x17c/0x390
worker_thread+0x251/0x360
kthread+0xd2/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Progs:
- A: SEC("fentry/cgroup_storage_ptr")
- cgid (BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH)
Record the id of the cgroup the current task belonging
to in this hash map, using the address of the cgroup
as the map key.
- cgrpa (BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE)
If current task is a kworker, lookup the above hash
map using function parameter @owner as the key to get
its corresponding cgroup id which is then used to get
a trusted pointer to the cgroup through
bpf_cgroup_from_id(). This trusted pointer can then
be passed to bpf_cgrp_storage_get() to finally trigger
the deadlock issue.
- B: SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
- cgrpb (BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE)
The only purpose of this prog is to fill Prog A's
hash map by calling bpf_cgrp_storage_get() for as
many userspace tasks as possible.
Steps to reproduce:
- Run A;
- while (true) { Run B; Destroy B; }
Fix this issue by passing its busy counter to the free procedure so
it can be properly incremented before storage/smap locking.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-58071

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
team: prevent adding a device which is already a team device lower
Prevent adding a device which is already a team device lower,
e.g. adding veth0 if vlan1 was already added and veth0 is a lower of
vlan1.
This is not useful in practice and can lead to recursive locking:
$ ip link add veth0 type veth peer name veth1
$ ip link set veth0 up
$ ip link set veth1 up
$ ip link add link veth0 name veth0.1 type vlan protocol 802.1Q id 1
$ ip link add team0 type team
$ ip link set veth0.1 down
$ ip link set veth0.1 master team0
team0: Port device veth0.1 added
$ ip link set veth0 down
$ ip link set veth0 master team0
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.13.0-rc2-virtme-00441-ga14a429069bb #46 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
ip/7684 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888016848e00 (team->team_lock_key){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: team_device_event (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2928 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2951 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2973)
but task is already holding lock:
ffff888016848e00 (team->team_lock_key){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: team_add_slave (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1147 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1977)
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(team->team_lock_key);
lock(team->team_lock_key);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
2 locks held by ip/7684:
stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 7684 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2-virtme-00441-ga14a429069bb #46
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122)
print_deadlock_bug.cold (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3040)
__lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3893 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226)
? netlink_broadcast_filtered (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1548)
lock_acquire.part.0 (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851)
? team_device_event (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2928 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2951 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2973)
? trace_lock_acquire (./include/trace/events/lock.h:24 (discriminator 2))
? team_device_event (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2928 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2951 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2973)
? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5822)
? team_device_event (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2928 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2951 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2973)
__mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 kernel/locking/mutex.c:735)
? team_device_event (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2928 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2951 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2973)
? team_device_event (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2928 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2951 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2973)
? fib_sync_up (net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:2167)
? team_device_event (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2928 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2951 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2973)
team_device_event (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2928 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2951 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2973)
notifier_call_chain (kernel/notifier.c:85)
call_netdevice_notifiers_info (net/core/dev.c:1996)
__dev_notify_flags (net/core/dev.c:8993)
? __dev_change_flags (net/core/dev.c:8975)
dev_change_flags (net/core/dev.c:9027)
vlan_device_event (net/8021q/vlan.c:85 net/8021q/vlan.c:470)
? br_device_event (net/bridge/br.c:143)
notifier_call_chain (kernel/notifier.c:85)
call_netdevice_notifiers_info (net/core/dev.c:1996)
dev_open (net/core/dev.c:1519 net/core/dev.c:1505)
team_add_slave (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1219 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1977)
? __pfx_team_add_slave (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1972)
do_set_master (net/core/rtnetlink.c:2917)
do_setlink.isra.0 (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3117)

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-58060

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject struct_ops registration that uses module ptr and the module btf_id is missing
There is a UAF report in the bpf_struct_ops when CONFIG_MODULES=n.
In particular, the report is on tcp_congestion_ops that has
a "struct module *owner" member.
For struct_ops that has a "struct module *owner" member,
it can be extended either by the regular kernel module or
by the bpf_struct_ops. bpf_try_module_get() will be used
to do the refcounting and different refcount is done
based on the owner pointer. When CONFIG_MODULES=n,
the btf_id of the "struct module" is missing:
WARN: resolve_btfids: unresolved symbol module
Thus, the bpf_try_module_get() cannot do the correct refcounting.
Not all subsystem's struct_ops requires the "struct module *owner" member.
e.g. the recent sched_ext_ops.
This patch is to disable bpf_struct_ops registration if
the struct_ops has the "struct module *" member and the
"struct module" btf_id is missing. The btf_type_is_fwd() helper
is moved to the btf.h header file for this test.
This has happened since the beginning of bpf_struct_ops which has gone
through many changes. The Fixes tag is set to a recent commit that this
patch can apply cleanly. Considering CONFIG_MODULES=n is not
common and the age of the issue, targeting for bpf-next also.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-58057

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: convert workqueues to unbound
When a workqueue is created with `WQ_UNBOUND`, its work items are
served by special worker-pools, whose host workers are not bound to
any specific CPU. In the default configuration (i.e. when
`queue_delayed_work` and friends do not specify which CPU to run the
work item on), `WQ_UNBOUND` allows the work item to be executed on any
CPU in the same node of the CPU it was enqueued on. While this
solution potentially sacrifices locality, it avoids contention with
other processes that might dominate the CPU time of the processor the
work item was scheduled on.
This is not just a theoretical problem: in a particular scenario
misconfigured process was hogging most of the time from CPU0, leaving
less than 0.5% of its CPU time to the kworker. The IDPF workqueues
that were using the kworker on CPU0 suffered large completion delays
as a result, causing performance degradation, timeouts and eventual
system crash.
* I have also run a manual test to gauge the performance
improvement. The test consists of an antagonist process
(`./stress --cpu 2`) consuming as much of CPU 0 as possible. This
process is run under `taskset 01` to bind it to CPU0, and its
priority is changed with `chrt -pQ 9900 10000 ${pid}` and
`renice -n -20 ${pid}` after start.
Then, the IDPF driver is forced to prefer CPU0 by editing all calls
to `queue_delayed_work`, `mod_delayed_work`, etc... to use CPU 0.
Finally, `ktraces` for the workqueue events are collected.
Without the current patch, the antagonist process can force
arbitrary delays between `workqueue_queue_work` and
`workqueue_execute_start`, that in my tests were as high as
`30ms`. With the current patch applied, the workqueue can be
migrated to another unloaded CPU in the same node, and, keeping
everything else equal, the maximum delay I could see was `6us`.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-58013

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix slab-use-after-free Read in mgmt_remove_adv_monitor_sync
This fixes the following crash:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_remove_adv_monitor_sync+0x3a/0xd0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5543
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88814128f898 by task kworker/u9:4/5961
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5961 Comm: kworker/u9:4 Not tainted 6.12.0-syzkaller-10684-gf1cd565ce577 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602
mgmt_remove_adv_monitor_sync+0x3a/0xd0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5543
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x22b/0x400 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa63/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Allocated by task 16026:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x243/0x390 mm/slub.c:4314
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:901 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1037 [inline]
mgmt_pending_new+0x65/0x250 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:269
mgmt_pending_add+0x36/0x120 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296
remove_adv_monitor+0x102/0x1b0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5568
hci_mgmt_cmd+0xc47/0x11d0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1712
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x7b8/0x11c0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1832
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:726
sock_write_iter+0x2d7/0x3f0 net/socket.c:1147
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:586 [inline]
vfs_write+0xaeb/0xd30 fs/read_write.c:679
ksys_write+0x18f/0x2b0 fs/read_write.c:731
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 16022:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:582
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x59/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2338 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4598 [inline]
kfree+0x196/0x420 mm/slub.c:4746
mgmt_pending_foreach+0xd1/0x130 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:259
__mgmt_power_off+0x183/0x430 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9550
hci_dev_close_sync+0x6c4/0x11c0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5208
hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:483 [inline]
hci_dev_close+0x112/0x210 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:508
sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1209
sock_ioctl+0x626/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1328
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-58005

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm: Change to kvalloc() in eventlog/acpi.c
The following failure was reported on HPE ProLiant D320:
[ 10.693310][ T1] tpm_tis STM0925:00: 2.0 TPM (device-id 0x3, rev-id 0)
[ 10.848132][ T1] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 10.853559][ T1] WARNING: CPU: 59 PID: 1 at mm/page_alloc.c:4727 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2ca/0x330
[ 10.862827][ T1] Modules linked in:
[ 10.866671][ T1] CPU: 59 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-lp155.2.g52785e2-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) 588cd98293a7c9eba9013378d807364c088c9375
[ 10.882741][ T1] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL320 Gen12/ProLiant DL320 Gen12, BIOS 1.20 10/28/2024
[ 10.892170][ T1] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_noprof+0x2ca/0x330
[ 10.898103][ T1] Code: 24 08 e9 4a fe ff ff e8 34 36 fa ff e9 88 fe ff ff 83 fe 0a 0f 86 b3 fd ff ff 80 3d 01 e7 ce 01 00 75 09 c6 05 f8 e6 ce 01 01 <0f> 0b 45 31 ff e9 e5 fe ff ff f7 c2 00 00 08 00 75 42 89 d9 80 e1
[ 10.917750][ T1] RSP: 0000:ffffb7cf40077980 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 10.923777][ T1] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000040cc0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 10.931727][ T1] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: 0000000000040cc0
The above transcript shows that ACPI pointed a 16 MiB buffer for the log
events because RSI maps to the 'order' parameter of __alloc_pages_noprof().
Address the bug by moving from devm_kmalloc() to devm_add_action() and
kvmalloc() and devm_add_action().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57996

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: sch_sfq: don't allow 1 packet limit
The current implementation does not work correctly with a limit of
1. iproute2 actually checks for this and this patch adds the check in
kernel as well.
This fixes the following syzkaller reported crash:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/sched/sch_sfq.c:210:6
index 65535 is out of range for type 'struct sfq_head[128]'
CPU: 0 PID: 2569 Comm: syz-executor101 Not tainted 5.10.0-smp-DEV #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
dump_stack+0x125/0x19f lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:148 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xed/0x120 lib/ubsan.c:347
sfq_link net/sched/sch_sfq.c:210 [inline]
sfq_dec+0x528/0x600 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:238
sfq_dequeue+0x39b/0x9d0 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:500
sfq_reset+0x13/0x50 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:525
qdisc_reset+0xfe/0x510 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1026
tbf_reset+0x3d/0x100 net/sched/sch_tbf.c:319
qdisc_reset+0xfe/0x510 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1026
dev_reset_queue+0x8c/0x140 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1296
netdev_for_each_tx_queue include/linux/netdevice.h:2350 [inline]
dev_deactivate_many+0x6dc/0xc20 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1362
__dev_close_many+0x214/0x350 net/core/dev.c:1468
dev_close_many+0x207/0x510 net/core/dev.c:1506
unregister_netdevice_many+0x40f/0x16b0 net/core/dev.c:10738
unregister_netdevice_queue+0x2be/0x310 net/core/dev.c:10695
unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:2893 [inline]
__tun_detach+0x6b6/0x1600 drivers/net/tun.c:689
tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:705 [inline]
tun_chr_close+0x104/0x1b0 drivers/net/tun.c:3640
__fput+0x203/0x840 fs/file_table.c:280
task_work_run+0x129/0x1b0 kernel/task_work.c:185
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:33 [inline]
do_exit+0x5ce/0x2200 kernel/exit.c:931
do_group_exit+0x144/0x310 kernel/exit.c:1046
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1057 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1055 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3b/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1055
do_syscall_64+0x6c/0xd0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
RIP: 0033:0x7fe5e7b52479
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7fe5e7b5244f.
RSP: 002b:00007ffd3c800398 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fe5e7b52479
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00007fe5e7bcd2d0 R08: ffffffffffffffb8 R09: 0000000000000014
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe5e7bcd2d0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fe5e7bcdd20 R15: 00007fe5e7b24270
The crash can be also be reproduced with the following (with a tc
recompiled to allow for sfq limits of 1):
tc qdisc add dev dummy0 handle 1: root tbf rate 1Kbit burst 100b lat 1s
../iproute2-6.9.0/tc/tc qdisc add dev dummy0 handle 2: parent 1:10 sfq limit 1
ifconfig dummy0 up
ping -I dummy0 -f -c2 -W0.1 8.8.8.8
sleep 1
Scenario that triggers the crash:
* the first packet is sent and queued in TBF and SFQ; qdisc qlen is 1
* TBF dequeues: it peeks from SFQ which moves the packet to the
gso_skb list and keeps qdisc qlen set to 1. TBF is out of tokens so
it schedules itself for later.
* the second packet is sent and TBF tries to queues it to SFQ. qdisc
qlen is now 2 and because the SFQ limit is 1 the packet is dropped
by SFQ. At this point qlen is 1, and all of the SFQ slots are empty,
however q->tail is not NULL.
At this point, assuming no more packets are queued, when sch_dequeue
runs again it will decrement the qlen for the current empty slot
causing an underflow and the subsequent out of bounds access.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57982

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: state: fix out-of-bounds read during lookup
lookup and resize can run in parallel.
The xfrm_state_hash_generation seqlock ensures a retry, but the hash
functions can observe a hmask value that is too large for the new hlist
array.
rehash does:
rcu_assign_pointer(net->xfrm.state_bydst, ndst) [..]
net->xfrm.state_hmask = nhashmask;
While state lookup does:
h = xfrm_dst_hash(net, daddr, saddr, tmpl->reqid, encap_family);
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, net->xfrm.state_bydst + h, bydst) {
This is only safe in case the update to state_bydst is larger than
net->xfrm.xfrm_state_hmask (or if the lookup function gets
serialized via state spinlock again).
Fix this by prefetching state_hmask and the associated pointers.
The xfrm_state_hash_generation seqlock retry will ensure that the pointer
and the hmask will be consistent.
The existing helpers, like xfrm_dst_hash(), are now unsafe for RCU side,
add lockdep assertions to document that they are only safe for insert
side.
xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr() uses the spinlock rather than RCU.
AFAICS this is an oversight from back when state lookup was converted to
RCU, this lock should be replaced with RCU in a future patch.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57979

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pps: Fix a use-after-free
On a board running ntpd and gpsd, I'm seeing a consistent use-after-free
in sys_exit() from gpsd when rebooting:
pps pps1: removed
------------[ cut here ]------------
kobject: '(null)' (00000000db4bec24): is not initialized, yet kobject_put() is being called.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 440 at lib/kobject.c:734 kobject_put+0x120/0x150
CPU: 2 UID: 299 PID: 440 Comm: gpsd Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-00308-gb31c44928842 #1
Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.1 (DT)
pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : kobject_put+0x120/0x150
lr : kobject_put+0x120/0x150
sp : ffffffc0803d3ae0
x29: ffffffc0803d3ae0 x28: ffffff8042dc9738 x27: 0000000000000001
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffffff8042dc9040 x24: ffffff8042dc9440
x23: ffffff80402a4620 x22: ffffff8042ef4bd0 x21: ffffff80405cb600
x20: 000000000008001b x19: ffffff8040b3b6e0 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 696e6920746f6e20
x14: 7369203a29343263 x13: 205d303434542020 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
kobject_put+0x120/0x150
cdev_put+0x20/0x3c
__fput+0x2c4/0x2d8
____fput+0x1c/0x38
task_work_run+0x70/0xfc
do_exit+0x2a0/0x924
do_group_exit+0x34/0x90
get_signal+0x7fc/0x8c0
do_signal+0x128/0x13b4
do_notify_resume+0xdc/0x160
el0_svc+0xd4/0xf8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x140/0x14c
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
...followed by more symptoms of corruption, with similar stacks:
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:62!
Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
This happens because pps_device_destruct() frees the pps_device with the
embedded cdev immediately after calling cdev_del(), but, as the comment
above cdev_del() notes, fops for previously opened cdevs are still
callable even after cdev_del() returns. I think this bug has always
been there: I can't explain why it suddenly started happening every time
I reboot this particular board.
In commit d953e0e837e6 ("pps: Fix a use-after free bug when
unregistering a source."), George Spelvin suggested removing the
embedded cdev. That seems like the simplest way to fix this, so I've
implemented his suggestion, using __register_chrdev() with pps_idr
becoming the source of truth for which minor corresponds to which
device.
But now that pps_idr defines userspace visibility instead of cdev_add(),
we need to be sure the pps->dev refcount can't reach zero while
userspace can still find it again. So, the idr_remove() call moves to
pps_unregister_cdev(), and pps_idr now holds a reference to pps->dev.
pps_core: source serial1 got cdev (251:1)
<...>
pps pps1: removed
pps_core: unregistering pps1
pps_core: deallocating pps1

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57977

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memcg: fix soft lockup in the OOM process
A soft lockup issue was found in the product with about 56,000 tasks were
in the OOM cgroup, it was traversing them when the soft lockup was
triggered.
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 23s! [VM Thread:1503066]
CPU: 2 PID: 1503066 Comm: VM Thread Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
Hardware name: Huawei Cloud OpenStack Nova, BIOS
RIP: 0010:console_unlock+0x343/0x540
RSP: 0000:ffffb751447db9a0 EFLAGS: 00000247 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000ffffffff
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000247
RBP: ffffffffafc71f90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000040
R10: 0000000000000080 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffafc74bd0
R13: ffffffffaf60a220 R14: 0000000000000247 R15: 0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f2fe6ad91f0 CR3: 00000004b2076003 CR4: 0000000000360ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
vprintk_emit+0x193/0x280
printk+0x52/0x6e
dump_task+0x114/0x130
mem_cgroup_scan_tasks+0x76/0x100
dump_header+0x1fe/0x210
oom_kill_process+0xd1/0x100
out_of_memory+0x125/0x570
mem_cgroup_out_of_memory+0xb5/0xd0
try_charge+0x720/0x770
mem_cgroup_try_charge+0x86/0x180
mem_cgroup_try_charge_delay+0x1c/0x40
do_anonymous_page+0xb5/0x390
handle_mm_fault+0xc4/0x1f0
This is because thousands of processes are in the OOM cgroup, it takes a
long time to traverse all of them. As a result, this lead to soft lockup
in the OOM process.
To fix this issue, call 'cond_resched' in the 'mem_cgroup_scan_tasks'
function per 1000 iterations. For global OOM, call
'touch_softlockup_watchdog' per 1000 iterations to avoid this issue.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57974

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udp: Deal with race between UDP socket address change and rehash
If a UDP socket changes its local address while it's receiving
datagrams, as a result of connect(), there is a period during which
a lookup operation might fail to find it, after the address is changed
but before the secondary hash (port and address) and the four-tuple
hash (local and remote ports and addresses) are updated.
Secondary hash chains were introduced by commit 30fff9231fad ("udp:
bind() optimisation") and, as a result, a rehash operation became
needed to make a bound socket reachable again after a connect().
This operation was introduced by commit 719f835853a9 ("udp: add
rehash on connect()") which isn't however a complete fix: the
socket will be found once the rehashing completes, but not while
it's pending.
This is noticeable with a socat(1) server in UDP4-LISTEN mode, and a
client sending datagrams to it. After the server receives the first
datagram (cf. _xioopen_ipdgram_listen()), it issues a connect() to
the address of the sender, in order to set up a directed flow.
Now, if the client, running on a different CPU thread, happens to
send a (subsequent) datagram while the server's socket changes its
address, but is not rehashed yet, this will result in a failed
lookup and a port unreachable error delivered to the client, as
apparent from the following reproducer:
LEN=$(($(cat /proc/sys/net/core/wmem_default) / 4))
dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=${LEN} of=tmp.in
while :; do
taskset -c 1 socat UDP4-LISTEN:1337,null-eof OPEN:tmp.out,create,trunc &
sleep 0.1 || sleep 1
taskset -c 2 socat OPEN:tmp.in UDP4:localhost:1337,shut-null
wait
done
where the client will eventually get ECONNREFUSED on a write()
(typically the second or third one of a given iteration):
2024/11/13 21:28:23 socat[46901] E write(6, 0x556db2e3c000, 8192): Connection refused
This issue was first observed as a seldom failure in Podman's tests
checking UDP functionality while using pasta(1) to connect the
container's network namespace, which leads us to a reproducer with
the lookup error resulting in an ICMP packet on a tap device:
LOCAL_ADDR="$(ip -j -4 addr show|jq -rM '.[] | .addr_info[0] | select(.scope == "global").local')"
while :; do
./pasta --config-net -p pasta.pcap -u 1337 socat UDP4-LISTEN:1337,null-eof OPEN:tmp.out,create,trunc &
sleep 0.2 || sleep 1
socat OPEN:tmp.in UDP4:${LOCAL_ADDR}:1337,shut-null
wait
cmp tmp.in tmp.out
done
Once this fails:
tmp.in tmp.out differ: char 8193, line 29
we can finally have a look at what's going on:
$ tshark -r pasta.pcap
1 0.000000 :: ? ff02::16 ICMPv6 110 Multicast Listener Report Message v2
2 0.168690 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
3 0.168767 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
4 0.168806 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
5 0.168827 c6:47:05:8d:dc:04 ? Broadcast ARP 42 Who has 88.198.0.161? Tell 88.198.0.164
6 0.168851 9a:55:9a:55:9a:55 ? c6:47:05:8d:dc:04 ARP 42 88.198.0.161 is at 9a:55:9a:55:9a:55
7 0.168875 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
8 0.168896 88.198.0.164 ? 88.198.0.161 ICMP 590 Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
9 0.168926 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
10 0.168959 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
11 0.168989 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 4138 60260 ? 1337 Len=4096
12 0.169010 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 42 60260 ? 1337 Len=0
On the third datagram received, the network namespace of the container
initiates an ARP lookup to deliver the ICMP message.
In another variant of this reproducer, starting the client with:
strace -f pasta --config-net -u 1337 socat UDP4-LISTEN:1337,null-eof OPEN:tmp.out,create,tru
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57948

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mac802154: check local interfaces before deleting sdata list
syzkaller reported a corrupted list in ieee802154_if_remove. [1]
Remove an IEEE 802.15.4 network interface after unregister an IEEE 802.15.4
hardware device from the system.
CPU0CPU1
========
genl_family_rcv_msg_doitieee802154_unregister_hw
ieee802154_del_ifaceieee802154_remove_interfaces
rdev_del_virtual_intf_deprecatedlist_del(&sdata->list)
ieee802154_if_remove
list_del_rcu
The net device has been unregistered, since the rcu grace period,
unregistration must be run before ieee802154_if_remove.
To avoid this issue, add a check for local->interfaces before deleting
sdata list.
[1]
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:58!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6277 Comm: syz-executor157 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-syzkaller-00005-g557329bcecc2 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xf4/0x140 lib/list_debug.c:56
Code: e8 a1 7e 00 07 90 0f 0b 48 c7 c7 e0 37 60 8c 4c 89 fe e8 8f 7e 00 07 90 0f 0b 48 c7 c7 40 38 60 8c 4c 89 fe e8 7d 7e 00 07 90 <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 a0 38 60 8c 4c 89 fe e8 6b 7e 00 07 90 0f 0b 48 c7
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000490f3d0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: dead000000000122 RCX: d211eee56bb28d00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88805b278dd8 R08: ffffffff8174a12c R09: 1ffffffff2852f0d
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff2852f0e R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: dead000000000100 R15: ffff88805b278cc0
FS: 0000555572f94380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000056262e4a3000 CR3: 0000000078496000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:124 [inline]
__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:215 [inline]
list_del_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:157 [inline]
ieee802154_if_remove+0x86/0x1e0 net/mac802154/iface.c:687
rdev_del_virtual_intf_deprecated net/ieee802154/rdev-ops.h:24 [inline]
ieee802154_del_iface+0x2c0/0x5c0 net/ieee802154/nl-phy.c:323
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0xb14/0xec0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2551
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1331 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7f6/0x990 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1357
netlink_sendmsg+0x8e4/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:729 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:744
____sys_sendmsg+0x52a/0x7e0 net/socket.c:2607
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2661 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x292/0x380 net/socket.c:2690
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57924

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: relax assertions on failure to encode file handles
Encoding file handles is usually performed by a filesystem >encode_fh()
method that may fail for various reasons.
The legacy users of exportfs_encode_fh(), namely, nfsd and
name_to_handle_at(2) syscall are ready to cope with the possibility
of failure to encode a file handle.
There are a few other users of exportfs_encode_{fh,fid}() that
currently have a WARN_ON() assertion when ->encode_fh() fails.
Relax those assertions because they are wrong.
The second linked bug report states commit 16aac5ad1fa9 ("ovl: support
encoding non-decodable file handles") in v6.6 as the regressing commit,
but this is not accurate.
The aforementioned commit only increases the chances of the assertion
and allows triggering the assertion with the reproducer using overlayfs,
inotify and drop_caches.
Triggering this assertion was always possible with other filesystems and
other reasons of ->encode_fh() failures and more particularly, it was
also possible with the exact same reproducer using overlayfs that is
mounted with options index=on,nfs_export=on also on kernels < v6.6.
Therefore, I am not listing the aforementioned commit as a Fixes commit.
Backport hint: this patch will have a trivial conflict applying to
v6.6.y, and other trivial conflicts applying to stable kernels < v6.6.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57888

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
workqueue: Do not warn when cancelling WQ_MEM_RECLAIM work from !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM worker
After commit
746ae46c1113 ("drm/sched: Mark scheduler work queues with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM")
amdgpu started seeing the following warning:
[ ] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM sdma0:drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM events:amdgpu_device_delay_enable_gfx_off [amdgpu]
...
[ ] Workqueue: sdma0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched]
...
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] <TASK>
...
[ ] ? check_flush_dependency+0xf5/0x110
...
[ ] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x6e/0x80
[ ] amdgpu_gfx_off_ctrl+0xab/0x140 [amdgpu]
[ ] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x40/0x50 [amdgpu]
[ ] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0xf4/0x810 [amdgpu]
[ ] ? drm_sched_run_job_work+0x22c/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[ ] amdgpu_job_run+0xaa/0x1f0 [amdgpu]
[ ] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x257/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[ ] process_one_work+0x217/0x720
...
[ ] </TASK>
The intent of the verifcation done in check_flush_depedency is to ensure
forward progress during memory reclaim, by flagging cases when either a
memory reclaim process, or a memory reclaim work item is flushed from a
context not marked as memory reclaim safe.
This is correct when flushing, but when called from the
cancel(_delayed)_work_sync() paths it is a false positive because work is
either already running, or will not be running at all. Therefore
cancelling it is safe and we can relax the warning criteria by letting the
helper know of the calling context.
References: 746ae46c1113 ("drm/sched: Mark scheduler work queues with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM")

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57884

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: vmscan: account for free pages to prevent infinite Loop in throttle_direct_reclaim()
The task sometimes continues looping in throttle_direct_reclaim() because
allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) keeps returning false.
#0 [ffff80002cb6f8d0] __switch_to at ffff8000080095ac
#1 [ffff80002cb6f900] __schedule at ffff800008abbd1c
#2 [ffff80002cb6f990] schedule at ffff800008abc50c
#3 [ffff80002cb6f9b0] throttle_direct_reclaim at ffff800008273550
#4 [ffff80002cb6fa20] try_to_free_pages at ffff800008277b68
#5 [ffff80002cb6fae0] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffff8000082c4660
#6 [ffff80002cb6fc50] alloc_pages_vma at ffff8000082e4a98
#7 [ffff80002cb6fca0] do_anonymous_page at ffff80000829f5a8
#8 [ffff80002cb6fce0] __handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5974
#9 [ffff80002cb6fd90] handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5bd4
At this point, the pgdat contains the following two zones:
NODE: 4 ZONE: 0 ADDR: ffff00817fffe540 NAME: "DMA32"
SIZE: 20480 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 11/28/45
VM_STAT:
NR_FREE_PAGES: 359
NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 18813
NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 0
NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 50
NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 0
NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0
NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0
NR_MLOCK: 0
NR_BOUNCE: 0
NR_ZSPAGES: 0
NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0
NODE: 4 ZONE: 1 ADDR: ffff00817fffec00 NAME: "Normal"
SIZE: 8454144 PRESENT: 98304 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 68/166/264
VM_STAT:
NR_FREE_PAGES: 146
NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 94668
NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 3
NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 735
NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 78
NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0
NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0
NR_MLOCK: 0
NR_BOUNCE: 0
NR_ZSPAGES: 0
NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0
In allow_direct_reclaim(), while processing ZONE_DMA32, the sum of
inactive/active file-backed pages calculated in zone_reclaimable_pages()
based on the result of zone_page_state_snapshot() is zero.
Additionally, since this system lacks swap, the calculation of inactive/
active anonymous pages is skipped.
crash> p nr_swap_pages
nr_swap_pages = $1937 = {
counter = 0
}
As a result, ZONE_DMA32 is deemed unreclaimable and skipped, moving on to
the processing of the next zone, ZONE_NORMAL, despite ZONE_DMA32 having
free pages significantly exceeding the high watermark.
The problem is that the pgdat->kswapd_failures hasn't been incremented.
crash> px ((struct pglist_data *) 0xffff00817fffe540)->kswapd_failures
$1935 = 0x0
This is because the node deemed balanced. The node balancing logic in
balance_pgdat() evaluates all zones collectively. If one or more zones
(e.g., ZONE_DMA32) have enough free pages to meet their watermarks, the
entire node is deemed balanced. This causes balance_pgdat() to exit early
before incrementing the kswapd_failures, as it considers the overall
memory state acceptable, even though some zones (like ZONE_NORMAL) remain
under significant pressure.
The patch ensures that zone_reclaimable_pages() includes free pages
(NR_FREE_PAGES) in its calculation when no other reclaimable pages are
available (e.g., file-backed or anonymous pages). This change prevents
zones like ZONE_DMA32, which have sufficient free pages, from being
mistakenly deemed unreclaimable. By doing so, the patch ensures proper
node balancing, avoids masking pressure on other zones like ZONE_NORMAL,
and prevents infinite loops in throttle_direct_reclaim() caused by
allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) repeatedly returning false.
The kernel hangs due to a task stuck in throttle_direct_reclaim(), caused
by a node being incorrectly deemed balanced despite pressure in certain
zones, such as ZONE_NORMAL. This issue arises from
zone_reclaimable_pages
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57882

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix TCP options overflow.
Syzbot reported the following splat:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5836 Comm: sshd Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/25/2024
RIP: 0010:_compound_head include/linux/page-flags.h:242 [inline]
RIP: 0010:put_page+0x23/0x260 include/linux/mm.h:1552
Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 41 57 41 56 53 49 89 fe 48 bd 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df e8 f8 5e 12 f8 49 8d 5e 08 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 8f c7 78 f8 48 8b 1b 48 89 de 48 83
RSP: 0000:ffffc90003916c90 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000008 RCX: ffff888030458000
RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffffff898ca81d R09: 1ffff110054414ac
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed10054414ad R12: 0000000000000007
R13: ffff88802a20a542 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f34f496e800(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f9d6ec9ec28 CR3: 000000004d260000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_page_unref include/linux/skbuff_ref.h:43 [inline]
__skb_frag_unref include/linux/skbuff_ref.h:56 [inline]
skb_release_data+0x483/0x8a0 net/core/skbuff.c:1119
skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1190 [inline]
__kfree_skb+0x55/0x70 net/core/skbuff.c:1204
tcp_clean_rtx_queue net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3436 [inline]
tcp_ack+0x2442/0x6bc0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:4032
tcp_rcv_state_process+0x8eb/0x44e0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6805
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x77d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1939
tcp_v4_rcv+0x2dc0/0x37f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2351
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x22e/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x341/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314
NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5672 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x2bf/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5785
process_backlog+0x662/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6117
__napi_poll+0xcb/0x490 net/core/dev.c:6883
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6952 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x89b/0x1240 net/core/dev.c:7074
handle_softirqs+0x2d4/0x9b0 kernel/softirq.c:561
__do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:595 [inline]
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:435 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0xf7/0x220 kernel/softirq.c:662
irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:678
instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 [inline]
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702
RIP: 0033:0x7f34f4519ad5
Code: 85 d2 74 0d 0f 10 02 48 8d 54 24 20 0f 11 44 24 20 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 27 41 b8 08 00 00 00 b8 0f 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 76 75 48 8b 15 24 73 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 83
RSP: 002b:00007ffec5b32ce0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 00000000000668a0 RCX: 00007f34f4519ad5
RDX: 00007ffec5b32d00 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000564f4bc6cae0
RBP: 0000564f4bc6b5a0 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007ffec5b32de8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000564f48ea8aa4
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000564f48ea93e8 R15: 00007ffec5b32d68
</TASK>
Eric noted a probable shinfo->nr_frags corruption, which indeed
occurs.
The root cause is a buggy MPTCP option len computation in some
circumstances: the ADD_ADDR option should be mutually exclusive
with DSS since the blamed commit.
Still, mptcp_established_options_add_addr() tries to set the
relevant info in mptcp_out_options, if
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57809

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: imx6: Fix suspend/resume support on i.MX6QDL
The suspend/resume functionality is currently broken on the i.MX6QDL
platform, as documented in the NXP errata (ERR005723):
https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/errata/IMX6DQCE.pdf
This patch addresses the issue by sharing most of the suspend/resume
sequences used by other i.MX devices, while avoiding modifications to
critical registers that disrupt the PCIe functionality. It targets the
same problem as the following downstream commit:
https://github.com/nxp-imx/linux-imx/commit/4e92355e1f79d225ea842511fcfd42b343b32995
Unlike the downstream commit, this patch also resets the connected PCIe
device if possible. Without this reset, certain drivers, such as ath10k
or iwlwifi, will crash on resume. The device reset is also done by the
driver on other i.MX platforms, making this patch consistent with
existing practices.
Upon resuming, the kernel will hang and display an error. Here's an
example of the error encountered with the ath10k driver:
ath10k_pci 0000:01:00.0: Unable to change power state from D3hot to D0, device inaccessible
Unhandled fault: imprecise external abort (0x1406) at 0x0106f944
Without this patch, suspend/resume will fail on i.MX6QDL devices if a
PCIe device is connected.
[kwilczynski: commit log, added tag for stable releases]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57795

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Remove the direct link to net_device
The similar patch in siw is in the link:
https://git.kernel.org/rdma/rdma/c/16b87037b48889
This problem also occurred in RXE. The following analyze this problem.
In the following Call Traces:
"
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dev_get_flags+0x188/0x1d0 net/core/dev.c:8782
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880554640b0 by task kworker/1:4/5295
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5295 Comm: kworker/1:4 Not tainted
6.12.0-rc3-syzkaller-00399-g9197b73fd7bb #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Workqueue: infiniband ib_cache_event_task
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
dev_get_flags+0x188/0x1d0 net/core/dev.c:8782
rxe_query_port+0x12d/0x260 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:60
__ib_query_port drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:2111 [inline]
ib_query_port+0x168/0x7d0 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:2143
ib_cache_update+0x1a9/0xb80 drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c:1494
ib_cache_event_task+0xf3/0x1e0 drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c:1568
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa65/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f2/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
"
1). In the link [1],
"
infiniband syz2: set down
"
This means that on 839.350575, the event ib_cache_event_task was sent andi
queued in ib_wq.
2). In the link [1],
"
team0 (unregistering): Port device team_slave_0 removed
"
It indicates that before 843.251853, the net device should be freed.
3). In the link [1],
"
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dev_get_flags+0x188/0x1d0
"
This means that on 850.559070, this slab-use-after-free problem occurred.
In all, on 839.350575, the event ib_cache_event_task was sent and queued
in ib_wq,
before 843.251853, the net device veth was freed.
on 850.559070, this event was executed, and the mentioned freed net device
was called. Thus, the above call trace occurred.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=12e7025f980000

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56786

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: put bpf_link's program when link is safe to be deallocated
In general, BPF link's underlying BPF program should be considered to be
reachable through attach hook -> link -> prog chain, and, pessimistically,
we have to assume that as long as link's memory is not safe to free,
attach hook's code might hold a pointer to BPF program and use it.
As such, it's not (generally) correct to put link's program early before
waiting for RCU GPs to go through. More eager bpf_prog_put() that we
currently do is mostly correct due to BPF program's release code doing
similar RCU GP waiting, but as will be shown in the following patches,
BPF program can be non-sleepable (and, thus, reliant on only "classic"
RCU GP), while BPF link's attach hook can have sleepable semantics and
needs to be protected by RCU Tasks Trace, and for such cases BPF link
has to go through RCU Tasks Trace + "classic" RCU GPs before being
deallocated. And so, if we put BPF program early, we might free BPF
program before we free BPF link, leading to use-after-free situation.
So, this patch defers bpf_prog_put() until we are ready to perform
bpf_link's deallocation. At worst, this delays BPF program freeing by
one extra RCU GP, but that seems completely acceptable. Alternatively,
we'd need more elaborate ways to determine BPF hook, BPF link, and BPF
program lifetimes, and how they relate to each other, which seems like
an unnecessary complication.
Note, for most BPF links we still will perform eager bpf_prog_put() and
link dealloc, so for those BPF links there are no observable changes
whatsoever. Only BPF links that use deferred dealloc might notice
slightly delayed freeing of BPF programs.
Also, to reduce code and logic duplication, extract program put + link
dealloc logic into bpf_link_dealloc() helper.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56772

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kunit: string-stream: Fix a UAF bug in kunit_init_suite()
In kunit_debugfs_create_suite(), if alloc_string_stream() fails in the
kunit_suite_for_each_test_case() loop, the "suite->log = stream"
has assigned before, and the error path only free the suite->log's stream
memory but not set it to NULL, so the later string_stream_clear() of
suite->log in kunit_init_suite() will cause below UAF bug.
Set stream pointer to NULL after free to fix it.
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 006440150000030d
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000004
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[006440150000030d] address between user and kernel address ranges
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in: iio_test_gts industrialio_gts_helper cfg80211 rfkill ipv6 [last unloaded: iio_test_gts]
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 6253 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W N 6.12.0-rc4+ #458
Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN, [N]=TEST
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : string_stream_clear+0x54/0x1ac
lr : string_stream_clear+0x1a8/0x1ac
sp : ffffffc080b47410
x29: ffffffc080b47410 x28: 006440550000030d x27: ffffff80c96b5e98
x26: ffffff80c96b5e80 x25: ffffffe461b3f6c0 x24: 0000000000000003
x23: ffffff80c96b5e88 x22: 1ffffff019cdf4fc x21: dfffffc000000000
x20: ffffff80ce6fa7e0 x19: 032202a80000186d x18: 0000000000001840
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffffffe45c355cb4
x14: ffffffe45c35589c x13: ffffffe45c03da78 x12: ffffffb810168e75
x11: 1ffffff810168e74 x10: ffffffb810168e74 x9 : dfffffc000000000
x8 : 0000000000000004 x7 : 0000000000000003 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffffffc080b473a0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : ffffffe462fbf620 x0 : dfffffc000000000
Call trace:
string_stream_clear+0x54/0x1ac
__kunit_test_suites_init+0x108/0x1d8
kunit_exec_run_tests+0xb8/0x100
kunit_module_notify+0x400/0x55c
notifier_call_chain+0xfc/0x3b4
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x68/0x9c
do_init_module+0x24c/0x5c8
load_module+0x4acc/0x4e90
init_module_from_file+0xd4/0x128
idempotent_init_module+0x2d4/0x57c
__arm64_sys_finit_module+0xac/0x100
invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x258
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x160/0x22c
do_el0_svc+0x44/0x5c
el0_svc+0x48/0xb8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
Code: f9400753 d2dff800 f2fbffe0 d343fe7c (38e06b80)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56765

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/pseries/vas: Add close() callback in vas_vm_ops struct
The mapping VMA address is saved in VAS window struct when the
paste address is mapped. This VMA address is used during migration
to unmap the paste address if the window is active. The paste
address mapping will be removed when the window is closed or with
the munmap(). But the VMA address in the VAS window is not updated
with munmap() which is causing invalid access during migration.
The KASAN report shows:
[16386.254991] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in reconfig_close_windows+0x1a0/0x4e8
[16386.255043] Read of size 8 at addr c00000014a819670 by task drmgr/696928
[16386.255096] CPU: 29 UID: 0 PID: 696928 Comm: drmgr Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B 6.11.0-rc5-nxgzip #2
[16386.255128] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE
[16386.255148] Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX Power11 (architected) 0x820200 0xf000007 of:IBM,FW1110.00 (NH1110_016) hv:phyp pSeries
[16386.255181] Call Trace:
[16386.255202] [c00000016b297660] [c0000000018ad0ac] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xe8 (unreliable)
[16386.255246] [c00000016b297690] [c0000000006e8a90] print_report+0x19c/0x764
[16386.255285] [c00000016b297760] [c0000000006e9490] kasan_report+0x128/0x1f8
[16386.255309] [c00000016b297880] [c0000000006eb5c8] __asan_load8+0xac/0xe0
[16386.255326] [c00000016b2978a0] [c00000000013f898] reconfig_close_windows+0x1a0/0x4e8
[16386.255343] [c00000016b297990] [c000000000140e58] vas_migration_handler+0x3a4/0x3fc
[16386.255368] [c00000016b297a90] [c000000000128848] pseries_migrate_partition+0x4c/0x4c4
...
[16386.256136] Allocated by task 696554 on cpu 31 at 16377.277618s:
[16386.256149] kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
[16386.256163] kasan_save_track+0x34/0x80
[16386.256175] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x58/0x74
[16386.256196] __kasan_slab_alloc+0xb8/0xdc
[16386.256209] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x200/0x3d0
[16386.256225] vm_area_alloc+0x44/0x150
[16386.256245] mmap_region+0x214/0x10c4
[16386.256265] do_mmap+0x5fc/0x750
[16386.256277] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x14c/0x24c
[16386.256292] ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x20c/0x348
[16386.256303] sys_mmap+0xd0/0x160
...
[16386.256350] Freed by task 0 on cpu 31 at 16386.204848s:
[16386.256363] kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
[16386.256374] kasan_save_track+0x34/0x80
[16386.256384] kasan_save_free_info+0x64/0x10c
[16386.256396] __kasan_slab_free+0x120/0x204
[16386.256415] kmem_cache_free+0x128/0x450
[16386.256428] vm_area_free_rcu_cb+0xa8/0xd8
[16386.256441] rcu_do_batch+0x2c8/0xcf0
[16386.256458] rcu_core+0x378/0x3c4
[16386.256473] handle_softirqs+0x20c/0x60c
[16386.256495] do_softirq_own_stack+0x6c/0x88
[16386.256509] do_softirq_own_stack+0x58/0x88
[16386.256521] __irq_exit_rcu+0x1a4/0x20c
[16386.256533] irq_exit+0x20/0x38
[16386.256544] interrupt_async_exit_prepare.constprop.0+0x18/0x2c
...
[16386.256717] Last potentially related work creation:
[16386.256729] kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
[16386.256741] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xcc/0x12c
[16386.256753] __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x94/0xd04
[16386.256766] vm_area_free+0x28/0x3c
[16386.256778] remove_vma+0xf4/0x114
[16386.256797] do_vmi_align_munmap.constprop.0+0x684/0x870
[16386.256811] __vm_munmap+0xe0/0x1f8
[16386.256821] sys_munmap+0x54/0x6c
[16386.256830] system_call_exception+0x1a0/0x4a0
[16386.256841] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
[16386.256868] The buggy address belongs to the object at c00000014a819670
which belongs to the cache vm_area_struct of size 168
[16386.256887] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
freed 168-byte region [c00000014a819670, c00000014a819718)
[16386.256915] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[16386.256928] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14a81
[16386.256950] memcg:c0000000ba430001
[16386.256961] anon flags: 0x43ffff800000000(node=4|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff)
[16386.256975] page_type: 0xfdffffff(slab)
[16386
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56718

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: protect link down work from execute after lgr freed
link down work may be scheduled before lgr freed but execute
after lgr freed, which may result in crash. So it is need to
hold a reference before shedule link down work, and put the
reference after work executed or canceled.
The relevant crash call stack as follows:
list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffffb638c9c0fe20,
but was 0000000000000000
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:51!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 6 PID: 978112 Comm: kworker/6:119 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G #1
Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 2221b89 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events smc_link_down_work [smc]
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid.cold+0x31/0x47
RSP: 0018:ffffb638c9c0fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010086
RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff942fb75e5128 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff943520930aa0 RSI: ffff94352091fc80 RDI: ffff94352091fc80
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb638c9c0fc38
R10: ffffb638c9c0fc30 R11: ffffffffa015eb28 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: ffffb638c9c0fe20 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff942f9cd051c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff943520900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f4f25214000 CR3: 000000025fbae004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x17e/0x470
smc_link_down_work+0x3c/0x60 [smc]
process_one_work+0x1ac/0x350
worker_thread+0x49/0x2f0
? rescuer_thread+0x360/0x360
kthread+0x118/0x140
? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56703

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: Fix soft lockups in fib6_select_path under high next hop churn
Soft lockups have been observed on a cluster of Linux-based edge routers
located in a highly dynamic environment. Using the `bird` service, these
routers continuously update BGP-advertised routes due to frequently
changing nexthop destinations, while also managing significant IPv6
traffic. The lockups occur during the traversal of the multipath
circular linked-list in the `fib6_select_path` function, particularly
while iterating through the siblings in the list. The issue typically
arises when the nodes of the linked list are unexpectedly deleted
concurrently on a different core—indicated by their 'next' and
'previous' elements pointing back to the node itself and their reference
count dropping to zero. This results in an infinite loop, leading to a
soft lockup that triggers a system panic via the watchdog timer.
Apply RCU primitives in the problematic code sections to resolve the
issue. Where necessary, update the references to fib6_siblings to
annotate or use the RCU APIs.
Include a test script that reproduces the issue. The script
periodically updates the routing table while generating a heavy load
of outgoing IPv6 traffic through multiple iperf3 clients. It
consistently induces infinite soft lockups within a couple of minutes.
Kernel log:
0 [ffffbd13003e8d30] machine_kexec at ffffffff8ceaf3eb
1 [ffffbd13003e8d90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8d0120e3
2 [ffffbd13003e8e58] panic at ffffffff8cef65d4
3 [ffffbd13003e8ed8] watchdog_timer_fn at ffffffff8d05cb03
4 [ffffbd13003e8f08] __hrtimer_run_queues at ffffffff8cfec62f
5 [ffffbd13003e8f70] hrtimer_interrupt at ffffffff8cfed756
6 [ffffbd13003e8fd0] __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt at ffffffff8cea01af
7 [ffffbd13003e8ff0] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt at ffffffff8df1b83d
-- <IRQ stack> --
8 [ffffbd13003d3708] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt at ffffffff8e000ecb
[exception RIP: fib6_select_path+299]
RIP: ffffffff8ddafe7b RSP: ffffbd13003d37b8 RFLAGS: 00000287
RAX: ffff975850b43600 RBX: ffff975850b40200 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 000000003fffffff RSI: 0000000051d383e4 RDI: ffff975850b43618
RBP: ffffbd13003d3800 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffff975850b40200
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffbd13003d3830
R13: ffff975850b436a8 R14: ffff975850b43600 R15: 0000000000000007
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
9 [ffffbd13003d3808] ip6_pol_route at ffffffff8ddb030c
10 [ffffbd13003d3888] ip6_pol_route_input at ffffffff8ddb068c
11 [ffffbd13003d3898] fib6_rule_lookup at ffffffff8ddf02b5
12 [ffffbd13003d3928] ip6_route_input at ffffffff8ddb0f47
13 [ffffbd13003d3a18] ip6_rcv_finish_core.constprop.0 at ffffffff8dd950d0
14 [ffffbd13003d3a30] ip6_list_rcv_finish.constprop.0 at ffffffff8dd96274
15 [ffffbd13003d3a98] ip6_sublist_rcv at ffffffff8dd96474
16 [ffffbd13003d3af8] ipv6_list_rcv at ffffffff8dd96615
17 [ffffbd13003d3b60] __netif_receive_skb_list_core at ffffffff8dc16fec
18 [ffffbd13003d3be0] netif_receive_skb_list_internal at ffffffff8dc176b3
19 [ffffbd13003d3c50] napi_gro_receive at ffffffff8dc565b9
20 [ffffbd13003d3c80] ice_receive_skb at ffffffffc087e4f5 [ice]
21 [ffffbd13003d3c90] ice_clean_rx_irq at ffffffffc0881b80 [ice]
22 [ffffbd13003d3d20] ice_napi_poll at ffffffffc088232f [ice]
23 [ffffbd13003d3d80] __napi_poll at ffffffff8dc18000
24 [ffffbd13003d3db8] net_rx_action at ffffffff8dc18581
25 [ffffbd13003d3e40] __do_softirq at ffffffff8df352e9
26 [ffffbd13003d3eb0] run_ksoftirqd at ffffffff8ceffe47
27 [ffffbd13003d3ec0] smpboot_thread_fn at ffffffff8cf36a30
28 [ffffbd13003d3ee8] kthread at ffffffff8cf2b39f
29 [ffffbd13003d3f28] ret_from_fork at ffffffff8ce5fa64
30 [ffffbd13003d3f50] ret_from_fork_asm at ffffffff8ce03cbb

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56664

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix race between element replace and close()
Element replace (with a socket different from the one stored) may race
with socket's close() link popping & unlinking. __sock_map_delete()
unconditionally unrefs the (wrong) element:
// set map[0] = s0
map_update_elem(map, 0, s0)
// drop fd of s0
close(s0)
sock_map_close()
lock_sock(sk) (s0!)
sock_map_remove_links(sk)
link = sk_psock_link_pop()
sock_map_unlink(sk, link)
sock_map_delete_from_link
// replace map[0] with s1
map_update_elem(map, 0, s1)
sock_map_update_elem
(s1!) lock_sock(sk)
sock_map_update_common
psock = sk_psock(sk)
spin_lock(&stab->lock)
osk = stab->sks[idx]
sock_map_add_link(..., &stab->sks[idx])
sock_map_unref(osk, &stab->sks[idx])
psock = sk_psock(osk)
sk_psock_put(sk, psock)
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&psock))
sk_psock_drop(sk, psock)
spin_unlock(&stab->lock)
unlock_sock(sk)
__sock_map_delete
spin_lock(&stab->lock)
sk = *psk // s1 replaced s0; sk == s1
if (!sk_test || sk_test == sk) // sk_test (s0) != sk (s1); no branch
sk = xchg(psk, NULL)
if (sk)
sock_map_unref(sk, psk) // unref s1; sks[idx] will dangle
psock = sk_psock(sk)
sk_psock_put(sk, psock)
if (refcount_dec_and_test())
sk_psock_drop(sk, psock)
spin_unlock(&stab->lock)
release_sock(sk)
Then close(map) enqueues bpf_map_free_deferred, which finally calls
sock_map_free(). This results in some refcount_t warnings along with
a KASAN splat [1].
Fix __sock_map_delete(), do not allow sock_map_unref() on elements that
may have been replaced.
[1]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88811f5b9100 by task kworker/u64:12/1063
CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Not tainted 6.12.0+ #125
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90
print_report+0x174/0x4f6
kasan_report+0xb9/0x190
kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0
sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330
bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320
process_one_work+0x846/0x1420
worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80
kthread+0x29e/0x360
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1202:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x85/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x131/0x450
sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220
sk_alloc+0x2c/0x870
unix_create1+0x88/0x8a0
unix_create+0xc5/0x180
__sock_create+0x241/0x650
__sys_socketpair+0x1ce/0x420
__x64_sys_socketpair+0x92/0x100
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 46:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70
kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x590
__sk_destruct+0x388/0x5a0
sk_psock_destroy+0x73e/0xa50
process_one_work+0x846/0x1420
worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80
kthread+0x29e/0x360
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
The bu
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56663

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: nl80211: fix NL80211_ATTR_MLO_LINK_ID off-by-one
Since the netlink attribute range validation provides inclusive
checking, the *max* of attribute NL80211_ATTR_MLO_LINK_ID should be
IEEE80211_MLD_MAX_NUM_LINKS - 1 otherwise causing an off-by-one.
One crash stack for demonstration:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in ieee80211_tx_control_port+0x3b6/0xca0 net/mac80211/tx.c:5939
Read of size 6 at addr 001102080000000c by task fuzzer.386/9508
CPU: 1 PID: 9508 Comm: syz.1.386 Not tainted 6.1.70 #2
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_report+0xe0/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:398
kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495
kasan_check_range+0x287/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
memcpy+0x25/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:65
ieee80211_tx_control_port+0x3b6/0xca0 net/mac80211/tx.c:5939
rdev_tx_control_port net/wireless/rdev-ops.h:761 [inline]
nl80211_tx_control_port+0x7b3/0xc40 net/wireless/nl80211.c:15453
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x22e/0x320 net/netlink/genetlink.c:756
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:833 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x539/0x740 net/netlink/genetlink.c:850
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:861
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352
netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499
___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Update the policy to ensure correct validation.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56658

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: defer final 'struct net' free in netns dismantle
Ilya reported a slab-use-after-free in dst_destroy [1]
Issue is in xfrm6_net_init() and xfrm4_net_init() :
They copy xfrm[46]_dst_ops_template into net->xfrm.xfrm[46]_dst_ops.
But net structure might be freed before all the dst callbacks are
called. So when dst_destroy() calls later :
if (dst->ops->destroy)
dst->ops->destroy(dst);
dst->ops points to the old net->xfrm.xfrm[46]_dst_ops, which has been freed.
See a relevant issue fixed in :
ac888d58869b ("net: do not delay dst_entries_add() in dst_release()")
A fix is to queue the 'struct net' to be freed after one
another cleanup_net() round (and existing rcu_barrier())
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8882137ccab0 by task swapper/37/0
Dec 03 05:46:18 kernel:
CPU: 37 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/37 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0 #67
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL, BIOS 1.16.1-1.el9 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:124)
print_address_description.constprop.0 (mm/kasan/report.c:378)
? dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:489)
? dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112)
? kasan_addr_to_slab (mm/kasan/common.c:37)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:603)
? dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112)
? rcu_do_batch (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2567)
dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112)
rcu_do_batch (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2567)
? __pfx_rcu_do_batch (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2491)
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4339 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4406)
rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2825)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:554)
__irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:589 kernel/softirq.c:428 kernel/softirq.c:637)
irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:651)
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049)
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702)
RIP: 0010:default_idle (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:37 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:92 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:743)
Code: 00 4d 29 c8 4c 01 c7 4c 29 c2 e9 6e ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 90 0f 00 2d c7 c9 27 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 90
RSP: 0018:ffff888100d2fe00 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 00000000001870ed RBX: 1ffff110201a5fc2 RCX: ffffffffb61a3e46
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffffb3d4d123
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed11c7e1835d
R10: ffff888e3f0c1aeb R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff888100d20000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
? ct_kernel_exit.constprop.0 (kernel/context_tracking.c:148)
? cpuidle_idle_call (kernel/sched/idle.c:186)
default_idle_call (./include/linux/cpuidle.h:143 kernel/sched/idle.c:118)
cpuidle_idle_call (kernel/sched/idle.c:186)
? __pfx_cpuidle_idle_call (kernel/sched/idle.c:168)
? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5848)
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4347 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4406)
? tsc_verify_tsc_adjust (arch/x86/kernel/tsc_sync.c:59)
do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:326)
cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:423 (discriminator 1))
start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:202 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:282)
? __pfx_start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:232)
? soft_restart_cpu (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:452)
common_startup_64 (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:414)
</TASK>
Dec 03 05:46:18 kernel:
Allocated by task 12184:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)
kasan_save_track (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:49 mm/kasan/common.c:60 mm/kasan/common.c:69)
__kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:319 mm/kasan/common.c:345)
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof (mm/slub.c:4085 mm/slub.c:4134 mm/slub.c:4141)
copy_net_ns (net/core/net_namespace.c:421 net/core/net_namespace.c:480)
create_new_namespaces
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56614

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: fix OOB map writes when deleting elements
Jordy says:
"
In the xsk_map_delete_elem function an unsigned integer
(map->max_entries) is compared with a user-controlled signed integer
(k). Due to implicit type conversion, a large unsigned value for
map->max_entries can bypass the intended bounds check:
if (k >= map->max_entries)
return -EINVAL;
This allows k to hold a negative value (between -2147483648 and -2),
which is then used as an array index in m->xsk_map[k], which results
in an out-of-bounds access.
spin_lock_bh(&m->lock);
map_entry = &m->xsk_map[k]; // Out-of-bounds map_entry
old_xs = unrcu_pointer(xchg(map_entry, NULL)); // Oob write
if (old_xs)
xsk_map_sock_delete(old_xs, map_entry);
spin_unlock_bh(&m->lock);
The xchg operation can then be used to cause an out-of-bounds write.
Moreover, the invalid map_entry passed to xsk_map_sock_delete can lead
to further memory corruption.
"
It indeed results in following splat:
[76612.897343] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc8fc2e461108
[76612.904330] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[76612.909639] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[76612.914855] PGD 0 P4D 0
[76612.917431] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[76612.921859] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 10318 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1+ #470
[76612.929189] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019
[76612.939781] RIP: 0010:xsk_map_delete_elem+0x2d/0x60
[76612.944738] Code: 00 00 41 54 55 53 48 63 2e 3b 6f 24 73 38 4c 8d a7 f8 00 00 00 48 89 fb 4c 89 e7 e8 2d bf 05 00 48 8d b4 eb 00 01 00 00 31 ff <48> 87 3e 48 85 ff 74 05 e8 16 ff ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 3e bc 05 00 31
[76612.963774] RSP: 0018:ffffc9002e407df8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[76612.969079] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9002e461000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[76612.976323] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffc8fc2e461108 RDI: 0000000000000000
[76612.983569] RBP: ffffffff80000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000007
[76612.990812] R10: ffffc9002e407e18 R11: ffff888108a38858 R12: ffffc9002e4610f8
[76612.998060] R13: ffff888108a38858 R14: 00007ffd1ae0ac78 R15: ffffc9002e4610c0
[76613.005303] FS: 00007f80b6f59740(0000) GS:ffff8897e0ec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[76613.013517] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[76613.019349] CR2: ffffc8fc2e461108 CR3: 000000011e3ef001 CR4: 00000000007726f0
[76613.026595] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[76613.033841] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[76613.041086] PKRU: 55555554
[76613.043842] Call Trace:
[76613.046331] <TASK>
[76613.048468] ? __die+0x20/0x60
[76613.051581] ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x450
[76613.055747] ? search_extable+0x22/0x30
[76613.059649] ? search_bpf_extables+0x5f/0x80
[76613.063988] ? exc_page_fault+0xa9/0x140
[76613.067975] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[76613.072229] ? xsk_map_delete_elem+0x2d/0x60
[76613.076573] ? xsk_map_delete_elem+0x23/0x60
[76613.080914] __sys_bpf+0x19b7/0x23c0
[76613.084555] __x64_sys_bpf+0x1a/0x20
[76613.088194] do_syscall_64+0x37/0xb0
[76613.091832] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[76613.096962] RIP: 0033:0x7f80b6d1e88d
[76613.100592] Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 b5 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[76613.119631] RSP: 002b:00007ffd1ae0ac68 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
[76613.131330] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f80b6d1e88d
[76613.142632] RDX: 0000000000000098 RSI: 00007ffd1ae0ad20 RDI: 0000000000000003
[76613.153967] RBP: 00007ffd1ae0adc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[76613.166030] R10: 00007f80b6f77040 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffd1ae0aed8
[76613.177130] R13: 000055ddf42ce1e9 R14: 000055ddf42d0d98 R15: 00
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56611

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mempolicy: fix migrate_to_node() assuming there is at least one VMA in a MM
We currently assume that there is at least one VMA in a MM, which isn't
true.
So we might end up having find_vma() return NULL, to then de-reference
NULL. So properly handle find_vma() returning NULL.
This fixes the report:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6021 Comm: syz-executor284 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00187-gf868cd251776 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024
RIP: 0010:migrate_to_node mm/mempolicy.c:1090 [inline]
RIP: 0010:do_migrate_pages+0x403/0x6f0 mm/mempolicy.c:1194
Code: ...
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000375fd08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000375fd78 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88807e171300 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88803390c044
RBP: ffff88807e171428 R08: 0000000000000014 R09: fffffbfff2039ef1
R10: ffffffff901cf78f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: ffffc9000375fe90 R14: ffffc9000375fe98 R15: ffffc9000375fdf8
FS: 00005555919e1380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005555919e1ca8 CR3: 000000007f12a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kernel_migrate_pages+0x5b2/0x750 mm/mempolicy.c:1709
__do_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1727 [inline]
__se_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1723 [inline]
__x64_sys_migrate_pages+0x96/0x100 mm/mempolicy.c:1723
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add unlikely()]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56609

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw88: use ieee80211_purge_tx_queue() to purge TX skb
When removing kernel modules by:
rmmod rtw88_8723cs rtw88_8703b rtw88_8723x rtw88_sdio rtw88_core
Driver uses skb_queue_purge() to purge TX skb, but not report tx status
causing "Have pending ack frames!" warning. Use ieee80211_purge_tx_queue()
to correct this.
Since ieee80211_purge_tx_queue() doesn't take locks, to prevent racing
between TX work and purge TX queue, flush and destroy TX work in advance.
wlan0: deauthenticating from aa:f5:fd:60:4c:a8 by local
choice (Reason: 3=DEAUTH_LEAVING)
------------[ cut here ]------------
Have pending ack frames!
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 9232 at net/mac80211/main.c:1691
ieee80211_free_ack_frame+0x5c/0x90 [mac80211]
CPU: 3 PID: 9232 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G C
6.10.1-200.fc40.aarch64 #1
Hardware name: pine64 Pine64 PinePhone Braveheart
(1.1)/Pine64 PinePhone Braveheart (1.1), BIOS 2024.01 01/01/2024
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : ieee80211_free_ack_frame+0x5c/0x90 [mac80211]
lr : ieee80211_free_ack_frame+0x5c/0x90 [mac80211]
sp : ffff80008c1b37b0
x29: ffff80008c1b37b0 x28: ffff000003be8000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff000003dc14b8 x24: ffff80008c1b37d0
x23: ffff000000ff9f80 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 000000007fffffff
x20: ffff80007c7e93d8 x19: ffff00006e66f400 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: ffff7ffffd2b3000 x16: ffff800083fc0000 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 2173656d61726620 x12: 6b636120676e6964
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 000000000000005d x9 : ffff8000802af2b0
x8 : ffff80008c1b3430 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000003be8000
Call trace:
ieee80211_free_ack_frame+0x5c/0x90 [mac80211]
idr_for_each+0x74/0x110
ieee80211_free_hw+0x44/0xe8 [mac80211]
rtw_sdio_remove+0x9c/0xc0 [rtw88_sdio]
sdio_bus_remove+0x44/0x180
device_remove+0x54/0x90
device_release_driver_internal+0x1d4/0x238
driver_detach+0x54/0xc0
bus_remove_driver+0x78/0x108
driver_unregister+0x38/0x78
sdio_unregister_driver+0x2c/0x40
rtw_8723cs_driver_exit+0x18/0x1000 [rtw88_8723cs]
__do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x190/0x338
__arm64_sys_delete_module+0x1c/0x30
invoke_syscall+0x74/0x100
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
el0_svc+0x3c/0x158
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x138
el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56566

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/slub: Avoid list corruption when removing a slab from the full list
Boot with slub_debug=UFPZ.
If allocated object failed in alloc_consistency_checks, all objects of
the slab will be marked as used, and then the slab will be removed from
the partial list.
When an object belonging to the slab got freed later, the remove_full()
function is called. Because the slab is neither on the partial list nor
on the full list, it eventually lead to a list corruption (actually a
list poison being detected).
So we need to mark and isolate the slab page with metadata corruption,
do not put it back in circulation.
Because the debug caches avoid all the fastpaths, reusing the frozen bit
to mark slab page with metadata corruption seems to be fine.
[ 4277.385669] list_del corruption, ffffea00044b3e50->next is LIST_POISON1 (dead000000000100)
[ 4277.387023] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 4277.387880] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:56!
[ 4277.388680] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 4277.389562] CPU: 5 PID: 90 Comm: kworker/5:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.6.1-1 #1
[ 4277.392113] Workqueue: xfs-inodegc/vda1 xfs_inodegc_worker [xfs]
[ 4277.393551] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0
[ 4277.394518] Code: 48 91 82 e8 37 f9 9a ff 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 28 49 91 82 e8 26 f9 9a ff 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 58 49 91
[ 4277.397292] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000333b38 EFLAGS: 00010082
[ 4277.398202] RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: ffffea00044b3e50 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 4277.399340] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff828f8715 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[ 4277.400545] RBP: ffffea00044b3e40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc900003339f0
[ 4277.401710] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffff82d44088 R12: ffff888112cf9910
[ 4277.402887] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff8881000424c0
[ 4277.404049] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88842fd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 4277.405357] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 4277.406389] CR2: 00007f2ad0b24000 CR3: 0000000102a3a006 CR4: 00000000007706e0
[ 4277.407589] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 4277.408780] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 4277.410000] PKRU: 55555554
[ 4277.410645] Call Trace:
[ 4277.411234] <TASK>
[ 4277.411777] ? die+0x32/0x80
[ 4277.412439] ? do_trap+0xd6/0x100
[ 4277.413150] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0
[ 4277.414158] ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90
[ 4277.414948] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0
[ 4277.415915] ? exc_invalid_op+0x4c/0x60
[ 4277.416710] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0
[ 4277.417675] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 4277.418482] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0
[ 4277.419466] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0
[ 4277.420410] free_to_partial_list+0x515/0x5e0
[ 4277.421242] ? xfs_iext_remove+0x41a/0xa10 [xfs]
[ 4277.422298] xfs_iext_remove+0x41a/0xa10 [xfs]
[ 4277.423316] ? xfs_inodegc_worker+0xb4/0x1a0 [xfs]
[ 4277.424383] xfs_bmap_del_extent_delay+0x4fe/0x7d0 [xfs]
[ 4277.425490] __xfs_bunmapi+0x50d/0x840 [xfs]
[ 4277.426445] xfs_itruncate_extents_flags+0x13a/0x490 [xfs]
[ 4277.427553] xfs_inactive_truncate+0xa3/0x120 [xfs]
[ 4277.428567] xfs_inactive+0x22d/0x290 [xfs]
[ 4277.429500] xfs_inodegc_worker+0xb4/0x1a0 [xfs]
[ 4277.430479] process_one_work+0x171/0x340
[ 4277.431227] worker_thread+0x277/0x390
[ 4277.431962] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 4277.432752] kthread+0xf0/0x120
[ 4277.433382] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 4277.434134] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[ 4277.434837] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 4277.435566] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[ 4277.436280] </TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56551

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix usage slab after free
[ +0.000021] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000027] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881b8605f88 by task amd_pci_unplug/2147
[ +0.000023] CPU: 6 PID: 2147 Comm: amd_pci_unplug Not tainted 6.10.0+ #1
[ +0.000016] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/ROG STRIX B550-F GAMING (WI-FI), BIOS 1401 12/03/2020
[ +0.000016] Call Trace:
[ +0.000008] <TASK>
[ +0.000009] dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0
[ +0.000017] print_report+0xce/0x5f0
[ +0.000017] ? drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000019] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000015] ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x72/0x200
[ +0.000016] ? drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000019] kasan_report+0xbe/0x110
[ +0.000015] ? drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000023] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x30
[ +0.000014] drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000020] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000013] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[ +0.000016] ? __pfx_drm_sched_entity_flush+0x10/0x10 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000020] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000013] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[ +0.000013] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000013] ? enable_work+0x124/0x220
[ +0.000015] ? __pfx_enable_work+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000013] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000014] ? free_large_kmalloc+0x85/0xf0
[ +0.000016] drm_sched_entity_destroy+0x18/0x30 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000020] amdgpu_vce_sw_fini+0x55/0x170 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000735] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ +0.000016] vce_v4_0_sw_fini+0x80/0x110 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000726] amdgpu_device_fini_sw+0x331/0xfc0 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000679] ? mutex_unlock+0x80/0xe0
[ +0.000017] ? __pfx_amdgpu_device_fini_sw+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000662] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000014] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[ +0.000013] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000013] ? mutex_unlock+0x80/0xe0
[ +0.000016] amdgpu_driver_release_kms+0x16/0x80 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000663] drm_minor_release+0xc9/0x140 [drm]
[ +0.000081] drm_release+0x1fd/0x390 [drm]
[ +0.000082] __fput+0x36c/0xad0
[ +0.000018] __fput_sync+0x3c/0x50
[ +0.000014] __x64_sys_close+0x7d/0xe0
[ +0.000014] x64_sys_call+0x1bc6/0x2680
[ +0.000014] do_syscall_64+0x70/0x130
[ +0.000014] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000014] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x60/0x190
[ +0.000015] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000014] ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50
[ +0.000012] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000013] ? exc_page_fault+0x7c/0x110
[ +0.000015] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ +0.000014] RIP: 0033:0x7ffff7b14f67
[ +0.000013] Code: ff e8 0d 16 02 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 73 ba f7 ff
[ +0.000026] RSP: 002b:00007fffffffe378 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
[ +0.000019] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ffff7b14f67
[ +0.000014] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffff7f6f47a RDI: 0000000000000003
[ +0.000014] RBP: 00007fffffffe3a0 R08: 0000555555569890 R09: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000014] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fffffffe5c8
[ +0.000013] R13: 00005555555552a9 R14: 0000555555557d48 R15: 00007ffff7ffd040
[ +0.000020] </TASK>
[ +0.000016] Allocated by task 383 on cpu 7 at 26.880319s:
[ +0.000014] kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x60
[ +0.000008] kasan_save_track+0x18/0x70
[ +0.000007] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x38/0x60
[ +0.000007] __kasan_kmalloc+0xc1/0xd0
[ +0.000007] kmalloc_trace_noprof+0x180/0x380
[ +0.000007] drm_sched_init+0x411/0xec0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000012] amdgpu_device_init+0x695f/0xa610 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000658] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x1a/0x120 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000662] amdgpu_pci_p
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56544

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udmabuf: change folios array from kmalloc to kvmalloc
When PAGE_SIZE 4096, MAX_PAGE_ORDER 10, 64bit machine,
page_alloc only support 4MB.
If above this, trigger this warn and return NULL.
udmabuf can change size limit, if change it to 3072(3GB), and then alloc
3GB udmabuf, will fail create.
[ 4080.876581] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 4080.876843] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2015 at mm/page_alloc.c:4556 __alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350
[ 4080.878839] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350
[ 4080.879470] Call Trace:
[ 4080.879473] <TASK>
[ 4080.879473] ? __alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350
[ 4080.879475] ? __warn.cold+0x8e/0xe8
[ 4080.880647] ? __alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350
[ 4080.880909] ? report_bug+0xff/0x140
[ 4080.881175] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80
[ 4080.881556] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[ 4080.881559] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 4080.882077] ? udmabuf_create+0x131/0x400
Because MAX_PAGE_ORDER, kmalloc can max alloc 4096 * (1 << 10), 4MB
memory, each array entry is pointer(8byte), so can save 524288 pages(2GB).
Further more, costly order(order 3) may not be guaranteed that it can be
applied for, due to fragmentation.
This patch change udmabuf array use kvmalloc_array, this can fallback
alloc into vmalloc, which can guarantee allocation for any size and does
not affect the performance of kmalloc allocations.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-55642

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: Prevent potential deadlocks in zone write plug error recovery
Zone write plugging for handling writes to zones of a zoned block
device always execute a zone report whenever a write BIO to a zone
fails. The intent of this is to ensure that the tracking of a zone write
pointer is always correct to ensure that the alignment to a zone write
pointer of write BIOs can be checked on submission and that we can
always correctly emulate zone append operations using regular write
BIOs.
However, this error recovery scheme introduces a potential deadlock if a
device queue freeze is initiated while BIOs are still plugged in a zone
write plug and one of these write operation fails. In such case, the
disk zone write plug error recovery work is scheduled and executes a
report zone. This in turn can result in a request allocation in the
underlying driver to issue the report zones command to the device. But
with the device queue freeze already started, this allocation will
block, preventing the report zone execution and the continuation of the
processing of the plugged BIOs. As plugged BIOs hold a queue usage
reference, the queue freeze itself will never complete, resulting in a
deadlock.
Avoid this problem by completely removing from the zone write plugging
code the use of report zones operations after a failed write operation,
instead relying on the device user to either execute a report zones,
reset the zone, finish the zone, or give up writing to the device (which
is a fairly common pattern for file systems which degrade to read-only
after write failures). This is not an unreasonnable requirement as all
well-behaved applications, FSes and device mapper already use report
zones to recover from write errors whenever possible by comparing the
current position of a zone write pointer with what their assumption
about the position is.
The changes to remove the automatic error recovery are as follows:
- Completely remove the error recovery work and its associated
resources (zone write plug list head, disk error list, and disk
zone_wplugs_work work struct). This also removes the functions
disk_zone_wplug_set_error() and disk_zone_wplug_clear_error().
- Change the BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_ERROR zone write plug flag into
BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_NEED_WP_UPDATE. This new flag is set for a zone write
plug whenever a write opration targetting the zone of the zone write
plug fails. This flag indicates that the zone write pointer offset is
not reliable and that it must be updated when the next report zone,
reset zone, finish zone or disk revalidation is executed.
- Modify blk_zone_write_plug_bio_endio() to set the
BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_NEED_WP_UPDATE flag for the target zone of a failed
write BIO.
- Modify the function disk_zone_wplug_set_wp_offset() to clear this
new flag, thus implementing recovery of a correct write pointer
offset with the reset (all) zone and finish zone operations.
- Modify blkdev_report_zones() to always use the disk_report_zones_cb()
callback so that disk_zone_wplug_sync_wp_offset() can be called for
any zone marked with the BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_NEED_WP_UPDATE flag.
This implements recovery of a correct write pointer offset for zone
write plugs marked with BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_NEED_WP_UPDATE and within
the range of the report zones operation executed by the user.
- Modify blk_revalidate_seq_zone() to call
disk_zone_wplug_sync_wp_offset() for all sequential write required
zones when a zoned block device is revalidated, thus always resolving
any inconsistency between the write pointer offset of zone write
plugs and the actual write pointer position of sequential zones.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-54460

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: iso: Fix circular lock in iso_listen_bis
This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by
releasing the socket lock before enterning iso_listen_bis, to
avoid any potential deadlock with hdev lock.
[ 75.307983] ======================================================
[ 75.307984] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 75.307985] 6.12.0-rc6+ #22 Not tainted
[ 75.307987] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 75.307987] kworker/u81:2/2623 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 75.307988] ffff8fde1769da58 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO)
at: iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308021]
but task is already holding lock:
[ 75.308022] ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock)
at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308053]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 75.308054]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 75.308055]
-> #1 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 75.308057] __mutex_lock+0xad/0xc50
[ 75.308061] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[ 75.308063] iso_sock_listen+0x143/0x5c0 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308085] __sys_listen_socket+0x49/0x60
[ 75.308088] __x64_sys_listen+0x4c/0x90
[ 75.308090] x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0
[ 75.308092] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150
[ 75.308095] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 75.308098]
-> #0 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[ 75.308100] __lock_acquire+0x155e/0x25f0
[ 75.308103] lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300
[ 75.308105] lock_sock_nested+0x32/0x90
[ 75.308107] iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308128] hci_connect_cfm+0x6c/0x190 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308155] hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x27b/0x2f0 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308180] hci_le_meta_evt+0xe7/0x200 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308206] hci_event_packet+0x21f/0x5c0 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308230] hci_rx_work+0x3ae/0xb10 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308254] process_one_work+0x212/0x740
[ 75.308256] worker_thread+0x1bd/0x3a0
[ 75.308258] kthread+0xe4/0x120
[ 75.308259] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70
[ 75.308261] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 75.308263]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 75.308264] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 75.308264] CPU0 CPU1
[ 75.308265] ---- ----
[ 75.308265] lock(&hdev->lock);
[ 75.308267] lock(sk_lock-
AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO);
[ 75.308268] lock(&hdev->lock);
[ 75.308269] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO);
[ 75.308270]
*** DEADLOCK ***
[ 75.308271] 4 locks held by kworker/u81:2/2623:
[ 75.308272] #0: ffff8fdd66e52148 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0},
at: process_one_work+0x443/0x740
[ 75.308276] #1: ffffafb488b7fe48 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)),
at: process_one_work+0x1ce/0x740
[ 75.308280] #2: ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}
at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth]
[ 75.308304] #3: ffffffffb6ba4900 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2},
at: hci_connect_cfm+0x29/0x190 [bluetooth]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53229

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix the qp flush warnings in req
When the qp is in error state, the status of WQEs in the queue should be
set to error. Or else the following will appear.
[ 920.617269] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 21 at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_comp.c:756 rxe_completer+0x989/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.617744] Modules linked in: rnbd_client(O) rtrs_client(O) rtrs_core(O) rdma_ucm rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm crc32_generic rdma_rxe ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel ib_uverbs ib_core loop brd null_blk ipv6
[ 920.618516] CPU: 1 PID: 21 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Tainted: G O 6.1.113-storage+ #65
[ 920.618986] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 920.619396] RIP: 0010:rxe_completer+0x989/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.619658] Code: 0f b6 84 24 3a 02 00 00 41 89 84 24 44 04 00 00 e9 2a f7 ff ff 39 ca bb 03 00 00 00 b8 0e 00 00 00 48 0f 45 d8 e9 15 f7 ff ff <0f> 0b e9 cb f8 ff ff 41 bf f5 ff ff ff e9 08 f8 ff ff 49 8d bc 24
[ 920.620482] RSP: 0018:ffff97b7c00bbc38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 920.620817] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 0000000000000008
[ 920.621183] RDX: ffff960dc396ebc0 RSI: 0000000000005400 RDI: ffff960dc4e2fbac
[ 920.621548] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffffac406450
[ 920.621884] R10: ffffffffac4060c0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff960dc4e2f800
[ 920.622254] R13: ffff960dc4e2f928 R14: ffff97b7c029c580 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 920.622609] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff960ef7d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 920.622979] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 920.623245] CR2: 00007fa056965e90 CR3: 00000001107f1000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 920.623680] Call Trace:
[ 920.623815] <TASK>
[ 920.623933] ? __warn+0x79/0xc0
[ 920.624116] ? rxe_completer+0x989/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.624356] ? report_bug+0xfb/0x150
[ 920.624594] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x60
[ 920.624796] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[ 920.624976] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 920.625203] ? rxe_completer+0x989/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.625474] ? rxe_completer+0x329/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.625749] rxe_do_task+0x80/0x110 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.626037] rxe_requester+0x625/0xde0 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.626310] ? rxe_cq_post+0xe2/0x180 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.626583] ? do_complete+0x18d/0x220 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.626812] ? rxe_completer+0x1a3/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.627050] rxe_do_task+0x80/0x110 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.627285] tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0xa4/0x120
[ 920.627522] handle_softirqs+0xc2/0x250
[ 920.627728] ? sort_range+0x20/0x20
[ 920.627942] run_ksoftirqd+0x1f/0x30
[ 920.628158] smpboot_thread_fn+0xc7/0x1b0
[ 920.628334] kthread+0xd6/0x100
[ 920.628504] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 920.628709] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 920.628892] </TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53224

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Move events notifier registration to be after device registration
Move pkey change work initialization and cleanup from device resources
stage to notifier stage, since this is the stage which handles this work
events.
Fix a race between the device deregistration and pkey change work by moving
MLX5_IB_STAGE_DEVICE_NOTIFIER to be after MLX5_IB_STAGE_IB_REG in order to
ensure that the notifier is deregistered before the device during cleanup.
Which ensures there are no works that are being executed after the
device has already unregistered which can cause the panic below.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 630071 Comm: kworker/1:2 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W OE --------- --- 5.14.0-162.6.1.el9_1.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS 090008 02/27/2023
Workqueue: events pkey_change_handler [mlx5_ib]
RIP: 0010:setup_qp+0x38/0x1f0 [mlx5_ib]
Code: ee 41 54 45 31 e4 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 20 8b 77 08 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 18 48 8b 07 48 8d 4c 24 16 <4c> 8b 38 49 8b 87 80 0b 00 00 4c 89 ff 48 8b 80 08 05 00 00 8b 40
RSP: 0018:ffffbcc54068be20 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff954054494128 RCX: ffffbcc54068be36
RDX: ffff954004934000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff954054494128
RBP: 0000000000000023 R08: ffff954001be2c20 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffff954001be2c20 R11: ffff9540260133c0 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000023 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9540ffcb0905
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9540ffc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010625c001 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
mlx5_ib_gsi_pkey_change+0x20/0x40 [mlx5_ib]
process_one_work+0x1e8/0x3c0
worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0
? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380
kthread+0x149/0x170
? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Modules linked in: rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) mlx5_fwctl(OE) fwctl(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) mlx5_core(OE) mlxdevm(OE) ib_core(OE) mlx_compat(OE) psample mlxfw(OE) tls knem(OE) netconsole nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache netfs qrtr rfkill sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common rapl hv_balloon hv_utils i2c_piix4 pcspkr joydev fuse ext4 mbcache jbd2 sr_mod sd_mod cdrom t10_pi sg ata_generic pci_hyperv pci_hyperv_intf hyperv_drm drm_shmem_helper drm_kms_helper hv_storvsc syscopyarea hv_netvsc sysfillrect sysimgblt hid_hyperv fb_sys_fops scsi_transport_fc hyperv_keyboard drm ata_piix crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel libata ghash_clmulni_intel hv_vmbus serio_raw [last unloaded: ib_core]
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace f6f8be4eae12f7bc ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53222

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
zram: fix NULL pointer in comp_algorithm_show()
LTP reported a NULL pointer dereference as followed:
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 5995 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6+ #3
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __pi_strcmp+0x24/0x140
lr : zcomp_available_show+0x60/0x100 [zram]
sp : ffff800088b93b90
x29: ffff800088b93b90 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: 0000000000400cc0
x26: 0000000000000ffe x25: ffff80007b3e2388 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: ffff80007b3e2390 x22: ffff0004041a9000 x21: ffff80007b3e2900
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff80007b3e2900 x9 : ffff80007b3cb280
x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 00656c722d6f7a6c
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff80007b3e2900 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
__pi_strcmp+0x24/0x140
comp_algorithm_show+0x40/0x70 [zram]
dev_attr_show+0x28/0x80
sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x90/0x140
kernfs_seq_show+0x34/0x48
seq_read_iter+0x1d4/0x4e8
kernfs_fop_read_iter+0x40/0x58
new_sync_read+0x9c/0x168
vfs_read+0x1a8/0x1f8
ksys_read+0x74/0x108
__arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x38
invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
el0_svc+0x38/0x138
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8
el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190
The zram->comp_algs[ZRAM_PRIMARY_COMP] can be NULL in zram_add() if
comp_algorithm_set() has not been called. User can access the zram device
by sysfs after device_add_disk(), so there is a time window to trigger the
NULL pointer dereference. Move it ahead device_add_disk() to make sure
when user can access the zram device, it is ready. comp_algorithm_set()
is protected by zram->init_lock in other places and no such problem.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53219

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtiofs: use pages instead of pointer for kernel direct IO
When trying to insert a 10MB kernel module kept in a virtio-fs with cache
disabled, the following warning was reported:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 404 at mm/page_alloc.c:4551 ......
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 404 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5+ #123
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ......
RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages+0x2bf/0x380
......
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x8e/0x150
? __alloc_pages+0x2bf/0x380
__kmalloc_large_node+0x86/0x160
__kmalloc+0x33c/0x480
virtio_fs_enqueue_req+0x240/0x6d0
virtio_fs_wake_pending_and_unlock+0x7f/0x190
queue_request_and_unlock+0x55/0x60
fuse_simple_request+0x152/0x2b0
fuse_direct_io+0x5d2/0x8c0
fuse_file_read_iter+0x121/0x160
__kernel_read+0x151/0x2d0
kernel_read+0x45/0x50
kernel_read_file+0x1a9/0x2a0
init_module_from_file+0x6a/0xe0
idempotent_init_module+0x175/0x230
__x64_sys_finit_module+0x5d/0xb0
x64_sys_call+0x1c3/0x9e0
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
......
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The warning is triggered as follows:
1) syscall finit_module() handles the module insertion and it invokes
kernel_read_file() to read the content of the module first.
2) kernel_read_file() allocates a 10MB buffer by using vmalloc() and
passes it to kernel_read(). kernel_read() constructs a kvec iter by
using iov_iter_kvec() and passes it to fuse_file_read_iter().
3) virtio-fs disables the cache, so fuse_file_read_iter() invokes
fuse_direct_io(). As for now, the maximal read size for kvec iter is
only limited by fc->max_read. For virtio-fs, max_read is UINT_MAX, so
fuse_direct_io() doesn't split the 10MB buffer. It saves the address and
the size of the 10MB-sized buffer in out_args[0] of a fuse request and
passes the fuse request to virtio_fs_wake_pending_and_unlock().
4) virtio_fs_wake_pending_and_unlock() uses virtio_fs_enqueue_req() to
queue the request. Because virtiofs need DMA-able address, so
virtio_fs_enqueue_req() uses kmalloc() to allocate a bounce buffer for
all fuse args, copies these args into the bounce buffer and passed the
physical address of the bounce buffer to virtiofsd. The total length of
these fuse args for the passed fuse request is about 10MB, so
copy_args_to_argbuf() invokes kmalloc() with a 10MB size parameter and
it triggers the warning in __alloc_pages():
if (WARN_ON_ONCE_GFP(order > MAX_PAGE_ORDER, gfp))
return NULL;
5) virtio_fs_enqueue_req() will retry the memory allocation in a
kworker, but it won't help, because kmalloc() will always return NULL
due to the abnormal size and finit_module() will hang forever.
A feasible solution is to limit the value of max_read for virtio-fs, so
the length passed to kmalloc() will be limited. However it will affect
the maximal read size for normal read. And for virtio-fs write initiated
from kernel, it has the similar problem but now there is no way to limit
fc->max_write in kernel.
So instead of limiting both the values of max_read and max_write in
kernel, introducing use_pages_for_kvec_io in fuse_conn and setting it as
true in virtiofs. When use_pages_for_kvec_io is enabled, fuse will use
pages instead of pointer to pass the KVEC_IO data.
After switching to pages for KVEC_IO data, these pages will be used for
DMA through virtio-fs. If these pages are backed by vmalloc(),
{flush|invalidate}_kernel_vmap_range() are necessary to flush or
invalidate the cache before the DMA operation. So add two new fields in
fuse_args_pages to record the base address of vmalloc area and the
condition indicating whether invalidation is needed. Perform the flush
in fuse_get_user_pages() for write operations and the invalidation in
fuse_release_user_pages() for read operations.
It may seem necessary to introduce another fie
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53216

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: release svc_expkey/svc_export with rcu_work
The last reference for `cache_head` can be reduced to zero in `c_show`
and `e_show`(using `rcu_read_lock` and `rcu_read_unlock`). Consequently,
`svc_export_put` and `expkey_put` will be invoked, leading to two
issues:
1. The `svc_export_put` will directly free ex_uuid. However,
`e_show`/`c_show` will access `ex_uuid` after `cache_put`, which can
trigger a use-after-free issue, shown below.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in svc_export_show+0x362/0x430 [nfsd]
Read of size 1 at addr ff11000010fdc120 by task cat/870
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 870 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3a0
print_report+0xb9/0x280
kasan_report+0xae/0xe0
svc_export_show+0x362/0x430 [nfsd]
c_show+0x161/0x390 [sunrpc]
seq_read_iter+0x589/0x770
seq_read+0x1e5/0x270
proc_reg_read+0xe1/0x140
vfs_read+0x125/0x530
ksys_read+0xc1/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Allocated by task 830:
kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
__kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x1bc/0x400
kmemdup_noprof+0x22/0x50
svc_export_parse+0x8a9/0xb80 [nfsd]
cache_do_downcall+0x71/0xa0 [sunrpc]
cache_write_procfs+0x8e/0xd0 [sunrpc]
proc_reg_write+0xe1/0x140
vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0
ksys_write+0xc1/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 868:
kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x50
kfree+0xf3/0x3e0
svc_export_put+0x87/0xb0 [nfsd]
cache_purge+0x17f/0x1f0 [sunrpc]
nfsd_destroy_serv+0x226/0x2d0 [nfsd]
nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd]
write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd]
nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd]
vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0
ksys_write+0xc1/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
2. We cannot sleep while using `rcu_read_lock`/`rcu_read_unlock`.
However, `svc_export_put`/`expkey_put` will call path_put, which
subsequently triggers a sleeping operation due to the following
`dput`.
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.10.0-dirty #141 Not tainted
-----------------------------
...
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x9a/0xd0
___might_sleep+0x231/0x240
dput+0x39/0x600
path_put+0x1b/0x30
svc_export_put+0x17/0x80
e_show+0x1c9/0x200
seq_read_iter+0x63f/0x7c0
seq_read+0x226/0x2d0
vfs_read+0x113/0x2c0
ksys_read+0xc9/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1
Fix these issues by using `rcu_work` to help release
`svc_expkey`/`svc_export`. This approach allows for an asynchronous
context to invoke `path_put` and also facilitates the freeing of
`uuid/exp/key` after an RCU grace period.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53209

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Fix receive ring space parameters when XDP is active
The MTU setting at the time an XDP multi-buffer is attached
determines whether the aggregation ring will be used and the
rx_skb_func handler. This is done in bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode().
If the MTU is later changed, the aggregation ring setting may need
to be changed and it may become out-of-sync with the settings
initially done in bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode(). This may result in
random memory corruption and crashes as the HW may DMA data larger
than the allocated buffer size, such as:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000003c0
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 17 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/17 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S OE 6.1.0-226bf9805506 #1
Hardware name: Wiwynn Delta Lake PVT BZA.02601.0150/Delta Lake-Class1, BIOS F0E_3A12 08/26/2021
RIP: 0010:bnxt_rx_pkt+0xe97/0x1ae0 [bnxt_en]
Code: 8b 95 70 ff ff ff 4c 8b 9d 48 ff ff ff 66 41 89 87 b4 00 00 00 e9 0b f7 ff ff 0f b7 43 0a 49 8b 95 a8 04 00 00 25 ff 0f 00 00 <0f> b7 14 42 48 c1 e2 06 49 03 95 a0 04 00 00 0f b6 42 33f
RSP: 0018:ffffa19f40cc0d18 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000001e0 RBX: ffff8e2c805c6100 RCX: 00000000000007ff
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8e2c271ab990 RDI: ffff8e2c84f12380
RBP: ffffa19f40cc0e48 R08: 000000000001000d R09: 974ea2fcddfa4cbf
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffa19f40cc0ff8 R12: ffff8e2c94b58980
R13: ffff8e2c952d6600 R14: 0000000000000016 R15: ffff8e2c271ab990
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e3b3f840000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000003c0 CR3: 0000000e8580a004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__bnxt_poll_work+0x1c2/0x3e0 [bnxt_en]
To address the issue, we now call bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode() within
bnxt_change_mtu() to properly set the AGG rings configuration and
update rx_skb_func based on the new MTU value.
Additionally, BNXT_FLAG_NO_AGG_RINGS is cleared at the beginning of
bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode() to make sure it gets set or cleared based on
the current MTU.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53208

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix slab-use-after-free Read in set_powered_sync
This fixes the following crash:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in set_powered_sync+0x3a/0xc0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1353
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888029b4dd18 by task kworker/u9:0/54
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-01155-gf723224742fc #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
q kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
set_powered_sync+0x3a/0xc0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1353
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x22b/0x400 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:328
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3231 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa2c/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3312
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd10 kernel/workqueue.c:3389
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Allocated by task 5247:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x19c/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:4193
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:681 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:807 [inline]
mgmt_pending_new+0x65/0x250 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:269
mgmt_pending_add+0x36/0x120 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296
set_powered+0x3cd/0x5e0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1394
hci_mgmt_cmd+0xc47/0x11d0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1712
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x7b8/0x11c0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1832
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745
sock_write_iter+0x2dd/0x400 net/socket.c:1160
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
vfs_write+0xa72/0xc90 fs/read_write.c:590
ksys_write+0x1a0/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:643
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 5246:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579
poison_slab_object+0xe0/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:240
__kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:256
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2256 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4477 [inline]
kfree+0x149/0x360 mm/slub.c:4598
settings_rsp+0x2bc/0x390 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1443
mgmt_pending_foreach+0xd1/0x130 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:259
__mgmt_power_off+0x112/0x420 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9455
hci_dev_close_sync+0x665/0x11a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5191
hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:483 [inline]
hci_dev_close+0x112/0x210 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:508
sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222
sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83gv
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53207

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible deadlocks
This fixes possible deadlocks like the following caused by
hci_cmd_sync_dequeue causing the destroy function to run:
INFO: task kworker/u19:0:143 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Tainted: G W O 6.8.0-2024-03-19-intel-next-iLS-24ww14 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:kworker/u19:0 state:D stack:0 pid:143 tgid:143 ppid:2 flags:0x00004000
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work [bluetooth]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x374/0xaf0
schedule+0x3c/0xf0
schedule_preempt_disabled+0x1c/0x30
__mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x3ef/0x7a0
__mutex_lock_slowpath+0x13/0x20
mutex_lock+0x3c/0x50
mgmt_set_connectable_complete+0xa4/0x150 [bluetooth]
? kfree+0x211/0x2a0
hci_cmd_sync_dequeue+0xae/0x130 [bluetooth]
? __pfx_cmd_complete_rsp+0x10/0x10 [bluetooth]
cmd_complete_rsp+0x26/0x80 [bluetooth]
mgmt_pending_foreach+0x4d/0x70 [bluetooth]
__mgmt_power_off+0x8d/0x180 [bluetooth]
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x23/0x40
hci_dev_close_sync+0x445/0x5b0 [bluetooth]
hci_set_powered_sync+0x149/0x250 [bluetooth]
set_powered_sync+0x24/0x60 [bluetooth]
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x90/0x150 [bluetooth]
process_one_work+0x13e/0x300
worker_thread+0x2f7/0x420
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x107/0x140
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x3d/0x60
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53196

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Don't retire aborted MMIO instruction
Returning an abort to the guest for an unsupported MMIO access is a
documented feature of the KVM UAPI. Nevertheless, it's clear that this
plumbing has seen limited testing, since userspace can trivially cause a
WARN in the MMIO return:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 30558 at arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h:536 kvm_handle_mmio_return+0x46c/0x5c4 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h:536
Call trace:
kvm_handle_mmio_return+0x46c/0x5c4 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h:536
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x98/0x15b4 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:1133
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x75c/0xa78 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4487
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x14c/0x1c8 fs/ioctl.c:893
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0x1e0/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x38/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
The splat is complaining that KVM is advancing PC while an exception is
pending, i.e. that KVM is retiring the MMIO instruction despite a
pending synchronous external abort. Womp womp.
Fix the glaring UAPI bug by skipping over all the MMIO emulation in
case there is a pending synchronous exception. Note that while userspace
is capable of pending an asynchronous exception (SError, IRQ, or FIQ),
it is still safe to retire the MMIO instruction in this case as (1) they
are by definition asynchronous, and (2) KVM relies on hardware support
for pending/delivering these exceptions instead of the software state
machine for advancing PC.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53195

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Get rid of userspace_irqchip_in_use
Improper use of userspace_irqchip_in_use led to syzbot hitting the
following WARN_ON() in kvm_timer_update_irq():
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3281 at arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c:459
kvm_timer_update_irq+0x21c/0x394
Call trace:
kvm_timer_update_irq+0x21c/0x394 arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c:459
kvm_timer_vcpu_reset+0x158/0x684 arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c:968
kvm_reset_vcpu+0x3b4/0x560 arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c:264
kvm_vcpu_set_target arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:1553 [inline]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_vcpu_init arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:1573 [inline]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x112c/0x1b3c arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:1695
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4ec/0xf74 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4658
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x108/0x184 fs/ioctl.c:893
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x78/0x1b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0xe8/0x1b0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x40/0x50 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x54/0x14c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
The following sequence led to the scenario:
- Userspace creates a VM and a vCPU.
- The vCPU is initialized with KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3 during
KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT.
- Without any other setup, such as vGIC or vPMU, userspace issues
KVM_RUN on the vCPU. Since the vPMU is requested, but not setup,
kvm_arm_pmu_v3_enable() fails in kvm_arch_vcpu_run_pid_change().
As a result, KVM_RUN returns after enabling the timer, but before
incrementing 'userspace_irqchip_in_use':
kvm_arch_vcpu_run_pid_change()
ret = kvm_arm_pmu_v3_enable()
if (!vcpu->arch.pmu.created)
return -EINVAL;
if (ret)
return ret;
[...]
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
static_branch_inc(&userspace_irqchip_in_use);
- Userspace ignores the error and issues KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT again.
Since the timer is already enabled, control moves through the
following flow, ultimately hitting the WARN_ON():
kvm_timer_vcpu_reset()
if (timer->enabled)
kvm_timer_update_irq()
if (!userspace_irqchip())
ret = kvm_vgic_inject_irq()
ret = vgic_lazy_init()
if (unlikely(!vgic_initialized(kvm)))
if (kvm->arch.vgic.vgic_model !=
KVM_DEV_TYPE_ARM_VGIC_V2)
return -EBUSY;
WARN_ON(ret);
Theoretically, since userspace_irqchip_in_use's functionality can be
simply replaced by '!irqchip_in_kernel()', get rid of the static key
to avoid the mismanagement, which also helps with the syzbot issue.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53190

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtlwifi: Drastically reduce the attempts to read efuse in case of failures
Syzkaller reported a hung task with uevent_show() on stack trace. That
specific issue was addressed by another commit [0], but even with that
fix applied (for example, running v6.12-rc5) we face another type of hung
task that comes from the same reproducer [1]. By investigating that, we
could narrow it to the following path:
(a) Syzkaller emulates a Realtek USB WiFi adapter using raw-gadget and
dummy_hcd infrastructure.
(b) During the probe of rtl8192cu, the driver ends-up performing an efuse
read procedure (which is related to EEPROM load IIUC), and here lies the
issue: the function read_efuse() calls read_efuse_byte() many times, as
loop iterations depending on the efuse size (in our example, 512 in total).
This procedure for reading efuse bytes relies in a loop that performs an
I/O read up to *10k* times in case of failures. We measured the time of
the loop inside read_efuse_byte() alone, and in this reproducer (which
involves the dummy_hcd emulation layer), it takes 15 seconds each. As a
consequence, we have the driver stuck in its probe routine for big time,
exposing a stack trace like below if we attempt to reboot the system, for
example:
task:kworker/0:3 state:D stack:0 pid:662 tgid:662 ppid:2 flags:0x00004000
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__schedule+0xe22/0xeb6
schedule_timeout+0xe7/0x132
__wait_for_common+0xb5/0x12e
usb_start_wait_urb+0xc5/0x1ef
? usb_alloc_urb+0x95/0xa4
usb_control_msg+0xff/0x184
_usbctrl_vendorreq_sync+0xa0/0x161
_usb_read_sync+0xb3/0xc5
read_efuse_byte+0x13c/0x146
read_efuse+0x351/0x5f0
efuse_read_all_map+0x42/0x52
rtl_efuse_shadow_map_update+0x60/0xef
rtl_get_hwinfo+0x5d/0x1c2
rtl92cu_read_eeprom_info+0x10a/0x8d5
? rtl92c_read_chip_version+0x14f/0x17e
rtl_usb_probe+0x323/0x851
usb_probe_interface+0x278/0x34b
really_probe+0x202/0x4a4
__driver_probe_device+0x166/0x1b2
driver_probe_device+0x2f/0xd8
[...]
We propose hereby to drastically reduce the attempts of doing the I/O
reads in case of failures, restricted to USB devices (given that
they're inherently slower than PCIe ones). By retrying up to 10 times
(instead of 10000), we got reponsiveness in the reproducer, while seems
reasonable to believe that there's no sane USB device implementation in
the field requiring this amount of retries at every I/O read in order
to properly work. Based on that assumption, it'd be good to have it
backported to stable but maybe not since driver implementation (the 10k
number comes from day 0), perhaps up to 6.x series makes sense.
[0] Commit 15fffc6a5624 ("driver core: Fix uevent_show() vs driver detach race")
[1] A note about that: this syzkaller report presents multiple reproducers
that differs by the type of emulated USB device. For this specific case,
check the entry from 2024/08/08 06:23 in the list of crashes; the C repro
is available at https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&x=1521fc83980000.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53185

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix NULL ptr deref in crypto_aead_setkey()
Neither SMB3.0 or SMB3.02 supports encryption negotiate context, so
when SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION flag is set in the negotiate response,
the client uses AES-128-CCM as the default cipher. See MS-SMB2
3.3.5.4.
Commit b0abcd65ec54 ("smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption") added
a @server->cipher_type check to conditionally call
smb3_crypto_aead_allocate(), but that check would always be false as
@server->cipher_type is unset for SMB3.02.
Fix the following KASAN splat by setting @server->cipher_type for
SMB3.02 as well.
mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o vers=3.02,seal,...
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130
Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000020 by task mount.cifs/1095
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1095 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 6.12.0 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41
04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
? crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130
kasan_report+0xda/0x110
? crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130
crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130
crypt_message+0x258/0xec0 [cifs]
? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50
? __pfx_crypt_message+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? mark_lock+0xb0/0x6a0
? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0
? mark_lock+0xb0/0x6a0
smb3_init_transform_rq+0x352/0x3f0 [cifs]
? lock_acquire.part.0+0xf4/0x2a0
smb_send_rqst+0x144/0x230 [cifs]
? __pfx_smb_send_rqst+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0
? smb2_setup_request+0x225/0x3a0 [cifs]
? __pfx_cifs_compound_last_callback+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
compound_send_recv+0x59b/0x1140 [cifs]
? __pfx_compound_send_recv+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? __create_object+0x5e/0x90
? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0xf0
cifs_send_recv+0x23/0x30 [cifs]
SMB2_tcon+0x3ec/0xb30 [cifs]
? __pfx_SMB2_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? lock_acquire.part.0+0xf4/0x2a0
? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
? do_raw_spin_trylock+0xc6/0x120
? lock_acquire+0x3f/0x90
? _get_xid+0x16/0xd0 [cifs]
? __pfx_SMB2_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? cifs_get_smb_ses+0xcdd/0x10a0 [cifs]
cifs_get_smb_ses+0xcdd/0x10a0 [cifs]
? __pfx_cifs_get_smb_ses+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? cifs_get_tcp_session+0xaa0/0xca0 [cifs]
cifs_mount_get_session+0x8a/0x210 [cifs]
dfs_mount_share+0x1b0/0x11d0 [cifs]
? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_dfs_mount_share+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? lock_acquire.part.0+0xf4/0x2a0
? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0
? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0
? lock_release+0x203/0x5d0
cifs_mount+0xb3/0x3d0 [cifs]
? do_raw_spin_trylock+0xc6/0x120
? __pfx_cifs_mount+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? lock_acquire+0x3f/0x90
? find_nls+0x16/0xa0
? smb3_update_mnt_flags+0x372/0x3b0 [cifs]
cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x1e2/0xc80 [cifs]
? __pfx_vfs_parse_fs_string+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
smb3_get_tree+0x1bf/0x330 [cifs]
vfs_get_tree+0x4a/0x160
path_mount+0x3c1/0xfb0
? kasan_quarantine_put+0xc7/0x1d0
? __pfx_path_mount+0x10/0x10
? kmem_cache_free+0x118/0x3e0
? user_path_at+0x74/0xa0
__x64_sys_mount+0x1a6/0x1e0
? __pfx___x64_sys_mount+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53178

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: Don't leak cfid when reconnect races with open_cached_dir
open_cached_dir() may either race with the tcon reconnection even before
compound_send_recv() or directly trigger a reconnection via
SMB2_open_init() or SMB_query_info_init().
The reconnection process invokes invalidate_all_cached_dirs() via
cifs_mark_open_files_invalid(), which removes all cfids from the
cfids->entries list but doesn't drop a ref if has_lease isn't true. This
results in the currently-being-constructed cfid not being on the list,
but still having a refcount of 2. It leaks if returned from
open_cached_dir().
Fix this by setting cfid->has_lease when the ref is actually taken; the
cfid will not be used by other threads until it has a valid time.
Addresses these kmemleaks:
unreferenced object 0xffff8881090c4000 (size 1024):
comm "bash", pid 1860, jiffies 4295126592
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 22 01 00 00 00 00 ad de ........".......
00 ca 45 22 81 88 ff ff f8 dc 4f 04 81 88 ff ff ..E"......O.....
backtrace (crc 6f58c20f):
[<ffffffff8b895a1e>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x2be/0x350
[<ffffffff8bda06e3>] open_cached_dir+0x993/0x1fb0
[<ffffffff8bdaa750>] cifs_readdir+0x15a0/0x1d50
[<ffffffff8b9a853f>] iterate_dir+0x28f/0x4b0
[<ffffffff8b9a9aed>] __x64_sys_getdents64+0xfd/0x200
[<ffffffff8cf6da05>] do_syscall_64+0x95/0x1a0
[<ffffffff8d00012f>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
unreferenced object 0xffff8881044fdcf8 (size 8):
comm "bash", pid 1860, jiffies 4295126592
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
00 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........
backtrace (crc 10c106a9):
[<ffffffff8b89a3d3>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x363/0x480
[<ffffffff8b7d7256>] kstrdup+0x36/0x60
[<ffffffff8bda0700>] open_cached_dir+0x9b0/0x1fb0
[<ffffffff8bdaa750>] cifs_readdir+0x15a0/0x1d50
[<ffffffff8b9a853f>] iterate_dir+0x28f/0x4b0
[<ffffffff8b9a9aed>] __x64_sys_getdents64+0xfd/0x200
[<ffffffff8cf6da05>] do_syscall_64+0x95/0x1a0
[<ffffffff8d00012f>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
And addresses these BUG splats when unmounting the SMB filesystem:
BUG: Dentry ffff888140590ba0{i=1000000000080,n=/} still in use (2) [unmount of cifs cifs]
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 3433 at fs/dcache.c:1536 umount_check+0xd0/0x100
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 3433 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.12.0-rc4-g850925a8133c-dirty #49
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
RIP: 0010:umount_check+0xd0/0x100
Code: 8d 7c 24 40 e8 31 5a f4 ff 49 8b 54 24 40 41 56 49 89 e9 45 89 e8 48 89 d9 41 57 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 80 e7 db ac e8 f0 72 9a ff <0f> 0b 58 31 c0 5a 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 2b e5 5d 01 41
RSP: 0018:ffff88811cc27978 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888140590ba0 RCX: ffffffffaaf20bae
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff8881f6fb6f40
RBP: ffff8881462ec000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1023984ee3
R10: ffff88811cc2771f R11: 00000000016cfcc0 R12: ffff888134383e08
R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffff8881462ec668 R15: ffffffffaceab4c0
FS: 00007f23bfa98740(0000) GS:ffff8881f6f80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000556de4a6f808 CR3: 0000000123c80000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
d_walk+0x6a/0x530
shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x6a/0x200
generic_shutdown_super+0x52/0x2a0
kill_anon_super+0x22/0x40
cifs_kill_sb+0x159/0x1e0
deactivate_locked_super+0x66/0xe0
cleanup_mnt+0x140/0x210
task_work_run+0xfb/0x170
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x29f/0x2b0
do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x1a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f23bfb93ae7
Code: ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 0d 11 93 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bf 0f 1f 44 00 00 b8 50 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e9 92 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53177

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: prevent use-after-free due to open_cached_dir error paths
If open_cached_dir() encounters an error parsing the lease from the
server, the error handling may race with receiving a lease break,
resulting in open_cached_dir() freeing the cfid while the queued work is
pending.
Update open_cached_dir() to drop refs rather than directly freeing the
cfid.
Have cached_dir_lease_break(), cfids_laundromat_worker(), and
invalidate_all_cached_dirs() clear has_lease immediately while still
holding cfids->cfid_list_lock, and then use this to also simplify the
reference counting in cfids_laundromat_worker() and
invalidate_all_cached_dirs().
Fixes this KASAN splat (which manually injects an error and lease break
in open_cached_dir()):
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in smb2_cached_lease_break+0x27/0xb0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811cc24c10 by task kworker/3:1/65
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 65 Comm: kworker/3:1 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-g255cf264e6e5-dirty #87
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
Workqueue: cifsiod smb2_cached_lease_break
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0
print_report+0xce/0x660
kasan_report+0xd3/0x110
smb2_cached_lease_break+0x27/0xb0
process_one_work+0x50a/0xc50
worker_thread+0x2ba/0x530
kthread+0x17c/0x1c0
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 2464:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
open_cached_dir+0xa7d/0x1fb0
smb2_query_path_info+0x43c/0x6e0
cifs_get_fattr+0x346/0xf10
cifs_get_inode_info+0x157/0x210
cifs_revalidate_dentry_attr+0x2d1/0x460
cifs_getattr+0x173/0x470
vfs_statx_path+0x10f/0x160
vfs_statx+0xe9/0x150
vfs_fstatat+0x5e/0xc0
__do_sys_newfstatat+0x91/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x95/0x1a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 2464:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x51/0x70
kfree+0x174/0x520
open_cached_dir+0x97f/0x1fb0
smb2_query_path_info+0x43c/0x6e0
cifs_get_fattr+0x346/0xf10
cifs_get_inode_info+0x157/0x210
cifs_revalidate_dentry_attr+0x2d1/0x460
cifs_getattr+0x173/0x470
vfs_statx_path+0x10f/0x160
vfs_statx+0xe9/0x150
vfs_fstatat+0x5e/0xc0
__do_sys_newfstatat+0x91/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x95/0x1a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xad/0xc0
insert_work+0x32/0x100
__queue_work+0x5c9/0x870
queue_work_on+0x82/0x90
open_cached_dir+0x1369/0x1fb0
smb2_query_path_info+0x43c/0x6e0
cifs_get_fattr+0x346/0xf10
cifs_get_inode_info+0x157/0x210
cifs_revalidate_dentry_attr+0x2d1/0x460
cifs_getattr+0x173/0x470
vfs_statx_path+0x10f/0x160
vfs_statx+0xe9/0x150
vfs_fstatat+0x5e/0xc0
__do_sys_newfstatat+0x91/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x95/0x1a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88811cc24c00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 16 bytes inside of
freed 1024-byte region [ffff88811cc24c00, ffff88811cc25000)

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53176

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: During unmount, ensure all cached dir instances drop their dentry
The unmount process (cifs_kill_sb() calling close_all_cached_dirs()) can
race with various cached directory operations, which ultimately results
in dentries not being dropped and these kernel BUGs:
BUG: Dentry ffff88814f37e358{i=1000000000080,n=/} still in use (2) [unmount of cifs cifs]
VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of cifs (cifs)
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/super.c:661!
This happens when a cfid is in the process of being cleaned up when, and
has been removed from the cfids->entries list, including:
- Receiving a lease break from the server
- Server reconnection triggers invalidate_all_cached_dirs(), which
removes all the cfids from the list
- The laundromat thread decides to expire an old cfid.
To solve these problems, dropping the dentry is done in queued work done
in a newly-added cfid_put_wq workqueue, and close_all_cached_dirs()
flushes that workqueue after it drops all the dentries of which it's
aware. This is a global workqueue (rather than scoped to a mount), but
the queued work is minimal.
The final cleanup work for cleaning up a cfid is performed via work
queued in the serverclose_wq workqueue; this is done separate from
dropping the dentries so that close_all_cached_dirs() doesn't block on
any server operations.
Both of these queued works expect to invoked with a cfid reference and
a tcon reference to avoid those objects from being freed while the work
is ongoing.
While we're here, add proper locking to close_all_cached_dirs(), and
locking around the freeing of cfid->dentry.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53170

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: fix uaf for flush rq while iterating tags
blk_mq_clear_flush_rq_mapping() is not called during scsi probe, by
checking blk_queue_init_done(). However, QUEUE_FLAG_INIT_DONE is cleared
in del_gendisk by commit aec89dc5d421 ("block: keep q_usage_counter in
atomic mode after del_gendisk"), hence for disk like scsi, following
blk_mq_destroy_queue() will not clear flush rq from tags->rqs[] as well,
cause following uaf that is found by our syzkaller for v6.6:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in blk_mq_find_and_get_req+0x16e/0x1a0 block/blk-mq-tag.c:261
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811c969c20 by task kworker/1:2H/224909
CPU: 1 PID: 224909 Comm: kworker/1:2H Not tainted 6.6.0-ga836a5060850 #32
Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_timeout_work
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x66/0x300 mm/kasan/report.c:364
print_report+0x3e/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:475
kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0 mm/kasan/report.c:588
blk_mq_find_and_get_req+0x16e/0x1a0 block/blk-mq-tag.c:261
bt_iter block/blk-mq-tag.c:288 [inline]
__sbitmap_for_each_set include/linux/sbitmap.h:295 [inline]
sbitmap_for_each_set include/linux/sbitmap.h:316 [inline]
bt_for_each+0x455/0x790 block/blk-mq-tag.c:325
blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x320/0x740 block/blk-mq-tag.c:534
blk_mq_timeout_work+0x1a3/0x7b0 block/blk-mq.c:1673
process_one_work+0x7c4/0x1450 kernel/workqueue.c:2631
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2704 [inline]
worker_thread+0x804/0xe40 kernel/workqueue.c:2785
kthread+0x346/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:293
Allocated by task 942:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:374 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:383 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:380
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:198 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:1007 [inline]
__kmalloc_node+0x69/0x170 mm/slab_common.c:1014
kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:620 [inline]
kzalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:732 [inline]
blk_alloc_flush_queue+0x144/0x2f0 block/blk-flush.c:499
blk_mq_alloc_hctx+0x601/0x940 block/blk-mq.c:3788
blk_mq_alloc_and_init_hctx+0x27f/0x330 block/blk-mq.c:4261
blk_mq_realloc_hw_ctxs+0x488/0x5e0 block/blk-mq.c:4294
blk_mq_init_allocated_queue+0x188/0x860 block/blk-mq.c:4350
blk_mq_init_queue_data block/blk-mq.c:4166 [inline]
blk_mq_init_queue+0x8d/0x100 block/blk-mq.c:4176
scsi_alloc_sdev+0x843/0xd50 drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c:335
scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x77c/0xde0 drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c:1189
__scsi_scan_target+0x1fc/0x5a0 drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c:1727
scsi_scan_channel drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c:1815 [inline]
scsi_scan_channel+0x14b/0x1e0 drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c:1791
scsi_scan_host_selected+0x2fe/0x400 drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c:1844
scsi_scan+0x3a0/0x3f0 drivers/scsi/scsi_sysfs.c:151
store_scan+0x2a/0x60 drivers/scsi/scsi_sysfs.c:191
dev_attr_store+0x5c/0x90 drivers/base/core.c:2388
sysfs_kf_write+0x11c/0x170 fs/sysfs/file.c:136
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3fc/0x610 fs/kernfs/file.c:338
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2083 [inline]
new_sync_write+0x1b4/0x2d0 fs/read_write.c:493
vfs_write+0x76c/0xb00 fs/read_write.c:586
ksys_write+0x127/0x250 fs/read_write.c:639
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x70/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2
Freed by task 244687:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:522
____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x12a/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:244
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:164 [in
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53169

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-fabrics: fix kernel crash while shutting down controller
The nvme keep-alive operation, which executes at a periodic interval,
could potentially sneak in while shutting down a fabric controller.
This may lead to a race between the fabric controller admin queue
destroy code path (invoked while shutting down controller) and hw/hctx
queue dispatcher called from the nvme keep-alive async request queuing
operation. This race could lead to the kernel crash shown below:
Call Trace:
autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0xbc (unreliable)
__blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x114/0x24c
blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x44/0x84
blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x140/0x220
nvme_keep_alive_work+0xc8/0x19c [nvme_core]
process_one_work+0x200/0x4e0
worker_thread+0x340/0x504
kthread+0x138/0x140
start_kernel_thread+0x14/0x18
While shutting down fabric controller, if nvme keep-alive request sneaks
in then it would be flushed off. The nvme_keep_alive_end_io function is
then invoked to handle the end of the keep-alive operation which
decrements the admin->q_usage_counter and assuming this is the last/only
request in the admin queue then the admin->q_usage_counter becomes zero.
If that happens then blk-mq destroy queue operation (blk_mq_destroy_
queue()) which could be potentially running simultaneously on another
cpu (as this is the controller shutdown code path) would forward
progress and deletes the admin queue. So, now from this point onward
we are not supposed to access the admin queue resources. However the
issue here's that the nvme keep-alive thread running hw/hctx queue
dispatch operation hasn't yet finished its work and so it could still
potentially access the admin queue resource while the admin queue had
been already deleted and that causes the above crash.
The above kernel crash is regression caused due to changes implemented
in commit a54a93d0e359 ("nvme: move stopping keep-alive into
nvme_uninit_ctrl()"). Ideally we should stop keep-alive before destroyin
g the admin queue and freeing the admin tagset so that it wouldn't sneak
in during the shutdown operation. However we removed the keep alive stop
operation from the beginning of the controller shutdown code path in commit
a54a93d0e359 ("nvme: move stopping keep-alive into nvme_uninit_ctrl()")
and added it under nvme_uninit_ctrl() which executes very late in the
shutdown code path after the admin queue is destroyed and its tagset is
removed. So this change created the possibility of keep-alive sneaking in
and interfering with the shutdown operation and causing observed kernel
crash.
To fix the observed crash, we decided to move nvme_stop_keep_alive() from
nvme_uninit_ctrl() to nvme_remove_admin_tag_set(). This change would ensure
that we don't forward progress and delete the admin queue until the keep-
alive operation is finished (if it's in-flight) or cancelled and that would
help contain the race condition explained above and hence avoid the crash.
Moving nvme_stop_keep_alive() to nvme_remove_admin_tag_set() instead of
adding nvme_stop_keep_alive() to the beginning of the controller shutdown
code path in nvme_stop_ctrl(), as was the case earlier before commit
a54a93d0e359 ("nvme: move stopping keep-alive into nvme_uninit_ctrl()"),
would help save one callsite of nvme_stop_keep_alive().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53168

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunrpc: fix one UAF issue caused by sunrpc kernel tcp socket
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tcp_write_timer_handler+0x156/0x3e0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888111f322cd by task swapper/0/0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc4-dirty #7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3d0
print_report+0xb4/0x270
kasan_report+0xbd/0xf0
tcp_write_timer_handler+0x156/0x3e0
tcp_write_timer+0x66/0x170
call_timer_fn+0xfb/0x1d0
__run_timers+0x3f8/0x480
run_timer_softirq+0x9b/0x100
handle_softirqs+0x153/0x390
__irq_exit_rcu+0x103/0x120
irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0x90
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:default_idle+0xf/0x20
Code: 4c 01 c7 4c 29 c2 e9 72 ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 66 90 0f 00 2d 33 f8 25 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 cc cc cc
cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 0018:ffffffffa2007e28 EFLAGS: 00000242
RAX: 00000000000f3b31 RBX: 1ffffffff4400fc7 RCX: ffffffffa09c3196
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff9f00590f
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed102360835d
R10: ffff88811b041aeb R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffa202d7c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000000147d0
default_idle_call+0x6b/0xa0
cpuidle_idle_call+0x1af/0x1f0
do_idle+0xbc/0x130
cpu_startup_entry+0x33/0x40
rest_init+0x11f/0x210
start_kernel+0x39a/0x420
x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30
x86_64_start_kernel+0x97/0xa0
common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
</TASK>
Allocated by task 595:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x87/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x12b/0x3f0
copy_net_ns+0x94/0x380
create_new_namespaces+0x24c/0x500
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x75/0xf0
ksys_unshare+0x24e/0x4f0
__x64_sys_unshare+0x1f/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x70/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 100:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x54/0x70
kmem_cache_free+0x156/0x5d0
cleanup_net+0x5d3/0x670
process_one_work+0x776/0xa90
worker_thread+0x2e2/0x560
kthread+0x1a8/0x1f0
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Reproduction script:
mkdir -p /mnt/nfsshare
mkdir -p /mnt/nfs/netns_1
mkfs.ext4 /dev/sdb
mount /dev/sdb /mnt/nfsshare
systemctl restart nfs-server
chmod 777 /mnt/nfsshare
exportfs -i -o rw,no_root_squash *:/mnt/nfsshare
ip netns add netns_1
ip link add name veth_1_peer type veth peer veth_1
ifconfig veth_1_peer 11.11.0.254 up
ip link set veth_1 netns netns_1
ip netns exec netns_1 ifconfig veth_1 11.11.0.1
ip netns exec netns_1 /root/iptables -A OUTPUT -d 11.11.0.254 -p tcp \
--tcp-flags FIN FIN -j DROP
(note: In my environment, a DESTROY_CLIENTID operation is always sent
immediately, breaking the nfs tcp connection.)
ip netns exec netns_1 timeout -s 9 300 mount -t nfs -o proto=tcp,vers=4.1 \
11.11.0.254:/mnt/nfsshare /mnt/nfs/netns_1
ip netns del netns_1
The reason here is that the tcp socket in netns_1 (nfs side) has been
shutdown and closed (done in xs_destroy), but the FIN message (with ack)
is discarded, and the nfsd side keeps sending retransmission messages.
As a result, when the tcp sock in netns_1 processes the received message,
it sends the message (FIN message) in the sending queue, and the tcp timer
is re-established. When the network namespace is deleted, the net structure
accessed by tcp's timer handler function causes problems.
To fix this problem, let's hold netns refcnt for the tcp kernel socket as
done in other modules. This is an ugly hack which can easily be backported
to earlier kernels. A proper fix which cleans up the interfaces will
follow, but may not be so easy to backport.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53167

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfs/blocklayout: Don't attempt unregister for invalid block device
Since commit d869da91cccb ("nfs/blocklayout: Fix premature PR key
unregistration") an unmount of a pNFS SCSI layout-enabled NFS may
dereference a NULL block_device in:
bl_unregister_scsi+0x16/0xe0 [blocklayoutdriver]
bl_free_device+0x70/0x80 [blocklayoutdriver]
bl_free_deviceid_node+0x12/0x30 [blocklayoutdriver]
nfs4_put_deviceid_node+0x60/0xc0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_deviceid_purge_client+0x132/0x190 [nfsv4]
unset_pnfs_layoutdriver+0x59/0x60 [nfsv4]
nfs4_destroy_server+0x36/0x70 [nfsv4]
nfs_free_server+0x23/0xe0 [nfs]
deactivate_locked_super+0x30/0xb0
cleanup_mnt+0xba/0x150
task_work_run+0x59/0x90
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x217/0x220
do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
This happens because even though we were able to create the
nfs4_deviceid_node, the lookup for the device was unable to attach the
block device to the pnfs_block_dev.
If we never found a block device to register, we can avoid this case with
the PNFS_BDEV_REGISTERED flag. Move the deref behind the test for the
flag.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53166

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block, bfq: fix bfqq uaf in bfq_limit_depth()
Set new allocated bfqq to bic or remove freed bfqq from bic are both
protected by bfqd->lock, however bfq_limit_depth() is deferencing bfqq
from bic without the lock, this can lead to UAF if the io_context is
shared by multiple tasks.
For example, test bfq with io_uring can trigger following UAF in v6.6:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfqq_group+0x15/0x50
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x80
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x66/0x300
print_report+0x3e/0x70
kasan_report+0xb4/0xf0
bfqq_group+0x15/0x50
bfqq_request_over_limit+0x130/0x9a0
bfq_limit_depth+0x1b5/0x480
__blk_mq_alloc_requests+0x2b5/0xa00
blk_mq_get_new_requests+0x11d/0x1d0
blk_mq_submit_bio+0x286/0xb00
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x331/0x400
__block_write_full_folio+0x3d0/0x640
writepage_cb+0x3b/0xc0
write_cache_pages+0x254/0x6c0
write_cache_pages+0x254/0x6c0
do_writepages+0x192/0x310
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x95/0xc0
__filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x99/0xd0
filemap_write_and_wait_range.part.0+0x4d/0xa0
blkdev_read_iter+0xef/0x1e0
io_read+0x1b6/0x8a0
io_issue_sqe+0x87/0x300
io_wq_submit_work+0xeb/0x390
io_worker_handle_work+0x24d/0x550
io_wq_worker+0x27f/0x6c0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 808602:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x83/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1b1/0x6d0
bfq_get_queue+0x138/0xfa0
bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split+0xe3/0x2c0
bfq_init_rq+0x196/0xbb0
bfq_insert_request.isra.0+0xb5/0x480
bfq_insert_requests+0x156/0x180
blk_mq_insert_request+0x15d/0x440
blk_mq_submit_bio+0x8a4/0xb00
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x331/0x400
__blkdev_direct_IO_async+0x2dd/0x330
blkdev_write_iter+0x39a/0x450
io_write+0x22a/0x840
io_issue_sqe+0x87/0x300
io_wq_submit_work+0xeb/0x390
io_worker_handle_work+0x24d/0x550
io_wq_worker+0x27f/0x6c0
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
Freed by task 808589:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40
__kasan_slab_free+0x126/0x1b0
kmem_cache_free+0x10c/0x750
bfq_put_queue+0x2dd/0x770
__bfq_insert_request.isra.0+0x155/0x7a0
bfq_insert_request.isra.0+0x122/0x480
bfq_insert_requests+0x156/0x180
blk_mq_dispatch_plug_list+0x528/0x7e0
blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.0+0xe5/0x590
__blk_flush_plug+0x3b/0x90
blk_finish_plug+0x40/0x60
do_writepages+0x19d/0x310
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x95/0xc0
__filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x99/0xd0
filemap_write_and_wait_range.part.0+0x4d/0xa0
blkdev_read_iter+0xef/0x1e0
io_read+0x1b6/0x8a0
io_issue_sqe+0x87/0x300
io_wq_submit_work+0xeb/0x390
io_worker_handle_work+0x24d/0x550
io_wq_worker+0x27f/0x6c0
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
Fix the problem by protecting bic_to_bfqq() with bfqd->lock.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53160

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rcu/kvfree: Fix data-race in __mod_timer / kvfree_call_rcu
KCSAN reports a data race when access the krcp->monitor_work.timer.expires
variable in the schedule_delayed_monitor_work() function:
<snip>
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __mod_timer / kvfree_call_rcu
read to 0xffff888237d1cce8 of 8 bytes by task 10149 on cpu 1:
schedule_delayed_monitor_work kernel/rcu/tree.c:3520 [inline]
kvfree_call_rcu+0x3b8/0x510 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3839
trie_update_elem+0x47c/0x620 kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:441
bpf_map_update_value+0x324/0x350 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:203
generic_map_update_batch+0x401/0x520 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1849
bpf_map_do_batch+0x28c/0x3f0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5143
__sys_bpf+0x2e5/0x7a0
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5741 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5739 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x43/0x50 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5739
x64_sys_call+0x2625/0x2d60 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:322
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
write to 0xffff888237d1cce8 of 8 bytes by task 56 on cpu 0:
__mod_timer+0x578/0x7f0 kernel/time/timer.c:1173
add_timer_global+0x51/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1330
__queue_delayed_work+0x127/0x1a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2523
queue_delayed_work_on+0xdf/0x190 kernel/workqueue.c:2552
queue_delayed_work include/linux/workqueue.h:677 [inline]
schedule_delayed_monitor_work kernel/rcu/tree.c:3525 [inline]
kfree_rcu_monitor+0x5e8/0x660 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3643
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0x483/0x9a0 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x51d/0x6f0 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x1d1/0x210 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 56 Comm: kworker/u8:4 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-syzkaller-00050-g5b7c893ed5ed #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Workqueue: events_unbound kfree_rcu_monitor
<snip>
kfree_rcu_monitor() rearms the work if a "krcp" has to be still
offloaded and this is done without holding krcp->lock, whereas
the kvfree_call_rcu() holds it.
Fix it by acquiring the "krcp->lock" for kfree_rcu_monitor() so
both functions do not race anymore.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53152

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: tegra194: Move controller cleanups to pex_ep_event_pex_rst_deassert()
Currently, the endpoint cleanup function dw_pcie_ep_cleanup() and EPF
deinit notify function pci_epc_deinit_notify() are called during the
execution of pex_ep_event_pex_rst_assert() i.e., when the host has asserted
PERST#. But quickly after this step, refclk will also be disabled by the
host.
All of the tegra194 endpoint SoCs supported as of now depend on the refclk
from the host for keeping the controller operational. Due to this
limitation, any access to the hardware registers in the absence of refclk
will result in a whole endpoint crash. Unfortunately, most of the
controller cleanups require accessing the hardware registers (like eDMA
cleanup performed in dw_pcie_ep_cleanup(), etc...). So these cleanup
functions can cause the crash in the endpoint SoC once host asserts PERST#.
One way to address this issue is by generating the refclk in the endpoint
itself and not depending on the host. But that is not always possible as
some of the endpoint designs do require the endpoint to consume refclk from
the host.
Thus, fix this crash by moving the controller cleanups to the start of
the pex_ep_event_pex_rst_deassert() function. This function is called
whenever the host has deasserted PERST# and it is guaranteed that the
refclk would be active at this point. So at the start of this function
(after enabling resources) the controller cleanup can be performed. Once
finished, rest of the code execution for PERST# deassert can continue as
usual.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53123

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: error out earlier on disconnect
Eric reported a division by zero splat in the MPTCP protocol:
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6094 Comm: syz-executor317 Not tainted
6.12.0-rc5-syzkaller-00291-g05b92660cdfe #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:__tcp_select_window+0x5b4/0x1310 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3163
Code: f6 44 01 e3 89 df e8 9b 75 09 f8 44 39 f3 0f 8d 11 ff ff ff e8
0d 74 09 f8 45 89 f4 e9 04 ff ff ff e8 00 74 09 f8 44 89 f0 99 <f7> 7c
24 14 41 29 d6 45 89 f4 e9 ec fe ff ff e8 e8 73 09 f8 48 89
RSP: 0018:ffffc900041f7930 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000017e67 RBX: 0000000000017e67 RCX: ffffffff8983314b
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff898331b0 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00000000005d6000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000017e67
R10: 0000000000003e80 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000003e80
R13: ffff888031d9b440 R14: 0000000000017e67 R15: 00000000002eb000
FS: 00007feb5d7f16c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007feb5d8adbb8 CR3: 0000000074e4c000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__tcp_cleanup_rbuf+0x3e7/0x4b0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1493
mptcp_rcv_space_adjust net/mptcp/protocol.c:2085 [inline]
mptcp_recvmsg+0x2156/0x2600 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2289
inet_recvmsg+0x469/0x6a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:885
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1051 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x1b2/0x250 net/socket.c:1073
__sys_recvfrom+0x1a5/0x2e0 net/socket.c:2265
__do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2283 [inline]
__se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2279 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0xe0/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2279
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7feb5d857559
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48
89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d
01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007feb5d7f1208 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007feb5d8e1318 RCX: 00007feb5d857559
RDX: 000000800000000e RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007feb5d8e1310 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff81000000
R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007feb5d8e131c
R13: 00007feb5d8ae074 R14: 000000800000000e R15: 00000000fffffdef
and provided a nice reproducer.
The root cause is the current bad handling of racing disconnect.
After the blamed commit below, sk_wait_data() can return (with
error) with the underlying socket disconnected and a zero rcv_mss.
Catch the error and return without performing any additional
operations on the current socket.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53121

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: fs, lock FTE when checking if active
The referenced commits introduced a two-step process for deleting FTEs:
- Lock the FTE, delete it from hardware, set the hardware deletion function
to NULL and unlock the FTE.
- Lock the parent flow group, delete the software copy of the FTE, and
remove it from the xarray.
However, this approach encounters a race condition if a rule with the same
match value is added simultaneously. In this scenario, fs_core may set the
hardware deletion function to NULL prematurely, causing a panic during
subsequent rule deletions.
To prevent this, ensure the active flag of the FTE is checked under a lock,
which will prevent the fs_core layer from attaching a new steering rule to
an FTE that is in the process of deletion.
[ 438.967589] MOSHE: 2496 mlx5_del_flow_rules del_hw_func
[ 438.968205] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 438.968654] refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.
[ 438.969249] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8957 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[ 438.970054] Modules linked in: act_mirred cls_flower act_gact sch_ingress openvswitch nsh mlx5_vdpa vringh vhost_iotlb vdpa mlx5_ib mlx5_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: cls_flower]
[ 438.973288] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 8957 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1+ #8
[ 438.973888] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 438.974874] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[ 438.975363] Code: 40 66 3b 82 c6 05 16 e9 4d 01 01 e8 1f 7c a0 ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 10 66 3b 82 c6 05 fd e8 4d 01 01 e8 05 7c a0 ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 90
[ 438.976947] RSP: 0018:ffff888124a53610 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 438.977446] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888119d56de0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 438.978090] RDX: ffff88852c828700 RSI: ffff88852c81b3c0 RDI: ffff88852c81b3c0
[ 438.978721] RBP: ffff888120fa0e88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888124a534b0
[ 438.979353] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888119d56de0
[ 438.979979] R13: ffff888120fa0ec0 R14: ffff888120fa0ee8 R15: ffff888119d56de0
[ 438.980607] FS: 00007fe6dcc0f800(0000) GS:ffff88852c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 438.983984] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 438.984544] CR2: 00000000004275e0 CR3: 0000000186982001 CR4: 0000000000372eb0
[ 438.985205] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 438.985842] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 438.986507] Call Trace:
[ 438.986799] <TASK>
[ 438.987070] ? __warn+0x7d/0x110
[ 438.987426] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[ 438.987877] ? report_bug+0x17d/0x190
[ 438.988261] ? prb_read_valid+0x17/0x20
[ 438.988659] ? handle_bug+0x53/0x90
[ 438.989054] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[ 438.989458] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 438.989883] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[ 438.990348] mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x2f7/0x340 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.990932] __mlx5_eswitch_del_rule+0x49/0x170 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.991519] ? mlx5_lag_is_sriov+0x3c/0x50 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.992054] ? xas_load+0x9/0xb0
[ 438.992407] mlx5e_tc_rule_unoffload+0x45/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.993037] mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0x2a6/0x2e0 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.993623] mlx5e_flow_put+0x29/0x60 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.994161] mlx5e_delete_flower+0x261/0x390 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.994728] tc_setup_cb_destroy+0xb9/0x190
[ 438.995150] fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x94/0xc0 [cls_flower]
[ 438.995650] fl_change+0x11a4/0x13c0 [cls_flower]
[ 438.996105] tc_new_tfilter+0x347/0xbc0
[ 438.996503] ? __
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53105

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: page_alloc: move mlocked flag clearance into free_pages_prepare()
Syzbot reported a bad page state problem caused by a page being freed
using free_page() still having a mlocked flag at free_pages_prepare()
stage:
BUG: Bad page state in process syz.5.504 pfn:61f45
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x61f45
flags: 0xfff00000080204(referenced|workingset|mlocked|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 00fff00000080204 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x400dc0(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT|__GFP_ZERO), pid 8443, tgid 8442 (syz.5.504), ts 201884660643, free_ts 201499827394
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1f3/0x230 mm/page_alloc.c:1537
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1545 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x303f/0x3190 mm/page_alloc.c:3457
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x292/0x710 mm/page_alloc.c:4733
alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x3e8/0x680 mm/mempolicy.c:2265
kvm_coalesced_mmio_init+0x1f/0xf0 virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:99
kvm_create_vm virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1235 [inline]
kvm_dev_ioctl_create_vm virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5488 [inline]
kvm_dev_ioctl+0x12dc/0x2240 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5530
__do_compat_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:1007 [inline]
__se_compat_sys_ioctl+0x510/0xc90 fs/ioctl.c:950
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0xb4/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:386
do_fast_syscall_32+0x34/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:411
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e
page last free pid 8399 tgid 8399 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1108 [inline]
free_unref_folios+0xf12/0x18d0 mm/page_alloc.c:2686
folios_put_refs+0x76c/0x860 mm/swap.c:1007
free_pages_and_swap_cache+0x5c8/0x690 mm/swap_state.c:335
__tlb_batch_free_encoded_pages mm/mmu_gather.c:136 [inline]
tlb_batch_pages_flush mm/mmu_gather.c:149 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu_free mm/mmu_gather.c:366 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu+0x3a3/0x680 mm/mmu_gather.c:373
tlb_finish_mmu+0xd4/0x200 mm/mmu_gather.c:465
exit_mmap+0x496/0xc40 mm/mmap.c:1926
__mmput+0x115/0x390 kernel/fork.c:1348
exit_mm+0x220/0x310 kernel/exit.c:571
do_exit+0x9b2/0x28e0 kernel/exit.c:926
do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1088
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1099 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1097 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1097
x64_sys_call+0x2634/0x2640 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 8442 Comm: syz.5.504 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
bad_page+0x176/0x1d0 mm/page_alloc.c:501
free_page_is_bad mm/page_alloc.c:918 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1100 [inline]
free_unref_page+0xed0/0xf20 mm/page_alloc.c:2638
kvm_destroy_vm virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1327 [inline]
kvm_put_kvm+0xc75/0x1350 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1386
kvm_vcpu_release+0x54/0x60 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4143
__fput+0x23f/0x880 fs/file_table.c:431
task_work_run+0x24f/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:239
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:43 [inline]
do_exit+0xa2f/0x28e0 kernel/exit.c:939
do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1088
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1099 [in
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53100

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: tcp: avoid race between queue_lock lock and destroy
Commit 76d54bf20cdc ("nvme-tcp: don't access released socket during
error recovery") added a mutex_lock() call for the queue->queue_lock
in nvme_tcp_get_address(). However, the mutex_lock() races with
mutex_destroy() in nvme_tcp_free_queue(), and causes the WARN below.
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 34077 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 __mutex_lock+0xcf0/0x1220
Modules linked in: nvmet_tcp nvmet nvme_tcp nvme_fabrics iw_cm ib_cm ib_core pktcdvd nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables qrtr sunrpc ppdev 9pnet_virtio 9pnet pcspkr netfs parport_pc parport e1000 i2c_piix4 i2c_smbus loop fuse nfnetlink zram bochs drm_vram_helper drm_ttm_helper ttm drm_kms_helper xfs drm sym53c8xx floppy nvme scsi_transport_spi nvme_core nvme_auth serio_raw ata_generic pata_acpi dm_multipath qemu_fw_cfg [last unloaded: ib_uverbs]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 34077 Comm: udisksd Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7 #319
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0xcf0/0x1220
Code: 08 84 d2 0f 85 c8 04 00 00 8b 15 ef b6 c8 01 85 d2 0f 85 78 f4 ff ff 48 c7 c6 20 93 ee af 48 c7 c7 60 91 ee af e8 f0 a7 6d fd <0f> 0b e9 5e f4 ff ff 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 f2 48 c1
RSP: 0018:ffff88811305f760 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88812c652058 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88811305f8b0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1075c36341
R10: ffff8883ae1b1a0b R11: 0000000000010498 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88812c652058
FS: 00007f9713ae4980(0000) GS:ffff8883ae180000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fcd78483c7c CR3: 0000000122c38000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn.cold+0x5b/0x1af
? __mutex_lock+0xcf0/0x1220
? report_bug+0x1ec/0x390
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80
? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x40
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? __mutex_lock+0xcf0/0x1220
? nvme_tcp_get_address+0xc2/0x1e0 [nvme_tcp]
? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? __lock_acquire+0xd6a/0x59e0
? nvme_tcp_get_address+0xc2/0x1e0 [nvme_tcp]
nvme_tcp_get_address+0xc2/0x1e0 [nvme_tcp]
? __pfx_nvme_tcp_get_address+0x10/0x10 [nvme_tcp]
nvme_sysfs_show_address+0x81/0xc0 [nvme_core]
dev_attr_show+0x42/0x80
? __asan_memset+0x1f/0x40
sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x1f0/0x370
seq_read_iter+0x2cb/0x1130
? rw_verify_area+0x3b1/0x590
? __mutex_lock+0x433/0x1220
vfs_read+0x6a6/0xa20
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10
ksys_read+0xf7/0x1d0
? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
? __x64_sys_openat+0x105/0x1d0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f9713f55cfa
Code: 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 55 e8 48 89 75 f0 89 7d f8 e8 e8 74 f8 ff 48 8b 55 e8 48 8b 75 f0 4
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53095

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: Fix use-after-free of network namespace.
Recently, we got a customer report that CIFS triggers oops while
reconnecting to a server. [0]
The workload runs on Kubernetes, and some pods mount CIFS servers
in non-root network namespaces. The problem rarely happened, but
it was always while the pod was dying.
The root cause is wrong reference counting for network namespace.
CIFS uses kernel sockets, which do not hold refcnt of the netns that
the socket belongs to. That means CIFS must ensure the socket is
always freed before its netns; otherwise, use-after-free happens.
The repro steps are roughly:
1. mount CIFS in a non-root netns
2. drop packets from the netns
3. destroy the netns
4. unmount CIFS
We can reproduce the issue quickly with the script [1] below and see
the splat [2] if CONFIG_NET_NS_REFCNT_TRACKER is enabled.
When the socket is TCP, it is hard to guarantee the netns lifetime
without holding refcnt due to async timers.
Let's hold netns refcnt for each socket as done for SMC in commit
9744d2bf1976 ("smc: Fix use-after-free in tcp_write_timer_handler().").
Note that we need to move put_net() from cifs_put_tcp_session() to
clean_demultiplex_info(); otherwise, __sock_create() still could touch a
freed netns while cifsd tries to reconnect from cifs_demultiplex_thread().
Also, maybe_get_net() cannot be put just before __sock_create() because
the code is not under RCU and there is a small chance that the same
address happened to be reallocated to another netns.
[0]:
CIFS: VFS: \\XXXXXXXXXXX has not responded in 15 seconds. Reconnecting...
CIFS: Serverclose failed 4 times, giving up
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 14de99e461f84a07
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000004
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
CM = 0, WnR = 0
[14de99e461f84a07] address between user and kernel address ranges
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: cls_bpf sch_ingress nls_utf8 cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 dns_resolver tcp_diag inet_diag veth xt_state xt_connmark nf_conntrack_netlink xt_nat xt_statistic xt_MASQUERADE xt_mark xt_addrtype ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_comment nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink overlay nls_ascii nls_cp437 sunrpc vfat fat aes_ce_blk aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sm4_ce_cipher sm4 sm3_ce sm3 sha3_ce sha512_ce sha512_arm64 sha1_ce ena button sch_fq_codel loop fuse configfs dmi_sysfs sha2_ce sha256_arm64 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod dax efivarfs
CPU: 5 PID: 2690970 Comm: cifsd Not tainted 6.1.103-109.184.amzn2023.aarch64 #1
Hardware name: Amazon EC2 r7g.4xlarge/, BIOS 1.0 11/1/2018
pstate: 00400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : fib_rules_lookup+0x44/0x238
lr : __fib_lookup+0x64/0xbc
sp : ffff8000265db790
x29: ffff8000265db790 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 000000000000bd01
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff000b4baf8000 x24: ffff00047b5e4580
x23: ffff8000265db7e0 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff00047b5e4500
x20: ffff0010e3f694f8 x19: 14de99e461f849f7 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 3f92800abd010002
x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0010e3f69420 x9 : ffff800008a6f294
x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000006 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : ffff001924354280 x3 : ffff8000265db7e0
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff0010e3f694f8 x0 : ffff00047b5e4500
Call trace:
fib_rules_lookup+0x44/0x238
__fib_lookup+0x64/0xbc
ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x2c4/0x398
ip_route_output_key_hash+0x60/0x8c
tcp_v4_connect+0x290/0x488
__inet_stream_connect+0x108/0x3d0
inet_stream_connect+0x50/0x78
kernel_connect+0x6c/0xac
generic_ip_conne
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53090

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix lock recursion
afs_wake_up_async_call() can incur lock recursion. The problem is that it
is called from AF_RXRPC whilst holding the ->notify_lock, but it tries to
take a ref on the afs_call struct in order to pass it to a work queue - but
if the afs_call is already queued, we then have an extraneous ref that must
be put... calling afs_put_call() may call back down into AF_RXRPC through
rxrpc_kernel_shutdown_call(), however, which might try taking the
->notify_lock again.
This case isn't very common, however, so defer it to a workqueue. The oops
looks something like:
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#0, krxrpcio/7001/1646
lock: 0xffff888141399b30, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: krxrpcio/7001/1646, .owner_cpu: 0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1646 Comm: krxrpcio/7001 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-build3+ #4351
Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x70
do_raw_spin_lock+0x3c/0x90
rxrpc_kernel_shutdown_call+0x83/0xb0
afs_put_call+0xd7/0x180
rxrpc_notify_socket+0xa0/0x190
rxrpc_input_split_jumbo+0x198/0x1d0
rxrpc_input_data+0x14b/0x1e0
? rxrpc_input_call_packet+0xc2/0x1f0
rxrpc_input_call_event+0xad/0x6b0
rxrpc_input_packet_on_conn+0x1e1/0x210
rxrpc_input_packet+0x3f2/0x4d0
rxrpc_io_thread+0x243/0x410
? __pfx_rxrpc_io_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xcf/0xe0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53079

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/thp: fix deferred split unqueue naming and locking
Recent changes are putting more pressure on THP deferred split queues:
under load revealing long-standing races, causing list_del corruptions,
"Bad page state"s and worse (I keep BUGs in both of those, so usually
don't get to see how badly they end up without). The relevant recent
changes being 6.8's mTHP, 6.10's mTHP swapout, and 6.12's mTHP swapin,
improved swap allocation, and underused THP splitting.
Before fixing locking: rename misleading folio_undo_large_rmappable(),
which does not undo large_rmappable, to folio_unqueue_deferred_split(),
which is what it does. But that and its out-of-line __callee are mm
internals of very limited usability: add comment and WARN_ON_ONCEs to
check usage; and return a bool to say if a deferred split was unqueued,
which can then be used in WARN_ON_ONCEs around safety checks (sparing
callers the arcane conditionals in __folio_unqueue_deferred_split()).
Just omit the folio_unqueue_deferred_split() from free_unref_folios(), all
of whose callers now call it beforehand (and if any forget then bad_page()
will tell) - except for its caller put_pages_list(), which itself no
longer has any callers (and will be deleted separately).
Swapout: mem_cgroup_swapout() has been resetting folio->memcg_data 0
without checking and unqueueing a THP folio from deferred split list;
which is unfortunate, since the split_queue_lock depends on the memcg
(when memcg is enabled); so swapout has been unqueueing such THPs later,
when freeing the folio, using the pgdat's lock instead: potentially
corrupting the memcg's list. __remove_mapping() has frozen refcount to 0
here, so no problem with calling folio_unqueue_deferred_split() before
resetting memcg_data.
That goes back to 5.4 commit 87eaceb3faa5 ("mm: thp: make deferred split
shrinker memcg aware"): which included a check on swapcache before adding
to deferred queue, but no check on deferred queue before adding THP to
swapcache. That worked fine with the usual sequence of events in reclaim
(though there were a couple of rare ways in which a THP on deferred queue
could have been swapped out), but 6.12 commit dafff3f4c850 ("mm: split
underused THPs") avoids splitting underused THPs in reclaim, which makes
swapcache THPs on deferred queue commonplace.
Keep the check on swapcache before adding to deferred queue? Yes: it is
no longer essential, but preserves the existing behaviour, and is likely
to be a worthwhile optimization (vmstat showed much more traffic on the
queue under swapping load if the check was removed); update its comment.
Memcg-v1 move (deprecated): mem_cgroup_move_account() has been changing
folio->memcg_data without checking and unqueueing a THP folio from the
deferred list, sometimes corrupting "from" memcg's list, like swapout.
Refcount is non-zero here, so folio_unqueue_deferred_split() can only be
used in a WARN_ON_ONCE to validate the fix, which must be done earlier:
mem_cgroup_move_charge_pte_range() first try to split the THP (splitting
of course unqueues), or skip it if that fails. Not ideal, but moving
charge has been requested, and khugepaged should repair the THP later:
nobody wants new custom unqueueing code just for this deprecated case.
The 87eaceb3faa5 commit did have the code to move from one deferred list
to another (but was not conscious of its unsafety while refcount non-0);
but that was removed by 5.6 commit fac0516b5534 ("mm: thp: don't need care
deferred split queue in memcg charge move path"), which argued that the
existence of a PMD mapping guarantees that the THP cannot be on a deferred
list. As above, false in rare cases, and now commonly false.
Backport to 6.11 should be straightforward. Earlier backports must take
care that other _deferred_list fixes and dependencies are included. There
is not a strong case for backports, but they can fix cornercases.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53044

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_api: fix xa_insert() error path in tcf_block_get_ext()
This command:
$ tc qdisc replace dev eth0 ingress_block 1 egress_block 1 clsact
Error: block dev insert failed: -EBUSY.
fails because user space requests the same block index to be set for
both ingress and egress.
[ side note, I don't think it even failed prior to commit 913b47d3424e
("net/sched: Introduce tc block netdev tracking infra"), because this
is a command from an old set of notes of mine which used to work, but
alas, I did not scientifically bisect this ]
The problem is not that it fails, but rather, that the second time
around, it fails differently (and irrecoverably):
$ tc qdisc replace dev eth0 ingress_block 1 egress_block 1 clsact
Error: dsa_core: Flow block cb is busy.
[ another note: the extack is added by me for illustration purposes.
the context of the problem is that clsact_init() obtains the same
&q->ingress_block pointer as &q->egress_block, and since we call
tcf_block_get_ext() on both of them, "dev" will be added to the
block->ports xarray twice, thus failing the operation: once through
the ingress block pointer, and once again through the egress block
pointer. the problem itself is that when xa_insert() fails, we have
emitted a FLOW_BLOCK_BIND command through ndo_setup_tc(), but the
offload never sees a corresponding FLOW_BLOCK_UNBIND. ]
Even correcting the bad user input, we still cannot recover:
$ tc qdisc replace dev swp3 ingress_block 1 egress_block 2 clsact
Error: dsa_core: Flow block cb is busy.
Basically the only way to recover is to reboot the system, or unbind and
rebind the net device driver.
To fix the bug, we need to fill the correct error teardown path which
was missed during code movement, and call tcf_block_offload_unbind()
when xa_insert() fails.
[ last note, fundamentally I blame the label naming convention in
tcf_block_get_ext() for the bug. The labels should be named after what
they do, not after the error path that jumps to them. This way, it is
obviously wrong that two labels pointing to the same code mean
something is wrong, and checking the code correctness at the goto site
is also easier ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50303

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
resource,kexec: walk_system_ram_res_rev must retain resource flags
walk_system_ram_res_rev() erroneously discards resource flags when passing
the information to the callback.
This causes systems with IORESOURCE_SYSRAM_DRIVER_MANAGED memory to have
these resources selected during kexec to store kexec buffers if that
memory happens to be at placed above normal system ram.
This leads to undefined behavior after reboot. If the kexec buffer is
never touched, nothing happens. If the kexec buffer is touched, it could
lead to a crash (like below) or undefined behavior.
Tested on a system with CXL memory expanders with driver managed memory,
TPM enabled, and CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC=y. Adding printk's showed the flags
were being discarded and as a result the check for
IORESOURCE_SYSRAM_DRIVER_MANAGED passes.
find_next_iomem_res: name(System RAM (kmem))
start(10000000000)
end(1034fffffff)
flags(83000200)
locate_mem_hole_top_down: start(10000000000) end(1034fffffff) flags(0)
[.] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff89834ffff000
[.] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[.] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[.] PGD c04c8bf067 P4D c04c8bf067 PUD c04c8be067 PMD 0
[.] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[.] RIP: 0010:ima_restore_measurement_list+0x95/0x4b0
[.] RSP: 0018:ffffc900000d3a80 EFLAGS: 00010286
[.] RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff89834ffff000
[.] RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff89834ffff000 RDI: ffff89834ffff018
[.] RBP: ffffc900000d3ba0 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: ffff888132b8a900
[.] R10: 4000000000000000 R11: 000000003a616d69 R12: 0000000000000000
[.] R13: ffffffff8404ac28 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff89834ffff000
[.] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff893d44640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[.] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[.] ata5: SATA link down (SStatus 0 SControl 300)
[.] CR2: ffff89834ffff000 CR3: 000001034d00f001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[.] PKRU: 55555554
[.] Call Trace:
[.] <TASK>
[.] ? __die+0x78/0xc0
[.] ? page_fault_oops+0x2a8/0x3a0
[.] ? exc_page_fault+0x84/0x130
[.] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[.] ? ima_restore_measurement_list+0x95/0x4b0
[.] ? template_desc_init_fields+0x317/0x410
[.] ? crypto_alloc_tfm_node+0x9c/0xc0
[.] ? init_ima_lsm+0x30/0x30
[.] ima_load_kexec_buffer+0x72/0xa0
[.] ima_init+0x44/0xa0
[.] __initstub__kmod_ima__373_1201_init_ima7+0x1e/0xb0
[.] ? init_ima_lsm+0x30/0x30
[.] do_one_initcall+0xad/0x200
[.] ? idr_alloc_cyclic+0xaa/0x110
[.] ? new_slab+0x12c/0x420
[.] ? new_slab+0x12c/0x420
[.] ? number+0x12a/0x430
[.] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa/0x80
[.] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20
[.] ? parse_args+0xd4/0x380
[.] ? parse_args+0x14b/0x380
[.] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c1/0x2b0
[.] ? rest_init+0xb0/0xb0
[.] kernel_init+0x16/0x1a0
[.] ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40
[.] ? rest_init+0xb0/0xb0
[.] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[.] </TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50261

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
macsec: Fix use-after-free while sending the offloading packet
KASAN reports the following UAF. The metadata_dst, which is used to
store the SCI value for macsec offload, is already freed by
metadata_dst_free() in macsec_free_netdev(), while driver still use it
for sending the packet.
To fix this issue, dst_release() is used instead to release
metadata_dst. So it is not freed instantly in macsec_free_netdev() if
still referenced by skb.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlx5e_xmit+0x1e8f/0x4190 [mlx5_core]
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88813e42e038 by task kworker/7:2/714
[...]
Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60
print_report+0xc1/0x600
kasan_report+0xab/0xe0
mlx5e_xmit+0x1e8f/0x4190 [mlx5_core]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x120/0x530
sch_direct_xmit+0x149/0x11e0
__qdisc_run+0x3ad/0x1730
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1196/0x2ed0
vlan_dev_hard_start_xmit+0x32e/0x510 [8021q]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x120/0x530
__dev_queue_xmit+0x14a7/0x2ed0
macsec_start_xmit+0x13e9/0x2340
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x120/0x530
__dev_queue_xmit+0x14a7/0x2ed0
ip6_finish_output2+0x923/0x1a70
ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x970
ip6_output+0x1ce/0x3a0
NF_HOOK.constprop.0+0x15f/0x190
mld_sendpack+0x59a/0xbd0
mld_ifc_work+0x48a/0xa80
process_one_work+0x5aa/0xe50
worker_thread+0x79c/0x1290
kthread+0x28f/0x350
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
Allocated by task 3922:
kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x77/0x90
__kmalloc_noprof+0x188/0x400
metadata_dst_alloc+0x1f/0x4e0
macsec_newlink+0x914/0x1410
__rtnl_newlink+0xe08/0x15b0
rtnl_newlink+0x5f/0x90
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x667/0xa80
netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360
netlink_unicast+0x551/0x770
netlink_sendmsg+0x72d/0xbd0
__sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190
____sys_sendmsg+0x52e/0x6a0
___sys_sendmsg+0xeb/0x170
__sys_sendmsg+0xb5/0x140
do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
Freed by task 4011:
kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x50
poison_slab_object+0x10c/0x190
__kasan_slab_free+0x11/0x30
kfree+0xe0/0x290
macsec_free_netdev+0x3f/0x140
netdev_run_todo+0x450/0xc70
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x66f/0xa80
netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360
netlink_unicast+0x551/0x770
netlink_sendmsg+0x72d/0xbd0
__sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190
____sys_sendmsg+0x52e/0x6a0
___sys_sendmsg+0xeb/0x170
__sys_sendmsg+0xb5/0x140
do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50200

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
maple_tree: correct tree corruption on spanning store
Patch series "maple_tree: correct tree corruption on spanning store", v3.
There has been a nasty yet subtle maple tree corruption bug that appears
to have been in existence since the inception of the algorithm.
This bug seems far more likely to happen since commit f8d112a4e657
("mm/mmap: avoid zeroing vma tree in mmap_region()"), which is the point
at which reports started to be submitted concerning this bug.
We were made definitely aware of the bug thanks to the kind efforts of
Bert Karwatzki who helped enormously in my being able to track this down
and identify the cause of it.
The bug arises when an attempt is made to perform a spanning store across
two leaf nodes, where the right leaf node is the rightmost child of the
shared parent, AND the store completely consumes the right-mode node.
This results in mas_wr_spanning_store() mitakenly duplicating the new and
existing entries at the maximum pivot within the range, and thus maple
tree corruption.
The fix patch corrects this by detecting this scenario and disallowing the
mistaken duplicate copy.
The fix patch commit message goes into great detail as to how this occurs.
This series also includes a test which reliably reproduces the issue, and
asserts that the fix works correctly.
Bert has kindly tested the fix and confirmed it resolved his issues. Also
Mikhail Gavrilov kindly reported what appears to be precisely the same
bug, which this fix should also resolve.
This patch (of 2):
There has been a subtle bug present in the maple tree implementation from
its inception.
This arises from how stores are performed - when a store occurs, it will
overwrite overlapping ranges and adjust the tree as necessary to
accommodate this.
A range may always ultimately span two leaf nodes. In this instance we
walk the two leaf nodes, determine which elements are not overwritten to
the left and to the right of the start and end of the ranges respectively
and then rebalance the tree to contain these entries and the newly
inserted one.
This kind of store is dubbed a 'spanning store' and is implemented by
mas_wr_spanning_store().
In order to reach this stage, mas_store_gfp() invokes
mas_wr_preallocate(), mas_wr_store_type() and mas_wr_walk() in turn to
walk the tree and update the object (mas) to traverse to the location
where the write should be performed, determining its store type.
When a spanning store is required, this function returns false stopping at
the parent node which contains the target range, and mas_wr_store_type()
marks the mas->store_type as wr_spanning_store to denote this fact.
When we go to perform the store in mas_wr_spanning_store(), we first
determine the elements AFTER the END of the range we wish to store (that
is, to the right of the entry to be inserted) - we do this by walking to
the NEXT pivot in the tree (i.e. r_mas.last + 1), starting at the node we
have just determined contains the range over which we intend to write.
We then turn our attention to the entries to the left of the entry we are
inserting, whose state is represented by l_mas, and copy these into a 'big
node', which is a special node which contains enough slots to contain two
leaf node's worth of data.
We then copy the entry we wish to store immediately after this - the copy
and the insertion of the new entry is performed by mas_store_b_node().
After this we copy the elements to the right of the end of the range which
we are inserting, if we have not exceeded the length of the node (i.e.
r_mas.offset <= r_mas.end).
Herein lies the bug - under very specific circumstances, this logic can
break and corrupt the maple tree.
Consider the following tree:
Height
0 Root Node
/ \
pivot = 0xffff / \ pivot = ULONG_MAX
/
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50164

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix overloading of MEM_UNINIT's meaning
Lonial reported an issue in the BPF verifier where check_mem_size_reg()
has the following code:
if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
/* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw
* mode so that the program is required to
* initialize all the memory that the helper could
* just partially fill up.
*/
meta = NULL;
This means that writes are not checked when the register containing the
size of the passed buffer has not a fixed size. Through this bug, a BPF
program can write to a map which is marked as read-only, for example,
.rodata global maps.
The problem is that MEM_UNINIT's initial meaning that "the passed buffer
to the BPF helper does not need to be initialized" which was added back
in commit 435faee1aae9 ("bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type")
got overloaded over time with "the passed buffer is being written to".
The problem however is that checks such as the above which were added later
via 06c1c049721a ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory") set meta
to NULL in order force the user to always initialize the passed buffer to
the helper. Due to the current double meaning of MEM_UNINIT, this bypasses
verifier write checks to the memory (not boundary checks though) and only
assumes the latter memory is read instead.
Fix this by reverting MEM_UNINIT back to its original meaning, and having
MEM_WRITE as an annotation to BPF helpers in order to then trigger the
BPF verifier checks for writing to memory.
Some notes: check_arg_pair_ok() ensures that for ARG_CONST_SIZE{,_OR_ZERO}
we can access fn->arg_type[arg - 1] since it must contain a preceding
ARG_PTR_TO_MEM. For check_mem_reg() the meta argument can be removed
altogether since we do check both BPF_READ and BPF_WRITE. Same for the
equivalent check_kfunc_mem_size_reg().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50162

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: devmap: provide rxq after redirect
rxq contains a pointer to the device from where
the redirect happened. Currently, the BPF program
that was executed after a redirect via BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP*
does not have it set.
This is particularly bad since accessing ingress_ifindex, e.g.
SEC("xdp")
int prog(struct xdp_md *pkt)
{
return bpf_redirect_map(&dev_redirect_map, 0, 0);
}
SEC("xdp/devmap")
int prog_after_redirect(struct xdp_md *pkt)
{
bpf_printk("ifindex %i", pkt->ingress_ifindex);
return XDP_PASS;
}
depends on access to rxq, so a NULL pointer gets dereferenced:
<1>[ 574.475170] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
<1>[ 574.475188] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
<1>[ 574.475194] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
<6>[ 574.475199] PGD 0 P4D 0
<4>[ 574.475207] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
<4>[ 574.475217] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc5-reduced-00859-g780801200300 #23
<4>[ 574.475226] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC13ANHi7/NUC13ANBi7, BIOS ANRPL357.0026.2023.0314.1458 03/14/2023
<4>[ 574.475231] Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
<4>[ 574.475247] RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_5e13354d9cf5018a_prog_after_redirect+0x17/0x3c
<4>[ 574.475257] Code: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 80 00 00 00 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 66 90 55 48 89 e5 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8b 57 20 <48> 8b 52 00 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 48 bf f8 a6 d5 c4 5d a0 ff ff be 0b
<4>[ 574.475263] RSP: 0018:ffffa62440280c98 EFLAGS: 00010206
<4>[ 574.475269] RAX: ffffa62440280cd8 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
<4>[ 574.475274] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffa62440549048 RDI: ffffa62440280ce0
<4>[ 574.475278] RBP: ffffa62440280c98 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001
<4>[ 574.475281] R10: ffffa05dc8b98000 R11: ffffa05f577fca40 R12: ffffa05dcab24000
<4>[ 574.475285] R13: ffffa62440280ce0 R14: ffffa62440549048 R15: ffffa62440549000
<4>[ 574.475289] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa05f4f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
<4>[ 574.475294] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
<4>[ 574.475298] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000025522e000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
<4>[ 574.475303] PKRU: 55555554
<4>[ 574.475306] Call Trace:
<4>[ 574.475313] <IRQ>
<4>[ 574.475318] ? __die+0x23/0x70
<4>[ 574.475329] ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c0
<4>[ 574.475339] ? skb_pp_cow_data+0x34c/0x490
<4>[ 574.475346] ? kmem_cache_free+0x257/0x280
<4>[ 574.475357] ? exc_page_fault+0x67/0x150
<4>[ 574.475368] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
<4>[ 574.475381] ? bpf_prog_5e13354d9cf5018a_prog_after_redirect+0x17/0x3c
<4>[ 574.475386] bq_xmit_all+0x158/0x420
<4>[ 574.475397] __dev_flush+0x30/0x90
<4>[ 574.475407] veth_poll+0x216/0x250 [veth]
<4>[ 574.475421] __napi_poll+0x28/0x1c0
<4>[ 574.475430] net_rx_action+0x32d/0x3a0
<4>[ 574.475441] handle_softirqs+0xcb/0x2c0
<4>[ 574.475451] do_softirq+0x40/0x60
<4>[ 574.475458] </IRQ>
<4>[ 574.475461] <TASK>
<4>[ 574.475464] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x66/0x70
<4>[ 574.475471] __dev_queue_xmit+0x268/0xe40
<4>[ 574.475480] ? selinux_ip_postroute+0x213/0x420
<4>[ 574.475491] ? alloc_skb_with_frags+0x4a/0x1d0
<4>[ 574.475502] ip6_finish_output2+0x2be/0x640
<4>[ 574.475512] ? nf_hook_slow+0x42/0xf0
<4>[ 574.475521] ip6_finish_output+0x194/0x300
<4>[ 574.475529] ? __pfx_ip6_finish_output+0x10/0x10
<4>[ 574.475538] mld_sendpack+0x17c/0x240
<4>[ 574.475548] mld_ifc_work+0x192/0x410
<4>[ 574.475557] process_one_work+0x15d/0x380
<4>[ 574.475566] worker_thread+0x29d/0x3a0
<4>[ 574.475573] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
<4>[ 574.475580] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
<4>[ 574.475587] kthread+0xcd/0x100
<4>[ 574.475597] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4>[ 574.475606] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
<4>[ 574.475615] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4>[ 574.475623] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50155

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netdevsim: use cond_resched() in nsim_dev_trap_report_work()
I am still seeing many syzbot reports hinting that syzbot
might fool nsim_dev_trap_report_work() with hundreds of ports [1]
Lets use cond_resched(), and system_unbound_wq
instead of implicit system_wq.
[1]
INFO: task syz-executor:20633 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-syzkaller-00205-g1d227fcc7222 #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:syz-executor state:D stack:25856 pid:20633 tgid:20633 ppid:1 flags:0x00004006
...
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 16760 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-syzkaller-00205-g1d227fcc7222 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Workqueue: events nsim_dev_trap_report_work
RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x0/0x70 kernel/kcov.c:210
Code: 89 fb e8 23 00 00 00 48 8b 3d 04 fb 9c 0c 48 89 de 5b e9 c3 c7 5d 00 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 <f3> 0f 1e fa 48 8b 04 24 65 48 8b 0c 25 c0 d7 03 00 65 8b 15 60 f0
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000a187e8 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000100 RBX: ffffc90000a188e0 RCX: ffff888027d3bc00
RDX: ffff888027d3bc00 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88804a2e6000 R08: ffffffff8a4bc495 R09: ffffffff89da3577
R10: 0000000000000004 R11: ffffffff8a4bc2b0 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffff88806573b503 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8880663cca00
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc90a747f98 CR3: 000000000e734000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 000000000000002b DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<NMI>
</NMI>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x1bb/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:382
spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:396 [inline]
nsim_dev_trap_report drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:820 [inline]
nsim_dev_trap_report_work+0x75d/0xaa0 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:850
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa63/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50147

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix command bitmask initialization
Command bitmask have a dedicated bit for MANAGE_PAGES command, this bit
isn't Initialize during command bitmask Initialization, only during
MANAGE_PAGES.
In addition, mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions() is trying to trigger
completion for MANAGE_PAGES command as well.
Hence, in case health error occurred before any MANAGE_PAGES command
have been invoke (for example, during mlx5_enable_hca()),
mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions() will try to trigger completion for
MANAGE_PAGES command, which will result in null-ptr-deref error.[1]
Fix it by Initialize command bitmask correctly.
While at it, re-write the code for better understanding.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions+0x1db/0x600 [mlx5_core]
Write of size 4 at addr 0000000000000214 by task kworker/u96:2/12078
CPU: 10 PID: 12078 Comm: kworker/u96:2 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2_for_upstream_debug_2024_04_07_19_01 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: mlx5_health0000:08:00.0 mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0
kasan_report+0xb9/0xf0
kasan_check_range+0xec/0x190
mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions+0x1db/0x600 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_cmd_flush+0x94/0x240 [mlx5_core]
enter_error_state+0x6c/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work+0xf3/0x480 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x787/0x1490
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400
? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0xda0/0xda0
? assign_work+0x168/0x240
worker_thread+0x586/0xd30
? rescuer_thread+0xae0/0xae0
kthread+0x2df/0x3b0
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50146

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Don't call cleanup on profile rollback failure
When profile rollback fails in mlx5e_netdev_change_profile, the netdev
profile var is left set to NULL. Avoid a crash when unloading the driver
by not calling profile->cleanup in such a case.
This was encountered while testing, with the original trigger that
the wq rescuer thread creation got interrupted (presumably due to
Ctrl+C-ing modprobe), which gets converted to ENOMEM (-12) by
mlx5e_priv_init, the profile rollback also fails for the same reason
(signal still active) so the profile is left as NULL, leading to a crash
later in _mlx5e_remove.
[ 732.473932] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1: E-Switch: Unload vfs: mode(OFFLOADS), nvfs(2), necvfs(0), active vports(2)
[ 734.525513] workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
[ 734.557372] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6235:(pid 6086): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
[ 734.559187] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1 eth3: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
[ 734.560153] workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
[ 734.589378] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6235:(pid 6086): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
[ 734.591136] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1 eth3: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12
[ 745.537492] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
[ 745.538222] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
<snipped>
[ 745.551290] Call Trace:
[ 745.551590] <TASK>
[ 745.551866] ? __die+0x20/0x60
[ 745.552218] ? page_fault_oops+0x150/0x400
[ 745.555307] ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0x240
[ 745.555729] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 745.556166] ? mlx5e_remove+0x6b/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
[ 745.556698] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x18/0x30
[ 745.557134] device_release_driver_internal+0x1df/0x240
[ 745.557654] bus_remove_device+0xd7/0x140
[ 745.558075] device_del+0x15b/0x3c0
[ 745.558456] mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked.part.0+0xb1/0x2f0 [mlx5_core]
[ 745.559112] mlx5_unregister_device+0x34/0x50 [mlx5_core]
[ 745.559686] mlx5_uninit_one+0x46/0xf0 [mlx5_core]
[ 745.560203] remove_one+0x4e/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
[ 745.560694] pci_device_remove+0x39/0xa0
[ 745.561112] device_release_driver_internal+0x1df/0x240
[ 745.561631] driver_detach+0x47/0x90
[ 745.562022] bus_remove_driver+0x84/0x100
[ 745.562444] pci_unregister_driver+0x3b/0x90
[ 745.562890] mlx5_cleanup+0xc/0x1b [mlx5_core]
[ 745.563415] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x14d/0x2f0
[ 745.563886] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1b0/0x460
[ 745.564313] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xe2/0x190
[ 745.564825] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
[ 745.565223] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[ 745.565725] RIP: 0033:0x7f1579b1288b

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50128

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: fix global oob in wwan_rtnl_policy
The variable wwan_rtnl_link_ops assign a *bigger* maxtype which leads to
a global out-of-bounds read when parsing the netlink attributes. Exactly
same bug cause as the oob fixed in commit b33fb5b801c6 ("net: qualcomm:
rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy").
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603
Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8b09cb60 by task syz.1.66276/323862
CPU: 0 PID: 323862 Comm: syz.1.66276 Not tainted 6.1.70 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline]
print_report+0x14f/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:395
kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495
validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:388 [inline]
__nla_validate_parse+0x19d7/0x29a0 lib/nlattr.c:603
__nla_parse+0x3c/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:700
nla_parse_nested_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:1269 [inline]
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3514 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x7bc/0x1fd0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3623
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x794/0xef0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6122
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352
netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499
___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f67b19a24ad
RSP: 002b:00007f67b17febb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f67b1b45f80 RCX: 00007f67b19a24ad
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020005e40 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f67b1a1e01d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffd2513764f R14: 00007ffd251376e0 R15: 00007f67b17fed40
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the variable:
wwan_rtnl_policy+0x20/0x40
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea00002c2700 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xb09c
flags: 0xfff00000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 00fff00000001000 ffffea00002c2708 ffffea00002c2708 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner info is not present (never set?)
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffffff8b09ca00: 05 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9
ffffffff8b09ca80: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
>ffffffff8b09cb00: 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9
^
ffffffff8b09cb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================
According to the comment of `nla_parse_nested_deprecated`, use correct size
`IFLA_WWAN_MAX` here to fix this issue.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50126

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: use RCU read-side critical section in taprio_dump()
Fix possible use-after-free in 'taprio_dump()' by adding RCU
read-side critical section there. Never seen on x86 but
found on a KASAN-enabled arm64 system when investigating
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b65e0af58423fc8a73aa:
[T15862] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in taprio_dump+0xa0c/0xbb0
[T15862] Read of size 4 at addr ffff0000d4bb88f8 by task repro/15862
[T15862]
[T15862] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 15862 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.11.0-rc1-00293-gdefaf1a2113a-dirty #2
[T15862] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20240524-5.fc40 05/24/2024
[T15862] Call trace:
[T15862] dump_backtrace+0x20c/0x220
[T15862] show_stack+0x2c/0x40
[T15862] dump_stack_lvl+0xf8/0x174
[T15862] print_report+0x170/0x4d8
[T15862] kasan_report+0xb8/0x1d4
[T15862] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x20/0x2c
[T15862] taprio_dump+0xa0c/0xbb0
[T15862] tc_fill_qdisc+0x540/0x1020
[T15862] qdisc_notify.isra.0+0x330/0x3a0
[T15862] tc_modify_qdisc+0x7b8/0x1838
[T15862] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3c8/0xc20
[T15862] netlink_rcv_skb+0x1f8/0x3d4
[T15862] rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x40
[T15862] netlink_unicast+0x51c/0x790
[T15862] netlink_sendmsg+0x79c/0xc20
[T15862] __sock_sendmsg+0xe0/0x1a0
[T15862] ____sys_sendmsg+0x6c0/0x840
[T15862] ___sys_sendmsg+0x1ac/0x1f0
[T15862] __sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1d0
[T15862] __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x74/0xb0
[T15862] invoke_syscall+0x88/0x2e0
[T15862] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xe4/0x2a0
[T15862] do_el0_svc+0x44/0x60
[T15862] el0_svc+0x50/0x184
[T15862] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c
[T15862] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
[T15862]
[T15862] Allocated by task 15857:
[T15862] kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x70
[T15862] kasan_save_track+0x20/0x3c
[T15862] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x40/0x60
[T15862] __kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0xe0
[T15862] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x194/0x334
[T15862] taprio_change+0x45c/0x2fe0
[T15862] tc_modify_qdisc+0x6a8/0x1838
[T15862] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3c8/0xc20
[T15862] netlink_rcv_skb+0x1f8/0x3d4
[T15862] rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x40
[T15862] netlink_unicast+0x51c/0x790
[T15862] netlink_sendmsg+0x79c/0xc20
[T15862] __sock_sendmsg+0xe0/0x1a0
[T15862] ____sys_sendmsg+0x6c0/0x840
[T15862] ___sys_sendmsg+0x1ac/0x1f0
[T15862] __sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1d0
[T15862] __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x74/0xb0
[T15862] invoke_syscall+0x88/0x2e0
[T15862] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xe4/0x2a0
[T15862] do_el0_svc+0x44/0x60
[T15862] el0_svc+0x50/0x184
[T15862] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c
[T15862] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
[T15862]
[T15862] Freed by task 6192:
[T15862] kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x70
[T15862] kasan_save_track+0x20/0x3c
[T15862] kasan_save_free_info+0x4c/0x80
[T15862] poison_slab_object+0x110/0x160
[T15862] __kasan_slab_free+0x3c/0x74
[T15862] kfree+0x134/0x3c0
[T15862] taprio_free_sched_cb+0x18c/0x220
[T15862] rcu_core+0x920/0x1b7c
[T15862] rcu_core_si+0x10/0x1c
[T15862] handle_softirqs+0x2e8/0xd64
[T15862] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50114

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Unregister redistributor for failed vCPU creation
Alex reports that syzkaller has managed to trigger a use-after-free when
tearing down a VM:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kvm_put_kvm+0x300/0xe68 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5769
Read of size 8 at addr ffffff801c6890d0 by task syz.3.2219/10758
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 10758 Comm: syz.3.2219 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-dirty #64
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x17c/0x1a8 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:317
show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:324
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x94/0xc0 lib/dump_stack.c:119
print_report+0x144/0x7a4 mm/kasan/report.c:377
kasan_report+0xcc/0x128 mm/kasan/report.c:601
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:381
kvm_put_kvm+0x300/0xe68 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5769
kvm_vm_release+0x4c/0x60 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1409
__fput+0x198/0x71c fs/file_table.c:422
____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:450
task_work_run+0x1cc/0x23c kernel/task_work.c:228
do_notify_resume+0x144/0x1a0 include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50
el0_svc+0x64/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
Upon closer inspection, it appears that we do not properly tear down the
MMIO registration for a vCPU that fails creation late in the game, e.g.
a vCPU w/ the same ID already exists in the VM.
It is important to consider the context of commit that introduced this bug
by moving the unregistration out of __kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(). That
change correctly sought to avoid an srcu v. config_lock inversion by
breaking up the vCPU teardown into two parts, one guarded by the
config_lock.
Fix the use-after-free while avoiding lock inversion by adding a
special-cased unregistration to __kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(). This is safe
because failed vCPUs are torn down outside of the config_lock.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50106

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix race between laundromat and free_stateid
There is a race between laundromat handling of revoked delegations
and a client sending free_stateid operation. Laundromat thread
finds that delegation has expired and needs to be revoked so it
marks the delegation stid revoked and it puts it on a reaper list
but then it unlock the state lock and the actual delegation revocation
happens without the lock. Once the stid is marked revoked a racing
free_stateid processing thread does the following (1) it calls
list_del_init() which removes it from the reaper list and (2) frees
the delegation stid structure. The laundromat thread ends up not
calling the revoke_delegation() function for this particular delegation
but that means it will no release the lock lease that exists on
the file.
Now, a new open for this file comes in and ends up finding that
lease list isn't empty and calls nfsd_breaker_owns_lease() which ends
up trying to derefence a freed delegation stateid. Leading to the
followint use-after-free KASAN warning:
kernel: ==================================================================
kernel: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nfsd_breaker_owns_lease+0x140/0x160 [nfsd]
kernel: Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000e73cd0c8 by task nfsd/6205
kernel:
kernel: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 6205 Comm: nfsd Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7+ #9
kernel: Hardware name: Apple Inc. Apple Virtualization Generic Platform, BIOS 2069.0.0.0.0 08/03/2024
kernel: Call trace:
kernel: dump_backtrace+0x98/0x120
kernel: show_stack+0x1c/0x30
kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x80/0xe8
kernel: print_address_description.constprop.0+0x84/0x390
kernel: print_report+0xa4/0x268
kernel: kasan_report+0xb4/0xf8
kernel: __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x1c/0x28
kernel: nfsd_breaker_owns_lease+0x140/0x160 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd_file_do_acquire+0xb3c/0x11d0 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd_file_acquire_opened+0x84/0x110 [nfsd]
kernel: nfs4_get_vfs_file+0x634/0x958 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd4_process_open2+0xa40/0x1a40 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd4_open+0xa08/0xe80 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd4_proc_compound+0xb8c/0x2130 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd_dispatch+0x22c/0x718 [nfsd]
kernel: svc_process_common+0x8e8/0x1960 [sunrpc]
kernel: svc_process+0x3d4/0x7e0 [sunrpc]
kernel: svc_handle_xprt+0x828/0xe10 [sunrpc]
kernel: svc_recv+0x2cc/0x6a8 [sunrpc]
kernel: nfsd+0x270/0x400 [nfsd]
kernel: kthread+0x288/0x310
kernel: ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
This patch proposes a fixed that's based on adding 2 new additional
stid's sc_status values that help coordinate between the laundromat
and other operations (nfsd4_free_stateid() and nfsd4_delegreturn()).
First to make sure, that once the stid is marked revoked, it is not
removed by the nfsd4_free_stateid(), the laundromat take a reference
on the stateid. Then, coordinating whether the stid has been put
on the cl_revoked list or we are processing FREE_STATEID and need to
make sure to remove it from the list, each check that state and act
accordingly. If laundromat has added to the cl_revoke list before
the arrival of FREE_STATEID, then nfsd4_free_stateid() knows to remove
it from the list. If nfsd4_free_stateid() finds that operations arrived
before laundromat has placed it on cl_revoke list, it marks the state
freed and then laundromat will no longer add it to the list.
Also, for nfsd4_delegreturn() when looking for the specified stid,
we need to access stid that are marked removed or freeable, it means
the laundromat has started processing it but hasn't finished and this
delegreturn needs to return nfserr_deleg_revoked and not
nfserr_bad_stateid. The latter will not trigger a FREE_STATEID and the
lack of it will leave this stid on the cl_revoked list indefinitely.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50102

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue
It turns out that AMD has a "Meltdown Lite(tm)" issue with non-canonical
accesses in kernel space. And so using just the high bit to decide
whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good
old "leak speculative data" if you have the right gadget using the
result:
CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“
Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those
instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures,
which closes the speculation window.
But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames the AC bit [1].
That improves performance of STAC/CLAC a lot, but also means that the
speculation window is now open.
Note that this affects not just the new address masking, but also the
regular valid_user_address() check used by access_ok(), and the asm
version of the sign bit check in the get_user() helpers.
It does not affect put_user() or clear_user() variants, since there's no
speculative result to be used in a gadget for those operations.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50095

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mad: Improve handling of timed out WRs of mad agent
Current timeout handler of mad agent acquires/releases mad_agent_priv
lock for every timed out WRs. This causes heavy locking contention
when higher no. of WRs are to be handled inside timeout handler.
This leads to softlockup with below trace in some use cases where
rdma-cm path is used to establish connection between peer nodes
Trace:
-----
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#4 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u128:3:19767]
CPU: 4 PID: 19767 Comm: kworker/u128:3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE
------- --- 5.14.0-427.13.1.el9_4.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R740/01YM03, BIOS 2.4.8 11/26/2019
Workqueue: ib_mad1 timeout_sends [ib_core]
RIP: 0010:__do_softirq+0x78/0x2ac
RSP: 0018:ffffb253449e4f98 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000001f
RDX: 000000000000001d RSI: 000000003d1879ab RDI: fff363b66fd3a86b
RBP: ffffb253604cbcd8 R08: 0000009065635f3b R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000040 R11: ffffb253449e4ff8 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8caa1fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fd9ec9db900 CR3: 0000000891934006 CR4: 00000000007706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? __irq_exit_rcu+0xa1/0xc0
? watchdog_timer_fn+0x1b2/0x210
? __pfx_watchdog_timer_fn+0x10/0x10
? __hrtimer_run_queues+0x127/0x2c0
? hrtimer_interrupt+0xfc/0x210
? __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x5c/0x110
? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x37/0x90
? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20
? __do_softirq+0x78/0x2ac
? __do_softirq+0x60/0x2ac
__irq_exit_rcu+0xa1/0xc0
sysvec_call_function_single+0x72/0x90
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_call_function_single+0x16/0x20
RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x14/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffffb253604cbd88 EFLAGS: 00000247
RAX: 000000000001960d RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffff8cad2a064800
RDX: 000000008020001b RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8cad5d39f66c
RBP: ffff8cad5d39f600 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8caa443e0c00 R11: ffffb253604cbcd8 R12: ffff8cacb8682538
R13: 0000000000000005 R14: ffffb253604cbd90 R15: ffff8cad5d39f66c
cm_process_send_error+0x122/0x1d0 [ib_cm]
timeout_sends+0x1dd/0x270 [ib_core]
process_one_work+0x1e2/0x3b0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
worker_thread+0x50/0x3a0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xdd/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
</TASK>
Simplified timeout handler by creating local list of timed out WRs
and invoke send handler post creating the list. The new method acquires/
releases lock once to fetch the list and hence helps to reduce locking
contetiong when processing higher no. of WRs

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50083

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: fix mptcp DSS corruption due to large pmtu xmit
Syzkaller was able to trigger a DSS corruption:
TCP: request_sock_subflow_v4: Possible SYN flooding on port [::]:20002. Sending cookies.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5227 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:695 __mptcp_move_skbs_from_subflow+0x20a9/0x21f0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:695
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5227 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted 6.11.0-syzkaller-08829-gaf9c191ac2a0 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
RIP: 0010:__mptcp_move_skbs_from_subflow+0x20a9/0x21f0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:695
Code: 0f b6 dc 31 ff 89 de e8 b5 dd ea f5 89 d8 48 81 c4 50 01 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc e8 98 da ea f5 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 47 ff ff ff e8 8a da ea f5 90 0f 0b 90 e9 99 e0 ff ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000006db8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffffffff8ba9df18 RBX: 00000000000055f0 RCX: ffff888030023c00
RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 00000000000081e5 RDI: 00000000000055f0
RBP: 1ffff110062bf1ae R08: ffffffff8ba9cf12 R09: 1ffff110062bf1b8
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed10062bf1b9 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 00000000700cec61 R15: 00000000000081e5
FS: 000055556679c380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020287000 CR3: 0000000077892000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
move_skbs_to_msk net/mptcp/protocol.c:811 [inline]
mptcp_data_ready+0x29c/0xa90 net/mptcp/protocol.c:854
subflow_data_ready+0x34a/0x920 net/mptcp/subflow.c:1490
tcp_data_queue+0x20fd/0x76c0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5283
tcp_rcv_established+0xfba/0x2020 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6237
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x96d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1915
tcp_v4_rcv+0x2dc0/0x37f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2350
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x22e/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x341/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314
NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5662 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x2bf/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5775
process_backlog+0x662/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6107
__napi_poll+0xcb/0x490 net/core/dev.c:6771
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6840 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x89b/0x1240 net/core/dev.c:6962
handle_softirqs+0x2c5/0x980 kernel/softirq.c:554
do_softirq+0x11b/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:455
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x1bb/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:382
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:919 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1764/0x3e80 net/core/dev.c:4451
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3094 [inline]
neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:526 [inline]
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:540 [inline]
ip_finish_output2+0xd41/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:236
ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:130 [inline]
__ip_queue_xmit+0x118c/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:536
__tcp_transmit_skb+0x2544/0x3b30 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1466
tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1484 [inline]
tcp_mtu_probe net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2547 [inline]
tcp_write_xmit+0x641d/0x6bf0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2752
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0x9b/0x360 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3015
tcp_push_pending_frames include/net/tcp.h:2107 [inline]
tcp_data_snd_check net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5714 [inline]
tcp_rcv_established+0x1026/0x2020 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6239
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x96d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1915
sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1113 [inline]
__release_sock+0x214/0x350 net/core/sock.c:3072
release_sock+0x61/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:3626
mptcp_push_
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50073

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: n_gsm: Fix use-after-free in gsm_cleanup_mux
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gsm_cleanup_mux+0x77b/0x7b0
drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3160 [n_gsm]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88815fe99c00 by task poc/3379
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3379 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.11.0+ #56
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX
Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
Call Trace:
<TASK>
gsm_cleanup_mux+0x77b/0x7b0 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3160 [n_gsm]
__pfx_gsm_cleanup_mux+0x10/0x10 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3124 [n_gsm]
__pfx_sched_clock_cpu+0x10/0x10 kernel/sched/clock.c:389
update_load_avg+0x1c1/0x27b0 kernel/sched/fair.c:4500
__pfx_min_vruntime_cb_rotate+0x10/0x10 kernel/sched/fair.c:846
__rb_insert_augmented+0x492/0xbf0 lib/rbtree.c:161
gsmld_ioctl+0x395/0x1450 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3408 [n_gsm]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x92/0xf0 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:107
__pfx_gsmld_ioctl+0x10/0x10 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3822 [n_gsm]
ktime_get+0x5e/0x140 kernel/time/timekeeping.c:195
ldsem_down_read+0x94/0x4e0 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:79
__pfx_ldsem_down_read+0x10/0x10 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:338
__pfx_do_vfs_ioctl+0x10/0x10 fs/ioctl.c:805
tty_ioctl+0x643/0x1100 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2818
Allocated by task 65:
gsm_data_alloc.constprop.0+0x27/0x190 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:926 [n_gsm]
gsm_send+0x2c/0x580 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:819 [n_gsm]
gsm1_receive+0x547/0xad0 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3038 [n_gsm]
gsmld_receive_buf+0x176/0x280 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3609 [n_gsm]
tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0x101/0x1e0 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:391
tty_port_default_receive_buf+0x61/0xa0 drivers/tty/tty_port.c:39
flush_to_ldisc+0x1b0/0x750 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:445
process_scheduled_works+0x2b0/0x10d0 kernel/workqueue.c:3229
worker_thread+0x3dc/0x950 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2a3/0x370 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:257
Freed by task 3367:
kfree+0x126/0x420 mm/slub.c:4580
gsm_cleanup_mux+0x36c/0x7b0 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3160 [n_gsm]
gsmld_ioctl+0x395/0x1450 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3408 [n_gsm]
tty_ioctl+0x643/0x1100 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2818
[Analysis]
gsm_msg on the tx_ctrl_list or tx_data_list of gsm_mux
can be freed by multi threads through ioctl,which leads
to the occurrence of uaf. Protect it by gsm tx lock.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50067

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uprobe: avoid out-of-bounds memory access of fetching args
Uprobe needs to fetch args into a percpu buffer, and then copy to ring
buffer to avoid non-atomic context problem.
Sometimes user-space strings, arrays can be very large, but the size of
percpu buffer is only page size. And store_trace_args() won't check
whether these data exceeds a single page or not, caused out-of-bounds
memory access.
It could be reproduced by following steps:
1. build kernel with CONFIG_KASAN enabled
2. save follow program as test.c
```
\#include <stdio.h>
\#include <stdlib.h>
\#include <string.h>
// If string length large than MAX_STRING_SIZE, the fetch_store_strlen()
// will return 0, cause __get_data_size() return shorter size, and
// store_trace_args() will not trigger out-of-bounds access.
// So make string length less than 4096.
\#define STRLEN 4093
void generate_string(char *str, int n)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
{
char c = i % 26 + 'a';
str[i] = c;
}
str[n-1] = '\0';
}
void print_string(char *str)
{
printf("%s\n", str);
}
int main()
{
char tmp[STRLEN];
generate_string(tmp, STRLEN);
print_string(tmp);
return 0;
}
```
3. compile program
`gcc -o test test.c`
4. get the offset of `print_string()`
```
objdump -t test | grep -w print_string
0000000000401199 g F .text 000000000000001b print_string
```
5. configure uprobe with offset 0x1199
```
off=0x1199
cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/
echo "p /root/test:${off} arg1=+0(%di):ustring arg2=\$comm arg3=+0(%di):ustring"
> uprobe_events
echo 1 > events/uprobes/enable
echo 1 > tracing_on
```
6. run `test`, and kasan will report error.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strncpy_from_user+0x1d6/0x1f0
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88812311c004 by task test/499CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 499 Comm: test Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #18
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.16.0-4.al8 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x27/0x310
kasan_report+0x10f/0x120
? strncpy_from_user+0x1d6/0x1f0
strncpy_from_user+0x1d6/0x1f0
? rmqueue.constprop.0+0x70d/0x2ad0
process_fetch_insn+0xb26/0x1470
? __pfx_process_fetch_insn+0x10/0x10
? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
? __pte_offset_map+0x1f/0x2d0
? unwind_next_frame+0xc5f/0x1f80
? arch_stack_walk+0x68/0xf0
? is_bpf_text_address+0x23/0x30
? kernel_text_address.part.0+0xbb/0xd0
? __kernel_text_address+0x66/0xb0
? unwind_get_return_address+0x5e/0xa0
? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
? arch_stack_walk+0xa2/0xf0
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8b/0xf0
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? depot_alloc_stack+0x4c/0x1f0
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xe/0x30
? stack_depot_save_flags+0x35d/0x4f0
? kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x50
? kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
? mutex_lock+0x91/0xe0
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
prepare_uprobe_buffer.part.0+0x2cd/0x500
uprobe_dispatcher+0x2c3/0x6a0
? __pfx_uprobe_dispatcher+0x10/0x10
? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4d/0x90
handler_chain+0xdd/0x3e0
handle_swbp+0x26e/0x3d0
? __pfx_handle_swbp+0x10/0x10
? uprobe_pre_sstep_notifier+0x151/0x1b0
irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xe2/0x1b0
asm_exc_int3+0x39/0x40
RIP: 0033:0x401199
Code: 01 c2 0f b6 45 fb 88 02 83 45 fc 01 8b 45 fc 3b 45 e4 7c b7 8b 45 e4 48 98 48 8d 50 ff 48 8b 45 e8 48 01 d0 ce
RSP: 002b:00007ffdf00576a8 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 00007ffdf00576b0 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000ff2
RDX: 0000000000000ffc RSI: 0000000000000ffd RDI: 00007ffdf00576b0
RBP: 00007ffdf00586b0 R08: 00007feb2f9c0d20 R09: 00007feb2f9c0d20
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000401040
R13: 00007ffdf0058780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
This commit enforces the buffer's maxlen less than a page-size to avoid
store_trace_args() out-of-memory access.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50063

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Prevent tail call between progs attached to different hooks
bpf progs can be attached to kernel functions, and the attached functions
can take different parameters or return different return values. If
prog attached to one kernel function tail calls prog attached to another
kernel function, the ctx access or return value verification could be
bypassed.
For example, if prog1 is attached to func1 which takes only 1 parameter
and prog2 is attached to func2 which takes two parameters. Since verifier
assumes the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed based on func2's
prototype, verifier allows prog2 to access the second parameter from
the bpf ctx passed to it. The problem is that verifier does not prevent
prog1 from passing its bpf ctx to prog2 via tail call. In this case,
the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed from func1 instead of func2,
that is, the assumption for ctx access verification is bypassed.
Another example, if BPF LSM prog1 is attached to hook file_alloc_security,
and BPF LSM prog2 is attached to hook bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known. Verifier
knows the return value rules for these two hooks, e.g. it is legal for
bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known to return positive number 1, and it is illegal
for file_alloc_security to return positive number. So verifier allows
prog2 to return positive number 1, but does not allow prog1 to return
positive number. The problem is that verifier does not prevent prog1
from calling prog2 via tail call. In this case, prog2's return value 1
will be used as the return value for prog1's hook file_alloc_security.
That is, the return value rule is bypassed.
This patch adds restriction for tail call to prevent such bypasses.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50047

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption
Doing an async decryption (large read) crashes with a
slab-use-after-free way down in the crypto API.
Reproducer:
# mount.cifs -o ...,seal,esize=1 //srv/share /mnt
# dd if=/mnt/largefile of=/dev/null
...
[ 194.196391] ==================================================================
[ 194.196844] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110
[ 194.197269] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888112bd0448 by task kworker/u77:2/899
[ 194.197707]
[ 194.197818] CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 899 Comm: kworker/u77:2 Not tainted 6.11.0-lku-00028-gfca3ca14a17a-dirty #43
[ 194.198400] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 194.199046] Workqueue: smb3decryptd smb2_decrypt_offload [cifs]
[ 194.200032] Call Trace:
[ 194.200191] <TASK>
[ 194.200327] dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70
[ 194.200558] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110
[ 194.200809] print_report+0x174/0x505
[ 194.201040] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ 194.201352] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 194.201604] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xdf/0x1c0
[ 194.201868] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110
[ 194.202128] kasan_report+0xc8/0x150
[ 194.202361] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110
[ 194.202616] gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110
[ 194.202863] ghash_update+0x184/0x210
[ 194.203103] shash_ahash_update+0x184/0x2a0
[ 194.203377] ? __pfx_shash_ahash_update+0x10/0x10
[ 194.203651] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 194.203877] ? crypto_gcm_init_common+0x1ba/0x340
[ 194.204142] gcm_hash_assoc_remain_continue+0x10a/0x140
[ 194.204434] crypt_message+0xec1/0x10a0 [cifs]
[ 194.206489] ? __pfx_crypt_message+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[ 194.208507] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 194.209205] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 194.209925] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 194.210443] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 194.211037] decrypt_raw_data+0x15f/0x250 [cifs]
[ 194.212906] ? __pfx_decrypt_raw_data+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[ 194.214670] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 194.215193] smb2_decrypt_offload+0x12a/0x6c0 [cifs]
This is because TFM is being used in parallel.
Fix this by allocating a new AEAD TFM for async decryption, but keep
the existing one for synchronous READ cases (similar to what is done
in smb3_calc_signature()).
Also remove the calls to aead_request_set_callback() and
crypto_wait_req() since it's always going to be a synchronous operation.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50046

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4: Prevent NULL-pointer dereference in nfs42_complete_copies()
On the node of an NFS client, some files saved in the mountpoint of the
NFS server were copied to another location of the same NFS server.
Accidentally, the nfs42_complete_copies() got a NULL-pointer dereference
crash with the following syslog:
[232064.838881] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116
[232064.839360] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116
[232066.588183] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000058
[232066.588586] Mem abort info:
[232066.588701] ESR = 0x0000000096000007
[232066.588862] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[232066.589084] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[232066.589216] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[232066.589340] FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault
[232066.589559] Data abort info:
[232066.589683] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[232066.589842] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[232066.589967] user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00002000956ff400
[232066.590231] [0000000000000058] pgd=08001100ae100003, p4d=08001100ae100003, pud=08001100ae100003, pmd=08001100b3c00003, pte=0000000000000000
[232066.590757] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[232066.590958] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun ipt_rpfilter xt_multiport ip_set_hash_ip ip_set_hash_net xfrm_interface xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 tunnel6 esp4 ah4 wireguard libcurve25519_generic veth xt_addrtype xt_set nf_conntrack_netlink ip_set_hash_ipportnet ip_set_hash_ipportip ip_set_bitmap_port ip_set_hash_ipport dummy ip_set ip_vs_sh ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_rr ip_vs iptable_filter sch_ingress nfnetlink_cttimeout vport_gre ip_gre ip_tunnel gre vport_geneve geneve vport_vxlan vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel openvswitch nf_conncount dm_round_robin dm_service_time dm_multipath xt_nat xt_MASQUERADE nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_mark xt_conntrack xt_comment nft_compat nft_counter nf_tables nfnetlink ocfs2 ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_ssif nbd overlay 8021q garp mrp bonding tls rfkill sunrpc ext4 mbcache jbd2
[232066.591052] vfat fat cas_cache cas_disk ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas sg acpi_ipmi ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ip_tables vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc fuse xfs libcrc32c ast drm_vram_helper qla2xxx drm_kms_helper syscopyarea crct10dif_ce sysfillrect ghash_ce sysimgblt sha2_ce fb_sys_fops cec sha256_arm64 sha1_ce drm_ttm_helper ttm nvme_fc igb sbsa_gwdt nvme_fabrics drm nvme_core i2c_algo_bit i40e scsi_transport_fc megaraid_sas aes_neon_bs
[232066.596953] CPU: 6 PID: 4124696 Comm: 10.253.166.125- Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.15.131-9.cl9_ocfs2.aarch64 #1
[232066.597356] Hardware name: Great Wall .\x93\x8e...RF6260 V5/GWMSSE2GL1T, BIOS T656FBE_V3.0.18 2024-01-06
[232066.597721] pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[232066.598034] pc : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4]
[232066.598327] lr : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x12c/0x800 [nfsv4]
[232066.598595] sp : ffff8000f568fc70
[232066.598731] x29: ffff8000f568fc70 x28: 0000000000001000 x27: ffff21003db33000
[232066.599030] x26: ffff800005521ae0 x25: ffff0100f98fa3f0 x24: 0000000000000001
[232066.599319] x23: ffff800009920008 x22: ffff21003db33040 x21: ffff21003db33050
[232066.599628] x20: ffff410172fe9e40 x19: ffff410172fe9e00 x18: 0000000000000000
[232066.599914] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000004 x15: 0000000000000000
[232066.600195] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800008e685a8 x12: 00000000eac0c6e6
[232066.600498] x11: 00000000000000
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50045

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: br_netfilter: fix panic with metadata_dst skb
Fix a kernel panic in the br_netfilter module when sending untagged
traffic via a VxLAN device.
This happens during the check for fragmentation in br_nf_dev_queue_xmit.
It is dependent on:
1) the br_netfilter module being loaded;
2) net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-iptables set to 1;
3) a bridge with a VxLAN (single-vxlan-device) netdevice as a bridge port;
4) untagged frames with size higher than the VxLAN MTU forwarded/flooded
When forwarding the untagged packet to the VxLAN bridge port, before
the netfilter hooks are called, br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel is called and
changes the skb_dst to the tunnel dst. The tunnel_dst is a metadata type
of dst, i.e., skb_valid_dst(skb) is false, and metadata->dst.dev is NULL.
Then in the br_netfilter hooks, in br_nf_dev_queue_xmit, there's a check
for frames that needs to be fragmented: frames with higher MTU than the
VxLAN device end up calling br_nf_ip_fragment, which in turns call
ip_skb_dst_mtu.
The ip_dst_mtu tries to use the skb_dst(skb) as if it was a valid dst
with valid dst->dev, thus the crash.
This case was never supported in the first place, so drop the packet
instead.
PING 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2) from 0.0.0.0 h1-eth0: 2000(2028) bytes of data.
[ 176.291791] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
virtual address 0000000000000110
[ 176.292101] Mem abort info:
[ 176.292184] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 176.292322] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 176.292530] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 176.292709] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 176.292862] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 176.293013] Data abort info:
[ 176.293104] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 176.293488] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 176.293787] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 176.293995] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000043ef5000
[ 176.294166] [0000000000000110] pgd=0000000000000000,
p4d=0000000000000000
[ 176.294827] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 176.295252] Modules linked in: vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel veth
br_netfilter bridge stp llc ipv6 crct10dif_ce
[ 176.295923] CPU: 0 PID: 188 Comm: ping Not tainted
6.8.0-rc3-g5b3fbd61b9d1 #2
[ 176.296314] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[ 176.296535] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS
BTYPE=--)
[ 176.296808] pc : br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x390/0x4ec [br_netfilter]
[ 176.297382] lr : br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x2ac/0x4ec [br_netfilter]
[ 176.297636] sp : ffff800080003630
[ 176.297743] x29: ffff800080003630 x28: 0000000000000008 x27:
ffff6828c49ad9f8
[ 176.298093] x26: ffff6828c49ad000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24:
00000000000003e8
[ 176.298430] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff6828c4960b40 x21:
ffff6828c3b16d28
[ 176.298652] x20: ffff6828c3167048 x19: ffff6828c3b16d00 x18:
0000000000000014
[ 176.298926] x17: ffffb0476322f000 x16: ffffb7e164023730 x15:
0000000095744632
[ 176.299296] x14: ffff6828c3f1c880 x13: 0000000000000002 x12:
ffffb7e137926a70
[ 176.299574] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff6828c3f1c898 x9 :
0000000000000000
[ 176.300049] x8 : ffff6828c49bf070 x7 : 0008460f18d5f20e x6 :
f20e0100bebafeca
[ 176.300302] x5 : ffff6828c7f918fe x4 : ffff6828c49bf070 x3 :
0000000000000000
[ 176.300586] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff6828c3c7ad00 x0 :
ffff6828c7f918f0
[ 176.300889] Call trace:
[ 176.301123] br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x390/0x4ec [br_netfilter]
[ 176.301411] br_nf_post_routing+0x2a8/0x3e4 [br_netfilter]
[ 176.301703] nf_hook_slow+0x48/0x124
[ 176.302060] br_forward_finish+0xc8/0xe8 [bridge]
[ 176.302371] br_nf_hook_thresh+0x124/0x134 [br_netfilter]
[ 176.302605] br_nf_forward_finish+0x118/0x22c [br_netfilter]
[ 176.302824] br_nf_forward_ip.part.0+0x264/0x290 [br_netfilter]
[ 176.303136] br_nf_forward+0x2b8/0x4e0 [br_netfilter]
[ 176.303359] nf_hook_slow+0x48/0x124
[ 176.303
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50042

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Fix increasing MSI-X on VF
Increasing MSI-X value on a VF leads to invalid memory operations. This
is caused by not reallocating some arrays.
Reproducer:
modprobe ice
echo 0 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/$PF_PCI/sriov_drivers_autoprobe
echo 1 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/$PF_PCI/sriov_numvfs
echo 17 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/$VF0_PCI/sriov_vf_msix_count
Default MSI-X is 16, so 17 and above triggers this issue.
KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ice_vsi_alloc_ring_stats+0x38d/0x4b0 [ice]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8888b937d180 by task bash/28433
(...)
Call Trace:
(...)
? ice_vsi_alloc_ring_stats+0x38d/0x4b0 [ice]
kasan_report+0xed/0x120
? ice_vsi_alloc_ring_stats+0x38d/0x4b0 [ice]
ice_vsi_alloc_ring_stats+0x38d/0x4b0 [ice]
ice_vsi_cfg_def+0x3360/0x4770 [ice]
? mutex_unlock+0x83/0xd0
? __pfx_ice_vsi_cfg_def+0x10/0x10 [ice]
? __pfx_ice_remove_vsi_lkup_fltr+0x10/0x10 [ice]
ice_vsi_cfg+0x7f/0x3b0 [ice]
ice_vf_reconfig_vsi+0x114/0x210 [ice]
ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count+0x3d0/0x960 [ice]
sriov_vf_msix_count_store+0x21c/0x300
(...)
Allocated by task 28201:
(...)
ice_vsi_cfg_def+0x1c8e/0x4770 [ice]
ice_vsi_cfg+0x7f/0x3b0 [ice]
ice_vsi_setup+0x179/0xa30 [ice]
ice_sriov_configure+0xcaa/0x1520 [ice]
sriov_numvfs_store+0x212/0x390
(...)
To fix it, use ice_vsi_rebuild() instead of ice_vf_reconfig_vsi(). This
causes the required arrays to be reallocated taking the new queue count
into account (ice_vsi_realloc_stat_arrays()). Set req_txq and req_rxq
before ice_vsi_rebuild(), so that realloc uses the newly set queue
count.
Additionally, ice_vsi_rebuild() does not remove VSI filters
(ice_fltr_remove_all()), so ice_vf_init_host_cfg() is no longer
necessary.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50029

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix UAF in hci_enhanced_setup_sync
This checks if the ACL connection remains valid as it could be destroyed
while hci_enhanced_setup_sync is pending on cmd_sync leading to the
following trace:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_enhanced_setup_sync+0x91b/0xa60
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888002328ffd by task kworker/u5:2/37
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 37 Comm: kworker/u5:2 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-01300-g810be445d8d6 #7099
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
? hci_enhanced_setup_sync+0x91b/0xa60
print_report+0x152/0x4c0
? hci_enhanced_setup_sync+0x91b/0xa60
? __virt_addr_valid+0x1fa/0x420
? hci_enhanced_setup_sync+0x91b/0xa60
kasan_report+0xda/0x1b0
? hci_enhanced_setup_sync+0x91b/0xa60
hci_enhanced_setup_sync+0x91b/0xa60
? __pfx_hci_enhanced_setup_sync+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x1c2/0x330
process_one_work+0x7d9/0x1360
? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
? assign_work+0x167/0x240
worker_thread+0x5b7/0xf60
? __kthread_parkme+0xac/0x1c0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x293/0x360
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x70
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 34:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
__hci_conn_add+0x187/0x17d0
hci_connect_sco+0x2e1/0xb90
sco_sock_connect+0x2a2/0xb80
__sys_connect+0x227/0x2a0
__x64_sys_connect+0x6d/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x71/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 37:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x101/0x160
kfree+0xd0/0x250
device_release+0x9a/0x210
kobject_put+0x151/0x280
hci_conn_del+0x448/0xbf0
hci_abort_conn_sync+0x46f/0x980
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x1c2/0x330
process_one_work+0x7d9/0x1360
worker_thread+0x5b7/0xf60
kthread+0x293/0x360
ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50022

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
device-dax: correct pgoff align in dax_set_mapping()
pgoff should be aligned using ALIGN_DOWN() instead of ALIGN(). Otherwise,
vmf->address not aligned to fault_size will be aligned to the next
alignment, that can result in memory failure getting the wrong address.
It's a subtle situation that only can be observed in
page_mapped_in_vma() after the page is page fault handled by
dev_dax_huge_fault. Generally, there is little chance to perform
page_mapped_in_vma in dev-dax's page unless in specific error injection
to the dax device to trigger an MCE - memory-failure. In that case,
page_mapped_in_vma() will be triggered to determine which task is
accessing the failure address and kill that task in the end.
We used self-developed dax device (which is 2M aligned mapping) , to
perform error injection to random address. It turned out that error
injected to non-2M-aligned address was causing endless MCE until panic.
Because page_mapped_in_vma() kept resulting wrong address and the task
accessing the failure address was never killed properly:
[ 3783.719419] Memory failure: 0x200c9742: recovery action for dax page:
Recovered
[ 3784.049006] mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at
200c9742380
[ 3784.049190] Memory failure: 0x200c9742: recovery action for dax page:
Recovered
[ 3784.448042] mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at
200c9742380
[ 3784.448186] Memory failure: 0x200c9742: recovery action for dax page:
Recovered
[ 3784.792026] mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at
200c9742380
[ 3784.792179] Memory failure: 0x200c9742: recovery action for dax page:
Recovered
[ 3785.162502] mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at
200c9742380
[ 3785.162633] Memory failure: 0x200c9742: recovery action for dax page:
Recovered
[ 3785.461116] mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at
200c9742380
[ 3785.461247] Memory failure: 0x200c9742: recovery action for dax page:
Recovered
[ 3785.764730] mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at
200c9742380
[ 3785.764859] Memory failure: 0x200c9742: recovery action for dax page:
Recovered
[ 3786.042128] mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at
200c9742380
[ 3786.042259] Memory failure: 0x200c9742: recovery action for dax page:
Recovered
[ 3786.464293] mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at
200c9742380
[ 3786.464423] Memory failure: 0x200c9742: recovery action for dax page:
Recovered
[ 3786.818090] mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at
200c9742380
[ 3786.818217] Memory failure: 0x200c9742: recovery action for dax page:
Recovered
[ 3787.085297] mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at
200c9742380
[ 3787.085424] Memory failure: 0x200c9742: recovery action for dax page:
Recovered
It took us several weeks to pinpoint this problem, but we eventually
used bpftrace to trace the page fault and mce address and successfully
identified the issue.
Joao added:
; Likely we never reproduce in production because we always pin
: device-dax regions in the region align they provide (Qemu does
: similarly with prealloc in hugetlb/file backed memory). I think this
: bug requires that we touch *unpinned* device-dax regions unaligned to
: the device-dax selected alignment (page size i.e. 4K/2M/1G)

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-49953

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix crash caused by calling __xfrm_state_delete() twice
The km.state is not checked in driver's delayed work. When
xfrm_state_check_expire() is called, the state can be reset to
XFRM_STATE_EXPIRED, even if it is XFRM_STATE_DEAD already. This
happens when xfrm state is deleted, but not freed yet. As
__xfrm_state_delete() is called again in xfrm timer, the following
crash occurs.
To fix this issue, skip xfrm_state_check_expire() if km.state is not
XFRM_STATE_VALID.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000108: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 7448 Comm: kworker/u102:2 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc2+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: mlx5e_ipsec: eth%d mlx5e_ipsec_handle_sw_limits [mlx5_core]
RIP: 0010:__xfrm_state_delete+0x3d/0x1b0
Code: 0f 84 8b 01 00 00 48 89 fd c6 87 c8 00 00 00 05 48 8d bb 40 10 00 00 e8 11 04 1a 00 48 8b 95 b8 00 00 00 48 8b 85 c0 00 00 00 <48> 89 42 08 48 89 10 48 8b 55 10 48 b8 00 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 48
RSP: 0018:ffff88885f945ec8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dead000000000122 RBX: ffffffff82afa940 RCX: 0000000000000036
RDX: dead000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff82afb980
RBP: ffff888109a20340 R08: ffff88885f945ea0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88885f945ff8 R12: 0000000000000246
R13: ffff888109a20340 R14: ffff88885f95f420 R15: ffff88885f95f400
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88885f940000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f2163102430 CR3: 00000001128d6001 CR4: 0000000000370eb0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? die_addr+0x33/0x90
? exc_general_protection+0x1a2/0x390
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
? __xfrm_state_delete+0x3d/0x1b0
? __xfrm_state_delete+0x2f/0x1b0
xfrm_timer_handler+0x174/0x350
? __xfrm_state_delete+0x1b0/0x1b0
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x121/0x270
hrtimer_run_softirq+0x88/0xd0
handle_softirqs+0xcc/0x270
do_softirq+0x3c/0x50
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x47/0x50
mlx5e_ipsec_handle_sw_limits+0x7d/0x90 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x137/0x2d0
worker_thread+0x28d/0x3a0
? rescuer_thread+0x480/0x480
kthread+0xb8/0xe0
? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-49946

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ppp: do not assume bh is held in ppp_channel_bridge_input()
Networking receive path is usually handled from BH handler.
However, some protocols need to acquire the socket lock, and
packets might be stored in the socket backlog is the socket was
owned by a user process.
In this case, release_sock(), __release_sock(), and sk_backlog_rcv()
might call the sk->sk_backlog_rcv() handler in process context.
sybot caught ppp was not considering this case in
ppp_channel_bridge_input() :
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
6.11.0-rc7-syzkaller-g5f5673607153 #0 Not tainted
--------------------------------
inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage.
ksoftirqd/1/24 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes:
ffff0000db7f11e0 (&pch->downl){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffff0000db7f11e0 (&pch->downl){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: ppp_channel_bridge_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2272 [inline]
ffff0000db7f11e0 (&pch->downl){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: ppp_input+0x16c/0x854 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2304
{SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
lock_acquire+0x240/0x728 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5759
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x60 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ppp_channel_bridge_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2272 [inline]
ppp_input+0x16c/0x854 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2304
pppoe_rcv_core+0xfc/0x314 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:379
sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1111 [inline]
__release_sock+0x1a8/0x3d8 net/core/sock.c:3004
release_sock+0x68/0x1b8 net/core/sock.c:3558
pppoe_sendmsg+0xc8/0x5d8 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:903
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0x374/0x4f4 net/socket.c:2204
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2216 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2212 [inline]
__arm64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0xf8 net/socket.c:2212
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x54/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
irq event stamp: 282914
hardirqs last enabled at (282914): [<ffff80008b42e30c>] __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:151 [inline]
hardirqs last enabled at (282914): [<ffff80008b42e30c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x38/0x98 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194
hardirqs last disabled at (282913): [<ffff80008b42e13c>] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline]
hardirqs last disabled at (282913): [<ffff80008b42e13c>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2c/0x7c kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
softirqs last enabled at (282904): [<ffff8000801f8e88>] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline]
softirqs last enabled at (282904): [<ffff8000801f8e88>] handle_softirqs+0xa3c/0xbfc kernel/softirq.c:582
softirqs last disabled at (282909): [<ffff8000801fbdf8>] run_ksoftirqd+0x70/0x158 kernel/softirq.c:928
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&pch->downl);
<Interrupt>
lock(&pch->downl);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by ksoftirqd/1/24:
#0: ffff80008f74dfa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x10/0x4c include/linux/rcupdate.h:325
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 24 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-syzkaller-g5f5673607153 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x1b8/0x1e4 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:319
show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:326
__dump_sta
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-49940

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
l2tp: prevent possible tunnel refcount underflow
When a session is created, it sets a backpointer to its tunnel. When
the session refcount drops to 0, l2tp_session_free drops the tunnel
refcount if session->tunnel is non-NULL. However, session->tunnel is
set in l2tp_session_create, before the tunnel refcount is incremented
by l2tp_session_register, which leaves a small window where
session->tunnel is non-NULL when the tunnel refcount hasn't been
bumped.
Moving the assignment to l2tp_session_register is trivial but
l2tp_session_create calls l2tp_session_set_header_len which uses
session->tunnel to get the tunnel's encap. Add an encap arg to
l2tp_session_set_header_len to avoid using session->tunnel.
If l2tpv3 sessions have colliding IDs, it is possible for
l2tp_v3_session_get to race with l2tp_session_register and fetch a
session which doesn't yet have session->tunnel set. Add a check for
this case.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-49939

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: avoid to add interface to list twice when SER
If SER L2 occurs during the WoWLAN resume flow, the add interface flow
is triggered by ieee80211_reconfig(). However, due to
rtw89_wow_resume() return failure, it will cause the add interface flow
to be executed again, resulting in a double add list and causing a kernel
panic. Therefore, we have added a check to prevent double adding of the
list.
list_add double add: new=ffff99d6992e2010, prev=ffff99d6992e2010, next=ffff99d695302628.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:37!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G W O 6.6.30-02659-gc18865c4dfbd #1 770df2933251a0e3c888ba69d1053a817a6376a7
Hardware name: HP Grunt/Grunt, BIOS Google_Grunt.11031.169.0 06/24/2021
Workqueue: events_freezable ieee80211_restart_work [mac80211]
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x5e/0xb0
Code: c7 74 18 48 39 ce 74 13 b0 01 59 5a 5e 5f 41 58 41 59 41 5a 5d e9 e2 d6 03 00 cc 48 c7 c7 8d 4f 17 83 48 89 c2 e8 02 c0 00 00 <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 aa 8c 1c 83 e8 f4 bf 00 00 0f 0b 48 c7 c7 c8 bc 12
RSP: 0018:ffffa91b8007bc50 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000058 RBX: ffff99d6992e0900 RCX: a014d76c70ef3900
RDX: ffffa91b8007bae8 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffffa91b8007bc88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffa91b8007bae0
R10: 00000000ffffdfff R11: ffffffff83a79800 R12: ffff99d695302060
R13: ffff99d695300900 R14: ffff99d6992e1be0 R15: ffff99d6992e2010
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff99d6aac00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000078fbdba43480 CR3: 000000010e464000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0x1f/0x70
? die+0x3d/0x60
? do_trap+0xa4/0x110
? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x5e/0xb0
? do_error_trap+0x6d/0x90
? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x5e/0xb0
? handle_invalid_op+0x30/0x40
? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x5e/0xb0
? exc_invalid_op+0x3c/0x50
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x5e/0xb0
rtw89_ops_add_interface+0x309/0x310 [rtw89_core 7c32b1ee6854761c0321027c8a58c5160e41f48f]
drv_add_interface+0x5c/0x130 [mac80211 83e989e6e616bd5b4b8a2b0a9f9352a2c385a3bc]
ieee80211_reconfig+0x241/0x13d0 [mac80211 83e989e6e616bd5b4b8a2b0a9f9352a2c385a3bc]
? finish_wait+0x3e/0x90
? synchronize_rcu_expedited+0x174/0x260
? sync_rcu_exp_done_unlocked+0x50/0x50
? wake_bit_function+0x40/0x40
ieee80211_restart_work+0xf0/0x140 [mac80211 83e989e6e616bd5b4b8a2b0a9f9352a2c385a3bc]
process_scheduled_works+0x1e5/0x480
worker_thread+0xea/0x1e0
kthread+0xdb/0x110
? move_linked_works+0x90/0x90
? kthread_associate_blkcg+0xa0/0xa0
ret_from_fork+0x3b/0x50
? kthread_associate_blkcg+0xa0/0xa0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
Modules linked in: dm_integrity async_xor xor async_tx lz4 lz4_compress zstd zstd_compress zram zsmalloc rfcomm cmac uinput algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg btusb btrtl iio_trig_hrtimer industrialio_sw_trigger btmtk industrialio_configfs btbcm btintel uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc iio_trig_sysfs videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common uvc snd_hda_codec_hdmi veth snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg acpi_als snd_hda_codec industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf snd_hwdep industrialio i2c_piix4 snd_hda_core designware_i2s ip6table_nat snd_soc_max98357a xt_MASQUERADE xt_cgroup snd_soc_acp_rt5682_mach fuse rtw89_8922ae(O) rtw89_8922a(O) rtw89_pci(O) rtw89_core(O) 8021q mac80211(O) bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc cfg80211 r8152 mii joydev
gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-49934

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/inode: Prevent dump_mapping() accessing invalid dentry.d_name.name
It's observed that a crash occurs during hot-remove a memory device,
in which user is accessing the hugetlb. See calltrace as following:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 14045 at arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1278 do_user_addr_fault+0x2a0/0x790
Modules linked in: kmem device_dax cxl_mem cxl_pmem cxl_port cxl_pci dax_hmem dax_pmem nd_pmem cxl_acpi nd_btt cxl_core crc32c_intel nvme virtiofs fuse nvme_core nfit libnvdimm dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc s
mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
CPU: 1 PID: 14045 Comm: daxctl Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-lizhijian+ #492
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:do_user_addr_fault+0x2a0/0x790
Code: 48 8b 00 a8 04 0f 84 b5 fe ff ff e9 1c ff ff ff 4c 89 e9 4c 89 e2 be 01 00 00 00 bf 02 00 00 00 e8 b5 ef 24 00 e9 42 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 08 4c 89 ea 48 89 ee 4c 89 e7 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41
RSP: 0000:ffffc90000a575f0 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: ffff88800c303600 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffffffff82504162 RDI: ffffffff824b2c36
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc90000a57658
R13: 0000000000001000 R14: ffff88800bc2e040 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f51cb57d880(0000) GS:ffff88807fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000001000 CR3: 00000000072e2004 CR4: 00000000001706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x8d/0x190
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2a0/0x790
? report_bug+0x1c3/0x1d0
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2a0/0x790
? exc_page_fault+0x31/0x200
exc_page_fault+0x68/0x200
<...snip...>
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 800000000ad92067 P4D 800000000ad92067 PUD 7677067 PMD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 800000000ad92067 P4D 800000000ad92067 PUD 7677067 PMD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 14045 Comm: daxctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc2-lizhijian+ #492
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:dentry_name+0x1f4/0x440
<...snip...>
? dentry_name+0x2fa/0x440
vsnprintf+0x1f3/0x4f0
vprintk_store+0x23a/0x540
vprintk_emit+0x6d/0x330
_printk+0x58/0x80
dump_mapping+0x10b/0x1a0
? __pfx_free_object_rcu+0x10/0x10
__dump_page+0x26b/0x3e0
? vprintk_emit+0xe0/0x330
? _printk+0x58/0x80
? dump_page+0x17/0x50
dump_page+0x17/0x50
do_migrate_range+0x2f7/0x7f0
? do_migrate_range+0x42/0x7f0
? offline_pages+0x2f4/0x8c0
offline_pages+0x60a/0x8c0
memory_subsys_offline+0x9f/0x1c0
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x77/0x100
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x38/0x60
device_offline+0xe3/0x110
state_store+0x6e/0xc0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x143/0x200
vfs_write+0x39f/0x560
ksys_write+0x65/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x62/0x130
Previously, some sanity check have been done in dump_mapping() before
the print facility parsing '%pd' though, it's still possible to run into
an invalid dentry.d_name.name.
Since dump_mapping() only needs to dump the filename only, retrieve it
by itself in a safer way to prevent an unnecessary crash.
Note that either retrieving the filename with '%pd' or
strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(), the filename could be unreliable.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-49886

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: ISST: Fix the KASAN report slab-out-of-bounds bug
Attaching SST PCI device to VM causes "BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds".
kasan report:
[ 19.411889] ==================================================================
[ 19.413702] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.415634] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888829e65200 by task cpuhp/16/113
[ 19.417368]
[ 19.418627] CPU: 16 PID: 113 Comm: cpuhp/16 Tainted: G E 6.9.0 #10
[ 19.420435] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.20192059.B64.2207280713 07/28/2022
[ 19.422687] Call Trace:
[ 19.424091] <TASK>
[ 19.425448] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
[ 19.426963] ? _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.428694] print_report+0x19d/0x52e
[ 19.430206] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ 19.431837] ? _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.433539] kasan_report+0xf0/0x170
[ 19.435019] ? _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.436709] _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.438379] ? __pfx_sched_clock_cpu+0x10/0x10
[ 19.439910] isst_if_cpu_online+0x406/0x58f [isst_if_common]
[ 19.441573] ? __pfx_isst_if_cpu_online+0x10/0x10 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.443263] ? ttwu_queue_wakelist+0x2c1/0x360
[ 19.444797] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x221/0xec0
[ 19.446337] cpuhp_thread_fun+0x21b/0x610
[ 19.447814] ? __pfx_cpuhp_thread_fun+0x10/0x10
[ 19.449354] smpboot_thread_fn+0x2e7/0x6e0
[ 19.450859] ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
[ 19.452405] kthread+0x29c/0x350
[ 19.453817] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 19.455253] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70
[ 19.456685] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 19.458114] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 19.459573] </TASK>
[ 19.460853]
[ 19.462055] Allocated by task 1198:
[ 19.463410] kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
[ 19.464788] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[ 19.466139] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
[ 19.467465] __kmalloc+0x1cd/0x470
[ 19.468748] isst_if_cdev_register+0x1da/0x350 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.470233] isst_if_mbox_init+0x108/0xff0 [isst_if_mbox_msr]
[ 19.471670] do_one_initcall+0xa4/0x380
[ 19.472903] do_init_module+0x238/0x760
[ 19.474105] load_module+0x5239/0x6f00
[ 19.475285] init_module_from_file+0xd1/0x130
[ 19.476506] idempotent_init_module+0x23b/0x650
[ 19.477725] __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130
[ 19.476506] idempotent_init_module+0x23b/0x650
[ 19.477725] __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130
[ 19.478920] do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160
[ 19.480036] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 19.481292]
[ 19.482205] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888829e65000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 19.484818] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 512-byte region [ffff888829e65000, ffff888829e65200)
[ 19.487447]
[ 19.488328] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 19.489569] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888829e60c00 pfn:0x829e60
[ 19.491140] head: order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
[ 19.492466] anon flags: 0x57ffffc0000840(slab|head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 19.493914] page_type: 0xffffffff()
[ 19.494988] raw: 0057ffffc0000840 ffff88810004cc80 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
[ 19.496451] raw: ffff888829e60c00 0000000080200018 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 19.497906] head: 0057ffffc0000840 ffff88810004cc80 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
[ 19.499379] head: ffff888829e60c00 0000000080200018 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 19.500844] head: 0057ffffc0000003 ffffea0020a79801 ffffea0020a79848 00000000ffffffff
[ 19.502316] head: 0000000800000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 19.503784] page dumped because: k
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-49885

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm, slub: avoid zeroing kmalloc redzone
Since commit 946fa0dbf2d8 ("mm/slub: extend redzone check to extra
allocated kmalloc space than requested"), setting orig_size treats
the wasted space (object_size - orig_size) as a redzone. However with
init_on_free=1 we clear the full object->size, including the redzone.
Additionally we clear the object metadata, including the stored orig_size,
making it zero, which makes check_object() treat the whole object as a
redzone.
These issues lead to the following BUG report with "slub_debug=FUZ
init_on_free=1":
[ 0.000000] =============================================================================
[ 0.000000] BUG kmalloc-8 (Not tainted): kmalloc Redzone overwritten
[ 0.000000] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ 0.000000]
[ 0.000000] 0xffff000010032858-0xffff00001003285f @offset=2136. First byte 0x0 instead of 0xcc
[ 0.000000] FIX kmalloc-8: Restoring kmalloc Redzone 0xffff000010032858-0xffff00001003285f=0xcc
[ 0.000000] Slab 0xfffffdffc0400c80 objects=36 used=23 fp=0xffff000010032a18 flags=0x3fffe0000000200(workingset|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
[ 0.000000] Object 0xffff000010032858 @offset=2136 fp=0xffff0000100328c8
[ 0.000000]
[ 0.000000] Redzone ffff000010032850: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........
[ 0.000000] Object ffff000010032858: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........
[ 0.000000] Redzone ffff000010032860: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........
[ 0.000000] Padding ffff0000100328b4: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............
[ 0.000000] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-next-20240814-00004-g61844c55c3f4 #144
[ 0.000000] Hardware name: NXP i.MX95 19X19 board (DT)
[ 0.000000] Call trace:
[ 0.000000] dump_backtrace+0x90/0xe8
[ 0.000000] show_stack+0x18/0x24
[ 0.000000] dump_stack_lvl+0x74/0x8c
[ 0.000000] dump_stack+0x18/0x24
[ 0.000000] print_trailer+0x150/0x218
[ 0.000000] check_object+0xe4/0x454
[ 0.000000] free_to_partial_list+0x2f8/0x5ec
To address the issue, use orig_size to clear the used area. And restore
the value of orig_size after clear the remaining area.
When CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG not defined, (get_orig_size()' directly returns
s->object_size. So when using memset to init the area, the size can simply
be orig_size, as orig_size returns object_size when CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG not
enabled. And orig_size can never be bigger than object_size.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-49569

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-rdma: unquiesce admin_q before destroy it
Kernel will hang on destroy admin_q while we create ctrl failed, such
as following calltrace:
PID: 23644 TASK: ff2d52b40f439fc0 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "nvme"
#0 [ff61d23de260fb78] __schedule at ffffffff8323bc15
#1 [ff61d23de260fc08] schedule at ffffffff8323c014
#2 [ff61d23de260fc28] blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait at ffffffff82a3dba1
#3 [ff61d23de260fc78] blk_freeze_queue at ffffffff82a4113a
#4 [ff61d23de260fc90] blk_cleanup_queue at ffffffff82a33006
#5 [ff61d23de260fcb0] nvme_rdma_destroy_admin_queue at ffffffffc12686ce
#6 [ff61d23de260fcc8] nvme_rdma_setup_ctrl at ffffffffc1268ced
#7 [ff61d23de260fd28] nvme_rdma_create_ctrl at ffffffffc126919b
#8 [ff61d23de260fd68] nvmf_dev_write at ffffffffc024f362
#9 [ff61d23de260fe38] vfs_write at ffffffff827d5f25
RIP: 00007fda7891d574 RSP: 00007ffe2ef06958 RFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e8122a4d90 RCX: 00007fda7891d574
RDX: 000000000000012b RSI: 000055e8122a4d90 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007ffe2ef079c0 R8: 000000000000012b R9: 000055e8122a4d90
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 000055e8122923c0 R14: 000000000000012b R15: 00007fda78a54500
ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 CS: 0033 SS: 002b
This due to we have quiesced admi_q before cancel requests, but forgot
to unquiesce before destroy it, as a result we fail to drain the
pending requests, and hang on blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait() forever. Here
try to reuse nvme_rdma_teardown_admin_queue() to fix this issue and
simplify the code.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-47719

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Protect against overflow of ALIGN() during iova allocation
Userspace can supply an iova and uptr such that the target iova alignment
becomes really big and ALIGN() overflows which corrupts the selected area
range during allocation. CONFIG_IOMMUFD_TEST can detect this:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5092 at drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:268 iopt_alloc_area_pages drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:268 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5092 at drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:268 iopt_map_pages+0xf95/0x1050 drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:352
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 5092 Comm: syz-executor294 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5-syzkaller-00294-g3ffea9a7a6f7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/07/2024
RIP: 0010:iopt_alloc_area_pages drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:268 [inline]
RIP: 0010:iopt_map_pages+0xf95/0x1050 drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:352
Code: fc e9 a4 f3 ff ff e8 1a 8b 4c fc 41 be e4 ff ff ff e9 8a f3 ff ff e8 0a 8b 4c fc 90 0f 0b 90 e9 37 f5 ff ff e8 fc 8a 4c fc 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 68 f3 ff ff 48 c7 c1 ec 82 ad 8f 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003ebf9e0 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff85499fa4 RBX: 00000000ffffffef RCX: ffff888079b49e00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffffef RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90003ebfc50 R08: ffffffff85499b30 R09: ffffffff85499942
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff888079b49e00 R12: ffff8880228e0010
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 1ffff920007d7f68 R15: ffffc90003ebfd00
FS: 000055557d760380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000005fdeb8 CR3: 000000007404a000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
iommufd_ioas_copy+0x610/0x7b0 drivers/iommu/iommufd/ioas.c:274
iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x4d9/0x5a0 drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c:421
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Cap the automatic alignment to the huge page size, which is probably a
better idea overall. Huge automatic alignments can fragment and chew up
the available IOVA space without any reason.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-47687

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vdpa/mlx5: Fix invalid mr resource destroy
Certain error paths from mlx5_vdpa_dev_add() can end up releasing mr
resources which never got initialized in the first place.
This patch adds the missing check in mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources()
to block releasing non-initialized mr resources.
Reference trace:
mlx5_core 0000:08:00.2: mlx5_vdpa_dev_add:3274:(pid 2700) warning: No mac address provisioned?
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 140216067 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 8 PID: 2700 Comm: vdpa Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-496.el9.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:vhost_iotlb_del_range+0xf/0xe0 [vhost_iotlb]
Code: [...]
RSP: 0018:ff1c823ac23077f0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffffffffc1a21a60 RBX: ffffffff899567a0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffffffffffffffff RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ff1bda1f7c21e800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ff1c823ac2307670
R10: ff1c823ac2307668 R11: ffffffff8a9e7b68 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ff1bda1f43e341a0 R15: 00000000ffffffea
FS: 00007f56eba7c740(0000) GS:ff1bda269f800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000104d90001 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? mlx5_vdpa_free+0x3d/0x150 [mlx5_vdpa]
? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
? page_fault_oops+0x134/0x170
? __irq_work_queue_local+0x2b/0xc0
? irq_work_queue+0x2c/0x50
? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x150
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? __pfx_mlx5_vdpa_free+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_vdpa]
? vhost_iotlb_del_range+0xf/0xe0 [vhost_iotlb]
mlx5_vdpa_free+0x3d/0x150 [mlx5_vdpa]
vdpa_release_dev+0x1e/0x50 [vdpa]
device_release+0x31/0x90
kobject_cleanup+0x37/0x130
mlx5_vdpa_dev_add+0x2d2/0x7a0 [mlx5_vdpa]
vdpa_nl_cmd_dev_add_set_doit+0x277/0x4c0 [vdpa]
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd9/0x130
genl_family_rcv_msg+0x14d/0x220
? __pfx_vdpa_nl_cmd_dev_add_set_doit+0x10/0x10 [vdpa]
? _copy_to_user+0x1a/0x30
? move_addr_to_user+0x4b/0xe0
genl_rcv_msg+0x47/0xa0
? __import_iovec+0x46/0x150
? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x245/0x370
netlink_sendmsg+0x206/0x440
__sys_sendto+0x1dc/0x1f0
? do_read_fault+0x10c/0x1d0
? do_pte_missing+0x10d/0x190
__x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xf0
? __count_memcg_events+0x4f/0xb0
? mm_account_fault+0x6c/0x100
? handle_mm_fault+0x116/0x270
? do_user_addr_fault+0x1d6/0x6a0
? do_syscall_64+0x6b/0xf0
? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80
? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80
? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80
? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80
? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46857

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix bridge mode operations when there are no VFs
Currently, trying to set the bridge mode attribute when numvfs=0 leads to a
crash:
bridge link set dev eth2 hwmode vepa
[ 168.967392] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030
[...]
[ 168.969989] RIP: 0010:mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x1f/0x300 [mlx5_core]
[...]
[ 168.976037] Call Trace:
[ 168.976188] <TASK>
[ 168.978620] _mlx5_eswitch_set_vepa_locked+0x113/0x230 [mlx5_core]
[ 168.979074] mlx5_eswitch_set_vepa+0x7f/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
[ 168.979471] rtnl_bridge_setlink+0xe9/0x1f0
[ 168.979714] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x159/0x400
[ 168.980451] netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
[ 168.980675] netlink_unicast+0x241/0x360
[ 168.980918] netlink_sendmsg+0x1f6/0x430
[ 168.981162] ____sys_sendmsg+0x3bb/0x3f0
[ 168.982155] ___sys_sendmsg+0x88/0xd0
[ 168.985036] __sys_sendmsg+0x59/0xa0
[ 168.985477] do_syscall_64+0x79/0x150
[ 168.987273] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 168.987773] RIP: 0033:0x7f8f7950f917
(esw->fdb_table.legacy.vepa_fdb is null)
The bridge mode is only relevant when there are multiple functions per
port. Therefore, prevent setting and getting this setting when there are no
VFs.
Note that after this change, there are no settings to change on the PF
interface using `bridge link` when there are no VFs, so the interface no
longer appears in the `bridge link` output.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46853

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: nxp-fspi: fix the KASAN report out-of-bounds bug
Change the memcpy length to fix the out-of-bounds issue when writing the
data that is not 4 byte aligned to TX FIFO.
To reproduce the issue, write 3 bytes data to NOR chip.
dd if=3b of=/dev/mtd0
[ 36.926103] ==================================================================
[ 36.933409] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nxp_fspi_exec_op+0x26ec/0x2838
[ 36.940514] Read of size 4 at addr ffff00081037c2a0 by task dd/455
[ 36.946721]
[ 36.948235] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 455 Comm: dd Not tainted 6.11.0-rc5-gc7b0e37c8434 #1070
[ 36.956185] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QM MEK (DT)
[ 36.961260] Call trace:
[ 36.963723] dump_backtrace+0x90/0xe8
[ 36.967414] show_stack+0x18/0x24
[ 36.970749] dump_stack_lvl+0x78/0x90
[ 36.974451] print_report+0x114/0x5cc
[ 36.978151] kasan_report+0xa4/0xf0
[ 36.981670] __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0x1c/0x28
[ 36.986587] nxp_fspi_exec_op+0x26ec/0x2838
[ 36.990800] spi_mem_exec_op+0x8ec/0xd30
[ 36.994762] spi_mem_no_dirmap_read+0x190/0x1e0
[ 36.999323] spi_mem_dirmap_write+0x238/0x32c
[ 37.003710] spi_nor_write_data+0x220/0x374
[ 37.007932] spi_nor_write+0x110/0x2e8
[ 37.011711] mtd_write_oob_std+0x154/0x1f0
[ 37.015838] mtd_write_oob+0x104/0x1d0
[ 37.019617] mtd_write+0xb8/0x12c
[ 37.022953] mtdchar_write+0x224/0x47c
[ 37.026732] vfs_write+0x1e4/0x8c8
[ 37.030163] ksys_write+0xec/0x1d0
[ 37.033586] __arm64_sys_write+0x6c/0x9c
[ 37.037539] invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x258
[ 37.041327] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x160/0x22c
[ 37.046244] do_el0_svc+0x44/0x5c
[ 37.049589] el0_svc+0x38/0x78
[ 37.052681] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158
[ 37.057077] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
[ 37.060775]
[ 37.062274] Allocated by task 455:
[ 37.065701] kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x54
[ 37.069570] kasan_save_track+0x20/0x3c
[ 37.073438] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x40/0x54
[ 37.077736] __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xb8
[ 37.081515] __kmalloc_noprof+0x158/0x2f8
[ 37.085563] mtd_kmalloc_up_to+0x120/0x154
[ 37.089690] mtdchar_write+0x130/0x47c
[ 37.093469] vfs_write+0x1e4/0x8c8
[ 37.096901] ksys_write+0xec/0x1d0
[ 37.100332] __arm64_sys_write+0x6c/0x9c
[ 37.104287] invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x258
[ 37.108064] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x160/0x22c
[ 37.112972] do_el0_svc+0x44/0x5c
[ 37.116319] el0_svc+0x38/0x78
[ 37.119401] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158
[ 37.123788] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
[ 37.127474]
[ 37.128977] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff00081037c2a0
[ 37.128977] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
[ 37.141177] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
[ 37.141177] allocated 3-byte region [ffff00081037c2a0, ffff00081037c2a3)
[ 37.153465]
[ 37.154971] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 37.160559] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x89037c
[ 37.168596] flags: 0xbfffe0000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
[ 37.175149] page_type: 0xfdffffff(slab)
[ 37.179021] raw: 0bfffe0000000000 ffff000800002500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
[ 37.186788] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080800080 00000001fdffffff 0000000000000000
[ 37.194553] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 37.200144]
[ 37.201647] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 37.206460] ffff00081037c180: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
[ 37.213701] ffff00081037c200: fa fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 03 fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc
[ 37.220946] >ffff00081037c280: 06 fc fc fc 03 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 37.228186] ^
[ 37.232473] ffff00081037c300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 37.239718] ffff00081037c380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 37.246962] ==============================================================
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46830

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.
Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU. I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems. Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm #552 Not tainted
-----------------------------
include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by repro/1071:
#0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm #552
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46796

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix double put of @cfile in smb2_set_path_size()
If smb2_compound_op() is called with a valid @cfile and returned
-EINVAL, we need to call cifs_get_writable_path() before retrying it
as the reference of @cfile was already dropped by previous call.
This fixes the following KASAN splat when running fstests generic/013
against Windows Server 2022:
CIFS: Attempting to mount //w22-fs0/scratch
run fstests generic/013 at 2024-09-02 19:48:59
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88811f1a3730 by task kworker/3:2/176
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 176 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40
04/01/2014
Workqueue: cifsoplockd cifs_oplock_break [cifs]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
? detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200
print_report+0x156/0x4d9
? detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200
? __virt_addr_valid+0x145/0x300
? __phys_addr+0x46/0x90
? detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200
kasan_report+0xda/0x110
? detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200
detach_if_pending+0xab/0x200
timer_delete+0x96/0xe0
? __pfx_timer_delete+0x10/0x10
? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50
try_to_grab_pending+0x46/0x3b0
__cancel_work+0x89/0x1b0
? __pfx___cancel_work+0x10/0x10
? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
cifs_close_deferred_file+0x110/0x2c0 [cifs]
? __pfx_cifs_close_deferred_file+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10
cifs_oplock_break+0x4c1/0xa50 [cifs]
? __pfx_cifs_oplock_break+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? lock_is_held_type+0x85/0xf0
? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90
process_one_work+0x4c6/0x9f0
? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0
? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
? lock_acquired+0x220/0x550
? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x37/0x100
worker_thread+0x2e4/0x570
? __kthread_parkme+0xd1/0xf0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x17f/0x1c0
? kthread+0xda/0x1c0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x60
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1118:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
cifs_new_fileinfo+0xc8/0x9d0 [cifs]
cifs_atomic_open+0x467/0x770 [cifs]
lookup_open.isra.0+0x665/0x8b0
path_openat+0x4c3/0x1380
do_filp_open+0x167/0x270
do_sys_openat2+0x129/0x160
__x64_sys_creat+0xad/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 83:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70
poison_slab_object+0xe9/0x160
__kasan_slab_free+0x32/0x50
kfree+0xf2/0x300
process_one_work+0x4c6/0x9f0
worker_thread+0x2e4/0x570
kthread+0x17f/0x1c0
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x60
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xad/0xc0
insert_work+0x29/0xe0
__queue_work+0x5ea/0x760
queue_work_on+0x6d/0x90
_cifsFileInfo_put+0x3f6/0x770 [cifs]
smb2_compound_op+0x911/0x3940 [cifs]
smb2_set_path_size+0x228/0x270 [cifs]
cifs_set_file_size+0x197/0x460 [cifs]
cifs_setattr+0xd9c/0x14b0 [cifs]
notify_change+0x4e3/0x740
do_truncate+0xfa/0x180
vfs_truncate+0x195/0x200
__x64_sys_truncate+0x109/0x150
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46793

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: Intel: Boards: Fix NULL pointer deref in BYT/CHT boards harder
Since commit 13f58267cda3 ("ASoC: soc.h: don't create dummy Component
via COMP_DUMMY()") dummy codecs declared like this:
SND_SOC_DAILINK_DEF(dummy,
DAILINK_COMP_ARRAY(COMP_DUMMY()));
expand to:
static struct snd_soc_dai_link_component dummy[] = {
};
Which means that dummy is a zero sized array and thus dais[i].codecs should
not be dereferenced *at all* since it points to the address of the next
variable stored in the data section as the "dummy" variable has an address
but no size, so even dereferencing dais[0] is already an out of bounds
array reference.
Which means that the if (dais[i].codecs->name) check added in
commit 7d99a70b6595 ("ASoC: Intel: Boards: Fix NULL pointer deref
in BYT/CHT boards") relies on that the part of the next variable which
the name member maps to just happens to be NULL.
Which apparently so far it usually is, except when it isn't
and then it results in crashes like this one:
[ 28.795659] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000030011
...
[ 28.795780] Call Trace:
[ 28.795787] <TASK>
...
[ 28.795862] ? strcmp+0x18/0x40
[ 28.795872] 0xffffffffc150c605
[ 28.795887] platform_probe+0x40/0xa0
...
[ 28.795979] ? __pfx_init_module+0x10/0x10 [snd_soc_sst_bytcr_wm5102]
Really fix things this time around by checking dais.num_codecs != 0.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46787

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
userfaultfd: fix checks for huge PMDs
Patch series "userfaultfd: fix races around pmd_trans_huge() check", v2.
The pmd_trans_huge() code in mfill_atomic() is wrong in three different
ways depending on kernel version:
1. The pmd_trans_huge() check is racy and can lead to a BUG_ON() (if you hit
the right two race windows) - I've tested this in a kernel build with
some extra mdelay() calls. See the commit message for a description
of the race scenario.
On older kernels (before 6.5), I think the same bug can even
theoretically lead to accessing transhuge page contents as a page table
if you hit the right 5 narrow race windows (I haven't tested this case).
2. As pointed out by Qi Zheng, pmd_trans_huge() is not sufficient for
detecting PMDs that don't point to page tables.
On older kernels (before 6.5), you'd just have to win a single fairly
wide race to hit this.
I've tested this on 6.1 stable by racing migration (with a mdelay()
patched into try_to_migrate()) against UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE - on my x86
VM, that causes a kernel oops in ptlock_ptr().
3. On newer kernels (>=6.5), for shmem mappings, khugepaged is allowed
to yank page tables out from under us (though I haven't tested that),
so I think the BUG_ON() checks in mfill_atomic() are just wrong.
I decided to write two separate fixes for these (one fix for bugs 1+2, one
fix for bug 3), so that the first fix can be backported to kernels
affected by bugs 1+2.
This patch (of 2):
This fixes two issues.
I discovered that the following race can occur:
mfill_atomic other thread
============ ============
<zap PMD>
pmdp_get_lockless() [reads none pmd]
<bail if trans_huge>
<if none:>
<pagefault creates transhuge zeropage>
__pte_alloc [no-op]
<zap PMD>
<bail if pmd_trans_huge(*dst_pmd)>
BUG_ON(pmd_none(*dst_pmd))
I have experimentally verified this in a kernel with extra mdelay() calls;
the BUG_ON(pmd_none(*dst_pmd)) triggers.
On kernels newer than commit 0d940a9b270b ("mm/pgtable: allow
pte_offset_map[_lock]() to fail"), this can't lead to anything worse than
a BUG_ON(), since the page table access helpers are actually designed to
deal with page tables concurrently disappearing; but on older kernels
(<=6.4), I think we could probably theoretically race past the two
BUG_ON() checks and end up treating a hugepage as a page table.
The second issue is that, as Qi Zheng pointed out, there are other types
of huge PMDs that pmd_trans_huge() can't catch: devmap PMDs and swap PMDs
(in particular, migration PMDs).
On <=6.4, this is worse than the first issue: If mfill_atomic() runs on a
PMD that contains a migration entry (which just requires winning a single,
fairly wide race), it will pass the PMD to pte_offset_map_lock(), which
assumes that the PMD points to a page table.
Breakage follows: First, the kernel tries to take the PTE lock (which will
crash or maybe worse if there is no "struct page" for the address bits in
the migration entry PMD - I think at least on X86 there usually is no
corresponding "struct page" thanks to the PTE inversion mitigation, amd64
looks different).
If that didn't crash, the kernel would next try to write a PTE into what
it wrongly thinks is a page table.
As part of fixing these issues, get rid of the check for pmd_trans_huge()
before __pte_alloc() - that's redundant, we're going to have to check for
that after the __pte_alloc() anyway.
Backport note: pmdp_get_lockless() is pmd_read_atomic() in older kernels.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46786

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fscache: delete fscache_cookie_lru_timer when fscache exits to avoid UAF
The fscache_cookie_lru_timer is initialized when the fscache module
is inserted, but is not deleted when the fscache module is removed.
If timer_reduce() is called before removing the fscache module,
the fscache_cookie_lru_timer will be added to the timer list of
the current cpu. Afterwards, a use-after-free will be triggered
in the softIRQ after removing the fscache module, as follows:
==================================================================
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff803c9e9
PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 21ffea067 P4D 21ffea067 PUD 21ffe6067 PMD 110a7c067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G W 6.11.0-rc3 #855
Tainted: [W]=WARN
RIP: 0010:__run_timer_base.part.0+0x254/0x8a0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x627/0x810
__walk_groups.isra.0+0x47/0x140
tmigr_handle_remote+0x1fa/0x2f0
handle_softirqs+0x180/0x590
irq_exit_rcu+0x84/0xb0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x90
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:default_idle+0xf/0x20
default_idle_call+0x38/0x60
do_idle+0x2b5/0x300
cpu_startup_entry+0x54/0x60
start_secondary+0x20d/0x280
common_startup_64+0x13e/0x148
</TASK>
Modules linked in: [last unloaded: netfs]
==================================================================
Therefore delete fscache_cookie_lru_timer when removing the fscahe module.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46783

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp_bpf: fix return value of tcp_bpf_sendmsg()
When we cork messages in psock->cork, the last message triggers the
flushing will result in sending a sk_msg larger than the current
message size. In this case, in tcp_bpf_send_verdict(), 'copied' becomes
negative at least in the following case:
468 case __SK_DROP:
469 default:
470 sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, tosend);
471 sk_msg_apply_bytes(psock, tosend);
472 *copied -= (tosend + delta); // <==== HERE
473 return -EACCES;
Therefore, it could lead to the following BUG with a proper value of
'copied' (thanks to syzbot). We should not use negative 'copied' as a
return value here.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/socket.c:733!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3265 Comm: syz-executor510 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00060-gd07b43284ab3 #0
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 61400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:733 [inline]
pc : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:728 [inline]
pc : __sock_sendmsg+0x5c/0x60 net/socket.c:745
lr : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
lr : __sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x60 net/socket.c:745
sp : ffff800088ea3b30
x29: ffff800088ea3b30 x28: fbf00000062bc900 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffff800088ea3bc0 x25: ffff800088ea3bc0 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: f9f00000048dc000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff800088ea3d90
x20: f9f00000048dc000 x19: ffff800088ea3d90 x18: 0000000000000001
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 000000002002ffaf
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff8000815849c0 x9 : ffff8000815b49c0
x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 000000000000003f x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 00000000000007e0 x4 : fff07ffffd239000 x3 : fbf00000062bc900
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 00000000fffffdef
Call trace:
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:733 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x5c/0x60 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x274/0x2ac net/socket.c:2597
___sys_sendmsg+0xac/0x100 net/socket.c:2651
__sys_sendmsg+0x84/0xe0 net/socket.c:2680
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2689 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2687 [inline]
__arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x24/0x30 net/socket.c:2687
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x34/0xec arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x12c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x19c/0x1a0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
Code: f9404463 d63f0060 3108441f 54fffe81 (d4210000)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46771

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: bcm: Remove proc entry when dev is unregistered.
syzkaller reported a warning in bcm_connect() below. [0]
The repro calls connect() to vxcan1, removes vxcan1, and calls
connect() with ifindex == 0.
Calling connect() for a BCM socket allocates a proc entry.
Then, bcm_sk(sk)->bound is set to 1 to prevent further connect().
However, removing the bound device resets bcm_sk(sk)->bound to 0
in bcm_notify().
The 2nd connect() tries to allocate a proc entry with the same
name and sets NULL to bcm_sk(sk)->bcm_proc_read, leaking the
original proc entry.
Since the proc entry is available only for connect()ed sockets,
let's clean up the entry when the bound netdev is unregistered.
[0]:
proc_dir_entry 'can-bcm/2456' already registered
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 394 at fs/proc/generic.c:376 proc_register+0x645/0x8f0 fs/proc/generic.c:375
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 394 Comm: syz-executor403 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-g852e42cc2dd4
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:proc_register+0x645/0x8f0 fs/proc/generic.c:375
Code: 00 00 00 00 00 48 85 ed 0f 85 97 02 00 00 4d 85 f6 0f 85 9f 02 00 00 48 c7 c7 9b cb cf 87 48 89 de 4c 89 fa e8 1c 6f eb fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 48 c7 c7 98 37 99 89 e8 cb 7e 22 05 bb 00 00 00 10 48
RSP: 0018:ffa0000000cd7c30 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 9e129be1950f0200 RBX: ff1100011b51582c RCX: ff1100011857cd80
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000002
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffd400000000000f R09: ff1100013e78cac0
R10: ffac800000cd7980 R11: ff1100013e12b1f0 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ff1100011a99a2ec
FS: 00007fbd7086f740(0000) GS:ff1100013fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000200071c0 CR3: 0000000118556004 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
proc_create_net_single+0x144/0x210 fs/proc/proc_net.c:220
bcm_connect+0x472/0x840 net/can/bcm.c:1673
__sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2049 [inline]
__sys_connect+0x5d2/0x690 net/socket.c:2066
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2076 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2073 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x8f/0x100 net/socket.c:2073
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7fbd708b0e5d
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff8cd33f08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fbd708b0e5d
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 0000000000000040
R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff8cd34098
R13: 0000000000401280 R14: 0000000000406de8 R15: 00007fbd70ab9000
</TASK>
remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'net/can-bcm', leaking at least '2456'

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46770

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Add netif_device_attach/detach into PF reset flow
Ethtool callbacks can be executed while reset is in progress and try to
access deleted resources, e.g. getting coalesce settings can result in a
NULL pointer dereference seen below.
Reproduction steps:
Once the driver is fully initialized, trigger reset:
# echo 1 > /sys/class/net/<interface>/device/reset
when reset is in progress try to get coalesce settings using ethtool:
# ethtool -c <interface>
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 11 PID: 19713 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G S 6.10.0-rc7+ #7
RIP: 0010:ice_get_q_coalesce+0x2e/0xa0 [ice]
RSP: 0018:ffffbab1e9bcf6a8 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 000000000000000c RBX: ffff94512305b028 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9451c3f2e588 RDI: ffff9451c3f2e588
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff9451c3f2e580 R11: 000000000000001f R12: ffff945121fa9000
R13: ffffbab1e9bcf760 R14: 0000000000000013 R15: ffffffff9e65dd40
FS: 00007faee5fbe740(0000) GS:ffff94546fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000106c2e005 CR4: 00000000001706f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ice_get_coalesce+0x17/0x30 [ice]
coalesce_prepare_data+0x61/0x80
ethnl_default_doit+0xde/0x340
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xf2/0x150
genl_rcv_msg+0x1b3/0x2c0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x5b/0x110
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x19c/0x290
netlink_sendmsg+0x222/0x490
__sys_sendto+0x1df/0x1f0
__x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7faee60d8e27
Calling netif_device_detach() before reset makes the net core not call
the driver when ethtool command is issued, the attempt to execute an
ethtool command during reset will result in the following message:
netlink error: No such device
instead of NULL pointer dereference. Once reset is done and
ice_rebuild() is executing, the netif_device_attach() is called to allow
for ethtool operations to occur again in a safe manner.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46766

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: move netif_queue_set_napi to rtnl-protected sections
Currently, netif_queue_set_napi() is called from ice_vsi_rebuild() that is
not rtnl-locked when called from the reset. This creates the need to take
the rtnl_lock just for a single function and complicates the
synchronization with .ndo_bpf. At the same time, there no actual need to
fill napi-to-queue information at this exact point.
Fill napi-to-queue information when opening the VSI and clear it when the
VSI is being closed. Those routines are already rtnl-locked.
Also, rewrite napi-to-queue assignment in a way that prevents inclusion of
XDP queues, as this leads to out-of-bounds writes, such as one below.
[ +0.000004] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in netif_queue_set_napi+0x1c2/0x1e0
[ +0.000012] Write of size 8 at addr ffff889881727c80 by task bash/7047
[ +0.000006] CPU: 24 PID: 7047 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2+ #2
[ +0.000004] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0014.082620210524 08/26/2021
[ +0.000003] Call Trace:
[ +0.000003] <TASK>
[ +0.000002] dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80
[ +0.000007] print_report+0xce/0x630
[ +0.000007] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000007] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x1c9/0x2c0
[ +0.000005] ? netif_queue_set_napi+0x1c2/0x1e0
[ +0.000003] kasan_report+0xe9/0x120
[ +0.000004] ? netif_queue_set_napi+0x1c2/0x1e0
[ +0.000004] netif_queue_set_napi+0x1c2/0x1e0
[ +0.000005] ice_vsi_close+0x161/0x670 [ice]
[ +0.000114] ice_dis_vsi+0x22f/0x270 [ice]
[ +0.000095] ice_pf_dis_all_vsi.constprop.0+0xae/0x1c0 [ice]
[ +0.000086] ice_prepare_for_reset+0x299/0x750 [ice]
[ +0.000087] pci_dev_save_and_disable+0x82/0xd0
[ +0.000006] pci_reset_function+0x12d/0x230
[ +0.000004] reset_store+0xa0/0x100
[ +0.000006] ? __pfx_reset_store+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000002] ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000004] ? __check_object_size+0x4c1/0x640
[ +0.000007] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x30b/0x4a0
[ +0.000006] vfs_write+0x5d6/0xdf0
[ +0.000005] ? fd_install+0x180/0x350
[ +0.000005] ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0xA10
[ +0.000004] ? do_fcntl+0x52c/0xcd0
[ +0.000004] ? kasan_save_track+0x13/0x60
[ +0.000003] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60
[ +0.000006] ksys_write+0xfa/0x1d0
[ +0.000003] ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000002] ? __x64_sys_fcntl+0x121/0x180
[ +0.000004] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x87/0xe0
[ +0.000005] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x170
[ +0.000007] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x87/0xe0
[ +0.000004] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000003] ? file_close_fd_locked+0x167/0x230
[ +0.000005] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7d/0x220
[ +0.000005] ? do_syscall_64+0x8c/0x170
[ +0.000004] ? do_syscall_64+0x8c/0x170
[ +0.000003] ? do_syscall_64+0x8c/0x170
[ +0.000003] ? fput+0x1a/0x2c0
[ +0.000004] ? filp_close+0x19/0x30
[ +0.000004] ? do_dup2+0x25a/0x4c0
[ +0.000004] ? __x64_sys_dup2+0x6e/0x2e0
[ +0.000002] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7d/0x220
[ +0.000004] ? do_syscall_64+0x8c/0x170
[ +0.000003] ? __count_memcg_events+0x113/0x380
[ +0.000005] ? handle_mm_fault+0x136/0x820
[ +0.000005] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x444/0xa80
[ +0.000004] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80
[ +0.000004] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80
[ +0.000002] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ +0.000005] RIP: 0033:0x7f2033593154

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46755

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: Do not return unused priv in mwifiex_get_priv_by_id()
mwifiex_get_priv_by_id() returns the priv pointer corresponding to
the bss_num and bss_type, but without checking if the priv is actually
currently in use.
Unused priv pointers do not have a wiphy attached to them which can
lead to NULL pointer dereferences further down the callstack. Fix
this by returning only used priv pointers which have priv->bss_mode
set to something else than NL80211_IFTYPE_UNSPECIFIED.
Said NULL pointer dereference happened when an Accesspoint was started
with wpa_supplicant -i mlan0 with this config:
network={
ssid="somessid"
mode=2
frequency=2412
key_mgmt=WPA-PSK WPA-PSK-SHA256
proto=RSN
group=CCMP
pairwise=CCMP
psk="12345678"
}
When waiting for the AP to be established, interrupting wpa_supplicant
with <ctrl-c> and starting it again this happens:
| Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000140
| Mem abort info:
| ESR = 0x0000000096000004
| EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
| SET = 0, FnV = 0
| EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
| FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
| Data abort info:
| ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
| CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
| GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
| user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000046d96000
| [0000000000000140] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
| Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
| Modules linked in: caam_jr caamhash_desc spidev caamalg_desc crypto_engine authenc libdes mwifiex_sdio
+mwifiex crct10dif_ce cdc_acm onboard_usb_hub fsl_imx8_ddr_perf imx8m_ddrc rtc_ds1307 lm75 rtc_snvs
+imx_sdma caam imx8mm_thermal spi_imx error imx_cpufreq_dt fuse ip_tables x_tables ipv6
| CPU: 0 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-00007-g937242013fce-dirty #18
| Hardware name: somemachine (DT)
| Workqueue: events sdio_irq_work
| pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : mwifiex_get_cfp+0xd8/0x15c [mwifiex]
| lr : mwifiex_get_cfp+0x34/0x15c [mwifiex]
| sp : ffff8000818b3a70
| x29: ffff8000818b3a70 x28: ffff000006bfd8a5 x27: 0000000000000004
| x26: 000000000000002c x25: 0000000000001511 x24: 0000000002e86bc9
| x23: ffff000006bfd996 x22: 0000000000000004 x21: ffff000007bec000
| x20: 000000000000002c x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
| x17: 000000040044ffff x16: 00500072b5503510 x15: ccc283740681e517
| x14: 0201000101006d15 x13: 0000000002e8ff43 x12: 002c01000000ffb1
| x11: 0100000000000000 x10: 02e8ff43002c0100 x9 : 0000ffb100100157
| x8 : ffff000003d20000 x7 : 00000000000002f1 x6 : 00000000ffffe124
| x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000003 x3 : 0000000000000000
| x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0001000000011001 x0 : 0000000000000000
| Call trace:
| mwifiex_get_cfp+0xd8/0x15c [mwifiex]
| mwifiex_parse_single_response_buf+0x1d0/0x504 [mwifiex]
| mwifiex_handle_event_ext_scan_report+0x19c/0x2f8 [mwifiex]
| mwifiex_process_sta_event+0x298/0xf0c [mwifiex]
| mwifiex_process_event+0x110/0x238 [mwifiex]
| mwifiex_main_process+0x428/0xa44 [mwifiex]
| mwifiex_sdio_interrupt+0x64/0x12c [mwifiex_sdio]
| process_sdio_pending_irqs+0x64/0x1b8
| sdio_irq_work+0x4c/0x7c
| process_one_work+0x148/0x2a0
| worker_thread+0x2fc/0x40c
| kthread+0x110/0x114
| ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
| Code: a94153f3 a8c37bfd d50323bf d65f03c0 (f940a000)
| ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46746

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: amd_sfh: free driver_data after destroying hid device
HID driver callbacks aren't called anymore once hid_destroy_device() has
been called. Hence, hid driver_data should be freed only after the
hid_destroy_device() function returned as driver_data is used in several
callbacks.
I observed a crash with kernel 6.10.0 on my T14s Gen 3, after enabling
KASAN to debug memory allocation, I got this output:
[ 13.050438] ==================================================================
[ 13.054060] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh]
[ 13.054809] psmouse serio1: trackpoint: Synaptics TrackPoint firmware: 0x02, buttons: 3/3
[ 13.056432] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88813152f408 by task (udev-worker)/479
[ 13.060970] CPU: 5 PID: 479 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.10.0-arch1-2 #1 893bb55d7f0073f25c46adbb49eb3785fefd74b0
[ 13.063978] Hardware name: LENOVO 21CQCTO1WW/21CQCTO1WW, BIOS R22ET70W (1.40 ) 03/21/2024
[ 13.067860] Call Trace:
[ 13.069383] input: TPPS/2 Synaptics TrackPoint as /devices/platform/i8042/serio1/input/input8
[ 13.071486] <TASK>
[ 13.071492] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
[ 13.074870] snd_hda_intel 0000:33:00.6: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
[ 13.078296] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
[ 13.082199] print_report+0x174/0x505
[ 13.085776] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ 13.089367] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.093255] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
[ 13.097464] kasan_report+0xc8/0x150
[ 13.101461] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
[ 13.105802] amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
[ 13.110303] amdtp_hid_request+0xb8/0x110 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
[ 13.114879] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.119450] sensor_hub_get_feature+0x1d3/0x540 [hid_sensor_hub 3f13be3016ff415bea03008d45d99da837ee3082]
[ 13.124097] hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x4d0/0xad0 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5]
[ 13.127404] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.131925] ? __pfx_hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5]
[ 13.136455] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x96/0xf0
[ 13.140197] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ 13.143602] ? devm_iio_device_alloc+0x34/0x50 [industrialio 3d261d5e5765625d2b052be40e526d62b1d2123b]
[ 13.147234] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.150446] ? __devm_add_action+0x167/0x1d0
[ 13.155061] hid_gyro_3d_probe+0x120/0x7f0 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172]
[ 13.158581] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.161814] platform_probe+0xa2/0x150
[ 13.165029] really_probe+0x1e3/0x8a0
[ 13.168243] __driver_probe_device+0x18c/0x370
[ 13.171500] driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x120
[ 13.175000] __driver_attach+0x190/0x4a0
[ 13.178521] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
[ 13.181771] bus_for_each_dev+0x106/0x180
[ 13.185033] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 13.188229] ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10
[ 13.191446] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.194382] bus_add_driver+0x29e/0x4d0
[ 13.197328] driver_register+0x1a5/0x360
[ 13.200283] ? __pfx_hid_gyro_3d_platform_driver_init+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172]
[ 13.203362] do_one_initcall+0xa7/0x380
[ 13.206432] ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
[ 13.210175] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.213211] ? kasan_unpoison+0x44/0x70
[ 13.216688] do_init_module+0x238/0x750
[ 13.2196
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46678

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: change ipsec_lock from spin lock to mutex
In the cited commit, bond->ipsec_lock is added to protect ipsec_list,
hence xdo_dev_state_add and xdo_dev_state_delete are called inside
this lock. As ipsec_lock is a spin lock and such xfrmdev ops may sleep,
"scheduling while atomic" will be triggered when changing bond's
active slave.
[ 101.055189] BUG: scheduling while atomic: bash/902/0x00000200
[ 101.055726] Modules linked in:
[ 101.058211] CPU: 3 PID: 902 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4+ #1
[ 101.058760] Hardware name:
[ 101.059434] Call Trace:
[ 101.059436] <TASK>
[ 101.060873] dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60
[ 101.061275] __schedule_bug+0x4e/0x60
[ 101.061682] __schedule+0x612/0x7c0
[ 101.062078] ? __mod_timer+0x25c/0x370
[ 101.062486] schedule+0x25/0xd0
[ 101.062845] schedule_timeout+0x77/0xf0
[ 101.063265] ? asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
[ 101.063724] ? __bpf_trace_itimer_state+0x10/0x10
[ 101.064215] __wait_for_common+0x87/0x190
[ 101.064648] ? usleep_range_state+0x90/0x90
[ 101.065091] cmd_exec+0x437/0xb20 [mlx5_core]
[ 101.065569] mlx5_cmd_do+0x1e/0x40 [mlx5_core]
[ 101.066051] mlx5_cmd_exec+0x18/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 101.066552] mlx5_crypto_create_dek_key+0xea/0x120 [mlx5_core]
[ 101.067163] ? bonding_sysfs_store_option+0x4d/0x80 [bonding]
[ 101.067738] ? kmalloc_trace+0x4d/0x350
[ 101.068156] mlx5_ipsec_create_sa_ctx+0x33/0x100 [mlx5_core]
[ 101.068747] mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0x47b/0xaa0 [mlx5_core]
[ 101.069312] bond_change_active_slave+0x392/0x900 [bonding]
[ 101.069868] bond_option_active_slave_set+0x1c2/0x240 [bonding]
[ 101.070454] __bond_opt_set+0xa6/0x430 [bonding]
[ 101.070935] __bond_opt_set_notify+0x2f/0x90 [bonding]
[ 101.071453] bond_opt_tryset_rtnl+0x72/0xb0 [bonding]
[ 101.071965] bonding_sysfs_store_option+0x4d/0x80 [bonding]
[ 101.072567] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1a0
[ 101.073033] vfs_write+0x2d8/0x400
[ 101.073416] ? alloc_fd+0x48/0x180
[ 101.073798] ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
[ 101.074175] do_syscall_64+0x52/0x110
[ 101.074576] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
As bond_ipsec_add_sa_all and bond_ipsec_del_sa_all are only called
from bond_change_active_slave, which requires holding the RTNL lock.
And bond_ipsec_add_sa and bond_ipsec_del_sa are xfrm state
xdo_dev_state_add and xdo_dev_state_delete APIs, which are in user
context. So ipsec_lock doesn't have to be spin lock, change it to
mutex, and thus the above issue can be resolved.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-45003

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfs: Don't evict inode under the inode lru traversing context
The inode reclaiming process(See function prune_icache_sb) collects all
reclaimable inodes and mark them with I_FREEING flag at first, at that
time, other processes will be stuck if they try getting these inodes
(See function find_inode_fast), then the reclaiming process destroy the
inodes by function dispose_list(). Some filesystems(eg. ext4 with
ea_inode feature, ubifs with xattr) may do inode lookup in the inode
evicting callback function, if the inode lookup is operated under the
inode lru traversing context, deadlock problems may happen.
Case 1: In function ext4_evict_inode(), the ea inode lookup could happen
if ea_inode feature is enabled, the lookup process will be stuck
under the evicting context like this:
1. File A has inode i_reg and an ea inode i_ea
2. getfattr(A, xattr_buf) // i_ea is added into lru // lru->i_ea
3. Then, following three processes running like this:
PA PB
echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
shrink_slab
prune_dcache_sb
// i_reg is added into lru, lru->i_ea->i_reg
prune_icache_sb
list_lru_walk_one
inode_lru_isolate
i_ea->i_state |= I_FREEING // set inode state
inode_lru_isolate
__iget(i_reg)
spin_unlock(&i_reg->i_lock)
spin_unlock(lru_lock)
rm file A
i_reg->nlink = 0
iput(i_reg) // i_reg->nlink is 0, do evict
ext4_evict_inode
ext4_xattr_delete_inode
ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all
ext4_xattr_inode_iget
ext4_iget(i_ea->i_ino)
iget_locked
find_inode_fast
__wait_on_freeing_inode(i_ea) ----→ AA deadlock
dispose_list // cannot be executed by prune_icache_sb
wake_up_bit(&i_ea->i_state)
Case 2: In deleted inode writing function ubifs_jnl_write_inode(), file
deleting process holds BASEHD's wbuf->io_mutex while getting the
xattr inode, which could race with inode reclaiming process(The
reclaiming process could try locking BASEHD's wbuf->io_mutex in
inode evicting function), then an ABBA deadlock problem would
happen as following:
1. File A has inode ia and a xattr(with inode ixa), regular file B has
inode ib and a xattr.
2. getfattr(A, xattr_buf) // ixa is added into lru // lru->ixa
3. Then, following three processes running like this:
PA PB PC
echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
shrink_slab
prune_dcache_sb
// ib and ia are added into lru, lru->ixa->ib->ia
prune_icache_sb
list_lru_walk_one
inode_lru_isolate
ixa->i_state |= I_FREEING // set inode state
inode_lru_isolate
__iget(ib)
spin_unlock(&ib->i_lock)
spin_unlock(lru_lock)
rm file B
ib->nlink = 0
rm file A
iput(ia)
ubifs_evict_inode(ia)
ubifs_jnl_delete_inode(ia)
ubifs_jnl_write_inode(ia)
make_reservation(BASEHD) // Lock wbuf->io_mutex
ubifs_iget(ixa->i_ino)
iget_locked
find_inode_fast
__wait_on_freeing_inode(ixa)
| iput(ib) // ib->nlink is 0, do evict
| ubifs_evict_inode
| ubifs_jnl_delete_inode(ib)
↓ ubifs_jnl_write_inode
ABBA deadlock ←-----make_reservation(BASEHD)
dispose_list // cannot be executed by prune_icache_sb
wake_up_bit(&ixa->i_state)
Fix the possible deadlock by using new inode state flag I_LRU_ISOLATING
to pin the inode in memory while inode_lru_isolate(
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-45000

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/netfs/fscache_cookie: add missing "n_accesses" check
This fixes a NULL pointer dereference bug due to a data race which
looks like this:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 33 PID: 16573 Comm: kworker/u97:799 Not tainted 6.8.7-cm4all1-hp+ #43
Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380 Gen9/ProLiant DL380 Gen9, BIOS P89 10/17/2018
Workqueue: events_unbound netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work
RIP: 0010:cachefiles_prepare_write+0x30/0xa0
Code: 57 41 56 45 89 ce 41 55 49 89 cd 41 54 49 89 d4 55 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 08 48 8b 47 08 48 83 7f 10 00 48 89 34 24 48 8b 68 20 <48> 8b 45 08 4c 8b 38 74 45 49 8b 7f 50 e8 4e a9 b0 ff 48 8b 73 10
RSP: 0018:ffffb4e78113bde0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffff976126be6d10 RBX: ffff97615cdb8438 RCX: 0000000000020000
RDX: ffff97605e6c4c68 RSI: ffff97605e6c4c60 RDI: ffff97615cdb8438
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000278333 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffff97605e6c4600 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff97605e6c4c68
R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff976064fe2c00
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9776dfd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000005942c002 CR4: 00000000001706f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x1f/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x15d/0x440
? search_module_extables+0xe/0x40
? fixup_exception+0x22/0x2f0
? exc_page_fault+0x5f/0x100
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? cachefiles_prepare_write+0x30/0xa0
netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work+0x135/0x2e0
process_one_work+0x137/0x2c0
worker_thread+0x2e9/0x400
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xcc/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
CR2: 0000000000000008
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
This happened because fscache_cookie_state_machine() was slow and was
still running while another process invoked fscache_unuse_cookie();
this led to a fscache_cookie_lru_do_one() call, setting the
FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_LRU_DISCARD flag, which was picked up by
fscache_cookie_state_machine(), withdrawing the cookie via
cachefiles_withdraw_cookie(), clearing cookie->cache_priv.
At the same time, yet another process invoked
cachefiles_prepare_write(), which found a NULL pointer in this code
line:
struct cachefiles_object *object = cachefiles_cres_object(cres);
The next line crashes, obviously:
struct cachefiles_cache *cache = object->volume->cache;
During cachefiles_prepare_write(), the "n_accesses" counter is
non-zero (via fscache_begin_operation()). The cookie must not be
withdrawn until it drops to zero.
The counter is checked by fscache_cookie_state_machine() before
switching to FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_RELINQUISHING and
FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_WITHDRAWING (in "case
FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_FAILED"), but not for
FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_LRU_DISCARDING ("case
FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_ACTIVE").
This patch adds the missing check. With a non-zero access counter,
the function returns and the next fscache_end_cookie_access() call
will queue another fscache_cookie_state_machine() call to handle the
still-pending FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_LRU_DISCARD.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-44987

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: prevent UAF in ip6_send_skb()
syzbot reported an UAF in ip6_send_skb() [1]
After ip6_local_out() has returned, we no longer can safely
dereference rt, unless we hold rcu_read_lock().
A similar issue has been fixed in commit
a688caa34beb ("ipv6: take rcu lock in rawv6_send_hdrinc()")
Another potential issue in ip6_finish_output2() is handled in a
separate patch.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip6_send_skb+0x18d/0x230 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1964
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88806dde4858 by task syz.1.380/6530
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6530 Comm: syz.1.380 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00306-gdf6cbc62cc9b #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
ip6_send_skb+0x18d/0x230 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1964
rawv6_push_pending_frames+0x75c/0x9e0 net/ipv6/raw.c:588
rawv6_sendmsg+0x19c7/0x23c0 net/ipv6/raw.c:926
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
sock_write_iter+0x2dd/0x400 net/socket.c:1160
do_iter_readv_writev+0x60a/0x890
vfs_writev+0x37c/0xbb0 fs/read_write.c:971
do_writev+0x1b1/0x350 fs/read_write.c:1018
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f936bf79e79
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f936cd7f038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f936c115f80 RCX: 00007f936bf79e79
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f936bfe7916 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f936c115f80 R15: 00007fff2860a7a8
</TASK>
Allocated by task 6530:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:312 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:338
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3988 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4037 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x135/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:4044
dst_alloc+0x12b/0x190 net/core/dst.c:89
ip6_blackhole_route+0x59/0x340 net/ipv6/route.c:2670
make_blackhole net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3120 [inline]
xfrm_lookup_route+0xd1/0x1c0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3313
ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x13e/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1257
rawv6_sendmsg+0x1283/0x23c0 net/ipv6/raw.c:898
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2680
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 45:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579
poison_slab_object+0xe0/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:240
__kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:256
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2252 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4473 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x145/0x350 mm/slub.c:4548
dst_destroy+0x2ac/0x460 net/core/dst.c:124
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2569 [inline]
rcu_core+0xafd/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-44975

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup/cpuset: fix panic caused by partcmd_update
We find a bug as below:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000003
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 3 PID: 358 Comm: bash Tainted: G W I 6.6.0-10893-g60d6
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/4
RIP: 0010:partition_sched_domains_locked+0x483/0x600
Code: 01 48 85 d2 74 0d 48 83 05 29 3f f8 03 01 f3 48 0f bc c2 89 c0 48 9
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000fdbc58 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 0000000100000003 RBX: ffff888100b3dfa0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000002fe80
RBP: ffff888100b3dfb0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffc90000fdbcb0 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: ffff888100a92b48 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f44a5425740(0000) GS:ffff888237d80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000100030973 CR3: 000000010722c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x8c/0xa0
? __die_body+0x23/0xa0
? __die+0x3a/0x50
? page_fault_oops+0x1d2/0x5c0
? partition_sched_domains_locked+0x483/0x600
? search_module_extables+0x2a/0xb0
? search_exception_tables+0x67/0x90
? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x144/0x1b0
? __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x211/0x360
? up_read+0x3b/0x50
? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x1a/0x30
? exc_page_fault+0x890/0xd90
? __lock_acquire.constprop.0+0x24f/0x8d0
? __lock_acquire.constprop.0+0x24f/0x8d0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
? partition_sched_domains_locked+0x483/0x600
? partition_sched_domains_locked+0xf0/0x600
rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x806/0xdc0
update_partition_sd_lb+0x118/0x130
cpuset_write_resmask+0xffc/0x1420
cgroup_file_write+0xb2/0x290
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x194/0x290
new_sync_write+0xeb/0x160
vfs_write+0x16f/0x1d0
ksys_write+0x81/0x180
__x64_sys_write+0x21/0x30
x64_sys_call+0x2f25/0x4630
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2
RIP: 0033:0x7f44a553c887
It can be reproduced with cammands:
cd /sys/fs/cgroup/
mkdir test
cd test/
echo +cpuset > ../cgroup.subtree_control
echo root > cpuset.cpus.partition
cat /sys/fs/cgroup/cpuset.cpus.effective
0-3
echo 0-3 > cpuset.cpus // taking away all cpus from root
This issue is caused by the incorrect rebuilding of scheduling domains.
In this scenario, test/cpuset.cpus.partition should be an invalid root
and should not trigger the rebuilding of scheduling domains. When calling
update_parent_effective_cpumask with partcmd_update, if newmask is not
null, it should recheck newmask whether there are cpus is available
for parect/cs that has tasks.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-44964

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: fix memory leaks and crashes while performing a soft reset
The second tagged commit introduced a UAF, as it removed restoring
q_vector->vport pointers after reinitializating the structures.
This is due to that all queue allocation functions are performed here
with the new temporary vport structure and those functions rewrite
the backpointers to the vport. Then, this new struct is freed and
the pointers start leading to nowhere.
But generally speaking, the current logic is very fragile. It claims
to be more reliable when the system is low on memory, but in fact, it
consumes two times more memory as at the moment of running this
function, there are two vports allocated with their queues and vectors.
Moreover, it claims to prevent the driver from running into "bad state",
but in fact, any error during the rebuild leaves the old vport in the
partially allocated state.
Finally, if the interface is down when the function is called, it always
allocates a new queue set, but when the user decides to enable the
interface later on, vport_open() allocates them once again, IOW there's
a clear memory leak here.
Just don't allocate a new queue set when performing a reset, that solves
crashes and memory leaks. Readd the old queue number and reopen the
interface on rollback - that solves limbo states when the device is left
disabled and/or without HW queues enabled.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-44932

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: fix UAFs when destroying the queues
The second tagged commit started sometimes (very rarely, but possible)
throwing WARNs from
net/core/page_pool.c:page_pool_disable_direct_recycling().
Turned out idpf frees interrupt vectors with embedded NAPIs *before*
freeing the queues making page_pools' NAPI pointers lead to freed
memory before these pools are destroyed by libeth.
It's not clear whether there are other accesses to the freed vectors
when destroying the queues, but anyway, we usually free queue/interrupt
vectors only when the queues are destroyed and the NAPIs are guaranteed
to not be referenced anywhere.
Invert the allocation and freeing logic making queue/interrupt vectors
be allocated first and freed last. Vectors don't require queues to be
present, so this is safe. Additionally, this change allows to remove
that useless queue->q_vector pointer cleanup, as vectors are still
valid when freeing the queues (+ both are freed within one function,
so it's not clear why nullify the pointers at all).

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-43910

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: add missing check_func_arg_reg_off() to prevent out-of-bounds memory accesses
Currently, it's possible to pass in a modified CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR to
a global function as an argument. The adverse effects of this is that
BPF helpers can continue to make use of this modified
CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR from within the context of the global function,
which can unintentionally result in out-of-bounds memory accesses and
therefore compromise overall system stability i.e.
[ 244.157771] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140
[ 244.161345] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810914be68 by task test_progs/302
[ 244.167151] CPU: 0 PID: 302 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G O E 6.10.0-rc3-00131-g66b586715063 #533
[ 244.174318] Call Trace:
[ 244.175787] <TASK>
[ 244.177356] dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
[ 244.179531] print_report+0xce/0x670
[ 244.182314] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x200/0x3e0
[ 244.184908] kasan_report+0xd7/0x110
[ 244.187408] ? bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140
[ 244.189714] ? bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140
[ 244.192020] bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140
[ 244.194264] bpf_prog_b02a02fdd2bdc5fa_global_call_bpf_dynptr_data+0x22/0x26
[ 244.198044] bpf_prog_b0fe7b9d7dc3abde_callback_adjust_bpf_dynptr_reg_off+0x1f/0x23
[ 244.202136] bpf_user_ringbuf_drain+0x2c7/0x570
[ 244.204744] ? 0xffffffffc0009e58
[ 244.206593] ? __pfx_bpf_user_ringbuf_drain+0x10/0x10
[ 244.209795] bpf_prog_33ab33f6a804ba2d_user_ringbuf_callback_const_ptr_to_dynptr_reg_off+0x47/0x4b
[ 244.215922] bpf_trampoline_6442502480+0x43/0xe3
[ 244.218691] __x64_sys_prlimit64+0x9/0xf0
[ 244.220912] do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0
[ 244.223043] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 244.226458] RIP: 0033:0x7ffa3eb8f059
[ 244.228582] Code: 08 89 e8 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8f 1d 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 244.241307] RSP: 002b:00007ffa3e9c6eb8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012e
[ 244.246474] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffa3e9c7cdc RCX: 00007ffa3eb8f059
[ 244.250478] RDX: 00007ffa3eb162b4 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007ffa3e9c7fb0
[ 244.255396] RBP: 00007ffa3e9c6ed0 R08: 00007ffa3e9c76c0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 244.260195] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: ffffffffffffff80
[ 244.264201] R13: 000000000000001c R14: 00007ffc5d6b4260 R15: 00007ffa3e1c7000
[ 244.268303] </TASK>
Add a check_func_arg_reg_off() to the path in which the BPF verifier
verifies the arguments of global function arguments, specifically
those which take an argument of type ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR |
MEM_RDONLY. Also, process_dynptr_func() doesn't appear to perform any
explicit and strict type matching on the supplied register type, so
let's also enforce that a register either type PTR_TO_STACK or
CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR is by the caller.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-43874

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Fix null pointer dereference in __sev_snp_shutdown_locked
Fix a null pointer dereference induced by DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE.
Return from __sev_snp_shutdown_locked() if the psp_device or the
sev_device structs are not initialized. Without the fix, the driver will
produce the following splat:
ccp 0000:55:00.5: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
ccp 0000:55:00.5: sev enabled
ccp 0000:55:00.5: psp enabled
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000f0
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI
CPU: 262 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1+ #29
RIP: 0010:__sev_snp_shutdown_locked+0x2e/0x150
Code: 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 54 53 48 83 ec 10 41 89 f7 49 89 fe 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d8 48 8b 05 6a 5a 7f 06 <4c> 8b a0 f0 00 00 00 41 0f b6 9c 24 a2 00 00 00 48 83 fb 02 0f 83
RSP: 0018:ffffb2ea4014b7b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e4acd2e0a28 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffb2ea4014b808
RBP: ffffb2ea4014b7e8 R08: 0000000000000106 R09: 000000000003d9c0
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffffa39ff070 R12: ffff9e49d40590c8
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffb2ea4014b808 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9e58b1e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000f0 CR3: 0000000418a3e001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0x6f/0xb0
? __die+0xcc/0xf0
? page_fault_oops+0x330/0x3a0
? save_trace+0x2a5/0x360
? do_user_addr_fault+0x583/0x630
? exc_page_fault+0x81/0x120
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x2b/0x30
? __sev_snp_shutdown_locked+0x2e/0x150
__sev_firmware_shutdown+0x349/0x5b0
? pm_runtime_barrier+0x66/0xe0
sev_dev_destroy+0x34/0xb0
psp_dev_destroy+0x27/0x60
sp_destroy+0x39/0x90
sp_pci_remove+0x22/0x60
pci_device_remove+0x4e/0x110
really_probe+0x271/0x4e0
__driver_probe_device+0x8f/0x160
driver_probe_device+0x24/0x120
__driver_attach+0xc7/0x280
? driver_attach+0x30/0x30
bus_for_each_dev+0x10d/0x130
driver_attach+0x22/0x30
bus_add_driver+0x171/0x2b0
? unaccepted_memory_init_kdump+0x20/0x20
driver_register+0x67/0x100
__pci_register_driver+0x83/0x90
sp_pci_init+0x22/0x30
sp_mod_init+0x13/0x30
do_one_initcall+0xb8/0x290
? sched_clock_noinstr+0xd/0x10
? local_clock_noinstr+0x3e/0x100
? stack_depot_save_flags+0x21e/0x6a0
? local_clock+0x1c/0x60
? stack_depot_save_flags+0x21e/0x6a0
? sched_clock_noinstr+0xd/0x10
? local_clock_noinstr+0x3e/0x100
? __lock_acquire+0xd90/0xe30
? sched_clock_noinstr+0xd/0x10
? local_clock_noinstr+0x3e/0x100
? __create_object+0x66/0x100
? local_clock+0x1c/0x60
? __create_object+0x66/0x100
? parameq+0x1b/0x90
? parse_one+0x6d/0x1d0
? parse_args+0xd7/0x1f0
? do_initcall_level+0x180/0x180
do_initcall_level+0xb0/0x180
do_initcalls+0x60/0xa0
? kernel_init+0x1f/0x1d0
do_basic_setup+0x41/0x50
kernel_init_freeable+0x1ac/0x230
? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
kernel_init+0x1f/0x1d0
? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
ret_from_fork+0x3d/0x50
? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
CR2: 00000000000000f0
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:__sev_snp_shutdown_locked+0x2e/0x150
Code: 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 54 53 48 83 ec 10 41 89 f7 49 89 fe 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d8 48 8b 05 6a 5a 7f 06 <4c> 8b a0 f0 00 00 00 41 0f b6 9c 24 a2 00 00 00 48 83 fb 02 0f 83
RSP: 0018:ffffb2ea4014b7b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e4acd2e0a28 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-43834

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xdp: fix invalid wait context of page_pool_destroy()
If the driver uses a page pool, it creates a page pool with
page_pool_create().
The reference count of page pool is 1 as default.
A page pool will be destroyed only when a reference count reaches 0.
page_pool_destroy() is used to destroy page pool, it decreases a
reference count.
When a page pool is destroyed, ->disconnect() is called, which is
mem_allocator_disconnect().
This function internally acquires mutex_lock().
If the driver uses XDP, it registers a memory model with
xdp_rxq_info_reg_mem_model().
The xdp_rxq_info_reg_mem_model() internally increases a page pool
reference count if a memory model is a page pool.
Now the reference count is 2.
To destroy a page pool, the driver should call both page_pool_destroy()
and xdp_unreg_mem_model().
The xdp_unreg_mem_model() internally calls page_pool_destroy().
Only page_pool_destroy() decreases a reference count.
If a driver calls page_pool_destroy() then xdp_unreg_mem_model(), we
will face an invalid wait context warning.
Because xdp_unreg_mem_model() calls page_pool_destroy() with
rcu_read_lock().
The page_pool_destroy() internally acquires mutex_lock().
Splat looks like:
=============================
[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
6.10.0-rc6+ #4 Tainted: G W
-----------------------------
ethtool/1806 is trying to lock:
ffffffff90387b90 (mem_id_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{5:5}
3 locks held by ethtool/1806:
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 1806 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc6+ #4 f916f41f172891c800f2fed
Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0
__lock_acquire+0x1681/0x4de0
? _printk+0x64/0xe0
? __pfx_mark_lock.part.0+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
lock_acquire+0x1b3/0x580
? mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
? __wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x16/0xc0
? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
? dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xc0
__mutex_lock+0x15c/0x1690
? mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
? __pfx_prb_read_valid+0x10/0x10
? mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
? __pfx_llist_add_batch+0x10/0x10
? console_unlock+0x193/0x1b0
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xbe/0x140
? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? tick_nohz_tick_stopped+0x16/0x90
? __irq_work_queue_local+0x1e5/0x330
? irq_work_queue+0x39/0x50
? __wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x79/0xc0
? mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
? __pfx_mem_allocator_disconnect+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0xa5/0xf0
? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
page_pool_release+0x36e/0x6d0
page_pool_destroy+0xd7/0x440
xdp_unreg_mem_model+0x1a7/0x2a0
? __pfx_xdp_unreg_mem_model+0x10/0x10
? kfree+0x125/0x370
? bnxt_free_ring.isra.0+0x2eb/0x500
? bnxt_free_mem+0x5ac/0x2500
xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x4a/0xd0
bnxt_free_mem+0x1356/0x2500
bnxt_close_nic+0xf0/0x3b0
? __pfx_bnxt_close_nic+0x10/0x10
? ethnl_parse_bit+0x2c6/0x6d0
? __pfx___nla_validate_parse+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_ethnl_parse_bit+0x10/0x10
bnxt_set_features+0x2a8/0x3e0
__netdev_update_features+0x4dc/0x1370
? ethnl_parse_bitset+0x4ff/0x750
? __pfx_ethnl_parse_bitset+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___netdev_update_features+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0xa5/0xf0
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x42/0x70
? __pm_runtime_resume+0x7d/0x110
ethnl_set_features+0x32d/0xa20
To fix this problem, it uses rhashtable_lookup_fast() instead of
rhashtable_lookup() with rcu_read_lock().
Using xa without rcu_read_lock() here is safe.
xa is freed by __xdp_mem_allocator_rcu_free() and this is called by
call_rcu() of mem_xa_remove().
The mem_xa_remove() is called by page_pool_destroy() if a reference
count reaches 0.
The xa is already protected by the reference count mechanism well in the
control plane.
So removing rcu_read_lock() for page_pool_destroy() is safe.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-42317

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/huge_memory: avoid PMD-size page cache if needed
xarray can't support arbitrary page cache size. the largest and supported
page cache size is defined as MAX_PAGECACHE_ORDER by commit 099d90642a71
("mm/filemap: make MAX_PAGECACHE_ORDER acceptable to xarray"). However,
it's possible to have 512MB page cache in the huge memory's collapsing
path on ARM64 system whose base page size is 64KB. 512MB page cache is
breaking the limitation and a warning is raised when the xarray entry is
split as shown in the following example.
[root@dhcp-10-26-1-207 ~]# cat /proc/1/smaps | grep KernelPageSize
KernelPageSize: 64 kB
[root@dhcp-10-26-1-207 ~]# cat /tmp/test.c
:
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
const char *filename = TEST_XFS_FILENAME;
int fd = 0;
void *buf = (void *)-1, *p;
int pgsize = getpagesize();
int ret = 0;
if (pgsize != 0x10000) {
fprintf(stdout, "System with 64KB base page size is required!\n");
return -EPERM;
}
system("echo 0 > /sys/devices/virtual/bdi/253:0/read_ahead_kb");
system("echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches");
/* Open the xfs file */
fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
assert(fd > 0);
/* Create VMA */
buf = mmap(NULL, TEST_MEM_SIZE, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
assert(buf != (void *)-1);
fprintf(stdout, "mapped buffer at 0x%p\n", buf);
/* Populate VMA */
ret = madvise(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE, MADV_NOHUGEPAGE);
assert(ret == 0);
ret = madvise(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE, MADV_POPULATE_READ);
assert(ret == 0);
/* Collapse VMA */
ret = madvise(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE, MADV_HUGEPAGE);
assert(ret == 0);
ret = madvise(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE, MADV_COLLAPSE);
if (ret) {
fprintf(stdout, "Error %d to madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE)\n", errno);
goto out;
}
/* Split xarray entry. Write permission is needed */
munmap(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE);
buf = (void *)-1;
close(fd);
fd = open(filename, O_RDWR);
assert(fd > 0);
fallocate(fd, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE | FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE,
TEST_MEM_SIZE - pgsize, pgsize);
out:
if (buf != (void *)-1)
munmap(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE);
if (fd > 0)
close(fd);
return ret;
}
[root@dhcp-10-26-1-207 ~]# gcc /tmp/test.c -o /tmp/test
[root@dhcp-10-26-1-207 ~]# /tmp/test
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 25 PID: 7560 at lib/xarray.c:1025 xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib \
nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct \
nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 \
ip_set rfkill nf_tables nfnetlink vfat fat virtio_balloon drm fuse \
xfs libcrc32c crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 virtio_net \
sha1_ce net_failover virtio_blk virtio_console failover dimlib virtio_mmio
CPU: 25 PID: 7560 Comm: test Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-gavin+ #9
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20240524-1.el9 05/24/2024
pstate: 83400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
lr : split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x1c4/0x780
sp : ffff8000ac32f660
x29: ffff8000ac32f660 x28: ffff0000e0969eb0 x27: ffff8000ac32f6c0
x26: 0000000000000c40 x25: ffff0000e0969eb0 x24: 000000000000000d
x23: ffff8000ac32f6c0 x22: ffffffdfc0700000 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffffdfc0700000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffd5f3708ffc70 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: ffffffffffffffc0 x10: 0000000000000040 x9 : ffffd5f3708e692c
x8 : 0000000000000003 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff0000e0969eb8
x5 : ffffd5f37289e378 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000c40
x2 : 000000000000000d x1 : 000000000000000c x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x1c4/0x780
truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xdc/0x160
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x1b4/0x4a8
truncate_pagecache_range+0x84/0xa
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-42294

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: fix deadlock between sd_remove & sd_release
Our test report the following hung task:
[ 2538.459400] INFO: task "kworker/0:0":7 blocked for more than 188 seconds.
[ 2538.459427] Call trace:
[ 2538.459430] __switch_to+0x174/0x338
[ 2538.459436] __schedule+0x628/0x9c4
[ 2538.459442] schedule+0x7c/0xe8
[ 2538.459447] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x24/0x40
[ 2538.459453] __mutex_lock+0x3ec/0xf04
[ 2538.459456] __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x14/0x24
[ 2538.459459] mutex_lock+0x30/0xd8
[ 2538.459462] del_gendisk+0xdc/0x350
[ 2538.459466] sd_remove+0x30/0x60
[ 2538.459470] device_release_driver_internal+0x1c4/0x2c4
[ 2538.459474] device_release_driver+0x18/0x28
[ 2538.459478] bus_remove_device+0x15c/0x174
[ 2538.459483] device_del+0x1d0/0x358
[ 2538.459488] __scsi_remove_device+0xa8/0x198
[ 2538.459493] scsi_forget_host+0x50/0x70
[ 2538.459497] scsi_remove_host+0x80/0x180
[ 2538.459502] usb_stor_disconnect+0x68/0xf4
[ 2538.459506] usb_unbind_interface+0xd4/0x280
[ 2538.459510] device_release_driver_internal+0x1c4/0x2c4
[ 2538.459514] device_release_driver+0x18/0x28
[ 2538.459518] bus_remove_device+0x15c/0x174
[ 2538.459523] device_del+0x1d0/0x358
[ 2538.459528] usb_disable_device+0x84/0x194
[ 2538.459532] usb_disconnect+0xec/0x300
[ 2538.459537] hub_event+0xb80/0x1870
[ 2538.459541] process_scheduled_works+0x248/0x4dc
[ 2538.459545] worker_thread+0x244/0x334
[ 2538.459549] kthread+0x114/0x1bc
[ 2538.461001] INFO: task "fsck.":15415 blocked for more than 188 seconds.
[ 2538.461014] Call trace:
[ 2538.461016] __switch_to+0x174/0x338
[ 2538.461021] __schedule+0x628/0x9c4
[ 2538.461025] schedule+0x7c/0xe8
[ 2538.461030] blk_queue_enter+0xc4/0x160
[ 2538.461034] blk_mq_alloc_request+0x120/0x1d4
[ 2538.461037] scsi_execute_cmd+0x7c/0x23c
[ 2538.461040] ioctl_internal_command+0x5c/0x164
[ 2538.461046] scsi_set_medium_removal+0x5c/0xb0
[ 2538.461051] sd_release+0x50/0x94
[ 2538.461054] blkdev_put+0x190/0x28c
[ 2538.461058] blkdev_release+0x28/0x40
[ 2538.461063] __fput+0xf8/0x2a8
[ 2538.461066] __fput_sync+0x28/0x5c
[ 2538.461070] __arm64_sys_close+0x84/0xe8
[ 2538.461073] invoke_syscall+0x58/0x114
[ 2538.461078] el0_svc_common+0xac/0xe0
[ 2538.461082] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
[ 2538.461087] el0_svc+0x38/0x68
[ 2538.461090] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xbc
[ 2538.461093] el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1ac
T1:T2:
sd_remove
del_gendisk
__blk_mark_disk_dead
blk_freeze_queue_start
++q->mq_freeze_depth
bdev_release
mutex_lock(&disk->open_mutex)
sd_release
scsi_execute_cmd
blk_queue_enter
wait_event(!q->mq_freeze_depth)
mutex_lock(&disk->open_mutex)
SCSI does not set GD_OWNS_QUEUE, so QUEUE_FLAG_DYING is not set in
this scenario. This is a classic ABBA deadlock. To fix the deadlock,
make sure we don't try to acquire disk->open_mutex after freezing
the queue.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-42241

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/shmem: disable PMD-sized page cache if needed
For shmem files, it's possible that PMD-sized page cache can't be
supported by xarray. For example, 512MB page cache on ARM64 when the base
page size is 64KB can't be supported by xarray. It leads to errors as the
following messages indicate when this sort of xarray entry is split.
WARNING: CPU: 34 PID: 7578 at lib/xarray.c:1025 xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
Modules linked in: binfmt_misc nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 \
nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject \
nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 \
ip_set rfkill nf_tables nfnetlink vfat fat virtio_balloon drm fuse xfs \
libcrc32c crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce virtio_net \
net_failover virtio_console virtio_blk failover dimlib virtio_mmio
CPU: 34 PID: 7578 Comm: test Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc5-gavin+ #9
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20240524-1.el9 05/24/2024
pstate: 83400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
lr : split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x1c4/0x720
sp : ffff8000882af5f0
x29: ffff8000882af5f0 x28: ffff8000882af650 x27: ffff8000882af768
x26: 0000000000000cc0 x25: 000000000000000d x24: ffff00010625b858
x23: ffff8000882af650 x22: ffffffdfc0900000 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffffdfc0900000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000018000000000 x15: 52f8004000000000
x14: 0000e00000000000 x13: 0000000000002000 x12: 0000000000000020
x11: 52f8000000000000 x10: 52f8e1c0ffff6000 x9 : ffffbeb9619a681c
x8 : 0000000000000003 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff00010b02ddb0
x5 : ffffbeb96395e378 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000cc0
x2 : 000000000000000d x1 : 000000000000000c x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x1c4/0x720
truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xdc/0x160
shmem_undo_range+0x2bc/0x6a8
shmem_fallocate+0x134/0x430
vfs_fallocate+0x124/0x2e8
ksys_fallocate+0x4c/0xa0
__arm64_sys_fallocate+0x24/0x38
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x7c/0xd8
do_el0_svc+0xb4/0xd0
el0_svc+0x44/0x1d8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x134/0x150
el0t_64_sync+0x17c/0x180
Fix it by disabling PMD-sized page cache when HPAGE_PMD_ORDER is larger
than MAX_PAGECACHE_ORDER. As Matthew Wilcox pointed, the page cache in a
shmem file isn't represented by a multi-index entry and doesn't have this
limitation when the xarry entry is split until commit 6b24ca4a1a8d ("mm:
Use multi-index entries in the page cache").

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-42239

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fail bpf_timer_cancel when callback is being cancelled
Given a schedule:
timer1 cbtimer2 cb
bpf_timer_cancel(timer2);bpf_timer_cancel(timer1);
Both bpf_timer_cancel calls would wait for the other callback to finish
executing, introducing a lockup.
Add an atomic_t count named 'cancelling' in bpf_hrtimer. This keeps
track of all in-flight cancellation requests for a given BPF timer.
Whenever cancelling a BPF timer, we must check if we have outstanding
cancellation requests, and if so, we must fail the operation with an
error (-EDEADLK) since cancellation is synchronous and waits for the
callback to finish executing. This implies that we can enter a deadlock
situation involving two or more timer callbacks executing in parallel
and attempting to cancel one another.
Note that we avoid incrementing the cancelling counter for the target
timer (the one being cancelled) if bpf_timer_cancel is not invoked from
a callback, to avoid spurious errors. The whole point of detecting
cur->cancelling and returning -EDEADLK is to not enter a busy wait loop
(which may or may not lead to a lockup). This does not apply in case the
caller is in a non-callback context, the other side can continue to
cancel as it sees fit without running into errors.
Background on prior attempts:
Earlier versions of this patch used a bool 'cancelling' bit and used the
following pattern under timer->lock to publish cancellation status.
lock(t->lock);
t->cancelling = true;
mb();
if (cur->cancelling)
return -EDEADLK;
unlock(t->lock);
hrtimer_cancel(t->timer);
t->cancelling = false;
The store outside the critical section could overwrite a parallel
requests t->cancelling assignment to true, to ensure the parallely
executing callback observes its cancellation status.
It would be necessary to clear this cancelling bit once hrtimer_cancel
is done, but lack of serialization introduced races. Another option was
explored where bpf_timer_start would clear the bit when (re)starting the
timer under timer->lock. This would ensure serialized access to the
cancelling bit, but may allow it to be cleared before in-flight
hrtimer_cancel has finished executing, such that lockups can occur
again.
Thus, we choose an atomic counter to keep track of all outstanding
cancellation requests and use it to prevent lockups in case callbacks
attempt to cancel each other while executing in parallel.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-42148

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnx2x: Fix multiple UBSAN array-index-out-of-bounds
Fix UBSAN warnings that occur when using a system with 32 physical
cpu cores or more, or when the user defines a number of Ethernet
queues greater than or equal to FP_SB_MAX_E1x using the num_queues
module parameter.
Currently there is a read/write out of bounds that occurs on the array
"struct stats_query_entry query" present inside the "bnx2x_fw_stats_req"
struct in "drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x.h".
Looking at the definition of the "struct stats_query_entry query" array:
struct stats_query_entry query[FP_SB_MAX_E1x+
BNX2X_FIRST_QUEUE_QUERY_IDX];
FP_SB_MAX_E1x is defined as the maximum number of fast path interrupts and
has a value of 16, while BNX2X_FIRST_QUEUE_QUERY_IDX has a value of 3
meaning the array has a total size of 19.
Since accesses to "struct stats_query_entry query" are offset-ted by
BNX2X_FIRST_QUEUE_QUERY_IDX, that means that the total number of Ethernet
queues should not exceed FP_SB_MAX_E1x (16). However one of these queues
is reserved for FCOE and thus the number of Ethernet queues should be set
to [FP_SB_MAX_E1x -1] (15) if FCOE is enabled or [FP_SB_MAX_E1x] (16) if
it is not.
This is also described in a comment in the source code in
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x.h just above the Macro definition
of FP_SB_MAX_E1x. Below is the part of this explanation that it important
for this patch
/*
* The total number of L2 queues, MSIX vectors and HW contexts (CIDs) is
* control by the number of fast-path status blocks supported by the
* device (HW/FW). Each fast-path status block (FP-SB) aka non-default
* status block represents an independent interrupts context that can
* serve a regular L2 networking queue. However special L2 queues such
* as the FCoE queue do not require a FP-SB and other components like
* the CNIC may consume FP-SB reducing the number of possible L2 queues
*
* If the maximum number of FP-SB available is X then:
* a. If CNIC is supported it consumes 1 FP-SB thus the max number of
* regular L2 queues is Y=X-1
* b. In MF mode the actual number of L2 queues is Y= (X-1/MF_factor)
* c. If the FCoE L2 queue is supported the actual number of L2 queues
* is Y+1
* d. The number of irqs (MSIX vectors) is either Y+1 (one extra for
* slow-path interrupts) or Y+2 if CNIC is supported (one additional
* FP interrupt context for the CNIC).
* e. The number of HW context (CID count) is always X or X+1 if FCoE
* L2 queue is supported. The cid for the FCoE L2 queue is always X.
*/
However this driver also supports NICs that use the E2 controller which can
handle more queues due to having more FP-SB represented by FP_SB_MAX_E2.
Looking at the commits when the E2 support was added, it was originally
using the E1x parameters: commit f2e0899f0f27 ("bnx2x: Add 57712 support").
Back then FP_SB_MAX_E2 was set to 16 the same as E1x. However the driver
was later updated to take full advantage of the E2 instead of having it be
limited to the capabilities of the E1x. But as far as we can tell, the
array "stats_query_entry query" was still limited to using the FP-SB
available to the E1x cards as part of an oversignt when the driver was
updated to take full advantage of the E2, and now with the driver being
aware of the greater queue size supported by E2 NICs, it causes the UBSAN
warnings seen in the stack traces below.
This patch increases the size of the "stats_query_entry query" array by
replacing FP_SB_MAX_E1x with FP_SB_MAX_E2 to be large enough to handle
both types of NICs.
Stack traces:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_stats.c:1529:11
index 20 is out of range for type 'stats_query_entry [19]'
CPU: 12 PID: 858 Comm: systemd-network Not tainted 6.9.0-060900rc7-generic
#202405052133
Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-42106

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet_diag: Initialize pad field in struct inet_diag_req_v2
KMSAN reported uninit-value access in raw_lookup() [1]. Diag for raw
sockets uses the pad field in struct inet_diag_req_v2 for the
underlying protocol. This field corresponds to the sdiag_raw_protocol
field in struct inet_diag_req_raw.
inet_diag_get_exact_compat() converts inet_diag_req to
inet_diag_req_v2, but leaves the pad field uninitialized. So the issue
occurs when raw_lookup() accesses the sdiag_raw_protocol field.
Fix this by initializing the pad field in
inet_diag_get_exact_compat(). Also, do the same fix in
inet_diag_dump_compat() to avoid the similar issue in the future.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in raw_lookup net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:49 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in raw_sock_get+0x657/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71
raw_lookup net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:49 [inline]
raw_sock_get+0x657/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71
raw_diag_dump_one+0xa1/0x660 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:99
inet_diag_cmd_exact+0x7d9/0x980
inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1404 [inline]
inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x469/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426
sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282
netlink_rcv_skb+0x537/0x670 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564
sock_diag_rcv+0x35/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:297
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xe74/0x1240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361
netlink_sendmsg+0x10c6/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x7f0/0xb70 net/socket.c:2585
___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2639
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2668 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2677 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2675 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x27e/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2675
x64_sys_call+0x135e/0x3ce0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Uninit was stored to memory at:
raw_sock_get+0x650/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71
raw_diag_dump_one+0xa1/0x660 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:99
inet_diag_cmd_exact+0x7d9/0x980
inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1404 [inline]
inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x469/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426
sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282
netlink_rcv_skb+0x537/0x670 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564
sock_diag_rcv+0x35/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:297
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xe74/0x1240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361
netlink_sendmsg+0x10c6/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x7f0/0xb70 net/socket.c:2585
___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2639
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2668 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2677 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2675 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x27e/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2675
x64_sys_call+0x135e/0x3ce0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Local variable req.i created at:
inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1396 [inline]
inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x2a6/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426
sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282
CPU: 1 PID: 8888 Comm: syz-executor.6 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc4-00217-g35bb670d65fc #32
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-42083

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ionic: fix kernel panic due to multi-buffer handling
Currently, the ionic_run_xdp() doesn't handle multi-buffer packets
properly for XDP_TX and XDP_REDIRECT.
When a jumbo frame is received, the ionic_run_xdp() first makes xdp
frame with all necessary pages in the rx descriptor.
And if the action is either XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT, it should unmap
dma-mapping and reset page pointer to NULL for all pages, not only the
first page.
But it doesn't for SG pages. So, SG pages unexpectedly will be reused.
It eventually causes kernel panic.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x504f4e4dbebc64ff: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3+ #25
RIP: 0010:xdp_return_frame+0x42/0x90
Code: 01 75 12 5b 4c 89 e6 5d 31 c9 41 5c 31 d2 41 5d e9 73 fd ff ff 44 8b 6b 20 0f b7 43 0a 49 81 ed 68 01 00 00 49 29 c5 49 01 fd <41> 80 7d0
RSP: 0018:ffff99d00122ce08 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000005453 RBX: ffff8d325f904000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 00000000670e1000 RSI: 000000011f90d000 RDI: 504f4e4d4c4b4a49
RBP: ffff99d003907740 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 000000011f90d000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8d325f904010
R13: 504f4e4dbebc64fd R14: ffff8d3242b070c8 R15: ffff99d0039077c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d399f780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f41f6c85e38 CR3: 000000037ac30000 CR4: 00000000007506f0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? die_addr+0x33/0x90
? exc_general_protection+0x251/0x2f0
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
? xdp_return_frame+0x42/0x90
ionic_tx_clean+0x211/0x280 [ionic 15881354510e6a9c655c59c54812b319ed2cd015]
ionic_tx_cq_service+0xd3/0x210 [ionic 15881354510e6a9c655c59c54812b319ed2cd015]
ionic_txrx_napi+0x41/0x1b0 [ionic 15881354510e6a9c655c59c54812b319ed2cd015]
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0x29/0x1b0
net_rx_action+0x2c4/0x350
handle_softirqs+0xf4/0x320
irq_exit_rcu+0x78/0xa0
common_interrupt+0x77/0x90

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-42076

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: can: j1939: Initialize unused data in j1939_send_one()
syzbot reported kernel-infoleak in raw_recvmsg() [1]. j1939_send_one()
creates full frame including unused data, but it doesn't initialize
it. This causes the kernel-infoleak issue. Fix this by initializing
unused data.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x366/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:185
instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline]
iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline]
iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline]
iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline]
_copy_to_iter+0x366/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:185
copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:196 [inline]
memcpy_to_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:4113 [inline]
raw_recvmsg+0x2b8/0x9e0 net/can/raw.c:1008
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x340 net/socket.c:1068
____sys_recvmsg+0x18a/0x620 net/socket.c:2803
___sys_recvmsg+0x223/0x840 net/socket.c:2845
do_recvmmsg+0x4fc/0xfd0 net/socket.c:2939
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x397/0x490 net/socket.c:3034
x64_sys_call+0xf6c/0x3b50 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:300
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3804 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3845 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x613/0xc50 mm/slub.c:3888
kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:577
__alloc_skb+0x35b/0x7a0 net/core/skbuff.c:668
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1313 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbf0 net/core/skbuff.c:6504
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa81/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2795
sock_alloc_send_skb include/net/sock.h:1842 [inline]
j1939_sk_alloc_skb net/can/j1939/socket.c:878 [inline]
j1939_sk_send_loop net/can/j1939/socket.c:1142 [inline]
j1939_sk_sendmsg+0xc0a/0x2730 net/can/j1939/socket.c:1277
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x877/0xb60 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2674
x64_sys_call+0xc4b/0x3b50 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Bytes 12-15 of 16 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 16 starts at ffff888120969690
Data copied to user address 00000000200017c0
CPU: 1 PID: 5050 Comm: syz-executor198 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00031-g71b1543c83d6 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-41045

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Defer work in bpf_timer_cancel_and_free
Currently, the same case as previous patch (two timer callbacks trying
to cancel each other) can be invoked through bpf_map_update_elem as
well, or more precisely, freeing map elements containing timers. Since
this relies on hrtimer_cancel as well, it is prone to the same deadlock
situation as the previous patch.
It would be sufficient to use hrtimer_try_to_cancel to fix this problem,
as the timer cannot be enqueued after async_cancel_and_free. Once
async_cancel_and_free has been done, the timer must be reinitialized
before it can be armed again. The callback running in parallel trying to
arm the timer will fail, and freeing bpf_hrtimer without waiting is
sufficient (given kfree_rcu), and bpf_timer_cb will return
HRTIMER_NORESTART, preventing the timer from being rearmed again.
However, there exists a UAF scenario where the callback arms the timer
before entering this function, such that if cancellation fails (due to
timer callback invoking this routine, or the target timer callback
running concurrently). In such a case, if the timer expiration is
significantly far in the future, the RCU grace period expiration
happening before it will free the bpf_hrtimer state and along with it
the struct hrtimer, that is enqueued.
Hence, it is clear cancellation needs to occur after
async_cancel_and_free, and yet it cannot be done inline due to deadlock
issues. We thus modify bpf_timer_cancel_and_free to defer work to the
global workqueue, adding a work_struct alongside rcu_head (both used at
_different_ points of time, so can share space).
Update existing code comments to reflect the new state of affairs.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-41031

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/filemap: skip to create PMD-sized page cache if needed
On ARM64, HPAGE_PMD_ORDER is 13 when the base page size is 64KB. The
PMD-sized page cache can't be supported by xarray as the following error
messages indicate.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 35 PID: 7484 at lib/xarray.c:1025 xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib \
nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct \
nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 \
ip_set rfkill nf_tables nfnetlink vfat fat virtio_balloon drm \
fuse xfs libcrc32c crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 \
sha1_ce virtio_net net_failover virtio_console virtio_blk failover \
dimlib virtio_mmio
CPU: 35 PID: 7484 Comm: test Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc5-gavin+ #9
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20240524-1.el9 05/24/2024
pstate: 83400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
lr : split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x1c4/0x720
sp : ffff800087a4f6c0
x29: ffff800087a4f6c0 x28: ffff800087a4f720 x27: 000000001fffffff
x26: 0000000000000c40 x25: 000000000000000d x24: ffff00010625b858
x23: ffff800087a4f720 x22: ffffffdfc0780000 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffffdfc0780000 x18: 000000001ff40000
x17: 00000000ffffffff x16: 0000018000000000 x15: 51ec004000000000
x14: 0000e00000000000 x13: 0000000000002000 x12: 0000000000000020
x11: 51ec000000000000 x10: 51ece1c0ffff8000 x9 : ffffbeb961a44d28
x8 : 0000000000000003 x7 : ffffffdfc0456420 x6 : ffff0000e1aa6eb8
x5 : 20bf08b4fe778fca x4 : ffffffdfc0456420 x3 : 0000000000000c40
x2 : 000000000000000d x1 : 000000000000000c x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x1c4/0x720
truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xdc/0x160
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x1b4/0x4a8
truncate_pagecache_range+0x84/0xa0
xfs_flush_unmap_range+0x70/0x90 [xfs]
xfs_file_fallocate+0xfc/0x4d8 [xfs]
vfs_fallocate+0x124/0x2e8
ksys_fallocate+0x4c/0xa0
__arm64_sys_fallocate+0x24/0x38
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x7c/0xd8
do_el0_svc+0xb4/0xd0
el0_svc+0x44/0x1d8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x134/0x150
el0t_64_sync+0x17c/0x180
Fix it by skipping to allocate PMD-sized page cache when its size is
larger than MAX_PAGECACHE_ORDER. For this specific case, we will fall to
regular path where the readahead window is determined by BDI's sysfs file
(read_ahead_kb).

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-41010

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix too early release of tcx_entry
Pedro Pinto and later independently also Hyunwoo Kim and Wongi Lee reported
an issue that the tcx_entry can be released too early leading to a use
after free (UAF) when an active old-style ingress or clsact qdisc with a
shared tc block is later replaced by another ingress or clsact instance.
Essentially, the sequence to trigger the UAF (one example) can be as follows:
1. A network namespace is created
2. An ingress qdisc is created. This allocates a tcx_entry, and
&tcx_entry->miniq is stored in the qdisc's miniqp->p_miniq. At the
same time, a tcf block with index 1 is created.
3. chain0 is attached to the tcf block. chain0 must be connected to
the block linked to the ingress qdisc to later reach the function
tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del() which triggers the UAF.
4. Create and graft a clsact qdisc. This causes the ingress qdisc
created in step 1 to be removed, thus freeing the previously linked
tcx_entry:
rtnetlink_rcv_msg()
=> tc_modify_qdisc()
=> qdisc_create()
=> clsact_init() [a]
=> qdisc_graft()
=> qdisc_destroy()
=> __qdisc_destroy()
=> ingress_destroy() [b]
=> tcx_entry_free()
=> kfree_rcu() // tcx_entry freed
5. Finally, the network namespace is closed. This registers the
cleanup_net worker, and during the process of releasing the
remaining clsact qdisc, it accesses the tcx_entry that was
already freed in step 4, causing the UAF to occur:
cleanup_net()
=> ops_exit_list()
=> default_device_exit_batch()
=> unregister_netdevice_many()
=> unregister_netdevice_many_notify()
=> dev_shutdown()
=> qdisc_put()
=> clsact_destroy() [c]
=> tcf_block_put_ext()
=> tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del()
=> tcf_chain_head_change_item()
=> clsact_chain_head_change()
=> mini_qdisc_pair_swap() // UAF
There are also other variants, the gist is to add an ingress (or clsact)
qdisc with a specific shared block, then to replace that qdisc, waiting
for the tcx_entry kfree_rcu() to be executed and subsequently accessing
the current active qdisc's miniq one way or another.
The correct fix is to turn the miniq_active boolean into a counter. What
can be observed, at step 2 above, the counter transitions from 0->1, at
step [a] from 1->2 (in order for the miniq object to remain active during
the replacement), then in [b] from 2->1 and finally [c] 1->0 with the
eventual release. The reference counter in general ranges from [0,2] and
it does not need to be atomic since all access to the counter is protected
by the rtnl mutex. With this in place, there is no longer a UAF happening
and the tcx_entry is freed at the correct time.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-39500

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sock_map: avoid race between sock_map_close and sk_psock_put
sk_psock_get will return NULL if the refcount of psock has gone to 0, which
will happen when the last call of sk_psock_put is done. However,
sk_psock_drop may not have finished yet, so the close callback will still
point to sock_map_close despite psock being NULL.
This can be reproduced with a thread deleting an element from the sock map,
while the second one creates a socket, adds it to the map and closes it.
That will trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7220 at net/core/sock_map.c:1701 sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 7220 Comm: syz-executor380 Not tainted 6.9.0-syzkaller-07726-g3c999d1ae3c7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
RIP: 0010:sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701
Code: df e8 92 29 88 f8 48 8b 1b 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 79 29 88 f8 4c 8b 23 eb 89 e8 4f 15 23 f8 90 <0f> 0b 90 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 13 26 3d 02
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000441fda8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff89731ae1 RBX: ffffffff94b87540 RCX: ffff888029470000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8bcab5c0 RDI: ffffffff8c1faba0
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff92f9b61f R09: 1ffffffff25f36c3
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff25f36c4 R12: ffffffff89731840
R13: ffff88804b587000 R14: ffff88804b587000 R15: ffffffff89731870
FS: 000055555e080380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000207d4000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
unix_release+0x87/0xc0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048
__sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
sock_close+0xbe/0x240 net/socket.c:1421
__fput+0x42b/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422
__do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline]
__se_sys_close fs/open.c:1541 [inline]
__x64_sys_close+0x7f/0x110 fs/open.c:1541
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fb37d618070
Code: 00 00 48 c7 c2 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb d4 e8 10 2c 00 00 80 3d 31 f0 07 00 00 74 17 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 48 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c
RSP: 002b:00007ffcd4a525d8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007fb37d618070
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000100000000 R09: 0000000100000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Use sk_psock, which will only check that the pointer is not been set to
NULL yet, which should only happen after the callbacks are restored. If,
then, a reference can still be gotten, we may call sk_psock_stop and cancel
psock->work.
As suggested by Paolo Abeni, reorder the condition so the control flow is
less convoluted.
After that change, the reproducer does not trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE
anymore.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-36013

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix slab-use-after-free in l2cap_connect()
Extend a critical section to prevent chan from early freeing.
Also make the l2cap_connect() return type void. Nothing is using the
returned value but it is ugly to return a potentially freed pointer.
Making it void will help with backports because earlier kernels did use
the return value. Now the compile will break for kernels where this
patch is not a complete fix.
Call stack summary:
[use]
l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd
l2cap_connect
┌ mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock);
│ chan = pchan->ops->new_connection(pchan); <- alloc chan
│ __l2cap_chan_add(conn, chan);
│ l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
│ list_add(&chan->list, &conn->chan_l); ... (1)
└ mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock);
chan->conf_state ... (4) <- use after free
[free]
l2cap_conn_del
┌ mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock);
│ foreach chan in conn->chan_l: ... (2)
│ l2cap_chan_put(chan);
│ l2cap_chan_destroy
│ kfree(chan) ... (3) <- chan freed
└ mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock);
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read
include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _test_bit
include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in l2cap_connect+0xa67/0x11a0
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4260
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810bf040a0 by task kworker/u3:1/311

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35980

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: tlb: Fix TLBI RANGE operand
KVM/arm64 relies on TLBI RANGE feature to flush TLBs when the dirty
pages are collected by VMM and the page table entries become write
protected during live migration. Unfortunately, the operand passed
to the TLBI RANGE instruction isn't correctly sorted out due to the
commit 117940aa6e5f ("KVM: arm64: Define kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range()").
It leads to crash on the destination VM after live migration because
TLBs aren't flushed completely and some of the dirty pages are missed.
For example, I have a VM where 8GB memory is assigned, starting from
0x40000000 (1GB). Note that the host has 4KB as the base page size.
In the middile of migration, kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range() is executed
to flush TLBs. It passes MAX_TLBI_RANGE_PAGES as the argument to
__kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range() and __flush_s2_tlb_range_op(). SCALE#3
and NUM#31, corresponding to MAX_TLBI_RANGE_PAGES, isn't supported
by __TLBI_RANGE_NUM(). In this specific case, -1 has been returned
from __TLBI_RANGE_NUM() for SCALE#3/2/1/0 and rejected by the loop
in the __flush_tlb_range_op() until the variable @scale underflows
and becomes -9, 0xffff708000040000 is set as the operand. The operand
is wrong since it's sorted out by __TLBI_VADDR_RANGE() according to
invalid @scale and @num.
Fix it by extending __TLBI_RANGE_NUM() to support the combination of
SCALE#3 and NUM#31. With the changes, [-1 31] instead of [-1 30] can
be returned from the macro, meaning the TLBs for 0x200000 pages in the
above example can be flushed in one shoot with SCALE#3 and NUM#31. The
macro TLBI_RANGE_MASK is dropped since no one uses it any more. The
comments are also adjusted accordingly.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35929

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rcu/nocb: Fix WARN_ON_ONCE() in the rcu_nocb_bypass_lock()
For the kernels built with CONFIG_RCU_NOCB_CPU_DEFAULT_ALL=y and
CONFIG_RCU_LAZY=y, the following scenarios will trigger WARN_ON_ONCE()
in the rcu_nocb_bypass_lock() and rcu_nocb_wait_contended() functions:
CPU2 CPU11
kthread
rcu_nocb_cb_kthread ksys_write
rcu_do_batch vfs_write
rcu_torture_timer_cb proc_sys_write
__kmem_cache_free proc_sys_call_handler
kmemleak_free drop_caches_sysctl_handler
delete_object_full drop_slab
__delete_object shrink_slab
put_object lazy_rcu_shrink_scan
call_rcu rcu_nocb_flush_bypass
__call_rcu_commn rcu_nocb_bypass_lock
raw_spin_trylock(&rdp->nocb_bypass_lock) fail
atomic_inc(&rdp->nocb_lock_contended);
rcu_nocb_wait_contended WARN_ON_ONCE(smp_processor_id() != rdp->cpu);
WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&rdp->nocb_lock_contended)) |
|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _same rdp and rdp->cpu != 11_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __|
Reproduce this bug with "echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches".
This commit therefore uses rcu_nocb_try_flush_bypass() instead of
rcu_nocb_flush_bypass() in lazy_rcu_shrink_scan(). If the nocb_bypass
queue is being flushed, then rcu_nocb_try_flush_bypass will return
directly.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35803

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/efistub: Call mixed mode boot services on the firmware's stack
Normally, the EFI stub calls into the EFI boot services using the stack
that was live when the stub was entered. According to the UEFI spec,
this stack needs to be at least 128k in size - this might seem large but
all asynchronous processing and event handling in EFI runs from the same
stack and so quite a lot of space may be used in practice.
In mixed mode, the situation is a bit different: the bootloader calls
the 32-bit EFI stub entry point, which calls the decompressor's 32-bit
entry point, where the boot stack is set up, using a fixed allocation
of 16k. This stack is still in use when the EFI stub is started in
64-bit mode, and so all calls back into the EFI firmware will be using
the decompressor's limited boot stack.
Due to the placement of the boot stack right after the boot heap, any
stack overruns have gone unnoticed. However, commit
5c4feadb0011983b ("x86/decompressor: Move global symbol references to C code")
moved the definition of the boot heap into C code, and now the boot
stack is placed right at the base of BSS, where any overruns will
corrupt the end of the .data section.
While it would be possible to work around this by increasing the size of
the boot stack, doing so would affect all x86 systems, and mixed mode
systems are a tiny (and shrinking) fraction of the x86 installed base.
So instead, record the firmware stack pointer value when entering from
the 32-bit firmware, and switch to this stack every time a EFI boot
service call is made.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-27031

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFS: Fix nfs_netfs_issue_read() xarray locking for writeback interrupt
The loop inside nfs_netfs_issue_read() currently does not disable
interrupts while iterating through pages in the xarray to submit
for NFS read. This is not safe though since after taking xa_lock,
another page in the mapping could be processed for writeback inside
an interrupt, and deadlock can occur. The fix is simple and clean
if we use xa_for_each_range(), which handles the iteration with RCU
while reducing code complexity.
The problem is easily reproduced with the following test:
mount -o vers=3,fsc 127.0.0.1:/export /mnt/nfs
dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/nfs/file1.bin bs=4096 count=1
echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
dd if=/mnt/nfs/file1.bin of=/dev/null
umount /mnt/nfs
On the console with a lockdep-enabled kernel a message similar to
the following will be seen:
================================
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
6.7.0-lockdbg+ #10 Not tainted
--------------------------------
inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage.
test5/1708 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
ffff888127baa598 (&xa->xa_lock#4){+.?.}-{3:3}, at:
nfs_netfs_issue_read+0x1b2/0x4b0 [nfs]
{IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:
lock_acquire+0x144/0x380
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4e/0xa0
__folio_end_writeback+0x17e/0x5c0
folio_end_writeback+0x93/0x1b0
iomap_finish_ioend+0xeb/0x6a0
blk_update_request+0x204/0x7f0
blk_mq_end_request+0x30/0x1c0
blk_complete_reqs+0x7e/0xa0
__do_softirq+0x113/0x544
__irq_exit_rcu+0xfe/0x120
irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20
sysvec_call_function_single+0x6f/0x90
asm_sysvec_call_function_single+0x1a/0x20
pv_native_safe_halt+0xf/0x20
default_idle+0x9/0x20
default_idle_call+0x67/0xa0
do_idle+0x2b5/0x300
cpu_startup_entry+0x34/0x40
start_secondary+0x19d/0x1c0
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x18f/0x19b
irq event stamp: 176891
hardirqs last enabled at (176891): [<ffffffffa67a0be4>]
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60
hardirqs last disabled at (176890): [<ffffffffa67a0899>]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x79/0xa0
softirqs last enabled at (176646): [<ffffffffa515d91e>]
__irq_exit_rcu+0xfe/0x120
softirqs last disabled at (176633): [<ffffffffa515d91e>]
__irq_exit_rcu+0xfe/0x120
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&xa->xa_lock#4);
<Interrupt>
lock(&xa->xa_lock#4);
*** DEADLOCK ***
2 locks held by test5/1708:
#0: ffff888127baa498 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#22){++++}-{4:4}, at:
nfs_start_io_read+0x28/0x90 [nfs]
#1: ffff888127baa650 (mapping.invalidate_lock#3){.+.+}-{4:4}, at:
page_cache_ra_unbounded+0xa4/0x280
stack backtrace:
CPU: 6 PID: 1708 Comm: test5 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.7.0-lockdbg+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39
04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x90
mark_lock+0xb3f/0xd20
__lock_acquire+0x77b/0x3360
_raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x80
nfs_netfs_issue_read+0x1b2/0x4b0 [nfs]
netfs_begin_read+0x77f/0x980 [netfs]
nfs_netfs_readahead+0x45/0x60 [nfs]
nfs_readahead+0x323/0x5a0 [nfs]
read_pages+0xf3/0x5c0
page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1c8/0x280
filemap_get_pages+0x38c/0xae0
filemap_read+0x206/0x5e0
nfs_file_read+0xb7/0x140 [nfs]
vfs_read+0x2a9/0x460
ksys_read+0xb7/0x140

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26991

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/mmu: x86: Don't overflow lpage_info when checking attributes
Fix KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES to not overflow lpage_info array and trigger
KASAN splat, as seen in the private_mem_conversions_test selftest.
When memory attributes are set on a GFN range, that range will have
specific properties applied to the TDP. A huge page cannot be used when
the attributes are inconsistent, so they are disabled for those the
specific huge pages. For internal KVM reasons, huge pages are also not
allowed to span adjacent memslots regardless of whether the backing memory
could be mapped as huge.
What GFNs support which huge page sizes is tracked by an array of arrays
'lpage_info' on the memslot, of ‘kvm_lpage_info’ structs. Each index of
lpage_info contains a vmalloc allocated array of these for a specific
supported page size. The kvm_lpage_info denotes whether a specific huge
page (GFN and page size) on the memslot is supported. These arrays include
indices for unaligned head and tail huge pages.
Preventing huge pages from spanning adjacent memslot is covered by
incrementing the count in head and tail kvm_lpage_info when the memslot is
allocated, but disallowing huge pages for memory that has mixed attributes
has to be done in a more complicated way. During the
KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES ioctl KVM updates lpage_info for each memslot in
the range that has mismatched attributes. KVM does this a memslot at a
time, and marks a special bit, KVM_LPAGE_MIXED_FLAG, in the kvm_lpage_info
for any huge page. This bit is essentially a permanently elevated count.
So huge pages will not be mapped for the GFN at that page size if the
count is elevated in either case: a huge head or tail page unaligned to
the memslot or if KVM_LPAGE_MIXED_FLAG is set because it has mixed
attributes.
To determine whether a huge page has consistent attributes, the
KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES operation checks an xarray to make sure it
consistently has the incoming attribute. Since level - 1 huge pages are
aligned to level huge pages, it employs an optimization. As long as the
level - 1 huge pages are checked first, it can just check these and assume
that if each level - 1 huge page contained within the level sized huge
page is not mixed, then the level size huge page is not mixed. This
optimization happens in the helper hugepage_has_attrs().
Unfortunately, although the kvm_lpage_info array representing page size
'level' will contain an entry for an unaligned tail page of size level,
the array for level - 1 will not contain an entry for each GFN at page
size level. The level - 1 array will only contain an index for any
unaligned region covered by level - 1 huge page size, which can be a
smaller region. So this causes the optimization to overflow the level - 1
kvm_lpage_info and perform a vmalloc out of bounds read.
In some cases of head and tail pages where an overflow could happen,
callers skip the operation completely as KVM_LPAGE_MIXED_FLAG is not
required to prevent huge pages as discussed earlier. But for memslots that
are smaller than the 1GB page size, it does call hugepage_has_attrs(). In
this case the huge page is both the head and tail page. The issue can be
observed simply by compiling the kernel with CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC and
running the selftest “private_mem_conversions_test”, which produces the
output like the following:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in hugepage_has_attrs+0x7e/0x110
Read of size 4 at addr ffffc900000a3008 by task private_mem_con/169
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl
print_report
? __virt_addr_valid
? hugepage_has_attrs
? hugepage_has_attrs
kasan_report
? hugepage_has_attrs
hugepage_has_attrs
kvm_arch_post_set_memory_attributes
kvm_vm_ioctl
It is a little ambiguous whether the unaligned head page (in the bug case
also the tail page) should be expected to have KVM_LPAGE_MIXED_FLAG set.
It is not functionally required, as the unal
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26918

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: Fix active state requirement in PME polling
The commit noted in fixes added a bogus requirement that runtime PM managed
devices need to be in the RPM_ACTIVE state for PME polling. In fact, only
devices in low power states should be polled.
However there's still a requirement that the device config space must be
accessible, which has implications for both the current state of the polled
device and the parent bridge, when present. It's not sufficient to assume
the bridge remains in D0 and cases have been observed where the bridge
passes the D0 test, but the PM state indicates RPM_SUSPENDING and config
space of the polled device becomes inaccessible during pci_pme_wakeup().
Therefore, since the bridge is already effectively required to be in the
RPM_ACTIVE state, formalize this in the code and elevate the PM usage count
to maintain the state while polling the subordinate device.
This resolves a regression reported in the bugzilla below where a
Thunderbolt/USB4 hierarchy fails to scan for an attached NVMe endpoint
downstream of a bridge in a D3hot power state.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26902

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: RISCV: Fix panic on pmu overflow handler
(1 << idx) of int is not desired when setting bits in unsigned long
overflowed_ctrs, use BIT() instead. This panic happens when running
'perf record -e branches' on sophgo sg2042.
[ 273.311852] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000098
[ 273.320851] Oops [#1]
[ 273.323179] Modules linked in:
[ 273.326303] CPU: 0 PID: 1475 Comm: perf Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3+ #9
[ 273.332521] Hardware name: Sophgo Mango (DT)
[ 273.336878] epc : riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask+0x8/0x62
[ 273.342291] ra : pmu_sbi_ovf_handler+0x2e0/0x34e
[ 273.347091] epc : ffffffff80aecd98 ra : ffffffff80aee056 sp : fffffff6e36928b0
[ 273.354454] gp : ffffffff821f82d0 tp : ffffffd90c353200 t0 : 0000002ade4f9978
[ 273.361815] t1 : 0000000000504d55 t2 : ffffffff8016cd8c s0 : fffffff6e3692a70
[ 273.369180] s1 : 0000000000000020 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : 00001a8e81800000
[ 273.376540] a2 : 0000003c00070198 a3 : 0000003c00db75a4 a4 : 0000000000000015
[ 273.383901] a5 : ffffffd7ff8804b0 a6 : 0000000000000015 a7 : 000000000000002a
[ 273.391327] s2 : 000000000000ffff s3 : 0000000000000000 s4 : ffffffd7ff8803b0
[ 273.398773] s5 : 0000000000504d55 s6 : ffffffd905069800 s7 : ffffffff821fe210
[ 273.406139] s8 : 000000007fffffff s9 : ffffffd7ff8803b0 s10: ffffffd903f29098
[ 273.413660] s11: 0000000080000000 t3 : 0000000000000003 t4 : ffffffff8017a0ca
[ 273.421022] t5 : ffffffff8023cfc2 t6 : ffffffd9040780e8
[ 273.426437] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000098 cause: 000000000000000d
[ 273.434512] [<ffffffff80aecd98>] riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask+0x8/0x62
[ 273.441169] [<ffffffff80076bd8>] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x98/0x1ee
[ 273.447562] [<ffffffff80071158>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x28/0x36
[ 273.454151] [<ffffffff8047a99a>] riscv_intc_irq+0x36/0x4e
[ 273.459659] [<ffffffff80c944de>] handle_riscv_irq+0x4a/0x74
[ 273.465442] [<ffffffff80c94c48>] do_irq+0x62/0x92
[ 273.470360] Code: 0420 60a2 6402 5529 0141 8082 0013 0000 0013 0000 (6d5c) b783
[ 273.477921] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 273.482630] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26683

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: detect stuck ECSA element in probe resp
We recently added some validation that we don't try to
connect to an AP that is currently in a channel switch
process, since that might want the channel to be quiet
or we might not be able to connect in time to hear the
switching in a beacon. This was in commit c09c4f31998b
("wifi: mac80211: don't connect to an AP while it's in
a CSA process").
However, we promptly got a report that this caused new
connection failures, and it turns out that the AP that
we now cannot connect to is permanently advertising an
extended channel switch announcement, even with quiet.
The AP in question was an Asus RT-AC53, with firmware
3.0.0.4.380_10760-g21a5898.
As a first step, attempt to detect that we're dealing
with such a situation, so mac80211 can use this later.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-53026

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: Fix ib block iterator counter overflow
When registering a new DMA MR after selecting the best aligned page size
for it, we iterate over the given sglist to split each entry to smaller,
aligned to the selected page size, DMA blocks.
In given circumstances where the sg entry and page size fit certain
sizes and the sg entry is not aligned to the selected page size, the
total size of the aligned pages we need to cover the sg entry is >= 4GB.
Under this circumstances, while iterating page aligned blocks, the
counter responsible for counting how much we advanced from the start of
the sg entry is overflowed because its type is u32 and we pass 4GB in
size. This can lead to an infinite loop inside the iterator function
because the overflow prevents the counter to be larger
than the size of the sg entry.
Fix the presented problem by changing the advancement condition to
eliminate overflow.
Backtrace:
[ 192.374329] efa_reg_user_mr_dmabuf
[ 192.376783] efa_register_mr
[ 192.382579] pgsz_bitmap 0xfffff000 rounddown 0x80000000
[ 192.386423] pg_sz [0x80000000] umem_length[0xc0000000]
[ 192.392657] start 0x0 length 0xc0000000 params.page_shift 31 params.page_num 3
[ 192.399559] hp_cnt[3], pages_in_hp[524288]
[ 192.403690] umem->sgt_append.sgt.nents[1]
[ 192.407905] number entries: [1], pg_bit: [31]
[ 192.411397] biter->__sg_nents [1] biter->__sg [0000000008b0c5d8]
[ 192.415601] biter->__sg_advance [665837568] sg_dma_len[3221225472]
[ 192.419823] biter->__sg_nents [1] biter->__sg [0000000008b0c5d8]
[ 192.423976] biter->__sg_advance [2813321216] sg_dma_len[3221225472]
[ 192.428243] biter->__sg_nents [1] biter->__sg [0000000008b0c5d8]
[ 192.432397] biter->__sg_advance [665837568] sg_dma_len[3221225472]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-53021

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_taprio: fix possible use-after-free
syzbot reported a nasty crash [1] in net_tx_action() which
made little sense until we got a repro.
This repro installs a taprio qdisc, but providing an
invalid TCA_RATE attribute.
qdisc_create() has to destroy the just initialized
taprio qdisc, and taprio_destroy() is called.
However, the hrtimer used by taprio had already fired,
therefore advance_sched() called __netif_schedule().
Then net_tx_action was trying to use a destroyed qdisc.
We can not undo the __netif_schedule(), so we must wait
until one cpu serviced the qdisc before we can proceed.
Many thanks to Alexander Potapenko for his help.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in queued_spin_trylock include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:94 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in do_raw_spin_trylock include/linux/spinlock.h:191 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __raw_spin_trylock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:89 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in _raw_spin_trylock+0x92/0xa0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:138
queued_spin_trylock include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:94 [inline]
do_raw_spin_trylock include/linux/spinlock.h:191 [inline]
__raw_spin_trylock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:89 [inline]
_raw_spin_trylock+0x92/0xa0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:138
spin_trylock include/linux/spinlock.h:359 [inline]
qdisc_run_begin include/net/sch_generic.h:187 [inline]
qdisc_run+0xee/0x540 include/net/pkt_sched.h:125
net_tx_action+0x77c/0x9a0 net/core/dev.c:5086
__do_softirq+0x1cc/0x7fb kernel/softirq.c:571
run_ksoftirqd+0x2c/0x50 kernel/softirq.c:934
smpboot_thread_fn+0x554/0x9f0 kernel/smpboot.c:164
kthread+0x31b/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:732 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3258 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x814/0x1250 mm/slub.c:4970
kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:358 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x346/0xcf0 net/core/skbuff.c:430
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1257 [inline]
nlmsg_new include/net/netlink.h:953 [inline]
netlink_ack+0x5f3/0x12b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2436
netlink_rcv_skb+0x55d/0x6c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2507
rtnetlink_rcv+0x30/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6108
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xf3b/0x1270 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
netlink_sendmsg+0x1288/0x1440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0xabc/0xe90 net/socket.c:2482
___sys_sendmsg+0x2a1/0x3f0 net/socket.c:2536
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2565 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2574 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2572 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x367/0x540 net/socket.c:2572
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
CPU: 0 PID: 13 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc2-syzkaller-47461-gac3859c02d7f #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/22/2022

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52999

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fix UaF in netns ops registration error path
If net_assign_generic() fails, the current error path in ops_init() tries
to clear the gen pointer slot. Anyway, in such error path, the gen pointer
itself has not been modified yet, and the existing and accessed one is
smaller than the accessed index, causing an out-of-bounds error:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ops_init+0x2de/0x320
Write of size 8 at addr ffff888109124978 by task modprobe/1018
CPU: 2 PID: 1018 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.2.0-rc2.mptcp_ae5ac65fbed5+ #1641
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x9f
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x86/0x2b5
print_report+0x11b/0x1fb
kasan_report+0x87/0xc0
ops_init+0x2de/0x320
register_pernet_operations+0x2e4/0x750
register_pernet_subsys+0x24/0x40
tcf_register_action+0x9f/0x560
do_one_initcall+0xf9/0x570
do_init_module+0x190/0x650
load_module+0x1fa5/0x23c0
__do_sys_finit_module+0x10d/0x1b0
do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x7f42518f778d
Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48
89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff
ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d cb 56 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff96869688 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005568ef7f7c90 RCX: 00007f42518f778d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005568ef41d796 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00005568ef41d796 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00005568ef7f7d30 R14: 0000000000040000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
This change addresses the issue by skipping the gen pointer
de-reference in the mentioned error-path.
Found by code inspection and verified with explicit error injection
on a kasan-enabled kernel.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52991

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fix NULL pointer in skb_segment_list
Commit 3a1296a38d0c ("net: Support GRO/GSO fraglist chaining.")
introduced UDP listifyed GRO. The segmentation relies on frag_list being
untouched when passing through the network stack. This assumption can be
broken sometimes, where frag_list itself gets pulled into linear area,
leaving frag_list being NULL. When this happens it can trigger
following NULL pointer dereference, and panic the kernel. Reverse the
test condition should fix it.
[19185.577801][ C1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address:
...
[19185.663775][ C1] RIP: 0010:skb_segment_list+0x1cc/0x390
...
[19185.834644][ C1] Call Trace:
[19185.841730][ C1] <TASK>
[19185.848563][ C1] __udp_gso_segment+0x33e/0x510
[19185.857370][ C1] inet_gso_segment+0x15b/0x3e0
[19185.866059][ C1] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x97/0x110
[19185.874939][ C1] __skb_gso_segment+0xb2/0x160
[19185.883646][ C1] udp_queue_rcv_skb+0xc3/0x1d0
[19185.892319][ C1] udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x75/0x90
[19185.900979][ C1] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xd2/0x200
[19185.910003][ C1] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x44/0x60
[19185.918757][ C1] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x8b/0xa0
[19185.927834][ C1] process_backlog+0x88/0x130
[19185.935840][ C1] __napi_poll+0x27/0x150
[19185.943447][ C1] net_rx_action+0x27e/0x5f0
[19185.951331][ C1] ? mlx5_cq_tasklet_cb+0x70/0x160 [mlx5_core]
[19185.960848][ C1] __do_softirq+0xbc/0x25d
[19185.968607][ C1] irq_exit_rcu+0x83/0xb0
[19185.976247][ C1] common_interrupt+0x43/0xa0
[19185.984235][ C1] asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
...
[19186.094106][ C1] </TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52975

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: iscsi_tcp: Fix UAF during logout when accessing the shost ipaddress
Bug report and analysis from Ding Hui.
During iSCSI session logout, if another task accesses the shost ipaddress
attr, we can get a KASAN UAF report like this:
[ 276.942144] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x78/0xe0
[ 276.942535] Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881053b45b8 by task cat/4088
[ 276.943511] CPU: 2 PID: 4088 Comm: cat Tainted: G E 6.1.0-rc8+ #3
[ 276.943997] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
[ 276.944470] Call Trace:
[ 276.944943] <TASK>
[ 276.945397] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48
[ 276.945887] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x86/0x1e7
[ 276.946421] print_report+0x36/0x4f
[ 276.947358] kasan_report+0xad/0x130
[ 276.948234] kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1c0
[ 276.948674] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x78/0xe0
[ 276.949989] iscsi_sw_tcp_host_get_param+0xad/0x2e0 [iscsi_tcp]
[ 276.951765] show_host_param_ISCSI_HOST_PARAM_IPADDRESS+0xe9/0x130 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.952185] dev_attr_show+0x3f/0x80
[ 276.953005] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x1fb/0x3e0
[ 276.953401] seq_read_iter+0x402/0x1020
[ 276.954260] vfs_read+0x532/0x7b0
[ 276.955113] ksys_read+0xed/0x1c0
[ 276.955952] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[ 276.956347] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 276.956769] RIP: 0033:0x7f5d3a679222
[ 276.957161] Code: c0 e9 b2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 32 c0 0b 00 e8 a5 fe 01 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24
[ 276.958009] RSP: 002b:00007ffc864d16a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[ 276.958431] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f5d3a679222
[ 276.958857] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f5d3a4fe000 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 276.959281] RBP: 00007f5d3a4fe000 R08: 00000000ffffffff R09: 0000000000000000
[ 276.959682] R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020000
[ 276.960126] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000557a26dada58
[ 276.960536] </TASK>
[ 276.961357] Allocated by task 2209:
[ 276.961756] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 276.962170] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
[ 276.962557] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7e/0x90
[ 276.962923] __kmalloc+0x5b/0x140
[ 276.963308] iscsi_alloc_session+0x28/0x840 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.963712] iscsi_session_setup+0xda/0xba0 [libiscsi]
[ 276.964078] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_create+0x1fd/0x330 [iscsi_tcp]
[ 276.964431] iscsi_if_create_session.isra.0+0x50/0x260 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.964793] iscsi_if_recv_msg+0xc5a/0x2660 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.965153] iscsi_if_rx+0x198/0x4b0 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.965546] netlink_unicast+0x4d5/0x7b0
[ 276.965905] netlink_sendmsg+0x78d/0xc30
[ 276.966236] sock_sendmsg+0xe5/0x120
[ 276.966576] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5fe/0x860
[ 276.966923] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe0/0x170
[ 276.967300] __sys_sendmsg+0xc8/0x170
[ 276.967666] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[ 276.968028] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 276.968773] Freed by task 2209:
[ 276.969111] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 276.969449] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
[ 276.969789] kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50
[ 276.970146] __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190
[ 276.970470] __kmem_cache_free+0x133/0x270
[ 276.970816] device_release+0x98/0x210
[ 276.971145] kobject_cleanup+0x101/0x360
[ 276.971462] iscsi_session_teardown+0x3fb/0x530 [libiscsi]
[ 276.971775] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_destroy+0xd8/0x130 [iscsi_tcp]
[ 276.972143] iscsi_if_recv_msg+0x1bf1/0x2660 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.972485] iscsi_if_rx+0x198/0x4b0 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.972808] netlink_unicast+0x4d5/0x7b0
[ 276.973201] netlink_sendmsg+0x78d/0xc30
[ 276.973544] sock_sendmsg+0xe5/0x120
[ 276.973864] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5fe/0x860
[ 276.974248] ___sys_
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52973

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vc_screen: move load of struct vc_data pointer in vcs_read() to avoid UAF
After a call to console_unlock() in vcs_read() the vc_data struct can be
freed by vc_deallocate(). Because of that, the struct vc_data pointer
load must be done at the top of while loop in vcs_read() to avoid a UAF
when vcs_size() is called.
Syzkaller reported a UAF in vcs_size().
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vcs_size (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:215)
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881137479a8 by task 4a005ed81e27e65/1537
CPU: 0 PID: 1537 Comm: 4a005ed81e27e65 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5 #1
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.15.0-2.module
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report_generic.c:350)
vcs_size (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:215)
vcs_read (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:415)
vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:468 fs/read_write.c:450)
...
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1191:
...
kmalloc_trace (mm/slab_common.c:1069)
vc_allocate (./include/linux/slab.h:580 ./include/linux/slab.h:720
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1128 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1108)
con_install (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3383)
tty_init_dev (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1301 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1413
drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1390)
tty_open (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2080 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2126)
chrdev_open (fs/char_dev.c:415)
do_dentry_open (fs/open.c:883)
vfs_open (fs/open.c:1014)
...
Freed by task 1548:
...
kfree (mm/slab_common.c:1021)
vc_port_destruct (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1094)
tty_port_destructor (drivers/tty/tty_port.c:296)
tty_port_put (drivers/tty/tty_port.c:312)
vt_disallocate_all (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:662 (discriminator 2))
vt_ioctl (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:903)
tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2776)
...
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888113747800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 424 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff888113747800, ffff888113747c00)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000b3fe6c7c refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000
index:0x0 pfn:0x113740
head:00000000b3fe6c7c order:3 compound_mapcount:0 subpages_mapcount:0
compound_pincount:0
anon flags: 0x17ffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
raw: 0017ffffc0010200 ffff888100042dc0 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888113747880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888113747900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ffff888113747980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff888113747a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888113747a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52935

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/khugepaged: fix ->anon_vma race
If an ->anon_vma is attached to the VMA, collapse_and_free_pmd() requires
it to be locked.
Page table traversal is allowed under any one of the mmap lock, the
anon_vma lock (if the VMA is associated with an anon_vma), and the
mapping lock (if the VMA is associated with a mapping); and so to be
able to remove page tables, we must hold all three of them.
retract_page_tables() bails out if an ->anon_vma is attached, but does
this check before holding the mmap lock (as the comment above the check
explains).
If we racily merged an existing ->anon_vma (shared with a child
process) from a neighboring VMA, subsequent rmap traversals on pages
belonging to the child will be able to see the page tables that we are
concurrently removing while assuming that nothing else can access them.
Repeat the ->anon_vma check once we hold the mmap lock to ensure that
there really is no concurrent page table access.
Hitting this bug causes a lockdep warning in collapse_and_free_pmd(),
in the line "lockdep_assert_held_write(&vma->anon_vma->root->rwsem)".
It can also lead to use-after-free access.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52933

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Squashfs: fix handling and sanity checking of xattr_ids count
A Sysbot [1] corrupted filesystem exposes two flaws in the handling and
sanity checking of the xattr_ids count in the filesystem. Both of these
flaws cause computation overflow due to incorrect typing.
In the corrupted filesystem the xattr_ids value is 4294967071, which
stored in a signed variable becomes the negative number -225.
Flaw 1 (64-bit systems only):
The signed integer xattr_ids variable causes sign extension.
This causes variable overflow in the SQUASHFS_XATTR_*(A) macros. The
variable is first multiplied by sizeof(struct squashfs_xattr_id) where the
type of the sizeof operator is "unsigned long".
On a 64-bit system this is 64-bits in size, and causes the negative number
to be sign extended and widened to 64-bits and then become unsigned. This
produces the very large number 18446744073709548016 or 2^64 - 3600. This
number when rounded up by SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE - 1 (8191 bytes) and
divided by SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE overflows and produces a length of 0
(stored in len).
Flaw 2 (32-bit systems only):
On a 32-bit system the integer variable is not widened by the unsigned
long type of the sizeof operator (32-bits), and the signedness of the
variable has no effect due it always being treated as unsigned.
The above corrupted xattr_ids value of 4294967071, when multiplied
overflows and produces the number 4294963696 or 2^32 - 3400. This number
when rounded up by SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE - 1 (8191 bytes) and divided by
SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE overflows again and produces a length of 0.
The effect of the 0 length computation:
In conjunction with the corrupted xattr_ids field, the filesystem also has
a corrupted xattr_table_start value, where it matches the end of
filesystem value of 850.
This causes the following sanity check code to fail because the
incorrectly computed len of 0 matches the incorrect size of the table
reported by the superblock (0 bytes).
len = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK_BYTES(*xattr_ids);
indexes = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCKS(*xattr_ids);
/*
* The computed size of the index table (len bytes) should exactly
* match the table start and end points
*/
start = table_start + sizeof(*id_table);
end = msblk->bytes_used;
if (len != (end - start))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
Changing the xattr_ids variable to be "usigned int" fixes the flaw on a
64-bit system. This relies on the fact the computation is widened by the
unsigned long type of the sizeof operator.
Casting the variable to u64 in the above macro fixes this flaw on a 32-bit
system.
It also means 64-bit systems do not implicitly rely on the type of the
sizeof operator to widen the computation.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/000000000000cd44f005f1a0f17f@google.com/

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52920

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking
Use instruction (jump) history to record instructions that performed
register spill/fill to/from stack, regardless if this was done through
read-only r10 register, or any other register after copying r10 into it
*and* potentially adjusting offset.
To make this work reliably, we push extra per-instruction flags into
instruction history, encoding stack slot index (spi) and stack frame
number in extra 10 bit flags we take away from prev_idx in instruction
history. We don't touch idx field for maximum performance, as it's
checked most frequently during backtracking.
This change removes basically the last remaining practical limitation of
precision backtracking logic in BPF verifier. It fixes known
deficiencies, but also opens up new opportunities to reduce number of
verified states, explored in the subsequent patches.
There are only three differences in selftests' BPF object files
according to veristat, all in the positive direction (less states).
File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF) States (A) States (B) States (DIFF)
-------------------------------------- ------------- --------- --------- ------------- ---------- ---------- -------------
test_cls_redirect_dynptr.bpf.linked3.o cls_redirect 2987 2864 -123 (-4.12%) 240 231 -9 (-3.75%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_tc 82848 82661 -187 (-0.23%) 5107 5073 -34 (-0.67%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_xdp 85116 84964 -152 (-0.18%) 5162 5130 -32 (-0.62%)
Note, I avoided renaming jmp_history to more generic insn_hist to
minimize number of lines changed and potential merge conflicts between
bpf and bpf-next trees.
Notice also cur_hist_entry pointer reset to NULL at the beginning of
instruction verification loop. This pointer avoids the problem of
relying on last jump history entry's insn_idx to determine whether we
already have entry for current instruction or not. It can happen that we
added jump history entry because current instruction is_jmp_point(), but
also we need to add instruction flags for stack access. In this case, we
don't want to entries, so we need to reuse last added entry, if it is
present.
Relying on insn_idx comparison has the same ambiguity problem as the one
that was fixed recently in [0], so we avoid that.
[0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20231110002638.4168352-3-andrii@kernel.org/

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52912

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Fixed bug on error when unloading amdgpu
Fixed bug on error when unloading amdgpu.
The error message is as follows:
[ 377.706202] kernel BUG at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_buddy.c:278!
[ 377.706215] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 377.706222] CPU: 4 PID: 8610 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G IOE 6.0.0-thomas #1
[ 377.706231] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z390-A, BIOS 2004 11/02/2021
[ 377.706238] RIP: 0010:drm_buddy_free_block+0x26/0x30 [drm_buddy]
[ 377.706264] Code: 00 00 00 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 0e 89 c8 25 00 0c 00 00 3d 00 04 00 00 75 10 48 8b 47 18 48 d3 e0 48 01 47 28 e9 fa fe ff ff <0f> 0b 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 48 89 f5 53
[ 377.706282] RSP: 0018:ffffad2dc4683cb8 EFLAGS: 00010287
[ 377.706289] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8b1743bd5138 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 377.706297] RDX: ffff8b1743bd5160 RSI: ffff8b1743bd5c78 RDI: ffff8b16d1b25f70
[ 377.706304] RBP: ffff8b1743bd59e0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 377.706311] R10: ffff8b16c8572400 R11: ffffad2dc4683cf0 R12: ffff8b16d1b25f70
[ 377.706318] R13: ffff8b16d1b25fd0 R14: ffff8b1743bd59c0 R15: ffff8b16d1b25f70
[ 377.706325] FS: 00007fec56c72c40(0000) GS:ffff8b1836500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 377.706334] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 377.706340] CR2: 00007f9b88c1ba50 CR3: 0000000110450004 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[ 377.706347] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 377.706354] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 377.706361] Call Trace:
[ 377.706365] <TASK>
[ 377.706369] drm_buddy_free_list+0x2a/0x60 [drm_buddy]
[ 377.706376] amdgpu_vram_mgr_fini+0xea/0x180 [amdgpu]
[ 377.706572] amdgpu_ttm_fini+0x12e/0x1a0 [amdgpu]
[ 377.706650] amdgpu_bo_fini+0x22/0x90 [amdgpu]
[ 377.706727] gmc_v11_0_sw_fini+0x26/0x30 [amdgpu]
[ 377.706821] amdgpu_device_fini_sw+0xa1/0x3c0 [amdgpu]
[ 377.706897] amdgpu_driver_release_kms+0x12/0x30 [amdgpu]
[ 377.706975] drm_dev_release+0x20/0x40 [drm]
[ 377.707006] release_nodes+0x35/0xb0
[ 377.707014] devres_release_all+0x8b/0xc0
[ 377.707020] device_unbind_cleanup+0xe/0x70
[ 377.707027] device_release_driver_internal+0xee/0x160
[ 377.707033] driver_detach+0x44/0x90
[ 377.707039] bus_remove_driver+0x55/0xe0
[ 377.707045] pci_unregister_driver+0x3b/0x90
[ 377.707052] amdgpu_exit+0x11/0x6c [amdgpu]
[ 377.707194] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x142/0x2b0
[ 377.707201] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x22/0x50
[ 377.707208] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x3e/0x190
[ 377.707215] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[ 377.707221] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52910

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/iova: Fix alloc iova overflows issue
In __alloc_and_insert_iova_range, there is an issue that retry_pfn
overflows. The value of iovad->anchor.pfn_hi is ~0UL, then when
iovad->cached_node is iovad->anchor, curr_iova->pfn_hi + 1 will
overflow. As a result, if the retry logic is executed, low_pfn is
updated to 0, and then new_pfn < low_pfn returns false to make the
allocation successful.
This issue occurs in the following two situations:
1. The first iova size exceeds the domain size. When initializing
iova domain, iovad->cached_node is assigned as iovad->anchor. For
example, the iova domain size is 10M, start_pfn is 0x1_F000_0000,
and the iova size allocated for the first time is 11M. The
following is the log information, new->pfn_lo is smaller than
iovad->cached_node.
Example log as follows:
[ 223.798112][T1705487] sh: [name:iova&]__alloc_and_insert_iova_range
start_pfn:0x1f0000,retry_pfn:0x0,size:0xb00,limit_pfn:0x1f0a00
[ 223.799590][T1705487] sh: [name:iova&]__alloc_and_insert_iova_range
success start_pfn:0x1f0000,new->pfn_lo:0x1efe00,new->pfn_hi:0x1f08ff
2. The node with the largest iova->pfn_lo value in the iova domain
is deleted, iovad->cached_node will be updated to iovad->anchor,
and then the alloc iova size exceeds the maximum iova size that can
be allocated in the domain.
After judging that retry_pfn is less than limit_pfn, call retry_pfn+1
to fix the overflow issue.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52909

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix handling of cached open files in nfsd4_open codepath
Commit fb70bf124b05 ("NFSD: Instantiate a struct file when creating a
regular NFSv4 file") added the ability to cache an open fd over a
compound. There are a couple of problems with the way this currently
works:
It's racy, as a newly-created nfsd_file can end up with its PENDING bit
cleared while the nf is hashed, and the nf_file pointer is still zeroed
out. Other tasks can find it in this state and they expect to see a
valid nf_file, and can oops if nf_file is NULL.
Also, there is no guarantee that we'll end up creating a new nfsd_file
if one is already in the hash. If an extant entry is in the hash with a
valid nf_file, nfs4_get_vfs_file will clobber its nf_file pointer with
the value of op_file and the old nf_file will leak.
Fix both issues by making a new nfsd_file_acquirei_opened variant that
takes an optional file pointer. If one is present when this is called,
we'll take a new reference to it instead of trying to open the file. If
the nfsd_file already has a valid nf_file, we'll just ignore the
optional file and pass the nfsd_file back as-is.
Also rework the tracepoints a bit to allow for an "opened" variant and
don't try to avoid counting acquisitions in the case where we already
have a cached open file.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52906

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_mpls: Fix warning during failed attribute validation
The 'TCA_MPLS_LABEL' attribute is of 'NLA_U32' type, but has a
validation type of 'NLA_VALIDATE_FUNCTION'. This is an invalid
combination according to the comment above 'struct nla_policy':
"
Meaning of `validate' field, use via NLA_POLICY_VALIDATE_FN:
NLA_BINARY Validation function called for the attribute.
All other Unused - but note that it's a union
"
This can trigger the warning [1] in nla_get_range_unsigned() when
validation of the attribute fails. Despite being of 'NLA_U32' type, the
associated 'min'/'max' fields in the policy are negative as they are
aliased by the 'validate' field.
Fix by changing the attribute type to 'NLA_BINARY' which is consistent
with the above comment and all other users of NLA_POLICY_VALIDATE_FN().
As a result, move the length validation to the validation function.
No regressions in MPLS tests:
# ./tdc.py -f tc-tests/actions/mpls.json
[...]
# echo $?
0
[1]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 17743 at lib/nlattr.c:118
nla_get_range_unsigned+0x1d8/0x1e0 lib/nlattr.c:117
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 17743 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc8 #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.13.0-48-gd9c812dda519-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:nla_get_range_unsigned+0x1d8/0x1e0 lib/nlattr.c:117
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__netlink_policy_dump_write_attr+0x23d/0x990 net/netlink/policy.c:310
netlink_policy_dump_write_attr+0x22/0x30 net/netlink/policy.c:411
netlink_ack_tlv_fill net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454 [inline]
netlink_ack+0x546/0x760 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2506
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1b7/0x240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2546
rtnetlink_rcv+0x18/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6109
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x5e9/0x6b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
netlink_sendmsg+0x739/0x860 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x38f/0x500 net/socket.c:2482
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2536 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x197/0x230 net/socket.c:2565
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2574 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2572 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2572
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52901

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: xhci: Check endpoint is valid before dereferencing it
When the host controller is not responding, all URBs queued to all
endpoints need to be killed. This can cause a kernel panic if we
dereference an invalid endpoint.
Fix this by using xhci_get_virt_ep() helper to find the endpoint and
checking if the endpoint is valid before dereferencing it.
[233311.853271] xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.1.auto: xHCI host controller not responding, assume dead
[233311.853393] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000e8
[233311.853964] pc : xhci_hc_died+0x10c/0x270
[233311.853971] lr : xhci_hc_died+0x1ac/0x270
[233311.854077] Call trace:
[233311.854085] xhci_hc_died+0x10c/0x270
[233311.854093] xhci_stop_endpoint_command_watchdog+0x100/0x1a4
[233311.854105] call_timer_fn+0x50/0x2d4
[233311.854112] expire_timers+0xac/0x2e4
[233311.854118] run_timer_softirq+0x300/0xabc
[233311.854127] __do_softirq+0x148/0x528
[233311.854135] irq_exit+0x194/0x1a8
[233311.854143] __handle_domain_irq+0x164/0x1d0
[233311.854149] gic_handle_irq.22273+0x10c/0x188
[233311.854156] el1_irq+0xfc/0x1a8
[233311.854175] lpm_cpuidle_enter+0x25c/0x418 [msm_pm]
[233311.854185] cpuidle_enter_state+0x1f0/0x764
[233311.854194] do_idle+0x594/0x6ac
[233311.854201] cpu_startup_entry+0x7c/0x80
[233311.854209] secondary_start_kernel+0x170/0x198

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52885

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Fix UAF in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready()
After the listener svc_sock is freed, and before invoking svc_tcp_accept()
for the established child sock, there is a window that the newsock
retaining a freed listener svc_sock in sk_user_data which cloning from
parent. In the race window, if data is received on the newsock, we will
observe use-after-free report in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready().
Reproduce by two tasks:
1. while :; do rpc.nfsd 0 ; rpc.nfsd; done
2. while :; do echo "" | ncat -4 127.0.0.1 2049 ; done
KASAN report:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready+0x1cf/0x1f0 [sunrpc]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888139d96228 by task nc/102553
CPU: 7 PID: 102553 Comm: nc Not tainted 6.3.0+ #18
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x27/0x310
print_report+0x3e/0x70
kasan_report+0xae/0xe0
svc_tcp_listen_data_ready+0x1cf/0x1f0 [sunrpc]
tcp_data_queue+0x9f4/0x20e0
tcp_rcv_established+0x666/0x1f60
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x51c/0x850
tcp_v4_rcv+0x23fc/0x2e80
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x62/0x300
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x267/0x350
ip_local_deliver+0x18b/0x2d0
ip_rcv+0x2fb/0x370
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x166/0x1b0
process_backlog+0x24c/0x5e0
__napi_poll+0xa2/0x500
net_rx_action+0x854/0xc90
__do_softirq+0x1bb/0x5de
do_softirq+0xcb/0x100
</IRQ>
<TASK>
...
</TASK>
Allocated by task 102371:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x7b/0x90
svc_setup_socket+0x52/0x4f0 [sunrpc]
svc_addsock+0x20d/0x400 [sunrpc]
__write_ports_addfd+0x209/0x390 [nfsd]
write_ports+0x239/0x2c0 [nfsd]
nfsctl_transaction_write+0xac/0x110 [nfsd]
vfs_write+0x1c3/0xae0
ksys_write+0xed/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Freed by task 102551:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50
__kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190
__kmem_cache_free+0x133/0x270
svc_xprt_free+0x1e2/0x350 [sunrpc]
svc_xprt_destroy_all+0x25a/0x440 [sunrpc]
nfsd_put+0x125/0x240 [nfsd]
nfsd_svc+0x2cb/0x3c0 [nfsd]
write_threads+0x1ac/0x2a0 [nfsd]
nfsctl_transaction_write+0xac/0x110 [nfsd]
vfs_write+0x1c3/0xae0
ksys_write+0xed/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Fix the UAF by simply doing nothing in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready()
if state != TCP_LISTEN, that will avoid dereferencing svsk for all
child socket.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52854

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
padata: Fix refcnt handling in padata_free_shell()
In a high-load arm64 environment, the pcrypt_aead01 test in LTP can lead
to system UAF (Use-After-Free) issues. Due to the lengthy analysis of
the pcrypt_aead01 function call, I'll describe the problem scenario
using a simplified model:
Suppose there's a user of padata named `user_function` that adheres to
the padata requirement of calling `padata_free_shell` after `serial()`
has been invoked, as demonstrated in the following code:
```c
struct request {
struct padata_priv padata;
struct completion *done;
};
void parallel(struct padata_priv *padata) {
do_something();
}
void serial(struct padata_priv *padata) {
struct request *request = container_of(padata,
struct request,
padata);
complete(request->done);
}
void user_function() {
DECLARE_COMPLETION(done)
padata->parallel = parallel;
padata->serial = serial;
padata_do_parallel();
wait_for_completion(&done);
padata_free_shell();
}
```
In the corresponding padata.c file, there's the following code:
```c
static void padata_serial_worker(struct work_struct *serial_work) {
...
cnt = 0;
while (!list_empty(&local_list)) {
...
padata->serial(padata);
cnt++;
}
local_bh_enable();
if (refcount_sub_and_test(cnt, &pd->refcnt))
padata_free_pd(pd);
}
```
Because of the high system load and the accumulation of unexecuted
softirq at this moment, `local_bh_enable()` in padata takes longer
to execute than usual. Subsequently, when accessing `pd->refcnt`,
`pd` has already been released by `padata_free_shell()`, resulting
in a UAF issue with `pd->refcnt`.
The fix is straightforward: add `refcount_dec_and_test` before calling
`padata_free_pd` in `padata_free_shell`.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52786

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix racy may inline data check in dio write
syzbot reports that the following warning from ext4_iomap_begin()
triggers as of the commit referenced below:
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ext4_has_inline_data(inode)))
return -ERANGE;
This occurs during a dio write, which is never expected to encounter
an inode with inline data. To enforce this behavior,
ext4_dio_write_iter() checks the current inline state of the inode
and clears the MAY_INLINE_DATA state flag to either fall back to
buffered writes, or enforce that any other writers in progress on
the inode are not allowed to create inline data.
The problem is that the check for existing inline data and the state
flag can span a lock cycle. For example, if the ilock is originally
locked shared and subsequently upgraded to exclusive, another writer
may have reacquired the lock and created inline data before the dio
write task acquires the lock and proceeds.
The commit referenced below loosens the lock requirements to allow
some forms of unaligned dio writes to occur under shared lock, but
AFAICT the inline data check was technically already racy for any
dio write that would have involved a lock cycle. Regardless, lift
clearing of the state bit to the same lock critical section that
checks for preexisting inline data on the inode to close the race.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52739

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Fix page corruption caused by racy check in __free_pages
When we upgraded our kernel, we started seeing some page corruption like
the following consistently:
BUG: Bad page state in process ganesha.nfsd pfn:1304ca
page:0000000022261c55 refcount:0 mapcount:-128 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1304ca
flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
raw: 0017ffffc0000000 ffff8a513ffd4c98 ffffeee24b35ec08 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
CPU: 0 PID: 15567 Comm: ganesha.nfsd Kdump: loaded Tainted: P B O 5.10.158-1.nutanix.20221209.el7.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 04/05/2016
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x74/0x96
bad_page.cold+0x63/0x94
check_new_page_bad+0x6d/0x80
rmqueue+0x46e/0x970
get_page_from_freelist+0xcb/0x3f0
? _cond_resched+0x19/0x40
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x164/0x300
alloc_pages_current+0x87/0xf0
skb_page_frag_refill+0x84/0x110
...
Sometimes, it would also show up as corruption in the free list pointer
and cause crashes.
After bisecting the issue, we found the issue started from commit
e320d3012d25 ("mm/page_alloc.c: fix freeing non-compound pages"):
if (put_page_testzero(page))
free_the_page(page, order);
else if (!PageHead(page))
while (order-- > 0)
free_the_page(page + (1 << order), order);
So the problem is the check PageHead is racy because at this point we
already dropped our reference to the page. So even if we came in with
compound page, the page can already be freed and PageHead can return
false and we will end up freeing all the tail pages causing double free.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52582

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Only call folio_start_fscache() one time for each folio
If a network filesystem using netfs implements a clamp_length()
function, it can set subrequest lengths smaller than a page size.
When we loop through the folios in netfs_rreq_unlock_folios() to
set any folios to be written back, we need to make sure we only
call folio_start_fscache() once for each folio.
Otherwise, this simple testcase:
mount -o fsc,rsize=1024,wsize=1024 127.0.0.1:/export /mnt/nfs
dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/nfs/file.bin bs=4096 count=1
1+0 records in
1+0 records out
4096 bytes (4.1 kB, 4.0 KiB) copied, 0.0126359 s, 324 kB/s
echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
cat /mnt/nfs/file.bin > /dev/null
will trigger an oops similar to the following:
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(folio_test_private_2(folio))
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at include/linux/netfs.h:44!
...
CPU: 5 PID: 134 Comm: kworker/u16:5 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.4.0-rc5
...
RIP: 0010:netfs_rreq_unlock_folios+0x68e/0x730 [netfs]
...
Call Trace:
netfs_rreq_assess+0x497/0x660 [netfs]
netfs_subreq_terminated+0x32b/0x610 [netfs]
nfs_netfs_read_completion+0x14e/0x1a0 [nfs]
nfs_read_completion+0x2f9/0x330 [nfs]
rpc_free_task+0x72/0xa0 [sunrpc]
rpc_async_release+0x46/0x70 [sunrpc]
process_one_work+0x3bd/0x710
worker_thread+0x89/0x610
kthread+0x181/0x1c0
ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52568

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/sgx: Resolves SECS reclaim vs. page fault for EAUG race
The SGX EPC reclaimer (ksgxd) may reclaim the SECS EPC page for an
enclave and set secs.epc_page to NULL. The SECS page is used for EAUG
and ELDU in the SGX page fault handler. However, the NULL check for
secs.epc_page is only done for ELDU, not EAUG before being used.
Fix this by doing the same NULL check and reloading of the SECS page as
needed for both EAUG and ELDU.
The SECS page holds global enclave metadata. It can only be reclaimed
when there are no other enclave pages remaining. At that point,
virtually nothing can be done with the enclave until the SECS page is
paged back in.
An enclave can not run nor generate page faults without a resident SECS
page. But it is still possible for a #PF for a non-SECS page to race
with paging out the SECS page: when the last resident non-SECS page A
triggers a #PF in a non-resident page B, and then page A and the SECS
both are paged out before the #PF on B is handled.
Hitting this bug requires that race triggered with a #PF for EAUG.
Following is a trace when it happens.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
RIP: 0010:sgx_encl_eaug_page+0xc7/0x210
Call Trace:
? __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x16a/0x440
? xa_load+0x6e/0xa0
sgx_vma_fault+0x119/0x230
__do_fault+0x36/0x140
do_fault+0x12f/0x400
__handle_mm_fault+0x728/0x1110
handle_mm_fault+0x105/0x310
do_user_addr_fault+0x1ee/0x750
? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
exc_page_fault+0x76/0x180
asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52518

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_codec: Fix leaking content of local_codecs
The following memory leak can be observed when the controller supports
codecs which are stored in local_codecs list but the elements are never
freed:
unreferenced object 0xffff88800221d840 (size 32):
comm "kworker/u3:0", pid 36, jiffies 4294898739 (age 127.060s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
f8 d3 02 03 80 88 ff ff 80 d8 21 02 80 88 ff ff ..........!.....
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffffb324f557>] __kmalloc+0x47/0x120
[<ffffffffb39ef37d>] hci_codec_list_add.isra.0+0x2d/0x160
[<ffffffffb39ef643>] hci_read_codec_capabilities+0x183/0x270
[<ffffffffb39ef9ab>] hci_read_supported_codecs+0x1bb/0x2d0
[<ffffffffb39f162e>] hci_read_local_codecs_sync+0x3e/0x60
[<ffffffffb39ff1b3>] hci_dev_open_sync+0x943/0x11e0
[<ffffffffb396d55d>] hci_power_on+0x10d/0x3f0
[<ffffffffb30c99b4>] process_one_work+0x404/0x800
[<ffffffffb30ca134>] worker_thread+0x374/0x670
[<ffffffffb30d9108>] kthread+0x188/0x1c0
[<ffffffffb304db6b>] ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x50
[<ffffffffb300206a>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52487

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix peer flow lists handling
The cited change refactored mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_peer_flow() to only clear DUP
flag when list of peer flows has become empty. However, if any concurrent
user holds a reference to a peer flow (for example, the neighbor update
workqueue task is updating peer flow's parent encap entry concurrently),
then the flow will not be removed from the peer list and, consecutively,
DUP flag will remain set. Since mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_peers_flow() calls
mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_peer_flow() for every possible peer index the algorithm
will try to remove the flow from eswitch instances that it has never peered
with causing either NULL pointer dereference when trying to remove the flow
peer list head of peer_index that was never initialized or a warning if the
list debug config is enabled[0].
Fix the issue by always removing the peer flow from the list even when not
releasing the last reference to it.
[0]:
[ 3102.985806] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 3102.986223] list_del corruption, ffff888139110698->next is NULL
[ 3102.986757] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 22109 at lib/list_debug.c:53 __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x4f/0xc0
[ 3102.987561] Modules linked in: act_ct nf_flow_table bonding act_tunnel_key act_mirred act_skbedit vxlan cls_matchall nfnetlink_cttimeout act_gact cls_flower sch_ingress mlx5_vdpa vringh vhost_iotlb vdpa openvswitch nsh xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink iptable_nat xt_addrtype xt_conntrack nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcg
ss oid_registry overlay rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core mlx5_core [last unloaded: bonding]
[ 3102.991113] CPU: 2 PID: 22109 Comm: revalidator28 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc6+ #3
[ 3102.991695] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 3102.992605] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x4f/0xc0
[ 3102.993122] Code: 39 c2 74 56 48 8b 32 48 39 fe 75 62 48 8b 51 08 48 39 f2 75 73 b8 01 00 00 00 c3 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 48 fd 0a 82 e8 41 0b ad ff <0f> 0b 31 c0 c3 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 70 fd 0a 82 e8 2d 0b ad ff 0f 0b
[ 3102.994615] RSP: 0018:ffff8881383e7710 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 3102.995078] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 3102.995670] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff88885f89b640 RDI: ffff88885f89b640
[ 3102.997188] DEL flow 00000000be367878 on port 0
[ 3102.998594] RBP: dead000000000122 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffffdfff
[ 3102.999604] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: ffff8881383e7598 R12: dead000000000100
[ 3103.000198] R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffff888139110000 R15: ffff888101901240
[ 3103.000790] FS: 00007f424cde4700(0000) GS:ffff88885f880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3103.001486] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3103.001986] CR2: 00007fd42e8dcb70 CR3: 000000011e68a003 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
[ 3103.002596] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 3103.003190] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 3103.003787] Call Trace:
[ 3103.004055] <TASK>
[ 3103.004297] ? __warn+0x7d/0x130
[ 3103.004623] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x4f/0xc0
[ 3103.005094] ? report_bug+0xf1/0x1c0
[ 3103.005439] ? console_unlock+0x4a/0xd0
[ 3103.005806] ? handle_bug+0x3f/0x70
[ 3103.006149] ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60
[ 3103.006531] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 3103.007430] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x4f/0xc0
[ 3103.007910] mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_peers_flow+0xcf/0x240 [mlx5_core]
[ 3103.008463] mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x46/0x270 [mlx5_core]
[ 3103.008944] mlx5e_flow_put+0x26/0x50 [mlx5_core]
[ 3103.009401] mlx5e_delete_flower+0x25f/0x380 [mlx5_core]
[ 3103.009901] tc_setup_cb_destroy+0xab/0x180
[ 3103.010292] fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x99/0xc0 [cls_flower]
[ 3103.010779] __fl_delete+0x2d4/0x2f0 [cls_flower]
[ 3103.0
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49759

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
VMCI: Use threaded irqs instead of tasklets
The vmci_dispatch_dgs() tasklet function calls vmci_read_data()
which uses wait_event() resulting in invalid sleep in an atomic
context (and therefore potentially in a deadlock).
Use threaded irqs to fix this issue and completely remove usage
of tasklets.
[ 20.264639] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_guest.c:145
[ 20.264643] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 762, name: vmtoolsd
[ 20.264645] preempt_count: 101, expected: 0
[ 20.264646] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
[ 20.264647] 1 lock held by vmtoolsd/762:
[ 20.264648] #0: ffff0000874ae440 (sk_lock-AF_VSOCK){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: vsock_connect+0x60/0x330 [vsock]
[ 20.264658] Preemption disabled at:
[ 20.264659] [<ffff80000151d7d8>] vmci_send_datagram+0x44/0xa0 [vmw_vmci]
[ 20.264665] CPU: 0 PID: 762 Comm: vmtoolsd Not tainted 5.19.0-0.rc8.20220727git39c3c396f813.60.fc37.aarch64 #1
[ 20.264667] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VBSA/VBSA, BIOS VEFI 12/31/2020
[ 20.264668] Call trace:
[ 20.264669] dump_backtrace+0xc4/0x130
[ 20.264672] show_stack+0x24/0x80
[ 20.264673] dump_stack_lvl+0x88/0xb4
[ 20.264676] dump_stack+0x18/0x34
[ 20.264677] __might_resched+0x1a0/0x280
[ 20.264679] __might_sleep+0x58/0x90
[ 20.264681] vmci_read_data+0x74/0x120 [vmw_vmci]
[ 20.264683] vmci_dispatch_dgs+0x64/0x204 [vmw_vmci]
[ 20.264686] tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0x13c/0x150
[ 20.264688] tasklet_action+0x40/0x50
[ 20.264689] __do_softirq+0x23c/0x6b4
[ 20.264690] __irq_exit_rcu+0x104/0x214
[ 20.264691] irq_exit_rcu+0x1c/0x50
[ 20.264693] el1_interrupt+0x38/0x6c
[ 20.264695] el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
[ 20.264696] el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c
[ 20.264697] preempt_count_sub+0xa4/0xe0
[ 20.264698] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x64/0xb0
[ 20.264701] vmci_send_datagram+0x7c/0xa0 [vmw_vmci]
[ 20.264703] vmci_datagram_dispatch+0x84/0x100 [vmw_vmci]
[ 20.264706] vmci_datagram_send+0x2c/0x40 [vmw_vmci]
[ 20.264709] vmci_transport_send_control_pkt+0xb8/0x120 [vmw_vsock_vmci_transport]
[ 20.264711] vmci_transport_connect+0x40/0x7c [vmw_vsock_vmci_transport]
[ 20.264713] vsock_connect+0x278/0x330 [vsock]
[ 20.264715] __sys_connect_file+0x8c/0xc0
[ 20.264718] __sys_connect+0x84/0xb4
[ 20.264720] __arm64_sys_connect+0x2c/0x3c
[ 20.264721] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x100
[ 20.264723] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x68/0x124
[ 20.264724] do_el0_svc+0x38/0x4c
[ 20.264725] el0_svc+0x60/0x180
[ 20.264726] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x11c/0x150
[ 20.264728] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49753

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: Fix double increment of client_count in dma_chan_get()
The first time dma_chan_get() is called for a channel the channel
client_count is incorrectly incremented twice for public channels,
first in balance_ref_count(), and again prior to returning. This
results in an incorrect client count which will lead to the
channel resources not being freed when they should be. A simple
test of repeated module load and unload of async_tx on a Dell
Power Edge R7425 also shows this resulting in a kref underflow
warning.
[ 124.329662] async_tx: api initialized (async)
[ 129.000627] async_tx: api initialized (async)
[ 130.047839] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 130.052472] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
[ 130.057279] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 19364 at lib/refcount.c:28
refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[ 130.065811] Modules linked in: async_tx(-) rfkill intel_rapl_msr
intel_rapl_common amd64_edac edac_mce_amd ipmi_ssif kvm_amd dcdbas kvm
mgag200 drm_shmem_helper acpi_ipmi irqbypass drm_kms_helper ipmi_si
syscopyarea sysfillrect rapl pcspkr ipmi_devintf sysimgblt fb_sys_fops
k10temp i2c_piix4 ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_cpufreq vfat
fat drm fuse xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg ahci crct10dif_pclmul
libahci crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel igb megaraid_sas
i40e libata i2c_algo_bit ccp sp5100_tco dca dm_mirror dm_region_hash
dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: async_tx]
[ 130.117361] CPU: 3 PID: 19364 Comm: modprobe Kdump: loaded Not
tainted 5.14.0-185.el9.x86_64 #1
[ 130.126091] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7425/02MJ3T, BIOS
1.18.0 01/17/2022
[ 130.133806] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[ 130.139041] Code: 01 01 e8 6d bd 55 00 0f 0b e9 72 9d 8a 00 80 3d
26 18 9c 01 00 75 85 48 c7 c7 f8 a3 03 9d c6 05 16 18 9c 01 01 e8 4a
bd 55 00 <0f> 0b e9 4f 9d 8a 00 80 3d 01 18 9c 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff
48 c7
[ 130.157807] RSP: 0018:ffffbf98898afe68 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 130.163036] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9da06028e598 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 130.170172] RDX: ffff9daf9de26480 RSI: ffff9daf9de198a0 RDI: ffff9daf9de198a0
[ 130.177316] RBP: ffff9da7cddf3970 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffff7fff
[ 130.184459] R10: ffffbf98898afd00 R11: ffffffff9d9e8c28 R12: ffff9da7cddf1970
[ 130.191596] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 130.198739] FS: 00007f646435c740(0000) GS:ffff9daf9de00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 130.206832] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 130.212586] CR2: 00007f6463b214f0 CR3: 00000008ab98c000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
[ 130.219729] Call Trace:
[ 130.222192] <TASK>
[ 130.224305] dma_chan_put+0x10d/0x110
[ 130.227988] dmaengine_put+0x7a/0xa0
[ 130.231575] __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x178/0x280
[ 130.237157] ? syscall_trace_enter.constprop.0+0x145/0x1d0
[ 130.242652] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
[ 130.246240] ? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x150
[ 130.250178] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 130.255243] RIP: 0033:0x7f6463a3f5ab
[ 130.258830] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 75 a8 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00
00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 45 a8 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89
01 48
[ 130.277591] RSP: 002b:00007fff22f972c8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX:
00000000000000b0
[ 130.285164] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b6786edd40 RCX: 00007f6463a3f5ab
[ 130.292303] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 000055b6786edda8
[ 130.299443] RBP: 000055b6786edd40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 130.306584] R10: 00007f6463b9eac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 000055b6786edda8
[ 130.313731] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055b6786edda8 R15: 00007fff22f995f8
[ 130.320875] </TASK>
[ 130.323081] ---[ end trace eff7156d56b5cf25 ]---
cat /sys/class/dma/dma0chan*/in_use would get the wrong result.
2
2
2
Test-by: Jie Hai <haijie1@huawei.com>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49740

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: Check the count value of channel spec to prevent out-of-bounds reads
This patch fixes slab-out-of-bounds reads in brcmfmac that occur in
brcmf_construct_chaninfo() and brcmf_enable_bw40_2g() when the count
value of channel specifications provided by the device is greater than
the length of 'list->element[]', decided by the size of the 'list'
allocated with kzalloc(). The patch adds checks that make the functions
free the buffer and return -EINVAL if that is the case. Note that the
negative return is handled by the caller, brcmf_setup_wiphybands() or
brcmf_cfg80211_attach().
Found by a modified version of syzkaller.
Crash Report from brcmf_construct_chaninfo():
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in brcmf_setup_wiphybands+0x1238/0x1430
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888115f24600 by task kworker/0:2/1896
CPU: 0 PID: 1896 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G W O 5.14.0+ #132
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x93/0x334
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
brcmf_setup_wiphybands+0x1238/0x1430
brcmf_cfg80211_attach+0x2118/0x3fd0
brcmf_attach+0x389/0xd40
brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690
usb_probe_interface+0x25f/0x710
really_probe+0x1be/0xa90
__driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460
driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
__device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250
bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0
__device_attach+0x207/0x330
bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260
device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0
usb_set_configuration+0x984/0x1770
usb_generic_driver_probe+0x69/0x90
usb_probe_device+0x9c/0x220
really_probe+0x1be/0xa90
__driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460
driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
__device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250
bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0
__device_attach+0x207/0x330
bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260
device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0
usb_new_device.cold+0x463/0xf66
hub_event+0x10d5/0x3330
process_one_work+0x873/0x13e0
worker_thread+0x8b/0xd10
kthread+0x379/0x450
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Allocated by task 1896:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x19e/0x330
brcmf_setup_wiphybands+0x290/0x1430
brcmf_cfg80211_attach+0x2118/0x3fd0
brcmf_attach+0x389/0xd40
brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690
usb_probe_interface+0x25f/0x710
really_probe+0x1be/0xa90
__driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460
driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
__device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250
bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0
__device_attach+0x207/0x330
bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260
device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0
usb_set_configuration+0x984/0x1770
usb_generic_driver_probe+0x69/0x90
usb_probe_device+0x9c/0x220
really_probe+0x1be/0xa90
__driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460
driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
__device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250
bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0
__device_attach+0x207/0x330
bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260
device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0
usb_new_device.cold+0x463/0xf66
hub_event+0x10d5/0x3330
process_one_work+0x873/0x13e0
worker_thread+0x8b/0xd10
kthread+0x379/0x450
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888115f24000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 1536 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff888115f24000, ffff888115f24800)
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888115f24500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888115f24580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff888115f24600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888115f24680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888115f24700: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Crash Report from brcmf_enable_bw40_2g():
==========
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49728

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: Fix signed integer overflow in __ip6_append_data
Resurrect ubsan overflow checks and ubsan report this warning,
fix it by change the variable [length] type to size_t.
UBSAN: signed-integer-overflow in net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1489:19
2147479552 + 8567 cannot be represented in type 'int'
CPU: 0 PID: 253 Comm: err Not tainted 5.16.0+ #1
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x214/0x230
show_stack+0x30/0x78
dump_stack_lvl+0xf8/0x118
dump_stack+0x18/0x30
ubsan_epilogue+0x18/0x60
handle_overflow+0xd0/0xf0
__ubsan_handle_add_overflow+0x34/0x44
__ip6_append_data.isra.48+0x1598/0x1688
ip6_append_data+0x128/0x260
udpv6_sendmsg+0x680/0xdd0
inet6_sendmsg+0x54/0x90
sock_sendmsg+0x70/0x88
____sys_sendmsg+0xe8/0x368
___sys_sendmsg+0x98/0xe0
__sys_sendmmsg+0xf4/0x3b8
__arm64_sys_sendmmsg+0x34/0x48
invoke_syscall+0x64/0x160
el0_svc_common.constprop.4+0x124/0x300
do_el0_svc+0x44/0xc8
el0_svc+0x3c/0x1e8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xb0
el0t_64_sync+0x16c/0x170
Changes since v1:
-Change the variable [length] type to unsigned, as Eric Dumazet suggested.
Changes since v2:
-Don't change exthdrlen type in ip6_make_skb, as Paolo Abeni suggested.
Changes since v3:
-Don't change ulen type in udpv6_sendmsg and l2tp_ip6_sendmsg, as
Jakub Kicinski suggested.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49721

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: ftrace: consistently handle PLTs.
Sometimes it is necessary to use a PLT entry to call an ftrace
trampoline. This is handled by ftrace_make_call() and ftrace_make_nop(),
with each having *almost* identical logic, but this is not handled by
ftrace_modify_call() since its introduction in commit:
3b23e4991fb66f6d ("arm64: implement ftrace with regs")
Due to this, if we ever were to call ftrace_modify_call() for a callsite
which requires a PLT entry for a trampoline, then either:
a) If the old addr requires a trampoline, ftrace_modify_call() will use
an out-of-range address to generate the 'old' branch instruction.
This will result in warnings from aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm() and
ftrace_modify_code(), and no instructions will be modified. As
ftrace_modify_call() will return an error, this will result in
subsequent internal ftrace errors.
b) If the old addr does not require a trampoline, but the new addr does,
ftrace_modify_call() will use an out-of-range address to generate the
'new' branch instruction. This will result in warnings from
aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm(), and ftrace_modify_code() will replace
the 'old' branch with a BRK. This will result in a kernel panic when
this BRK is later executed.
Practically speaking, case (a) is vastly more likely than case (b), and
typically this will result in internal ftrace errors that don't
necessarily affect the rest of the system. This can be demonstrated with
an out-of-tree test module which triggers ftrace_modify_call(), e.g.
| # insmod test_ftrace.ko
| test_ftrace: Function test_function raw=0xffffb3749399201c, callsite=0xffffb37493992024
| branch_imm_common: offset out of range
| branch_imm_common: offset out of range
| ------------[ ftrace bug ]------------
| ftrace failed to modify
| [<ffffb37493992024>] test_function+0x8/0x38 [test_ftrace]
| actual: 1d:00:00:94
| Updating ftrace call site to call a different ftrace function
| ftrace record flags: e0000002
| (2) R
| expected tramp: ffffb374ae42ed54
| ------------[ cut here ]------------
| WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 165 at kernel/trace/ftrace.c:2085 ftrace_bug+0x280/0x2b0
| Modules linked in: test_ftrace(+)
| CPU: 0 PID: 165 Comm: insmod Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-00002-g4d9ead8b45ce #13
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : ftrace_bug+0x280/0x2b0
| lr : ftrace_bug+0x280/0x2b0
| sp : ffff80000839ba00
| x29: ffff80000839ba00 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff80000839bcf0
| x26: ffffb37493994180 x25: ffffb374b0991c28 x24: ffffb374b0d70000
| x23: 00000000ffffffea x22: ffffb374afcc33b0 x21: ffffb374b08f9cc8
| x20: ffff572b8462c000 x19: ffffb374b08f9000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
| x17: 6c6c6163202c6331 x16: ffffb374ae5ad110 x15: ffffb374b0d51ee4
| x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 3435646532346561 x12: 3437336266666666
| x11: 203a706d61727420 x10: 6465746365707865 x9 : ffffb374ae5149e8
| x8 : 336266666666203a x7 : 706d617274206465 x6 : 00000000fffff167
| x5 : ffff572bffbc4a08 x4 : 00000000fffff167 x3 : 0000000000000000
| x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff572b84461e00 x0 : 0000000000000022
| Call trace:
| ftrace_bug+0x280/0x2b0
| ftrace_replace_code+0x98/0xa0
| ftrace_modify_all_code+0xe0/0x144
| arch_ftrace_update_code+0x14/0x20
| ftrace_startup+0xf8/0x1b0
| register_ftrace_function+0x38/0x90
| test_ftrace_init+0xd0/0x1000 [test_ftrace]
| do_one_initcall+0x50/0x2b0
| do_init_module+0x50/0x1f0
| load_module+0x17c8/0x1d64
| __do_sys_finit_module+0xa8/0x100
| __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x2c/0x3c
| invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120
| el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xdc/0x100
| do_el0_svc+0x3c/0xd0
| el0_svc+0x34/0xb0
| el0t_64_sync_handler+0xbc/0x140
| el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190
| ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
We can solve this by consistently determining whether to use a PLT entry
for an address.
Note that since (the earlier) commit:
f1a54ae9
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49720

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: Fix handling of offline queues in blk_mq_alloc_request_hctx()
This patch prevents that test nvme/004 triggers the following:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in block/blk-mq.h:135:9
index 512 is out of range for type 'long unsigned int [512]'
Call Trace:
show_stack+0x52/0x58
dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x5e
dump_stack+0x10/0x12
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x3b
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49
blk_mq_alloc_request_hctx+0x304/0x310
__nvme_submit_sync_cmd+0x70/0x200 [nvme_core]
nvmf_connect_io_queue+0x23e/0x2a0 [nvme_fabrics]
nvme_loop_connect_io_queues+0x8d/0xb0 [nvme_loop]
nvme_loop_create_ctrl+0x58e/0x7d0 [nvme_loop]
nvmf_create_ctrl+0x1d7/0x4d0 [nvme_fabrics]
nvmf_dev_write+0xae/0x111 [nvme_fabrics]
vfs_write+0x144/0x560
ksys_write+0xb7/0x140
__x64_sys_write+0x42/0x50
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49708

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix bug_on ext4_mb_use_inode_pa
Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON:
==================================================================
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/mballoc.c:3211!
[...]
RIP: 0010:ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used.cold+0x85/0x136f
[...]
Call Trace:
ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x9df/0x5d30
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x1803/0x4d80
ext4_map_blocks+0x3a4/0x1a10
ext4_writepages+0x126d/0x2c30
do_writepages+0x7f/0x1b0
__filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x285/0x3b0
file_write_and_wait_range+0xb1/0x140
ext4_sync_file+0x1aa/0xca0
vfs_fsync_range+0xfb/0x260
do_fsync+0x48/0xa0
[...]
==================================================================
Above issue may happen as follows:
-------------------------------------
do_fsync
vfs_fsync_range
ext4_sync_file
file_write_and_wait_range
__filemap_fdatawrite_range
do_writepages
ext4_writepages
mpage_map_and_submit_extent
mpage_map_one_extent
ext4_map_blocks
ext4_mb_new_blocks
ext4_mb_normalize_request
>>> start + size <= ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical
ext4_mb_regular_allocator
ext4_mb_simple_scan_group
ext4_mb_use_best_found
ext4_mb_new_preallocation
ext4_mb_new_inode_pa
ext4_mb_use_inode_pa
>>> set ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len <= 0
ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used
>>> BUG_ON(ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len <= 0);
we can easily reproduce this problem with the following commands:
`fallocate -l100M disk`
`mkfs.ext4 -b 1024 -g 256 disk`
`mount disk /mnt`
`fsstress -d /mnt -l 0 -n 1000 -p 1`
The size must be smaller than or equal to EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP.
Therefore, "start + size <= ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical" may occur
when the size is truncated. So start should be the start position of
the group where ac_o_ex.fe_logical is located after alignment.
In addition, when the value of fe_logical or EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP
is very large, the value calculated by start_off is more accurate.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49700

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/slub: add missing TID updates on slab deactivation
The fastpath in slab_alloc_node() assumes that c->slab is stable as long as
the TID stays the same. However, two places in __slab_alloc() currently
don't update the TID when deactivating the CPU slab.
If multiple operations race the right way, this could lead to an object
getting lost; or, in an even more unlikely situation, it could even lead to
an object being freed onto the wrong slab's freelist, messing up the
`inuse` counter and eventually causing a page to be freed to the page
allocator while it still contains slab objects.
(I haven't actually tested these cases though, this is just based on
looking at the code. Writing testcases for this stuff seems like it'd be
a pain...)
The race leading to state inconsistency is (all operations on the same CPU
and kmem_cache):
- task A: begin do_slab_free():
- read TID
- read pcpu freelist (==NULL)
- check `slab == c->slab` (true)
- [PREEMPT A->B]
- task B: begin slab_alloc_node():
- fastpath fails (`c->freelist` is NULL)
- enter __slab_alloc()
- slub_get_cpu_ptr() (disables preemption)
- enter ___slab_alloc()
- take local_lock_irqsave()
- read c->freelist as NULL
- get_freelist() returns NULL
- write `c->slab = NULL`
- drop local_unlock_irqrestore()
- goto new_slab
- slub_percpu_partial() is NULL
- get_partial() returns NULL
- slub_put_cpu_ptr() (enables preemption)
- [PREEMPT B->A]
- task A: finish do_slab_free():
- this_cpu_cmpxchg_double() succeeds()
- [CORRUPT STATE: c->slab==NULL, c->freelist!=NULL]
From there, the object on c->freelist will get lost if task B is allowed to
continue from here: It will proceed to the retry_load_slab label,
set c->slab, then jump to load_freelist, which clobbers c->freelist.
But if we instead continue as follows, we get worse corruption:
- task A: run __slab_free() on object from other struct slab:
- CPU_PARTIAL_FREE case (slab was on no list, is now on pcpu partial)
- task A: run slab_alloc_node() with NUMA node constraint:
- fastpath fails (c->slab is NULL)
- call __slab_alloc()
- slub_get_cpu_ptr() (disables preemption)
- enter ___slab_alloc()
- c->slab is NULL: goto new_slab
- slub_percpu_partial() is non-NULL
- set c->slab to slub_percpu_partial(c)
- [CORRUPT STATE: c->slab points to slab-1, c->freelist has objects
from slab-2]
- goto redo
- node_match() fails
- goto deactivate_slab
- existing c->freelist is passed into deactivate_slab()
- inuse count of slab-1 is decremented to account for object from
slab-2
At this point, the inuse count of slab-1 is 1 lower than it should be.
This means that if we free all allocated objects in slab-1 except for one,
SLUB will think that slab-1 is completely unused, and may free its page,
leading to use-after-free.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49697

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix request_sock leak in sk lookup helpers
A customer reported a request_socket leak in a Calico cloud environment. We
found that a BPF program was doing a socket lookup with takes a refcnt on
the socket and that it was finding the request_socket but returning the parent
LISTEN socket via sk_to_full_sk() without decrementing the child request socket
1st, resulting in request_sock slab object leak. This patch retains the
existing behaviour of returning full socks to the caller but it also decrements
the child request_socket if one is present before doing so to prevent the leak.
Thanks to Curtis Taylor for all the help in diagnosing and testing this. And
thanks to Antoine Tenart for the reproducer and patch input.
v2 of this patch contains, refactor as per Daniel Borkmann's suggestions to
validate RCU flags on the listen socket so that it balances with bpf_sk_release()
and update comments as per Martin KaFai Lau's suggestion. One small change to
Daniels suggestion, put "sk = sk2" under "if (sk2 != sk)" to avoid an extra
instruction.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49696

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix use-after-free Read in tipc_named_reinit
syzbot found the following issue on:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tipc_named_reinit+0x94f/0x9b0
net/tipc/name_distr.c:413
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88805299a000 by task kworker/1:9/23764
CPU: 1 PID: 23764 Comm: kworker/1:9 Not tainted
5.18.0-rc4-syzkaller-00878-g17d49e6e8012 #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events tipc_net_finalize_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xeb/0x495
mm/kasan/report.c:313
print_report mm/kasan/report.c:429 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0xf4/0x1c6 mm/kasan/report.c:491
tipc_named_reinit+0x94f/0x9b0 net/tipc/name_distr.c:413
tipc_net_finalize+0x234/0x3d0 net/tipc/net.c:138
process_one_work+0x996/0x1610 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:298
</TASK>
[...]
==================================================================
In the commit
d966ddcc3821 ("tipc: fix a deadlock when flushing scheduled work"),
the cancel_work_sync() function just to make sure ONLY the work
tipc_net_finalize_work() is executing/pending on any CPU completed before
tipc namespace is destroyed through tipc_exit_net(). But this function
is not guaranteed the work is the last queued. So, the destroyed instance
may be accessed in the work which will try to enqueue later.
In order to completely fix, we re-order the calling of cancel_work_sync()
to make sure the work tipc_net_finalize_work() was last queued and it
must be completed by calling cancel_work_sync().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49691

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erspan: do not assume transport header is always set
Rewrite tests in ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit() and
erspan_fb_xmit() to not assume transport header is set.
syzbot reported:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1350 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2911 skb_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2911 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1350 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2911 ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit+0x15af/0x2eb0 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:963
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1350 Comm: aoe_tx0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-syzkaller-00160-g274295c6e53f #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:skb_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2911 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit+0x15af/0x2eb0 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:963
Code: 0f 47 f0 40 88 b5 7f fe ff ff e8 8c 16 4b f9 89 de bf ff ff ff ff e8 a0 12 4b f9 66 83 fb ff 0f 85 1d f1 ff ff e8 71 16 4b f9 <0f> 0b e9 43 f0 ff ff e8 65 16 4b f9 48 8d 85 30 ff ff ff ba 60 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005daf910 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000ffff RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88801f032100 RSI: ffffffff882e8d3f RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: ffffc90005dafab8 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 000000000000ffff
R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888024f21d40
R13: 000000000000a288 R14: 00000000000000b0 R15: ffff888025a2e000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88802c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b2e425000 CR3: 000000006d099000 CR4: 0000000000152ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4805 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4819 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3588 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x188/0x880 net/core/dev.c:3604
sch_direct_xmit+0x19f/0xbe0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:342
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3815 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x14a1/0x3900 net/core/dev.c:4219
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:2994 [inline]
tx+0x6a/0xc0 drivers/block/aoe/aoenet.c:63
kthread+0x1e7/0x3b0 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1229
kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:302
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49687

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_net: fix xdp_rxq_info bug after suspend/resume
The following sequence currently causes a driver bug warning
when using virtio_net:
# ip link set eth0 up
# echo mem > /sys/power/state (or e.g. # rtcwake -s 10 -m mem)
<resume>
# ip link set eth0 down
Missing register, driver bug
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 375 at net/core/xdp.c:138 xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x58/0x60
Call trace:
xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x58/0x60
virtnet_close+0x58/0xac
__dev_close_many+0xac/0x140
__dev_change_flags+0xd8/0x210
dev_change_flags+0x24/0x64
do_setlink+0x230/0xdd0
...
This happens because virtnet_freeze() frees the receive_queue
completely (including struct xdp_rxq_info) but does not call
xdp_rxq_info_unreg(). Similarly, virtnet_restore() sets up the
receive_queue again but does not call xdp_rxq_info_reg().
Actually, parts of virtnet_freeze_down() and virtnet_restore_up()
are almost identical to virtnet_close() and virtnet_open(): only
the calls to xdp_rxq_info_(un)reg() are missing. This means that
we can fix this easily and avoid such problems in the future by
just calling virtnet_close()/open() from the freeze/restore handlers.
Aside from adding the missing xdp_rxq_info calls the only difference
is that the refill work is only cancelled if netif_running(). However,
this should not make any functional difference since the refill work
should only be active if the network interface is actually up.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49675

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tick/nohz: unexport __init-annotated tick_nohz_full_setup()
EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text
section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot
use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up
with kernel panic.
modpost used to detect it, but it had been broken for a decade.
Commit 28438794aba4 ("modpost: fix section mismatch check for exported
init/exit sections") fixed it so modpost started to warn it again, then
this showed up:
MODPOST vmlinux.symvers
WARNING: modpost: vmlinux.o(___ksymtab_gpl+tick_nohz_full_setup+0x0): Section mismatch in reference from the variable __ksymtab_tick_nohz_full_setup to the function .init.text:tick_nohz_full_setup()
The symbol tick_nohz_full_setup is exported and annotated __init
Fix this by removing the __init annotation of tick_nohz_full_setup or drop the export.
Drop the export because tick_nohz_full_setup() is only called from the
built-in code in kernel/sched/isolation.c.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49670

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
linux/dim: Fix divide by 0 in RDMA DIM
Fix a divide 0 error in rdma_dim_stats_compare() when prev->cpe_ratio ==
0.
CallTrace:
Hardware name: H3C R4900 G3/RS33M2C9S, BIOS 2.00.37P21 03/12/2020
task: ffff880194b78000 task.stack: ffffc90006714000
RIP: 0010:backport_rdma_dim+0x10e/0x240 [mlx_compat]
RSP: 0018:ffff880c10e83ec0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000002710 RBX: ffff88096cd7f780 RCX: 0000000000000064
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000001d7c6c09
R13: ffff88096cd7f780 R14: ffff880b174fe800 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880c10e80000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000a0965b00 CR3: 000000000200a003 CR4: 00000000007606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
ib_poll_handler+0x43/0x80 [ib_core]
irq_poll_softirq+0xae/0x110
__do_softirq+0xd1/0x28c
irq_exit+0xde/0xf0
do_IRQ+0x54/0xe0
common_interrupt+0x8f/0x8f
</IRQ>
? cpuidle_enter_state+0xd9/0x2a0
? cpuidle_enter_state+0xc7/0x2a0
? do_idle+0x170/0x1d0
? cpu_startup_entry+0x6f/0x80
? start_secondary+0x1b9/0x210
? secondary_startup_64+0xa5/0xb0
Code: 0f 87 e1 00 00 00 8b 4c 24 14 44 8b 43 14 89 c8 4d 63 c8 44 29 c0 99 31 d0 29 d0 31 d2 48 98 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 80 48 c1 e0 02 <49> f7 f1 48 83 f8 0a 0f 86 c1 00 00 00 44 39 c1 7f 10 48 89 df
RIP: backport_rdma_dim+0x10e/0x240 [mlx_compat] RSP: ffff880c10e83ec0

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49667

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bonding: fix use-after-free after 802.3ad slave unbind
commit 0622cab0341c ("bonding: fix 802.3ad aggregator reselection"),
resolve case, when there is several aggregation groups in the same bond.
bond_3ad_unbind_slave will invalidate (clear) aggregator when
__agg_active_ports return zero. So, ad_clear_agg can be executed even, when
num_of_ports!=0. Than bond_3ad_unbind_slave can be executed again for,
previously cleared aggregator. NOTE: at this time bond_3ad_unbind_slave
will not update slave ports list, because lag_ports==NULL. So, here we
got slave ports, pointing to freed aggregator memory.
Fix with checking actual number of ports in group (as was before
commit 0622cab0341c ("bonding: fix 802.3ad aggregator reselection") ),
before ad_clear_agg().
The KASAN logs are as follows:
[ 767.617392] ==================================================================
[ 767.630776] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bond_3ad_state_machine_handler+0x13dc/0x1470
[ 767.638764] Read of size 2 at addr ffff00011ba9d430 by task kworker/u8:7/767
[ 767.647361] CPU: 3 PID: 767 Comm: kworker/u8:7 Tainted: G O 5.15.11 #15
[ 767.655329] Hardware name: DNI AmazonGo1 A7040 board (DT)
[ 767.660760] Workqueue: lacp_1 bond_3ad_state_machine_handler
[ 767.666468] Call trace:
[ 767.668930] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2d0
[ 767.672625] show_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 767.675965] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84
[ 767.679659] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2b8
[ 767.685451] kasan_report+0x1f0/0x260
[ 767.689148] __asan_load2+0x94/0xd0
[ 767.692667] bond_3ad_state_machine_handler+0x13dc/0x1470

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49666

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/memhotplug: Add add_pages override for PPC
With commit ffa0b64e3be5 ("powerpc: Fix virt_addr_valid() for 64-bit Book3E & 32-bit")
the kernel now validate the addr against high_memory value. This results
in the below BUG_ON with dax pfns.
[ 635.798741][T26531] kernel BUG at mm/page_alloc.c:5521!
1:mon> e
cpu 0x1: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c000000007287630]
pc: c00000000055ed48: free_pages.part.0+0x48/0x110
lr: c00000000053ca70: tlb_finish_mmu+0x80/0xd0
sp: c0000000072878d0
msr: 800000000282b033
current = 0xc00000000afabe00
paca = 0xc00000037ffff300 irqmask: 0x03 irq_happened: 0x05
pid = 26531, comm = 50-landscape-sy
kernel BUG at :5521!
Linux version 5.19.0-rc3-14659-g4ec05be7c2e1 (kvaneesh@ltc-boston8) (gcc (Ubuntu 9.4.0-1ubuntu1~20.04.1) 9.4.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Ubuntu) 2.34) #625 SMP Thu Jun 23 00:35:43 CDT 2022
1:mon> t
[link register ] c00000000053ca70 tlb_finish_mmu+0x80/0xd0
[c0000000072878d0] c00000000053ca54 tlb_finish_mmu+0x64/0xd0 (unreliable)
[c000000007287900] c000000000539424 exit_mmap+0xe4/0x2a0
[c0000000072879e0] c00000000019fc1c mmput+0xcc/0x210
[c000000007287a20] c000000000629230 begin_new_exec+0x5e0/0xf40
[c000000007287ae0] c00000000070b3cc load_elf_binary+0x3ac/0x1e00
[c000000007287c10] c000000000627af0 bprm_execve+0x3b0/0xaf0
[c000000007287cd0] c000000000628414 do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x1e4/0x310
[c000000007287d80] c00000000062858c sys_execve+0x4c/0x60
[c000000007287db0] c00000000002c1b0 system_call_exception+0x160/0x2c0
[c000000007287e10] c00000000000c53c system_call_common+0xec/0x250
The fix is to make sure we update high_memory on memory hotplug.
This is similar to what x86 does in commit 3072e413e305 ("mm/memory_hotplug: introduce add_pages")

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49664

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: move bc link creation back to tipc_node_create
Shuang Li reported a NULL pointer dereference crash:
[] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000068
[] RIP: 0010:tipc_link_is_up+0x5/0x10 [tipc]
[] Call Trace:
[] <IRQ>
[] tipc_bcast_rcv+0xa2/0x190 [tipc]
[] tipc_node_bc_rcv+0x8b/0x200 [tipc]
[] tipc_rcv+0x3af/0x5b0 [tipc]
[] tipc_udp_recv+0xc7/0x1e0 [tipc]
It was caused by the 'l' passed into tipc_bcast_rcv() is NULL. When it
creates a node in tipc_node_check_dest(), after inserting the new node
into hashtable in tipc_node_create(), it creates the bc link. However,
there is a gap between this insert and bc link creation, a bc packet
may come in and get the node from the hashtable then try to dereference
its bc link, which is NULL.
This patch is to fix it by moving the bc link creation before inserting
into the hashtable.
Note that for a preliminary node becoming "real", the bc link creation
should also be called before it's rehashed, as we don't create it for
preliminary nodes.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49662

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix lockdep splat in in6_dump_addrs()
As reported by syzbot, we should not use rcu_dereference()
when rcu_read_lock() is not held.
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.19.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
net/ipv6/addrconf.c:5175 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by syz-executor326/3617:
#0: ffffffff8d5848e8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netlink_dump+0xae/0xc20 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2223
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 3617 Comm: syz-executor326 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
in6_dump_addrs+0x12d1/0x1790 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:5175
inet6_dump_addr+0x9c1/0xb50 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:5300
netlink_dump+0x541/0xc20 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2275
__netlink_dump_start+0x647/0x900 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2380
netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:245 [inline]
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x73e/0xc90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6046
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x543/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
netlink_sendmsg+0x917/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:734
____sys_sendmsg+0x6eb/0x810 net/socket.c:2492
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2546
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2575 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x132/0x220 net/socket.c:2582
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49658

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix insufficient bounds propagation from adjust_scalar_min_max_vals
Kuee reported a corner case where the tnum becomes constant after the call
to __reg_bound_offset(), but the register's bounds are not, that is, its
min bounds are still not equal to the register's max bounds.
This in turn allows to leak pointers through turning a pointer register as
is into an unknown scalar via adjust_ptr_min_max_vals().
Before:
func#0 @0
0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
0: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))
1: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
2: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()
3: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()
4: (47) r3 |= 32767 ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)
5: (75) if r3 s>= 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
6: (95) exit
from 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
7: (d5) if r3 s<= 0x8000 goto pc+1 ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
8: (95) exit
from 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
9: (07) r3 += -32767 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) <--- [*]
10: (95) exit
What can be seen here is that R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff;
0x8000)) after the operation R3 += -32767 results in a 'malformed' constant, that
is, R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)). Intersecting with var_off has
not been done at that point via __update_reg_bounds(), which would have improved
the umax to be equal to umin.
Refactor the tnum <> min/max bounds information flow into a reg_bounds_sync()
helper and use it consistently everywhere. After the fix, bounds have been
corrected to R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) and thus the register
is regarded as a 'proper' constant scalar of 0.
After:
func#0 @0
0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
0: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))
1: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
2: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()
3: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()
4: (47) r3 |= 32767 ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)
5: (75) if r3 s>= 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
6: (95) exit
from 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
7: (d5) if r3 s<= 0x8000 goto pc+1 ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
8: (95) exit
from 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49655

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fscache: Fix invalidation/lookup race
If an NFS file is opened for writing and closed, fscache_invalidate() will
be asked to invalidate the file - however, if the cookie is in the
LOOKING_UP state (or the CREATING state), then request to invalidate
doesn't get recorded for fscache_cookie_state_machine() to do something
with.
Fix this by making __fscache_invalidate() set a flag if it sees the cookie
is in the LOOKING_UP state to indicate that we need to go to invalidation.
Note that this requires a count on the n_accesses counter for the state
machine, which that will release when it's done.
fscache_cookie_state_machine() then shifts to the INVALIDATING state if it
sees the flag.
Without this, an nfs file can get corrupted if it gets modified locally and
then read locally as the cache contents may not get updated.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49647

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup: Use separate src/dst nodes when preloading css_sets for migration
Each cset (css_set) is pinned by its tasks. When we're moving tasks around
across csets for a migration, we need to hold the source and destination
csets to ensure that they don't go away while we're moving tasks about. This
is done by linking cset->mg_preload_node on either the
mgctx->preloaded_src_csets or mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets list. Using the
same cset->mg_preload_node for both the src and dst lists was deemed okay as
a cset can't be both the source and destination at the same time.
Unfortunately, this overloading becomes problematic when multiple tasks are
involved in a migration and some of them are identity noop migrations while
others are actually moving across cgroups. For example, this can happen with
the following sequence on cgroup1:
#1> mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b
#2> echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs
#3> RUN_A_COMMAND_WHICH_CREATES_MULTIPLE_THREADS &
#4> PID=$!
#5> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b/tasks
#6> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs
the process including the group leader back into a. In this final migration,
non-leader threads would be doing identity migration while the group leader
is doing an actual one.
After #3, let's say the whole process was in cset A, and that after #4, the
leader moves to cset B. Then, during #6, the following happens:
1. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on B for the leader.
2. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on A for the other threads.
3. cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst() is called. It scans the src list.
4. It notices that B wants to migrate to A, so it tries to A to the dst
list but realizes that its ->mg_preload_node is already busy.
5. and then it notices A wants to migrate to A as it's an identity
migration, it culls it by list_del_init()'ing its ->mg_preload_node and
putting references accordingly.
6. The rest of migration takes place with B on the src list but nothing on
the dst list.
This means that A isn't held while migration is in progress. If all tasks
leave A before the migration finishes and the incoming task pins it, the
cset will be destroyed leading to use-after-free.
This is caused by overloading cset->mg_preload_node for both src and dst
preload lists. We wanted to exclude the cset from the src list but ended up
inadvertently excluding it from the dst list too.
This patch fixes the issue by separating out cset->mg_preload_node into
->mg_src_preload_node and ->mg_dst_preload_node, so that the src and dst
preloadings don't interfere with each other.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49626

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sfc: fix use after free when disabling sriov
Use after free is detected by kfence when disabling sriov. What was read
after being freed was vf->pci_dev: it was freed from pci_disable_sriov
and later read in efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vports, called from
efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vswitching.
Set the pointer to NULL at release time to not trying to read it later.
Reproducer and dmesg log (note that kfence doesn't detect it every time):
$ echo 1 > /sys/class/net/enp65s0f0np0/device/sriov_numvfs
$ echo 0 > /sys/class/net/enp65s0f0np0/device/sriov_numvfs
BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vswitching+0x82/0x170 [sfc]
Use-after-free read at 0x00000000ff3c1ba5 (in kfence-#224):
efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vswitching+0x82/0x170 [sfc]
efx_ef10_pci_sriov_disable+0x38/0x70 [sfc]
efx_pci_sriov_configure+0x24/0x40 [sfc]
sriov_numvfs_store+0xfe/0x140
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0
new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0
vfs_write+0x1eb/0x280
ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
kfence-#224: 0x00000000edb8ef95-0x00000000671f5ce1, size=2792, cache=kmalloc-4k
allocated by task 6771 on cpu 10 at 3137.860196s:
pci_alloc_dev+0x21/0x60
pci_iov_add_virtfn+0x2a2/0x320
sriov_enable+0x212/0x3e0
efx_ef10_sriov_configure+0x67/0x80 [sfc]
efx_pci_sriov_configure+0x24/0x40 [sfc]
sriov_numvfs_store+0xba/0x140
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0
new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0
vfs_write+0x1eb/0x280
ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
freed by task 6771 on cpu 12 at 3170.991309s:
device_release+0x34/0x90
kobject_cleanup+0x3a/0x130
pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0xd9/0x120
sriov_disable+0x30/0xe0
efx_ef10_pci_sriov_disable+0x57/0x70 [sfc]
efx_pci_sriov_configure+0x24/0x40 [sfc]
sriov_numvfs_store+0xfe/0x140
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0
new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0
vfs_write+0x1eb/0x280
ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49624

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atlantic: remove aq_nic_deinit() when resume
aq_nic_deinit() has been called while suspending, so we don't have to call
it again on resume.
Actually, call it again leads to another hang issue when resuming from
S3.
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992345] Call Trace:
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992346] <TASK>
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992348] aq_nic_deinit+0xb4/0xd0 [atlantic]
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992356] aq_pm_thaw+0x7f/0x100 [atlantic]
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992362] pci_pm_resume+0x5c/0x90
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992366] ? pci_pm_thaw+0x80/0x80
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992368] dpm_run_callback+0x4e/0x120
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992371] device_resume+0xad/0x200
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992373] async_resume+0x1e/0x40
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992374] async_run_entry_fn+0x33/0x120
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992377] process_one_work+0x220/0x3c0
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992380] worker_thread+0x4d/0x3f0
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992382] ? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992384] kthread+0x12a/0x150
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992386] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992387] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992391] </TASK>
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992392] ---[ end trace 1ec8c79604ed5e0d ]---
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992394] PM: dpm_run_callback(): pci_pm_resume+0x0/0x90 returns -110
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992397] atlantic 0000:02:00.0: PM: failed to resume async: error -110

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49613

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: 8250: Fix PM usage_count for console handover
When console is enabled, univ8250_console_setup() calls
serial8250_console_setup() before .dev is set to uart_port. Therefore,
it will not call pm_runtime_get_sync(). Later, when the actual driver
is going to take over univ8250_console_exit() is called. As .dev is
already set, serial8250_console_exit() makes pm_runtime_put_sync() call
with usage count being zero triggering PM usage count warning
(extra debug for univ8250_console_setup(), univ8250_console_exit(), and
serial8250_register_ports()):
[ 0.068987] univ8250_console_setup ttyS0 nodev
[ 0.499670] printk: console [ttyS0] enabled
[ 0.717955] printk: console [ttyS0] printing thread started
[ 1.960163] serial8250_register_ports assigned dev for ttyS0
[ 1.976830] printk: console [ttyS0] disabled
[ 1.976888] printk: console [ttyS0] printing thread stopped
[ 1.977073] univ8250_console_exit ttyS0 usage:0
[ 1.977075] serial8250 serial8250: Runtime PM usage count underflow!
[ 1.977429] dw-apb-uart.6: ttyS0 at MMIO 0x4010006000 (irq = 33, base_baud = 115200) is a 16550A
[ 1.977812] univ8250_console_setup ttyS0 usage:2
[ 1.978167] printk: console [ttyS0] printing thread started
[ 1.978203] printk: console [ttyS0] enabled
To fix the issue, call pm_runtime_get_sync() in
serial8250_register_ports() as soon as .dev is set for an uart_port
if it has console enabled.
This problem became apparent only recently because 82586a721595 ("PM:
runtime: Avoid device usage count underflows") added the warning
printout. I confirmed this problem also occurs with v5.18 (w/o the
warning printout, obviously).

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49605

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
igc: Reinstate IGC_REMOVED logic and implement it properly
The initially merged version of the igc driver code (via commit
146740f9abc4, "igc: Add support for PF") contained the following
IGC_REMOVED checks in the igc_rd32/wr32() MMIO accessors:
u32 igc_rd32(struct igc_hw *hw, u32 reg)
{
u8 __iomem *hw_addr = READ_ONCE(hw->hw_addr);
u32 value = 0;
if (IGC_REMOVED(hw_addr))
return ~value;
value = readl(&hw_addr[reg]);
/* reads should not return all F's */
if (!(~value) && (!reg || !(~readl(hw_addr))))
hw->hw_addr = NULL;
return value;
}
And:
#define wr32(reg, val) \
do { \
u8 __iomem *hw_addr = READ_ONCE((hw)->hw_addr); \
if (!IGC_REMOVED(hw_addr)) \
writel((val), &hw_addr[(reg)]); \
} while (0)
E.g. igb has similar checks in its MMIO accessors, and has a similar
macro E1000_REMOVED, which is implemented as follows:
#define E1000_REMOVED(h) unlikely(!(h))
These checks serve to detect and take note of an 0xffffffff MMIO read
return from the device, which can be caused by a PCIe link flap or some
other kind of PCI bus error, and to avoid performing MMIO reads and
writes from that point onwards.
However, the IGC_REMOVED macro was not originally implemented:
#ifndef IGC_REMOVED
#define IGC_REMOVED(a) (0)
#endif /* IGC_REMOVED */
This led to the IGC_REMOVED logic to be removed entirely in a
subsequent commit (commit 3c215fb18e70, "igc: remove IGC_REMOVED
function"), with the rationale that such checks matter only for
virtualization and that igc does not support virtualization -- but a
PCIe device can become detached even without virtualization being in
use, and without proper checks, a PCIe bus error affecting an igc
adapter will lead to various NULL pointer dereferences, as the first
access after the error will set hw->hw_addr to NULL, and subsequent
accesses will blindly dereference this now-NULL pointer.
This patch reinstates the IGC_REMOVED checks in igc_rd32/wr32(), and
implements IGC_REMOVED the way it is done for igb, by checking for the
unlikely() case of hw_addr being NULL. This change prevents the oopses
seen when a PCIe link flap occurs on an igc adapter.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49560

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exfat: check if cluster num is valid
Syzbot reported slab-out-of-bounds read in exfat_clear_bitmap.
This was triggered by reproducer calling truncute with size 0,
which causes the following trace:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in exfat_clear_bitmap+0x147/0x490 fs/exfat/balloc.c:174
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888115aa9508 by task syz-executor251/365
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1e2/0x24b lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description+0x81/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:233
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:419 [inline]
kasan_report+0x1a4/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:436
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:309
exfat_clear_bitmap+0x147/0x490 fs/exfat/balloc.c:174
exfat_free_cluster+0x25a/0x4a0 fs/exfat/fatent.c:181
__exfat_truncate+0x99e/0xe00 fs/exfat/file.c:217
exfat_truncate+0x11b/0x4f0 fs/exfat/file.c:243
exfat_setattr+0xa03/0xd40 fs/exfat/file.c:339
notify_change+0xb76/0xe10 fs/attr.c:336
do_truncate+0x1ea/0x2d0 fs/open.c:65
Move the is_valid_cluster() helper from fatent.c to a common
header to make it reusable in other *.c files. And add is_valid_cluster()
to validate if cluster number is within valid range in exfat_clear_bitmap()
and exfat_set_bitmap().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49559

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Drop WARNs that assert a triple fault never "escapes" from L2
Remove WARNs that sanity check that KVM never lets a triple fault for L2
escape and incorrectly end up in L1. In normal operation, the sanity
check is perfectly valid, but it incorrectly assumes that it's impossible
for userspace to induce KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT without bouncing through
KVM_RUN (which guarantees kvm_check_nested_state() will see and handle
the triple fault).
The WARN can currently be triggered if userspace injects a machine check
while L2 is active and CR4.MCE=0. And a future fix to allow save/restore
of KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, e.g. so that a synthesized triple fault isn't
lost on migration, will make it trivially easy for userspace to trigger
the WARN.
Clearing KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT when forcibly leaving guest mode is
tempting, but wrong, especially if/when the request is saved/restored,
e.g. if userspace restores events (including a triple fault) and then
restores nested state (which may forcibly leave guest mode). Ignoring
the fact that KVM doesn't currently provide the necessary APIs, it's
userspace's responsibility to manage pending events during save/restore.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1399 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4522 nested_vmx_vmexit+0x7fe/0xd90 [kvm_intel]
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
CPU: 7 PID: 1399 Comm: state_test Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3+ #808
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:nested_vmx_vmexit+0x7fe/0xd90 [kvm_intel]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
vmx_set_nested_state+0xca/0x3e0 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xf49/0x13e0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4b9/0x660 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49543

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ath11k: fix the warning of dev_wake in mhi_pm_disable_transition()
When test device recovery with below command, it has warning in message
as below.
echo assert > /sys/kernel/debug/ath11k/wcn6855\ hw2.0/simulate_fw_crash
echo assert > /sys/kernel/debug/ath11k/qca6390\ hw2.0/simulate_fw_crash
warning message:
[ 1965.642121] ath11k_pci 0000:06:00.0: simulating firmware assert crash
[ 1968.471364] ieee80211 phy0: Hardware restart was requested
[ 1968.511305] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1968.511368] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1546 at drivers/bus/mhi/core/pm.c:505 mhi_pm_disable_transition+0xb37/0xda0 [mhi]
[ 1968.511443] Modules linked in: ath11k_pci ath11k mac80211 libarc4 cfg80211 qmi_helpers qrtr_mhi mhi qrtr nvme nvme_core
[ 1968.511563] CPU: 3 PID: 1546 Comm: kworker/u17:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc3-wt-ath+ #579
[ 1968.511629] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7HVK/NUC8i7HVB, BIOS HNKBLi70.86A.0067.2021.0528.1339 05/28/2021
[ 1968.511704] Workqueue: mhi_hiprio_wq mhi_pm_st_worker [mhi]
[ 1968.511787] RIP: 0010:mhi_pm_disable_transition+0xb37/0xda0 [mhi]
[ 1968.511870] Code: a9 fe ff ff 4c 89 ff 44 89 04 24 e8 03 46 f6 e5 44 8b 04 24 41 83 f8 01 0f 84 21 fe ff ff e9 4c fd ff ff 0f 0b e9 af f8 ff ff <0f> 0b e9 5c f8 ff ff 48 89 df e8 da 9e ee e3 e9 12 fd ff ff 4c 89
[ 1968.511923] RSP: 0018:ffffc900024efbf0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 1968.511969] RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: ffff88811d241250 RCX: ffffffffc0176922
[ 1968.512014] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888118a90a24
[ 1968.512059] RBP: ffff888118a90800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888118a90a27
[ 1968.512102] R10: ffffed1023152144 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888118a908ac
[ 1968.512229] R13: ffff888118a90928 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff888118a90a24
[ 1968.512310] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888234200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1968.512405] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1968.512493] CR2: 00007f5538f443a8 CR3: 000000016dc28001 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[ 1968.512587] Call Trace:
[ 1968.512672] <TASK>
[ 1968.512751] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x1f/0x40
[ 1968.512859] mhi_pm_st_worker+0x3ac/0x790 [mhi]
[ 1968.512959] ? mhi_pm_mission_mode_transition.isra.0+0x7d0/0x7d0 [mhi]
[ 1968.513063] process_one_work+0x86a/0x1400
[ 1968.513184] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x230/0x230
[ 1968.513312] ? move_linked_works+0x125/0x290
[ 1968.513416] worker_thread+0x6db/0xf60
[ 1968.513536] ? process_one_work+0x1400/0x1400
[ 1968.513627] kthread+0x241/0x2d0
[ 1968.513733] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 1968.513821] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 1968.513924] </TASK>
Reason is mhi_deassert_dev_wake() from mhi_device_put() is called
but mhi_assert_dev_wake() from __mhi_device_get_sync() is not called
in progress of recovery. Commit 8e0559921f9a ("bus: mhi: core:
Skip device wake in error or shutdown state") add check for the
pm_state of mhi in __mhi_device_get_sync(), and the pm_state is not
the normal state untill recovery is completed, so it leads the
dev_wake is not 0 and above warning print in mhi_pm_disable_transition()
while checking mhi_cntrl->dev_wake.
Add check in ath11k_pci_write32()/ath11k_pci_read32() to skip call
mhi_device_put() if mhi_device_get_sync() does not really do wake,
then the warning gone.
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03003-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-2

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49539

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtw89: ser: fix CAM leaks occurring in L2 reset
The CAM, meaning address CAM and bssid CAM here, will get leaks during
SER (system error recover) L2 reset process and ieee80211_restart_hw()
which is called by L2 reset process eventually.
The normal flow would be like
-> add interface (acquire 1)
-> enter ips (release 1)
-> leave ips (acquire 1)
-> connection (occupy 1) <(A) 1 leak after L2 reset if non-sec connection>
The ieee80211_restart_hw() flow (under connection)
-> ieee80211 reconfig
-> add interface (acquire 1)
-> leave ips (acquire 1)
-> connection (occupy (A) + 2) <(B) 1 more leak>
Originally, CAM is released before HW restart only if connection is under
security. Now, release CAM whatever connection it is to fix leak in (A).
OTOH, check if CAM is already valid to avoid acquiring multiple times to
fix (B).
Besides, if AP mode, release address CAM of all stations before HW restart.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49536

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: lpfc: Fix SCSI I/O completion and abort handler deadlock
During stress I/O tests with 500+ vports, hard LOCKUP call traces are
observed.
CPU A:
native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x192
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x32
lpfc_handle_fcp_err+0x4c6
lpfc_fcp_io_cmd_wqe_cmpl+0x964
lpfc_sli4_fp_handle_cqe+0x266
__lpfc_sli4_process_cq+0x105
__lpfc_sli4_hba_process_cq+0x3c
lpfc_cq_poll_hdler+0x16
irq_poll_softirq+0x76
__softirqentry_text_start+0xe4
irq_exit+0xf7
do_IRQ+0x7f
CPU B:
native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x5b
_raw_spin_lock+0x1c
lpfc_abort_handler+0x13e
scmd_eh_abort_handler+0x85
process_one_work+0x1a7
worker_thread+0x30
kthread+0x112
ret_from_fork+0x1f
Diagram of lockup:
CPUA CPUB
---- ----
lpfc_cmd->buf_lock
phba->hbalock
lpfc_cmd->buf_lock
phba->hbalock
Fix by reordering the taking of the lpfc_cmd->buf_lock and phba->hbalock in
lpfc_abort_handler routine so that it tries to take the lpfc_cmd->buf_lock
first before phba->hbalock.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49535

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: lpfc: Fix null pointer dereference after failing to issue FLOGI and PLOGI
If lpfc_issue_els_flogi() fails and returns non-zero status, the node
reference count is decremented to trigger the release of the nodelist
structure. However, if there is a prior registration or dev-loss-evt work
pending, the node may be released prematurely. When dev-loss-evt
completes, the released node is referenced causing a use-after-free null
pointer dereference.
Similarly, when processing non-zero ELS PLOGI completion status in
lpfc_cmpl_els_plogi(), the ndlp flags are checked for a transport
registration before triggering node removal. If dev-loss-evt work is
pending, the node may be released prematurely and a subsequent call to
lpfc_dev_loss_tmo_handler() results in a use after free ndlp dereference.
Add test for pending dev-loss before decrementing the node reference count
for FLOGI, PLOGI, PRLI, and ADISC handling.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49526

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/bitmap: don't set sb values if can't pass sanity check
If bitmap area contains invalid data, kernel will crash then mdadm
triggers "Segmentation fault".
This is cluster-md speical bug. In non-clustered env, mdadm will
handle broken metadata case. In clustered array, only kernel space
handles bitmap slot info. But even this bug only happened in clustered
env, current sanity check is wrong, the code should be changed.
How to trigger: (faulty injection)
dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=1 oflag=direct of=/dev/sda
dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=1 oflag=direct of=/dev/sdb
mdadm -C /dev/md0 -b clustered -e 1.2 -n 2 -l mirror /dev/sda /dev/sdb
mdadm -Ss
echo aaa > magic.txt
== below modifying slot 2 bitmap data ==
dd if=magic.txt of=/dev/sda seek=16384 bs=1 count=3 <== destroy magic
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda seek=16436 bs=1 count=4 <== ZERO chunksize
mdadm -A /dev/md0 /dev/sda /dev/sdb
== kernel crashes. mdadm outputs "Segmentation fault" ==
Reason of kernel crash:
In md_bitmap_read_sb (called by md_bitmap_create), bad bitmap magic didn't
block chunksize assignment, and zero value made DIV_ROUND_UP_SECTOR_T()
trigger "divide error".
Crash log:
kernel: md: md0 stopped.
kernel: md/raid1:md0: not clean -- starting background reconstruction
kernel: md/raid1:md0: active with 2 out of 2 mirrors
kernel: dlm: ... ...
kernel: md-cluster: Joined cluster 44810aba-38bb-e6b8-daca-bc97a0b254aa slot 1
kernel: md0: invalid bitmap file superblock: bad magic
kernel: md_bitmap_copy_from_slot can't get bitmap from slot 2
kernel: md-cluster: Could not gather bitmaps from slot 2
kernel: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 1603 Comm: mdadm Not tainted 5.14.6-1-default
kernel: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
kernel: RIP: 0010:md_bitmap_create+0x1d1/0x850 [md_mod]
kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffc22ac0843ba0 EFLAGS: 00010246
kernel: ... ...
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: ? dlm_lock_sync+0xd0/0xd0 [md_cluster 77fe..7a0]
kernel: md_bitmap_copy_from_slot+0x2c/0x290 [md_mod 24ea..d3a]
kernel: load_bitmaps+0xec/0x210 [md_cluster 77fe..7a0]
kernel: md_bitmap_load+0x81/0x1e0 [md_mod 24ea..d3a]
kernel: do_md_run+0x30/0x100 [md_mod 24ea..d3a]
kernel: md_ioctl+0x1290/0x15a0 [md_mod 24ea....d3a]
kernel: ? mddev_unlock+0xaa/0x130 [md_mod 24ea..d3a]
kernel: ? blkdev_ioctl+0xb1/0x2b0
kernel: block_ioctl+0x3b/0x40
kernel: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x7f/0xb0
kernel: do_syscall_64+0x59/0x80
kernel: ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ab/0x230
kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x40
kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x80
kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7f4a15fa722b
kernel: ... ...
kernel: ---[ end trace 8afa7612f559c868 ]---
kernel: RIP: 0010:md_bitmap_create+0x1d1/0x850 [md_mod]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49523

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ath11k: disable spectral scan during spectral deinit
When ath11k modules are removed using rmmod with spectral scan enabled,
crash is observed. Different crash trace is observed for each crash.
Send spectral scan disable WMI command to firmware before cleaning
the spectral dbring in the spectral_deinit API to avoid this crash.
call trace from one of the crash observed:
[ 1252.880802] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000008
[ 1252.882722] pgd = 0f42e886
[ 1252.890955] [00000008] *pgd=00000000
[ 1252.893478] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 1253.093035] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.4.89 #0
[ 1253.115261] Hardware name: Generic DT based system
[ 1253.121149] PC is at ath11k_spectral_process_data+0x434/0x574 [ath11k]
[ 1253.125940] LR is at 0x88e31017
[ 1253.132448] pc : [<7f9387b8>] lr : [<88e31017>] psr: a0000193
[ 1253.135488] sp : 80d01bc8 ip : 00000001 fp : 970e0000
[ 1253.141737] r10: 88e31000 r9 : 970ec000 r8 : 00000080
[ 1253.146946] r7 : 94734040 r6 : a0000113 r5 : 00000057 r4 : 00000000
[ 1253.152159] r3 : e18cb694 r2 : 00000217 r1 : 1df1f000 r0 : 00000001
[ 1253.158755] Flags: NzCv IRQs off FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
[ 1253.165266] Control: 10c0383d Table: 5e71006a DAC: 00000055
[ 1253.172472] Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x60870141)
[ 1253.458055] [<7f9387b8>] (ath11k_spectral_process_data [ath11k]) from [<7f917fdc>] (ath11k_dbring_buffer_release_event+0x214/0x2e4 [ath11k])
[ 1253.466139] [<7f917fdc>] (ath11k_dbring_buffer_release_event [ath11k]) from [<7f8ea3c4>] (ath11k_wmi_tlv_op_rx+0x1840/0x29cc [ath11k])
[ 1253.478807] [<7f8ea3c4>] (ath11k_wmi_tlv_op_rx [ath11k]) from [<7f8fe868>] (ath11k_htc_rx_completion_handler+0x180/0x4e0 [ath11k])
[ 1253.490699] [<7f8fe868>] (ath11k_htc_rx_completion_handler [ath11k]) from [<7f91308c>] (ath11k_ce_per_engine_service+0x2c4/0x3b4 [ath11k])
[ 1253.502386] [<7f91308c>] (ath11k_ce_per_engine_service [ath11k]) from [<7f9a4198>] (ath11k_pci_ce_tasklet+0x28/0x80 [ath11k_pci])
[ 1253.514811] [<7f9a4198>] (ath11k_pci_ce_tasklet [ath11k_pci]) from [<8032227c>] (tasklet_action_common.constprop.2+0x64/0xe8)
[ 1253.526476] [<8032227c>] (tasklet_action_common.constprop.2) from [<803021e8>] (__do_softirq+0x130/0x2d0)
[ 1253.537756] [<803021e8>] (__do_softirq) from [<80322610>] (irq_exit+0xcc/0xe8)
[ 1253.547304] [<80322610>] (irq_exit) from [<8036a4a4>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x60/0xb4)
[ 1253.554428] [<8036a4a4>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<805eb348>] (gic_handle_irq+0x4c/0x90)
[ 1253.562321] [<805eb348>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<80301a78>] (__irq_svc+0x58/0x8c)
Tested-on: QCN6122 hw1.0 AHB WLAN.HK.2.6.0.1-00851-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49519

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ath10k: skip ath10k_halt during suspend for driver state RESTARTING
Double free crash is observed when FW recovery(caused by wmi
timeout/crash) is followed by immediate suspend event. The FW recovery
is triggered by ath10k_core_restart() which calls driver clean up via
ath10k_halt(). When the suspend event occurs between the FW recovery,
the restart worker thread is put into frozen state until suspend completes.
The suspend event triggers ath10k_stop() which again triggers ath10k_halt()
The double invocation of ath10k_halt() causes ath10k_htt_rx_free() to be
called twice(Note: ath10k_htt_rx_alloc was not called by restart worker
thread because of its frozen state), causing the crash.
To fix this, during the suspend flow, skip call to ath10k_halt() in
ath10k_stop() when the current driver state is ATH10K_STATE_RESTARTING.
Also, for driver state ATH10K_STATE_RESTARTING, call
ath10k_wait_for_suspend() in ath10k_stop(). This is because call to
ath10k_wait_for_suspend() is skipped later in
[ath10k_halt() > ath10k_core_stop()] for the driver state
ATH10K_STATE_RESTARTING.
The frozen restart worker thread will be cancelled during resume when the
device comes out of suspend.
Below is the crash stack for reference:
[ 428.469167] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 428.469180] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:4150!
[ 428.469193] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 428.469219] Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
[ 428.469230] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x319/0x31b
[ 428.469241] RSP: 0018:ffffa1fac015fc30 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 428.469247] RAX: ffffedb10419d108 RBX: ffff8c05262b0000
[ 428.469252] RDX: ffff8c04a8c07000 RSI: 0000000000000000
[ 428.469256] RBP: ffffa1fac015fc78 R08: 0000000000000000
[ 428.469276] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 428.469285] Call Trace:
[ 428.469295] ? dma_free_attrs+0x5f/0x7d
[ 428.469320] ath10k_core_stop+0x5b/0x6f
[ 428.469336] ath10k_halt+0x126/0x177
[ 428.469352] ath10k_stop+0x41/0x7e
[ 428.469387] drv_stop+0x88/0x10e
[ 428.469410] __ieee80211_suspend+0x297/0x411
[ 428.469441] rdev_suspend+0x6e/0xd0
[ 428.469462] wiphy_suspend+0xb1/0x105
[ 428.469483] ? name_show+0x2d/0x2d
[ 428.469490] dpm_run_callback+0x8c/0x126
[ 428.469511] ? name_show+0x2d/0x2d
[ 428.469517] __device_suspend+0x2e7/0x41b
[ 428.469523] async_suspend+0x1f/0x93
[ 428.469529] async_run_entry_fn+0x3d/0xd1
[ 428.469535] process_one_work+0x1b1/0x329
[ 428.469541] worker_thread+0x213/0x372
[ 428.469547] kthread+0x150/0x15f
[ 428.469552] ? pr_cont_work+0x58/0x58
[ 428.469558] ? kthread_blkcg+0x31/0x31
Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00288-QCARMSWPZ-1

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49518

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: ipc3-topology: Correct get_control_data for non bytes payload
It is possible to craft a topology where sof_get_control_data() would do
out of bounds access because it expects that it is only called when the
payload is bytes type.
Confusingly it also handles other types of controls, but the payload
parsing implementation is only valid for bytes.
Fix the code to count the non bytes controls and instead of storing a
pointer to sof_abi_hdr in sof_widget_data (which is only valid for bytes),
store the pointer to the data itself and add a new member to save the size
of the data.
In case of non bytes controls we store the pointer to the chanv itself,
which is just an array of values at the end.
In case of bytes control, drop the wrong cdata->data (wdata[i].pdata) check
against NULL since it is incorrect and invalid in this context.
The data is pointing to the end of cdata struct, so it should never be
null.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49515

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: cs35l41: Fix an out-of-bounds access in otp_packed_element_t
The CS35L41_NUM_OTP_ELEM is 100, but only 99 entries are defined in
the array otp_map_1/2[CS35L41_NUM_OTP_ELEM], this will trigger UBSAN
to report a shift-out-of-bounds warning in the cs35l41_otp_unpack()
since the last entry in the array will result in GENMASK(-1, 0).
UBSAN reports this problem:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in /home/hwang4/build/jammy/jammy/sound/soc/codecs/cs35l41-lib.c:836:8
shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
CPU: 10 PID: 595 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.15.0-23-generic #23
Hardware name: LENOVO \x02MFG_IN_GO/\x02MFG_IN_GO, BIOS N3GET19W (1.00 ) 03/11/2022
Call Trace:
<TASK>
show_stack+0x52/0x58
dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x5f
dump_stack+0x10/0x12
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x45
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x61/0xef
? regmap_unlock_mutex+0xe/0x10
cs35l41_otp_unpack.cold+0x1c6/0x2b2 [snd_soc_cs35l41_lib]
cs35l41_hda_probe+0x24f/0x33a [snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41]
cs35l41_hda_i2c_probe+0x65/0x90 [snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_i2c]
? cs35l41_hda_i2c_remove+0x20/0x20 [snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_i2c]
i2c_device_probe+0x252/0x2b0

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49513

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: governor: Use kobject release() method to free dbs_data
The struct dbs_data embeds a struct gov_attr_set and
the struct gov_attr_set embeds a kobject. Since every kobject must have
a release() method and we can't use kfree() to free it directly,
so introduce cpufreq_dbs_data_release() to release the dbs_data via
the kobject::release() method. This fixes the calltrace like below:
ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x34
WARNING: CPU: 12 PID: 810 at lib/debugobjects.c:505 debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
Modules linked in:
CPU: 12 PID: 810 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.16.0-next-20220120-yocto-standard+ #536
Hardware name: Marvell OcteonTX CN96XX board (DT)
pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
lr : debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
sp : ffff80001dfcf9a0
x29: ffff80001dfcf9a0 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: ffff0001464f0000
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff8000090e3f00 x24: ffff80000af60210
x23: ffff8000094dfb78 x22: ffff8000090e3f00 x21: ffff0001080b7118
x20: ffff80000aeb2430 x19: ffff800009e8f5e0 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000002 x16: 00004d62e58be040 x15: 013590470523aff8
x14: ffff8000090e1828 x13: 0000000001359047 x12: 00000000f5257d14
x11: 0000000000040591 x10: 0000000066c1ffea x9 : ffff8000080d15e0
x8 : ffff80000a1765a8 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffff800009e8c000 x4 : ffff800009e8c760 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0001474ed040
Call trace:
debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
__debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x1d0/0x25c
debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x24/0xa0
kfree+0x11c/0x440
cpufreq_dbs_governor_exit+0xa8/0xac
cpufreq_exit_governor+0x44/0x90
cpufreq_set_policy+0x29c/0x570
store_scaling_governor+0x110/0x154
store+0xb0/0xe0
sysfs_kf_write+0x58/0x84
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1c0
new_sync_write+0xf0/0x18c
vfs_write+0x1cc/0x220
ksys_write+0x74/0x100
__arm64_sys_write+0x28/0x3c
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x58/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x70/0x170
el0_svc+0x54/0x190
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x130
el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4
irq event stamp: 189006
hardirqs last enabled at (189005): [<ffff8000080849d0>] finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xe0/0x2c0
hardirqs last disabled at (189006): [<ffff8000090667a4>] el1_dbg+0x24/0xa0
softirqs last enabled at (188966): [<ffff8000080106d0>] __do_softirq+0x4b0/0x6a0
softirqs last disabled at (188957): [<ffff80000804a618>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x108/0x1a4
[ rjw: Because can be freed by the gov_attr_set_put() in
cpufreq_dbs_governor_exit() now, it is also necessary to put the
invocation of the governor ->exit() callback into the new
cpufreq_dbs_data_release() function. ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49511

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: defio: fix the pagelist corruption
Easily hit the below list corruption:
==
list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffffffffc0ceb090), but
was ffffec604507edc8. (prev=ffffec604507edc8).
WARNING: CPU: 65 PID: 3959 at lib/list_debug.c:26
__list_add_valid+0x53/0x80
CPU: 65 PID: 3959 Comm: fbdev Tainted: G U
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x53/0x80
Call Trace:
<TASK>
fb_deferred_io_mkwrite+0xea/0x150
do_page_mkwrite+0x57/0xc0
do_wp_page+0x278/0x2f0
__handle_mm_fault+0xdc2/0x1590
handle_mm_fault+0xdd/0x2c0
do_user_addr_fault+0x1d3/0x650
exc_page_fault+0x77/0x180
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30
asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
RIP: 0033:0x7fd98fc8fad1
==
Figure out the race happens when one process is adding &page->lru into
the pagelist tail in fb_deferred_io_mkwrite(), another process is
re-initializing the same &page->lru in fb_deferred_io_fault(), which is
not protected by the lock.
This fix is to init all the page lists one time during initialization,
it not only fixes the list corruption, but also avoids INIT_LIST_HEAD()
redundantly.
V2: change "int i" to "unsigned int i" (Geert Uytterhoeven)

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49504

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: lpfc: Inhibit aborts if external loopback plug is inserted
After running a short external loopback test, when the external loopback is
removed and a normal cable inserted that is directly connected to a target
device, the system oops in the llpfc_set_rrq_active() routine.
When the loopback was inserted an FLOGI was transmit. As we're looped back,
we receive the FLOGI request. The FLOGI is ABTS'd as we recognize the same
wppn thus understand it's a loopback. However, as the ABTS sends address
information the port is not set to (fffffe), the ABTS is dropped on the
wire. A short 1 frame loopback test is run and completes before the ABTS
times out. The looback is unplugged and the new cable plugged in, and the
an FLOGI to the new device occurs and completes. Due to a mixup in ref
counting the completion of the new FLOGI releases the fabric ndlp. Then the
original ABTS completes and references the released ndlp generating the
oops.
Correct by no-op'ing the ABTS when in loopback mode (it will be dropped
anyway). Added a flag to track the mode to recognize when it should be
no-op'd.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49471

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtw89: cfo: check mac_id to avoid out-of-bounds
Somehow, hardware reports incorrect mac_id and pollute memory. Check index
before we access the array.
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in rtw89/phy.c:2517:23
index 188 is out of range for type 's32 [64]'
CPU: 1 PID: 51550 Comm: irq/35-rtw89_pc Tainted: G OE
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
show_stack+0x52/0x58
dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x63
dump_stack+0x10/0x12
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x45
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49
? __alloc_skb+0x92/0x1d0
rtw89_phy_cfo_parse+0x44/0x7f [rtw89_core]
rtw89_core_rx+0x261/0x871 [rtw89_core]
? __alloc_skb+0xee/0x1d0
rtw89_pci_napi_poll+0x3fa/0x4ea [rtw89_pci]
__napi_poll+0x33/0x1a0
net_rx_action+0x126/0x260
? __queue_work+0x217/0x4c0
__do_softirq+0xd9/0x315
? disable_irq_nosync+0x10/0x10
do_softirq.part.0+0x6d/0x90
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x62/0x70
rtw89_pci_interrupt_threadfn+0x182/0x1a6 [rtw89_pci]
irq_thread_fn+0x28/0x60
irq_thread+0xc8/0x190
? irq_thread_fn+0x60/0x60
kthread+0x16b/0x190
? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xe0/0xe0
? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49468

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thermal/core: Fix memory leak in __thermal_cooling_device_register()
I got memory leak as follows when doing fault injection test:
unreferenced object 0xffff888010080000 (size 264312):
comm "182", pid 102533, jiffies 4296434960 (age 10.100s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 .....N..........
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 40 7f 1f b9 ff ff ff ff ........@.......
backtrace:
[<0000000038b2f4fc>] kmalloc_order_trace+0x1d/0x110 mm/slab_common.c:969
[<00000000ebcb8da5>] __kmalloc+0x373/0x420 include/linux/slab.h:510
[<0000000084137f13>] thermal_cooling_device_setup_sysfs+0x15d/0x2d0 include/linux/slab.h:586
[<00000000352b8755>] __thermal_cooling_device_register+0x332/0xa60 drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c:927
[<00000000fb9f331b>] devm_thermal_of_cooling_device_register+0x6b/0xf0 drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c:1041
[<000000009b8012d2>] max6650_probe.cold+0x557/0x6aa drivers/hwmon/max6650.c:211
[<00000000da0b7e04>] i2c_device_probe+0x472/0xac0 drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:561
If device_register() fails, thermal_cooling_device_destroy_sysfs() need be called
to free the memory allocated in thermal_cooling_device_setup_sysfs().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49465

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-throttle: Set BIO_THROTTLED when bio has been throttled
1.In current process, all bio will set the BIO_THROTTLED flag
after __blk_throtl_bio().
2.If bio needs to be throttled, it will start the timer and
stop submit bio directly. Bio will submit in
blk_throtl_dispatch_work_fn() when the timer expires.But in
the current process, if bio is throttled. The BIO_THROTTLED
will be set to bio after timer start. If the bio has been
completed, it may cause use-after-free blow.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in blk_throtl_bio+0x12f0/0x2c70
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88801b8902d4 by task fio/26380
dump_stack+0x9b/0xce
print_address_description.constprop.6+0x3e/0x60
kasan_report.cold.9+0x22/0x3a
blk_throtl_bio+0x12f0/0x2c70
submit_bio_checks+0x701/0x1550
submit_bio_noacct+0x83/0xc80
submit_bio+0xa7/0x330
mpage_readahead+0x380/0x500
read_pages+0x1c1/0xbf0
page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x471/0x6f0
do_page_cache_ra+0xda/0x110
ondemand_readahead+0x442/0xae0
page_cache_async_ra+0x210/0x300
generic_file_buffered_read+0x4d9/0x2130
generic_file_read_iter+0x315/0x490
blkdev_read_iter+0x113/0x1b0
aio_read+0x2ad/0x450
io_submit_one+0xc8e/0x1d60
__se_sys_io_submit+0x125/0x350
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Allocated by task 26380:
kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.2+0xc1/0xd0
kmem_cache_alloc+0x146/0x440
mempool_alloc+0x125/0x2f0
bio_alloc_bioset+0x353/0x590
mpage_alloc+0x3b/0x240
do_mpage_readpage+0xddf/0x1ef0
mpage_readahead+0x264/0x500
read_pages+0x1c1/0xbf0
page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x471/0x6f0
do_page_cache_ra+0xda/0x110
ondemand_readahead+0x442/0xae0
page_cache_async_ra+0x210/0x300
generic_file_buffered_read+0x4d9/0x2130
generic_file_read_iter+0x315/0x490
blkdev_read_iter+0x113/0x1b0
aio_read+0x2ad/0x450
io_submit_one+0xc8e/0x1d60
__se_sys_io_submit+0x125/0x350
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Freed by task 0:
kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30
__kasan_slab_free+0x111/0x160
kmem_cache_free+0x94/0x460
mempool_free+0xd6/0x320
bio_free+0xe0/0x130
bio_put+0xab/0xe0
bio_endio+0x3a6/0x5d0
blk_update_request+0x590/0x1370
scsi_end_request+0x7d/0x400
scsi_io_completion+0x1aa/0xe50
scsi_softirq_done+0x11b/0x240
blk_mq_complete_request+0xd4/0x120
scsi_mq_done+0xf0/0x200
virtscsi_vq_done+0xbc/0x150
vring_interrupt+0x179/0x390
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0xf7/0x490
handle_irq_event_percpu+0x7b/0x160
handle_irq_event+0xcc/0x170
handle_edge_irq+0x215/0xb20
common_interrupt+0x60/0x120
asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
Fix this by move BIO_THROTTLED set into the queue_lock.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49456

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: fix missed rcu protection
When removing the rcu_read_lock in bond_ethtool_get_ts_info() as
discussed [1], I didn't notice it could be called via setsockopt,
which doesn't hold rcu lock, as syzbot pointed:
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 3599 Comm: syz-executor317 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-syzkaller-01392-g01f4685797a5 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
bond_option_active_slave_get_rcu include/net/bonding.h:353 [inline]
bond_ethtool_get_ts_info+0x32c/0x3a0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5595
__ethtool_get_ts_info+0x173/0x240 net/ethtool/common.c:554
ethtool_get_phc_vclocks+0x99/0x110 net/ethtool/common.c:568
sock_timestamping_bind_phc net/core/sock.c:869 [inline]
sock_set_timestamping+0x3a3/0x7e0 net/core/sock.c:916
sock_setsockopt+0x543/0x2ec0 net/core/sock.c:1221
__sys_setsockopt+0x55e/0x6a0 net/socket.c:2223
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2238 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2235 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xba/0x150 net/socket.c:2235
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f8902c8eb39
Fix it by adding rcu_read_lock and take a ref on the real_dev.
Since dev_hold() and dev_put() can take NULL these days, we can
skip checking if real_dev exist.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/27565.1642742439@famine/

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49446

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvdimm: Fix firmware activation deadlock scenarios
Lockdep reports the following deadlock scenarios for CXL root device
power-management, device_prepare(), operations, and device_shutdown()
operations for 'nd_region' devices:
Chain exists of:
&nvdimm_region_key --> &nvdimm_bus->reconfig_mutex --> system_transition_mutex
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(system_transition_mutex);
lock(&nvdimm_bus->reconfig_mutex);
lock(system_transition_mutex);
lock(&nvdimm_region_key);
Chain exists of:
&cxl_nvdimm_bridge_key --> acpi_scan_lock --> &cxl_root_key
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&cxl_root_key);
lock(acpi_scan_lock);
lock(&cxl_root_key);
lock(&cxl_nvdimm_bridge_key);
These stem from holding nvdimm_bus_lock() over hibernate_quiet_exec()
which walks the entire system device topology taking device_lock() along
the way. The nvdimm_bus_lock() is protecting against unregistration,
multiple simultaneous ops callers, and preventing activate_show() from
racing activate_store(). For the first 2, the lock is redundant.
Unregistration already flushes all ops users, and sysfs already prevents
multiple threads to be active in an ops handler at the same time. For
the last userspace should already be waiting for its last
activate_store() to complete, and does not need activate_show() to flush
the write side, so this lock usage can be deleted in these attributes.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49441

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: fix deadlock caused by calling printk() under tty_port->lock
pty_write() invokes kmalloc() which may invoke a normal printk() to print
failure message. This can cause a deadlock in the scenario reported by
syz-bot below:
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
---- ---- ----
lock(console_owner);
lock(&port_lock_key);
lock(&port->lock);
lock(&port_lock_key);
lock(&port->lock);
lock(console_owner);
As commit dbdda842fe96 ("printk: Add console owner and waiter logic to
load balance console writes") said, such deadlock can be prevented by
using printk_deferred() in kmalloc() (which is invoked in the section
guarded by the port->lock). But there are too many printk() on the
kmalloc() path, and kmalloc() can be called from anywhere, so changing
printk() to printk_deferred() is too complicated and inelegant.
Therefore, this patch chooses to specify __GFP_NOWARN to kmalloc(), so
that printk() will not be called, and this deadlock problem can be
avoided.
Syzbot reported the following lockdep error:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.4.143-00237-g08ccc19a-dirty #10 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.4/29420 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8aedb2a0 (console_owner){....}-{0:0}, at: console_trylock_spinning kernel/printk/printk.c:1752 [inline]
ffffffff8aedb2a0 (console_owner){....}-{0:0}, at: vprintk_emit+0x2ca/0x470 kernel/printk/printk.c:2023
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880119c9158 (&port->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: pty_write+0xf4/0x1f0 drivers/tty/pty.c:120
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&port->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
tty_port_tty_get drivers/tty/tty_port.c:288 [inline] <-- lock(&port->lock);
tty_port_default_wakeup+0x1d/0xb0 drivers/tty/tty_port.c:47
serial8250_tx_chars+0x530/0xa80 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1767
serial8250_handle_irq.part.0+0x31f/0x3d0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1854
serial8250_handle_irq drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1827 [inline] <-- lock(&port_lock_key);
serial8250_default_handle_irq+0xb2/0x220 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1870
serial8250_interrupt+0xfd/0x200 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c:126
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x109/0xa50 kernel/irq/handle.c:156
[...]
-> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}-{2:2}:
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
serial8250_console_write+0x184/0xa40 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3198
<-- lock(&port_lock_key);
call_console_drivers kernel/printk/printk.c:1819 [inline]
console_unlock+0x8cb/0xd00 kernel/printk/printk.c:2504
vprintk_emit+0x1b5/0x470 kernel/printk/printk.c:2024<-- lock(console_owner);
vprintk_func+0x8d/0x250 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:394
printk+0xba/0xed kernel/printk/printk.c:2084
register_console+0x8b3/0xc10 kernel/printk/printk.c:2829
univ8250_console_init+0x3a/0x46 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c:681
console_init+0x49d/0x6d3 kernel/printk/printk.c:2915
start_kernel+0x5e9/0x879 init/main.c:713
secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:241
-> #0 (console_owner){....}-{0:0}:
[...]
lock_acquire+0x127/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4734
console_trylock_spinning kernel/printk/printk.c:1773
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49430

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: gpio-keys - cancel delayed work only in case of GPIO
gpio_keys module can either accept gpios or interrupts. The module
initializes delayed work in case of gpios only and is only used if
debounce timer is not used, so make sure cancel_delayed_work_sync()
is called only when its gpio-backed and debounce_use_hrtimer is false.
This fixes the issue seen below when the gpio_keys module is unloaded and
an interrupt pin is used instead of GPIO:
[ 360.297569] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 360.302303] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 237 at kernel/workqueue.c:3066 __flush_work+0x414/0x470
[ 360.310531] Modules linked in: gpio_keys(-)
[ 360.314797] CPU: 0 PID: 237 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-arm64-renesas-00116-g73636105874d-dirty #166
[ 360.324662] Hardware name: Renesas SMARC EVK based on r9a07g054l2 (DT)
[ 360.331270] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 360.338318] pc : __flush_work+0x414/0x470
[ 360.342385] lr : __cancel_work_timer+0x140/0x1b0
[ 360.347065] sp : ffff80000a7fba00
[ 360.350423] x29: ffff80000a7fba00 x28: ffff000012b9c5c0 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 360.357664] x26: ffff80000a7fbb80 x25: ffff80000954d0a8 x24: 0000000000000001
[ 360.364904] x23: ffff800009757000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff80000919b000
[ 360.372143] x20: ffff00000f5974e0 x19: ffff00000f5974e0 x18: ffff8000097fcf48
[ 360.379382] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000053f40
[ 360.386622] x14: ffff800009850e88 x13: 0000000000000002 x12: 000000000000a60c
[ 360.393861] x11: 000000000000a610 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000008
[ 360.401100] x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 00000000a473c394 x6 : 0080808080808080
[ 360.408339] x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff80000919b458
[ 360.415578] x2 : ffff8000097577f0 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 360.422818] Call trace:
[ 360.425299] __flush_work+0x414/0x470
[ 360.429012] __cancel_work_timer+0x140/0x1b0
[ 360.433340] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x10/0x18
[ 360.437931] gpio_keys_quiesce_key+0x28/0x58 [gpio_keys]
[ 360.443327] devm_action_release+0x10/0x18
[ 360.447481] release_nodes+0x8c/0x1a0
[ 360.451194] devres_release_all+0x90/0x100
[ 360.455346] device_unbind_cleanup+0x14/0x60
[ 360.459677] device_release_driver_internal+0xe8/0x168
[ 360.464883] driver_detach+0x4c/0x90
[ 360.468509] bus_remove_driver+0x54/0xb0
[ 360.472485] driver_unregister+0x2c/0x58
[ 360.476462] platform_driver_unregister+0x10/0x18
[ 360.481230] gpio_keys_exit+0x14/0x828 [gpio_keys]
[ 360.486088] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x1e0/0x270
[ 360.490945] invoke_syscall+0x40/0xf8
[ 360.494661] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xf0/0x110
[ 360.499515] do_el0_svc+0x20/0x78
[ 360.502877] el0_svc+0x48/0xf8
[ 360.505977] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xb0
[ 360.510216] el0t_64_sync+0x148/0x14c
[ 360.513930] irq event stamp: 4306
[ 360.517288] hardirqs last enabled at (4305): [<ffff8000080b0300>] __cancel_work_timer+0x130/0x1b0
[ 360.526359] hardirqs last disabled at (4306): [<ffff800008d194fc>] el1_dbg+0x24/0x88
[ 360.534204] softirqs last enabled at (4278): [<ffff8000080104a0>] _stext+0x4a0/0x5e0
[ 360.542133] softirqs last disabled at (4267): [<ffff8000080932ac>] irq_exit_rcu+0x18c/0x1b0
[ 360.550591] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49420

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: annotate races around sk->sk_bound_dev_if
UDP sendmsg() is lockless, and reads sk->sk_bound_dev_if while
this field can be changed by another thread.
Adds minimal annotations to avoid KCSAN splats for UDP.
Following patches will add more annotations to potential lockless readers.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __ip6_datagram_connect / udpv6_sendmsg
write to 0xffff888136d47a94 of 4 bytes by task 7681 on cpu 0:
__ip6_datagram_connect+0x6e2/0x930 net/ipv6/datagram.c:221
ip6_datagram_connect+0x2a/0x40 net/ipv6/datagram.c:272
inet_dgram_connect+0x107/0x190 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:576
__sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1900 [inline]
__sys_connect+0x197/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1917
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1927 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1924 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1924
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff888136d47a94 of 4 bytes by task 7670 on cpu 1:
udpv6_sendmsg+0xc60/0x16e0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1436
inet6_sendmsg+0x5f/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:652
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:725 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x39a/0x510 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2467 [inline]
__sys_sendmmsg+0x267/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0xffffff9b
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 7670 Comm: syz-executor.3 Tainted: G W 5.18.0-rc1-syzkaller-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
I chose to not add Fixes: tag because race has minor consequences
and stable teams busy enough.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49419

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
video: fbdev: vesafb: Fix a use-after-free due early fb_info cleanup
Commit b3c9a924aab6 ("fbdev: vesafb: Cleanup fb_info in .fb_destroy rather
than .remove") fixed a use-after-free error due the vesafb driver freeing
the fb_info in the .remove handler instead of doing it in .fb_destroy.
This can happen if the .fb_destroy callback is executed after the .remove
callback, since the former tries to access a pointer freed by the latter.
But that change didn't take into account that another possible scenario is
that .fb_destroy is called before the .remove callback. For example, if no
process has the fbdev chardev opened by the time the driver is removed.
If that's the case, fb_info will be freed when unregister_framebuffer() is
called, making the fb_info pointer accessed in vesafb_remove() after that
to no longer be valid.
To prevent that, move the expression containing the info->par to happen
before the unregister_framebuffer() function call.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49412

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bfq: Avoid merging queues with different parents
It can happen that the parent of a bfqq changes between the moment we
decide two queues are worth to merge (and set bic->stable_merge_bfqq)
and the moment bfq_setup_merge() is called. This can happen e.g. because
the process submitted IO for a different cgroup and thus bfqq got
reparented. It can even happen that the bfqq we are merging with has
parent cgroup that is already offline and going to be destroyed in which
case the merge can lead to use-after-free issues such as:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800693c0c0 by task runc:[2:INIT]/10544
CPU: 0 PID: 10544 Comm: runc:[2:INIT] Tainted: G E 5.15.2-0.g5fb85fd-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) f1f3b891c72369aebecd2e43e4641a6358867c70
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x46/0x5a
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140
? __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50
kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
? __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50
__bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50
? update_curr+0x32f/0x5d0
bfq_deactivate_entity+0xa0/0x1d0
bfq_del_bfqq_busy+0x28a/0x420
? resched_curr+0x116/0x1d0
? bfq_requeue_bfqq+0x70/0x70
? check_preempt_wakeup+0x52b/0xbc0
__bfq_bfqq_expire+0x1a2/0x270
bfq_bfqq_expire+0xd16/0x2160
? try_to_wake_up+0x4ee/0x1260
? bfq_end_wr_async_queues+0xe0/0xe0
? _raw_write_unlock_bh+0x60/0x60
? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x81/0xe0
bfq_idle_slice_timer+0x109/0x280
? bfq_dispatch_request+0x4870/0x4870
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x37d/0x700
? enqueue_hrtimer+0x1b0/0x1b0
? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0xd/0x10
? ktime_get_update_offsets_now+0x6f/0x280
hrtimer_interrupt+0x2c8/0x740
Fix the problem by checking that the parent of the two bfqqs we are
merging in bfq_setup_merge() is the same.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49409

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix bug_on in __es_tree_search
Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON:
==================================================================
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:199!
[...]
RIP: 0010:ext4_es_end fs/ext4/extents_status.c:199 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__es_tree_search+0x1e0/0x260 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:217
[...]
Call Trace:
ext4_es_cache_extent+0x109/0x340 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:766
ext4_cache_extents+0x239/0x2e0 fs/ext4/extents.c:561
ext4_find_extent+0x6b7/0xa20 fs/ext4/extents.c:964
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x16b/0x4b70 fs/ext4/extents.c:4384
ext4_map_blocks+0xe26/0x19f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:567
ext4_getblk+0x320/0x4c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:980
ext4_bread+0x2d/0x170 fs/ext4/inode.c:1031
ext4_quota_read+0x248/0x320 fs/ext4/super.c:6257
v2_read_header+0x78/0x110 fs/quota/quota_v2.c:63
v2_check_quota_file+0x76/0x230 fs/quota/quota_v2.c:82
vfs_load_quota_inode+0x5d1/0x1530 fs/quota/dquot.c:2368
dquot_enable+0x28a/0x330 fs/quota/dquot.c:2490
ext4_quota_enable fs/ext4/super.c:6137 [inline]
ext4_enable_quotas+0x5d7/0x960 fs/ext4/super.c:6163
ext4_fill_super+0xa7c9/0xdc00 fs/ext4/super.c:4754
mount_bdev+0x2e9/0x3b0 fs/super.c:1158
mount_fs+0x4b/0x1e4 fs/super.c:1261
[...]
==================================================================
Above issue may happen as follows:
-------------------------------------
ext4_fill_super
ext4_enable_quotas
ext4_quota_enable
ext4_iget
__ext4_iget
ext4_ext_check_inode
ext4_ext_check
__ext4_ext_check
ext4_valid_extent_entries
Check for overlapping extents does't take effect
dquot_enable
vfs_load_quota_inode
v2_check_quota_file
v2_read_header
ext4_quota_read
ext4_bread
ext4_getblk
ext4_map_blocks
ext4_ext_map_blocks
ext4_find_extent
ext4_cache_extents
ext4_es_cache_extent
ext4_es_cache_extent
__es_tree_search
ext4_es_end
BUG_ON(es->es_lblk + es->es_len < es->es_lblk)
The error ext4 extents is as follows:
0af3 0300 0400 0000 00000000 extent_header
00000000 0100 0000 12000000 extent1
00000000 0100 0000 18000000 extent2
02000000 0400 0000 14000000 extent3
In the ext4_valid_extent_entries function,
if prev is 0, no error is returned even if lblock<=prev.
This was intended to skip the check on the first extent, but
in the error image above, prev=0+1-1=0 when checking the second extent,
so even though lblock<=prev, the function does not return an error.
As a result, bug_ON occurs in __es_tree_search and the system panics.
To solve this problem, we only need to check that:
1. The lblock of the first extent is not less than 0.
2. The lblock of the next extent is not less than
the next block of the previous extent.
The same applies to extent_idx.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49406

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: Fix potential deadlock in blk_ia_range_sysfs_show()
When being read, a sysfs attribute is already protected against removal
with the kobject node active reference counter. As a result, in
blk_ia_range_sysfs_show(), there is no need to take the queue sysfs
lock when reading the value of a range attribute. Using the queue sysfs
lock in this function creates a potential deadlock situation with the
disk removal, something that a lockdep signals with a splat when the
device is removed:
[ 760.703551] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 760.703551]
[ 760.703554] CPU0 CPU1
[ 760.703556] ---- ----
[ 760.703558] lock(&q->sysfs_lock);
[ 760.703565] lock(kn->active#385);
[ 760.703573] lock(&q->sysfs_lock);
[ 760.703579] lock(kn->active#385);
[ 760.703587]
[ 760.703587] *** DEADLOCK ***
Solve this by removing the mutex_lock()/mutex_unlock() calls from
blk_ia_range_sysfs_show().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49400

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: Don't set mddev private to NULL in raid0 pers->free
In normal stop process, it does like this:
do_md_stop
|
__md_stop (pers->free(); mddev->private=NULL)
|
md_free (free mddev)
__md_stop sets mddev->private to NULL after pers->free. The raid device
will be stopped and mddev memory is free. But in reshape, it doesn't
free the mddev and mddev will still be used in new raid.
In reshape, it first sets mddev->private to new_pers and then runs
old_pers->free(). Now raid0 sets mddev->private to NULL in raid0_free.
The new raid can't work anymore. It will panic when dereference
mddev->private because of NULL pointer dereference.
It can panic like this:
[63010.814972] kernel BUG at drivers/md/raid10.c:928!
[63010.819778] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[63010.825011] CPU: 3 PID: 44437 Comm: md0_resync Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-86.el9.x86_64 #1
[63010.833789] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R6415/07YXFK, BIOS 1.15.0 09/11/2020
[63010.841440] RIP: 0010:raise_barrier+0x161/0x170 [raid10]
[63010.865508] RSP: 0018:ffffc312408bbc10 EFLAGS: 00010246
[63010.870734] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa00bf7d39800 RCX: 0000000000000000
[63010.877866] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffa00bf7d39800
[63010.884999] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: fffffa4945e74400 R09: 0000000000000000
[63010.892132] R10: ffffa00eed02f798 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa00bbc435200
[63010.899266] R13: ffffa00bf7d39800 R14: 0000000000000400 R15: 0000000000000003
[63010.906399] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa00eed000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[63010.914485] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[63010.920229] CR2: 00007f5cfbe99828 CR3: 0000000105efe000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
[63010.927363] Call Trace:
[63010.929822] ? bio_reset+0xe/0x40
[63010.933144] ? raid10_alloc_init_r10buf+0x60/0xa0 [raid10]
[63010.938629] raid10_sync_request+0x756/0x1610 [raid10]
[63010.943770] md_do_sync.cold+0x3e4/0x94c
[63010.947698] md_thread+0xab/0x160
[63010.951024] ? md_write_inc+0x50/0x50
[63010.954688] kthread+0x149/0x170
[63010.957923] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
[63010.962107] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Removing the code that sets mddev->private to NULL in raid0 can fix
problem.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49398

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: dwc3: gadget: Replace list_for_each_entry_safe() if using giveback
The list_for_each_entry_safe() macro saves the current item (n) and
the item after (n+1), so that n can be safely removed without
corrupting the list. However, when traversing the list and removing
items using gadget giveback, the DWC3 lock is briefly released,
allowing other routines to execute. There is a situation where, while
items are being removed from the cancelled_list using
dwc3_gadget_ep_cleanup_cancelled_requests(), the pullup disable
routine is running in parallel (due to UDC unbind). As the cleanup
routine removes n, and the pullup disable removes n+1, once the
cleanup retakes the DWC3 lock, it references a request who was already
removed/handled. With list debug enabled, this leads to a panic.
Ensure all instances of the macro are replaced where gadget giveback
is used.
Example call stack:
Thread#1:
__dwc3_gadget_ep_set_halt() - CLEAR HALT
-> dwc3_gadget_ep_cleanup_cancelled_requests()
->list_for_each_entry_safe()
->dwc3_gadget_giveback(n)
->dwc3_gadget_del_and_unmap_request()- n deleted[cancelled_list]
->spin_unlock
->Thread#2 executes
...
->dwc3_gadget_giveback(n+1)
->Already removed!
Thread#2:
dwc3_gadget_pullup()
->waiting for dwc3 spin_lock
...
->Thread#1 released lock
->dwc3_stop_active_transfers()
->dwc3_remove_requests()
->fetches n+1 item from cancelled_list (n removed by Thread#1)
->dwc3_gadget_giveback()
->dwc3_gadget_del_and_unmap_request()- n+1 deleted[cancelled_list]
->spin_unlock

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49394

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-iolatency: Fix inflight count imbalances and IO hangs on offline
iolatency needs to track the number of inflight IOs per cgroup. As this
tracking can be expensive, it is disabled when no cgroup has iolatency
configured for the device. To ensure that the inflight counters stay
balanced, iolatency_set_limit() freezes the request_queue while manipulating
the enabled counter, which ensures that no IO is in flight and thus all
counters are zero.
Unfortunately, iolatency_set_limit() isn't the only place where the enabled
counter is manipulated. iolatency_pd_offline() can also dec the counter and
trigger disabling. As this disabling happens without freezing the q, this
can easily happen while some IOs are in flight and thus leak the counts.
This can be easily demonstrated by turning on iolatency on an one empty
cgroup while IOs are in flight in other cgroups and then removing the
cgroup. Note that iolatency shouldn't have been enabled elsewhere in the
system to ensure that removing the cgroup disables iolatency for the whole
device.
The following keeps flipping on and off iolatency on sda:
echo +io > /sys/fs/cgroup/cgroup.subtree_control
while true; do
mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/test
echo '8:0 target=100000' > /sys/fs/cgroup/test/io.latency
sleep 1
rmdir /sys/fs/cgroup/test
sleep 1
done
and there's concurrent fio generating direct rand reads:
fio --name test --filename=/dev/sda --direct=1 --rw=randread \
--runtime=600 --time_based --iodepth=256 --numjobs=4 --bs=4k
while monitoring with the following drgn script:
while True:
for css in css_for_each_descendant_pre(prog['blkcg_root'].css.address_of_()):
for pos in hlist_for_each(container_of(css, 'struct blkcg', 'css').blkg_list):
blkg = container_of(pos, 'struct blkcg_gq', 'blkcg_node')
pd = blkg.pd[prog['blkcg_policy_iolatency'].plid]
if pd.value_() == 0:
continue
iolat = container_of(pd, 'struct iolatency_grp', 'pd')
inflight = iolat.rq_wait.inflight.counter.value_()
if inflight:
print(f'inflight={inflight} {disk_name(blkg.q.disk).decode("utf-8")} '
f'{cgroup_path(css.cgroup).decode("utf-8")}')
time.sleep(1)
The monitoring output looks like the following:
inflight=1 sda /user.slice
inflight=1 sda /user.slice
...
inflight=14 sda /user.slice
inflight=13 sda /user.slice
inflight=17 sda /user.slice
inflight=15 sda /user.slice
inflight=18 sda /user.slice
inflight=17 sda /user.slice
inflight=20 sda /user.slice
inflight=19 sda /user.slice <- fio stopped, inflight stuck at 19
inflight=19 sda /user.slice
inflight=19 sda /user.slice
If a cgroup with stuck inflight ends up getting throttled, the throttled IOs
will never get issued as there's no completion event to wake it up leading
to an indefinite hang.
This patch fixes the bug by unifying enable handling into a work item which
is automatically kicked off from iolatency_set_min_lat_nsec() which is
called from both iolatency_set_limit() and iolatency_pd_offline() paths.
Punting to a work item is necessary as iolatency_pd_offline() is called
under spinlocks while freezing a request_queue requires a sleepable context.
This also simplifies the code reducing LOC sans the comments and avoids the
unnecessary freezes which were happening whenever a cgroup's latency target
is newly set or cleared.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49390

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
macsec: fix UAF bug for real_dev
Create a new macsec device but not get reference to real_dev. That can
not ensure that real_dev is freed after macsec. That will trigger the
UAF bug for real_dev as following:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in macsec_get_iflink+0x5f/0x70 drivers/net/macsec.c:3662
Call Trace:
...
macsec_get_iflink+0x5f/0x70 drivers/net/macsec.c:3662
dev_get_iflink+0x73/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:637
default_operstate net/core/link_watch.c:42 [inline]
rfc2863_policy+0x233/0x2d0 net/core/link_watch.c:54
linkwatch_do_dev+0x2a/0x150 net/core/link_watch.c:161
Allocated by task 22209:
...
alloc_netdev_mqs+0x98/0x1100 net/core/dev.c:10549
rtnl_create_link+0x9d7/0xc00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3235
veth_newlink+0x20e/0xa90 drivers/net/veth.c:1748
Freed by task 8:
...
kfree+0xd6/0x4d0 mm/slub.c:4552
kvfree+0x42/0x50 mm/util.c:615
device_release+0x9f/0x240 drivers/base/core.c:2229
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:673 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:704 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline]
kobject_put+0x1c8/0x540 lib/kobject.c:721
netdev_run_todo+0x72e/0x10b0 net/core/dev.c:10327
After commit faab39f63c1f ("net: allow out-of-order netdev unregistration")
and commit e5f80fcf869a ("ipv6: give an IPv6 dev to blackhole_netdev"), we
can add dev_hold_track() in macsec_dev_init() and dev_put_track() in
macsec_free_netdev() to fix the problem.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49379

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
driver core: Fix wait_for_device_probe() & deferred_probe_timeout interaction
Mounting NFS rootfs was timing out when deferred_probe_timeout was
non-zero [1]. This was because ip_auto_config() initcall times out
waiting for the network interfaces to show up when
deferred_probe_timeout was non-zero. While ip_auto_config() calls
wait_for_device_probe() to make sure any currently running deferred
probe work or asynchronous probe finishes, that wasn't sufficient to
account for devices being deferred until deferred_probe_timeout.
Commit 35a672363ab3 ("driver core: Ensure wait_for_device_probe() waits
until the deferred_probe_timeout fires") tried to fix that by making
sure wait_for_device_probe() waits for deferred_probe_timeout to expire
before returning.
However, if wait_for_device_probe() is called from the kernel_init()
context:
- Before deferred_probe_initcall() [2], it causes the boot process to
hang due to a deadlock.
- After deferred_probe_initcall() [3], it blocks kernel_init() from
continuing till deferred_probe_timeout expires and beats the point of
deferred_probe_timeout that's trying to wait for userspace to load
modules.
Neither of this is good. So revert the changes to
wait_for_device_probe().
[1] - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/TYAPR01MB45443DF63B9EF29054F7C41FD8C60@TYAPR01MB4544.jpnprd01.prod.outlook.com/
[2] - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YowHNo4sBjr9ijZr@dev-arch.thelio-3990X/
[3] - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Yo3WvGnNk3LvLb7R@linutronix.de/

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49378

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sfc: fix considering that all channels have TX queues
Normally, all channels have RX and TX queues, but this is not true if
modparam efx_separate_tx_channels=1 is used. In that cases, some
channels only have RX queues and others only TX queues (or more
preciselly, they have them allocated, but not initialized).
Fix efx_channel_has_tx_queues to return the correct value for this case
too.
Messages shown at probe time before the fix:
sfc 0000:03:00.0 ens6f0np0: MC command 0x82 inlen 544 failed rc=-22 (raw=0) arg=0
------------[ cut here ]------------
netdevice: ens6f0np0: failed to initialise TXQ -1
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 626 at drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c:2393 efx_ef10_tx_init+0x201/0x300 [sfc]
[...] stripped
RIP: 0010:efx_ef10_tx_init+0x201/0x300 [sfc]
[...] stripped
Call Trace:
efx_init_tx_queue+0xaa/0xf0 [sfc]
efx_start_channels+0x49/0x120 [sfc]
efx_start_all+0x1f8/0x430 [sfc]
efx_net_open+0x5a/0xe0 [sfc]
__dev_open+0xd0/0x190
__dev_change_flags+0x1b3/0x220
dev_change_flags+0x21/0x60
[...] stripped
Messages shown at remove time before the fix:
sfc 0000:03:00.0 ens6f0np0: failed to flush 10 queues
sfc 0000:03:00.0 ens6f0np0: failed to flush queues

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49372

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: tcp_rtx_synack() can be called from process context
Laurent reported the enclosed report [1]
This bug triggers with following coditions:
0) Kernel built with CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT=y
1) A new passive FastOpen TCP socket is created.
This FO socket waits for an ACK coming from client to be a complete
ESTABLISHED one.
2) A socket operation on this socket goes through lock_sock()
release_sock() dance.
3) While the socket is owned by the user in step 2),
a retransmit of the SYN is received and stored in socket backlog.
4) At release_sock() time, the socket backlog is processed while
in process context.
5) A SYNACK packet is cooked in response of the SYN retransmit.
6) -> tcp_rtx_synack() is called in process context.
Before blamed commit, tcp_rtx_synack() was always called from BH handler,
from a timer handler.
Fix this by using TCP_INC_STATS() & NET_INC_STATS()
which do not assume caller is in non preemptible context.
[1]
BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: epollpep/2180
caller is tcp_rtx_synack.part.0+0x36/0xc0
CPU: 10 PID: 2180 Comm: epollpep Tainted: G OE 5.16.0-0.bpo.4-amd64 #1 Debian 5.16.12-1~bpo11+1
Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5039MC-H8TRF/X11SCD-F, BIOS 1.7 11/23/2021
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x5e
check_preemption_disabled+0xde/0xe0
tcp_rtx_synack.part.0+0x36/0xc0
tcp_rtx_synack+0x8d/0xa0
? kmem_cache_alloc+0x2e0/0x3e0
? apparmor_file_alloc_security+0x3b/0x1f0
inet_rtx_syn_ack+0x16/0x30
tcp_check_req+0x367/0x610
tcp_rcv_state_process+0x91/0xf60
? get_nohz_timer_target+0x18/0x1a0
? lock_timer_base+0x61/0x80
? preempt_count_add+0x68/0xa0
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0xbd/0x270
__release_sock+0x6d/0xb0
release_sock+0x2b/0x90
sock_setsockopt+0x138/0x1140
? __sys_getsockname+0x7e/0xc0
? aa_sk_perm+0x3e/0x1a0
__sys_setsockopt+0x198/0x1e0
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x21/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49371

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
driver core: fix deadlock in __device_attach
In __device_attach function, The lock holding logic is as follows:
...
__device_attach
device_lock(dev) // get lock dev
async_schedule_dev(__device_attach_async_helper, dev); // func
async_schedule_node
async_schedule_node_domain(func)
entry = kzalloc(sizeof(struct async_entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
/* when fail or work limit, sync to execute func, but
__device_attach_async_helper will get lock dev as
well, which will lead to A-A deadlock. */
if (!entry || atomic_read(&entry_count) > MAX_WORK) {
func;
else
queue_work_node(node, system_unbound_wq, &entry->work)
device_unlock(dev)
As shown above, when it is allowed to do async probes, because of
out of memory or work limit, async work is not allowed, to do
sync execute instead. it will lead to A-A deadlock because of
__device_attach_async_helper getting lock dev.
To fix the deadlock, move the async_schedule_dev outside device_lock,
as we can see, in async_schedule_node_domain, the parameter of
queue_work_node is system_unbound_wq, so it can accept concurrent
operations. which will also not change the code logic, and will
not lead to deadlock.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49357

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
On Apple T2 Macs, when Linux attempts to read the db and dbx efi variables
at early boot to load UEFI Secure Boot certificates, a page fault occurs
in Apple firmware code and EFI runtime services are disabled with the
following logs:
[Firmware Bug]: Page fault caused by firmware at PA: 0xffffb1edc0068000
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 104 at arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c:735 efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault+0x50/0xf0
(Removed some logs from here)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
page_fault_oops+0x4f/0x2c0
? search_bpf_extables+0x6b/0x80
? search_module_extables+0x50/0x80
? search_exception_tables+0x5b/0x60
kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x9e/0x110
__bad_area_nosemaphore+0x155/0x190
bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20
do_kern_addr_fault+0x8c/0xa0
exc_page_fault+0xd8/0x180
asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
(Removed some logs from here)
? __efi_call+0x28/0x30
? switch_mm+0x20/0x30
? efi_call_rts+0x19a/0x8e0
? process_one_work+0x222/0x3f0
? worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0
? kthread+0x17a/0x1a0
? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0
? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
---[ end trace 1f82023595a5927f ]---
efi: Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
efi: EFI Runtime Services are disabled!
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: Couldn't get mokx list
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x80000000
So we avoid reading these UEFI variables and thus prevent the crash.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49349

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix use-after-free in ext4_rename_dir_prepare
We got issue as follows:
EXT4-fs (loop0): mounted filesystem without journal. Opts: ,errors=continue
ext4_get_first_dir_block: bh->b_data=0xffff88810bee6000 len=34478
ext4_get_first_dir_block: *parent_de=0xffff88810beee6ae bh->b_data=0xffff88810bee6000
ext4_rename_dir_prepare: [1] parent_de=0xffff88810beee6ae
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_rename_dir_prepare+0x152/0x220
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810beee6ae by task rep/1895
CPU: 13 PID: 1895 Comm: rep Not tainted 5.10.0+ #241
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xbe/0xf9
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1e/0x220
kasan_report.cold+0x37/0x7f
ext4_rename_dir_prepare+0x152/0x220
ext4_rename+0xf44/0x1ad0
ext4_rename2+0x11c/0x170
vfs_rename+0xa84/0x1440
do_renameat2+0x683/0x8f0
__x64_sys_renameat+0x53/0x60
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7f45a6fc41c9
RSP: 002b:00007ffc5a470218 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000108
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f45a6fc41c9
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007ffc5a470240 R08: 00007ffc5a470160 R09: 0000000020000080
R10: 00000000200001c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400bb0
R13: 00007ffc5a470320 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:00000000440015ce refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x10beee
flags: 0x200000000000000()
raw: 0200000000000000 ffffea00043ff4c8 ffffea0004325608 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88810beee580: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff88810beee600: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff88810beee680: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
ffff88810beee700: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff88810beee780: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
ext4_rename_dir_prepare: [2] parent_de->inode=3537895424
ext4_rename_dir_prepare: [3] dir=0xffff888124170140
ext4_rename_dir_prepare: [4] ino=2
ext4_rename_dir_prepare: ent->dir->i_ino=2 parent=-757071872
Reason is first directory entry which 'rec_len' is 34478, then will get illegal
parent entry. Now, we do not check directory entry after read directory block
in 'ext4_get_first_dir_block'.
To solve this issue, check directory entry in 'ext4_get_first_dir_block'.
[ Trigger an ext4_error() instead of just warning if the directory is
missing a '.' or '..' entry. Also make sure we return an error code
if the file system is corrupted. -TYT ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49347

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix bug_on in ext4_writepages
we got issue as follows:
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:1141: group 0, block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 25 vs 31513 free cls
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inode.c:2708!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 2 PID: 2147 Comm: rep Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2-next-20220413+ #155
RIP: 0010:ext4_writepages+0x1977/0x1c10
RSP: 0018:ffff88811d3e7880 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff88811c098000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88811c098000 RDI: 0000000000000002
RBP: ffff888128140f50 R08: ffffffffb1ff6387 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffffed10250281ea R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00000000000000a4 R14: ffff88811d3e7bb8 R15: ffff888128141028
FS: 00007f443aed9740(0000) GS:ffff8883aef00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020007200 CR3: 000000011c2a4000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
do_writepages+0x130/0x3a0
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x83/0xa0
filemap_flush+0xab/0xe0
ext4_alloc_da_blocks+0x51/0x120
__ext4_ioctl+0x1534/0x3210
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x12c/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
It may happen as follows:
1. write inline_data inode
vfs_write
new_sync_write
ext4_file_write_iter
ext4_buffered_write_iter
generic_perform_write
ext4_da_write_begin
ext4_da_write_inline_data_begin -> If inline data size too
small will allocate block to write, then mapping will has
dirty page
ext4_da_convert_inline_data_to_extent ->clear EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA
2. fallocate
do_vfs_ioctl
ioctl_preallocate
vfs_fallocate
ext4_fallocate
ext4_convert_inline_data
ext4_convert_inline_data_nolock
ext4_map_blocks -> fail will goto restore data
ext4_restore_inline_data
ext4_create_inline_data
ext4_write_inline_data
ext4_set_inode_state -> set inode EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA
3. writepages
__ext4_ioctl
ext4_alloc_da_blocks
filemap_flush
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc
do_writepages
ext4_writepages
if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode))
BUG_ON(ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA))
The root cause of this issue is we destory inline data until call
ext4_writepages under delay allocation mode. But there maybe already
convert from inline to extent. To solve this issue, we call
filemap_flush first..

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49341

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, arm64: Clear prog->jited_len along prog->jited
syzbot reported an illegal copy_to_user() attempt
from bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd() [1]
There was no repro yet on this bug, but I think
that commit 0aef499f3172 ("mm/usercopy: Detect vmalloc overruns")
is exposing a prior bug in bpf arm64.
bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd() looks at prog->jited_len
to determine if the JIT image can be copied out to user space.
My theory is that syzbot managed to get a prog where prog->jited_len
has been set to 43, while prog->bpf_func has ben cleared.
It is not clear why copy_to_user(uinsns, NULL, ulen) is triggering
this particular warning.
I thought find_vma_area(NULL) would not find a vm_struct.
As we do not hold vmap_area_lock spinlock, it might be possible
that the found vm_struct was garbage.
[1]
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset 792633534417210172, size 43)!
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 25002 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.18.0-syzkaller-10139-g8291eaafed36 #0
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:101
lr : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:89
sp : ffff80000b773a20
x29: ffff80000b773a30 x28: faff80000b745000 x27: ffff80000b773b48
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 000000000000002b x24: 0000000000000000
x23: 00000000000000e0 x22: ffff80000b75db67 x21: 0000000000000001
x20: 000000000000002b x19: ffff80000b75db3c x18: 00000000fffffffd
x17: 2820636f6c6c616d x16: 76206d6f72662064 x15: 6574636574656420
x14: 74706d6574746120 x13: 2129333420657a69 x12: 73202c3237313031
x11: 3237313434333533 x10: 3336323937207465 x9 : 657275736f707865
x8 : ffff80000a30c550 x7 : ffff80000b773830 x6 : ffff80000b773830
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff00007fbbaa10 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : f7ff000028fc0000 x0 : 0000000000000064
Call trace:
usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:89
check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:186 [inline]
__check_object_size mm/usercopy.c:252 [inline]
__check_object_size+0x198/0x36c mm/usercopy.c:214
check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:199 [inline]
check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:235 [inline]
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:159 [inline]
bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd.isra.0+0xf14/0xfdc kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3993
bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd+0x12c/0x510 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4253
__sys_bpf+0x900/0x2150 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4956
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5021 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5019 [inline]
__arm64_sys_bpf+0x28/0x40 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5019
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x44/0xec arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
do_el0_svc+0xa0/0xc0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206
el0_svc+0x44/0xb0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:624
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x1ac/0x1b0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:642
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581
Code: aa0003e3 d00038c0 91248000 97fff65f (d4210000)

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49333

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: E-Switch, pair only capable devices
OFFLOADS paring using devcom is possible only on devices
that support LAG. Filter based on lag capabilities.
This fixes an issue where mlx5_get_next_phys_dev() was
called without holding the interface lock.
This issue was found when commit
bc4c2f2e0179 ("net/mlx5: Lag, filter non compatible devices")
added an assert that verifies the interface lock is held.
WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 1706 at drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/dev.c:642 mlx5_get_next_phys_dev+0xd2/0x100 [mlx5_core]
Modules linked in: mlx5_vdpa vringh vhost_iotlb vdpa mlx5_ib mlx5_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_umad ib_ipoib ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core overlay fuse [last unloaded: mlx5_core]
CPU: 9 PID: 1706 Comm: devlink Not tainted 5.18.0-rc7+ #11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5_get_next_phys_dev+0xd2/0x100 [mlx5_core]
Code: 02 00 75 48 48 8b 85 80 04 00 00 5d c3 31 c0 5d c3 be ff ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 08 41 5b a0 e8 36 87 28 e3 85 c0 0f 85 6f ff ff ff <0f> 0b e9 68 ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 0c 91 cc 84 e8 cb 36 6f e1 e9 4d ff
RSP: 0018:ffff88811bf47458 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811b398000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffffa05b4108 RDI: ffff88812daaaa78
RBP: ffff88812d050380 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff88811d6b3437
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000fddd3581 R12: ffff88815238c000
R13: ffff88812d050380 R14: ffff8881018aa7e0 R15: ffff88811d6b3428
FS: 00007fc82e18ae80(0000) GS:ffff88842e080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f9630d1b421 CR3: 0000000149802004 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5_esw_offloads_devcom_event+0x99/0x3b0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_devcom_send_event+0x167/0x1d0 [mlx5_core]
esw_offloads_enable+0x1153/0x1500 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5_esw_offloads_controller_valid+0x170/0x170 [mlx5_core]
? wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x20/0x20
? mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked+0x318/0x810 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x586/0xc50 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5_eswitch_disable_pf_vf_vports+0x1d0/0x1d0 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5_esw_try_lock+0x1b/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5_eswitch_enable+0x270/0x270 [mlx5_core]
? __debugfs_create_file+0x260/0x3e0
mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0x27e/0x870 [mlx5_core]
? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x12c0/0x12c0
? esw_offloads_disable+0x250/0x250 [mlx5_core]
? devlink_nl_cmd_trap_get_dumpit+0x470/0x470
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
devlink_nl_cmd_eswitch_set_doit+0x217/0x620

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49330

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: fix tcp_mtup_probe_success vs wrong snd_cwnd
syzbot got a new report [1] finally pointing to a very old bug,
added in initial support for MTU probing.
tcp_mtu_probe() has checks about starting an MTU probe if
tcp_snd_cwnd(tp) >= 11.
But nothing prevents tcp_snd_cwnd(tp) to be reduced later
and before the MTU probe succeeds.
This bug would lead to potential zero-divides.
Debugging added in commit 40570375356c ("tcp: add accessors
to read/set tp->snd_cwnd") has paid off :)
While we are at it, address potential overflows in this code.
[1]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 14132 at include/net/tcp.h:1219 tcp_mtup_probe_success+0x366/0x570 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:2712
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 14132 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.18.0-syzkaller-07857-gbabf0bb978e3 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:tcp_snd_cwnd_set include/net/tcp.h:1219 [inline]
RIP: 0010:tcp_mtup_probe_success+0x366/0x570 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:2712
Code: 74 08 48 89 ef e8 da 80 17 f9 48 8b 45 00 65 48 ff 80 80 03 00 00 48 83 c4 30 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 e8 aa b0 c5 f8 <0f> 0b e9 16 fe ff ff 48 8b 4c 24 08 80 e1 07 38 c1 0f 8c c7 fc ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc900079e70f8 EFLAGS: 00010287
RAX: ffffffff88c0f7f6 RBX: ffff8880756e7a80 RCX: 0000000000040000
RDX: ffffc9000c6c4000 RSI: 0000000000031f9e RDI: 0000000000031f9f
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff88c0f606 R09: ffffc900079e7520
R10: ffffed101011226d R11: 1ffff1101011226c R12: 1ffff1100eadcf50
R13: ffff8880756e72c0 R14: 1ffff1100eadcf89 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 00007f643236e700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1ab3f1e2a0 CR3: 0000000064fe7000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tcp_clean_rtx_queue+0x223a/0x2da0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3356
tcp_ack+0x1962/0x3c90 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3861
tcp_rcv_established+0x7c8/0x1ac0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5973
tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x57b/0x1210 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1476
sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1061 [inline]
__release_sock+0x1d8/0x4c0 net/core/sock.c:2849
release_sock+0x5d/0x1c0 net/core/sock.c:3404
sk_stream_wait_memory+0x700/0xdc0 net/core/stream.c:145
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x111d/0x3fc0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1410
tcp_sendmsg+0x2c/0x40 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1448
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0x439/0x5c0 net/socket.c:2119
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2131 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2127 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0xda/0xf0 net/socket.c:2127
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7f6431289109
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f643236e168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f643139c100 RCX: 00007f6431289109
RDX: 00000000d0d0c2ac RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 000000000000000a
RBP: 00007f64312e308d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fff372533af R14: 00007f643236e300 R15: 0000000000022000

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49329

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vduse: Fix NULL pointer dereference on sysfs access
The control device has no drvdata. So we will get a
NULL pointer dereference when accessing control
device's msg_timeout attribute via sysfs:
[ 132.841881][ T3644] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000f8
[ 132.850619][ T3644] RIP: 0010:msg_timeout_show (drivers/vdpa/vdpa_user/vduse_dev.c:1271)
[ 132.869447][ T3644] dev_attr_show (drivers/base/core.c:2094)
[ 132.870215][ T3644] sysfs_kf_seq_show (fs/sysfs/file.c:59)
[ 132.871164][ T3644] ? device_remove_bin_file (drivers/base/core.c:2088)
[ 132.872082][ T3644] kernfs_seq_show (fs/kernfs/file.c:164)
[ 132.872838][ T3644] seq_read_iter (fs/seq_file.c:230)
[ 132.873578][ T3644] ? __vmalloc_area_node (mm/vmalloc.c:3041)
[ 132.874532][ T3644] kernfs_fop_read_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:238)
[ 132.875513][ T3644] __kernel_read (fs/read_write.c:440 (discriminator 1))
[ 132.876319][ T3644] kernel_read (fs/read_write.c:459)
[ 132.877129][ T3644] kernel_read_file (fs/kernel_read_file.c:94)
[ 132.877978][ T3644] kernel_read_file_from_fd (include/linux/file.h:45 fs/kernel_read_file.c:186)
[ 132.879019][ T3644] __do_sys_finit_module (kernel/module.c:4207)
[ 132.879930][ T3644] __ia32_sys_finit_module (kernel/module.c:4189)
[ 132.880930][ T3644] do_int80_syscall_32 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:112 arch/x86/entry/common.c:132)
[ 132.881847][ T3644] entry_INT80_compat (arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:419)
To fix it, don't create the unneeded attribute for
control device anymore.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49328

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mt76: fix use-after-free by removing a non-RCU wcid pointer
Fixes an issue caught by KASAN about use-after-free in mt76_txq_schedule
by protecting mtxq->wcid with rcu_lock between mt76_txq_schedule and
sta_info_[alloc, free].
[18853.876689] ==================================================================
[18853.876751] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mt76_txq_schedule+0x204/0xaf8 [mt76]
[18853.876773] Read of size 8 at addr ffffffaf989a2138 by task mt76-tx phy0/883
[18853.876786]
[18853.876810] CPU: 5 PID: 883 Comm: mt76-tx phy0 Not tainted 5.10.100-fix-510-56778d365941-kasan #5 0b01fbbcf41a530f52043508fec2e31a4215
[18853.876840] Call trace:
[18853.876861] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3ec
[18853.876878] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[18853.876899] dump_stack+0x11c/0x1ac
[18853.876918] print_address_description+0x74/0x514
[18853.876934] kasan_report+0x134/0x174
[18853.876948] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x44/0x50
[18853.876976] mt76_txq_schedule+0x204/0xaf8 [mt76 074e03e4640e97fe7405ee1fab547b81c4fa45d2]
[18853.877002] mt76_txq_schedule_all+0x2c/0x48 [mt76 074e03e4640e97fe7405ee1fab547b81c4fa45d2]
[18853.877030] mt7921_tx_worker+0xa0/0x1cc [mt7921_common f0875ebac9d7b4754e1010549e7db50fbd90a047]
[18853.877054] __mt76_worker_fn+0x190/0x22c [mt76 074e03e4640e97fe7405ee1fab547b81c4fa45d2]
[18853.877071] kthread+0x2f8/0x3b8
[18853.877087] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
[18853.877098]
[18853.877112] Allocated by task 941:
[18853.877131] kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x68
[18853.877147] __kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0xfc
[18853.877163] kasan_kmalloc+0x10/0x1c
[18853.877177] __kmalloc+0x264/0x3c4
[18853.877294] sta_info_alloc+0x460/0xf88 [mac80211]
[18853.877410] ieee80211_prep_connection+0x204/0x1ee0 [mac80211]
[18853.877523] ieee80211_mgd_auth+0x6c4/0xa4c [mac80211]
[18853.877635] ieee80211_auth+0x20/0x2c [mac80211]
[18853.877733] rdev_auth+0x7c/0x438 [cfg80211]
[18853.877826] cfg80211_mlme_auth+0x26c/0x390 [cfg80211]
[18853.877919] nl80211_authenticate+0x6d4/0x904 [cfg80211]
[18853.877938] genl_rcv_msg+0x748/0x93c
[18853.877954] netlink_rcv_skb+0x160/0x2a8
[18853.877969] genl_rcv+0x3c/0x54
[18853.877985] netlink_unicast_kernel+0x104/0x1ec
[18853.877999] netlink_unicast+0x178/0x268
[18853.878015] netlink_sendmsg+0x3cc/0x5f0
[18853.878030] sock_sendmsg+0xb4/0xd8
[18853.878043] ____sys_sendmsg+0x2f8/0x53c
[18853.878058] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe8/0x150
[18853.878071] __sys_sendmsg+0xc4/0x1f4
[18853.878087] __arm64_compat_sys_sendmsg+0x88/0x9c
[18853.878101] el0_svc_common+0x1b4/0x390
[18853.878115] do_el0_svc_compat+0x8c/0xdc
[18853.878131] el0_svc_compat+0x10/0x1c
[18853.878146] el0_sync_compat_handler+0xa8/0xcc
[18853.878161] el0_sync_compat+0x188/0x1c0
[18853.878171]
[18853.878183] Freed by task 10927:
[18853.878200] kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x68
[18853.878215] kasan_set_track+0x28/0x3c
[18853.878228] kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x48
[18853.878244] __kasan_slab_free+0x11c/0x154
[18853.878259] kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x24
[18853.878273] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xac/0x1b0
[18853.878287] kfree+0x104/0x390
[18853.878402] sta_info_free+0x198/0x210 [mac80211]
[18853.878515] __sta_info_destroy_part2+0x230/0x2d4 [mac80211]
[18853.878628] __sta_info_flush+0x300/0x37c [mac80211]
[18853.878740] ieee80211_set_disassoc+0x2cc/0xa7c [mac80211]
[18853.878851] ieee80211_mgd_deauth+0x4a4/0x10a0 [mac80211]
[18853.878962] ieee80211_deauth+0x20/0x2c [mac80211]
[18853.879057] rdev_deauth+0x7c/0x438 [cfg80211]
[18853.879150] cfg80211_mlme_deauth+0x274/0x414 [cfg80211]
[18853.879243] cfg80211_mlme_down+0xe4/0x118 [cfg80211]
[18853.879335] cfg80211_disconnect+0x218/0x2d8 [cfg80211]
[18853.879427] __cfg80211_leave+0x17c/0x240 [cfg80211]
[18853.879519] cfg80211_leave+0x3c/0x58 [cfg80211]
[18853.879611] wiphy_suspend+0xdc/0x200 [cfg80211]
[18853.879628] dpm_run_callback+0x58/0x408
[18853.879642] __device_suspend+0x4cc/0x864
[18853.879658] async_suspend+0x34/0xf4
[18
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49296

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix possible deadlock when holding Fwb to get inline_data
1, mount with wsync.
2, create a file with O_RDWR, and the request was sent to mds.0:
ceph_atomic_open()-->
ceph_mdsc_do_request(openc)
finish_open(file, dentry, ceph_open)-->
ceph_open()-->
ceph_init_file()-->
ceph_init_file_info()-->
ceph_uninline_data()-->
{
...
if (inline_version == 1 || /* initial version, no data */
inline_version == CEPH_INLINE_NONE)
goto out_unlock;
...
}
The inline_version will be 1, which is the initial version for the
new create file. And here the ci->i_inline_version will keep with 1,
it's buggy.
3, buffer write to the file immediately:
ceph_write_iter()-->
ceph_get_caps(file, need=Fw, want=Fb, ...);
generic_perform_write()-->
a_ops->write_begin()-->
ceph_write_begin()-->
netfs_write_begin()-->
netfs_begin_read()-->
netfs_rreq_submit_slice()-->
netfs_read_from_server()-->
rreq->netfs_ops->issue_read()-->
ceph_netfs_issue_read()-->
{
...
if (ci->i_inline_version != CEPH_INLINE_NONE &&
ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline(subreq))
return;
...
}
ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, Fwb);
The ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline() will send a getattr(Fsr) request to
mds.1.
4, then the mds.1 will request the rd lock for CInode::filelock from
the auth mds.0, the mds.0 will do the CInode::filelock state transation
from excl --> sync, but it need to revoke the Fxwb caps back from the
clients.
While the kernel client has aleady held the Fwb caps and waiting for
the getattr(Fsr).
It's deadlock!
URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55377

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49272

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: pcm: Fix potential AB/BA lock with buffer_mutex and mmap_lock
syzbot caught a potential deadlock between the PCM
runtime->buffer_mutex and the mm->mmap_lock. It was brought by the
recent fix to cover the racy read/write and other ioctls, and in that
commit, I overlooked a (hopefully only) corner case that may take the
revert lock, namely, the OSS mmap. The OSS mmap operation
exceptionally allows to re-configure the parameters inside the OSS
mmap syscall, where mm->mmap_mutex is already held. Meanwhile, the
copy_from/to_user calls at read/write operations also take the
mm->mmap_lock internally, hence it may lead to a AB/BA deadlock.
A similar problem was already seen in the past and we fixed it with a
refcount (in commit b248371628aa). The former fix covered only the
call paths with OSS read/write and OSS ioctls, while we need to cover
the concurrent access via both ALSA and OSS APIs now.
This patch addresses the problem above by replacing the buffer_mutex
lock in the read/write operations with a refcount similar as we've
used for OSS. The new field, runtime->buffer_accessing, keeps the
number of concurrent read/write operations. Unlike the former
buffer_mutex protection, this protects only around the
copy_from/to_user() calls; the other codes are basically protected by
the PCM stream lock. The refcount can be a negative, meaning blocked
by the ioctls. If a negative value is seen, the read/write aborts
with -EBUSY. In the ioctl side, OTOH, they check this refcount, too,
and set to a negative value for blocking unless it's already being
accessed.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49266

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: fix rq-qos breakage from skipping rq_qos_done_bio()
a647a524a467 ("block: don't call rq_qos_ops->done_bio if the bio isn't
tracked") made bio_endio() skip rq_qos_done_bio() if BIO_TRACKED is not set.
While this fixed a potential oops, it also broke blk-iocost by skipping the
done_bio callback for merged bios.
Before, whether a bio goes through rq_qos_throttle() or rq_qos_merge(),
rq_qos_done_bio() would be called on the bio on completion with BIO_TRACKED
distinguishing the former from the latter. rq_qos_done_bio() is not called
for bios which wenth through rq_qos_merge(). This royally confuses
blk-iocost as the merged bios never finish and are considered perpetually
in-flight.
One reliably reproducible failure mode is an intermediate cgroup geting
stuck active preventing its children from being activated due to the
leaf-only rule, leading to loss of control. The following is from
resctl-bench protection scenario which emulates isolating a web server like
workload from a memory bomb run on an iocost configuration which should
yield a reasonable level of protection.
# cat /sys/block/nvme2n1/device/model
Samsung SSD 970 PRO 512GB
# cat /sys/fs/cgroup/io.cost.model
259:0 ctrl=user model=linear rbps=834913556 rseqiops=93622 rrandiops=102913 wbps=618985353 wseqiops=72325 wrandiops=71025
# cat /sys/fs/cgroup/io.cost.qos
259:0 enable=1 ctrl=user rpct=95.00 rlat=18776 wpct=95.00 wlat=8897 min=60.00 max=100.00
# resctl-bench -m 29.6G -r out.json run protection::scenario=mem-hog,loops=1
...
Memory Hog Summary
==================
IO Latency: R p50=242u:336u/2.5m p90=794u:1.4m/7.5m p99=2.7m:8.0m/62.5m max=8.0m:36.4m/350m
W p50=221u:323u/1.5m p90=709u:1.2m/5.5m p99=1.5m:2.5m/9.5m max=6.9m:35.9m/350m
Isolation and Request Latency Impact Distributions:
min p01 p05 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 max mean stdev
isol% 15.90 15.90 15.90 40.05 57.24 59.07 60.01 74.63 74.63 90.35 90.35 58.12 15.82
lat-imp% 0 0 0 0 0 4.55 14.68 15.54 233.5 548.1 548.1 53.88 143.6
Result: isol=58.12:15.82% lat_imp=53.88%:143.6 work_csv=100.0% missing=3.96%
The isolation result of 58.12% is close to what this device would show
without any IO control.
Fix it by introducing a new flag BIO_QOS_MERGED to mark merged bios and
calling rq_qos_done_bio() on them too. For consistency and clarity, rename
BIO_TRACKED to BIO_QOS_THROTTLED. The flag checks are moved into
rq_qos_done_bio() so that it's next to the code paths that set the flags.
With the patch applied, the above same benchmark shows:
# resctl-bench -m 29.6G -r out.json run protection::scenario=mem-hog,loops=1
...
Memory Hog Summary
==================
IO Latency: R p50=123u:84.4u/985u p90=322u:256u/2.5m p99=1.6m:1.4m/9.5m max=11.1m:36.0m/350m
W p50=429u:274u/995u p90=1.7m:1.3m/4.5m p99=3.4m:2.7m/11.5m max=7.9m:5.9m/26.5m
Isolation and Request Latency Impact Distributions:
min p01 p05 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 max mean stdev
isol% 84.91 84.91 89.51 90.73 92.31 94.49 96.36 98.04 98.71 100.0 100.0 94.42 2.81
lat-imp% 0 0 0 0 0 2.81 5.73 11.11 13.92 17.53 22.61 4.10 4.68
Result: isol=94.42:2.81% lat_imp=4.10%:4.68 work_csv=58.34% missing=0%

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49264

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exec: Force single empty string when argv is empty
Quoting[1] Ariadne Conill:
"In several other operating systems, it is a hard requirement that the
second argument to execve(2) be the name of a program, thus prohibiting
a scenario where argc < 1. POSIX 2017 also recommends this behaviour,
but it is not an explicit requirement[2]:
The argument arg0 should point to a filename string that is
associated with the process being started by one of the exec
functions.
...
Interestingly, Michael Kerrisk opened an issue about this in 2008[3],
but there was no consensus to support fixing this issue then.
Hopefully now that CVE-2021-4034 shows practical exploitative use[4]
of this bug in a shellcode, we can reconsider.
This issue is being tracked in the KSPP issue tracker[5]."
While the initial code searches[6][7] turned up what appeared to be
mostly corner case tests, trying to that just reject argv == NULL
(or an immediately terminated pointer list) quickly started tripping[8]
existing userspace programs.
The next best approach is forcing a single empty string into argv and
adjusting argc to match. The number of programs depending on argc == 0
seems a smaller set than those calling execve with a NULL argv.
Account for the additional stack space in bprm_stack_limits(). Inject an
empty string when argc == 0 (and set argc = 1). Warn about the case so
userspace has some notice about the change:
process './argc0' launched './argc0' with NULL argv: empty string added
Additionally WARN() and reject NULL argv usage for kernel threads.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220127000724.15106-1-ariadne@dereferenced.org/
[2] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/exec.html
[3] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8408
[4] https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt
[5] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/176
[6] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execve%5C+*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C+*NULL&literal=0
[7] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execlp%3F%5Cs*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C%5Cs*NULL&literal=0
[8] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220131144352.GE16385@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49256

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
watch_queue: Actually free the watch
free_watch() does everything barring actually freeing the watch object. Fix
this by adding the missing kfree.
kmemleak produces a report something like the following. Note that as an
address can be seen in the first word, the watch would appear to have gone
through call_rcu().
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810ce4a200 (size 96):
comm "syz-executor352", pid 3605, jiffies 4294947473 (age 13.720s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
e0 82 48 0d 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..H.............
80 a2 e4 0c 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff8214e6cc>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:581 [inline]
[<ffffffff8214e6cc>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:714 [inline]
[<ffffffff8214e6cc>] keyctl_watch_key+0xec/0x2e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:1800
[<ffffffff8214ec84>] __do_sys_keyctl+0x3c4/0x490 security/keys/keyctl.c:2016
[<ffffffff84493a25>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
[<ffffffff84493a25>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
[<ffffffff84600068>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49238

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ath11k: free peer for station when disconnect from AP for QCA6390/WCN6855
Commit b4a0f54156ac ("ath11k: move peer delete after vdev stop of station
for QCA6390 and WCN6855") is to fix firmware crash by changing the WMI
command sequence, but actually skip all the peer delete operation, then
it lead commit 58595c9874c6 ("ath11k: Fixing dangling pointer issue upon
peer delete failure") not take effect, and then happened a use-after-free
warning from KASAN. because the peer->sta is not set to NULL and then used
later.
Change to only skip the WMI_PEER_DELETE_CMDID for QCA6390/WCN6855.
log of user-after-free:
[ 534.888665] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ath11k_dp_rx_update_peer_stats+0x912/0xc10 [ath11k]
[ 534.888696] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881396bb1b8 by task rtcwake/2860
[ 534.888705] CPU: 4 PID: 2860 Comm: rtcwake Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 5.15.0-wt-ath+ #523
[ 534.888712] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7HVK/NUC8i7HVB, BIOS HNKBLi70.86A.0067.2021.0528.1339 05/28/2021
[ 534.888716] Call Trace:
[ 534.888720] <IRQ>
[ 534.888726] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
[ 534.888736] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x170
[ 534.888745] ? ath11k_dp_rx_update_peer_stats+0x912/0xc10 [ath11k]
[ 534.888771] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
[ 534.888783] ? ath11k_dp_rx_update_peer_stats+0x912/0xc10 [ath11k]
[ 534.888810] ath11k_dp_rx_update_peer_stats+0x912/0xc10 [ath11k]
[ 534.888840] ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_status+0x529/0xa70 [ath11k]
[ 534.888874] ? ath11k_dp_rx_mon_status_bufs_replenish+0x3f0/0x3f0 [ath11k]
[ 534.888897] ? check_prev_add+0x20f0/0x20f0
[ 534.888922] ? __lock_acquire+0xb72/0x1870
[ 534.888937] ? find_held_lock+0x33/0x110
[ 534.888954] ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x297/0x520 [ath11k]
[ 534.888981] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x40/0x40
[ 534.888990] ? ath11k_dp_rx_pdev_alloc+0xd90/0xd90 [ath11k]
[ 534.889026] ath11k_dp_service_mon_ring+0x67/0xe0 [ath11k]
[ 534.889053] ? ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x520/0x520 [ath11k]
[ 534.889075] call_timer_fn+0x167/0x4a0
[ 534.889084] ? add_timer_on+0x3b0/0x3b0
[ 534.889103] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare.part.0+0x18c/0x370
[ 534.889117] __run_timers.part.0+0x539/0x8b0
[ 534.889123] ? ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x520/0x520 [ath11k]
[ 534.889157] ? call_timer_fn+0x4a0/0x4a0
[ 534.889164] ? mark_lock_irq+0x1c30/0x1c30
[ 534.889173] ? clockevents_program_event+0xdd/0x280
[ 534.889189] ? mark_held_locks+0xa5/0xe0
[ 534.889203] run_timer_softirq+0x97/0x180
[ 534.889213] __do_softirq+0x276/0x86a
[ 534.889230] __irq_exit_rcu+0x11c/0x180
[ 534.889238] irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20
[ 534.889244] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8e/0xc0
[ 534.889251] </IRQ>
[ 534.889254] <TASK>
[ 534.889259] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
[ 534.889265] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x38/0x70
[ 534.889271] Code: 74 24 10 e8 ea c2 bf fd 48 89 ef e8 12 53 c0 fd 81 e3 00 02 00 00 75 25 9c 58 f6 c4 02 75 2d 48 85 db 74 01 fb bf 01 00 00 00 <e8> 13 a7 b5 fd 65 8b 05 cc d9 9c 5e 85 c0 74 0a 5b 5d c3 e8 a0 ee
[ 534.889276] RSP: 0018:ffffc90002e5f880 EFLAGS: 00000206
[ 534.889284] RAX: 0000000000000006 RBX: 0000000000000200 RCX: ffffffff9f256f10
[ 534.889289] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffa1c6e420 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 534.889293] RBP: ffff8881095e6200 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffffa40d2b8f
[ 534.889298] R10: fffffbfff481a571 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8881095e6e68
[ 534.889302] R13: ffffc90002e5f908 R14: 0000000000000246 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 534.889316] ? mark_lock+0xd0/0x14a0
[ 534.889332] klist_next+0x1d4/0x450
[ 534.889340] ? dpm_wait_for_subordinate+0x2d0/0x2d0
[ 534.889350] device_for_each_child+0xa8/0x140
[ 534.889360] ? device_remove_class_symlinks+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 534.889370] ? __lock_release+0x4bd/0x9f0
[ 534.889378] ? dpm_suspend+0x26b/0x3f0
[ 534.889390] dpm_wait_for_subordinate+
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49236

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix UAF due to race between btf_try_get_module and load_module
While working on code to populate kfunc BTF ID sets for module BTF from
its initcall, I noticed that by the time the initcall is invoked, the
module BTF can already be seen by userspace (and the BPF verifier). The
existing btf_try_get_module calls try_module_get which only fails if
mod->state == MODULE_STATE_GOING, i.e. it can increment module reference
when module initcall is happening in parallel.
Currently, BTF parsing happens from MODULE_STATE_COMING notifier
callback. At this point, the module initcalls have not been invoked.
The notifier callback parses and prepares the module BTF, allocates an
ID, which publishes it to userspace, and then adds it to the btf_modules
list allowing the kernel to invoke btf_try_get_module for the BTF.
However, at this point, the module has not been fully initialized (i.e.
its initcalls have not finished). The code in module.c can still fail
and free the module, without caring for other users. However, nothing
stops btf_try_get_module from succeeding between the state transition
from MODULE_STATE_COMING to MODULE_STATE_LIVE.
This leads to a use-after-free issue when BPF program loads
successfully in the state transition, load_module's do_init_module call
fails and frees the module, and BPF program fd on close calls module_put
for the freed module. Future patch has test case to verify we don't
regress in this area in future.
There are multiple points after prepare_coming_module (in load_module)
where failure can occur and module loading can return error. We
illustrate and test for the race using the last point where it can
practically occur (in module __init function).
An illustration of the race:
CPU 0 CPU 1
load_module
notifier_call(MODULE_STATE_COMING)
btf_parse_module
btf_alloc_id// Published to userspace
list_add(&btf_mod->list, btf_modules)
mod->init(...)
...^
bpf_check |
check_pseudo_btf_id |
btf_try_get_module |
returns true | ...
... | module __init in progress
return prog_fd | ...
... V
if (ret < 0)
free_module(mod)
...
close(prog_fd)
...
bpf_prog_free_deferred
module_put(used_btf.mod) // use-after-free
We fix this issue by setting a flag BTF_MODULE_F_LIVE, from the notifier
callback when MODULE_STATE_LIVE state is reached for the module, so that
we return NULL from btf_try_get_module for modules that are not fully
formed. Since try_module_get already checks that module is not in
MODULE_STATE_GOING state, and that is the only transition a live module
can make before being removed from btf_modules list, this is enough to
close the race and prevent the bug.
A later selftest patch crafts the race condition artifically to verify
that it has been fixed, and that verifier fails to load program (with
ENXIO).
Lastly, a couple of comments:
1. Even if this race didn't exist, it seems more appropriate to only
access resources (ksyms and kfuncs) of a fully formed module which
has been initialized completely.
2. This patch was born out of need for synchronization against module
initcall for the next patch, so it is needed for correctness even
without the aforementioned race condition. The BTF resources
initialized by module initcall are set up once and then only looked
up, so just waiting until the initcall has finished ensures correct
behavior.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49227

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
igc: avoid kernel warning when changing RX ring parameters
Calling ethtool changing the RX ring parameters like this:
$ ethtool -G eth0 rx 1024
on igc triggers kernel warnings like this:
[ 225.198467] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 225.198473] Missing unregister, handled but fix driver
[ 225.198485] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 959 at net/core/xdp.c:168
xdp_rxq_info_reg+0x79/0xd0
[...]
[ 225.198601] Call Trace:
[ 225.198604] <TASK>
[ 225.198609] igc_setup_rx_resources+0x3f/0xe0 [igc]
[ 225.198617] igc_ethtool_set_ringparam+0x30e/0x450 [igc]
[ 225.198626] ethnl_set_rings+0x18a/0x250
[ 225.198631] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xca/0x110
[ 225.198637] genl_rcv_msg+0xce/0x1c0
[ 225.198640] ? rings_prepare_data+0x60/0x60
[ 225.198644] ? genl_get_cmd+0xd0/0xd0
[ 225.198647] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4e/0xf0
[ 225.198652] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
[ 225.198655] netlink_unicast+0x20e/0x330
[ 225.198659] netlink_sendmsg+0x23f/0x480
[ 225.198663] sock_sendmsg+0x5b/0x60
[ 225.198667] __sys_sendto+0xf0/0x160
[ 225.198671] ? handle_mm_fault+0xb2/0x280
[ 225.198676] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1eb/0x690
[ 225.198680] __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
[ 225.198683] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[ 225.198687] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 225.198693] RIP: 0033:0x7f7ae38ac3aa
igc_ethtool_set_ringparam() copies the igc_ring structure but neglects to
reset the xdp_rxq_info member before calling igc_setup_rx_resources().
This in turn calls xdp_rxq_info_reg() with an already registered xdp_rxq_info.
Make sure to unregister the xdp_rxq_info structure first in
igc_setup_rx_resources.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49219

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio/pci: fix memory leak during D3hot to D0 transition
If 'vfio_pci_core_device::needs_pm_restore' is set (PCI device does
not have No_Soft_Reset bit set in its PMCSR config register), then
the current PCI state will be saved locally in
'vfio_pci_core_device::pm_save' during D0->D3hot transition and same
will be restored back during D3hot->D0 transition.
For saving the PCI state locally, pci_store_saved_state() is being
used and the pci_load_and_free_saved_state() will free the allocated
memory.
But for reset related IOCTLs, vfio driver calls PCI reset-related
API's which will internally change the PCI power state back to D0. So,
when the guest resumes, then it will get the current state as D0 and it
will skip the call to vfio_pci_set_power_state() for changing the
power state to D0 explicitly. In this case, the memory pointed by
'pm_save' will never be freed. In a malicious sequence, the state changing
to D3hot followed by VFIO_DEVICE_RESET/VFIO_DEVICE_PCI_HOT_RESET can be
run in a loop and it can cause an OOM situation.
This patch frees the earlier allocated memory first before overwriting
'pm_save' to prevent the mentioned memory leak.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49218

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/dp: Fix OOB read when handling Post Cursor2 register
The link_status array was not large enough to read the Adjust Request
Post Cursor2 register, so remove the common helper function to avoid
an OOB read, found with a -Warray-bounds build:
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_helper.c: In function 'drm_dp_get_adjust_request_post_cursor':
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_helper.c:59:27: error: array subscript 10 is outside array bounds of 'const u8[6]' {aka 'const unsigned char[6]'} [-Werror=array-bounds]
59 | return link_status[r - DP_LANE0_1_STATUS];
| ~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_helper.c:147:51: note: while referencing 'link_status'
147 | u8 drm_dp_get_adjust_request_post_cursor(const u8 link_status[DP_LINK_STATUS_SIZE],
| ~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Replace the only user of the helper with an open-coded fetch and decode,
similar to drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link_dp.c.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49215

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: Fix race at socket teardown
Fix a race in the xsk socket teardown code that can lead to a NULL pointer
dereference splat. The current xsk unbind code in xsk_unbind_dev() starts by
setting xs->state to XSK_UNBOUND, sets xs->dev to NULL and then waits for any
NAPI processing to terminate using synchronize_net(). After that, the release
code starts to tear down the socket state and free allocated memory.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c0
PGD 8000000932469067 P4D 8000000932469067 PUD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 25 PID: 69132 Comm: grpcpp_sync_ser Tainted: G I 5.16.0+ #2
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/0599V5, BIOS 1.2.10 03/09/2015
RIP: 0010:__xsk_sendmsg+0x2c/0x690
[...]
RSP: 0018:ffffa2348bd13d50 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: ffff8d5fc632d258
RDX: 0000000000400000 RSI: ffffa2348bd13e10 RDI: ffff8d5fc5489800
RBP: ffffa2348bd13db0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffffffff000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8d5fc5489800
R13: ffff8d5fcb0f5140 R14: ffff8d5fcb0f5140 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f991cff9400(0000) GS:ffff8d6f1f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000000114888005 CR4: 00000000001706e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? aa_sk_perm+0x43/0x1b0
xsk_sendmsg+0xf0/0x110
sock_sendmsg+0x65/0x70
__sys_sendto+0x113/0x190
? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x23/0x50
? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xa5/0x1d0
__x64_sys_sendto+0x29/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
There are two problems with the current code. First, setting xs->dev to NULL
before waiting for all users to stop using the socket is not correct. The
entry to the data plane functions xsk_poll(), xsk_sendmsg(), and xsk_recvmsg()
are all guarded by a test that xs->state is in the state XSK_BOUND and if not,
it returns right away. But one process might have passed this test but still
have not gotten to the point in which it uses xs->dev in the code. In this
interim, a second process executing xsk_unbind_dev() might have set xs->dev to
NULL which will lead to a crash for the first process. The solution here is
just to get rid of this NULL assignment since it is not used anymore. Before
commit 42fddcc7c64b ("xsk: use state member for socket synchronization"),
xs->dev was the gatekeeper to admit processes into the data plane functions,
but it was replaced with the state variable xs->state in the aforementioned
commit.
The second problem is that synchronize_net() does not wait for any process in
xsk_poll(), xsk_sendmsg(), or xsk_recvmsg() to complete, which means that the
state they rely on might be cleaned up prematurely. This can happen when the
notifier gets called (at driver unload for example) as it uses xsk_unbind_dev().
Solve this by extending the RCU critical region from just the ndo_xsk_wakeup
to the whole functions mentioned above, so that both the test of xs->state ==
XSK_BOUND and the last use of any member of xs is covered by the RCU critical
section. This will guarantee that when synchronize_net() completes, there will
be no processes left executing xsk_poll(), xsk_sendmsg(), or xsk_recvmsg() and
state can be cleaned up safely. Note that we need to drop the RCU lock for the
skb xmit path as it uses functions that might sleep. Due to this, we have to
retest the xs->state after we grab the mutex that protects the skb xmit code
from, among a number of things, an xsk_unbind_dev() being executed from the
notifier at the same time.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49198

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: Fix crash due to tcp_tsorted_anchor was initialized before release skb
Got crash when doing pressure test of mptcp:
===========================================================================
dst_release: dst:ffffa06ce6e5c058 refcnt:-1
kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffa06ce6e5c058
PGD 190a01067 P4D 190a01067 PUD 43fffb067 PMD 22e403063 PTE 8000000226e5c063
Oops: 0011 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 7 PID: 7823 Comm: kworker/7:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.2.1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
? skb_release_head_state+0x68/0x100
? skb_release_all+0xe/0x30
? kfree_skb+0x32/0xa0
? mptcp_sendmsg_frag+0x57e/0x750
? __mptcp_retrans+0x21b/0x3c0
? __switch_to_asm+0x35/0x70
? mptcp_worker+0x25e/0x320
? process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
? worker_thread+0x30/0x390
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
? kthread+0x112/0x130
? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
===========================================================================
In __mptcp_alloc_tx_skb skb was allocated and skb->tcp_tsorted_anchor will
be initialized, in under memory pressure situation sk_wmem_schedule will
return false and then kfree_skb. In this case skb->_skb_refdst is not null
because_skb_refdst and tcp_tsorted_anchor are stored in the same mem, and
kfree_skb will try to release dst and cause crash.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49196

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/pseries: Fix use after free in remove_phb_dynamic()
In remove_phb_dynamic() we use &phb->io_resource, after we've called
device_unregister(&host_bridge->dev). But the unregister may have freed
phb, because pcibios_free_controller_deferred() is the release function
for the host_bridge.
If there are no outstanding references when we call device_unregister()
then phb will be freed out from under us.
This has gone mainly unnoticed, but with slub_debug and page_poison
enabled it can lead to a crash:
PID: 7574 TASK: c0000000d492cb80 CPU: 13 COMMAND: "drmgr"
#0 [c0000000e4f075a0] crash_kexec at c00000000027d7dc
#1 [c0000000e4f075d0] oops_end at c000000000029608
#2 [c0000000e4f07650] __bad_page_fault at c0000000000904b4
#3 [c0000000e4f076c0] do_bad_slb_fault at c00000000009a5a8
#4 [c0000000e4f076f0] data_access_slb_common_virt at c000000000008b30
Data SLB Access [380] exception frame:
R0: c000000000167250 R1: c0000000e4f07a00 R2: c000000002a46100
R3: c000000002b39ce8 R4: 00000000000000c0 R5: 00000000000000a9
R6: 3894674d000000c0 R7: 0000000000000000 R8: 00000000000000ff
R9: 0000000000000100 R10: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b R11: 0000000000008000
R12: c00000000023da80 R13: c0000009ffd38b00 R14: 0000000000000000
R15: 000000011c87f0f0 R16: 0000000000000006 R17: 0000000000000003
R18: 0000000000000002 R19: 0000000000000004 R20: 0000000000000005
R21: 000000011c87ede8 R22: 000000011c87c5a8 R23: 000000011c87d3a0
R24: 0000000000000000 R25: 0000000000000001 R26: c0000000e4f07cc8
R27: c00000004d1cc400 R28: c0080000031d00e8 R29: c00000004d23d800
R30: c00000004d1d2400 R31: c00000004d1d2540
NIP: c000000000167258 MSR: 8000000000009033 OR3: c000000000e9f474
CTR: 0000000000000000 LR: c000000000167250 XER: 0000000020040003
CCR: 0000000024088420 MQ: 0000000000000000 DAR: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6ba3
DSISR: c0000000e4f07920 Syscall Result: fffffffffffffff2
[NIP : release_resource+56]
[LR : release_resource+48]
#5 [c0000000e4f07a00] release_resource at c000000000167258 (unreliable)
#6 [c0000000e4f07a30] remove_phb_dynamic at c000000000105648
#7 [c0000000e4f07ab0] dlpar_remove_slot at c0080000031a09e8 [rpadlpar_io]
#8 [c0000000e4f07b50] remove_slot_store at c0080000031a0b9c [rpadlpar_io]
#9 [c0000000e4f07be0] kobj_attr_store at c000000000817d8c
#10 [c0000000e4f07c00] sysfs_kf_write at c00000000063e504
#11 [c0000000e4f07c20] kernfs_fop_write_iter at c00000000063d868
#12 [c0000000e4f07c70] new_sync_write at c00000000054339c
#13 [c0000000e4f07d10] vfs_write at c000000000546624
#14 [c0000000e4f07d60] ksys_write at c0000000005469f4
#15 [c0000000e4f07db0] system_call_exception at c000000000030840
#16 [c0000000e4f07e10] system_call_vectored_common at c00000000000c168
To avoid it, we can take a reference to the host_bridge->dev until we're
done using phb. Then when we drop the reference the phb will be freed.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49179

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block, bfq: don't move oom_bfqq
Our test report a UAF:
[ 2073.019181] ==================================================================
[ 2073.019188] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __bfq_put_async_bfqq+0xa0/0x168
[ 2073.019191] Write of size 8 at addr ffff8000ccf64128 by task rmmod/72584
[ 2073.019192]
[ 2073.019196] CPU: 0 PID: 72584 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.19.90-yk #5
[ 2073.019198] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
[ 2073.019200] Call trace:
[ 2073.019203] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x310
[ 2073.019206] show_stack+0x28/0x38
[ 2073.019210] dump_stack+0xec/0x15c
[ 2073.019216] print_address_description+0x68/0x2d0
[ 2073.019220] kasan_report+0x238/0x2f0
[ 2073.019224] __asan_store8+0x88/0xb0
[ 2073.019229] __bfq_put_async_bfqq+0xa0/0x168
[ 2073.019233] bfq_put_async_queues+0xbc/0x208
[ 2073.019236] bfq_pd_offline+0x178/0x238
[ 2073.019240] blkcg_deactivate_policy+0x1f0/0x420
[ 2073.019244] bfq_exit_queue+0x128/0x178
[ 2073.019249] blk_mq_exit_sched+0x12c/0x160
[ 2073.019252] elevator_exit+0xc8/0xd0
[ 2073.019256] blk_exit_queue+0x50/0x88
[ 2073.019259] blk_cleanup_queue+0x228/0x3d8
[ 2073.019267] null_del_dev+0xfc/0x1e0 [null_blk]
[ 2073.019274] null_exit+0x90/0x114 [null_blk]
[ 2073.019278] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x358/0x5a0
[ 2073.019282] el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x320
[ 2073.019287] el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160
[ 2073.019290] el0_svc+0x10/0x218
[ 2073.019291]
[ 2073.019294] Allocated by task 14163:
[ 2073.019301] kasan_kmalloc+0xe0/0x190
[ 2073.019305] kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x1cc/0x418
[ 2073.019308] bfq_pd_alloc+0x54/0x118
[ 2073.019313] blkcg_activate_policy+0x250/0x460
[ 2073.019317] bfq_create_group_hierarchy+0x38/0x110
[ 2073.019321] bfq_init_queue+0x6d0/0x948
[ 2073.019325] blk_mq_init_sched+0x1d8/0x390
[ 2073.019330] elevator_switch_mq+0x88/0x170
[ 2073.019334] elevator_switch+0x140/0x270
[ 2073.019338] elv_iosched_store+0x1a4/0x2a0
[ 2073.019342] queue_attr_store+0x90/0xe0
[ 2073.019348] sysfs_kf_write+0xa8/0xe8
[ 2073.019351] kernfs_fop_write+0x1f8/0x378
[ 2073.019359] __vfs_write+0xe0/0x360
[ 2073.019363] vfs_write+0xf0/0x270
[ 2073.019367] ksys_write+0xdc/0x1b8
[ 2073.019371] __arm64_sys_write+0x50/0x60
[ 2073.019375] el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x320
[ 2073.019380] el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160
[ 2073.019383] el0_svc+0x10/0x218
[ 2073.019385]
[ 2073.019387] Freed by task 72584:
[ 2073.019391] __kasan_slab_free+0x120/0x228
[ 2073.019394] kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18
[ 2073.019397] kfree+0x94/0x368
[ 2073.019400] bfqg_put+0x64/0xb0
[ 2073.019404] bfqg_and_blkg_put+0x90/0xb0
[ 2073.019408] bfq_put_queue+0x220/0x228
[ 2073.019413] __bfq_put_async_bfqq+0x98/0x168
[ 2073.019416] bfq_put_async_queues+0xbc/0x208
[ 2073.019420] bfq_pd_offline+0x178/0x238
[ 2073.019424] blkcg_deactivate_policy+0x1f0/0x420
[ 2073.019429] bfq_exit_queue+0x128/0x178
[ 2073.019433] blk_mq_exit_sched+0x12c/0x160
[ 2073.019437] elevator_exit+0xc8/0xd0
[ 2073.019440] blk_exit_queue+0x50/0x88
[ 2073.019443] blk_cleanup_queue+0x228/0x3d8
[ 2073.019451] null_del_dev+0xfc/0x1e0 [null_blk]
[ 2073.019459] null_exit+0x90/0x114 [null_blk]
[ 2073.019462] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x358/0x5a0
[ 2073.019467] el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x320
[ 2073.019471] el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160
[ 2073.019474] el0_svc+0x10/0x218
[ 2073.019475]
[ 2073.019479] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8000ccf63f00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1024 of size 1024
[ 2073.019484] The buggy address is located 552 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff8000ccf63f00, ffff8000ccf64300)
[ 2073.019486] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 2073.019492] page:ffff7e000333d800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8000c0003a00 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 2073.020123] flags: 0x7ffff0000008100(slab|head)
[ 2073.020403] raw: 07ffff0000008100 ffff7e0003334c08 ffff7e00001f5a08 ffff8000c0003a00
[ 2073.020409] ra
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49176

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bfq: fix use-after-free in bfq_dispatch_request
KASAN reports a use-after-free report when doing normal scsi-mq test
[69832.239032] ==================================================================
[69832.241810] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.243267] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88802622ba88 by task kworker/3:1H/155
[69832.244656]
[69832.245007] CPU: 3 PID: 155 Comm: kworker/3:1H Not tainted 5.10.0-10295-g576c6382529e #8
[69832.246626] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[69832.249069] Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_run_work_fn
[69832.250022] Call Trace:
[69832.250541] dump_stack+0x9b/0xce
[69832.251232] ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.252243] print_address_description.constprop.6+0x3e/0x60
[69832.253381] ? __cpuidle_text_end+0x5/0x5
[69832.254211] ? vprintk_func+0x6b/0x120
[69832.254994] ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.255952] ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.256914] kasan_report.cold.9+0x22/0x3a
[69832.257753] ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.258755] check_memory_region+0x1c1/0x1e0
[69832.260248] bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.261181] ? bfq_bfqq_expire+0x2440/0x2440
[69832.262032] ? blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queues+0xf9/0x170
[69832.263022] __blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched+0x52f/0x830
[69832.264011] ? blk_mq_sched_request_inserted+0x100/0x100
[69832.265101] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x398/0x4f0
[69832.266206] ? blk_mq_do_dispatch_ctx+0x570/0x570
[69832.267147] ? __switch_to+0x5f4/0xee0
[69832.267898] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xdf/0x140
[69832.268946] __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xc0/0x270
[69832.269840] blk_mq_run_work_fn+0x51/0x60
[69832.278170] process_one_work+0x6d4/0xfe0
[69832.278984] worker_thread+0x91/0xc80
[69832.279726] ? __kthread_parkme+0xb0/0x110
[69832.280554] ? process_one_work+0xfe0/0xfe0
[69832.281414] kthread+0x32d/0x3f0
[69832.282082] ? kthread_park+0x170/0x170
[69832.282849] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[69832.283573]
[69832.283886] Allocated by task 7725:
[69832.284599] kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40
[69832.285385] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.2+0xc1/0xd0
[69832.286350] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x13f/0x460
[69832.287237] bfq_get_queue+0x3d4/0x1140
[69832.287993] bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split+0x103/0x510
[69832.289015] bfq_init_rq+0x337/0x2d50
[69832.289749] bfq_insert_requests+0x304/0x4e10
[69832.290634] blk_mq_sched_insert_requests+0x13e/0x390
[69832.291629] blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x4b4/0x760
[69832.292538] blk_flush_plug_list+0x2c5/0x480
[69832.293392] io_schedule_prepare+0xb2/0xd0
[69832.294209] io_schedule_timeout+0x13/0x80
[69832.295014] wait_for_common_io.constprop.1+0x13c/0x270
[69832.296137] submit_bio_wait+0x103/0x1a0
[69832.296932] blkdev_issue_discard+0xe6/0x160
[69832.297794] blk_ioctl_discard+0x219/0x290
[69832.298614] blkdev_common_ioctl+0x50a/0x1750
[69832.304715] blkdev_ioctl+0x470/0x600
[69832.305474] block_ioctl+0xde/0x120
[69832.306232] vfs_ioctl+0x6c/0xc0
[69832.306877] __se_sys_ioctl+0x90/0xa0
[69832.307629] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
[69832.308362] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[69832.309382]
[69832.309701] Freed by task 155:
[69832.310328] kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40
[69832.311121] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
[69832.311868] kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30
[69832.312699] __kasan_slab_free+0x111/0x160
[69832.313524] kmem_cache_free+0x94/0x460
[69832.314367] bfq_put_queue+0x582/0x940
[69832.315112] __bfq_bfqd_reset_in_service+0x166/0x1d0
[69832.317275] bfq_bfqq_expire+0xb27/0x2440
[69832.318084] bfq_dispatch_request+0x697/0x44b0
[69832.318991] __blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched+0x52f/0x830
[69832.319984] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x398/0x4f0
[69832.321087] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xdf/0x140
[69832.322225] __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xc0/0x270
[69832.323114] blk_mq_run_work_fn+0x51/0x6
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49174

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix ext4_mb_mark_bb() with flex_bg with fast_commit
In case of flex_bg feature (which is by default enabled), extents for
any given inode might span across blocks from two different block group.
ext4_mb_mark_bb() only reads the buffer_head of block bitmap once for the
starting block group, but it fails to read it again when the extent length
boundary overflows to another block group. Then in this below loop it
accesses memory beyond the block group bitmap buffer_head and results
into a data abort.
for (i = 0; i < clen; i++)
if (!mb_test_bit(blkoff + i, bitmap_bh->b_data) == !state)
already++;
This patch adds this functionality for checking block group boundary in
ext4_mb_mark_bb() and update the buffer_head(bitmap_bh) for every different
block group.
w/o this patch, I was easily able to hit a data access abort using Power platform.
<...>
[ 74.327662] EXT4-fs error (device loop3): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:1141: group 11, block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 21248 vs 23294 free clusters
[ 74.533214] EXT4-fs (loop3): shut down requested (2)
[ 74.536705] Aborting journal on device loop3-8.
[ 74.702705] BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0xc00000005e980000
[ 74.703727] Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000007bffb8
cpu 0xd: Vector: 300 (Data Access) at [c000000015db7060]
pc: c0000000007bffb8: ext4_mb_mark_bb+0x198/0x5a0
lr: c0000000007bfeec: ext4_mb_mark_bb+0xcc/0x5a0
sp: c000000015db7300
msr: 800000000280b033
dar: c00000005e980000
dsisr: 40000000
current = 0xc000000027af6880
paca = 0xc00000003ffd5200 irqmask: 0x03 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 5167, comm = mount
<...>
enter ? for help
[c000000015db7380] c000000000782708 ext4_ext_clear_bb+0x378/0x410
[c000000015db7400] c000000000813f14 ext4_fc_replay+0x1794/0x2000
[c000000015db7580] c000000000833f7c do_one_pass+0xe9c/0x12a0
[c000000015db7710] c000000000834504 jbd2_journal_recover+0x184/0x2d0
[c000000015db77c0] c000000000841398 jbd2_journal_load+0x188/0x4a0
[c000000015db7880] c000000000804de8 ext4_fill_super+0x2638/0x3e10
[c000000015db7a40] c0000000005f8404 get_tree_bdev+0x2b4/0x350
[c000000015db7ae0] c0000000007ef058 ext4_get_tree+0x28/0x40
[c000000015db7b00] c0000000005f6344 vfs_get_tree+0x44/0x100
[c000000015db7b70] c00000000063c408 path_mount+0xdd8/0xe70
[c000000015db7c40] c00000000063c8f0 sys_mount+0x450/0x550
[c000000015db7d50] c000000000035770 system_call_exception+0x4a0/0x4e0
[c000000015db7e10] c00000000000c74c system_call_common+0xec/0x250

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49159

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Implement ref count for SRB
The timeout handler and the done function are racing. When
qla2x00_async_iocb_timeout() starts to run it can be preempted by the
normal response path (via the firmware?). qla24xx_async_gpsc_sp_done()
releases the SRB unconditionally. When scheduling back to
qla2x00_async_iocb_timeout() qla24xx_async_abort_cmd() will access an freed
sp->qpair pointer:
qla2xxx [0000:83:00.0]-2871:0: Async-gpsc timeout - hdl=63d portid=234500 50:06:0e:80:08:77:b6:21.
qla2xxx [0000:83:00.0]-2853:0: Async done-gpsc res 0, WWPN 50:06:0e:80:08:77:b6:21
qla2xxx [0000:83:00.0]-2854:0: Async-gpsc OUT WWPN 20:45:00:27:f8:75:33:00 speeds=2c00 speed=0400.
qla2xxx [0000:83:00.0]-28d8:0: qla24xx_handle_gpsc_event 50:06:0e:80:08:77:b6:21 DS 7 LS 6 rc 0 login 1|1 rscn 1|0 lid 5
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
IP: qla24xx_async_abort_cmd+0x1b/0x1c0 [qla2xxx]
Obvious solution to this is to introduce a reference counter. One reference
is taken for the normal code path (the 'good' case) and one for the timeout
path. As we always race between the normal good case and the timeout/abort
handler we need to serialize it. Also we cannot assume any order between
the handlers. Since this is slow path we can use proper synchronization via
locks.
When we are able to cancel a timer (del_timer returns 1) we know there
can't be any error handling in progress because the timeout handler hasn't
expired yet, thus we can safely decrement the refcounter by one.
If we are not able to cancel the timer, we know an abort handler is
running. We have to make sure we call sp->done() in the abort handlers
before calling kref_put().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49158

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix warning message due to adisc being flushed
Fix warning message due to adisc being flushed. Linux kernel triggered a
warning message where a different error code type is not matching up with
the expected type. Add additional translation of one error code type to
another.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1131623 at drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_init.c:498
qla2x00_async_adisc_sp_done+0x294/0x2b0 [qla2xxx]
CPU: 2 PID: 1131623 Comm: drmgr Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1-autotest #1
..
GPR28: c000000aaa9c8890 c0080000079ab678 c00000140a104800 c00000002bd19000
NIP [c00800000790857c] qla2x00_async_adisc_sp_done+0x294/0x2b0 [qla2xxx]
LR [c008000007908578] qla2x00_async_adisc_sp_done+0x290/0x2b0 [qla2xxx]
Call Trace:
[c00000001cdc3620] [c008000007908578] qla2x00_async_adisc_sp_done+0x290/0x2b0 [qla2xxx] (unreliable)
[c00000001cdc3710] [c0080000078f3080] __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0x1b8/0x580 [qla2xxx]
[c00000001cdc3840] [c0080000078f589c] qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0x34/0xd0 [qla2xxx]
[c00000001cdc3880] [c0080000079153d8] qla2x00_abort_isp_cleanup+0x3f0/0x570 [qla2xxx]
[c00000001cdc3920] [c0080000078fb7e8] qla2x00_remove_one+0x3d0/0x480 [qla2xxx]
[c00000001cdc39b0] [c00000000071c274] pci_device_remove+0x64/0x120
[c00000001cdc39f0] [c0000000007fb818] device_release_driver_internal+0x168/0x2a0
[c00000001cdc3a30] [c00000000070e304] pci_stop_bus_device+0xb4/0x100
[c00000001cdc3a70] [c00000000070e4f0] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0x20/0x40
[c00000001cdc3aa0] [c000000000073940] pci_hp_remove_devices+0x90/0x130
[c00000001cdc3b30] [c0080000070704d0] disable_slot+0x38/0x90 [rpaphp] [
c00000001cdc3b60] [c00000000073eb4c] power_write_file+0xcc/0x180
[c00000001cdc3be0] [c0000000007354bc] pci_slot_attr_store+0x3c/0x60
[c00000001cdc3c00] [c00000000055f820] sysfs_kf_write+0x60/0x80 [c00000001cdc3c20]
[c00000000055df10] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1a0/0x290
[c00000001cdc3c70] [c000000000447c4c] new_sync_write+0x14c/0x1d0
[c00000001cdc3d10] [c00000000044b134] vfs_write+0x224/0x330
[c00000001cdc3d60] [c00000000044b3f4] ksys_write+0x74/0x130
[c00000001cdc3db0] [c00000000002df70] system_call_exception+0x150/0x2d0
[c00000001cdc3e10] [c00000000000d45c] system_call_common+0xec/0x278

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49156

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix scheduling while atomic
The driver makes a call into midlayer (fc_remote_port_delete) which can put
the thread to sleep. The thread that originates the call is in interrupt
context. The combination of the two trigger a crash. Schedule the call in
non-interrupt context where it is more safe.
kernel: BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/7/0/0x00010000
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: <IRQ>
kernel: dump_stack+0x66/0x81
kernel: __schedule_bug.cold.90+0x5/0x1d
kernel: __schedule+0x7af/0x960
kernel: schedule+0x28/0x80
kernel: schedule_timeout+0x26d/0x3b0
kernel: wait_for_completion+0xb4/0x140
kernel: ? wake_up_q+0x70/0x70
kernel: __wait_rcu_gp+0x12c/0x160
kernel: ? sdev_evt_alloc+0xc0/0x180 [scsi_mod]
kernel: synchronize_sched+0x6c/0x80
kernel: ? call_rcu_bh+0x20/0x20
kernel: ? __bpf_trace_rcu_invoke_callback+0x10/0x10
kernel: sdev_evt_alloc+0xfd/0x180 [scsi_mod]
kernel: starget_for_each_device+0x85/0xb0 [scsi_mod]
kernel: ? scsi_init_io+0x360/0x3d0 [scsi_mod]
kernel: scsi_init_io+0x388/0x3d0 [scsi_mod]
kernel: device_for_each_child+0x54/0x90
kernel: fc_remote_port_delete+0x70/0xe0 [scsi_transport_fc]
kernel: qla2x00_schedule_rport_del+0x62/0xf0 [qla2xxx]
kernel: qla2x00_mark_device_lost+0x9c/0xd0 [qla2xxx]
kernel: qla24xx_handle_plogi_done_event+0x55f/0x570 [qla2xxx]
kernel: qla2x00_async_login_sp_done+0xd2/0x100 [qla2xxx]
kernel: qla24xx_logio_entry+0x13a/0x3c0 [qla2xxx]
kernel: qla24xx_process_response_queue+0x306/0x400 [qla2xxx]
kernel: qla24xx_msix_rsp_q+0x3f/0xb0 [qla2xxx]
kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x40/0x180
kernel: handle_irq_event_percpu+0x30/0x80
kernel: handle_irq_event+0x36/0x60

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49154

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: fix panic on out-of-bounds guest IRQ
As guest_irq is coming from KVM_IRQFD API call, it may trigger
crash in svm_update_pi_irte() due to out-of-bounds:
crash> bt
PID: 22218 TASK: ffff951a6ad74980 CPU: 73 COMMAND: "vcpu8"
#0 [ffffb1ba6707fa40] machine_kexec at ffffffff8565b397
#1 [ffffb1ba6707fa90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff85788a6d
#2 [ffffb1ba6707fb58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8578995d
#3 [ffffb1ba6707fb70] oops_end at ffffffff85623c0d
#4 [ffffb1ba6707fb90] no_context at ffffffff856692c9
#5 [ffffb1ba6707fbf8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff85f95b51
#6 [ffffb1ba6707fc50] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff86000ace
[exception RIP: svm_update_pi_irte+227]
RIP: ffffffffc0761b53 RSP: ffffb1ba6707fd08 RFLAGS: 00010086
RAX: ffffb1ba6707fd78 RBX: ffffb1ba66d91000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 00003c803f63f1c0 RSI: 000000000000019a RDI: ffffb1ba66db2ab8
RBP: 000000000000019a R8: 0000000000000040 R9: ffff94ca41b82200
R10: ffffffffffffffcf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffffffffffffcf R15: 000000000000005f
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
#7 [ffffb1ba6707fdb8] kvm_irq_routing_update at ffffffffc09f19a1 [kvm]
#8 [ffffb1ba6707fde0] kvm_set_irq_routing at ffffffffc09f2133 [kvm]
#9 [ffffb1ba6707fe18] kvm_vm_ioctl at ffffffffc09ef544 [kvm]
RIP: 00007f143c36488b RSP: 00007f143a4e04b8 RFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f05780041d0 RCX: 00007f143c36488b
RDX: 00007f05780041d0 RSI: 000000004008ae6a RDI: 0000000000000020
RBP: 00000000000004e8 R8: 0000000000000008 R9: 00007f05780041e0
R10: 00007f0578004560 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000004e0
R13: 000000000000001a R14: 00007f1424001c60 R15: 00007f0578003bc0
ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 CS: 0033 SS: 002b
Vmx have been fix this in commit 3a8b0677fc61 (KVM: VMX: Do not BUG() on
out-of-bounds guest IRQ), so we can just copy source from that to fix
this.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49132

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ath11k: pci: fix crash on suspend if board file is not found
Mario reported that the kernel was crashing on suspend if ath11k was not able
to find a board file:
[ 473.693286] PM: Suspending system (s2idle)
[ 473.693291] printk: Suspending console(s) (use no_console_suspend to debug)
[ 474.407787] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000002070
[ 474.407791] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 474.407794] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 474.407798] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 474.407801] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 474.407805] CPU: 2 PID: 2350 Comm: kworker/u32:14 Tainted: G W 5.16.0 #248
[...]
[ 474.407868] Call Trace:
[ 474.407870] <TASK>
[ 474.407874] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2a/0x60
[ 474.407882] ? lock_timer_base+0x72/0xa0
[ 474.407889] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x29/0x3d
[ 474.407892] ? try_to_del_timer_sync+0x54/0x80
[ 474.407896] ath11k_dp_rx_pktlog_stop+0x49/0xc0 [ath11k]
[ 474.407912] ath11k_core_suspend+0x34/0x130 [ath11k]
[ 474.407923] ath11k_pci_pm_suspend+0x1b/0x50 [ath11k_pci]
[ 474.407928] pci_pm_suspend+0x7e/0x170
[ 474.407935] ? pci_pm_freeze+0xc0/0xc0
[ 474.407939] dpm_run_callback+0x4e/0x150
[ 474.407947] __device_suspend+0x148/0x4c0
[ 474.407951] async_suspend+0x20/0x90
dmesg-efi-164255130401001:
Oops#1 Part1
[ 474.407955] async_run_entry_fn+0x33/0x120
[ 474.407959] process_one_work+0x220/0x3f0
[ 474.407966] worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0
[ 474.407971] kthread+0x17a/0x1a0
[ 474.407975] ? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0
[ 474.407979] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
[ 474.407983] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 474.407991] </TASK>
The issue here is that board file loading happens after ath11k_pci_probe()
succesfully returns (ath11k initialisation happends asynchronously) and the
suspend handler is still enabled, of course failing as ath11k is not properly
initialised. Fix this by checking ATH11K_FLAG_QMI_FAIL during both suspend and
resume.
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03003-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-2

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49124

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mce: Work around an erratum on fast string copy instructions
A rare kernel panic scenario can happen when the following conditions
are met due to an erratum on fast string copy instructions:
1) An uncorrected error.
2) That error must be in first cache line of a page.
3) Kernel must execute page_copy from the page immediately before that
page.
The fast string copy instructions ("REP; MOVS*") could consume an
uncorrectable memory error in the cache line _right after_ the desired
region to copy and raise an MCE.
Bit 0 of MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE can be cleared to disable fast string
copy and will avoid such spurious machine checks. However, that is less
preferable due to the permanent performance impact. Considering memory
poison is rare, it's desirable to keep fast string copy enabled until an
MCE is seen.
Intel has confirmed the following:
1. The CPU erratum of fast string copy only applies to Skylake,
Cascade Lake and Cooper Lake generations.
Directly return from the MCE handler:
2. Will result in complete execution of the "REP; MOVS*" with no data
loss or corruption.
3. Will not result in another MCE firing on the next poisoned cache line
due to "REP; MOVS*".
4. Will resume execution from a correct point in code.
5. Will result in the same instruction that triggered the MCE firing a
second MCE immediately for any other software recoverable data fetch
errors.
6. Is not safe without disabling the fast string copy, as the next fast
string copy of the same buffer on the same CPU would result in a PANIC
MCE.
This should mitigate the erratum completely with the only caveat that
the fast string copy is disabled on the affected hyper thread thus
performance degradation.
This is still better than the OS crashing on MCEs raised on an
irrelevant process due to "REP; MOVS*' accesses in a kernel context,
e.g., copy_page.
Injected errors on 1st cache line of 8 anonymous pages of process
'proc1' and observed MCE consumption from 'proc2' with no panic
(directly returned).
Without the fix, the host panicked within a few minutes on a
random 'proc2' process due to kernel access from copy_page.
[ bp: Fix comment style + touch ups, zap an unlikely(), improve the
quirk function's readability. ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49123

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ath11k: Fix frames flush failure caused by deadlock
We are seeing below warnings:
kernel: [25393.301506] ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to flush mgmt transmit queue 0
kernel: [25398.421509] ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to flush mgmt transmit queue 0
kernel: [25398.421831] ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: dropping mgmt frame for vdev 0, is_started 0
this means ath11k fails to flush mgmt. frames because wmi_mgmt_tx_work
has no chance to run in 5 seconds.
By setting /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs to 20 and increasing
ATH11K_FLUSH_TIMEOUT to 50 we get below warnings:
kernel: [ 120.763160] INFO: task wpa_supplicant:924 blocked for more than 20 seconds.
kernel: [ 120.763169] Not tainted 5.10.90 #12
kernel: [ 120.763177] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
kernel: [ 120.763186] task:wpa_supplicant state:D stack: 0 pid: 924 ppid: 1 flags:0x000043a0
kernel: [ 120.763201] Call Trace:
kernel: [ 120.763214] __schedule+0x785/0x12fa
kernel: [ 120.763224] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xe2/0x1bb
kernel: [ 120.763242] schedule+0x7e/0xa1
kernel: [ 120.763253] schedule_timeout+0x98/0xfe
kernel: [ 120.763266] ? run_local_timers+0x4a/0x4a
kernel: [ 120.763291] ath11k_mac_flush_tx_complete+0x197/0x2b1 [ath11k 13c3a9bf37790f4ac8103b3decf7ab4008ac314a]
kernel: [ 120.763306] ? init_wait_entry+0x2e/0x2e
kernel: [ 120.763343] __ieee80211_flush_queues+0x167/0x21f [mac80211 335da900954f1c5ea7f1613d92088ce83342042c]
kernel: [ 120.763378] __ieee80211_recalc_idle+0x105/0x125 [mac80211 335da900954f1c5ea7f1613d92088ce83342042c]
kernel: [ 120.763411] ieee80211_recalc_idle+0x14/0x27 [mac80211 335da900954f1c5ea7f1613d92088ce83342042c]
kernel: [ 120.763441] ieee80211_free_chanctx+0x77/0xa2 [mac80211 335da900954f1c5ea7f1613d92088ce83342042c]
kernel: [ 120.763473] __ieee80211_vif_release_channel+0x100/0x131 [mac80211 335da900954f1c5ea7f1613d92088ce83342042c]
kernel: [ 120.763540] ieee80211_vif_release_channel+0x66/0x81 [mac80211 335da900954f1c5ea7f1613d92088ce83342042c]
kernel: [ 120.763572] ieee80211_destroy_auth_data+0xa3/0xe6 [mac80211 335da900954f1c5ea7f1613d92088ce83342042c]
kernel: [ 120.763612] ieee80211_mgd_deauth+0x178/0x29b [mac80211 335da900954f1c5ea7f1613d92088ce83342042c]
kernel: [ 120.763654] cfg80211_mlme_deauth+0x1a8/0x22c [cfg80211 8945aa5bc2af5f6972336665d8ad6f9c191ad5be]
kernel: [ 120.763697] nl80211_deauthenticate+0xfa/0x123 [cfg80211 8945aa5bc2af5f6972336665d8ad6f9c191ad5be]
kernel: [ 120.763715] genl_rcv_msg+0x392/0x3c2
kernel: [ 120.763750] ? nl80211_associate+0x432/0x432 [cfg80211 8945aa5bc2af5f6972336665d8ad6f9c191ad5be]
kernel: [ 120.763782] ? nl80211_associate+0x432/0x432 [cfg80211 8945aa5bc2af5f6972336665d8ad6f9c191ad5be]
kernel: [ 120.763802] ? genl_rcv+0x36/0x36
kernel: [ 120.763814] netlink_rcv_skb+0x89/0xf7
kernel: [ 120.763829] genl_rcv+0x28/0x36
kernel: [ 120.763840] netlink_unicast+0x179/0x24b
kernel: [ 120.763854] netlink_sendmsg+0x393/0x401
kernel: [ 120.763872] sock_sendmsg+0x72/0x76
kernel: [ 120.763886] ____sys_sendmsg+0x170/0x1e6
kernel: [ 120.763897] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x7a/0xa2
kernel: [ 120.763914] ___sys_sendmsg+0x95/0xd1
kernel: [ 120.763940] __sys_sendmsg+0x85/0xbf
kernel: [ 120.763956] do_syscall_64+0x43/0x55
kernel: [ 120.763966] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
kernel: [ 120.763977] RIP: 0033:0x79089f3fcc83
kernel: [ 120.763986] RSP: 002b:00007ffe604f0508 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
kernel: [ 120.763997] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000059b40e987690 RCX: 000079089f3fcc83
kernel: [ 120.764006] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe604f0558 RDI: 0000000000000009
kernel: [ 120.764014] RBP: 00007ffe604f0540 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000400000
kernel: [ 120.764023] R10: 00007ffe604f0638 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000059b40ea04980
kernel: [ 120.764032] R13: 00007ffe604
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49111

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: Fix use after free in hci_send_acl
This fixes the following trace caused by receiving
HCI_EV_DISCONN_PHY_LINK_COMPLETE which does call hci_conn_del without
first checking if conn->type is in fact AMP_LINK and in case it is
do properly cleanup upper layers with hci_disconn_cfm:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800e404818 by task bluetoothd/142
CPU: 0 PID: 142 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted
5.17.0-rc5-00006-gda4022eeac1a #7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150
kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50
l2cap_do_send+0x23f/0x3d0
l2cap_chan_send+0xc06/0x2cc0
l2cap_sock_sendmsg+0x201/0x2b0
sock_sendmsg+0xdc/0x110
sock_write_iter+0x20f/0x370
do_iter_readv_writev+0x343/0x690
do_iter_write+0x132/0x640
vfs_writev+0x198/0x570
do_writev+0x202/0x280
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RSP: 002b:00007ffce8a099b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014
Code: 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3
0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05
<48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffce8a099e0 RDI: 0000000000000015
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffce8a099e0 RCX: 00007f788fc3cf77
R10: 00007ffce8af7080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055e4ccf75580
RBP: 0000000000000015 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001
</TASK>
R13: 000055e4ccf754a0 R14: 000055e4ccf75cd0 R15: 000055e4ccf4a6b0
Allocated by task 45:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0
hci_chan_create+0x9a/0x2f0
l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x1a/0xdc0
l2cap_connect_cfm+0x236/0x1000
le_conn_complete_evt+0x15a7/0x1db0
hci_le_conn_complete_evt+0x226/0x2c0
hci_le_meta_evt+0x247/0x450
hci_event_packet+0x61b/0xe90
hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50
process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0
worker_thread+0x576/0x1240
kthread+0x29d/0x340
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Freed by task 45:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
__kasan_slab_free+0xfb/0x130
kfree+0xac/0x350
hci_conn_cleanup+0x101/0x6a0
hci_conn_del+0x27e/0x6c0
hci_disconn_phylink_complete_evt+0xe0/0x120
hci_event_packet+0x812/0xe90
hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50
process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0
worker_thread+0x576/0x1240
kthread+0x29d/0x340
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c0f0500
The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
The buggy address belongs to the page:
128-byte region [ffff88800c0f0500, ffff88800c0f0580)
flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1)
page:00000000fe45cd86 refcount:1 mapcount:0
mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xc0f0
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff
0000000000000000
raw: 0100000000000200 ffffea00003a2c80 dead000000000004
ffff8880078418c0
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
ffff88800c0f0400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc
Memory state around the buggy address:
>ffff88800c0f0500: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88800c0f0480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88800c0f0580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49096

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sfc: add missing xdp queue reinitialization
After rx/tx ring buffer size is changed, kernel panic occurs when
it acts XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT.
When tx/rx ring buffer size is changed(ethtool -G), sfc driver
reallocates and reinitializes rx and tx queues and their buffer
(tx_queue->buffer).
But it misses reinitializing xdp queues(efx->xdp_tx_queues).
So, while it is acting XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT, it uses the uninitialized
tx_queue->buffer.
A new function efx_set_xdp_channels() is separated from efx_set_channels()
to handle only xdp queues.
Splat looks like:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002a
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#4] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:efx_tx_map_chunk+0x54/0x90 [sfc]
CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Tainted: G D 5.17.0+ #55 e8beeee8289528f11357029357cf
Code: 48 8b 8d a8 01 00 00 48 8d 14 52 4c 8d 2c d0 44 89 e0 48 85 c9 74 0e 44 89 e2 4c 89 f6 48 80
RSP: 0018:ffff92f121e45c60 EFLAGS: 00010297
RIP: 0010:efx_tx_map_chunk+0x54/0x90 [sfc]
RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffff92ea506895c0 RCX: ffffffffc0330870
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000001139b10ce RDI: ffff92ea506895c0
RBP: ffffffffc0358a80 R08: 00000001139b110d R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff92ea414c0088 R12: 0000000000000040
R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00000001139b10ce R15: ffff92ea506895c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92f121ec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
Code: 48 8b 8d a8 01 00 00 48 8d 14 52 4c 8d 2c d0 44 89 e0 48 85 c9 74 0e 44 89 e2 4c 89 f6 48 80
CR2: 000000000000002a CR3: 00000003e6810004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
RSP: 0018:ffff92f121e85c60 EFLAGS: 00010297
PKRU: 55555554
RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffff92ea50689700 RCX: ffffffffc0330870
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000001145a90ce RDI: ffff92ea50689700
RBP: ffffffffc0358a80 R08: 00000001145a910d R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff92ea414c0088 R12: 0000000000000040
R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00000001145a90ce R15: ffff92ea50689700
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92f121e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000002a CR3: 00000003e6810005 CR4: 00000000007706e0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
efx_xdp_tx_buffers+0x12b/0x3d0 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
__efx_rx_packet+0x5c3/0x930 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
efx_rx_packet+0x28c/0x2e0 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
efx_ef10_ev_process+0x5f8/0xf40 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
? enqueue_task_fair+0x95/0x550
efx_poll+0xc4/0x360 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49094

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tls: fix slab-out-of-bounds bug in decrypt_internal
The memory size of tls_ctx->rx.iv for AES128-CCM is 12 setting in
tls_set_sw_offload(). The return value of crypto_aead_ivsize()
for "ccm(aes)" is 16. So memcpy() require 16 bytes from 12 bytes
memory space will trigger slab-out-of-bounds bug as following:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in decrypt_internal+0x385/0xc40 [tls]
Read of size 16 at addr ffff888114e84e60 by task tls/10911
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5db
? decrypt_internal+0x385/0xc40 [tls]
kasan_report+0xab/0x120
? decrypt_internal+0x385/0xc40 [tls]
kasan_check_range+0xf9/0x1e0
memcpy+0x20/0x60
decrypt_internal+0x385/0xc40 [tls]
? tls_get_rec+0x2e0/0x2e0 [tls]
? process_rx_list+0x1a5/0x420 [tls]
? tls_setup_from_iter.constprop.0+0x2e0/0x2e0 [tls]
decrypt_skb_update+0x9d/0x400 [tls]
tls_sw_recvmsg+0x3c8/0xb50 [tls]
Allocated by task 10911:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0
tls_set_sw_offload+0x2eb/0xa20 [tls]
tls_setsockopt+0x68c/0x700 [tls]
__sys_setsockopt+0xfe/0x1b0
Replace the crypto_aead_ivsize() with prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size
when memcpy() iv value in TLS_1_3_VERSION scenario.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49092

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv4: fix route with nexthop object delete warning
FRR folks have hit a kernel warning[1] while deleting routes[2] which is
caused by trying to delete a route pointing to a nexthop id without
specifying nhid but matching on an interface. That is, a route is found
but we hit a warning while matching it. The warning is from
fib_info_nh() in include/net/nexthop.h because we run it on a fib_info
with nexthop object. The call chain is:
inet_rtm_delroute -> fib_table_delete -> fib_nh_match (called with a
nexthop fib_info and also with fc_oif set thus calling fib_info_nh on
the fib_info and triggering the warning). The fix is to not do any
matching in that branch if the fi has a nexthop object because those are
managed separately. I.e. we should match when deleting without nh spec and
should fail when deleting a nexthop route with old-style nh spec because
nexthop objects are managed separately, e.g.:
$ ip r show 1.2.3.4/32
1.2.3.4 nhid 12 via 192.168.11.2 dev dummy0
$ ip r del 1.2.3.4/32
$ ip r del 1.2.3.4/32 nhid 12
<both should work>
$ ip r del 1.2.3.4/32 dev dummy0
<should fail with ESRCH>
[1]
[ 523.462226] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 523.462230] WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 22893 at include/net/nexthop.h:468 fib_nh_match+0x210/0x460
[ 523.462236] Modules linked in: dummy rpcsec_gss_krb5 xt_socket nf_socket_ipv4 nf_socket_ipv6 ip6table_raw iptable_raw bpf_preload xt_statistic ip_set ip_vs_sh ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_rr ip_vs xt_mark nf_tables xt_nat veth nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype br_netfilter overlay dm_crypt nfsv3 nfs fscache netfs vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack 8021q garp mrp ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 ip6table_mangle ip6table_nat iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bridge stp llc rfcomm snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer rpcrdma rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core ip6table_filter xt_comment ip6_tables vboxnetadp(OE) vboxnetflt(OE) vboxdrv(OE) qrtr bnep binfmt_misc xfs vfat fat squashfs loop nvidia_drm(POE) nvidia_modeset(POE) nvidia_uvm(POE) nvidia(POE) intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_codec_hdmi btusb btrtl iwlmvm uvcvideo btbcm snd_hda_intel edac_mce_amd
[ 523.462274] videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops btintel snd_intel_dspcfg videobuf2_v4l2 snd_intel_sdw_acpi bluetooth snd_usb_audio snd_hda_codec mac80211 snd_usbmidi_lib joydev snd_hda_core videobuf2_common kvm_amd snd_rawmidi snd_hwdep snd_seq videodev ccp snd_seq_device libarc4 ecdh_generic mc snd_pcm kvm iwlwifi snd_timer drm_kms_helper snd cfg80211 cec soundcore irqbypass rapl wmi_bmof i2c_piix4 rfkill k10temp pcspkr acpi_cpufreq nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc drm zram ip_tables crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel nvme sp5100_tco r8169 nvme_core wmi ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler fuse
[ 523.462300] CPU: 14 PID: 22893 Comm: ip Tainted: P OE 5.16.18-200.fc35.x86_64 #1
[ 523.462302] Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7C37/MPG X570 GAMING EDGE WIFI (MS-7C37), BIOS 1.C0 10/29/2020
[ 523.462303] RIP: 0010:fib_nh_match+0x210/0x460
[ 523.462304] Code: 7c 24 20 48 8b b5 90 00 00 00 e8 bb ee f4 ff 48 8b 7c 24 20 41 89 c4 e8 ee eb f4 ff 45 85 e4 0f 85 2e fe ff ff e9 4c ff ff ff <0f> 0b e9 17 ff ff ff 3c 0a 0f 85 61 fe ff ff 48 8b b5 98 00 00 00
[ 523.462306] RSP: 0018:ffffaa53d4d87928 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 523.462307] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffaa53d4d87a90 RCX: ffffaa53d4d87bb0
[ 523.462308] RDX: ffff9e3d2ee6be80 RSI: ffffaa53d4d87a90 RDI: ffffffff920ed380
[ 523.462309] RBP: ffff9e3d2ee6be80 R08: 0000000000000064 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 523.462310] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000031
[ 523.462310] R13: 0000000000000020 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9e3d331054e0
[ 523.462311] FS: 00007f2455
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49087

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: fix a race in rxrpc_exit_net()
Current code can lead to the following race:
CPU0 CPU1
rxrpc_exit_net()
rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker()
if (rxnet->live)
rxnet->live = false;
del_timer_sync(&rxnet->peer_keepalive_timer);
timer_reduce(&rxnet->peer_keepalive_timer, jiffies + delay);
cancel_work_sync(&rxnet->peer_keepalive_work);
rxrpc_exit_net() exits while peer_keepalive_timer is still armed,
leading to use-after-free.
syzbot report was:
ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: rxrpc_peer_keepalive_timeout+0x0/0xb0
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3660 at lib/debugobjects.c:505 debug_print_object+0x16e/0x250 lib/debugobjects.c:505
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3660 Comm: kworker/u4:6 Not tainted 5.17.0-syzkaller-13993-g88e6c0207623 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x16e/0x250 lib/debugobjects.c:505
Code: ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 af 00 00 00 48 8b 14 dd 00 1c 26 8a 4c 89 ee 48 c7 c7 00 10 26 8a e8 b1 e7 28 05 <0f> 0b 83 05 15 eb c5 09 01 48 83 c4 18 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000353fb00 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888029196140 RSI: ffffffff815efad8 RDI: fffff520006a7f52
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff815ea4ae R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff89ce23e0
R13: ffffffff8a2614e0 R14: ffffffff816628c0 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe1f2908924 CR3: 0000000043720000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__debug_check_no_obj_freed lib/debugobjects.c:992 [inline]
debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x301/0x420 lib/debugobjects.c:1023
kfree+0xd6/0x310 mm/slab.c:3809
ops_free_list.part.0+0x119/0x370 net/core/net_namespace.c:176
ops_free_list net/core/net_namespace.c:174 [inline]
cleanup_net+0x591/0xb00 net/core/net_namespace.c:598
process_one_work+0x996/0x1610 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:298
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49086

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix leak of nested actions
While parsing user-provided actions, openvswitch module may dynamically
allocate memory and store pointers in the internal copy of the actions.
So this memory has to be freed while destroying the actions.
Currently there are only two such actions: ct() and set(). However,
there are many actions that can hold nested lists of actions and
ovs_nla_free_flow_actions() just jumps over them leaking the memory.
For example, removal of the flow with the following actions will lead
to a leak of the memory allocated by nf_ct_tmpl_alloc():
actions:clone(ct(commit),0)
Non-freed set() action may also leak the 'dst' structure for the
tunnel info including device references.
Under certain conditions with a high rate of flow rotation that may
cause significant memory leak problem (2MB per second in reporter's
case). The problem is also hard to mitigate, because the user doesn't
have direct control over the datapath flows generated by OVS.
Fix that by iterating over all the nested actions and freeing
everything that needs to be freed recursively.
New build time assertion should protect us from this problem if new
actions will be added in the future.
Unfortunately, openvswitch module doesn't use NLA_F_NESTED, so all
attributes has to be explicitly checked. sample() and clone() actions
are mixing extra attributes into the user-provided action list. That
prevents some code generalization too.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49082

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpt3sas: Fix use after free in _scsih_expander_node_remove()
The function mpt3sas_transport_port_remove() called in
_scsih_expander_node_remove() frees the port field of the sas_expander
structure, leading to the following use-after-free splat from KASAN when
the ioc_info() call following that function is executed (e.g. when doing
rmmod of the driver module):
[ 3479.371167] ==================================================================
[ 3479.378496] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x710/0x750 [mpt3sas]
[ 3479.386936] Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881c037691c by task rmmod/1531
[ 3479.393524]
[ 3479.395035] CPU: 18 PID: 1531 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8+ #1436
[ 3479.401712] Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/H12SSL-NT, BIOS 2.1 06/02/2021
[ 3479.409263] Call Trace:
[ 3479.411743] <TASK>
[ 3479.413875] dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
[ 3479.417582] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x120
[ 3479.423389] ? _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x710/0x750 [mpt3sas]
[ 3479.429469] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
[ 3479.433438] ? _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x710/0x750 [mpt3sas]
[ 3479.439514] _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x710/0x750 [mpt3sas]
[ 3479.445411] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x40
[ 3479.452032] scsih_remove+0x525/0xc90 [mpt3sas]
[ 3479.458212] ? mpt3sas_expander_remove+0x1d0/0x1d0 [mpt3sas]
[ 3479.465529] ? down_write+0xde/0x150
[ 3479.470746] ? up_write+0x14d/0x460
[ 3479.475840] ? kernfs_find_ns+0x137/0x310
[ 3479.481438] pci_device_remove+0x65/0x110
[ 3479.487013] __device_release_driver+0x316/0x680
[ 3479.493180] driver_detach+0x1ec/0x2d0
[ 3479.498499] bus_remove_driver+0xe7/0x2d0
[ 3479.504081] pci_unregister_driver+0x26/0x250
[ 3479.510033] _mpt3sas_exit+0x2b/0x6cf [mpt3sas]
[ 3479.516144] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x2fd/0x510
[ 3479.522315] ? free_module+0xaa0/0xaa0
[ 3479.527593] ? __cond_resched+0x1c/0x90
[ 3479.532951] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
[ 3479.539607] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x21/0x70
[ 3479.546161] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x110
[ 3479.551828] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
[ 3479.556884] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 3479.563402] RIP: 0033:0x7f1fc482483b
...
[ 3479.943087] ==================================================================
Fix this by introducing the local variable port_id to store the port ID
value before executing mpt3sas_transport_port_remove(). This local variable
is then used in the call to ioc_info() instead of dereferencing the freed
port structure.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49081

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
highmem: fix checks in __kmap_local_sched_{in,out}
When CONFIG_DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL is enabled __kmap_local_sched_{in,out} check
that even slots in the tsk->kmap_ctrl.pteval are unmapped. The slots are
initialized with 0 value, but the check is done with pte_none. 0 pte
however does not necessarily mean that pte_none will return true. e.g.
on xtensa it returns false, resulting in the following runtime warnings:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 101 at mm/highmem.c:627 __kmap_local_sched_out+0x51/0x108
CPU: 0 PID: 101 Comm: touch Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-00010-gd3a1cdde80d2-dirty #13
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xc/0x40
__warn+0x8f/0x174
warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0xac
__kmap_local_sched_out+0x51/0x108
__schedule+0x71a/0x9c4
preempt_schedule_irq+0xa0/0xe0
common_exception_return+0x5c/0x93
do_wp_page+0x30e/0x330
handle_mm_fault+0xa70/0xc3c
do_page_fault+0x1d8/0x3c4
common_exception+0x7f/0x7f
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 101 at mm/highmem.c:664 __kmap_local_sched_in+0x50/0xe0
CPU: 0 PID: 101 Comm: touch Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc7-00010-gd3a1cdde80d2-dirty #13
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xc/0x40
__warn+0x8f/0x174
warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0xac
__kmap_local_sched_in+0x50/0xe0
finish_task_switch$isra$0+0x1ce/0x2f8
__schedule+0x86e/0x9c4
preempt_schedule_irq+0xa0/0xe0
common_exception_return+0x5c/0x93
do_wp_page+0x30e/0x330
handle_mm_fault+0xa70/0xc3c
do_page_fault+0x1d8/0x3c4
common_exception+0x7f/0x7f
Fix it by replacing !pte_none(pteval) with pte_val(pteval) != 0.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49062

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cachefiles: Fix KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in cachefiles_set_volume_xattr
Use the actual length of volume coherency data when setting the
xattr to avoid the following KASAN report.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0xa0/0x350 [cachefiles]
Write of size 4 at addr ffff888101e02af4 by task kworker/6:0/1347
CPU: 6 PID: 1347 Comm: kworker/6:0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-nfs-fscache-netfs+ #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events fscache_create_volume_work [fscache]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x5a
print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5db
? __lock_text_start+0x8/0x8
? cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0xa0/0x350 [cachefiles]
kasan_report+0xab/0x120
? cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0xa0/0x350 [cachefiles]
kasan_check_range+0xf5/0x1d0
memcpy+0x39/0x60
cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0xa0/0x350 [cachefiles]
cachefiles_acquire_volume+0x2be/0x500 [cachefiles]
? __cachefiles_free_volume+0x90/0x90 [cachefiles]
fscache_create_volume_work+0x68/0x160 [fscache]
process_one_work+0x3b7/0x6a0
worker_thread+0x2c4/0x650
? process_one_work+0x6a0/0x6a0
kthread+0x16c/0x1a0
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1347:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0
cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0x76/0x350 [cachefiles]
cachefiles_acquire_volume+0x2be/0x500 [cachefiles]
fscache_create_volume_work+0x68/0x160 [fscache]
process_one_work+0x3b7/0x6a0
worker_thread+0x2c4/0x650
kthread+0x16c/0x1a0
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888101e02af0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of
8-byte region [ffff888101e02af0, ffff888101e02af8)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000a2292d70 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x101e02
flags: 0x17ffffc0000200(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
raw: 0017ffffc0000200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff888100042280
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080660066 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888101e02980: fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc
ffff888101e02a00: 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00
>ffff888101e02a80: fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 04 fc
^
ffff888101e02b00: fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc
ffff888101e02b80: fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc
==================================================================

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49052

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: fix unexpected zeroed page mapping with zram swap
Two processes under CLONE_VM cloning, user process can be corrupted by
seeing zeroed page unexpectedly.
CPU A CPU B
do_swap_page do_swap_page
SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path
swap_readpage valid data
swap_slot_free_notify
delete zram entry
swap_readpage zeroed(invalid) data
pte_lock
map the *zero data* to userspace
pte_unlock
pte_lock
if (!pte_same)
goto out_nomap;
pte_unlock
return and next refault will
read zeroed data
The swap_slot_free_notify is bogus for CLONE_VM case since it doesn't
increase the refcount of swap slot at copy_mm so it couldn't catch up
whether it's safe or not to discard data from backing device. In the
case, only the lock it could rely on to synchronize swap slot freeing is
page table lock. Thus, this patch gets rid of the swap_slot_free_notify
function. With this patch, CPU A will see correct data.
CPU A CPU B
do_swap_page do_swap_page
SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path
swap_readpage original data
pte_lock
map the original data
swap_free
swap_range_free
bd_disk->fops->swap_slot_free_notify
swap_readpage read zeroed data
pte_unlock
pte_lock
if (!pte_same)
goto out_nomap;
pte_unlock
return
on next refault will see mapped data by CPU B
The concern of the patch would increase memory consumption since it
could keep wasted memory with compressed form in zram as well as
uncompressed form in address space. However, most of cases of zram uses
no readahead and do_swap_page is followed by swap_free so it will free
the compressed form from in zram quickly.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49022

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac8021: fix possible oob access in ieee80211_get_rate_duration
Fix possible out-of-bound access in ieee80211_get_rate_duration routine
as reported by the following UBSAN report:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/mac80211/airtime.c:455:47
index 15 is out of range for type 'u16 [12]'
CPU: 2 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/u32:10 Not tainted 6.1.0-060100rc3-generic
Hardware name: Acer Aspire TC-281/Aspire TC-281, BIOS R01-A2 07/18/2017
Workqueue: mt76 mt76u_tx_status_data [mt76_usb]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
show_stack+0x4e/0x61
dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x6f
dump_stack+0x10/0x18
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x43
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x42/0x47
ieee80211_get_rate_duration.constprop.0+0x22f/0x2a0 [mac80211]
? ieee80211_tx_status_ext+0x32e/0x640 [mac80211]
ieee80211_calc_rx_airtime+0xda/0x120 [mac80211]
ieee80211_calc_tx_airtime+0xb4/0x100 [mac80211]
mt76x02_send_tx_status+0x266/0x480 [mt76x02_lib]
mt76x02_tx_status_data+0x52/0x80 [mt76x02_lib]
mt76u_tx_status_data+0x67/0xd0 [mt76_usb]
process_one_work+0x225/0x400
worker_thread+0x50/0x3e0
? process_one_work+0x400/0x400
kthread+0xe9/0x110
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49021

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: fix null-ptr-deref while probe() failed
I got a null-ptr-deref report as following when doing fault injection test:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 253 Comm: 507-spi-dm9051 Tainted: G B N 6.1.0-rc3+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:klist_put+0x2d/0xd0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
klist_remove+0xf1/0x1c0
device_release_driver_internal+0x23e/0x2d0
bus_remove_device+0x1bd/0x240
device_del+0x357/0x770
phy_device_remove+0x11/0x30
mdiobus_unregister+0xa5/0x140
release_nodes+0x6a/0xa0
devres_release_all+0xf8/0x150
device_unbind_cleanup+0x19/0xd0
//probe path:
phy_device_register()
device_add()
phy_connect
phy_attach_direct() //set device driver
probe() //it's failed, driver is not bound
device_bind_driver() // probe failed, it's not called
//remove path:
phy_device_remove()
device_del()
device_release_driver_internal()
__device_release_driver() //dev->drv is not NULL
klist_remove() <- knode_driver is not added yet, cause null-ptr-deref
In phy_attach_direct(), after setting the 'dev->driver', probe() fails,
device_bind_driver() is not called, so the knode_driver->n_klist is not
set, then it causes null-ptr-deref in __device_release_driver() while
deleting device. Fix this by setting dev->driver to NULL in the error
path in phy_attach_direct().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49017

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: re-fetch skb cb after tipc_msg_validate
As the call trace shows, the original skb was freed in tipc_msg_validate(),
and dereferencing the old skb cb would cause an use-after-free crash.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tipc_crypto_rcv_complete+0x1835/0x2240 [tipc]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
tipc_crypto_rcv_complete+0x1835/0x2240 [tipc]
tipc_crypto_rcv+0xd32/0x1ec0 [tipc]
tipc_rcv+0x744/0x1150 [tipc]
...
Allocated by task 47078:
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x158/0x4d0
__alloc_skb+0x1c1/0x270
tipc_buf_acquire+0x1e/0xe0 [tipc]
tipc_msg_create+0x33/0x1c0 [tipc]
tipc_link_build_proto_msg+0x38a/0x2100 [tipc]
tipc_link_timeout+0x8b8/0xef0 [tipc]
tipc_node_timeout+0x2a1/0x960 [tipc]
call_timer_fn+0x2d/0x1c0
...
Freed by task 47078:
tipc_msg_validate+0x7b/0x440 [tipc]
tipc_crypto_rcv_complete+0x4b5/0x2240 [tipc]
tipc_crypto_rcv+0xd32/0x1ec0 [tipc]
tipc_rcv+0x744/0x1150 [tipc]
This patch fixes it by re-fetching the skb cb from the new allocated skb
after calling tipc_msg_validate().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49014

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: tun: Fix use-after-free in tun_detach()
syzbot reported use-after-free in tun_detach() [1]. This causes call
trace like below:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in notifier_call_chain+0x1ee/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:75
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807324e2a8 by task syz-executor.0/3673
CPU: 0 PID: 3673 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5-syzkaller-00044-gcc675d22e422 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd1/0x138 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline]
print_report+0x15e/0x461 mm/kasan/report.c:395
kasan_report+0xbf/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:495
notifier_call_chain+0x1ee/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:75
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x86/0x130 net/core/dev.c:1942
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1983 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1997 [inline]
netdev_wait_allrefs_any net/core/dev.c:10237 [inline]
netdev_run_todo+0xbc6/0x1100 net/core/dev.c:10351
tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:704 [inline]
tun_chr_close+0xe4/0x190 drivers/net/tun.c:3467
__fput+0x27c/0xa90 fs/file_table.c:320
task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
do_exit+0xb3d/0x2a30 kernel/exit.c:820
do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:950
get_signal+0x21b1/0x2440 kernel/signal.c:2858
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x86/0x2300 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:869
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:168 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250 kernel/entry/common.c:203
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296
do_syscall_64+0x46/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The cause of the issue is that sock_put() from __tun_detach() drops
last reference count for struct net, and then notifier_call_chain()
from netdev_state_change() accesses that struct net.
This patch fixes the issue by calling sock_put() from tun_detach()
after all necessary accesses for the struct net has done.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49013

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix memory leak in sctp_stream_outq_migrate()
When sctp_stream_outq_migrate() is called to release stream out resources,
the memory pointed to by prio_head in stream out is not released.
The memory leak information is as follows:
unreferenced object 0xffff88801fe79f80 (size 64):
comm "sctp_repo", pid 7957, jiffies 4294951704 (age 36.480s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
80 9f e7 1f 80 88 ff ff 80 9f e7 1f 80 88 ff ff ................
90 9f e7 1f 80 88 ff ff 90 9f e7 1f 80 88 ff ff ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81b215c6>] kmalloc_trace+0x26/0x60
[<ffffffff88ae517c>] sctp_sched_prio_set+0x4cc/0x770
[<ffffffff88ad64f2>] sctp_stream_init_ext+0xd2/0x1b0
[<ffffffff88aa2604>] sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x1614/0x1a30
[<ffffffff88ab7ff1>] sctp_sendmsg+0xda1/0x1ef0
[<ffffffff87f765ed>] inet_sendmsg+0x9d/0xe0
[<ffffffff8754b5b3>] sock_sendmsg+0xd3/0x120
[<ffffffff8755446a>] __sys_sendto+0x23a/0x340
[<ffffffff87554651>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1b0
[<ffffffff89978b49>] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
[<ffffffff89a0008b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49006

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Free buffers when a used dynamic event is removed
After 65536 dynamic events have been added and removed, the "type" field
of the event then uses the first type number that is available (not
currently used by other events). A type number is the identifier of the
binary blobs in the tracing ring buffer (known as events) to map them to
logic that can parse the binary blob.
The issue is that if a dynamic event (like a kprobe event) is traced and
is in the ring buffer, and then that event is removed (because it is
dynamic, which means it can be created and destroyed), if another dynamic
event is created that has the same number that new event's logic on
parsing the binary blob will be used.
To show how this can be an issue, the following can crash the kernel:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# for i in `seq 65536`; do
echo 'p:kprobes/foo do_sys_openat2 $arg1:u32' > kprobe_events
# done
For every iteration of the above, the writing to the kprobe_events will
remove the old event and create a new one (with the same format) and
increase the type number to the next available on until the type number
reaches over 65535 which is the max number for the 16 bit type. After it
reaches that number, the logic to allocate a new number simply looks for
the next available number. When an dynamic event is removed, that number
is then available to be reused by the next dynamic event created. That is,
once the above reaches the max number, the number assigned to the event in
that loop will remain the same.
Now that means deleting one dynamic event and created another will reuse
the previous events type number. This is where bad things can happen.
After the above loop finishes, the kprobes/foo event which reads the
do_sys_openat2 function call's first parameter as an integer.
# echo 1 > kprobes/foo/enable
# cat /etc/passwd > /dev/null
# cat trace
cat-2211 [005] .... 2007.849603: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196
cat-2211 [005] .... 2007.849620: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196
cat-2211 [005] .... 2007.849838: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196
cat-2211 [005] .... 2007.849880: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196
# echo 0 > kprobes/foo/enable
Now if we delete the kprobe and create a new one that reads a string:
# echo 'p:kprobes/foo do_sys_openat2 +0($arg2):string' > kprobe_events
And now we can the trace:
# cat trace
sendmail-1942 [002] ..... 530.136320: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1= cat-2046 [004] ..... 530.930817: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="��"
cat-2046 [004] ..... 530.930961: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="��"
cat-2046 [004] ..... 530.934278: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="��"
cat-2046 [004] ..... 530.934563: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="��
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48986

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/gup: fix gup_pud_range() for dax
For dax pud, pud_huge() returns true on x86. So the function works as long
as hugetlb is configured. However, dax doesn't depend on hugetlb.
Commit 414fd080d125 ("mm/gup: fix gup_pmd_range() for dax") fixed
devmap-backed huge PMDs, but missed devmap-backed huge PUDs. Fix this as
well.
This fixes the below kernel panic:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x69e7c000cc478: 0000 [#1] SMP
< snip >
Call Trace:
<TASK>
get_user_pages_fast+0x1f/0x40
iov_iter_get_pages+0xc6/0x3b0
? mempool_alloc+0x5d/0x170
bio_iov_iter_get_pages+0x82/0x4e0
? bvec_alloc+0x91/0xc0
? bio_alloc_bioset+0x19a/0x2a0
blkdev_direct_IO+0x282/0x480
? __io_complete_rw_common+0xc0/0xc0
? filemap_range_has_page+0x82/0xc0
generic_file_direct_write+0x9d/0x1a0
? inode_update_time+0x24/0x30
__generic_file_write_iter+0xbd/0x1e0
blkdev_write_iter+0xb4/0x150
? io_import_iovec+0x8d/0x340
io_write+0xf9/0x300
io_issue_sqe+0x3c3/0x1d30
? sysvec_reschedule_ipi+0x6c/0x80
__io_queue_sqe+0x33/0x240
? fget+0x76/0xa0
io_submit_sqes+0xe6a/0x18d0
? __fget_light+0xd1/0x100
__x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x199/0x880
? __context_tracking_enter+0x1f/0x70
? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x24/0x30
? irqentry_exit+0x1d/0x30
? __context_tracking_exit+0xe/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
RIP: 0033:0x7fc97c11a7be
< snip >
</TASK>
---[ end trace 48b2e0e67debcaeb ]---
RIP: 0010:internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x340/0x990
< snip >
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Kernel Offset: disabled

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48985

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: Fix race on per-CQ variable napi work_done
After calling napi_complete_done(), the NAPIF_STATE_SCHED bit may be
cleared, and another CPU can start napi thread and access per-CQ variable,
cq->work_done. If the other thread (for example, from busy_poll) sets
it to a value >= budget, this thread will continue to run when it should
stop, and cause memory corruption and panic.
To fix this issue, save the per-CQ work_done variable in a local variable
before napi_complete_done(), so it won't be corrupted by a possible
concurrent thread after napi_complete_done().
Also, add a flag bit to advertise to the NIC firmware: the NAPI work_done
variable race is fixed, so the driver is able to reliably support features
like busy_poll.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48984

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: slcan: fix freed work crash
The LTP test pty03 is causing a crash in slcan:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 348 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 6.0.8-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 9d20364b934f5aab0a9bdf84e8f45cfdfae39dab
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: 0x0 (events)
RIP: 0010:process_one_work (/home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/workqueue.c:706 /home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/workqueue.c:2185)
Code: 49 89 ff 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 89 f3 48 83 ec 10 48 8b 06 48 8b 6f 48 49 89 c4 45 30 e4 a8 04 b8 00 00 00 00 4c 0f 44 e0 <49> 8b 44 24 08 44 8b a8 00 01 00 00 41 83 e5 20 f6 45 10 04 75 0e
RSP: 0018:ffffaf7b40f47e98 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9d644e1b8b48 RCX: ffff9d649e439968
RDX: 00000000ffff8455 RSI: ffff9d644e1b8b48 RDI: ffff9d64764aa6c0
RBP: ffff9d649e4335c0 R08: 0000000000000c00 R09: ffff9d64764aa734
R10: 0000000000000007 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff9d649e4335e8 R14: ffff9d64490da780 R15: ffff9d64764aa6c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9d649e400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000036424000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
worker_thread (/home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/workqueue.c:2436)
kthread (/home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/kthread.c:376)
ret_from_fork (/home/rich/kernel/linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:312)
Apparently, the slcan's tx_work is freed while being scheduled. While
slcan_netdev_close() (netdev side) calls flush_work(&sl->tx_work),
slcan_close() (tty side) does not. So when the netdev is never set UP,
but the tty is stuffed with bytes and forced to wakeup write, the work
is scheduled, but never flushed.
So add an additional flush_work() to slcan_close() to be sure the work
is flushed under all circumstances.
The Fixes commit below moved flush_work() from slcan_close() to
slcan_netdev_close(). What was the rationale behind it? Maybe we can
drop the one in slcan_netdev_close()?
I see the same pattern in can327. So it perhaps needs the very same fix.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48983

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: Fix a null-ptr-deref in io_tctx_exit_cb()
Syzkaller reports a NULL deref bug as follows:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000138 by task file1/1955
CPU: 1 PID: 1955 Comm: file1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7-00103-gef4d3ea40565 #75
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134
? io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
kasan_report+0xbb/0x1f0
? io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
kasan_check_range+0x140/0x190
io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
task_work_run+0x164/0x250
? task_work_cancel+0x30/0x30
get_signal+0x1c3/0x2440
? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
? exit_signals+0x8b0/0x8b0
? do_raw_read_unlock+0x3b/0x70
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x50/0x230
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x82/0x2470
? kmem_cache_free+0x260/0x4b0
? putname+0xfe/0x140
? get_sigframe_size+0x10/0x10
? do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x226/0x710
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100
? putname+0xfe/0x140
? do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x238/0x710
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50
do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0023:0x0
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
RSP: 002b:00000000fffb7790 EFLAGS: 00000200 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000000b
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
This happens because the adding of task_work from io_ring_exit_work()
isn't synchronized with canceling all work items from eg exec. The
execution of the two are ordered in that they are both run by the task
itself, but if io_tctx_exit_cb() is queued while we're canceling all
work items off exec AND gets executed when the task exits to userspace
rather than in the main loop in io_uring_cancel_generic(), then we can
find current->io_uring == NULL and hit the above crash.
It's safe to add this NULL check here, because the execution of the two
paths are done by the task itself.
[axboe: add code comment and also put an explanation in the commit msg]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48982

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: Fix crash when replugging CSR fake controllers
It seems fake CSR 5.0 clones can cause the suspend notifier to be
registered twice causing the following kernel panic:
[ 71.986122] Call Trace:
[ 71.986124] <TASK>
[ 71.986125] blocking_notifier_chain_register+0x33/0x60
[ 71.986130] hci_register_dev+0x316/0x3d0 [bluetooth 99b5497ea3d09708fa1366c1dc03288bf3cca8da]
[ 71.986154] btusb_probe+0x979/0xd85 [btusb e1e0605a4f4c01984a4b9c8ac58c3666ae287477]
[ 71.986159] ? __pm_runtime_set_status+0x1a9/0x300
[ 71.986162] ? ktime_get_mono_fast_ns+0x3e/0x90
[ 71.986167] usb_probe_interface+0xe3/0x2b0
[ 71.986171] really_probe+0xdb/0x380
[ 71.986174] ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90
[ 71.986177] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x170
[ 71.986180] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0x90
[ 71.986183] __device_attach_driver+0x89/0x110
[ 71.986186] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x70/0x70
[ 71.986189] bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xe0
[ 71.986192] __device_attach+0xb2/0x1e0
[ 71.986195] bus_probe_device+0x92/0xb0
[ 71.986198] device_add+0x422/0x9a0
[ 71.986201] ? sysfs_merge_group+0xd4/0x110
[ 71.986205] usb_set_configuration+0x57a/0x820
[ 71.986208] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x4f/0x70
[ 71.986211] usb_probe_device+0x3a/0x110
[ 71.986213] really_probe+0xdb/0x380
[ 71.986216] ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90
[ 71.986219] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x170
[ 71.986221] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0x90
[ 71.986224] __device_attach_driver+0x89/0x110
[ 71.986227] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x70/0x70
[ 71.986230] bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xe0
[ 71.986232] __device_attach+0xb2/0x1e0
[ 71.986235] bus_probe_device+0x92/0xb0
[ 71.986237] device_add+0x422/0x9a0
[ 71.986239] ? _dev_info+0x7d/0x98
[ 71.986242] ? blake2s_update+0x4c/0xc0
[ 71.986246] usb_new_device.cold+0x148/0x36d
[ 71.986250] hub_event+0xa8a/0x1910
[ 71.986255] process_one_work+0x1c4/0x380
[ 71.986259] worker_thread+0x51/0x390
[ 71.986262] ? rescuer_thread+0x3b0/0x3b0
[ 71.986264] kthread+0xdb/0x110
[ 71.986266] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 71.986268] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 71.986273] </TASK>
[ 71.986274] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 71.986284] btusb: probe of 2-1.6:1.0 failed with error -17

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48978

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in hid_report_raw_event
Syzbot reported shift-out-of-bounds in hid_report_raw_event.
microsoft 0003:045E:07DA.0001: hid_field_extract() called with n (128) >
32! (swapper/0)
======================================================================
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1323:20
shift exponent 127 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
6.1.0-rc4-syzkaller-00159-g4bbf3422df78 #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 10/26/2022
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1e3/0x2cb lib/dump_stack.c:106
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:151 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x3a6/0x420 lib/ubsan.c:322
snto32 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1323 [inline]
hid_input_fetch_field drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1572 [inline]
hid_process_report drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1665 [inline]
hid_report_raw_event+0xd56/0x18b0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1998
hid_input_report+0x408/0x4f0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2066
hid_irq_in+0x459/0x690 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:284
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x369/0x530 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1671
dummy_timer+0x86b/0x3110 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1988
call_timer_fn+0xf5/0x210 kernel/time/timer.c:1474
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1519 [inline]
__run_timers+0x76a/0x980 kernel/time/timer.c:1790
run_timer_softirq+0x63/0xf0 kernel/time/timer.c:1803
__do_softirq+0x277/0x75b kernel/softirq.c:571
__irq_exit_rcu+0xec/0x170 kernel/softirq.c:650
irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:662
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x91/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1107
======================================================================
If the size of the integer (unsigned n) is bigger than 32 in snto32(),
shift exponent will be too large for 32-bit type 'int', resulting in a
shift-out-of-bounds bug.
Fix this by adding a check on the size of the integer (unsigned n) in
snto32(). To add support for n greater than 32 bits, set n to 32, if n
is greater than 32.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48969

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen-netfront: Fix NULL sring after live migration
A NAPI is setup for each network sring to poll data to kernel
The sring with source host is destroyed before live migration and
new sring with target host is setup after live migration.
The NAPI for the old sring is not deleted until setup new sring
with target host after migration. With busy_poll/busy_read enabled,
the NAPI can be polled before got deleted when resume VM.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
0000000000000008
IP: xennet_poll+0xae/0xd20
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
Call Trace:
finish_task_switch+0x71/0x230
timerqueue_del+0x1d/0x40
hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0xb5/0x110
xennet_alloc_rx_buffers+0x2a0/0x2a0
napi_busy_loop+0xdb/0x270
sock_poll+0x87/0x90
do_sys_poll+0x26f/0x580
tracing_map_insert+0x1d4/0x2f0
event_hist_trigger+0x14a/0x260
finish_task_switch+0x71/0x230
__schedule+0x256/0x890
recalc_sigpending+0x1b/0x50
xen_sched_clock+0x15/0x20
__rb_reserve_next+0x12d/0x140
ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x123/0x3d0
event_triggers_call+0x87/0xb0
trace_event_buffer_commit+0x1c4/0x210
xen_clocksource_get_cycles+0x15/0x20
ktime_get_ts64+0x51/0xf0
SyS_ppoll+0x160/0x1a0
SyS_ppoll+0x160/0x1a0
do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x41/0xa6
...
RIP: xennet_poll+0xae/0xd20 RSP: ffffb4f041933900
CR2: 0000000000000008
---[ end trace f8601785b354351c ]---
xen frontend should remove the NAPIs for the old srings before live
migration as the bond srings are destroyed
There is a tiny window between the srings are set to NULL and
the NAPIs are disabled, It is safe as the NAPI threads are still
frozen at that time

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48961

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mdio: fix unbalanced fwnode reference count in mdio_device_release()
There is warning report about of_node refcount leak
while probing mdio device:
OF: ERROR: memory leak, expected refcount 1 instead of 2,
of_node_get()/of_node_put() unbalanced - destroy cset entry:
attach overlay node /spi/soc@0/mdio@710700c0/ethernet@4
In of_mdiobus_register_device(), we increase fwnode refcount
by fwnode_handle_get() before associating the of_node with
mdio device, but it has never been decreased in normal path.
Since that, in mdio_device_release(), it needs to call
fwnode_handle_put() in addition instead of calling kfree()
directly.
After above, just calling mdio_device_free() in the error handle
path of of_mdiobus_register_device() is enough to keep the
refcount balanced.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48953

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtc: cmos: Fix event handler registration ordering issue
Because acpi_install_fixed_event_handler() enables the event
automatically on success, it is incorrect to call it before the
handler routine passed to it is ready to handle events.
Unfortunately, the rtc-cmos driver does exactly the incorrect thing
by calling cmos_wake_setup(), which passes rtc_handler() to
acpi_install_fixed_event_handler(), before cmos_do_probe(), because
rtc_handler() uses dev_get_drvdata() to get to the cmos object
pointer and the driver data pointer is only populated in
cmos_do_probe().
This leads to a NULL pointer dereference in rtc_handler() on boot
if the RTC fixed event happens to be active at the init time.
To address this issue, change the initialization ordering of the
driver so that cmos_wake_setup() is always called after a successful
cmos_do_probe() call.
While at it, change cmos_pnp_probe() to call cmos_do_probe() after
the initial if () statement used for computing the IRQ argument to
be passed to cmos_do_probe() which is cleaner than calling it in
each branch of that if () (local variable "irq" can be of type int,
because it is passed to that function as an argument of type int).
Note that commit 6492fed7d8c9 ("rtc: rtc-cmos: Do not check
ACPI_FADT_LOW_POWER_S0") caused this issue to affect a larger number
of systems, because previously it only affected systems with
ACPI_FADT_LOW_POWER_S0 set, but it is present regardless of that
commit.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48950

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Fix perf_pending_task() UaF
Per syzbot it is possible for perf_pending_task() to run after the
event is free()'d. There are two related but distinct cases:
- the task_work was already queued before destroying the event;
- destroying the event itself queues the task_work.
The first cannot be solved using task_work_cancel() since
perf_release() itself might be called from a task_work (____fput),
which means the current->task_works list is already empty and
task_work_cancel() won't be able to find the perf_pending_task()
entry.
The simplest alternative is extending the perf_event lifetime to cover
the task_work.
The second is just silly, queueing a task_work while you know the
event is going away makes no sense and is easily avoided by
re-arranging how the event is marked STATE_DEAD and ensuring it goes
through STATE_OFF on the way down.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48914

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen/netfront: destroy queues before real_num_tx_queues is zeroed
xennet_destroy_queues() relies on info->netdev->real_num_tx_queues to
delete queues. Since d7dac083414eb5bb99a6d2ed53dc2c1b405224e5
("net-sysfs: update the queue counts in the unregistration path"),
unregister_netdev() indirectly sets real_num_tx_queues to 0. Those two
facts together means, that xennet_destroy_queues() called from
xennet_remove() cannot do its job, because it's called after
unregister_netdev(). This results in kfree-ing queues that are still
linked in napi, which ultimately crashes:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 52 Comm: xenwatch Tainted: G W 5.16.10-1.32.fc32.qubes.x86_64+ #226
RIP: 0010:free_netdev+0xa3/0x1a0
Code: ff 48 89 df e8 2e e9 00 00 48 8b 43 50 48 8b 08 48 8d b8 a0 fe ff ff 48 8d a9 a0 fe ff ff 49 39 c4 75 26 eb 47 e8 ed c1 66 ff <48> 8b 85 60 01 00 00 48 8d 95 60 01 00 00 48 89 ef 48 2d 60 01 00
RSP: 0000:ffffc90000bcfd00 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88800edad000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffc90000bcfc30 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: fffffffffffffea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88800edad050
R13: ffff8880065f8f88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8880066c6680
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880f3300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000e998c006 CR4: 00000000003706e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
xennet_remove+0x13d/0x300 [xen_netfront]
xenbus_dev_remove+0x6d/0xf0
__device_release_driver+0x17a/0x240
device_release_driver+0x24/0x30
bus_remove_device+0xd8/0x140
device_del+0x18b/0x410
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x16/0x30
? klist_iter_exit+0x14/0x20
? xenbus_dev_request_and_reply+0x80/0x80
device_unregister+0x13/0x60
xenbus_dev_changed+0x18e/0x1f0
xenwatch_thread+0xc0/0x1a0
? do_wait_intr_irq+0xa0/0xa0
kthread+0x16b/0x190
? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
Fix this by calling xennet_destroy_queues() from xennet_uninit(),
when real_num_tx_queues is still available. This ensures that queues are
destroyed when real_num_tx_queues is set to 0, regardless of how
unregister_netdev() was called.
Originally reported at
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/7257

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48913

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blktrace: fix use after free for struct blk_trace
When tracing the whole disk, 'dropped' and 'msg' will be created
under 'q->debugfs_dir' and 'bt->dir' is NULL, thus blk_trace_free()
won't remove those files. What's worse, the following UAF can be
triggered because of accessing stale 'dropped' and 'msg':
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in blk_dropped_read+0x89/0x100
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88816912f3d8 by task blktrace/1188
CPU: 27 PID: 1188 Comm: blktrace Not tainted 5.17.0-rc4-next-20220217+ #469
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20190727_073836-4
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xab/0x381
? blk_dropped_read+0x89/0x100
? blk_dropped_read+0x89/0x100
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
? blk_dropped_read+0x89/0x100
kasan_check_range+0x140/0x1b0
blk_dropped_read+0x89/0x100
? blk_create_buf_file_callback+0x20/0x20
? kmem_cache_free+0xa1/0x500
? do_sys_openat2+0x258/0x460
full_proxy_read+0x8f/0xc0
vfs_read+0xc6/0x260
ksys_read+0xb9/0x150
? vfs_write+0x3d0/0x3d0
? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x55/0x60
? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x39/0x1e0
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fbc080d92fd
Code: ce 20 00 00 75 10 b8 00 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 1
RSP: 002b:00007fbb95ff9cb0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fbb95ff9dc0 RCX: 00007fbc080d92fd
RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 00007fbb95ff9cc0 RDI: 0000000000000045
RBP: 0000000000000045 R08: 0000000000406299 R09: 00000000fffffffd
R10: 000000000153afa0 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007fbb780008c0
R13: 00007fbb78000938 R14: 0000000000608b30 R15: 00007fbb780029c8
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1050:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0
do_blk_trace_setup+0xcb/0x410
__blk_trace_setup+0xac/0x130
blk_trace_ioctl+0xe9/0x1c0
blkdev_ioctl+0xf1/0x390
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xa5/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Freed by task 1050:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
__kasan_slab_free+0x103/0x180
kfree+0x9a/0x4c0
__blk_trace_remove+0x53/0x70
blk_trace_ioctl+0x199/0x1c0
blkdev_common_ioctl+0x5e9/0xb30
blkdev_ioctl+0x1a5/0x390
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xa5/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88816912f380
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96
The buggy address is located 88 bytes inside of
96-byte region [ffff88816912f380, ffff88816912f3e0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:000000009a1b4e7c refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0f
flags: 0x17ffffc0000200(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
raw: 0017ffffc0000200 ffffea00044f1100 dead000000000002 ffff88810004c780
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88816912f280: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
ffff88816912f300: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
>ffff88816912f380: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88816912f400: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
ffff88816912f480: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
==================================================================

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48889

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: Intel: sof-nau8825: fix module alias overflow
The maximum name length for a platform_device_id entry is 20 characters
including the trailing NUL byte. The sof_nau8825.c file exceeds that,
which causes an obscure error message:
sound/soc/intel/boards/snd-soc-sof_nau8825.mod.c:35:45: error: illegal character encoding in string literal [-Werror,-Winvalid-source-encoding]
MODULE_ALIAS("platform:adl_max98373_nau8825<U+0018><AA>");
^~~~
include/linux/module.h:168:49: note: expanded from macro 'MODULE_ALIAS'
^~~~~~
include/linux/module.h:165:56: note: expanded from macro 'MODULE_INFO'
^~~~
include/linux/moduleparam.h:26:47: note: expanded from macro '__MODULE_INFO'
= __MODULE_INFO_PREFIX __stringify(tag) "=" info
I could not figure out how to make the module handling robust enough
to handle this better, but as a quick fix, using slightly shorter
names that are still unique avoids the build issue.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48876

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: fix initialization of rx->link and rx->link_sta
There are some codepaths that do not initialize rx->link_sta properly. This
causes a crash in places which assume that rx->link_sta is valid if rx->sta
is valid.
One known instance is triggered by __ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu being called from
fast-rx. It results in a crash like this one:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a8
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 506 Comm: mt76-usb-rx phy Tainted: G E 6.1.0-debian64x+1.7 #3
Hardware name: ZOTAC ZBOX-ID92/ZBOX-IQ01/ZBOX-ID92/ZBOX-IQ01, BIOS B220P007 05/21/2014
RIP: 0010:ieee80211_deliver_skb+0x62/0x1f0 [mac80211]
Code: 00 48 89 04 24 e8 9e a7 c3 df 89 c0 48 03 1c c5 a0 ea 39 a1 4c 01 6b 08 48 ff 03 48
83 7d 28 00 74 11 48 8b 45 30 48 63 55 44 <48> 83 84 d0 a8 00 00 00 01 41 8b 86 c0
11 00 00 8d 50 fd 83 fa 01
RSP: 0018:ffff999040803b10 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffb9903f496480 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff999040803ce0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8d21828ac900
R13: 000000000000004a R14: ffff8d2198ed89c0 R15: ffff8d2198ed8000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d24afe80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000a8 CR3: 0000000429810002 CR4: 00000000001706e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu+0x1b5/0x240 [mac80211]
? ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0xcdd/0x1320 [mac80211]
? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x3b/0xa0
ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0xcdd/0x1320 [mac80211]
? prepare_transfer+0x109/0x1a0 [xhci_hcd]
ieee80211_rx_list+0xa80/0xda0 [mac80211]
mt76_rx_complete+0x207/0x2e0 [mt76]
mt76_rx_poll_complete+0x357/0x5a0 [mt76]
mt76u_rx_worker+0x4f5/0x600 [mt76_usb]
? mt76_get_min_avg_rssi+0x140/0x140 [mt76]
__mt76_worker_fn+0x50/0x80 [mt76]
kthread+0xed/0x120
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Since the initialization of rx->link and rx->link_sta is rather convoluted
and duplicated in many places, clean it up by using a helper function to
set it.
[remove unnecessary rx->sta->sta.mlo check]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48875

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: sdata can be NULL during AMPDU start
ieee80211_tx_ba_session_handle_start() may get NULL for sdata when a
deauthentication is ongoing.
Here a trace triggering the race with the hostapd test
multi_ap_fronthaul_on_ap:
(gdb) list *drv_ampdu_action+0x46
0x8b16 is in drv_ampdu_action (net/mac80211/driver-ops.c:396).
391 int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
392
393 might_sleep();
394
395 sdata = get_bss_sdata(sdata);
396 if (!check_sdata_in_driver(sdata))
397 return -EIO;
398
399 trace_drv_ampdu_action(local, sdata, params);
400
wlan0: moving STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 to state 3
wlan0: associated
wlan0: deauthenticating from 02:00:00:00:03:00 by local choice (Reason: 3=DEAUTH_LEAVING)
wlan3.sta1: Open BA session requested for 02:00:00:00:00:00 tid 0
wlan3.sta1: dropped frame to 02:00:00:00:00:00 (unauthorized port)
wlan0: moving STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 to state 2
wlan0: moving STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 to state 1
wlan0: Removed STA 02:00:00:00:03:00
wlan0: Destroyed STA 02:00:00:00:03:00
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffb48
PGD 11814067 P4D 11814067 PUD 11816067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 2 PID: 133397 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc8-wt+ #59
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-20220807_005459-localhost 04/01/2014
Workqueue: phy3 ieee80211_ba_session_work [mac80211]
RIP: 0010:drv_ampdu_action+0x46/0x280 [mac80211]
Code: 53 48 89 f3 be 89 01 00 00 e8 d6 43 bf ef e8 21 46 81 f0 83 bb a0 1b 00 00 04 75 0e 48 8b 9b 28 0d 00 00 48 81 eb 10 0e 00 00 <8b> 93 58 09 00 00 f6 c2 20 0f 84 3b 01 00 00 8b 05 dd 1c 0f 00 85
RSP: 0018:ffffc900025ebd20 EFLAGS: 00010287
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: fffffffffffff1f0 RCX: ffff888102228240
RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffff918c5de0 RDI: ffff888102228b40
RBP: ffffc900025ebd40 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888118c18ec0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc900025ebd60 R15: ffff888018b7efb8
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88817a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: fffffffffffffb48 CR3: 0000000105228006 CR4: 0000000000170ee0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ieee80211_tx_ba_session_handle_start+0xd0/0x190 [mac80211]
ieee80211_ba_session_work+0xff/0x2e0 [mac80211]
process_one_work+0x29f/0x620
worker_thread+0x4d/0x3d0
? process_one_work+0x620/0x620
kthread+0xfb/0x120
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48865

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix kernel panic when enabling bearer
When enabling a bearer on a node, a kernel panic is observed:
[ 4.498085] RIP: 0010:tipc_mon_prep+0x4e/0x130 [tipc]
...
[ 4.520030] Call Trace:
[ 4.520689] <IRQ>
[ 4.521236] tipc_link_build_proto_msg+0x375/0x750 [tipc]
[ 4.522654] tipc_link_build_state_msg+0x48/0xc0 [tipc]
[ 4.524034] __tipc_node_link_up+0xd7/0x290 [tipc]
[ 4.525292] tipc_rcv+0x5da/0x730 [tipc]
[ 4.526346] ? __netif_receive_skb_core+0xb7/0xfc0
[ 4.527601] tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0x5e/0x90 [tipc]
[ 4.528737] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x20b/0x260
[ 4.530068] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1bf/0x2e0
[ 4.531450] ? dev_gro_receive+0x4c2/0x680
[ 4.532512] napi_complete_done+0x6f/0x180
[ 4.533570] virtnet_poll+0x29c/0x42e [virtio_net]
...
The node in question is receiving activate messages in another
thread after changing bearer status to allow message sending/
receiving in current thread:
thread 1 | thread 2
-------- | --------
|
tipc_enable_bearer() |
test_and_set_bit_lock() |
tipc_bearer_xmit_skb() |
| tipc_l2_rcv_msg()
| tipc_rcv()
| __tipc_node_link_up()
| tipc_link_build_state_msg()
| tipc_link_build_proto_msg()
| tipc_mon_prep()
| {
| ...
| // null-pointer dereference
| u16 gen = mon->dom_gen;
| ...
| }
// Not being executed yet |
tipc_mon_create() |
{ |
... |
// allocate |
mon = kzalloc(); |
... |
} |
Monitoring pointer in thread 2 is dereferenced before monitoring data
is allocated in thread 1. This causes kernel panic.
This commit fixes it by allocating the monitoring data before enabling
the bearer to receive messages.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48862

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost: fix hung thread due to erroneous iotlb entries
In vhost_iotlb_add_range_ctx(), range size can overflow to 0 when
start is 0 and last is ULONG_MAX. One instance where it can happen
is when userspace sends an IOTLB message with iova=size=uaddr=0
(vhost_process_iotlb_msg). So, an entry with size = 0, start = 0,
last = ULONG_MAX ends up in the iotlb. Next time a packet is sent,
iotlb_access_ok() loops indefinitely due to that erroneous entry.
Call Trace:
<TASK>
iotlb_access_ok+0x21b/0x3e0 drivers/vhost/vhost.c:1340
vq_meta_prefetch+0xbc/0x280 drivers/vhost/vhost.c:1366
vhost_transport_do_send_pkt+0xe0/0xfd0 drivers/vhost/vsock.c:104
vhost_worker+0x23d/0x3d0 drivers/vhost/vhost.c:372
kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:377
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295
</TASK>
Reported by syzbot at:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0abd373e2e50d704db87
To fix this, do two things:
1. Return -EINVAL in vhost_chr_write_iter() when userspace asks to map
a range with size 0.
2. Fix vhost_iotlb_add_range_ctx() to handle the range [0, ULONG_MAX]
by splitting it into two entries.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48858

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix a race on command flush flow
Fix a refcount use after free warning due to a race on command entry.
Such race occurs when one of the commands releases its last refcount and
frees its index and entry while another process running command flush
flow takes refcount to this command entry. The process which handles
commands flush may see this command as needed to be flushed if the other
process released its refcount but didn't release the index yet. Fix it
by adding the needed spin lock.
It fixes the following warning trace:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 540311 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x80/0xe0
...
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x80/0xe0
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions+0x293/0x340 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_cmd_flush+0x3a/0xf0 [mlx5_core]
enter_error_state+0x44/0x80 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work+0x37/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x1be/0x390
worker_thread+0x4d/0x3d0
? rescuer_thread+0x350/0x350
kthread+0x141/0x160
? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48853

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE
The problem I'm addressing was discovered by the LTP test covering
cve-2018-1000204.
A short description of what happens follows:
1) The test case issues a command code 00 (TEST UNIT READY) via the SG_IO
interface with: dxfer_len == 524288, dxdfer_dir == SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV
and a corresponding dxferp. The peculiar thing about this is that TUR
is not reading from the device.
2) In sg_start_req() the invocation of blk_rq_map_user() effectively
bounces the user-space buffer. As if the device was to transfer into
it. Since commit a45b599ad808 ("scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in
sg_build_indirect()") we make sure this first bounce buffer is
allocated with GFP_ZERO.
3) For the rest of the story we keep ignoring that we have a TUR, so the
device won't touch the buffer we prepare as if the we had a
DMA_FROM_DEVICE type of situation. My setup uses a virtio-scsi device
and the buffer allocated by SG is mapped by the function
virtqueue_add_split() which uses DMA_FROM_DEVICE for the "in" sgs (here
scatter-gather and not scsi generics). This mapping involves bouncing
via the swiotlb (we need swiotlb to do virtio in protected guest like
s390 Secure Execution, or AMD SEV).
4) When the SCSI TUR is done, we first copy back the content of the second
(that is swiotlb) bounce buffer (which most likely contains some
previous IO data), to the first bounce buffer, which contains all
zeros. Then we copy back the content of the first bounce buffer to
the user-space buffer.
5) The test case detects that the buffer, which it zero-initialized,
ain't all zeros and fails.
One can argue that this is an swiotlb problem, because without swiotlb
we leak all zeros, and the swiotlb should be transparent in a sense that
it does not affect the outcome (if all other participants are well
behaved).
Copying the content of the original buffer into the swiotlb buffer is
the only way I can think of to make swiotlb transparent in such
scenarios. So let's do just that if in doubt, but allow the driver
to tell us that the whole mapped buffer is going to be overwritten,
in which case we can preserve the old behavior and avoid the performance
impact of the extra bounce.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48850

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show
When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be
triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already
removed.
[ 755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called
[ 756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called
...
[ 757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 758.031397] IP: [<ffffffff8ee11acb>] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280
crash> bt
...
PID: 12649 TASK: ffff8924108f2100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "amsd"
...
#9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778
[exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab]
RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb RSP: ffff89240e1a3968 RFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff89243d874100 RCX: 0000000000001000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff89243d874090
RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0 R8: 000000000001f080 R9: ffff8905ffc03c00
R10: ffffffffc04680d4 R11: ffffffff8edde9fd R12: 00000000000080d0
R13: ffff89243d874090 R14: ffff89243d874080 R15: 0000000000000000
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
#10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core]
#11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core]
#12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core]
#13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core]
#14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core]
#15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core]
#16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core]
#17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46
#18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208
#19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3
#20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf
#21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596
#22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10
#23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5
#24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff
#25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f
#26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92
crash> net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000
state = 0x5 (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER)
To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48848

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/osnoise: Do not unregister events twice
Nicolas reported that using:
# trace-cmd record -e all -M 10 -p osnoise --poll
Resulted in the following kernel warning:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1217 at kernel/tracepoint.c:404 tracepoint_probe_unregister+0x280/0x370
[...]
CPU: 0 PID: 1217 Comm: trace-cmd Not tainted 5.17.0-rc6-next-20220307-nico+ #19
RIP: 0010:tracepoint_probe_unregister+0x280/0x370
[...]
CR2: 00007ff919b29497 CR3: 0000000109da4005 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
osnoise_workload_stop+0x36/0x90
tracing_set_tracer+0x108/0x260
tracing_set_trace_write+0x94/0xd0
? __check_object_size.part.0+0x10a/0x150
? selinux_file_permission+0x104/0x150
vfs_write+0xb5/0x290
ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7ff919a18127
[...]
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The warning complains about an attempt to unregister an
unregistered tracepoint.
This happens on trace-cmd because it first stops tracing, and
then switches the tracer to nop. Which is equivalent to:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/
# echo osnoise > current_tracer
# echo 0 > tracing_on
# echo nop > current_tracer
The osnoise tracer stops the workload when no trace instance
is actually collecting data. This can be caused both by
disabling tracing or disabling the tracer itself.
To avoid unregistering events twice, use the existing
trace_osnoise_callback_enabled variable to check if the events
(and the workload) are actually active before trying to
deactivate them.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48840

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iavf: Fix hang during reboot/shutdown
Recent commit 974578017fc1 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is
initialized in remove") adds a wait-loop at the beginning of
iavf_remove() to ensure that port initialization is finished
prior unregistering net device. This causes a regression
in reboot/shutdown scenario because in this case callback
iavf_shutdown() is called and this callback detaches the device,
makes it down if it is running and sets its state to __IAVF_REMOVE.
Later shutdown callback of associated PF driver (e.g. ice_shutdown)
is called. That callback calls among other things sriov_disable()
that calls indirectly iavf_remove() (see stack trace below).
As the adapter state is already __IAVF_REMOVE then the mentioned
loop is end-less and shutdown process hangs.
The patch fixes this by checking adapter's state at the beginning
of iavf_remove() and skips the rest of the function if the adapter
is already in remove state (shutdown is in progress).
Reproducer:
1. Create VF on PF driven by ice or i40e driver
2. Ensure that the VF is bound to iavf driver
3. Reboot
[52625.981294] sysrq: SysRq : Show Blocked State
[52625.988377] task:reboot state:D stack: 0 pid:17359 ppid: 1 f2
[52625.996732] Call Trace:
[52625.999187] __schedule+0x2d1/0x830
[52626.007400] schedule+0x35/0xa0
[52626.010545] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock+0x83/0x100
[52626.020046] usleep_range+0x5b/0x80
[52626.023540] iavf_remove+0x63/0x5b0 [iavf]
[52626.027645] pci_device_remove+0x3b/0xc0
[52626.031572] device_release_driver_internal+0x103/0x1f0
[52626.036805] pci_stop_bus_device+0x72/0xa0
[52626.040904] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0xe/0x20
[52626.045870] pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0xba/0x120
[52626.050232] sriov_disable+0x2f/0xe0
[52626.053813] ice_free_vfs+0x7c/0x340 [ice]
[52626.057946] ice_remove+0x220/0x240 [ice]
[52626.061967] ice_shutdown+0x16/0x50 [ice]
[52626.065987] pci_device_shutdown+0x34/0x60
[52626.070086] device_shutdown+0x165/0x1c5
[52626.074011] kernel_restart+0xe/0x30
[52626.077593] __do_sys_reboot+0x1d2/0x210
[52626.093815] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1a0
[52626.097483] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48839

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/packet: fix slab-out-of-bounds access in packet_recvmsg()
syzbot found that when an AF_PACKET socket is using PACKET_COPY_THRESH
and mmap operations, tpacket_rcv() is queueing skbs with
garbage in skb->cb[], triggering a too big copy [1]
Presumably, users of af_packet using mmap() already gets correct
metadata from the mapped buffer, we can simply make sure
to clear 12 bytes that might be copied to user space later.
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489
Write of size 165 at addr ffffc9000385fb78 by task syz-executor233/3631
CPU: 0 PID: 3631 Comm: syz-executor233 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-syzkaller-02396-g0b3660695e80 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xf/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
memcpy+0x39/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:66
memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]
packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline]
____sys_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x600 net/socket.c:2632
___sys_recvmsg+0x127/0x200 net/socket.c:2674
__sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2704
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fdfd5954c29
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 41 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffcf8e71e48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fdfd5954c29
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000500 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 000000000000000d
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffcf8e71e60
R13: 00000000000f4240 R14: 000000000000c1ff R15: 00007ffcf8e71e54
</TASK>
addr ffffc9000385fb78 is located in stack of task syz-executor233/3631 at offset 32 in frame:
____sys_recvmsg+0x0/0x600 include/linux/uio.h:246
this frame has 1 object:
[32, 160) 'addr'
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffc9000385fa80: 00 04 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffffc9000385fb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00
>ffffc9000385fb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3
^
ffffc9000385fc00: f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1
ffffc9000385fc80: f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48835

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpt3sas: Page fault in reply q processing
A page fault was encountered in mpt3sas on a LUN reset error path:
[ 145.763216] mpt3sas_cm1: Task abort tm failed: handle(0x0002),timeout(30) tr_method(0x0) smid(3) msix_index(0)
[ 145.778932] scsi 1:0:0:0: task abort: FAILED scmd(0x0000000024ba29a2)
[ 145.817307] scsi 1:0:0:0: attempting device reset! scmd(0x0000000024ba29a2)
[ 145.827253] scsi 1:0:0:0: [sg1] tag#2 CDB: Receive Diagnostic 1c 01 01 ff fc 00
[ 145.837617] scsi target1:0:0: handle(0x0002), sas_address(0x500605b0000272b9), phy(0)
[ 145.848598] scsi target1:0:0: enclosure logical id(0x500605b0000272b8), slot(0)
[ 149.858378] mpt3sas_cm1: Poll ReplyDescriptor queues for completion of smid(0), task_type(0x05), handle(0x0002)
[ 149.875202] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000007fffc445d
[ 149.885617] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 149.894346] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 149.903123] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 149.909387] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 149.917417] CPU: 24 PID: 3512 Comm: scsi_eh_1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S O 5.10.89-altav-1 #1
[ 149.934327] Hardware name: DDN 200NVX2 /200NVX2-MB , BIOS ATHG2.2.02.01 09/10/2021
[ 149.951871] RIP: 0010:_base_process_reply_queue+0x4b/0x900 [mpt3sas]
[ 149.961889] Code: 0f 84 22 02 00 00 8d 48 01 49 89 fd 48 8d 57 38 f0 0f b1 4f 38 0f 85 d8 01 00 00 49 8b 45 10 45 31 e4 41 8b 55 0c 48 8d 1c d0 <0f> b6 03 83 e0 0f 3c 0f 0f 85 a2 00 00 00 e9 e6 01 00 00 0f b7 ee
[ 149.991952] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000f1ebcb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 150.000937] RAX: 0000000000000055 RBX: 00000007fffc445d RCX: 000000002548f071
[ 150.011841] RDX: 00000000ffff8881 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff888125ed50d8
[ 150.022670] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffff7fff
[ 150.033445] R10: ffffc9000f1ebb68 R11: ffffc9000f1ebb60 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 150.044204] R13: ffff888125ed50d8 R14: 0000000000000080 R15: 34cdc00034cdea80
[ 150.054963] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88dfaf200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 150.066715] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 150.076078] CR2: 00000007fffc445d CR3: 000000012448a006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 150.086887] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 150.097670] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 150.108323] PKRU: 55555554
[ 150.114690] Call Trace:
[ 150.120497] ? printk+0x48/0x4a
[ 150.127049] mpt3sas_scsih_issue_tm.cold.114+0x2e/0x2b3 [mpt3sas]
[ 150.136453] mpt3sas_scsih_issue_locked_tm+0x86/0xb0 [mpt3sas]
[ 150.145759] scsih_dev_reset+0xea/0x300 [mpt3sas]
[ 150.153891] scsi_eh_ready_devs+0x541/0x9e0 [scsi_mod]
[ 150.162206] ? __scsi_host_match+0x20/0x20 [scsi_mod]
[ 150.170406] ? scsi_try_target_reset+0x90/0x90 [scsi_mod]
[ 150.178925] ? blk_mq_tagset_busy_iter+0x45/0x60
[ 150.186638] ? scsi_try_target_reset+0x90/0x90 [scsi_mod]
[ 150.195087] scsi_error_handler+0x3a5/0x4a0 [scsi_mod]
[ 150.203206] ? __schedule+0x1e9/0x610
[ 150.209783] ? scsi_eh_get_sense+0x210/0x210 [scsi_mod]
[ 150.217924] kthread+0x12e/0x150
[ 150.224041] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x130/0x130
[ 150.231206] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
This is caused by mpt3sas_base_sync_reply_irqs() using an invalid reply_q
pointer outside of the list_for_each_entry() loop. At the end of the full
list traversal the pointer is invalid.
Move the _base_process_reply_queue() call inside of the loop.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48830

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: isotp: fix potential CAN frame reception race in isotp_rcv()
When receiving a CAN frame the current code logic does not consider
concurrently receiving processes which do not show up in real world
usage.
Ziyang Xuan writes:
The following syz problem is one of the scenarios. so->rx.len is
changed by isotp_rcv_ff() during isotp_rcv_cf(), so->rx.len equals
0 before alloc_skb() and equals 4096 after alloc_skb(). That will
trigger skb_over_panic() in skb_put().
=======================================================
CPU: 1 PID: 19 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8-syzkaller #0
RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x16c/0x16e net/core/skbuff.c:113
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_over_panic net/core/skbuff.c:118 [inline]
skb_put.cold+0x24/0x24 net/core/skbuff.c:1990
isotp_rcv_cf net/can/isotp.c:570 [inline]
isotp_rcv+0xa38/0x1e30 net/can/isotp.c:668
deliver net/can/af_can.c:574 [inline]
can_rcv_filter+0x445/0x8d0 net/can/af_can.c:635
can_receive+0x31d/0x580 net/can/af_can.c:665
can_rcv+0x120/0x1c0 net/can/af_can.c:696
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x114/0x180 net/core/dev.c:5465
__netif_receive_skb+0x24/0x1b0 net/core/dev.c:5579
Therefore we make sure the state changes and data structures stay
consistent at CAN frame reception time by adding a spin_lock in
isotp_rcv(). This fixes the issue reported by syzkaller but does not
affect real world operation.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48811

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ibmvnic: don't release napi in __ibmvnic_open()
If __ibmvnic_open() encounters an error such as when setting link state,
it calls release_resources() which frees the napi structures needlessly.
Instead, have __ibmvnic_open() only clean up the work it did so far (i.e.
disable napi and irqs) and leave the rest to the callers.
If caller of __ibmvnic_open() is ibmvnic_open(), it should release the
resources immediately. If the caller is do_reset() or do_hard_reset(),
they will release the resources on the next reset.
This fixes following crash that occurred when running the drmgr command
several times to add/remove a vnic interface:
[102056] ibmvnic 30000003 env3: Disabling rx_scrq[6] irq
[102056] ibmvnic 30000003 env3: Disabling rx_scrq[7] irq
[102056] ibmvnic 30000003 env3: Replenished 8 pools
Kernel attempted to read user page (10) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000010
Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000a3c840
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
...
CPU: 9 PID: 102056 Comm: kworker/9:2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5-autotest-g6441998e2e37 #1
Workqueue: events_long __ibmvnic_reset [ibmvnic]
NIP: c000000000a3c840 LR: c0080000029b5378 CTR: c000000000a3c820
REGS: c0000000548e37e0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.16.0-rc5-autotest-g6441998e2e37)
MSR: 8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28248484 XER: 00000004
CFAR: c0080000029bdd24 DAR: 0000000000000010 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c0080000029b55d0 c0000000548e3a80 c0000000028f0200 0000000000000000
...
NIP [c000000000a3c840] napi_enable+0x20/0xc0
LR [c0080000029b5378] __ibmvnic_open+0xf0/0x430 [ibmvnic]
Call Trace:
[c0000000548e3a80] [0000000000000006] 0x6 (unreliable)
[c0000000548e3ab0] [c0080000029b55d0] __ibmvnic_open+0x348/0x430 [ibmvnic]
[c0000000548e3b40] [c0080000029bcc28] __ibmvnic_reset+0x500/0xdf0 [ibmvnic]
[c0000000548e3c60] [c000000000176228] process_one_work+0x288/0x570
[c0000000548e3d00] [c000000000176588] worker_thread+0x78/0x660
[c0000000548e3da0] [c0000000001822f0] kthread+0x1c0/0x1d0
[c0000000548e3e10] [c00000000000cf64] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
Instruction dump:
7d2948f8 792307e0 4e800020 60000000 3c4c01eb 384239e0 f821ffd1 39430010
38a0fff6 e92d1100 f9210028 39200000 <e9030010> f9010020 60420000 e9210020
---[ end trace 5f8033b08fd27706 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48810

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmr,ip6mr: acquire RTNL before calling ip[6]mr_free_table() on failure path
ip[6]mr_free_table() can only be called under RTNL lock.
RTNL: assertion failed at net/core/dev.c (10367)
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5890 at net/core/dev.c:10367 unregister_netdevice_many+0x1246/0x1850 net/core/dev.c:10367
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 5890 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller-11627-g422ee58dc0ef #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:unregister_netdevice_many+0x1246/0x1850 net/core/dev.c:10367
Code: 0f 85 9b ee ff ff e8 69 07 4b fa ba 7f 28 00 00 48 c7 c6 00 90 ae 8a 48 c7 c7 40 90 ae 8a c6 05 6d b1 51 06 01 e8 8c 90 d8 01 <0f> 0b e9 70 ee ff ff e8 3e 07 4b fa 4c 89 e7 e8 86 2a 59 fa e9 ee
RSP: 0018:ffffc900046ff6e0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888050f51d00 RSI: ffffffff815fa008 RDI: fffff520008dfece
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff815f3d6e R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffff4
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffc900046ff750 R15: ffff88807b7dc000
FS: 00007f4ab736e700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fee0b4f8990 CR3: 000000001e7d2000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mroute_clean_tables+0x244/0xb40 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1509
ip6mr_free_table net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:389 [inline]
ip6mr_rules_init net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:246 [inline]
ip6mr_net_init net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1306 [inline]
ip6mr_net_init+0x3f0/0x4e0 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1298
ops_init+0xaf/0x470 net/core/net_namespace.c:140
setup_net+0x54f/0xbb0 net/core/net_namespace.c:331
copy_net_ns+0x318/0x760 net/core/net_namespace.c:475
create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xb20 kernel/nsproxy.c:110
copy_namespaces+0x391/0x450 kernel/nsproxy.c:178
copy_process+0x2e0c/0x7300 kernel/fork.c:2167
kernel_clone+0xe7/0xab0 kernel/fork.c:2555
__do_sys_clone+0xc8/0x110 kernel/fork.c:2672
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f4ab89f9059
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7f4ab89f902f.
RSP: 002b:00007f4ab736e118 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4ab8b0bf60 RCX: 00007f4ab89f9059
RDX: 0000000020000280 RSI: 0000000020000270 RDI: 0000000040200000
RBP: 00007f4ab8a5308d R08: 0000000020000300 R09: 0000000020000300
R10: 00000000200002c0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffc3977cc1f R14: 00007f4ab736e300 R15: 0000000000022000
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48802

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/proc: task_mmu.c: don't read mapcount for migration entry
The syzbot reported the below BUG:
kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:785!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 4392 Comm: syz-executor560 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:PageDoubleMap include/linux/page-flags.h:785 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__page_mapcount+0x2d2/0x350 mm/util.c:744
Call Trace:
page_mapcount include/linux/mm.h:837 [inline]
smaps_account+0x470/0xb10 fs/proc/task_mmu.c:466
smaps_pte_entry fs/proc/task_mmu.c:538 [inline]
smaps_pte_range+0x611/0x1250 fs/proc/task_mmu.c:601
walk_pmd_range mm/pagewalk.c:128 [inline]
walk_pud_range mm/pagewalk.c:205 [inline]
walk_p4d_range mm/pagewalk.c:240 [inline]
walk_pgd_range mm/pagewalk.c:277 [inline]
__walk_page_range+0xe23/0x1ea0 mm/pagewalk.c:379
walk_page_vma+0x277/0x350 mm/pagewalk.c:530
smap_gather_stats.part.0+0x148/0x260 fs/proc/task_mmu.c:768
smap_gather_stats fs/proc/task_mmu.c:741 [inline]
show_smap+0xc6/0x440 fs/proc/task_mmu.c:822
seq_read_iter+0xbb0/0x1240 fs/seq_file.c:272
seq_read+0x3e0/0x5b0 fs/seq_file.c:162
vfs_read+0x1b5/0x600 fs/read_write.c:479
ksys_read+0x12d/0x250 fs/read_write.c:619
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The reproducer was trying to read /proc/$PID/smaps when calling
MADV_FREE at the mean time. MADV_FREE may split THPs if it is called
for partial THP. It may trigger the below race:
CPU A CPU B
----- -----
smaps walk: MADV_FREE:
page_mapcount()
PageCompound()
split_huge_page()
page = compound_head(page)
PageDoubleMap(page)
When calling PageDoubleMap() this page is not a tail page of THP anymore
so the BUG is triggered.
This could be fixed by elevated refcount of the page before calling
mapcount, but that would prevent it from counting migration entries, and
it seems overkilling because the race just could happen when PMD is
split so all PTE entries of tail pages are actually migration entries,
and smaps_account() does treat migration entries as mapcount == 1 as
Kirill pointed out.
Add a new parameter for smaps_account() to tell this entry is migration
entry then skip calling page_mapcount(). Don't skip getting mapcount
for device private entries since they do track references with mapcount.
Pagemap also has the similar issue although it was not reported. Fixed
it as well.
[shy828301@gmail.com: v4]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220203182641.824731-1-shy828301@gmail.com
[nathan@kernel.org: avoid unused variable warning in pagemap_pmd_range()]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220207171049.1102239-1-nathan@kernel.org

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48797

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: don't try to NUMA-migrate COW pages that have other uses
Oded Gabbay reports that enabling NUMA balancing causes corruption with
his Gaudi accelerator test load:
"All the details are in the bug, but the bottom line is that somehow,
this patch causes corruption when the numa balancing feature is
enabled AND we don't use process affinity AND we use GUP to pin pages
so our accelerator can DMA to/from system memory.
Either disabling numa balancing, using process affinity to bind to
specific numa-node or reverting this patch causes the bug to
disappear"
and Oded bisected the issue to commit 09854ba94c6a ("mm: do_wp_page()
simplification").
Now, the NUMA balancing shouldn't actually be changing the writability
of a page, and as such shouldn't matter for COW. But it appears it
does. Suspicious.
However, regardless of that, the condition for enabling NUMA faults in
change_pte_range() is nonsensical. It uses "page_mapcount(page)" to
decide if a COW page should be NUMA-protected or not, and that makes
absolutely no sense.
The number of mappings a page has is irrelevant: not only does GUP get a
reference to a page as in Oded's case, but the other mappings migth be
paged out and the only reference to them would be in the page count.
Since we should never try to NUMA-balance a page that we can't move
anyway due to other references, just fix the code to use 'page_count()'.
Oded confirms that that fixes his issue.
Now, this does imply that something in NUMA balancing ends up changing
page protections (other than the obvious one of making the page
inaccessible to get the NUMA faulting information). Otherwise the COW
simplification wouldn't matter - since doing the GUP on the page would
make sure it's writable.
The cause of that permission change would be good to figure out too,
since it clearly results in spurious COW events - but fixing the
nonsensical test that just happened to work before is obviously the
CorrectThing(tm) to do regardless.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48796

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu: Fix potential use-after-free during probe
Kasan has reported the following use after free on dev->iommu.
when a device probe fails and it is in process of freeing dev->iommu
in dev_iommu_free function, a deferred_probe_work_func runs in parallel
and tries to access dev->iommu->fwspec in of_iommu_configure path thus
causing use after free.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in of_iommu_configure+0xb4/0x4a4
Read of size 8 at addr ffffff87a2f1acb8 by task kworker/u16:2/153
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x33c
show_stack+0x18/0x24
dump_stack_lvl+0x16c/0x1e0
print_address_description+0x84/0x39c
__kasan_report+0x184/0x308
kasan_report+0x50/0x78
__asan_load8+0xc0/0xc4
of_iommu_configure+0xb4/0x4a4
of_dma_configure_id+0x2fc/0x4d4
platform_dma_configure+0x40/0x5c
really_probe+0x1b4/0xb74
driver_probe_device+0x11c/0x228
__device_attach_driver+0x14c/0x304
bus_for_each_drv+0x124/0x1b0
__device_attach+0x25c/0x334
device_initial_probe+0x24/0x34
bus_probe_device+0x78/0x134
deferred_probe_work_func+0x130/0x1a8
process_one_work+0x4c8/0x970
worker_thread+0x5c8/0xaec
kthread+0x1f8/0x220
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Allocated by task 1:
____kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0x114
__kasan_kmalloc+0x10/0x1c
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xe4/0x3d4
__iommu_probe_device+0x90/0x394
probe_iommu_group+0x70/0x9c
bus_for_each_dev+0x11c/0x19c
bus_iommu_probe+0xb8/0x7d4
bus_set_iommu+0xcc/0x13c
arm_smmu_bus_init+0x44/0x130 [arm_smmu]
arm_smmu_device_probe+0xb88/0xc54 [arm_smmu]
platform_drv_probe+0xe4/0x13c
really_probe+0x2c8/0xb74
driver_probe_device+0x11c/0x228
device_driver_attach+0xf0/0x16c
__driver_attach+0x80/0x320
bus_for_each_dev+0x11c/0x19c
driver_attach+0x38/0x48
bus_add_driver+0x1dc/0x3a4
driver_register+0x18c/0x244
__platform_driver_register+0x88/0x9c
init_module+0x64/0xff4 [arm_smmu]
do_one_initcall+0x17c/0x2f0
do_init_module+0xe8/0x378
load_module+0x3f80/0x4a40
__se_sys_finit_module+0x1a0/0x1e4
__arm64_sys_finit_module+0x44/0x58
el0_svc_common+0x100/0x264
do_el0_svc+0x38/0xa4
el0_svc+0x20/0x30
el0_sync_handler+0x68/0xac
el0_sync+0x160/0x180
Freed by task 1:
kasan_set_track+0x4c/0x84
kasan_set_free_info+0x28/0x4c
____kasan_slab_free+0x120/0x15c
__kasan_slab_free+0x18/0x28
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x204/0x2fc
kfree+0xfc/0x3a4
__iommu_probe_device+0x284/0x394
probe_iommu_group+0x70/0x9c
bus_for_each_dev+0x11c/0x19c
bus_iommu_probe+0xb8/0x7d4
bus_set_iommu+0xcc/0x13c
arm_smmu_bus_init+0x44/0x130 [arm_smmu]
arm_smmu_device_probe+0xb88/0xc54 [arm_smmu]
platform_drv_probe+0xe4/0x13c
really_probe+0x2c8/0xb74
driver_probe_device+0x11c/0x228
device_driver_attach+0xf0/0x16c
__driver_attach+0x80/0x320
bus_for_each_dev+0x11c/0x19c
driver_attach+0x38/0x48
bus_add_driver+0x1dc/0x3a4
driver_register+0x18c/0x244
__platform_driver_register+0x88/0x9c
init_module+0x64/0xff4 [arm_smmu]
do_one_initcall+0x17c/0x2f0
do_init_module+0xe8/0x378
load_module+0x3f80/0x4a40
__se_sys_finit_module+0x1a0/0x1e4
__arm64_sys_finit_module+0x44/0x58
el0_svc_common+0x100/0x264
do_el0_svc+0x38/0xa4
el0_svc+0x20/0x30
el0_sync_handler+0x68/0xac
el0_sync+0x160/0x180
Fix this by setting dev->iommu to NULL first and
then freeing dev_iommu structure in dev_iommu_free
function.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48785

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: mcast: use rcu-safe version of ipv6_get_lladdr()
Some time ago 8965779d2c0e ("ipv6,mcast: always hold idev->lock before mca_lock")
switched ipv6_get_lladdr() to __ipv6_get_lladdr(), which is rcu-unsafe
version. That was OK, because idev->lock was held for these codepaths.
In 88e2ca308094 ("mld: convert ifmcaddr6 to RCU") these external locks were
removed, so we probably need to restore the original rcu-safe call.
Otherwise, we occasionally get a machine crashed/stalled with the following
in dmesg:
[ 3405.966610][T230589] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead00000000008c: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 3405.982083][T230589] CPU: 44 PID: 230589 Comm: kworker/44:3 Tainted: G O 5.15.19-cloudflare-2022.2.1 #1
[ 3405.998061][T230589] Hardware name: SUPA-COOL-SERV
[ 3406.009552][T230589] Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
[ 3406.017224][T230589] RIP: 0010:__ipv6_get_lladdr+0x34/0x60
[ 3406.025780][T230589] Code: 57 10 48 83 c7 08 48 89 e5 48 39 d7 74 3e 48 8d 82 38 ff ff ff eb 13 48 8b 90 d0 00 00 00 48 8d 82 38 ff ff ff 48 39 d7 74 22 <66> 83 78 32 20 77 1b 75 e4 89 ca 23 50 2c 75 dd 48 8b 50 08 48 8b
[ 3406.055748][T230589] RSP: 0018:ffff94e4b3fc3d10 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 3406.065617][T230589] RAX: dead00000000005a RBX: ffff94e4b3fc3d30 RCX: 0000000000000040
[ 3406.077477][T230589] RDX: dead000000000122 RSI: ffff94e4b3fc3d30 RDI: ffff8c3a31431008
[ 3406.089389][T230589] RBP: ffff94e4b3fc3d10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 3406.101445][T230589] R10: ffff8c3a31430000 R11: 000000000000000b R12: ffff8c2c37887100
[ 3406.113553][T230589] R13: ffff8c3a39537000 R14: 00000000000005dc R15: ffff8c3a31431000
[ 3406.125730][T230589] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8c3b9fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3406.138992][T230589] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3406.149895][T230589] CR2: 00007f0dfea1db60 CR3: 000000387b5f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
[ 3406.162421][T230589] Call Trace:
[ 3406.170235][T230589] <TASK>
[ 3406.177736][T230589] mld_newpack+0xfe/0x1a0
[ 3406.186686][T230589] add_grhead+0x87/0xa0
[ 3406.195498][T230589] add_grec+0x485/0x4e0
[ 3406.204310][T230589] ? newidle_balance+0x126/0x3f0
[ 3406.214024][T230589] mld_ifc_work+0x15d/0x450
[ 3406.223279][T230589] process_one_work+0x1e6/0x380
[ 3406.232982][T230589] worker_thread+0x50/0x3a0
[ 3406.242371][T230589] ? rescuer_thread+0x360/0x360
[ 3406.252175][T230589] kthread+0x127/0x150
[ 3406.261197][T230589] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
[ 3406.271287][T230589] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 3406.280812][T230589] </TASK>
[ 3406.288937][T230589] Modules linked in: ... [last unloaded: kheaders]
[ 3406.476714][T230589] ---[ end trace 3525a7655f2f3b9e ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48781

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: af_alg - get rid of alg_memory_allocated
alg_memory_allocated does not seem to be really used.
alg_proto does have a .memory_allocated field, but no
corresponding .sysctl_mem.
This means sk_has_account() returns true, but all sk_prot_mem_limits()
users will trigger a NULL dereference [1].
THis was not a problem until SO_RESERVE_MEM addition.
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 1 PID: 3591 Comm: syz-executor153 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3-syzkaller-00316-gb81b1829e7e3 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:sk_prot_mem_limits include/net/sock.h:1523 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_reserve_memory+0x1d7/0x330 net/core/sock.c:1000
Code: 08 00 74 08 48 89 ef e8 27 20 bb f9 4c 03 7c 24 10 48 8b 6d 00 48 83 c5 08 48 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df <80> 3c 08 00 74 08 48 89 ef e8 fb 1f bb f9 48 8b 6d 00 4c 89 ff 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001f1fb68 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88814aabc000 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff90e18120
RBP: 0000000000000008 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: fffffbfff21c3025
R10: fffffbfff21c3025 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff8d109840
R13: 0000000000001002 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 0000555556e08300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc74416f130 CR3: 0000000073d9e000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
sock_setsockopt+0x14a9/0x3a30 net/core/sock.c:1446
__sys_setsockopt+0x5af/0x980 net/socket.c:2176
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb1/0xc0 net/socket.c:2188
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fc7440fddc9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffe98f07968 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fc7440fddc9
RDX: 0000000000000049 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 00007ffe98f07990
R10: 0000000020000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe98f0798c
R13: 00007ffe98f079a0 R14: 00007ffe98f079e0 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:sk_prot_mem_limits include/net/sock.h:1523 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_reserve_memory+0x1d7/0x330 net/core/sock.c:1000
Code: 08 00 74 08 48 89 ef e8 27 20 bb f9 4c 03 7c 24 10 48 8b 6d 00 48 83 c5 08 48 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df <80> 3c 08 00 74 08 48 89 ef e8 fb 1f bb f9 48 8b 6d 00 4c 89 ff 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001f1fb68 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88814aabc000 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff90e18120
RBP: 0000000000000008 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: fffffbfff21c3025
R10: fffffbfff21c3025 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff8d109840
R13: 0000000000001002 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 0000555556e08300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc74416f130 CR3: 0000000073d9e000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48751

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: Transitional solution for clcsock race issue
We encountered a crash in smc_setsockopt() and it is caused by
accessing smc->clcsock after clcsock was released.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 50309 Comm: nginx Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.16.0-rc4+ #53
RIP: 0010:smc_setsockopt+0x59/0x280 [smc]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__sys_setsockopt+0xfc/0x190
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x34/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f16ba83918e
</TASK>
This patch tries to fix it by holding clcsock_release_lock and
checking whether clcsock has already been released before access.
In case that a crash of the same reason happens in smc_getsockopt()
or smc_switch_to_fallback(), this patch also checkes smc->clcsock
in them too. And the caller of smc_switch_to_fallback() will identify
whether fallback succeeds according to the return value.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48744

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Avoid field-overflowing memcpy()
In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid
intentionally writing across neighboring fields.
Use flexible arrays instead of zero-element arrays (which look like they
are always overflowing) and split the cross-field memcpy() into two halves
that can be appropriately bounds-checked by the compiler.
We were doing:
#define ETH_HLEN 14
#define VLAN_HLEN 4
...
#define MLX5E_XDP_MIN_INLINE (ETH_HLEN + VLAN_HLEN)
...
struct mlx5e_tx_wqe *wqe = mlx5_wq_cyc_get_wqe(wq, pi);
...
struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg *eseg = &wqe->eth;
struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg *dseg = wqe->data;
...
memcpy(eseg->inline_hdr.start, xdptxd->data, MLX5E_XDP_MIN_INLINE);
target is wqe->eth.inline_hdr.start (which the compiler sees as being
2 bytes in size), but copying 18, intending to write across start
(really vlan_tci, 2 bytes). The remaining 16 bytes get written into
wqe->data[0], covering byte_count (4 bytes), lkey (4 bytes), and addr
(8 bytes).
struct mlx5e_tx_wqe {
struct mlx5_wqe_ctrl_seg ctrl; /* 0 16 */
struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg eth; /* 16 16 */
struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg data[]; /* 32 0 */
/* size: 32, cachelines: 1, members: 3 */
/* last cacheline: 32 bytes */
};
struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg {
u8 swp_outer_l4_offset; /* 0 1 */
u8 swp_outer_l3_offset; /* 1 1 */
u8 swp_inner_l4_offset; /* 2 1 */
u8 swp_inner_l3_offset; /* 3 1 */
u8 cs_flags; /* 4 1 */
u8 swp_flags; /* 5 1 */
__be16 mss; /* 6 2 */
__be32 flow_table_metadata; /* 8 4 */
union {
struct {
__be16 sz; /* 12 2 */
u8 start[2]; /* 14 2 */
} inline_hdr; /* 12 4 */
struct {
__be16 type; /* 12 2 */
__be16 vlan_tci; /* 14 2 */
} insert; /* 12 4 */
__be32 trailer; /* 12 4 */
}; /* 12 4 */
/* size: 16, cachelines: 1, members: 9 */
/* last cacheline: 16 bytes */
};
struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg {
__be32 byte_count; /* 0 4 */
__be32 lkey; /* 4 4 */
__be64 addr; /* 8 8 */
/* size: 16, cachelines: 1, members: 3 */
/* last cacheline: 16 bytes */
};
So, split the memcpy() so the compiler can reason about the buffer
sizes.
"pahole" shows no size nor member offset changes to struct mlx5e_tx_wqe
nor struct mlx5e_umr_wqe. "objdump -d" shows no meaningful object
code changes (i.e. only source line number induced differences and
optimizations).

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48719

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net, neigh: Do not trigger immediate probes on NUD_FAILED from neigh_managed_work
syzkaller was able to trigger a deadlock for NTF_MANAGED entries [0]:
kworker/0:16/14617 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8d4dd370 (&tbl->lock){++-.}-{2:2}, at: ___neigh_create+0x9e1/0x2990 net/core/neighbour.c:652
[...]
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8d4dd370 (&tbl->lock){++-.}-{2:2}, at: neigh_managed_work+0x35/0x250 net/core/neighbour.c:1572
The neighbor entry turned to NUD_FAILED state, where __neigh_event_send()
triggered an immediate probe as per commit cd28ca0a3dd1 ("neigh: reduce
arp latency") via neigh_probe() given table lock was held.
One option to fix this situation is to defer the neigh_probe() back to
the neigh_timer_handler() similarly as pre cd28ca0a3dd1. For the case
of NTF_MANAGED, this deferral is acceptable given this only happens on
actual failure state and regular / expected state is NUD_VALID with the
entry already present.
The fix adds a parameter to __neigh_event_send() in order to communicate
whether immediate probe is allowed or disallowed. Existing call-sites
of neigh_event_send() default as-is to immediate probe. However, the
neigh_managed_work() disables it via use of neigh_event_send_probe().
[0] <TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2956 [inline]
check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2999 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3788 [inline]
__lock_acquire.cold+0x149/0x3ab kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5027
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5639 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1ab/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5604
__raw_write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:202 [inline]
_raw_write_lock_bh+0x2f/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:334
___neigh_create+0x9e1/0x2990 net/core/neighbour.c:652
ip6_finish_output2+0x1070/0x14f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:123
__ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:191 [inline]
__ip6_finish_output+0x61e/0xe90 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:170
ip6_finish_output+0x32/0x200 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:201
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:296 [inline]
ip6_output+0x1e4/0x530 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:224
dst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline]
ndisc_send_skb+0xa99/0x17f0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:508
ndisc_send_ns+0x3a9/0x840 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:650
ndisc_solicit+0x2cd/0x4f0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:742
neigh_probe+0xc2/0x110 net/core/neighbour.c:1040
__neigh_event_send+0x37d/0x1570 net/core/neighbour.c:1201
neigh_event_send include/net/neighbour.h:470 [inline]
neigh_managed_work+0x162/0x250 net/core/neighbour.c:1574
process_one_work+0x9ac/0x1650 kernel/workqueue.c:2307
worker_thread+0x657/0x1110 kernel/workqueue.c:2454
kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:377
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48653

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Don't double unplug aux on peer initiated reset
In the IDC callback that is accessed when the aux drivers request a reset,
the function to unplug the aux devices is called. This function is also
called in the ice_prepare_for_reset function. This double call is causing
a "scheduling while atomic" BUG.
[ 662.676430] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: cqp opcode = 0x1 maj_err_code = 0xffff min_err_code = 0x8003
[ 662.676609] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: [Modify QP Cmd Error][op_code=8] status=-29 waiting=1 completion_err=1 maj=0xffff min=0x8003
[ 662.815006] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: ICE OICR event notification: oicr = 0x10000003
[ 662.815014] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: critical PE Error, GLPE_CRITERR=0x00011424
[ 662.815017] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: Requesting a reset
[ 662.815475] BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/37/0/0x00010002
[ 662.815475] BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/37/0/0x00010002
[ 662.815477] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs rfkill 8021q garp mrp stp llc vfat fat rpcrdma intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common sunrpc i10nm_edac rdma_ucm nfit ib_srpt libnvdimm ib_isert iscsi_target_mod x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp target_core_mod snd_hda_intel ib_iser snd_intel_dspcfg libiscsi snd_intel_sdw_acpi scsi_transport_iscsi kvm_intel iTCO_wdt rdma_cm snd_hda_codec kvm iw_cm ipmi_ssif iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_core irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device rapl snd_pcm snd_timer isst_if_mbox_pci pcspkr isst_if_mmio irdma intel_uncore idxd acpi_ipmi joydev isst_if_common snd mei_me idxd_bus ipmi_si soundcore i2c_i801 mei ipmi_devintf i2c_smbus i2c_ismt ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_pad rv(OE) ib_uverbs ib_cm ib_core xfs libcrc32c ast i2c_algo_bit drm_vram_helper drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm_ttm_helpe
r ttm
[ 662.815546] nvme nvme_core ice drm crc32c_intel i40e t10_pi wmi pinctrl_emmitsburg dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
[ 662.815557] Preemption disabled at:
[ 662.815558] [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[ 662.815563] CPU: 37 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/37 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S OE 5.17.1 #2
[ 662.815566] Hardware name: Intel Corporation D50DNP/D50DNP, BIOS SE5C6301.86B.6624.D18.2111021741 11/02/2021
[ 662.815568] Call Trace:
[ 662.815572] <IRQ>
[ 662.815574] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x42
[ 662.815581] __schedule_bug.cold.147+0x7d/0x8a
[ 662.815588] __schedule+0x798/0x990
[ 662.815595] schedule+0x44/0xc0
[ 662.815597] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x14/0x20
[ 662.815600] __mutex_lock.isra.11+0x46c/0x490
[ 662.815603] ? __ibdev_printk+0x76/0xc0 [ib_core]
[ 662.815633] device_del+0x37/0x3d0
[ 662.815639] ice_unplug_aux_dev+0x1a/0x40 [ice]
[ 662.815674] ice_schedule_reset+0x3c/0xd0 [ice]
[ 662.815693] irdma_iidc_event_handler.cold.7+0xb6/0xd3 [irdma]
[ 662.815712] ? bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off+0x45/0xa0
[ 662.815719] ice_send_event_to_aux+0x54/0x70 [ice]
[ 662.815741] ice_misc_intr+0x21d/0x2d0 [ice]
[ 662.815756] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4c/0x180
[ 662.815762] handle_irq_event_percpu+0xf/0x40
[ 662.815764] handle_irq_event+0x34/0x60
[ 662.815766] handle_edge_irq+0x9a/0x1c0
[ 662.815770] __common_interrupt+0x62/0x100
[ 662.815774] common_interrupt+0xb4/0xd0
[ 662.815779] </IRQ>
[ 662.815780] <TASK>
[ 662.815780] asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
[ 662.815785] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xd6/0x380
[ 662.815789] Code: 49 89 c4 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 ff e8 65 d7 95 ff 45 84 ff 74 12 9c 58 f6 c4 02 0f 85 64 02 00 00 31 ff e8 ae c5 9c ff fb 45 85 f6 <0f> 88 12 01 00 00 49 63 d6 4c 2b 24 24 48 8d 04 52 48 8d 04 82 49
[ 662.815791] RSP: 0018:ff2c2c4f18edbe80 EFLAGS: 00000202
[ 662.815793] RAX: ff280805df140000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000001f
[ 662.815795] RDX: 0000009a52da2d08 R
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48652

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Fix crash by keep old cfg when update TCs more than queues
There are problems if allocated queues less than Traffic Classes.
Commit a632b2a4c920 ("ice: ethtool: Prohibit improper channel config
for DCB") already disallow setting less queues than TCs.
Another case is if we first set less queues, and later update more TCs
config due to LLDP, ice_vsi_cfg_tc() will failed but left dirty
num_txq/rxq and tc_cfg in vsi, that will cause invalid pointer access.
[ 95.968089] ice 0000:3b:00.1: More TCs defined than queues/rings allocated.
[ 95.968092] ice 0000:3b:00.1: Trying to use more Rx queues (8), than were allocated (1)!
[ 95.968093] ice 0000:3b:00.1: Failed to config TC for VSI index: 0
[ 95.969621] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 95.969705] CPU: 1 PID: 58405 Comm: lldpad Kdump: loaded Tainted: G U W O --------- -t - 4.18.0 #1
[ 95.969867] Hardware name: O.E.M/BC11SPSCB10, BIOS 8.23 12/30/2021
[ 95.969992] RIP: 0010:devm_kmalloc+0xa/0x60
[ 95.970052] Code: 5c ff ff ff 31 c0 5b 5d 41 5c c3 b8 f4 ff ff ff eb f4 0f 1f 40 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 89 d1 <8b> 97 60 02 00 00 48 8d 7e 18 48 39 f7 72 3f 55 89 ce 53 48 8b 4c
[ 95.970344] RSP: 0018:ffffc9003f553888 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 95.970425] RAX: dead000000000200 RBX: ffffea003c425b00 RCX: 00000000006080c0
[ 95.970536] RDX: 00000000006080c0 RSI: 0000000000000200 RDI: dead000000000200
[ 95.970648] RBP: dead000000000200 R08: 00000000000463c0 R09: ffff888ffa900000
[ 95.970760] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff888ff6b40100
[ 95.970870] R13: ffff888ff6a55018 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888ff6a55460
[ 95.970981] FS: 00007f51b7d24700(0000) GS:ffff88903ee80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 95.971108] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 95.971197] CR2: 00007fac5410d710 CR3: 0000000f2c1de002 CR4: 00000000007606e0
[ 95.971309] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 95.971419] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 95.971530] PKRU: 55555554
[ 95.971573] Call Trace:
[ 95.971622] ice_setup_rx_ring+0x39/0x110 [ice]
[ 95.971695] ice_vsi_setup_rx_rings+0x54/0x90 [ice]
[ 95.971774] ice_vsi_open+0x25/0x120 [ice]
[ 95.971843] ice_open_internal+0xb8/0x1f0 [ice]
[ 95.971919] ice_ena_vsi+0x4f/0xd0 [ice]
[ 95.971987] ice_dcb_ena_dis_vsi.constprop.5+0x29/0x90 [ice]
[ 95.972082] ice_pf_dcb_cfg+0x29a/0x380 [ice]
[ 95.972154] ice_dcbnl_setets+0x174/0x1b0 [ice]
[ 95.972220] dcbnl_ieee_set+0x89/0x230
[ 95.972279] ? dcbnl_ieee_del+0x150/0x150
[ 95.972341] dcb_doit+0x124/0x1b0
[ 95.972392] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x243/0x2f0
[ 95.972457] ? dcb_doit+0x14d/0x1b0
[ 95.972510] ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x1d3/0x280
[ 95.972591] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.31+0x100/0x100
[ 95.972661] netlink_rcv_skb+0xcf/0xf0
[ 95.972720] netlink_unicast+0x16d/0x220
[ 95.972781] netlink_sendmsg+0x2ba/0x3a0
[ 95.975891] sock_sendmsg+0x4c/0x50
[ 95.979032] ___sys_sendmsg+0x2e4/0x300
[ 95.982147] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x13e/0x190
[ 95.985242] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0x79/0x90
[ 95.988338] ? __check_object_size+0xac/0x1b0
[ 95.991440] ? _copy_to_user+0x22/0x30
[ 95.994539] ? move_addr_to_user+0xbb/0xd0
[ 95.997619] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x53/0x80
[ 96.000664] __sys_sendmsg+0x53/0x80
[ 96.003747] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1d0
[ 96.006862] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
Only update num_txq/rxq when passed check, and restore tc_cfg if setup
queue map failed.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48644

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: taprio: avoid disabling offload when it was never enabled
In an incredibly strange API design decision, qdisc->destroy() gets
called even if qdisc->init() never succeeded, not exclusively since
commit 87b60cfacf9f ("net_sched: fix error recovery at qdisc creation"),
but apparently also earlier (in the case of qdisc_create_dflt()).
The taprio qdisc does not fully acknowledge this when it attempts full
offload, because it starts off with q->flags = TAPRIO_FLAGS_INVALID in
taprio_init(), then it replaces q->flags with TCA_TAPRIO_ATTR_FLAGS
parsed from netlink (in taprio_change(), tail called from taprio_init()).
But in taprio_destroy(), we call taprio_disable_offload(), and this
determines what to do based on FULL_OFFLOAD_IS_ENABLED(q->flags).
But looking at the implementation of FULL_OFFLOAD_IS_ENABLED()
(a bitwise check of bit 1 in q->flags), it is invalid to call this macro
on q->flags when it contains TAPRIO_FLAGS_INVALID, because that is set
to U32_MAX, and therefore FULL_OFFLOAD_IS_ENABLED() will return true on
an invalid set of flags.
As a result, it is possible to crash the kernel if user space forces an
error between setting q->flags = TAPRIO_FLAGS_INVALID, and the calling
of taprio_enable_offload(). This is because drivers do not expect the
offload to be disabled when it was never enabled.
The error that we force here is to attach taprio as a non-root qdisc,
but instead as child of an mqprio root qdisc:
$ tc qdisc add dev swp0 root handle 1: \
mqprio num_tc 8 map 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 \
queues 1@0 1@1 1@2 1@3 1@4 1@5 1@6 1@7 hw 0
$ tc qdisc replace dev swp0 parent 1:1 \
taprio num_tc 8 map 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 \
queues 1@0 1@1 1@2 1@3 1@4 1@5 1@6 1@7 base-time 0 \
sched-entry S 0x7f 990000 sched-entry S 0x80 100000 \
flags 0x0 clockid CLOCK_TAI
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffffffffffffff8
[fffffffffffffff8] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Call trace:
taprio_dump+0x27c/0x310
vsc9959_port_setup_tc+0x1f4/0x460
felix_port_setup_tc+0x24/0x3c
dsa_slave_setup_tc+0x54/0x27c
taprio_disable_offload.isra.0+0x58/0xe0
taprio_destroy+0x80/0x104
qdisc_create+0x240/0x470
tc_modify_qdisc+0x1fc/0x6b0
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x12c/0x390
netlink_rcv_skb+0x5c/0x130
rtnetlink_rcv+0x1c/0x2c
Fix this by keeping track of the operations we made, and undo the
offload only if we actually did it.
I've added "bool offloaded" inside a 4 byte hole between "int clockid"
and "atomic64_t picos_per_byte". Now the first cache line looks like
below:
$ pahole -C taprio_sched net/sched/sch_taprio.o
struct taprio_sched {
struct Qdisc * * qdiscs; /* 0 8 */
struct Qdisc * root; /* 8 8 */
u32 flags; /* 16 4 */
enum tk_offsets tk_offset; /* 20 4 */
int clockid; /* 24 4 */
bool offloaded; /* 28 1 */
/* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */
atomic64_t picos_per_byte; /* 32 0 */
/* XXX 8 bytes hole, try to pack */
spinlock_t current_entry_lock; /* 40 0 */
/* XXX 8 bytes hole, try to pack */
struct sched_entry * current_entry; /* 48 8 */
struct sched_gate_list * oper_sched; /* 56 8 */
/* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47634

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ubi: Fix race condition between ctrl_cdev_ioctl and ubi_cdev_ioctl
Hulk Robot reported a KASAN report about use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0x13d/0x160
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888035e37d98 by task ubiattach/1385
[...]
Call Trace:
klist_dec_and_del+0xa7/0x4a0
klist_put+0xc7/0x1a0
device_del+0x4d4/0xed0
cdev_device_del+0x1a/0x80
ubi_attach_mtd_dev+0x2951/0x34b0 [ubi]
ctrl_cdev_ioctl+0x286/0x2f0 [ubi]
Allocated by task 1414:
device_add+0x60a/0x18b0
cdev_device_add+0x103/0x170
ubi_create_volume+0x1118/0x1a10 [ubi]
ubi_cdev_ioctl+0xb7f/0x1ba0 [ubi]
Freed by task 1385:
cdev_device_del+0x1a/0x80
ubi_remove_volume+0x438/0x6c0 [ubi]
ubi_cdev_ioctl+0xbf4/0x1ba0 [ubi]
[...]
==================================================================
The lock held by ctrl_cdev_ioctl is ubi_devices_mutex, but the lock held
by ubi_cdev_ioctl is ubi->device_mutex. Therefore, the two locks can be
concurrent.
ctrl_cdev_ioctl contains two operations: ubi_attach and ubi_detach.
ubi_detach is bug-free because it uses reference counting to prevent
concurrency. However, uif_init and uif_close in ubi_attach may race with
ubi_cdev_ioctl.
uif_init will race with ubi_cdev_ioctl as in the following stack.
cpu1 cpu2 cpu3
_______________________|________________________|______________________
ctrl_cdev_ioctl
ubi_attach_mtd_dev
uif_init
ubi_cdev_ioctl
ubi_create_volume
cdev_device_add
ubi_add_volume
// sysfs exist
kill_volumes
ubi_cdev_ioctl
ubi_remove_volume
cdev_device_del
// first free
ubi_free_volume
cdev_del
// double free
cdev_device_del
And uif_close will race with ubi_cdev_ioctl as in the following stack.
cpu1 cpu2 cpu3
_______________________|________________________|______________________
ctrl_cdev_ioctl
ubi_attach_mtd_dev
uif_init
ubi_cdev_ioctl
ubi_create_volume
cdev_device_add
ubi_debugfs_init_dev
//error goto out_uif;
uif_close
kill_volumes
ubi_cdev_ioctl
ubi_remove_volume
cdev_device_del
// first free
ubi_free_volume
// double free
The cause of this problem is that commit 714fb87e8bc0 make device
"available" before it becomes accessible via sysfs. Therefore, we
roll back the modification. We will fix the race condition between
ubi device creation and udev by removing ubi_get_device in
vol_attribute_show and dev_attribute_show.This avoids accessing
uninitialized ubi_devices[ubi_num].
ubi_get_device is used to prevent devices from being deleted during
sysfs execution. However, now kernfs ensures that devices will not
be deleted before all reference counting are released.
The key process is shown in the following stack.
device_del
device_remove_attrs
device_remove_groups
sysfs_remove_groups
sysfs_remove_group
remove_files
kernfs_remove_by_name
kernfs_remove_by_name_ns
__kernfs_remove
kernfs_drain

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47632

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/set_memory: Avoid spinlock recursion in change_page_attr()
Commit 1f9ad21c3b38 ("powerpc/mm: Implement set_memory() routines")
included a spin_lock() to change_page_attr() in order to
safely perform the three step operations. But then
commit 9f7853d7609d ("powerpc/mm: Fix set_memory_*() against
concurrent accesses") modify it to use pte_update() and do
the operation safely against concurrent access.
In the meantime, Maxime reported some spinlock recursion.
[ 15.351649] BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#0, kworker/0:2/217
[ 15.357540] lock: init_mm+0x3c/0x420, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: kworker/0:2/217, .owner_cpu: 0
[ 15.366563] CPU: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 5.15.0+ #523
[ 15.373350] Workqueue: events do_free_init
[ 15.377615] Call Trace:
[ 15.380232] [e4105ac0] [800946a4] do_raw_spin_lock+0xf8/0x120 (unreliable)
[ 15.387340] [e4105ae0] [8001f4ec] change_page_attr+0x40/0x1d4
[ 15.393413] [e4105b10] [801424e0] __apply_to_page_range+0x164/0x310
[ 15.400009] [e4105b60] [80169620] free_pcp_prepare+0x1e4/0x4a0
[ 15.406045] [e4105ba0] [8016c5a0] free_unref_page+0x40/0x2b8
[ 15.411979] [e4105be0] [8018724c] kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte+0x6c/0x94
[ 15.418989] [e4105c00] [801424e0] __apply_to_page_range+0x164/0x310
[ 15.425451] [e4105c50] [80187834] kasan_release_vmalloc+0xbc/0x134
[ 15.431898] [e4105c70] [8015f7a8] __purge_vmap_area_lazy+0x4e4/0xdd8
[ 15.438560] [e4105d30] [80160d10] _vm_unmap_aliases.part.0+0x17c/0x24c
[ 15.445283] [e4105d60] [801642d0] __vunmap+0x2f0/0x5c8
[ 15.450684] [e4105db0] [800e32d0] do_free_init+0x68/0x94
[ 15.456181] [e4105dd0] [8005d094] process_one_work+0x4bc/0x7b8
[ 15.462283] [e4105e90] [8005d614] worker_thread+0x284/0x6e8
[ 15.468227] [e4105f00] [8006aaec] kthread+0x1f0/0x210
[ 15.473489] [e4105f40] [80017148] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c
Remove the read / modify / write sequence to make the operation atomic
and remove the spin_lock() in change_page_attr().
To do the operation atomically, we can't use pte modification helpers
anymore. Because all platforms have different combination of bits, it
is not easy to use those bits directly. But all have the
_PAGE_KERNEL_{RO/ROX/RW/RWX} set of flags. All we need it to compare
two sets to know which bits are set or cleared.
For instance, by comparing _PAGE_KERNEL_ROX and _PAGE_KERNEL_RO you
know which bit gets cleared and which bit get set when changing exec
permission.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47561

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: virtio: disable timeout handling
If a timeout is hit, it can result is incorrect data on the I2C bus
and/or memory corruptions in the guest since the device can still be
operating on the buffers it was given while the guest has freed them.
Here is, for example, the start of a slub_debug splat which was
triggered on the next transfer after one transfer was forced to timeout
by setting a breakpoint in the backend (rust-vmm/vhost-device):
BUG kmalloc-1k (Not tainted): Poison overwritten
First byte 0x1 instead of 0x6b
Allocated in virtio_i2c_xfer+0x65/0x35c age=350 cpu=0 pid=29
__kmalloc+0xc2/0x1c9
virtio_i2c_xfer+0x65/0x35c
__i2c_transfer+0x429/0x57d
i2c_transfer+0x115/0x134
i2cdev_ioctl_rdwr+0x16a/0x1de
i2cdev_ioctl+0x247/0x2ed
vfs_ioctl+0x21/0x30
sys_ioctl+0xb18/0xb41
Freed in virtio_i2c_xfer+0x32e/0x35c age=244 cpu=0 pid=29
kfree+0x1bd/0x1cc
virtio_i2c_xfer+0x32e/0x35c
__i2c_transfer+0x429/0x57d
i2c_transfer+0x115/0x134
i2cdev_ioctl_rdwr+0x16a/0x1de
i2cdev_ioctl+0x247/0x2ed
vfs_ioctl+0x21/0x30
sys_ioctl+0xb18/0xb41
There is no simple fix for this (the driver would have to always create
bounce buffers and hold on to them until the device eventually returns
the buffers), so just disable the timeout support for now.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47559

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: Fix NULL pointer dereferencing in smc_vlan_by_tcpsk()
Coverity reports a possible NULL dereferencing problem:
in smc_vlan_by_tcpsk():
6. returned_null: netdev_lower_get_next returns NULL (checked 29 out of 30 times).
7. var_assigned: Assigning: ndev = NULL return value from netdev_lower_get_next.
1623 ndev = (struct net_device *)netdev_lower_get_next(ndev, &lower);
CID 1468509 (#1 of 1): Dereference null return value (NULL_RETURNS)
8. dereference: Dereferencing a pointer that might be NULL ndev when calling is_vlan_dev.
1624 if (is_vlan_dev(ndev)) {
Remove the manual implementation and use netdev_walk_all_lower_dev() to
iterate over the lower devices. While on it remove an obsolete function
parameter comment.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47465

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest()
In commit 10d91611f426 ("powerpc/64s: Reimplement book3s idle code in
C") kvm_start_guest() became idle_kvm_start_guest(). The old code
allocated a stack frame on the emergency stack, but didn't use the
frame to store anything, and also didn't store anything in its caller's
frame.
idle_kvm_start_guest() on the other hand is written more like a normal C
function, it creates a frame on entry, and also stores CR/LR into its
callers frame (per the ABI). The problem is that there is no caller
frame on the emergency stack.
The emergency stack for a given CPU is allocated with:
paca_ptrs[i]->emergency_sp = alloc_stack(limit, i) + THREAD_SIZE;
So emergency_sp actually points to the first address above the emergency
stack allocation for a given CPU, we must not store above it without
first decrementing it to create a frame. This is different to the
regular kernel stack, paca->kstack, which is initialised to point at an
initial frame that is ready to use.
idle_kvm_start_guest() stores the backchain, CR and LR all of which
write outside the allocation for the emergency stack. It then creates a
stack frame and saves the non-volatile registers. Unfortunately the
frame it creates is not large enough to fit the non-volatiles, and so
the saving of the non-volatile registers also writes outside the
emergency stack allocation.
The end result is that we corrupt whatever is at 0-24 bytes, and 112-248
bytes above the emergency stack allocation.
In practice this has gone unnoticed because the memory immediately above
the emergency stack happens to be used for other stack allocations,
either another CPUs mc_emergency_sp or an IRQ stack. See the order of
calls to irqstack_early_init() and emergency_stack_init().
The low addresses of another stack are the top of that stack, and so are
only used if that stack is under extreme pressue, which essentially
never happens in practice - and if it did there's a high likelyhood we'd
crash due to that stack overflowing.
Still, we shouldn't be corrupting someone else's stack, and it is purely
luck that we aren't corrupting something else.
To fix it we save CR/LR into the caller's frame using the existing r1 on
entry, we then create a SWITCH_FRAME_SIZE frame (which has space for
pt_regs) on the emergency stack with the backchain pointing to the
existing stack, and then finally we switch to the new frame on the
emergency stack.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47449

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix locking for Tx timestamp tracking flush
Commit 4dd0d5c33c3e ("ice: add lock around Tx timestamp tracker flush")
added a lock around the Tx timestamp tracker flow which is used to
cleanup any left over SKBs and prepare for device removal.
This lock is problematic because it is being held around a call to
ice_clear_phy_tstamp. The clear function takes a mutex to send a PHY
write command to firmware. This could lead to a deadlock if the mutex
actually sleeps, and causes the following warning on a kernel with
preemption debugging enabled:
[ 715.419426] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:573
[ 715.427900] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 3100, name: rmmod
[ 715.435652] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ 715.439591] Preemption disabled at:
[ 715.439594] [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[ 715.446678] CPU: 52 PID: 3100 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W OE 5.15.0-rc4+ #42 bdd7ec3018e725f159ca0d372ce8c2c0e784891c
[ 715.458058] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600STQ/S2600STQ, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0010.010620200716 01/06/2020
[ 715.468483] Call Trace:
[ 715.470940] dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x9a
[ 715.474613] ___might_sleep.cold+0x224/0x26a
[ 715.478895] __mutex_lock+0xb3/0x1440
[ 715.482569] ? stack_depot_save+0x378/0x500
[ 715.486763] ? ice_sq_send_cmd+0x78/0x14c0 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.494979] ? kfree+0xc1/0x520
[ 715.498128] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x12a0/0x12a0
[ 715.502837] ? kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
[ 715.507110] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x10b/0x140
[ 715.511385] ? slab_free_freelist_hook+0xc7/0x220
[ 715.516092] ? kfree+0xc1/0x520
[ 715.519235] ? ice_deinit_lag+0x16c/0x220 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.527359] ? ice_remove+0x1cf/0x6a0 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.535133] ? pci_device_remove+0xab/0x1d0
[ 715.539318] ? __device_release_driver+0x35b/0x690
[ 715.544110] ? driver_detach+0x214/0x2f0
[ 715.548035] ? bus_remove_driver+0x11d/0x2f0
[ 715.552309] ? pci_unregister_driver+0x26/0x250
[ 715.556840] ? ice_module_exit+0xc/0x2f [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.564799] ? __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x2d8/0x4e0
[ 715.570554] ? do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 715.574303] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 715.579529] ? start_flush_work+0x542/0x8f0
[ 715.583719] ? ice_sq_send_cmd+0x78/0x14c0 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.591923] ice_sq_send_cmd+0x78/0x14c0 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.599960] ? wait_for_completion_io+0x250/0x250
[ 715.604662] ? lock_acquire+0x196/0x200
[ 715.608504] ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0xa5/0x160
[ 715.612864] ice_sbq_rw_reg+0x1e6/0x2f0 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.620813] ? ice_reset+0x130/0x130 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.628497] ? __debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x1e8/0x3c0
[ 715.633550] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x130
[ 715.637748] ice_write_phy_reg_e810+0x70/0xf0 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.646220] ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0xa5/0x160
[ 715.650581] ? ice_ptp_release+0x910/0x910 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.658797] ? ice_ptp_release+0x255/0x910 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.667013] ice_clear_phy_tstamp+0x2c/0x110 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.675403] ice_ptp_release+0x408/0x910 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.683440] ice_remove+0x560/0x6a0 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.691037] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x46/0x73
[ 715.696005] pci_device_remove+0xab/0x1d0
[ 715.700018] __device_release_driver+0x35b/0x690
[ 715.704637] driver_detach+0x214/0x2f0
[ 715.708389] bus_remove_driver+0x11d/0x2f0
[ 715.712489] pci_unregister_driver+0x26/0x250
[ 71
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47365

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix page leak
There's a loop in afs_extend_writeback() that adds extra pages to a write
we want to make to improve the efficiency of the writeback by making it
larger. This loop stops, however, if we hit a page we can't write back
from immediately, but it doesn't get rid of the page ref we speculatively
acquired.
This was caused by the removal of the cleanup loop when the code switched
from using find_get_pages_contig() to xarray scanning as the latter only
gets a single page at a time, not a batch.
Fix this by putting the page on a ref on an early break from the loop.
Unfortunately, we can't just add that page to the pagevec we're employing
as we'll go through that and add those pages to the RPC call.
This was found by the generic/074 test. It leaks ~4GiB of RAM each time it
is run - which can be observed with "top".

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47346

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
coresight: tmc-etf: Fix global-out-of-bounds in tmc_update_etf_buffer()
commit 6f755e85c332 ("coresight: Add helper for inserting synchronization
packets") removed trailing '\0' from barrier_pkt array and updated the
call sites like etb_update_buffer() to have proper checks for barrier_pkt
size before read but missed updating tmc_update_etf_buffer() which still
reads barrier_pkt past the array size resulting in KASAN out-of-bounds
bug. Fix this by adding a check for barrier_pkt size before accessing
like it is done in etb_update_buffer().
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in tmc_update_etf_buffer+0x4b8/0x698
Read of size 4 at addr ffffffd05b7d1030 by task perf/2629
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x27c
show_stack+0x20/0x2c
dump_stack+0x11c/0x188
print_address_description+0x3c/0x4a4
__kasan_report+0x140/0x164
kasan_report+0x10/0x18
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x1c/0x24
tmc_update_etf_buffer+0x4b8/0x698
etm_event_stop+0x248/0x2d8
etm_event_del+0x20/0x2c
event_sched_out+0x214/0x6f0
group_sched_out+0xd0/0x270
ctx_sched_out+0x2ec/0x518
__perf_event_task_sched_out+0x4fc/0xe6c
__schedule+0x1094/0x16a0
preempt_schedule_irq+0x88/0x170
arm64_preempt_schedule_irq+0xf0/0x18c
el1_irq+0xe8/0x180
perf_event_exec+0x4d8/0x56c
setup_new_exec+0x204/0x400
load_elf_binary+0x72c/0x18c0
search_binary_handler+0x13c/0x420
load_script+0x500/0x6c4
search_binary_handler+0x13c/0x420
exec_binprm+0x118/0x654
__do_execve_file+0x77c/0xba4
__arm64_compat_sys_execve+0x98/0xac
el0_svc_common+0x1f8/0x5e0
el0_svc_compat_handler+0x84/0xb0
el0_svc_compat+0x10/0x50
The buggy address belongs to the variable:
barrier_pkt+0x10/0x40
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffffd05b7d0f00: fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
ffffffd05b7d0f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffffffd05b7d1000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 03
^
ffffffd05b7d1080: fa fa fa fa 00 02 fa fa fa fa fa fa 03 fa fa fa
ffffffd05b7d1100: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 05 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
==================================================================

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47318

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arch_topology: Avoid use-after-free for scale_freq_data
Currently topology_scale_freq_tick() (which gets called from
scheduler_tick()) may end up using a pointer to "struct
scale_freq_data", which was previously cleared by
topology_clear_scale_freq_source(), as there is no protection in place
here. The users of topology_clear_scale_freq_source() though needs a
guarantee that the previously cleared scale_freq_data isn't used
anymore, so they can free the related resources.
Since topology_scale_freq_tick() is called from scheduler tick, we don't
want to add locking in there. Use the RCU update mechanism instead
(which is already used by the scheduler's utilization update path) to
guarantee race free updates here.
synchronize_rcu() makes sure that all RCU critical sections that started
before it is called, will finish before it returns. And so the callers
of topology_clear_scale_freq_source() don't need to worry about their
callback getting called anymore.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47275

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bcache: avoid oversized read request in cache missing code path
In the cache missing code path of cached device, if a proper location
from the internal B+ tree is matched for a cache miss range, function
cached_dev_cache_miss() will be called in cache_lookup_fn() in the
following code block,
[code block 1]
526 unsigned int sectors = KEY_INODE(k) == s->iop.inode
527 ? min_t(uint64_t, INT_MAX,
528 KEY_START(k) - bio->bi_iter.bi_sector)
529 : INT_MAX;
530 int ret = s->d->cache_miss(b, s, bio, sectors);
Here s->d->cache_miss() is the call backfunction pointer initialized as
cached_dev_cache_miss(), the last parameter 'sectors' is an important
hint to calculate the size of read request to backing device of the
missing cache data.
Current calculation in above code block may generate oversized value of
'sectors', which consequently may trigger 2 different potential kernel
panics by BUG() or BUG_ON() as listed below,
1) BUG_ON() inside bch_btree_insert_key(),
[code block 2]
886 BUG_ON(b->ops->is_extents && !KEY_SIZE(k));
2) BUG() inside biovec_slab(),
[code block 3]
51 default:
52 BUG();
53 return NULL;
All the above panics are original from cached_dev_cache_miss() by the
oversized parameter 'sectors'.
Inside cached_dev_cache_miss(), parameter 'sectors' is used to calculate
the size of data read from backing device for the cache missing. This
size is stored in s->insert_bio_sectors by the following lines of code,
[code block 4]
909 s->insert_bio_sectors = min(sectors, bio_sectors(bio) + reada);
Then the actual key inserting to the internal B+ tree is generated and
stored in s->iop.replace_key by the following lines of code,
[code block 5]
911 s->iop.replace_key = KEY(s->iop.inode,
912 bio->bi_iter.bi_sector + s->insert_bio_sectors,
913 s->insert_bio_sectors);
The oversized parameter 'sectors' may trigger panic 1) by BUG_ON() from
the above code block.
And the bio sending to backing device for the missing data is allocated
with hint from s->insert_bio_sectors by the following lines of code,
[code block 6]
926 cache_bio = bio_alloc_bioset(GFP_NOWAIT,
927 DIV_ROUND_UP(s->insert_bio_sectors, PAGE_SECTORS),
928 &dc->disk.bio_split);
The oversized parameter 'sectors' may trigger panic 2) by BUG() from the
agove code block.
Now let me explain how the panics happen with the oversized 'sectors'.
In code block 5, replace_key is generated by macro KEY(). From the
definition of macro KEY(),
[code block 7]
71 #define KEY(inode, offset, size) \
72 ((struct bkey) { \
73 .high = (1ULL << 63) | ((__u64) (size) << 20) | (inode), \
74 .low = (offset) \
75 })
Here 'size' is 16bits width embedded in 64bits member 'high' of struct
bkey. But in code block 1, if "KEY_START(k) - bio->bi_iter.bi_sector" is
very probably to be larger than (1<<16) - 1, which makes the bkey size
calculation in code block 5 is overflowed. In one bug report the value
of parameter 'sectors' is 131072 (= 1 << 17), the overflowed 'sectors'
results the overflowed s->insert_bio_sectors in code block 4, then makes
size field of s->iop.replace_key to be 0 in code block 5. Then the 0-
sized s->iop.replace_key is inserted into the internal B+ tree as cache
missing check key (a special key to detect and avoid a racing between
normal write request and cache missing read request) as,
[code block 8]
915 ret = bch_btree_insert_check_key(b, &s->op, &s->iop.replace_key);
Then the 0-sized s->iop.replace_key as 3rd parameter triggers the bkey
size check BUG_ON() in code block 2, and causes the kernel panic 1).
Another ke
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47238

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv4: fix memory leak in ip_mc_add1_src
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888101bc4c00 (size 32):
comm "syz-executor527", pid 360, jiffies 4294807421 (age 19.329s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ac 14 14 bb 00 00 02 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000f17c5244>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:558 [inline]
[<00000000f17c5244>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:688 [inline]
[<00000000f17c5244>] ip_mc_add1_src net/ipv4/igmp.c:1971 [inline]
[<00000000f17c5244>] ip_mc_add_src+0x95f/0xdb0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2095
[<000000001cb99709>] ip_mc_source+0x84c/0xea0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2416
[<0000000052cf19ed>] do_ip_setsockopt net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1294 [inline]
[<0000000052cf19ed>] ip_setsockopt+0x114b/0x30c0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1423
[<00000000477edfbc>] raw_setsockopt+0x13d/0x170 net/ipv4/raw.c:857
[<00000000e75ca9bb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x158/0x270 net/socket.c:2117
[<00000000bdb993a8>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2128 [inline]
[<00000000bdb993a8>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2125 [inline]
[<00000000bdb993a8>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xba/0x150 net/socket.c:2125
[<000000006a1ffdbd>] do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
[<00000000b11467c4>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
In commit 24803f38a5c0 ("igmp: do not remove igmp souce list info when set
link down"), the ip_mc_clear_src() in ip_mc_destroy_dev() was removed,
because it was also called in igmpv3_clear_delrec().
Rough callgraph:
inetdev_destroy
-> ip_mc_destroy_dev
-> igmpv3_clear_delrec
-> ip_mc_clear_src
-> RCU_INIT_POINTER(dev->ip_ptr, NULL)
However, ip_mc_clear_src() called in igmpv3_clear_delrec() doesn't
release in_dev->mc_list->sources. And RCU_INIT_POINTER() assigns the
NULL to dev->ip_ptr. As a result, in_dev cannot be obtained through
inetdev_by_index() and then in_dev->mc_list->sources cannot be released
by ip_mc_del1_src() in the sock_close. Rough call sequence goes like:
sock_close
-> __sock_release
-> inet_release
-> ip_mc_drop_socket
-> inetdev_by_index
-> ip_mc_leave_src
-> ip_mc_del_src
-> ip_mc_del1_src
So we still need to call ip_mc_clear_src() in ip_mc_destroy_dev() to free
in_dev->mc_list->sources.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47230

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Immediately reset the MMU context when the SMM flag is cleared
Immediately reset the MMU context when the vCPU's SMM flag is cleared so
that the SMM flag in the MMU role is always synchronized with the vCPU's
flag. If RSM fails (which isn't correctly emulated), KVM will bail
without calling post_leave_smm() and leave the MMU in a bad state.
The bad MMU role can lead to a NULL pointer dereference when grabbing a
shadow page's rmap for a page fault as the initial lookups for the gfn
will happen with the vCPU's SMM flag (=0), whereas the rmap lookup will
use the shadow page's SMM flag, which comes from the MMU (=1). SMM has
an entirely different set of memslots, and so the initial lookup can find
a memslot (SMM=0) and then explode on the rmap memslot lookup (SMM=1).
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 1 PID: 8410 Comm: syz-executor382 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__gfn_to_rmap arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:935 [inline]
RIP: 0010:gfn_to_rmap+0x2b0/0x4d0 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:947
Code: <42> 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 ff e8 f1 79 a9 00 4c 89 fb 4d 8b 37 44
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000ffef98 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888015b9f414 RCX: ffff888019669c40
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffff811d9cdb R09: ffffed10065a6002
R10: ffffed10065a6002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 000000000124b300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000028e31000 CR4: 00000000001526e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
rmap_add arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:965 [inline]
mmu_set_spte+0x862/0xe60 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:2604
__direct_map arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:2862 [inline]
direct_page_fault+0x1f74/0x2b70 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:3769
kvm_mmu_do_page_fault arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h:124 [inline]
kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x199/0x1440 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:5065
vmx_handle_exit+0x26/0x160 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6122
vcpu_enter_guest+0x3bdd/0x9630 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9428
vcpu_run+0x416/0xc20 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9494
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x4e8/0xa40 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9722
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x70f/0xbb0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3460
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:1069 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfb/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:1055
do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x440ce9

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47227

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/fpu: Prevent state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig()
The non-compacted slowpath uses __copy_from_user() and copies the entire
user buffer into the kernel buffer, verbatim. This means that the kernel
buffer may now contain entirely invalid state on which XRSTOR will #GP.
validate_user_xstate_header() can detect some of that corruption, but that
leaves the onus on callers to clear the buffer.
Prior to XSAVES support, it was possible just to reinitialize the buffer,
completely, but with supervisor states that is not longer possible as the
buffer clearing code split got it backwards. Fixing that is possible but
not corrupting the state in the first place is more robust.
Avoid corruption of the kernel XSAVE buffer by using copy_user_to_xstate()
which validates the XSAVE header contents before copying the actual states
to the kernel. copy_user_to_xstate() was previously only called for
compacted-format kernel buffers, but it works for both compacted and
non-compacted forms.
Using it for the non-compacted form is slower because of multiple
__copy_from_user() operations, but that cost is less important than robust
code in an already slow path.
[ Changelog polished by Dave Hansen ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47214

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hugetlb, userfaultfd: fix reservation restore on userfaultfd error
Currently in the is_continue case in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(), if we
bail out using "goto out_release_unlock;" in the cases where idx >=
size, or !huge_pte_none(), the code will detect that new_pagecache_page
== false, and so call restore_reserve_on_error(). In this case I see
restore_reserve_on_error() delete the reservation, and the following
call to remove_inode_hugepages() will increment h->resv_hugepages
causing a 100% reproducible leak.
We should treat the is_continue case similar to adding a page into the
pagecache and set new_pagecache_page to true, to indicate that there is
no reservation to restore on the error path, and we need not call
restore_reserve_on_error(). Rename new_pagecache_page to
page_in_pagecache to make that clear.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47103

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet: fully convert sk->sk_rx_dst to RCU rules
syzbot reported various issues around early demux,
one being included in this changelog [1]
sk->sk_rx_dst is using RCU protection without clearly
documenting it.
And following sequences in tcp_v4_do_rcv()/tcp_v6_do_rcv()
are not following standard RCU rules.
[a] dst_release(dst);
[b] sk->sk_rx_dst = NULL;
They look wrong because a delete operation of RCU protected
pointer is supposed to clear the pointer before
the call_rcu()/synchronize_rcu() guarding actual memory freeing.
In some cases indeed, dst could be freed before [b] is done.
We could cheat by clearing sk_rx_dst before calling
dst_release(), but this seems the right time to stick
to standard RCU annotations and debugging facilities.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dst_check include/net/dst.h:470 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_v4_early_demux+0x95b/0x960 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1792
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88807f1cb73a by task syz-executor.5/9204
CPU: 0 PID: 9204 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x320 mm/kasan/report.c:247
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:433 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:450
dst_check include/net/dst.h:470 [inline]
tcp_v4_early_demux+0x95b/0x960 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1792
ip_rcv_finish_core.constprop.0+0x15de/0x1e80 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:340
ip_list_rcv_finish.constprop.0+0x1b2/0x6e0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:583
ip_sublist_rcv net/ipv4/ip_input.c:609 [inline]
ip_list_rcv+0x34e/0x490 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:644
__netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5508 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x549/0x8e0 net/core/dev.c:5556
__netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5608 [inline]
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x75e/0xd80 net/core/dev.c:5699
gro_normal_list net/core/dev.c:5853 [inline]
gro_normal_list net/core/dev.c:5849 [inline]
napi_complete_done+0x1f1/0x880 net/core/dev.c:6590
virtqueue_napi_complete drivers/net/virtio_net.c:339 [inline]
virtnet_poll+0xca2/0x11b0 drivers/net/virtio_net.c:1557
__napi_poll+0xaf/0x440 net/core/dev.c:7023
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:7090 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x801/0xb40 net/core/dev.c:7177
__do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:432 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0x123/0x180 kernel/softirq.c:637
irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:649
common_interrupt+0x52/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:240
asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:629
RIP: 0033:0x7f5e972bfd57
Code: 39 d1 73 14 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 8b 50 f8 48 83 e8 08 48 39 ca 77 f3 48 39 c3 73 3e 48 89 13 48 8b 50 f8 48 89 38 49 8b 0e <48> 8b 3e 48 83 c3 08 48 83 c6 08 eb bc 48 39 d1 72 9e 48 39 d0 73
RSP: 002b:00007fff8a413210 EFLAGS: 00000283
RAX: 00007f5e97108990 RBX: 00007f5e97108338 RCX: ffffffff81d3aa45
RDX: ffffffff81d3aa45 RSI: 00007f5e97108340 RDI: ffffffff81d3aa45
RBP: 00007f5e97107eb8 R08: 00007f5e97108d88 R09: 0000000093c2e8d9
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00007f5e97107eb0
R13: 00007f5e97108338 R14: 00007f5e97107ea8 R15: 0000000000000019
</TASK>
Allocated by task 13:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:46 [inline]
set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:434 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x90/0xc0 mm/kasan/common.c:467
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:259 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:519 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3234 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3242 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x202/0x3a0 mm/slub.c:3247
dst_alloc+0x146/0x1f0 net/core/dst.c:92
rt_dst_alloc+0x73/0x430 net/ipv4/route.c:1613
ip_route_input_slow+0x1817/0x3a20 net/ipv4/route.c:234
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47092

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: VMX: Always clear vmx->fail on emulation_required
Revert a relatively recent change that set vmx->fail if the vCPU is in L2
and emulation_required is true, as that behavior is completely bogus.
Setting vmx->fail and synthesizing a VM-Exit is contradictory and wrong:
(a) it's impossible to have both a VM-Fail and VM-Exit
(b) vmcs.EXIT_REASON is not modified on VM-Fail
(c) emulation_required refers to guest state and guest state checks are
always VM-Exits, not VM-Fails.
For KVM specifically, emulation_required is handled before nested exits
in __vmx_handle_exit(), thus setting vmx->fail has no immediate effect,
i.e. KVM calls into handle_invalid_guest_state() and vmx->fail is ignored.
Setting vmx->fail can ultimately result in a WARN in nested_vmx_vmexit()
firing when tearing down the VM as KVM never expects vmx->fail to be set
when L2 is active, KVM always reflects those errors into L1.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 21158 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4548
nested_vmx_vmexit+0x16bd/0x17e0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4547
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 21158 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:nested_vmx_vmexit+0x16bd/0x17e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4547
Code: <0f> 0b e9 2e f8 ff ff e8 57 b3 5d 00 0f 0b e9 00 f1 ff ff 89 e9 80
Call Trace:
vmx_leave_nested arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:6220 [inline]
nested_vmx_free_vcpu+0x83/0xc0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:330
vmx_free_vcpu+0x11f/0x2a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6799
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x6b/0x240 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10989
kvm_vcpu_destroy+0x29/0x90 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:441
kvm_free_vcpus arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11426 [inline]
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x3ef/0x6b0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11545
kvm_destroy_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1189 [inline]
kvm_put_kvm+0x751/0xe40 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1220
kvm_vcpu_release+0x53/0x60 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3489
__fput+0x3fc/0x870 fs/file_table.c:280
task_work_run+0x146/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:164
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:32 [inline]
do_exit+0x705/0x24f0 kernel/exit.c:832
do_group_exit+0x168/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:929
get_signal+0x1740/0x2120 kernel/signal.c:2852
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x9c/0x730 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:868
handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x191/0x220 kernel/entry/common.c:207
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:289 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2e/0x70 kernel/entry/common.c:300
do_syscall_64+0x53/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47041

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-tcp: fix incorrect locking in state_change sk callback
We are not changing anything in the TCP connection state so
we should not take a write_lock but rather a read lock.
This caused a deadlock when running nvmet-tcp and nvme-tcp
on the same system, where state_change callbacks on the
host and on the controller side have causal relationship
and made lockdep report on this with blktests:
================================
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
5.12.0-rc3 #1 Tainted: G I
--------------------------------
inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-R} usage.
nvme/1324 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
ffff888363151000 (clock-AF_INET){++-?}-{2:2}, at: nvme_tcp_state_change+0x21/0x150 [nvme_tcp]
{IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:
__lock_acquire+0x79b/0x18d0
lock_acquire+0x1ca/0x480
_raw_write_lock_bh+0x39/0x80
nvmet_tcp_state_change+0x21/0x170 [nvmet_tcp]
tcp_fin+0x2a8/0x780
tcp_data_queue+0xf94/0x1f20
tcp_rcv_established+0x6ba/0x1f00
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x502/0x760
tcp_v4_rcv+0x257e/0x3430
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x69/0x6a0
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x1e2/0x2f0
ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x420
ip_rcv+0x4fb/0x6b0
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x162/0x1b0
process_backlog+0x1ff/0x770
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa9/0x5c0
net_rx_action+0x7b3/0xb30
__do_softirq+0x1f0/0x940
do_softirq+0xa1/0xd0
__local_bh_enable_ip+0xd8/0x100
ip_finish_output2+0x6b7/0x18a0
__ip_queue_xmit+0x706/0x1aa0
__tcp_transmit_skb+0x2068/0x2e20
tcp_write_xmit+0xc9e/0x2bb0
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0x92/0x310
inet_shutdown+0x158/0x300
__nvme_tcp_stop_queue+0x36/0x270 [nvme_tcp]
nvme_tcp_stop_queue+0x87/0xb0 [nvme_tcp]
nvme_tcp_teardown_admin_queue+0x69/0xe0 [nvme_tcp]
nvme_do_delete_ctrl+0x100/0x10c [nvme_core]
nvme_sysfs_delete.cold+0x8/0xd [nvme_core]
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2c7/0x460
new_sync_write+0x36c/0x610
vfs_write+0x5c0/0x870
ksys_write+0xf9/0x1d0
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
irq event stamp: 10687
hardirqs last enabled at (10687): [<ffffffff9ec376bd>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x40
hardirqs last disabled at (10686): [<ffffffff9ec374d8>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x68/0x90
softirqs last enabled at (10684): [<ffffffff9f000608>] __do_softirq+0x608/0x940
softirqs last disabled at (10649): [<ffffffff9cdedd31>] do_softirq+0xa1/0xd0
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(clock-AF_INET);
<Interrupt>
lock(clock-AF_INET);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by nvme/1324:
#0: ffff8884a01fe470 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0xf9/0x1d0
#1: ffff8886e435c090 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x216/0x460
#2: ffff888104d90c38 (kn->active#255){++++}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_remove_self+0x22d/0x330
#3: ffff8884634538d0 (&queue->queue_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: nvme_tcp_stop_queue+0x52/0xb0 [nvme_tcp]
#4: ffff888363150d30 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: inet_shutdown+0x59/0x300
stack backtrace:
CPU: 26 PID: 1324 Comm: nvme Tainted: G I 5.12.0-rc3 #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R640/06NR82, BIOS 2.10.0 11/12/2020
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x93/0xc2
mark_lock_irq.cold+0x2c/0xb3
? verify_lock_unused+0x390/0x390
? stack_trace_consume_entry+0x160/0x160
? lock_downgrade+0x100/0x100
? save_trace+0x88/0x5e0
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x40
mark_lock+0x530/0x1470
? mark_lock_irq+0x1d10/0x1d10
? enqueue_timer+0x660/0x660
mark_usage+0x215/0x2a0
__lock_acquire+0x79b/0x18d0
? tcp_schedule_loss_probe.part.0+0x38c/0x520
lock_acquire+0x1ca/0x480
? nvme_tcp_state_change+0x21/0x150 [nvme_tcp]
? rcu_read_unlock+0x40/0x40
? tcp_mtu_probe+0x1ae0/0x1ae0
? kmalloc_reserve+0xa0/0xa0
? sysfs_file_ops+0x170/0x170
_raw_read_lock+0x3d/0xa0
? nvme_tcp_state_change+0x21/0x150 [nvme_tcp]
nvme_tcp_state_change+0x21/0x150 [nvme_tcp]
? sysfs_file_ops
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-46999

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: do asoc update earlier in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a
There's a panic that occurs in a few of envs, the call trace is as below:
[] general protection fault, ... 0x29acd70f1000a: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[] RIP: 0010:sctp_ulpevent_notify_peer_addr_change+0x4b/0x1fa [sctp]
[] sctp_assoc_control_transport+0x1b9/0x210 [sctp]
[] sctp_do_8_2_transport_strike.isra.16+0x15c/0x220 [sctp]
[] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.21+0x1231/0x1a10 [sctp]
[] sctp_do_sm+0xc3/0x2a0 [sctp]
[] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x81/0xf0 [sctp]
This is caused by a transport use-after-free issue. When processing a
duplicate COOKIE-ECHO chunk in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a(), both COOKIE-ACK
and SHUTDOWN chunks are allocated with the transort from the new asoc.
However, later in the sideeffect machine, the old asoc is used to send
them out and old asoc's shutdown_last_sent_to is set to the transport
that SHUTDOWN chunk attached to in sctp_cmd_setup_t2(), which actually
belongs to the new asoc. After the new_asoc is freed and the old asoc
T2 timeout, the old asoc's shutdown_last_sent_to that is already freed
would be accessed in sctp_sf_t2_timer_expire().
Thanks Alexander and Jere for helping dig into this issue.
To fix it, this patch is to do the asoc update first, then allocate
the COOKIE-ACK and SHUTDOWN chunks with the 'updated' old asoc. This
would make more sense, as a chunk from an asoc shouldn't be sent out
with another asoc. We had fixed quite a few issues caused by this.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-46931

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Wrap the tx reporter dump callback to extract the sq
Function mlx5e_tx_reporter_dump_sq() casts its void * argument to struct
mlx5e_txqsq *, but in TX-timeout-recovery flow the argument is actually
of type struct mlx5e_tx_timeout_ctx *.
mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1 enp8s0f1: TX timeout detected
mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1 enp8s0f1: TX timeout on queue: 1, SQ: 0x11ec, CQ: 0x146d, SQ Cons: 0x0 SQ Prod: 0x1, usecs since last trans: 21565000
BUG: stack guard page was hit at 0000000093f1a2de (stack is 00000000b66ea0dc..000000004d932dae)
kernel stack overflow (page fault): 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 5 PID: 95 Comm: kworker/u20:1 Tainted: G W OE 5.13.0_mlnx #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: mlx5e mlx5e_tx_timeout_work [mlx5_core]
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_tx_reporter_dump_sq+0xd3/0x180
[mlx5_core]
Call Trace:
mlx5e_tx_reporter_dump+0x43/0x1c0 [mlx5_core]
devlink_health_do_dump.part.91+0x71/0xd0
devlink_health_report+0x157/0x1b0
mlx5e_reporter_tx_timeout+0xb9/0xf0 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5e_tx_reporter_err_cqe_recover+0x1d0/0x1d0
[mlx5_core]
? mlx5e_health_queue_dump+0xd0/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
? update_load_avg+0x19b/0x550
? set_next_entity+0x72/0x80
? pick_next_task_fair+0x227/0x340
? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x280
mlx5e_tx_timeout_work+0x83/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x1de/0x3a0
worker_thread+0x2d/0x3c0
? process_one_work+0x3a0/0x3a0
kthread+0x115/0x130
? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
--[ end trace 51ccabea504edaff ]---
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_tx_reporter_dump_sq+0xd3/0x180
PKRU: 55555554
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Kernel Offset: disabled
end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
To fix this bug add a wrapper for mlx5e_tx_reporter_dump_sq() which
extracts the sq from struct mlx5e_tx_timeout_ctx and set it as the
TX-timeout-recovery flow dump callback.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-26603

Description:

Vim is a greatly improved version of the good old UNIX editor Vi. Vim allows to redirect screen messages using the `:redir` ex command to register, variables and files. It also allows to show the contents of registers using the `:registers` or `:display` ex command. When redirecting the output of `:display` to a register, Vim will free the register content before storing the new content in the register. Now when redirecting the `:display` command to a register that is being displayed, Vim will free the content while shortly afterwards trying to access it, which leads to a use-after-free. Vim pre 9.1.1115 checks in the ex_display() function, that it does not try to redirect to a register while displaying this register at the same time. However this check is not complete, and so Vim does not check the `+` and `*` registers (which typically donate the X11/clipboard registers, and when a clipboard connection is not possible will fall back to use register 0 instead. In Patch 9.1.1115 Vim will therefore skip outputting to register zero when trying to redirect to the clipboard registers `*` or `+`. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Locations:

vim-filesystem-2:8.2.2637-21.el9
vim-minimal-2:8.2.2637-21.el9

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-22009

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
regulator: dummy: force synchronous probing
Sometimes I get a NULL pointer dereference at boot time in kobject_get()
with the following call stack:
anatop_regulator_probe()
devm_regulator_register()
regulator_register()
regulator_resolve_supply()
kobject_get()
By placing some extra BUG_ON() statements I could verify that this is
raised because probing of the 'dummy' regulator driver is not completed
('dummy_regulator_rdev' is still NULL).
In the JTAG debugger I can see that dummy_regulator_probe() and
anatop_regulator_probe() can be run by different kernel threads
(kworker/u4:*). I haven't further investigated whether this can be
changed or if there are other possibilities to force synchronization
between these two probe routines. On the other hand I don't expect much
boot time penalty by probing the 'dummy' regulator synchronously.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21981

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix memory leak in aRFS after reset
Fix aRFS (accelerated Receive Flow Steering) structures memory leak by
adding a checker to verify if aRFS memory is already allocated while
configuring VSI. aRFS objects are allocated in two cases:
- as part of VSI initialization (at probe), and
- as part of reset handling
However, VSI reconfiguration executed during reset involves memory
allocation one more time, without prior releasing already allocated
resources. This led to the memory leak with the following signature:
[root@os-delivery ~]# cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
unreferenced object 0xff3c1ca7252e6000 (size 8192):
comm "kworker/0:0", pid 8, jiffies 4296833052
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace (crc 0):
[<ffffffff991ec485>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x275/0x340
[<ffffffffc0a6e06a>] ice_init_arfs+0x3a/0xe0 [ice]
[<ffffffffc09f1027>] ice_vsi_cfg_def+0x607/0x850 [ice]
[<ffffffffc09f244b>] ice_vsi_setup+0x5b/0x130 [ice]
[<ffffffffc09c2131>] ice_init+0x1c1/0x460 [ice]
[<ffffffffc09c64af>] ice_probe+0x2af/0x520 [ice]
[<ffffffff994fbcd3>] local_pci_probe+0x43/0xa0
[<ffffffff98f07103>] work_for_cpu_fn+0x13/0x20
[<ffffffff98f0b6d9>] process_one_work+0x179/0x390
[<ffffffff98f0c1e9>] worker_thread+0x239/0x340
[<ffffffff98f14abc>] kthread+0xcc/0x100
[<ffffffff98e45a6d>] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[<ffffffff98e083ba>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
...

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21953

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: cleanup mana struct after debugfs_remove()
When on a MANA VM hibernation is triggered, as part of hibernate_snapshot(),
mana_gd_suspend() and mana_gd_resume() are called. If during this
mana_gd_resume(), a failure occurs with HWC creation, mana_port_debugfs
pointer does not get reinitialized and ends up pointing to older,
cleaned-up dentry.
Further in the hibernation path, as part of power_down(), mana_gd_shutdown()
is triggered. This call, unaware of the failures in resume, tries to cleanup
the already cleaned up mana_port_debugfs value and hits the following bug:
[ 191.359296] mana 7870:00:00.0: Shutdown was called
[ 191.359918] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098
[ 191.360584] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ 191.361125] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ 191.361727] PGD 1080ea067 P4D 0
[ 191.362172] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 191.362606] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 1674 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5+ #2
[ 191.363292] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 11/21/2024
[ 191.364124] RIP: 0010:down_write+0x19/0x50
[ 191.364537] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 48 89 fb e8 de cd ff ff 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 48 0f b1 13 75 16 65 48 8b 05 88 24 4c 6a 48 89 43 08 48 8b 5d
[ 191.365867] RSP: 0000:ff45fbe0c1c037b8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 191.366350] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000098 RCX: ffffff8100000000
[ 191.366951] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000064 RDI: 0000000000000098
[ 191.367600] RBP: ff45fbe0c1c037c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 191.368225] R10: ff45fbe0d2b01000 R11: 0000000000000008 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 191.368874] R13: 000000000000000b R14: ff43dc27509d67c0 R15: 0000000000000020
[ 191.369549] FS: 00007dbc5001e740(0000) GS:ff43dc663f380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 191.370213] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 191.370830] CR2: 0000000000000098 CR3: 0000000168e8e002 CR4: 0000000000b73ef0
[ 191.371557] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 191.372192] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 191.372906] Call Trace:
[ 191.373262] <TASK>
[ 191.373621] ? show_regs+0x64/0x70
[ 191.374040] ? __die+0x24/0x70
[ 191.374468] ? page_fault_oops+0x290/0x5b0
[ 191.374875] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x448/0x800
[ 191.375357] ? exc_page_fault+0x7a/0x160
[ 191.375971] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
[ 191.376416] ? down_write+0x19/0x50
[ 191.376832] ? down_write+0x12/0x50
[ 191.377232] simple_recursive_removal+0x4a/0x2a0
[ 191.377679] ? __pfx_remove_one+0x10/0x10
[ 191.378088] debugfs_remove+0x44/0x70
[ 191.378530] mana_detach+0x17c/0x4f0
[ 191.378950] ? __flush_work+0x1e2/0x3b0
[ 191.379362] ? __cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
[ 191.379787] mana_remove+0xf2/0x1a0
[ 191.380193] mana_gd_shutdown+0x3b/0x70
[ 191.380642] pci_device_shutdown+0x3a/0x80
[ 191.381063] device_shutdown+0x13e/0x230
[ 191.381480] kernel_power_off+0x35/0x80
[ 191.381890] hibernate+0x3c6/0x470
[ 191.382312] state_store+0xcb/0xd0
[ 191.382734] kobj_attr_store+0x12/0x30
[ 191.383211] sysfs_kf_write+0x3e/0x50
[ 191.383640] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x140/0x1d0
[ 191.384106] vfs_write+0x271/0x440
[ 191.384521] ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
[ 191.384924] __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x20
[ 191.385313] x64_sys_call+0x2b0/0x20b0
[ 191.385736] do_syscall_64+0x79/0x150
[ 191.386146] ? __mod_memcg_lruvec_state+0xe7/0x240
[ 191.386676] ? __lruvec_stat_mod_folio+0x79/0xb0
[ 191.387124] ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10
[ 191.387515] ? queued_spin_unlock+0x9/0x10
[ 191.387937] ? do_anonymous_page+0x33c/0xa00
[ 191.388374] ? __handle_mm_fault+0xcf3/0x1210
[ 191.388805] ? __count_memcg_events+0xbe/0x180
[ 191.389235] ? handle_mm_fault+0xae/0x300
[ 19
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21939

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/hmm: Don't dereference struct page pointers without notifier lock
The pnfs that we obtain from hmm_range_fault() point to pages that
we don't have a reference on, and the guarantee that they are still
in the cpu page-tables is that the notifier lock must be held and the
notifier seqno is still valid.
So while building the sg table and marking the pages accesses / dirty
we need to hold this lock with a validated seqno.
However, the lock is reclaim tainted which makes
sg_alloc_table_from_pages_segment() unusable, since it internally
allocates memory.
Instead build the sg-table manually. For the non-iommu case
this might lead to fewer coalesces, but if that's a problem it can
be fixed up later in the resource cursor code. For the iommu case,
the whole sg-table may still be coalesced to a single contigous
device va region.
This avoids marking pages that we don't own dirty and accessed, and
it also avoid dereferencing struct pages that we don't own.
v2:
- Use assert to check whether hmm pfns are valid (Matthew Auld)
- Take into account that large pages may cross range boundaries
(Matthew Auld)
v3:
- Don't unnecessarily check for a non-freed sg-table. (Matthew Auld)
- Add a missing up_read() in an error path. (Matthew Auld)
(cherry picked from commit ea3e66d280ce2576664a862693d1da8fd324c317)

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21922

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ppp: Fix KMSAN uninit-value warning with bpf
Syzbot caught an "KMSAN: uninit-value" warning [1], which is caused by the
ppp driver not initializing a 2-byte header when using socket filter.
The following code can generate a PPP filter BPF program:
'''
struct bpf_program fp;
pcap_t *handle;
handle = pcap_open_dead(DLT_PPP_PPPD, 65535);
pcap_compile(handle, &fp, "ip and outbound", 0, 0);
bpf_dump(&fp, 1);
'''
Its output is:
'''
(000) ldh [2]
(001) jeq #0x21 jt 2 jf 5
(002) ldb [0]
(003) jeq #0x1 jt 4 jf 5
(004) ret #65535
(005) ret #0
'''
Wen can find similar code at the following link:
https://github.com/ppp-project/ppp/blob/master/pppd/options.c#L1680
The maintainer of this code repository is also the original maintainer
of the ppp driver.
As you can see the BPF program skips 2 bytes of data and then reads the
'Protocol' field to determine if it's an IP packet. Then it read the first
byte of the first 2 bytes to determine the direction.
The issue is that only the first byte indicating direction is initialized
in current ppp driver code while the second byte is not initialized.
For normal BPF programs generated by libpcap, uninitialized data won't be
used, so it's not a problem. However, for carefully crafted BPF programs,
such as those generated by syzkaller [2], which start reading from offset
0, the uninitialized data will be used and caught by KMSAN.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=853242d9c9917165d791
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&x=11994913980000

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21921

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethtool: netlink: Allow NULL nlattrs when getting a phy_device
ethnl_req_get_phydev() is used to lookup a phy_device, in the case an
ethtool netlink command targets a specific phydev within a netdev's
topology.
It takes as a parameter a const struct nlattr *header that's used for
error handling :
if (!phydev) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG_ATTR(extack, header,
"no phy matching phyindex");
return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
}
In the notify path after a ->set operation however, there's no request
attributes available.
The typical callsite for the above function looks like:
phydev = ethnl_req_get_phydev(req_base, tb[ETHTOOL_A_XXX_HEADER],
info->extack);
So, when tb is NULL (such as in the ethnl notify path), we have a nice
crash.
It turns out that there's only the PLCA command that is in that case, as
the other phydev-specific commands don't have a notification.
This commit fixes the crash by passing the cmd index and the nlattr
array separately, allowing NULL-checking it directly inside the helper.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21916

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: atm: cxacru: fix a flaw in existing endpoint checks
Syzbot once again identified a flaw in usb endpoint checking, see [1].
This time the issue stems from a commit authored by me (2eabb655a968
("usb: atm: cxacru: fix endpoint checking in cxacru_bind()")).
While using usb_find_common_endpoints() may usually be enough to
discard devices with wrong endpoints, in this case one needs more
than just finding and identifying the sufficient number of endpoints
of correct types - one needs to check the endpoint's address as well.
Since cxacru_bind() fills URBs with CXACRU_EP_CMD address in mind,
switch the endpoint verification approach to usb_check_XXX_endpoints()
instead to fix incomplete ep testing.
[1] Syzbot report:
usb 5-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1378 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504 usb_submit_urb+0xc4e/0x18c0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503
...
RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xc4e/0x18c0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
cxacru_cm+0x3c8/0xe50 drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:649
cxacru_card_status drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:760 [inline]
cxacru_bind+0xcf9/0x1150 drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:1223
usbatm_usb_probe+0x314/0x1d30 drivers/usb/atm/usbatm.c:1058
cxacru_usb_probe+0x184/0x220 drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:1377
usb_probe_interface+0x641/0xbb0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396
really_probe+0x2b9/0xad0 drivers/base/dd.c:658
__driver_probe_device+0x1a2/0x390 drivers/base/dd.c:800
driver_probe_device+0x50/0x430 drivers/base/dd.c:830
...

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21910

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: regulatory: improve invalid hints checking
Syzbot keeps reporting an issue [1] that occurs when erroneous symbols
sent from userspace get through into user_alpha2[] via
regulatory_hint_user() call. Such invalid regulatory hints should be
rejected.
While a sanity check from commit 47caf685a685 ("cfg80211: regulatory:
reject invalid hints") looks to be enough to deter these very cases,
there is a way to get around it due to 2 reasons.
1) The way isalpha() works, symbols other than latin lower and
upper letters may be used to determine a country/domain.
For instance, greek letters will also be considered upper/lower
letters and for such characters isalpha() will return true as well.
However, ISO-3166-1 alpha2 codes should only hold latin
characters.
2) While processing a user regulatory request, between
reg_process_hint_user() and regulatory_hint_user() there happens to
be a call to queue_regulatory_request() which modifies letters in
request->alpha2[] with toupper(). This works fine for latin symbols,
less so for weird letter characters from the second part of _ctype[].
Syzbot triggers a warning in is_user_regdom_saved() by first sending
over an unexpected non-latin letter that gets malformed by toupper()
into a character that ends up failing isalpha() check.
Prevent this by enhancing is_an_alpha2() to ensure that incoming
symbols are latin letters and nothing else.
[1] Syzbot report:
------------[ cut here ]------------
Unexpected user alpha2: A�
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 964 at net/wireless/reg.c:442 is_user_regdom_saved net/wireless/reg.c:440 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 964 at net/wireless/reg.c:442 restore_alpha2 net/wireless/reg.c:3424 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 964 at net/wireless/reg.c:442 restore_regulatory_settings+0x3c0/0x1e50 net/wireless/reg.c:3516
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 964 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-syzkaller-00044-gc1e939a21eb1 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Workqueue: events_power_efficient crda_timeout_work
RIP: 0010:is_user_regdom_saved net/wireless/reg.c:440 [inline]
RIP: 0010:restore_alpha2 net/wireless/reg.c:3424 [inline]
RIP: 0010:restore_regulatory_settings+0x3c0/0x1e50 net/wireless/reg.c:3516
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
crda_timeout_work+0x27/0x50 net/wireless/reg.c:542
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa65/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f2/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21907

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: memory-failure: update ttu flag inside unmap_poisoned_folio
Patch series "mm: memory_failure: unmap poisoned folio during migrate
properly", v3.
Fix two bugs during folio migration if the folio is poisoned.
This patch (of 3):
Commit 6da6b1d4a7df ("mm/hwpoison: convert TTU_IGNORE_HWPOISON to
TTU_HWPOISON") introduce TTU_HWPOISON to replace TTU_IGNORE_HWPOISON in
order to stop send SIGBUS signal when accessing an error page after a
memory error on a clean folio. However during page migration, anon folio
must be set with TTU_HWPOISON during unmap_*(). For pagecache we need
some policy just like the one in hwpoison_user_mappings to set this flag.
So move this policy from hwpoison_user_mappings to unmap_poisoned_folio to
handle this warning properly.
Warning will be produced during unamp poison folio with the following log:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 365 at mm/rmap.c:1847 try_to_unmap_one+0x8fc/0xd3c
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 365 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc1-00018-gacdb4bbda7ab #42
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : try_to_unmap_one+0x8fc/0xd3c
lr : try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c
Call trace:
try_to_unmap_one+0x8fc/0xd3c (P)
try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c (L)
rmap_walk_anon+0xdc/0x1f8
rmap_walk+0x3c/0x58
try_to_unmap+0x88/0x90
unmap_poisoned_folio+0x30/0xa8
do_migrate_range+0x4a0/0x568
offline_pages+0x5a4/0x670
memory_block_action+0x17c/0x374
memory_subsys_offline+0x3c/0x78
device_offline+0xa4/0xd0
state_store+0x8c/0xf0
dev_attr_store+0x18/0x2c
sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x54
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x118/0x1a8
vfs_write+0x3a8/0x4bc
ksys_write+0x6c/0xf8
__arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28
invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
el0_svc+0x30/0xd0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xcc
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[mawupeng1@huawei.com: unmap_poisoned_folio(): remove shadowed local `mapping', per Miaohe]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21895

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Order the PMU list to fix warning about unordered pmu_ctx_list
Syskaller triggers a warning due to prev_epc->pmu != next_epc->pmu in
perf_event_swap_task_ctx_data(). vmcore shows that two lists have the same
perf_event_pmu_context, but not in the same order.
The problem is that the order of pmu_ctx_list for the parent is impacted by
the time when an event/PMU is added. While the order for a child is
impacted by the event order in the pinned_groups and flexible_groups. So
the order of pmu_ctx_list in the parent and child may be different.
To fix this problem, insert the perf_event_pmu_context to its proper place
after iteration of the pmu_ctx_list.
The follow testcase can trigger above warning:
# perf record -e cycles --call-graph lbr -- taskset -c 3 ./a.out &
# perf stat -e cpu-clock,cs -p xxx // xxx is the pid of a.out
test.c
void main() {
int count = 0;
pid_t pid;
printf("%d running\n", getpid());
sleep(30);
printf("running\n");
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
printf("fork error\n");
return;
}
if (pid == 0) {
while (1) {
count++;
}
} else {
while (1) {
count++;
}
}
}
The testcase first opens an LBR event, so it will allocate task_ctx_data,
and then open tracepoint and software events, so the parent context will
have 3 different perf_event_pmu_contexts. On inheritance, child ctx will
insert the perf_event_pmu_context in another order and the warning will
trigger.
[ mingo: Tidied up the changelog. ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21891

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvlan: ensure network headers are in skb linear part
syzbot found that ipvlan_process_v6_outbound() was assuming
the IPv6 network header isis present in skb->head [1]
Add the needed pskb_network_may_pull() calls for both
IPv4 and IPv6 handlers.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __ipv6_addr_type+0xa2/0x490 net/ipv6/addrconf_core.c:47
__ipv6_addr_type+0xa2/0x490 net/ipv6/addrconf_core.c:47
ipv6_addr_type include/net/ipv6.h:555 [inline]
ip6_route_output_flags_noref net/ipv6/route.c:2616 [inline]
ip6_route_output_flags+0x51/0x720 net/ipv6/route.c:2651
ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:93 [inline]
ipvlan_route_v6_outbound+0x24e/0x520 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:476
ipvlan_process_v6_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:491 [inline]
ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:541 [inline]
ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:605 [inline]
ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xd72/0x1780 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:671
ipvlan_start_xmit+0x5b/0x210 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:223
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5150 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5159 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3735 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa20 net/core/dev.c:3751
sch_direct_xmit+0x399/0xd40 net/sched/sch_generic.c:343
qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:408 [inline]
__qdisc_run+0x14da/0x35d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:416
qdisc_run+0x141/0x4d0 include/net/pkt_sched.h:127
net_tx_action+0x78b/0x940 net/core/dev.c:5484
handle_softirqs+0x1a0/0x7c0 kernel/softirq.c:561
__do_softirq+0x14/0x1a kernel/softirq.c:595
do_softirq+0x9a/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:462
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x9f/0xb0 kernel/softirq.c:389
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:919 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2758/0x57d0 net/core/dev.c:4611
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3311 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3132 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x93e0/0xa7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3164
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21889

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Add RCU read lock protection to perf_iterate_ctx()
The perf_iterate_ctx() function performs RCU list traversal but
currently lacks RCU read lock protection. This causes lockdep warnings
when running perf probe with unshare(1) under CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST=y:
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
kernel/events/core.c:8168 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
Call Trace:
lockdep_rcu_suspicious
? perf_event_addr_filters_apply
perf_iterate_ctx
perf_event_exec
begin_new_exec
? load_elf_phdrs
load_elf_binary
? lock_acquire
? find_held_lock
? bprm_execve
bprm_execve
do_execveat_common.isra.0
__x64_sys_execve
do_syscall_64
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
This protection was previously present but was removed in commit
bd2756811766 ("perf: Rewrite core context handling"). Add back the
necessary rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() pair around
perf_iterate_ctx() call in perf_event_exec().
[ mingo: Use scoped_guard() as suggested by Peter ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21888

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix a WARN during dereg_mr for DM type
Memory regions (MR) of type DM (device memory) do not have an associated
umem.
In the __mlx5_ib_dereg_mr() -> mlx5_free_priv_descs() flow, the code
incorrectly takes the wrong branch, attempting to call
dma_unmap_single() on a DMA address that is not mapped.
This results in a WARN [1], as shown below.
The issue is resolved by properly accounting for the DM type and
ensuring the correct branch is selected in mlx5_free_priv_descs().
[1]
WARNING: CPU: 12 PID: 1346 at drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c:1230 iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90
Modules linked in: ip6table_mangle ip6table_nat ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_mangle xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry ovelay rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core fuse mlx5_core
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 1346 Comm: ibv_rc_pingpong Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7+ #1631
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90
Code: 2b 49 3b 29 72 26 49 3b 69 08 73 20 4d 89 f0 44 89 e9 4c 89 e2 48 89 ee 48 89 df 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 07 b8 88 ff <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc 66 0f 1f 44 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001913a10 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88810194b0a8 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88810194b0a8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f537abdd740(0000) GS:ffff88885fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f537aeb8000 CR3: 000000010c248001 CR4: 0000000000372eb0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x84/0x190
? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90
? report_bug+0xf8/0x1c0
? handle_bug+0x55/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90
dma_unmap_page_attrs+0xe6/0x290
mlx5_free_priv_descs+0xb0/0xe0 [mlx5_ib]
__mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x37e/0x520 [mlx5_ib]
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40
? wait_for_completion+0xfe/0x130
? rdma_restrack_put+0x63/0xe0 [ib_core]
ib_dereg_mr_user+0x5f/0x120 [ib_core]
? lock_release+0xc6/0x280
destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x1d/0x60 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x58/0x1d0 [ib_uverbs]
uobj_destroy+0x3f/0x70 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x3e4/0xbb0 [ib_uverbs]
? __pfx_uverbs_destroy_def_handler+0x10/0x10 [ib_uverbs]
? lock_acquire+0xc1/0x2f0
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xcb/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x116/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? lock_release+0xc6/0x280
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe7/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xcb/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1b0/0xa70
do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f537adaf17b
Code: 0f 1e fa 48 8b 05 1d ad 0c 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ed ac 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffff218f0b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffff218f1d8 RCX: 00007f537adaf17b
RDX: 00007ffff218f1c0 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffff218f1a0 R08: 00007f537aa8d010 R09: 0000561ee2e4f270
R10: 00007f537aace3a8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffff218f190
R13: 000000000000001c R14: 0000561ee2e4d7c0 R15: 00007ffff218f450
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21884

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: better track kernel sockets lifetime
While kernel sockets are dismantled during pernet_operations->exit(),
their freeing can be delayed by any tx packets still held in qdisc
or device queues, due to skb_set_owner_w() prior calls.
This then trigger the following warning from ref_tracker_dir_exit() [1]
To fix this, make sure that kernel sockets own a reference on net->passive.
Add sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() helper, used whenever a kernel socket
is converted to a refcounted one.
[1]
[ 136.263918][ T35] ref_tracker: net notrefcnt@ffff8880638f01e0 has 1/2 users at
[ 136.263918][ T35] sk_alloc+0x2b3/0x370
[ 136.263918][ T35] inet6_create+0x6ce/0x10f0
[ 136.263918][ T35] __sock_create+0x4c0/0xa30
[ 136.263918][ T35] inet_ctl_sock_create+0xc2/0x250
[ 136.263918][ T35] igmp6_net_init+0x39/0x390
[ 136.263918][ T35] ops_init+0x31e/0x590
[ 136.263918][ T35] setup_net+0x287/0x9e0
[ 136.263918][ T35] copy_net_ns+0x33f/0x570
[ 136.263918][ T35] create_new_namespaces+0x425/0x7b0
[ 136.263918][ T35] unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x124/0x180
[ 136.263918][ T35] ksys_unshare+0x57d/0xa70
[ 136.263918][ T35] __x64_sys_unshare+0x38/0x40
[ 136.263918][ T35] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230
[ 136.263918][ T35] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 136.263918][ T35]
[ 136.343488][ T35] ref_tracker: net notrefcnt@ffff8880638f01e0 has 1/2 users at
[ 136.343488][ T35] sk_alloc+0x2b3/0x370
[ 136.343488][ T35] inet6_create+0x6ce/0x10f0
[ 136.343488][ T35] __sock_create+0x4c0/0xa30
[ 136.343488][ T35] inet_ctl_sock_create+0xc2/0x250
[ 136.343488][ T35] ndisc_net_init+0xa7/0x2b0
[ 136.343488][ T35] ops_init+0x31e/0x590
[ 136.343488][ T35] setup_net+0x287/0x9e0
[ 136.343488][ T35] copy_net_ns+0x33f/0x570
[ 136.343488][ T35] create_new_namespaces+0x425/0x7b0
[ 136.343488][ T35] unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x124/0x180
[ 136.343488][ T35] ksys_unshare+0x57d/0xa70
[ 136.343488][ T35] __x64_sys_unshare+0x38/0x40
[ 136.343488][ T35] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230
[ 136.343488][ T35] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21881

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uprobes: Reject the shared zeropage in uprobe_write_opcode()
We triggered the following crash in syzkaller tests:
BUG: Bad page state in process syz.7.38 pfn:1eff3
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1eff3
flags: 0x3fffff00004004(referenced|reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
raw: 003fffff00004004 ffffe6c6c07bfcc8 ffffe6c6c07bfcc8 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000fffffffe 0000000000000000
page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x32/0x50
bad_page+0x69/0xf0
free_unref_page_prepare+0x401/0x500
free_unref_page+0x6d/0x1b0
uprobe_write_opcode+0x460/0x8e0
install_breakpoint.part.0+0x51/0x80
register_for_each_vma+0x1d9/0x2b0
__uprobe_register+0x245/0x300
bpf_uprobe_multi_link_attach+0x29b/0x4f0
link_create+0x1e2/0x280
__sys_bpf+0x75f/0xac0
__x64_sys_bpf+0x1a/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x56/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2
BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000452453e0 type:MM_FILEPAGES val:-1
The following syzkaller test case can be used to reproduce:
r2 = creat(&(0x7f0000000000)='./file0\x00', 0x8)
write$nbd(r2, &(0x7f0000000580)=ANY=[], 0x10)
r4 = openat(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000040)='./file0\x00', 0x42, 0x0)
mmap$IORING_OFF_SQ_RING(&(0x7f0000ffd000/0x3000)=nil, 0x3000, 0x0, 0x12, r4, 0x0)
r5 = userfaultfd(0x80801)
ioctl$UFFDIO_API(r5, 0xc018aa3f, &(0x7f0000000040)={0xaa, 0x20})
r6 = userfaultfd(0x80801)
ioctl$UFFDIO_API(r6, 0xc018aa3f, &(0x7f0000000140))
ioctl$UFFDIO_REGISTER(r6, 0xc020aa00, &(0x7f0000000100)={{&(0x7f0000ffc000/0x4000)=nil, 0x4000}, 0x2})
ioctl$UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE(r5, 0xc020aa04, &(0x7f0000000000)={{&(0x7f0000ffd000/0x1000)=nil, 0x1000}})
r7 = bpf$PROG_LOAD(0x5, &(0x7f0000000140)={0x2, 0x3, &(0x7f0000000200)=ANY=[@ANYBLOB="1800000000120000000000000000000095"], &(0x7f0000000000)='GPL\x00', 0x7, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, '\x00', 0x0, @fallback=0x30, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x10, 0x0, @void, @value}, 0x94)
bpf$BPF_LINK_CREATE_XDP(0x1c, &(0x7f0000000040)={r7, 0x0, 0x30, 0x1e, @val=@uprobe_multi={&(0x7f0000000080)='./file0\x00', &(0x7f0000000100)=[0x2], 0x0, 0x0, 0x1}}, 0x40)
The cause is that zero pfn is set to the PTE without increasing the RSS
count in mfill_atomic_pte_zeropage() and the refcount of zero folio does
not increase accordingly. Then, the operation on the same pfn is performed
in uprobe_write_opcode()->__replace_page() to unconditional decrease the
RSS count and old_folio's refcount.
Therefore, two bugs are introduced:
1. The RSS count is incorrect, when process exit, the check_mm() report
error "Bad rss-count".
2. The reserved folio (zero folio) is freed when folio->refcount is zero,
then free_pages_prepare->free_page_is_bad() report error
"Bad page state".
There is more, the following warning could also theoretically be triggered:
__replace_page()
-> ...
-> folio_remove_rmap_pte()
-> VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO(is_zero_folio(folio), folio)
Considering that uprobe hit on the zero folio is a very rare case, just
reject zero old folio immediately after get_user_page_vma_remote().
[ mingo: Cleaned up the changelog ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21880

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/userptr: fix EFAULT handling
Currently we treat EFAULT from hmm_range_fault() as a non-fatal error
when called from xe_vm_userptr_pin() with the idea that we want to avoid
killing the entire vm and chucking an error, under the assumption that
the user just did an unmap or something, and has no intention of
actually touching that memory from the GPU. At this point we have
already zapped the PTEs so any access should generate a page fault, and
if the pin fails there also it will then become fatal.
However it looks like it's possible for the userptr vma to still be on
the rebind list in preempt_rebind_work_func(), if we had to retry the
pin again due to something happening in the caller before we did the
rebind step, but in the meantime needing to re-validate the userptr and
this time hitting the EFAULT.
This explains an internal user report of hitting:
[ 191.738349] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 157 at drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_res_cursor.h:158 xe_pt_stage_bind.constprop.0+0x60a/0x6b0 [xe]
[ 191.738551] Workqueue: xe-ordered-wq preempt_rebind_work_func [xe]
[ 191.738616] RIP: 0010:xe_pt_stage_bind.constprop.0+0x60a/0x6b0 [xe]
[ 191.738690] Call Trace:
[ 191.738692] <TASK>
[ 191.738694] ? show_regs+0x69/0x80
[ 191.738698] ? __warn+0x93/0x1a0
[ 191.738703] ? xe_pt_stage_bind.constprop.0+0x60a/0x6b0 [xe]
[ 191.738759] ? report_bug+0x18f/0x1a0
[ 191.738764] ? handle_bug+0x63/0xa0
[ 191.738767] ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x70
[ 191.738770] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
[ 191.738777] ? xe_pt_stage_bind.constprop.0+0x60a/0x6b0 [xe]
[ 191.738834] ? ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 191.738849] bind_op_prepare+0x105/0x7b0 [xe]
[ 191.738906] ? dma_resv_reserve_fences+0x301/0x380
[ 191.738912] xe_pt_update_ops_prepare+0x28c/0x4b0 [xe]
[ 191.738966] ? kmemleak_alloc+0x4b/0x80
[ 191.738973] ops_execute+0x188/0x9d0 [xe]
[ 191.739036] xe_vm_rebind+0x4ce/0x5a0 [xe]
[ 191.739098] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x4d/0x60
[ 191.739112] preempt_rebind_work_func+0x76f/0xd00 [xe]
Followed by NPD, when running some workload, since the sg was never
actually populated but the vma is still marked for rebind when it should
be skipped for this special EFAULT case. This is confirmed to fix the
user report.
v2 (MattB):
- Move earlier.
v3 (MattB):
- Update the commit message to make it clear that this indeed fixes the
issue.
(cherry picked from commit 6b93cb98910c826c2e2004942f8b060311e43618)

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21877

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbnet: gl620a: fix endpoint checking in genelink_bind()
Syzbot reports [1] a warning in usb_submit_urb() triggered by
inconsistencies between expected and actually present endpoints
in gl620a driver. Since genelink_bind() does not properly
verify whether specified eps are in fact provided by the device,
in this case, an artificially manufactured one, one may get a
mismatch.
Fix the issue by resorting to a usbnet utility function
usbnet_get_endpoints(), usually reserved for this very problem.
Check for endpoints and return early before proceeding further if
any are missing.
[1] Syzbot report:
usb 5-1: Manufacturer: syz
usb 5-1: SerialNumber: syz
usb 5-1: config 0 descriptor??
gl620a 5-1:0.23 usb0: register 'gl620a' at usb-dummy_hcd.0-1, ...
------------[ cut here ]------------
usb 5-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1841 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503 usb_submit_urb+0xe4b/0x1730 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1841 Comm: kworker/2:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-syzkaller-07834-g06afb0f36106 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xe4b/0x1730 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
usbnet_start_xmit+0x6be/0x2780 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1467
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5002 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5011 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3590 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x9a/0x7b0 net/core/dev.c:3606
sch_direct_xmit+0x1ae/0xc30 net/sched/sch_generic.c:343
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3827 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x13d4/0x43e0 net/core/dev.c:4400
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3168 [inline]
neigh_resolve_output net/core/neighbour.c:1514 [inline]
neigh_resolve_output+0x5bc/0x950 net/core/neighbour.c:1494
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:539 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0xb1b/0x2070 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:141
__ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:215 [inline]
ip6_finish_output+0x3f9/0x1360 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:226
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]
ip6_output+0x1f8/0x540 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247
dst_output include/net/dst.h:450 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
mld_sendpack+0x9f0/0x11d0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1819
mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2120 [inline]
mld_ifc_work+0x740/0xca0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2651
process_one_work+0x9c5/0x1ba0 kernel/workqueue.c:3229
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3310 [inline]
worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf00 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21876

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Fix suspicious RCU usage
Commit <d74169ceb0d2> ("iommu/vt-d: Allocate DMAR fault interrupts
locally") moved the call to enable_drhd_fault_handling() to a code
path that does not hold any lock while traversing the drhd list. Fix
it by ensuring the dmar_global_lock lock is held when traversing the
drhd list.
Without this fix, the following warning is triggered:
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.14.0-rc3 #55 Not tainted
-----------------------------
drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c:2046 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
2 locks held by cpuhp/1/23:
#0: ffffffff84a67c50 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x87/0x2c0
#1: ffffffff84a6a380 (cpuhp_state-up){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x87/0x2c0
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 23 Comm: cpuhp/1 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3 #55
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xb7/0xd0
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x159/0x1f0
? __pfx_enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x10/0x10
enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x151/0x180
cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x1df/0x990
cpuhp_thread_fun+0x1ea/0x2c0
smpboot_thread_fn+0x1f5/0x2e0
? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x12a/0x2d0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x4a/0x60
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Holding the lock in enable_drhd_fault_handling() triggers a lockdep splat
about a possible deadlock between dmar_global_lock and cpu_hotplug_lock.
This is avoided by not holding dmar_global_lock when calling
iommu_device_register(), which initiates the device probe process.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21872

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
efi: Don't map the entire mokvar table to determine its size
Currently, when validating the mokvar table, we (re)map the entire table
on each iteration of the loop, adding space as we discover new entries.
If the table grows over a certain size, this fails due to limitations of
early_memmap(), and we get a failure and traceback:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at mm/early_ioremap.c:139 __early_ioremap+0xef/0x220
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __early_ioremap+0xef/0x220
? __warn.cold+0x93/0xfa
? __early_ioremap+0xef/0x220
? report_bug+0xff/0x140
? early_fixup_exception+0x5d/0xb0
? early_idt_handler_common+0x2f/0x3a
? __early_ioremap+0xef/0x220
? efi_mokvar_table_init+0xce/0x1d0
? setup_arch+0x864/0xc10
? start_kernel+0x6b/0xa10
? x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30
? x86_64_start_kernel+0xed/0xf0
? common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
mokvar: Failed to map EFI MOKvar config table pa=0x7c4c3000, size=265187.
Mapping the entire structure isn't actually necessary, as we don't ever
need more than one entry header mapped at once.
Changes efi_mokvar_table_init() to only map each entry header, not the
entire table, when determining the table size. Since we're not mapping
any data past the variable name, it also changes the code to enforce
that each variable name is NUL terminated, rather than attempting to
verify it in place.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21869

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/code-patching: Disable KASAN report during patching via temporary mm
Erhard reports the following KASAN hit on Talos II (power9) with kernel 6.13:
[ 12.028126] ==================================================================
[ 12.028198] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0x8c/0x1a0
[ 12.028260] Write of size 8 at addr 0000187e458f2000 by task systemd/1
[ 12.028346] CPU: 87 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G T 6.13.0-P9-dirty #3
[ 12.028408] Tainted: [T]=RANDSTRUCT
[ 12.028446] Hardware name: T2P9D01 REV 1.01 POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:skiboot-bc106a0 PowerNV
[ 12.028500] Call Trace:
[ 12.028536] [c000000008dbf3b0] [c000000001656a48] dump_stack_lvl+0xbc/0x110 (unreliable)
[ 12.028609] [c000000008dbf3f0] [c0000000006e2fc8] print_report+0x6b0/0x708
[ 12.028666] [c000000008dbf4e0] [c0000000006e2454] kasan_report+0x164/0x300
[ 12.028725] [c000000008dbf600] [c0000000006e54d4] kasan_check_range+0x314/0x370
[ 12.028784] [c000000008dbf640] [c0000000006e6310] __kasan_check_write+0x20/0x40
[ 12.028842] [c000000008dbf660] [c000000000578e8c] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0x8c/0x1a0
[ 12.028902] [c000000008dbf6a0] [c0000000000acfe4] __patch_instructions+0x194/0x210
[ 12.028965] [c000000008dbf6e0] [c0000000000ade80] patch_instructions+0x150/0x590
[ 12.029026] [c000000008dbf7c0] [c0000000001159bc] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x6c/0xe0
[ 12.029085] [c000000008dbf800] [c000000000424250] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x40/0xc0
[ 12.029147] [c000000008dbf830] [c000000000115dec] bpf_int_jit_compile+0x3bc/0x930
[ 12.029206] [c000000008dbf990] [c000000000423720] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x1f0/0x280
[ 12.029266] [c000000008dbfa00] [c000000000434b18] bpf_prog_load+0xbb8/0x1370
[ 12.029324] [c000000008dbfb70] [c000000000436ebc] __sys_bpf+0x5ac/0x2e00
[ 12.029379] [c000000008dbfd00] [c00000000043a228] sys_bpf+0x28/0x40
[ 12.029435] [c000000008dbfd20] [c000000000038eb4] system_call_exception+0x334/0x610
[ 12.029497] [c000000008dbfe50] [c00000000000c270] system_call_vectored_common+0xf0/0x280
[ 12.029561] --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x3fff82f5cfa8
[ 12.029608] NIP: 00003fff82f5cfa8 LR: 00003fff82f5cfa8 CTR: 0000000000000000
[ 12.029660] REGS: c000000008dbfe80 TRAP: 3000 Tainted: G T (6.13.0-P9-dirty)
[ 12.029735] MSR: 900000000280f032 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 42004848 XER: 00000000
[ 12.029855] IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: 0000000000000169 00003fffdcf789a0 00003fff83067100 0000000000000005
GPR04: 00003fffdcf78a98 0000000000000090 0000000000000000 0000000000000008
GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR12: 0000000000000000 00003fff836ff7e0 c000000000010678 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00003fffdcf78f28 00003fffdcf78f90
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00003fffdcf78f80
GPR24: 00003fffdcf78f70 00003fffdcf78d10 00003fff835c7239 00003fffdcf78bd8
GPR28: 00003fffdcf78a98 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000000011f547580
[ 12.030316] NIP [00003fff82f5cfa8] 0x3fff82f5cfa8
[ 12.030361] LR [00003fff82f5cfa8] 0x3fff82f5cfa8
[ 12.030405] --- interrupt: 3000
[ 12.030444] ==================================================================
Commit c28c15b6d28a ("powerpc/code-patching: Use temporary mm for
Radix MMU") is inspired from x86 but unlike x86 is doesn't disable
KASAN reports during patching. This wasn't a problem at the begining
because __patch_mem() is not instrumented.
Commit 465cabc97b42 ("powerpc/code-patching: introduce
patch_instructions()") use copy_to_kernel_nofault() to copy several
instructions at once. But when using temporary mm the destination is
not regular kernel memory but a kind of kernel-like memory located
in user address space.
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21867

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, test_run: Fix use-after-free issue in eth_skb_pkt_type()
KMSAN reported a use-after-free issue in eth_skb_pkt_type()[1]. The
cause of the issue was that eth_skb_pkt_type() accessed skb's data
that didn't contain an Ethernet header. This occurs when
bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() passes an invalid value as the user_data
argument to bpf_test_init().
Fix this by returning an error when user_data is less than ETH_HLEN in
bpf_test_init(). Additionally, remove the check for "if (user_size >
size)" as it is unnecessary.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in eth_skb_pkt_type include/linux/etherdevice.h:627 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in eth_type_trans+0x4ee/0x980 net/ethernet/eth.c:165
eth_skb_pkt_type include/linux/etherdevice.h:627 [inline]
eth_type_trans+0x4ee/0x980 net/ethernet/eth.c:165
__xdp_build_skb_from_frame+0x5a8/0xa50 net/core/xdp.c:635
xdp_recv_frames net/bpf/test_run.c:272 [inline]
xdp_test_run_batch net/bpf/test_run.c:361 [inline]
bpf_test_run_xdp_live+0x2954/0x3330 net/bpf/test_run.c:390
bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x148e/0x1b10 net/bpf/test_run.c:1318
bpf_prog_test_run+0x5b7/0xa30 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4371
__sys_bpf+0x6a6/0xe20 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5777
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5866 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5864 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0xa4/0xf0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5864
x64_sys_call+0x2ea0/0x3d90 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:322
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Uninit was created at:
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1056 [inline]
free_unref_page+0x156/0x1320 mm/page_alloc.c:2657
__free_pages+0xa3/0x1b0 mm/page_alloc.c:4838
bpf_ringbuf_free kernel/bpf/ringbuf.c:226 [inline]
ringbuf_map_free+0xff/0x1e0 kernel/bpf/ringbuf.c:235
bpf_map_free kernel/bpf/syscall.c:838 [inline]
bpf_map_free_deferred+0x17c/0x310 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:862
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa2b/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0xedf/0x1550 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x535/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x6e/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 17276 Comm: syz.1.16450 Not tainted 6.12.0-05490-g9bb88c659673 #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21866

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/code-patching: Fix KASAN hit by not flagging text patching area as VM_ALLOC
Erhard reported the following KASAN hit while booting his PowerMac G4
with a KASAN-enabled kernel 6.13-rc6:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8
Write of size 8 at addr f1000000 by task chronyd/1293
CPU: 0 UID: 123 PID: 1293 Comm: chronyd Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4 #2
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: PowerMac3,6 7455 0x80010303 PowerMac
Call Trace:
[c2437590] [c1631a84] dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x8c (unreliable)
[c24375b0] [c0504998] print_report+0xdc/0x504
[c2437610] [c050475c] kasan_report+0xf8/0x108
[c2437690] [c0505a3c] kasan_check_range+0x24/0x18c
[c24376a0] [c03fb5e4] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8
[c24376c0] [c004c014] patch_instructions+0x15c/0x16c
[c2437710] [c00731a8] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x60/0x7c
[c2437730] [c0281168] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x50/0xac
[c2437750] [c0073cf4] bpf_int_jit_compile+0xb30/0xdec
[c2437880] [c0280394] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x15c/0x478
[c24378d0] [c1263428] bpf_prepare_filter+0xbf8/0xc14
[c2437990] [c12677ec] bpf_prog_create_from_user+0x258/0x2b4
[c24379d0] [c027111c] do_seccomp+0x3dc/0x1890
[c2437ac0] [c001d8e0] system_call_exception+0x2dc/0x420
[c2437f30] [c00281ac] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2c
--- interrupt: c00 at 0x5a1274
NIP: 005a1274 LR: 006a3b3c CTR: 005296c8
REGS: c2437f40 TRAP: 0c00 Tainted: G W (6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4)
MSR: 0200f932 <VEC,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 24004422 XER: 00000000
GPR00: 00000166 af8f3fa0 a7ee3540 00000001 00000000 013b6500 005a5858 0200f932
GPR08: 00000000 00001fe9 013d5fc8 005296c8 2822244c 00b2fcd8 00000000 af8f4b57
GPR16: 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000002
GPR24: 00afdbb0 00000000 00000000 00000000 006e0004 013ce060 006e7c1c 00000001
NIP [005a1274] 0x5a1274
LR [006a3b3c] 0x6a3b3c
--- interrupt: c00
The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
[f1000000, f1002000) created by:
text_area_cpu_up+0x20/0x190
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x76e30
flags: 0x80000000(zone=2)
raw: 80000000 00000000 00000122 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000001
raw: 00000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
f0ffff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
f0ffff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>f1000000: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
^
f1000080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
f1000100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
==================================================================
f8 corresponds to KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID which means the area is not
initialised hence not supposed to be used yet.
Powerpc text patching infrastructure allocates a virtual memory area
using get_vm_area() and flags it as VM_ALLOC. But that flag is meant
to be used for vmalloc() and vmalloc() allocated memory is not
supposed to be used before a call to __vmalloc_node_range() which is
never called for that area.
That went undetected until commit e4137f08816b ("mm, kasan, kmsan:
instrument copy_from/to_kernel_nofault")
The area allocated by text_area_cpu_up() is not vmalloc memory, it is
mapped directly on demand when needed by map_kernel_page(). There is
no VM flag corresponding to such usage, so just pass no flag. That way
the area will be unpoisonned and usable immediately.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21829

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix the warning "__rxe_cleanup+0x12c/0x170 [rdma_rxe]"
The Call Trace is as below:
"
<TASK>
? show_regs.cold+0x1a/0x1f
? __rxe_cleanup+0x12c/0x170 [rdma_rxe]
? __warn+0x84/0xd0
? __rxe_cleanup+0x12c/0x170 [rdma_rxe]
? report_bug+0x105/0x180
? handle_bug+0x46/0x80
? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
? __rxe_cleanup+0x12c/0x170 [rdma_rxe]
? __rxe_cleanup+0x124/0x170 [rdma_rxe]
rxe_destroy_qp.cold+0x24/0x29 [rdma_rxe]
ib_destroy_qp_user+0x118/0x190 [ib_core]
rdma_destroy_qp.cold+0x43/0x5e [rdma_cm]
rtrs_cq_qp_destroy.cold+0x1d/0x2b [rtrs_core]
rtrs_srv_close_work.cold+0x1b/0x31 [rtrs_server]
process_one_work+0x21d/0x3f0
worker_thread+0x4a/0x3c0
? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0
kthread+0xf0/0x120
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
"
When too many rdma resources are allocated, rxe needs more time to
handle these rdma resources. Sometimes with the current timeout, rxe
can not release the rdma resources correctly.
Compared with other rdma drivers, a bigger timeout is used.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21827

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Add locks for usb_driver_claim_interface()
The documentation for usb_driver_claim_interface() says that "the
device lock" is needed when the function is called from places other
than probe(). This appears to be the lock for the USB interface
device. The Mediatek btusb code gets called via this path:
Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on [bluetooth]
Call trace:
usb_driver_claim_interface
btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf
btusb_mtk_setup
hci_dev_open_sync
hci_power_on
process_scheduled_works
worker_thread
kthread
With the above call trace the device lock hasn't been claimed. Claim
it.
Without this fix, we'd sometimes see the error "Failed to claim iso
interface". Sometimes we'd even see worse errors, like a NULL pointer
dereference (where `intf->dev.driver` was NULL) with a trace like:
Call trace:
usb_suspend_both
usb_runtime_suspend
__rpm_callback
rpm_suspend
pm_runtime_work
process_scheduled_works
Both errors appear to be fixed with the proper locking.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21825

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Cancel the running bpf_timer through kworker for PREEMPT_RT
During the update procedure, when overwrite element in a pre-allocated
htab, the freeing of old_element is protected by the bucket lock. The
reason why the bucket lock is necessary is that the old_element has
already been stashed in htab->extra_elems after alloc_htab_elem()
returns. If freeing the old_element after the bucket lock is unlocked,
the stashed element may be reused by concurrent update procedure and the
freeing of old_element will run concurrently with the reuse of the
old_element. However, the invocation of check_and_free_fields() may
acquire a spin-lock which violates the lockdep rule because its caller
has already held a raw-spin-lock (bucket lock). The following warning
will be reported when such race happens:
BUG: scheduling while atomic: test_progs/676/0x00000003
3 locks held by test_progs/676:
#0: ffffffff864b0240 (rcu_read_lock_trace){....}-{0:0}, at: bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x2c0/0x830
#1: ffff88810e961188 (&htab->lockdep_key){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x306/0x1500
#2: ffff8881f4eac1b8 (&base->softirq_expiry_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: hrtimer_cancel_wait_running+0xe9/0x1b0
Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(O)
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffffff817837a3>] htab_map_update_elem+0x293/0x1500
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 676 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G ... 6.12.0+ #11
Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x70
dump_stack+0x10/0x20
__schedule_bug+0x120/0x170
__schedule+0x300c/0x4800
schedule_rtlock+0x37/0x60
rtlock_slowlock_locked+0x6d9/0x54c0
rt_spin_lock+0x168/0x230
hrtimer_cancel_wait_running+0xe9/0x1b0
hrtimer_cancel+0x24/0x30
bpf_timer_delete_work+0x1d/0x40
bpf_timer_cancel_and_free+0x5e/0x80
bpf_obj_free_fields+0x262/0x4a0
check_and_free_fields+0x1d0/0x280
htab_map_update_elem+0x7fc/0x1500
bpf_prog_9f90bc20768e0cb9_overwrite_cb+0x3f/0x43
bpf_prog_ea601c4649694dbd_overwrite_timer+0x5d/0x7e
bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x322/0x830
__sys_bpf+0x135d/0x3ca0
__x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0
x64_sys_call+0x1b5/0xa10
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
...
</TASK>
It seems feasible to break the reuse and refill of per-cpu extra_elems
into two independent parts: reuse the per-cpu extra_elems with bucket
lock being held and refill the old_element as per-cpu extra_elems after
the bucket lock is unlocked. However, it will make the concurrent
overwrite procedures on the same CPU return unexpected -E2BIG error when
the map is full.
Therefore, the patch fixes the lock problem by breaking the cancelling
of bpf_timer into two steps for PREEMPT_RT:
1) use hrtimer_try_to_cancel() and check its return value
2) if the timer is running, use hrtimer_cancel() through a kworker to
cancel it again
Considering that the current implementation of hrtimer_cancel() will try
to acquire a being held softirq_expiry_lock when the current timer is
running, these steps above are reasonable. However, it also has
downside. When the timer is running, the cancelling of the timer is
delayed when releasing the last map uref. The delay is also fixable
(e.g., break the cancelling of bpf timer into two parts: one part in
locked scope, another one in unlocked scope), it can be revised later if
necessary.
It is a bit hard to decide the right fix tag. One reason is that the
problem depends on PREEMPT_RT which is enabled in v6.12. Considering the
softirq_expiry_lock lock exists since v5.4 and bpf_timer is introduced
in v5.15, the bpf_timer commit is used in the fixes tag and an extra
depends-on tag is added to state the dependency on PREEMPT_RT.
Depends-on: v6.12+ with PREEMPT_RT enabled

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21810

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
driver core: class: Fix wild pointer dereferences in API class_dev_iter_next()
There are a potential wild pointer dereferences issue regarding APIs
class_dev_iter_(init|next|exit)(), as explained by below typical usage:
// All members of @iter are wild pointers.
struct class_dev_iter iter;
// class_dev_iter_init(@iter, @class, ...) checks parameter @class for
// potential class_to_subsys() error, and it returns void type and does
// not initialize its output parameter @iter, so caller can not detect
// the error and continues to invoke class_dev_iter_next(@iter) even if
// @iter still contains wild pointers.
class_dev_iter_init(&iter, ...);
// Dereference these wild pointers in @iter here once suffer the error.
while (dev = class_dev_iter_next(&iter)) { ... };
// Also dereference these wild pointers here.
class_dev_iter_exit(&iter);
Actually, all callers of these APIs have such usage pattern in kernel tree.
Fix by:
- Initialize output parameter @iter by memset() in class_dev_iter_init()
and give callers prompt by pr_crit() for the error.
- Check if @iter is valid in class_dev_iter_next().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21807

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: fix queue freeze vs limits lock order in sysfs store methods
queue_attr_store() always freezes a device queue before calling the
attribute store operation. For attributes that control queue limits, the
store operation will also lock the queue limits with a call to
queue_limits_start_update(). However, some drivers (e.g. SCSI sd) may
need to issue commands to a device to obtain limit values from the
hardware with the queue limits locked. This creates a potential ABBA
deadlock situation if a user attempts to modify a limit (thus freezing
the device queue) while the device driver starts a revalidation of the
device queue limits.
Avoid such deadlock by not freezing the queue before calling the
->store_limit() method in struct queue_sysfs_entry and instead use the
queue_limits_commit_update_frozen helper to freeze the queue after taking
the limits lock.
This also removes taking the sysfs lock for the store_limit method as
it doesn't protect anything here, but creates even more nesting.
Hopefully it will go away from the actual sysfs methods entirely soon.
(commit log adapted from a similar patch from Damien Le Moal)

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21776

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: hub: Ignore non-compliant devices with too many configs or interfaces
Robert Morris created a test program which can cause
usb_hub_to_struct_hub() to dereference a NULL or inappropriate
pointer:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xcccccccccccccccc: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 117 Comm: kworker/7:1 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-00017-gf44d154d6e3d #14
Hardware name: FreeBSD BHYVE/BHYVE, BIOS 14.0 10/17/2021
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
RIP: 0010:usb_hub_adjust_deviceremovable+0x78/0x110
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die_addr+0x31/0x80
? exc_general_protection+0x1b4/0x3c0
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
? usb_hub_adjust_deviceremovable+0x78/0x110
hub_probe+0x7c7/0xab0
usb_probe_interface+0x14b/0x350
really_probe+0xd0/0x2d0
? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10
__driver_probe_device+0x6e/0x110
driver_probe_device+0x1a/0x90
__device_attach_driver+0x7e/0xc0
bus_for_each_drv+0x7f/0xd0
__device_attach+0xaa/0x1a0
bus_probe_device+0x8b/0xa0
device_add+0x62e/0x810
usb_set_configuration+0x65d/0x990
usb_generic_driver_probe+0x4b/0x70
usb_probe_device+0x36/0xd0
The cause of this error is that the device has two interfaces, and the
hub driver binds to interface 1 instead of interface 0, which is where
usb_hub_to_struct_hub() looks.
We can prevent the problem from occurring by refusing to accept hub
devices that violate the USB spec by having more than one
configuration or interface.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21733

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/osnoise: Fix resetting of tracepoints
If a timerlat tracer is started with the osnoise option OSNOISE_WORKLOAD
disabled, but then that option is enabled and timerlat is removed, the
tracepoints that were enabled on timerlat registration do not get
disabled. If the option is disabled again and timelat is started, then it
triggers a warning in the tracepoint code due to registering the
tracepoint again without ever disabling it.
Do not use the same user space defined options to know to disable the
tracepoints when timerlat is removed. Instead, set a global flag when it
is enabled and use that flag to know to disable the events.
~# echo NO_OSNOISE_WORKLOAD > /sys/kernel/tracing/osnoise/options
~# echo timerlat > /sys/kernel/tracing/current_tracer
~# echo OSNOISE_WORKLOAD > /sys/kernel/tracing/osnoise/options
~# echo nop > /sys/kernel/tracing/current_tracer
~# echo NO_OSNOISE_WORKLOAD > /sys/kernel/tracing/osnoise/options
~# echo timerlat > /sys/kernel/tracing/current_tracer
Triggers:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 1337 at kernel/tracepoint.c:294 tracepoint_add_func+0x3b6/0x3f0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 1337 Comm: rtla Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-test-00018-ga867c441128e-dirty #73
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:tracepoint_add_func+0x3b6/0x3f0
Code: 48 8b 53 28 48 8b 73 20 4c 89 04 24 e8 23 59 11 00 4c 8b 04 24 e9 36 fe ff ff 0f 0b b8 ea ff ff ff 45 84 e4 0f 84 68 fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 61 fe ff ff 48 8b 7b 18 48 85 ff 0f 84 4f ff ff ff 49 8b
RSP: 0018:ffffb9b003a87ca0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000ffffffef RBX: ffffffff92f30860 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9bf59e91ccd0 RDI: ffffffff913b6410
RBP: 000000000000000a R08: 00000000000005c7 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: ffffb9b003a87ce0 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffffb9b003a87ce0 R14: ffffffffffffffef R15: 0000000000000008
FS: 00007fce81209240(0000) GS:ffff9bf6fdd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055e99b728000 CR3: 00000001277c0002 CR4: 0000000000172ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn.cold+0xb7/0x14d
? tracepoint_add_func+0x3b6/0x3f0
? report_bug+0xea/0x170
? handle_bug+0x58/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? __pfx_trace_sched_migrate_callback+0x10/0x10
? tracepoint_add_func+0x3b6/0x3f0
? __pfx_trace_sched_migrate_callback+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_trace_sched_migrate_callback+0x10/0x10
tracepoint_probe_register+0x78/0xb0
? __pfx_trace_sched_migrate_callback+0x10/0x10
osnoise_workload_start+0x2b5/0x370
timerlat_tracer_init+0x76/0x1b0
tracing_set_tracer+0x244/0x400
tracing_set_trace_write+0xa0/0xe0
vfs_write+0xfc/0x570
? do_sys_openat2+0x9c/0xe0
ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21727

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
padata: fix UAF in padata_reorder
A bug was found when run ltp test:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in padata_find_next+0x29/0x1a0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88bbfe003524 by task kworker/u113:2/3039206
CPU: 0 PID: 3039206 Comm: kworker/u113:2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.6.0+
Workqueue: pdecrypt_parallel padata_parallel_worker
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x32/0x50
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x6b/0x3d0
print_report+0xdd/0x2c0
kasan_report+0xa5/0xd0
padata_find_next+0x29/0x1a0
padata_reorder+0x131/0x220
padata_parallel_worker+0x3d/0xc0
process_one_work+0x2ec/0x5a0
If 'mdelay(10)' is added before calling 'padata_find_next' in the
'padata_reorder' function, this issue could be reproduced easily with
ltp test (pcrypt_aead01).
This can be explained as bellow:
pcrypt_aead_encrypt
...
padata_do_parallel
refcount_inc(&pd->refcnt); // add refcnt
...
padata_do_serial
padata_reorder // pd
while (1) {
padata_find_next(pd, true); // using pd
queue_work_on
...
padata_serial_workercrypto_del_alg
padata_put_pd_cnt // sub refcnt
padata_free_shell
padata_put_pd(ps->pd);
// pd is freed
// loop again, but pd is freed
// call padata_find_next, UAF
}
In the padata_reorder function, when it loops in 'while', if the alg is
deleted, the refcnt may be decreased to 0 before entering
'padata_find_next', which leads to UAF.
As mentioned in [1], do_serial is supposed to be called with BHs disabled
and always happen under RCU protection, to address this issue, add
synchronize_rcu() in 'padata_free_shell' wait for all _do_serial calls
to finish.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221028160401.cccypv4euxikusiq@parnassus.localdomain/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/jfjz5d7zwbytztackem7ibzalm5lnxldi2eofeiczqmqs2m7o6@fq426cwnjtkm/

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21723

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpi3mr: Fix possible crash when setting up bsg fails
If bsg_setup_queue() fails, the bsg_queue is assigned a non-NULL value.
Consequently, in mpi3mr_bsg_exit(), the condition "if(!mrioc->bsg_queue)"
will not be satisfied, preventing execution from entering
bsg_remove_queue(), which could lead to the following crash:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000041c
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mpi3mr_bsg_exit+0x1f/0x50 [mpi3mr]
mpi3mr_remove+0x6f/0x340 [mpi3mr]
pci_device_remove+0x3f/0xb0
device_release_driver_internal+0x19d/0x220
unbind_store+0xa4/0xb0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11f/0x200
vfs_write+0x1fc/0x3e0
ksys_write+0x67/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21719

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmr: do not call mr_mfc_uses_dev() for unres entries
syzbot found that calling mr_mfc_uses_dev() for unres entries
would crash [1], because c->mfc_un.res.minvif / c->mfc_un.res.maxvif
alias to "struct sk_buff_head unresolved", which contain two pointers.
This code never worked, lets remove it.
[1]
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff5fff2d536613
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xfffefff96a9b3098-0xfffefff96a9b309f]
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 7321 Comm: syz.0.16 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-syzkaller-g1950a0af2d55 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : mr_mfc_uses_dev net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:290 [inline]
pc : mr_table_dump+0x5a4/0x8b0 net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:334
lr : mr_mfc_uses_dev net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:289 [inline]
lr : mr_table_dump+0x694/0x8b0 net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:334
Call trace:
mr_mfc_uses_dev net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:290 [inline] (P)
mr_table_dump+0x5a4/0x8b0 net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:334 (P)
mr_rtm_dumproute+0x254/0x454 net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:382
ipmr_rtm_dumproute+0x248/0x4b4 net/ipv4/ipmr.c:2648
rtnl_dump_all+0x2e4/0x4e8 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4327
rtnl_dumpit+0x98/0x1d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6791
netlink_dump+0x4f0/0xbc0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2317
netlink_recvmsg+0x56c/0xe64 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1973
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1033 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1055 [inline]
sock_read_iter+0x2d8/0x40c net/socket.c:1125
new_sync_read fs/read_write.c:484 [inline]
vfs_read+0x740/0x970 fs/read_write.c:565
ksys_read+0x15c/0x26c fs/read_write.c:708

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21716

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: Fix uninit-value in vxlan_vnifilter_dump()
KMSAN reported an uninit-value access in vxlan_vnifilter_dump() [1].
If the length of the netlink message payload is less than
sizeof(struct tunnel_msg), vxlan_vnifilter_dump() accesses bytes
beyond the message. This can lead to uninit-value access. Fix this by
returning an error in such situations.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in vxlan_vnifilter_dump+0x328/0x920 drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_vnifilter.c:422
vxlan_vnifilter_dump+0x328/0x920 drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_vnifilter.c:422
rtnl_dumpit+0xd5/0x2f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6786
netlink_dump+0x93e/0x15f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2317
__netlink_dump_start+0x716/0xd60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2432
netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:340 [inline]
rtnetlink_dump_start net/core/rtnetlink.c:6815 [inline]
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1256/0x14a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6882
netlink_rcv_skb+0x467/0x660 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2542
rtnetlink_rcv+0x35/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6944
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1321 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xed6/0x1290 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1347
netlink_sendmsg+0x1092/0x1230 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1891
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x330/0x3d0 net/socket.c:726
____sys_sendmsg+0x7f4/0xb50 net/socket.c:2583
___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2637
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2669 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2672 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x211/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2672
x64_sys_call+0x3878/0x3d90 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4110 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4153 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x800/0xe80 mm/slub.c:4205
kmalloc_reserve+0x13b/0x4b0 net/core/skbuff.c:587
__alloc_skb+0x347/0x7d0 net/core/skbuff.c:678
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1323 [inline]
netlink_alloc_large_skb+0xa5/0x280 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1196
netlink_sendmsg+0xac9/0x1230 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1866
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x330/0x3d0 net/socket.c:726
____sys_sendmsg+0x7f4/0xb50 net/socket.c:2583
___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2637
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2669 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2672 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x211/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2672
x64_sys_call+0x3878/0x3d90 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 30991 Comm: syz.4.10630 Not tainted 6.12.0-10694-gc44daa7e3c73 #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21713

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/pseries/iommu: Don't unset window if it was never set
On pSeries, when user attempts to use the same vfio container used by
different iommu group, the spapr_tce_set_window() returns -EPERM
and the subsequent cleanup leads to the below crash.
Kernel attempted to read user page (308) - exploit attempt?
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000308
Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000001ce358
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
NIP: c0000000001ce358 LR: c0000000001ce05c CTR: c00000000005add0
<snip>
NIP [c0000000001ce358] spapr_tce_unset_window+0x3b8/0x510
LR [c0000000001ce05c] spapr_tce_unset_window+0xbc/0x510
Call Trace:
spapr_tce_unset_window+0xbc/0x510 (unreliable)
tce_iommu_attach_group+0x24c/0x340 [vfio_iommu_spapr_tce]
vfio_container_attach_group+0xec/0x240 [vfio]
vfio_group_fops_unl_ioctl+0x548/0xb00 [vfio]
sys_ioctl+0x754/0x1580
system_call_exception+0x13c/0x330
system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
<snip>
--- interrupt: 3000
Fix this by having null check for the tbl passed to the
spapr_tce_unset_window().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21708

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: rtl8150: enable basic endpoint checking
Syzkaller reports [1] encountering a common issue of utilizing a wrong
usb endpoint type during URB submitting stage. This, in turn, triggers
a warning shown below.
For now, enable simple endpoint checking (specifically, bulk and
interrupt eps, testing control one is not essential) to mitigate
the issue with a view to do other related cosmetic changes later,
if they are necessary.
[1] Syzkaller report:
usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2586 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503 usb_submit_urb+0xe4b/0x1730 driv>
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2586 Comm: dhcpcd Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller-00069-gfc88bb11617>
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xe4b/0x1730 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503
Code: 84 3c 02 00 00 e8 05 e4 fc fc 4c 89 ef e8 fd 25 d7 fe 45 89 e0 89 e9 4c 89 f2 48 8>
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000441f740 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888112487a00 RCX: ffffffff811a99a9
RDX: ffff88810df6ba80 RSI: ffffffff811a99b6 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff8881023bf0a8 R14: ffff888112452a20 R15: ffff888112487a7c
FS: 00007fc04eea5740(0000) GS:ffff8881f6300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0a1de9f870 CR3: 000000010dbd0000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rtl8150_open+0x300/0xe30 drivers/net/usb/rtl8150.c:733
__dev_open+0x2d4/0x4e0 net/core/dev.c:1474
__dev_change_flags+0x561/0x720 net/core/dev.c:8838
dev_change_flags+0x8f/0x160 net/core/dev.c:8910
devinet_ioctl+0x127a/0x1f10 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1177
inet_ioctl+0x3aa/0x3f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1003
sock_do_ioctl+0x116/0x280 net/socket.c:1222
sock_ioctl+0x22e/0x6c0 net/socket.c:1341
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fc04ef73d49
...
This change has not been tested on real hardware.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21663

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: dwmac-tegra: Read iommu stream id from device tree
Nvidia's Tegra MGBE controllers require the IOMMU "Stream ID" (SID) to be
written to the MGBE_WRAP_AXI_ASID0_CTRL register.
The current driver is hard coded to use MGBE0's SID for all controllers.
This causes softirq time outs and kernel panics when using controllers
other than MGBE0.
Example dmesg errors when an ethernet cable is connected to MGBE1:
[ 116.133290] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: Link is Up - 1Gbps/Full - flow control rx/tx
[ 121.851283] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: NETDEV WATCHDOG: CPU: 5: transmit queue 0 timed out 5690 ms
[ 121.851782] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: Reset adapter.
[ 121.892464] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: Register MEM_TYPE_PAGE_POOL RxQ-0
[ 121.905920] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: PHY [stmmac-1:00] driver [Aquantia AQR113] (irq=171)
[ 121.907356] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: Enabling Safety Features
[ 121.907578] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: IEEE 1588-2008 Advanced Timestamp supported
[ 121.908399] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: registered PTP clock
[ 121.908582] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: configuring for phy/10gbase-r link mode
[ 125.961292] tegra-mgbe 6910000.ethernet eth1: Link is Up - 1Gbps/Full - flow control rx/tx
[ 181.921198] rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
[ 181.921404] rcu: 7-....: (1 GPs behind) idle=540c/1/0x4000000000000002 softirq=1748/1749 fqs=2337
[ 181.921684] rcu: (detected by 4, t=6002 jiffies, g=1357, q=1254 ncpus=8)
[ 181.921878] Sending NMI from CPU 4 to CPUs 7:
[ 181.921886] NMI backtrace for cpu 7
[ 181.922131] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3+ #6
[ 181.922390] Hardware name: NVIDIA CTI Forge + Orin AGX/Jetson, BIOS 202402.1-Unknown 10/28/2024
[ 181.922658] pstate: 40400009 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 181.922847] pc : handle_softirqs+0x98/0x368
[ 181.922978] lr : __do_softirq+0x18/0x20
[ 181.923095] sp : ffff80008003bf50
[ 181.923189] x29: ffff80008003bf50 x28: 0000000000000008 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 181.923379] x26: ffffce78ea277000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000001c61befda0
[ 181.924486] x23: 0000000060400009 x22: ffffce78e99918bc x21: ffff80008018bd70
[ 181.925568] x20: ffffce78e8bb00d8 x19: ffff80008018bc20 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 181.926655] x17: ffff318ebe7d3000 x16: ffff800080038000 x15: 0000000000000000
[ 181.931455] x14: ffff000080816680 x13: ffff318ebe7d3000 x12: 000000003464d91d
[ 181.938628] x11: 0000000000000040 x10: ffff000080165a70 x9 : ffffce78e8bb0160
[ 181.945804] x8 : ffff8000827b3160 x7 : f9157b241586f343 x6 : eeb6502a01c81c74
[ 181.953068] x5 : a4acfcdd2e8096bb x4 : ffffce78ea277340 x3 : 00000000ffffd1e1
[ 181.960329] x2 : 0000000000000101 x1 : ffffce78ea277340 x0 : ffff318ebe7d3000
[ 181.967591] Call trace:
[ 181.970043] handle_softirqs+0x98/0x368 (P)
[ 181.974240] __do_softirq+0x18/0x20
[ 181.977743] ____do_softirq+0x14/0x28
[ 181.981415] call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 181.985180] do_softirq_own_stack+0x20/0x30
[ 181.989379] __irq_exit_rcu+0x114/0x140
[ 181.993142] irq_exit_rcu+0x14/0x28
[ 181.996816] el1_interrupt+0x44/0xb8
[ 182.000316] el1h_64_irq_handler+0x14/0x20
[ 182.004343] el1h_64_irq+0x80/0x88
[ 182.007755] cpuidle_enter_state+0xc4/0x4a8 (P)
[ 182.012305] cpuidle_enter+0x3c/0x58
[ 182.015980] cpuidle_idle_call+0x128/0x1c0
[ 182.020005] do_idle+0xe0/0xf0
[ 182.023155] cpu_startup_entry+0x3c/0x48
[ 182.026917] secondary_start_kernel+0xdc/0x120
[ 182.031379] __secondary_switched+0x74/0x78
[ 212.971162] rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected expedited stalls on CPUs/tasks: { 7-.... } 6103 jiffies s: 417 root: 0x80/.
[ 212.985935] rcu: blocking rcu_node structures (internal RCU debug):
[ 212.992758] Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 7:
[ 212.998539] NMI backtrace for cpu 7
[ 213.004304] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PI
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21651

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hns3: don't auto enable misc vector
Currently, there is a time window between misc irq enabled
and service task inited. If an interrupte is reported at
this time, it will cause warning like below:
[ 16.324639] Call trace:
[ 16.324641] __queue_delayed_work+0xb8/0xe0
[ 16.324643] mod_delayed_work_on+0x78/0xd0
[ 16.324655] hclge_errhand_task_schedule+0x58/0x90 [hclge]
[ 16.324662] hclge_misc_irq_handle+0x168/0x240 [hclge]
[ 16.324666] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x64/0x1e0
[ 16.324667] handle_irq_event+0x80/0x170
[ 16.324670] handle_fasteoi_edge_irq+0x110/0x2bc
[ 16.324671] __handle_domain_irq+0x84/0xfc
[ 16.324673] gic_handle_irq+0x88/0x2c0
[ 16.324674] el1_irq+0xb8/0x140
[ 16.324677] arch_cpu_idle+0x18/0x40
[ 16.324679] default_idle_call+0x5c/0x1bc
[ 16.324682] cpuidle_idle_call+0x18c/0x1c4
[ 16.324684] do_idle+0x174/0x17c
[ 16.324685] cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x6c
[ 16.324687] secondary_start_kernel+0x1a4/0x280
[ 16.324688] ---[ end trace 6aa0bff672a964aa ]---
So don't auto enable misc vector when request irq..

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21644

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Fix tlb invalidation when wedging
If GuC fails to load, the driver wedges, but in the process it tries to
do stuff that may not be initialized yet. This moves the
xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_init() to be done earlier: as its own doc says,
it's a software-only initialization and should had been named with the
_early() suffix.
Move it to be called by xe_gt_init_early(), so the locks and seqno are
initialized, avoiding a NULL ptr deref when wedging:
xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: load failed: status: Reset = 0, BootROM = 0x50, UKernel = 0x00, MIA = 0x00, Auth = 0x01
xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: firmware signature verification failed
xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* CRITICAL: Xe has declared device 0000:03:00.0 as wedged.
...
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 3908 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G U W 6.13.0-rc4-xe+ #3
Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN
Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-S ADP-S DDR5 UDIMM CRB, BIOS ADLSFWI1.R00.3275.A00.2207010640 07/01/2022
RIP: 0010:xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_reset+0x75/0x110 [xe]
This can be easily triggered by poking the GuC binary to force a
signature failure. There will still be an extra message,
xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: GuC mmio request 0x4100: no reply 0x4100
but that's better than a NULL ptr deref.
(cherry picked from commit 5001ef3af8f2c972d6fd9c5221a8457556f8bea6)

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21634

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup/cpuset: remove kernfs active break
A warning was found:
WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 3486953 at fs/kernfs/file.c:828
CPU: 10 PID: 3486953 Comm: rmdir Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
RIP: 0010:kernfs_should_drain_open_files+0x1a1/0x1b0
RSP: 0018:ffff8881107ef9e0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000080000002 RBX: ffff888154738c00 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888154738c04
RBP: ffff888154738c04 R08: ffffffffaf27fa15 R09: ffffed102a8e7180
R10: ffff888154738c07 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888154738c08
R13: ffff888750f8c000 R14: ffff888750f8c0e8 R15: ffff888154738ca0
FS: 00007f84cd0be740(0000) GS:ffff8887ddc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000555f9fbe00c8 CR3: 0000000153eec001 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
kernfs_drain+0x15e/0x2f0
__kernfs_remove+0x165/0x300
kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x7b/0xc0
cgroup_rm_file+0x154/0x1c0
cgroup_addrm_files+0x1c2/0x1f0
css_clear_dir+0x77/0x110
kill_css+0x4c/0x1b0
cgroup_destroy_locked+0x194/0x380
cgroup_rmdir+0x2a/0x140
It can be explained by:
rmdir echo 1 > cpuset.cpus
kernfs_fop_write_iter // active=0
cgroup_rm_file
kernfs_remove_by_name_nskernfs_get_active // active=1
__kernfs_remove // active=0x80000002
kernfs_draincpuset_write_resmask
wait_event
//waiting (active == 0x80000001)
kernfs_break_active_protection
// active = 0x80000001
// continue
kernfs_unbreak_active_protection
// active = 0x80000002
...
kernfs_should_drain_open_files
// warning occurs
kernfs_put_active
This warning is caused by 'kernfs_break_active_protection' when it is
writing to cpuset.cpus, and the cgroup is removed concurrently.
The commit 3a5a6d0c2b03 ("cpuset: don't nest cgroup_mutex inside
get_online_cpus()") made cpuset_hotplug_workfn asynchronous, This change
involves calling flush_work(), which can create a multiple processes
circular locking dependency that involve cgroup_mutex, potentially leading
to a deadlock. To avoid deadlock. the commit 76bb5ab8f6e3 ("cpuset: break
kernfs active protection in cpuset_write_resmask()") added
'kernfs_break_active_protection' in the cpuset_write_resmask. This could
lead to this warning.
After the commit 2125c0034c5d ("cgroup/cpuset: Make cpuset hotplug
processing synchronous"), the cpuset_write_resmask no longer needs to
wait the hotplug to finish, which means that concurrent hotplug and cpuset
operations are no longer possible. Therefore, the deadlock doesn't exist
anymore and it does not have to 'break active protection' now. To fix this
warning, just remove kernfs_break_active_protection operation in the
'cpuset_write_resmask'.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21632

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/fpu: Ensure shadow stack is active before "getting" registers
The x86 shadow stack support has its own set of registers. Those registers
are XSAVE-managed, but they are "supervisor state components" which means
that userspace can not touch them with XSAVE/XRSTOR. It also means that
they are not accessible from the existing ptrace ABI for XSAVE state.
Thus, there is a new ptrace get/set interface for it.
The regset code that ptrace uses provides an ->active() handler in
addition to the get/set ones. For shadow stack this ->active() handler
verifies that shadow stack is enabled via the ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK bit in the
thread struct. The ->active() handler is checked from some call sites of
the regset get/set handlers, but not the ptrace ones. This was not
understood when shadow stack support was put in place.
As a result, both the set/get handlers can be called with
XFEATURE_CET_USER in its init state, which would cause get_xsave_addr() to
return NULL and trigger a WARN_ON(). The ssp_set() handler luckily has an
ssp_active() check to avoid surprising the kernel with shadow stack
behavior when the kernel is not ready for it (ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK==0). That
check just happened to avoid the warning.
But the ->get() side wasn't so lucky. It can be called with shadow stacks
disabled, triggering the warning in practice, as reported by Christina
Schimpe:
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1773 at arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c:198 ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x6e/0x80
? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
? __warn+0x91/0x150
? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
? report_bug+0x19d/0x1b0
? handle_bug+0x46/0x80
? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
? __pfx_ssp_get+0x10/0x10
? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
? ssp_get+0x52/0xa0
__regset_get+0xad/0xf0
copy_regset_to_user+0x52/0xc0
ptrace_regset+0x119/0x140
ptrace_request+0x13c/0x850
? wait_task_inactive+0x142/0x1d0
? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90
arch_ptrace+0x102/0x300
[...]
Ensure that shadow stacks are active in a thread before looking them up
in the XSAVE buffer. Since ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK and user_ssp[SHSTK_EN] are
set at the same time, the active check ensures that there will be
something to find in the XSAVE buffer.
[ dhansen: changelog/subject tweaks ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-58090

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/core: Prevent rescheduling when interrupts are disabled
David reported a warning observed while loop testing kexec jump:
Interrupts enabled after irqrouter_resume+0x0/0x50
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 560 at drivers/base/syscore.c:103 syscore_resume+0x18a/0x220
kernel_kexec+0xf6/0x180
__do_sys_reboot+0x206/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
The corresponding interrupt flag trace:
hardirqs last enabled at (15573): [<ffffffffa8281b8e>] __up_console_sem+0x7e/0x90
hardirqs last disabled at (15580): [<ffffffffa8281b73>] __up_console_sem+0x63/0x90
That means __up_console_sem() was invoked with interrupts enabled. Further
instrumentation revealed that in the interrupt disabled section of kexec
jump one of the syscore_suspend() callbacks woke up a task, which set the
NEED_RESCHED flag. A later callback in the resume path invoked
cond_resched() which in turn led to the invocation of the scheduler:
__cond_resched+0x21/0x60
down_timeout+0x18/0x60
acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x4c/0x80
acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x3d/0x100
acpi_ns_get_node+0x27/0x60
acpi_ns_evaluate+0x1cb/0x2d0
acpi_rs_set_srs_method_data+0x156/0x190
acpi_pci_link_set+0x11c/0x290
irqrouter_resume+0x54/0x60
syscore_resume+0x6a/0x200
kernel_kexec+0x145/0x1c0
__do_sys_reboot+0xeb/0x240
do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
This is a long standing problem, which probably got more visible with
the recent printk changes. Something does a task wakeup and the
scheduler sets the NEED_RESCHED flag. cond_resched() sees it set and
invokes schedule() from a completely bogus context. The scheduler
enables interrupts after context switching, which causes the above
warning at the end.
Quite some of the code paths in syscore_suspend()/resume() can result in
triggering a wakeup with the exactly same consequences. They might not
have done so yet, but as they share a lot of code with normal operations
it's just a question of time.
The problem only affects the PREEMPT_NONE and PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY scheduling
models. Full preemption is not affected as cond_resched() is disabled and
the preemption check preemptible() takes the interrupt disabled flag into
account.
Cure the problem by adding a corresponding check into cond_resched().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-58084

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: qcom: scm: Fix missing read barrier in qcom_scm_get_tzmem_pool()
Commit 2e4955167ec5 ("firmware: qcom: scm: Fix __scm and waitq
completion variable initialization") introduced a write barrier in probe
function to store global '__scm' variable. We all known barriers are
paired (see memory-barriers.txt: "Note that write barriers should
normally be paired with read or address-dependency barriers"), therefore
accessing it from concurrent contexts requires read barrier. Previous
commit added such barrier in qcom_scm_is_available(), so let's use that
directly.
Lack of this read barrier can result in fetching stale '__scm' variable
value, NULL, and dereferencing it.
Note that barrier in qcom_scm_is_available() satisfies here the control
dependency.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-58070

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: bpf_local_storage: Always use bpf_mem_alloc in PREEMPT_RT
In PREEMPT_RT, kmalloc(GFP_ATOMIC) is still not safe in non preemptible
context. bpf_mem_alloc must be used in PREEMPT_RT. This patch is
to enforce bpf_mem_alloc in the bpf_local_storage when CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT
is enabled.
[ 35.118559] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
[ 35.118566] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1832, name: test_progs
[ 35.118569] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
[ 35.118571] RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 1
[ 35.118577] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
...
[ 35.118647] __might_resched+0x433/0x5b0
[ 35.118677] rt_spin_lock+0xc3/0x290
[ 35.118700] ___slab_alloc+0x72/0xc40
[ 35.118723] __kmalloc_noprof+0x13f/0x4e0
[ 35.118732] bpf_map_kzalloc+0xe5/0x220
[ 35.118740] bpf_selem_alloc+0x1d2/0x7b0
[ 35.118755] bpf_local_storage_update+0x2fa/0x8b0
[ 35.118784] bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing+0x15a/0x1d0
[ 35.118791] bpf_prog_9a118d86fca78ebb_trace_inet_sock_set_state+0x44/0x66
[ 35.118795] bpf_trace_run3+0x222/0x400
[ 35.118820] __bpf_trace_inet_sock_set_state+0x11/0x20
[ 35.118824] trace_inet_sock_set_state+0x112/0x130
[ 35.118830] inet_sk_state_store+0x41/0x90
[ 35.118836] tcp_set_state+0x3b3/0x640
There is no need to adjust the gfp_flags passing to the
bpf_mem_cache_alloc_flags() which only honors the GFP_KERNEL.
The verifier has ensured GFP_KERNEL is passed only in sleepable context.
It has been an old issue since the first introduction of the
bpf_local_storage ~5 years ago, so this patch targets the bpf-next.
bpf_mem_alloc is needed to solve it, so the Fixes tag is set
to the commit when bpf_mem_alloc was first used in the bpf_local_storage.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57999

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/pseries/iommu: IOMMU incorrectly marks MMIO range in DDW
Power Hypervisor can possibily allocate MMIO window intersecting with
Dynamic DMA Window (DDW) range, which is over 32-bit addressing.
These MMIO pages needs to be marked as reserved so that IOMMU doesn't map
DMA buffers in this range.
The current code is not marking these pages correctly which is resulting
in LPAR to OOPS while booting. The stack is at below
BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0xc00800005cd40000
Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000005cdac
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: af_packet rfkill ibmveth(X) lpfc(+) nvmet_fc nvmet nvme_keyring crct10dif_vpmsum nvme_fc nvme_fabrics nvme_core be2net(+) nvme_auth rtc_generic nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc fuse configfs ip_tables x_tables xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time ibmvfc(X) scsi_transport_fc vmx_crypto gf128mul crc32c_vpmsum dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_multipath dm_mod sd_mod scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_alua t10_pi crc64_rocksoft_generic crc64_rocksoft sg crc64 scsi_mod
Supported: Yes, External
CPU: 8 PID: 241 Comm: kworker/8:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.4.0-150600.23.14-default #1 SLE15-SP6 b44ee71c81261b9e4bab5e0cde1f2ed891d5359b
Hardware name: IBM,9080-M9S POWER9 (raw) 0x4e2103 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW950.B0 (VH950_149) hv:phyp pSeries
Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
NIP: c00000000005cdac LR: c00000000005e830 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c00001400c9ff770 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.4.0-150600.23.14-default)
MSR: 800000000280b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24228448 XER: 00000001
CFAR: c00000000005cdd4 DAR: c00800005cd40000 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c00000000005e830 c00001400c9ffa10 c000000001987d00 c00001400c4fe800
GPR04: 0000080000000000 0000000000000001 0000000004000000 0000000000800000
GPR08: 0000000004000000 0000000000000001 c00800005cd40000 ffffffffffffffff
GPR12: 0000000084228882 c00000000a4c4f00 0000000000000010 0000080000000000
GPR16: c00001400c4fe800 0000000004000000 0800000000000000 c00000006088b800
GPR20: c00001401a7be980 c00001400eff3800 c000000002a2da68 000000000000002b
GPR24: c0000000026793a8 c000000002679368 000000000000002a c0000000026793c8
GPR28: 000008007effffff 0000080000000000 0000000000800000 c00001400c4fe800
NIP [c00000000005cdac] iommu_table_reserve_pages+0xac/0x100
LR [c00000000005e830] iommu_init_table+0x80/0x1e0
Call Trace:
[c00001400c9ffa10] [c00000000005e810] iommu_init_table+0x60/0x1e0 (unreliable)
[c00001400c9ffa90] [c00000000010356c] iommu_bypass_supported_pSeriesLP+0x9cc/0xe40
[c00001400c9ffc30] [c00000000005c300] dma_iommu_dma_supported+0xf0/0x230
[c00001400c9ffcb0] [c00000000024b0c4] dma_supported+0x44/0x90
[c00001400c9ffcd0] [c00000000024b14c] dma_set_mask+0x3c/0x80
[c00001400c9ffd00] [c0080000555b715c] be_probe+0xc4/0xb90 [be2net]
[c00001400c9ffdc0] [c000000000986f3c] local_pci_probe+0x6c/0x110
[c00001400c9ffe40] [c000000000188f28] work_for_cpu_fn+0x38/0x60
[c00001400c9ffe70] [c00000000018e454] process_one_work+0x314/0x620
[c00001400c9fff10] [c00000000018f280] worker_thread+0x2b0/0x620
[c00001400c9fff90] [c00000000019bb18] kthread+0x148/0x150
[c00001400c9fffe0] [c00000000000ded8] start_kernel_thread+0x14/0x18
There are 2 issues in the code
1. The index is "int" while the address is "unsigned long". This results in
negative value when setting the bitmap.
2. The DMA offset is page shifted but the MMIO range is used as-is (64-bit
address). MMIO address needs to be page shifted as well.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57994

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ptr_ring: do not block hard interrupts in ptr_ring_resize_multiple()
Jakub added a lockdep_assert_no_hardirq() check in __page_pool_put_page()
to increase test coverage.
syzbot found a splat caused by hard irq blocking in
ptr_ring_resize_multiple() [1]
As current users of ptr_ring_resize_multiple() do not require
hard irqs being masked, replace it to only block BH.
Rename helpers to better reflect they are safe against BH only.
- ptr_ring_resize_multiple() to ptr_ring_resize_multiple_bh()
- skb_array_resize_multiple() to skb_array_resize_multiple_bh()
[1]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9150 at net/core/page_pool.c:709 __page_pool_put_page net/core/page_pool.c:709 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9150 at net/core/page_pool.c:709 page_pool_put_unrefed_netmem+0x157/0xa40 net/core/page_pool.c:780
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9150 Comm: syz.1.1052 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00202-gf8669d7b5f5d #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
RIP: 0010:__page_pool_put_page net/core/page_pool.c:709 [inline]
RIP: 0010:page_pool_put_unrefed_netmem+0x157/0xa40 net/core/page_pool.c:780
Code: 74 0e e8 7c aa fb f7 eb 43 e8 75 aa fb f7 eb 3c 65 8b 1d 38 a8 6a 76 31 ff 89 de e8 a3 ae fb f7 85 db 74 0b e8 5a aa fb f7 90 <0f> 0b 90 eb 1d 65 8b 1d 15 a8 6a 76 31 ff 89 de e8 84 ae fb f7 85
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000bda6b58 EFLAGS: 00010083
RAX: ffffffff8997e523 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000040000
RDX: ffffc9000fbd0000 RSI: 0000000000001842 RDI: 0000000000001843
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff8997df2c R09: 1ffffd40003a000d
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff940003a000e R12: ffffea0001d00040
R13: ffff88802e8a4000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
FS: 00007fb7aaf716c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fa15a0d4b72 CR3: 00000000561b0000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tun_ptr_free drivers/net/tun.c:617 [inline]
__ptr_ring_swap_queue include/linux/ptr_ring.h:571 [inline]
ptr_ring_resize_multiple_noprof include/linux/ptr_ring.h:643 [inline]
tun_queue_resize drivers/net/tun.c:3694 [inline]
tun_device_event+0xaaf/0x1080 drivers/net/tun.c:3714
notifier_call_chain+0x19f/0x3e0 kernel/notifier.c:93
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2032 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2046 [inline]
dev_change_tx_queue_len+0x158/0x2a0 net/core/dev.c:9024
do_setlink+0xff6/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2923
rtnl_setlink+0x40d/0x5a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3201
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x73f/0xcf0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6647
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57952

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "libfs: fix infinite directory reads for offset dir"
The current directory offset allocator (based on mtree_alloc_cyclic)
stores the next offset value to return in octx->next_offset. This
mechanism typically returns values that increase monotonically over
time. Eventually, though, the newly allocated offset value wraps
back to a low number (say, 2) which is smaller than other already-
allocated offset values.
Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> reports that, after commit 64a7ce76fb90
("libfs: fix infinite directory reads for offset dir"), if a
directory's offset allocator wraps, existing entries are no longer
visible via readdir/getdents because offset_readdir() stops listing
entries once an entry's offset is larger than octx->next_offset.
These entries vanish persistently -- they can be looked up, but will
never again appear in readdir(3) output.
The reason for this is that the commit treats directory offsets as
monotonically increasing integer values rather than opaque cookies,
and introduces this comparison:
if (dentry2offset(dentry) >= last_index) {
On 64-bit platforms, the directory offset value upper bound is
2^63 - 1. Directory offsets will monotonically increase for millions
of years without wrapping.
On 32-bit platforms, however, LONG_MAX is 2^31 - 1. The allocator
can wrap after only a few weeks (at worst).
Revert commit 64a7ce76fb90 ("libfs: fix infinite directory reads for
offset dir") to prepare for a fix that can work properly on 32-bit
systems and might apply to recent LTS kernels where shmem employs
the simple_offset mechanism.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57914

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpci: fix NULL pointer issue on shared irq case
The tcpci_irq() may meet below NULL pointer dereference issue:
[ 2.641851] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000010
[ 2.641951] status 0x1, 0x37f
[ 2.650659] Mem abort info:
[ 2.656490] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 2.660230] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 2.665532] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 2.668579] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 2.671715] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 2.676584] Data abort info:
[ 2.679459] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 2.684936] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 2.689980] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 2.695284] [0000000000000010] user address but active_mm is swapper
[ 2.701632] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 2.707883] Modules linked in:
[ 2.710936] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 87 Comm: irq/111-2-0051 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-06316-g7f63786ad3d1-dirty #4
[ 2.720570] Hardware name: NXP i.MX93 11X11 EVK board (DT)
[ 2.726040] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 2.732989] pc : tcpci_irq+0x38/0x318
[ 2.736647] lr : _tcpci_irq+0x14/0x20
[ 2.740295] sp : ffff80008324bd30
[ 2.743597] x29: ffff80008324bd70 x28: ffff800080107894 x27: ffff800082198f70
[ 2.750721] x26: ffff0000050e6680 x25: ffff000004d172ac x24: ffff0000050f0000
[ 2.757845] x23: ffff000004d17200 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: ffff0000050f0000
[ 2.764969] x20: ffff000004d17200 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000001
[ 2.772093] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff80008183d8a0 x15: ffff00007fbab040
[ 2.779217] x14: ffff00007fb918c0 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 000000000000017a
[ 2.786341] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000a90 x9 : ffff80008324bd00
[ 2.793465] x8 : ffff0000050f0af0 x7 : ffff00007fbaa840 x6 : 0000000000000031
[ 2.800589] x5 : 000000000000017a x4 : 0000000000000002 x3 : 0000000000000002
[ 2.807713] x2 : ffff80008324bd3a x1 : 0000000000000010 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 2.814838] Call trace:
[ 2.817273] tcpci_irq+0x38/0x318
[ 2.820583] _tcpci_irq+0x14/0x20
[ 2.823885] irq_thread_fn+0x2c/0xa8
[ 2.827456] irq_thread+0x16c/0x2f4
[ 2.830940] kthread+0x110/0x114
[ 2.834164] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 2.837738] Code: f9426420 f9001fe0 d2800000 52800201 (f9400a60)
This may happen on shared irq case. Such as two Type-C ports share one
irq. After the first port finished tcpci_register_port(), it may trigger
interrupt. However, if the interrupt comes by chance the 2nd port finishes
devm_request_threaded_irq(), the 2nd port interrupt handler will run at
first. Then the above issue happens due to tcpci is still a NULL pointer
in tcpci_irq() when dereference to regmap.
devm_request_threaded_irq()
<-- port1 irq comes
disable_irq(client->irq);
tcpci_register_port()
This will restore the logic to the state before commit (77e85107a771 "usb:
typec: tcpci: support edge irq").
However, moving tcpci_register_port() earlier creates a problem when use
edge irq because tcpci_init() will be called before
devm_request_threaded_irq(). The tcpci_init() writes the ALERT_MASK to
the hardware to tell it to start generating interrupts but we're not ready
to deal with them yet, then the ALERT events may be missed and ALERT line
will not recover to high level forever. To avoid the issue, this will also
set ALERT_MASK register after devm_request_threaded_irq() return.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57885

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/kmemleak: fix sleeping function called from invalid context at print message
Address a bug in the kernel that triggers a "sleeping function called from
invalid context" warning when /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak is printed under
specific conditions:
- CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y
- Set SELinux as the LSM for the system
- Set kptr_restrict to 1
- kmemleak buffer contains at least one item
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 136, name: cat
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 2, expected: 2
6 locks held by cat/136:
#0: ffff32e64bcbf950 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: seq_read_iter+0xb8/0xe30
#1: ffffafe6aaa9dea0 (scan_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kmemleak_seq_start+0x34/0x128
#3: ffff32e6546b1cd0 (&object->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: kmemleak_seq_show+0x3c/0x1e0
#4: ffffafe6aa8d8560 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: has_ns_capability_noaudit+0x8/0x1b0
#5: ffffafe6aabbc0f8 (notif_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: avc_compute_av+0xc4/0x3d0
irq event stamp: 136660
hardirqs last enabled at (136659): [<ffffafe6a80fd7a0>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xa8/0xd8
hardirqs last disabled at (136660): [<ffffafe6a80fd85c>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8c/0xb0
softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffafe6a5d50b28>] copy_process+0x11d8/0x3df8
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffafe6a6598a4c>] kmemleak_seq_show+0x3c/0x1e0
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 136 Comm: cat Tainted: G E 6.11.0-rt7+ #34
Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0xa0/0x128
show_stack+0x1c/0x30
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x198
dump_stack+0x18/0x20
rt_spin_lock+0x8c/0x1a8
avc_perm_nonode+0xa0/0x150
cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x118/0x218
selinux_capable+0x50/0x80
security_capable+0x7c/0xd0
has_ns_capability_noaudit+0x94/0x1b0
has_capability_noaudit+0x20/0x30
restricted_pointer+0x21c/0x4b0
pointer+0x298/0x760
vsnprintf+0x330/0xf70
seq_printf+0x178/0x218
print_unreferenced+0x1a4/0x2d0
kmemleak_seq_show+0xd0/0x1e0
seq_read_iter+0x354/0xe30
seq_read+0x250/0x378
full_proxy_read+0xd8/0x148
vfs_read+0x190/0x918
ksys_read+0xf0/0x1e0
__arm64_sys_read+0x70/0xa8
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xd4/0x1d8
el0_svc+0x50/0x158
el0t_64_sync+0x17c/0x180
%pS and %pK, in the same back trace line, are redundant, and %pS can void
%pK service in certain contexts.
%pS alone already provides the necessary information, and if it cannot
resolve the symbol, it falls back to printing the raw address voiding
the original intent behind the %pK.
Additionally, %pK requires a privilege check CAP_SYSLOG enforced through
the LSM, which can trigger a "sleeping function called from invalid
context" warning under RT_PREEMPT kernels when the check occurs in an
atomic context. This issue may also affect other LSMs.
This change avoids the unnecessary privilege check and resolves the
sleeping function warning without any loss of information.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57883

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: hugetlb: independent PMD page table shared count
The folio refcount may be increased unexpectly through try_get_folio() by
caller such as split_huge_pages. In huge_pmd_unshare(), we use refcount
to check whether a pmd page table is shared. The check is incorrect if
the refcount is increased by the above caller, and this can cause the page
table leaked:
BUG: Bad page state in process sh pfn:109324
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x66 pfn:0x109324
flags: 0x17ffff800000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xfffff)
page_type: f2(table)
raw: 017ffff800000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000066 0000000000000000 00000000f2000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
...
CPU: 31 UID: 0 PID: 7515 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B 6.13.0-rc2master+ #7
Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call trace:
show_stack+0x20/0x38 (C)
dump_stack_lvl+0x80/0xf8
dump_stack+0x18/0x28
bad_page+0x8c/0x130
free_page_is_bad_report+0xa4/0xb0
free_unref_page+0x3cc/0x620
__folio_put+0xf4/0x158
split_huge_pages_all+0x1e0/0x3e8
split_huge_pages_write+0x25c/0x2d8
full_proxy_write+0x64/0xd8
vfs_write+0xcc/0x280
ksys_write+0x70/0x110
__arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38
invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
el0_svc+0x34/0x128
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xd0
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198
The issue may be triggered by damon, offline_page, page_idle, etc, which
will increase the refcount of page table.
1. The page table itself will be discarded after reporting the
"nonzero mapcount".
2. The HugeTLB page mapped by the page table miss freeing since we
treat the page table as shared and a shared page table will not be
unmapped.
Fix it by introducing independent PMD page table shared count. As
described by comment, pt_index/pt_mm/pt_frag_refcount are used for s390
gmap, x86 pgds and powerpc, pt_share_count is used for x86/arm64/riscv
pmds, so we can reuse the field as pt_share_count.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57878

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: ptrace: fix partial SETREGSET for NT_ARM_FPMR
Currently fpmr_set() doesn't initialize the temporary 'fpmr' variable,
and a SETREGSET call with a length of zero will leave this
uninitialized. Consequently an arbitrary value will be written back to
target->thread.uw.fpmr, potentially leaking up to 64 bits of memory from
the kernel stack. The read is limited to a specific slot on the stack,
and the issue does not provide a write mechanism.
Fix this by initializing the temporary value before copying the regset
from userspace, as for other regsets (e.g. NT_PRSTATUS, NT_PRFPREG,
NT_ARM_SYSTEM_CALL). In the case of a zero-length write, the existing
contents of FPMR will be retained.
Before this patch:
| # ./fpmr-test
| Attempting to write NT_ARM_FPMR::fpmr = 0x900d900d900d900d
| SETREGSET(nt=0x40e, len=8) wrote 8 bytes
|
| Attempting to read NT_ARM_FPMR::fpmr
| GETREGSET(nt=0x40e, len=8) read 8 bytes
| Read NT_ARM_FPMR::fpmr = 0x900d900d900d900d
|
| Attempting to write NT_ARM_FPMR (zero length)
| SETREGSET(nt=0x40e, len=0) wrote 0 bytes
|
| Attempting to read NT_ARM_FPMR::fpmr
| GETREGSET(nt=0x40e, len=8) read 8 bytes
| Read NT_ARM_FPMR::fpmr = 0xffff800083963d50
After this patch:
| # ./fpmr-test
| Attempting to write NT_ARM_FPMR::fpmr = 0x900d900d900d900d
| SETREGSET(nt=0x40e, len=8) wrote 8 bytes
|
| Attempting to read NT_ARM_FPMR::fpmr
| GETREGSET(nt=0x40e, len=8) read 8 bytes
| Read NT_ARM_FPMR::fpmr = 0x900d900d900d900d
|
| Attempting to write NT_ARM_FPMR (zero length)
| SETREGSET(nt=0x40e, len=0) wrote 0 bytes
|
| Attempting to read NT_ARM_FPMR::fpmr
| GETREGSET(nt=0x40e, len=8) read 8 bytes
| Read NT_ARM_FPMR::fpmr = 0x900d900d900d900d

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56702

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Mark raw_tp arguments with PTR_MAYBE_NULL
Arguments to a raw tracepoint are tagged as trusted, which carries the
semantics that the pointer will be non-NULL. However, in certain cases,
a raw tracepoint argument may end up being NULL. More context about this
issue is available in [0].
Thus, there is a discrepancy between the reality, that raw_tp arguments
can actually be NULL, and the verifier's knowledge, that they are never
NULL, causing explicit NULL checks to be deleted, and accesses to such
pointers potentially crashing the kernel.
To fix this, mark raw_tp arguments as PTR_MAYBE_NULL, and then special
case the dereference and pointer arithmetic to permit it, and allow
passing them into helpers/kfuncs; these exceptions are made for raw_tp
programs only. Ensure that we don't do this when ref_obj_id > 0, as in
that case this is an acquired object and doesn't need such adjustment.
The reason we do mask_raw_tp_trusted_reg logic is because other will
recheck in places whether the register is a trusted_reg, and then
consider our register as untrusted when detecting the presence of the
PTR_MAYBE_NULL flag.
To allow safe dereference, we enable PROBE_MEM marking when we see loads
into trusted pointers with PTR_MAYBE_NULL.
While trusted raw_tp arguments can also be passed into helpers or kfuncs
where such broken assumption may cause issues, a future patch set will
tackle their case separately, as PTR_TO_BTF_ID (without PTR_TRUSTED) can
already be passed into helpers and causes similar problems. Thus, they
are left alone for now.
It is possible that these checks also permit passing non-raw_tp args
that are trusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID with null marking. In such a case,
allowing dereference when pointer is NULL expands allowed behavior, so
won't regress existing programs, and the case of passing these into
helpers is the same as above and will be dealt with later.
Also update the failure case in tp_btf_nullable selftest to capture the
new behavior, as the verifier will no longer cause an error when
directly dereference a raw tracepoint argument marked as __nullable.
[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ZrCZS6nisraEqehw@jlelli-thinkpadt14gen4.remote.csb

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56669

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Remove cache tags before disabling ATS
The current implementation removes cache tags after disabling ATS,
leading to potential memory leaks and kernel crashes. Specifically,
CACHE_TAG_DEVTLB type cache tags may still remain in the list even
after the domain is freed, causing a use-after-free condition.
This issue really shows up when multiple VFs from different PFs
passed through to a single user-space process via vfio-pci. In such
cases, the kernel may crash with kernel messages like:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000014
PGD 19036a067 P4D 1940a3067 PUD 136c9b067 PMD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 74 UID: 0 PID: 3183 Comm: testCli Not tainted 6.11.9 #2
RIP: 0010:cache_tag_flush_range+0x9b/0x250
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x1f/0x60
? page_fault_oops+0x163/0x590
? exc_page_fault+0x72/0x190
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? cache_tag_flush_range+0x9b/0x250
? cache_tag_flush_range+0x5d/0x250
intel_iommu_tlb_sync+0x29/0x40
intel_iommu_unmap_pages+0xfe/0x160
__iommu_unmap+0xd8/0x1a0
vfio_unmap_unpin+0x182/0x340 [vfio_iommu_type1]
vfio_remove_dma+0x2a/0xb0 [vfio_iommu_type1]
vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl+0xafa/0x18e0 [vfio_iommu_type1]
Move cache_tag_unassign_domain() before iommu_disable_pci_caps() to fix
it.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56668

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Fix qi_batch NULL pointer with nested parent domain
The qi_batch is allocated when assigning cache tag for a domain. While
for nested parent domain, it is missed. Hence, when trying to map pages
to the nested parent, NULL dereference occurred. Also, there is potential
memleak since there is no lock around domain->qi_batch allocation.
To solve it, add a helper for qi_batch allocation, and call it in both
the __cache_tag_assign_domain() and __cache_tag_assign_parent_domain().
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000200
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 8104795067 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 223 UID: 0 PID: 4357 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-00028-g4b50c3c3b998-dirty #2632
Call Trace:
? __die+0x24/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x80/0x150
? do_user_addr_fault+0x63/0x7b0
? exc_page_fault+0x7c/0x220
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
? cache_tag_flush_range_np+0x13c/0x260
intel_iommu_iotlb_sync_map+0x1a/0x30
iommu_map+0x61/0xf0
batch_to_domain+0x188/0x250
iopt_area_fill_domains+0x125/0x320
? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50
iopt_map_pages+0x63/0x100
iopt_map_common.isra.0+0xa7/0x190
iopt_map_user_pages+0x6a/0x80
iommufd_ioas_map+0xcd/0x1d0
iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x118/0x1c0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x71/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56653

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btmtk: avoid UAF in btmtk_process_coredump
hci_devcd_append may lead to the release of the skb, so it cannot be
accessed once it is called.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btmtk_process_coredump+0x2a7/0x2d0 [btmtk]
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888033cfabb0 by task kworker/0:3/82
CPU: 0 PID: 82 Comm: kworker/0:3 Tainted: G U 6.6.40-lockdep-03464-g1d8b4eb3060e #1 b0b3c1cc0c842735643fb411799d97921d1f688c
Hardware name: Google Yaviks_Ufs/Yaviks_Ufs, BIOS Google_Yaviks_Ufs.15217.552.0 05/07/2024
Workqueue: events btusb_rx_work [btusb]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xfd/0x150
print_report+0x131/0x780
kasan_report+0x177/0x1c0
btmtk_process_coredump+0x2a7/0x2d0 [btmtk 03edd567dd71a65958807c95a65db31d433e1d01]
btusb_recv_acl_mtk+0x11c/0x1a0 [btusb 675430d1e87c4f24d0c1f80efe600757a0f32bec]
btusb_rx_work+0x9e/0xe0 [btusb 675430d1e87c4f24d0c1f80efe600757a0f32bec]
worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0
kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0
ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 82:
stack_trace_save+0xdc/0x190
kasan_set_track+0x4e/0x80
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x4e/0x60
kmem_cache_alloc+0x19f/0x360
skb_clone+0x132/0xf70
btusb_recv_acl_mtk+0x104/0x1a0 [btusb]
btusb_rx_work+0x9e/0xe0 [btusb]
worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0
kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0
ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
Freed by task 1733:
stack_trace_save+0xdc/0x190
kasan_set_track+0x4e/0x80
kasan_save_free_info+0x28/0xb0
____kasan_slab_free+0xfd/0x170
kmem_cache_free+0x183/0x3f0
hci_devcd_rx+0x91a/0x2060 [bluetooth]
worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0
kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0
ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888033cfab40
which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232
The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of
freed 232-byte region [ffff888033cfab40, ffff888033cfac28)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000a174ba93 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x33cfa
head:00000000a174ba93 order:1 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
anon flags: 0x4000000000000840(slab|head|zone=1)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 4000000000000840 ffff888100848a00 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888033cfaa80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc
ffff888033cfab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff888033cfab80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff888033cfac00: fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888033cfac80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Check if we need to call hci_devcd_complete before calling
hci_devcd_append. That requires that we check data->cd_info.cnt >=
MTK_COREDUMP_NUM instead of data->cd_info.cnt > MTK_COREDUMP_NUM, as we
increment data->cd_info.cnt only once the call to hci_devcd_append
succeeds.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56617

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cacheinfo: Allocate memory during CPU hotplug if not done from the primary CPU
Commit
5944ce092b97 ("arch_topology: Build cacheinfo from primary CPU")
adds functionality that architectures can use to optionally allocate and
build cacheinfo early during boot. Commit
6539cffa9495 ("cacheinfo: Add arch specific early level initializer")
lets secondary CPUs correct (and reallocate memory) cacheinfo data if
needed.
If the early build functionality is not used and cacheinfo does not need
correction, memory for cacheinfo is never allocated. x86 does not use
the early build functionality. Consequently, during the cacheinfo CPU
hotplug callback, last_level_cache_is_valid() attempts to dereference
a NULL pointer:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000100
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEPMT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID 19 Comm: cpuhp/0 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc2 #1
RIP: 0010: last_level_cache_is_valid+0x95/0xe0a
Allocate memory for cacheinfo during the cacheinfo CPU hotplug callback
if not done earlier.
Moreover, before determining the validity of the last-level cache info,
ensure that it has been allocated. Simply checking for non-zero
cache_leaves() is not sufficient, as some architectures (e.g., Intel
processors) have non-zero cache_leaves() before allocation.
Dereferencing NULL cacheinfo can occur in update_per_cpu_data_slice_size().
This function iterates over all online CPUs. However, a CPU may have come
online recently, but its cacheinfo may not have been allocated yet.
While here, remove an unnecessary indentation in allocate_cache_info().
[ bp: Massage. ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56613

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/numa: fix memory leak due to the overwritten vma->numab_state
[Problem Description]
When running the hackbench program of LTP, the following memory leak is
reported by kmemleak.
# /opt/ltp/testcases/bin/hackbench 20 thread 1000
Running with 20*40 (== 800) tasks.
# dmesg | grep kmemleak
...
kmemleak: 480 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)
kmemleak: 665 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
unreferenced object 0xffff888cd8ca2c40 (size 64):
comm "hackbench", pid 17142, jiffies 4299780315
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
ac 74 49 00 01 00 00 00 4c 84 49 00 01 00 00 00 .tI.....L.I.....
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace (crc bff18fd4):
[<ffffffff81419a89>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x2f9/0x3f0
[<ffffffff8113f715>] task_numa_work+0x725/0xa00
[<ffffffff8110f878>] task_work_run+0x58/0x90
[<ffffffff81ddd9f8>] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1c8/0x1e0
[<ffffffff81dd78d5>] do_syscall_64+0x85/0x150
[<ffffffff81e0012b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
...
This issue can be consistently reproduced on three different servers:
* a 448-core server
* a 256-core server
* a 192-core server
[Root Cause]
Since multiple threads are created by the hackbench program (along with
the command argument 'thread'), a shared vma might be accessed by two or
more cores simultaneously. When two or more cores observe that
vma->numab_state is NULL at the same time, vma->numab_state will be
overwritten.
Although current code ensures that only one thread scans the VMAs in a
single 'numa_scan_period', there might be a chance for another thread
to enter in the next 'numa_scan_period' while we have not gotten till
numab_state allocation [1].
Note that the command `/opt/ltp/testcases/bin/hackbench 50 process 1000`
cannot the reproduce the issue. It is verified with 200+ test runs.
[Solution]
Use the cmpxchg atomic operation to ensure that only one thread executes
the vma->numab_state assignment.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1794be3c-358c-4cdc-a43d-a1f841d91ef7@amd.com/

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56592

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Call free_htab_elem() after htab_unlock_bucket()
For htab of maps, when the map is removed from the htab, it may hold the
last reference of the map. bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() will invoke
bpf_map_free_id() to free the id of the removed map element. However,
bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() is invoked while holding a bucket lock
(raw_spin_lock_t), and bpf_map_free_id() attempts to acquire map_idr_lock
(spinlock_t), triggering the following lockdep warning:
=============================
[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
6.11.0-rc4+ #49 Not tainted
-----------------------------
test_maps/4881 is trying to lock:
ffffffff84884578 (map_idr_lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: bpf_map_free_id.part.0+0x21/0x70
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{5:5}
2 locks held by test_maps/4881:
#0: ffffffff846caf60 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0xf9/0x270
#1: ffff888149ced148 (&htab->lockdep_key#2){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x178/0xa80
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 4881 Comm: test_maps Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), ...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xb0
dump_stack+0x10/0x20
__lock_acquire+0x73e/0x36c0
lock_acquire+0x182/0x450
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x43/0x70
bpf_map_free_id.part.0+0x21/0x70
bpf_map_put+0xcf/0x110
bpf_map_fd_put_ptr+0x9a/0xb0
free_htab_elem+0x69/0xe0
htab_map_update_elem+0x50f/0xa80
bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0x131/0x270
htab_map_update_elem+0x50f/0xa80
bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0x131/0x270
bpf_map_update_value+0x266/0x380
__sys_bpf+0x21bb/0x36b0
__x64_sys_bpf+0x45/0x60
x64_sys_call+0x1b2a/0x20d0
do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
One way to fix the lockdep warning is using raw_spinlock_t for
map_idr_lock as well. However, bpf_map_alloc_id() invokes
idr_alloc_cyclic() after acquiring map_idr_lock, it will trigger a
similar lockdep warning because the slab's lock (s->cpu_slab->lock) is
still a spinlock.
Instead of changing map_idr_lock's type, fix the issue by invoking
htab_put_fd_value() after htab_unlock_bucket(). However, only deferring
the invocation of htab_put_fd_value() is not enough, because the old map
pointers in htab of maps can not be saved during batched deletion.
Therefore, also defer the invocation of free_htab_elem(), so these
to-be-freed elements could be linked together similar to lru map.
There are four callers for ->map_fd_put_ptr:
(1) alloc_htab_elem() (through htab_put_fd_value())
It invokes ->map_fd_put_ptr() under a raw_spinlock_t. The invocation of
htab_put_fd_value() can not simply move after htab_unlock_bucket(),
because the old element has already been stashed in htab->extra_elems.
It may be reused immediately after htab_unlock_bucket() and the
invocation of htab_put_fd_value() after htab_unlock_bucket() may release
the newly-added element incorrectly. Therefore, saving the map pointer
of the old element for htab of maps before unlocking the bucket and
releasing the map_ptr after unlock. Beside the map pointer in the old
element, should do the same thing for the special fields in the old
element as well.
(2) free_htab_elem() (through htab_put_fd_value())
Its caller includes __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem(),
htab_map_delete_elem() and __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch().
For htab_map_delete_elem(), simply invoke free_htab_elem() after
htab_unlock_bucket(). For __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), just
like lru map, linking the to-be-freed element into node_to_free list
and invoking free_htab_elem() for these element after unlock. It is safe
to reuse batch_flink as the link for node_to_free, because these
elements have been removed from the hash llist.
Because htab of maps doesn't support lookup_and_delete operation,
__htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem() doesn't have the problem, so kept
it as
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56588

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: hisi_sas: Create all dump files during debugfs initialization
For the current debugfs of hisi_sas, after user triggers dump, the
driver allocate memory space to save the register information and create
debugfs files to display the saved information. In this process, the
debugfs files created after each dump.
Therefore, when the dump is triggered while the driver is unbind, the
following hang occurs:
[67840.853907] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a0
[67840.862947] Mem abort info:
[67840.865855] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[67840.869713] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[67840.875125] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[67840.878291] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[67840.881545] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[67840.886528] Data abort info:
[67840.889524] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[67840.895117] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[67840.900284] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[67840.905709] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000002803a1f000
[67840.912263] [00000000000000a0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
[67840.919177] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[67840.996435] pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[67841.003628] pc : down_write+0x30/0x98
[67841.007546] lr : start_creating.part.0+0x60/0x198
[67841.012495] sp : ffff8000b979ba20
[67841.016046] x29: ffff8000b979ba20 x28: 0000000000000010 x27: 0000000000024b40
[67841.023412] x26: 0000000000000012 x25: ffff20202b355ae8 x24: ffff20202b35a8c8
[67841.030779] x23: ffffa36877928208 x22: ffffa368b4972240 x21: ffff8000b979bb18
[67841.038147] x20: ffff00281dc1e3c0 x19: fffffffffffffffe x18: 0000000000000020
[67841.045515] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffa368b128a530 x15: ffffffffffffffff
[67841.052888] x14: ffff8000b979bc18 x13: ffffffffffffffff x12: ffff8000b979bb18
[67841.060263] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffa368b1289b18
[67841.067640] x8 : 0000000000000012 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 00000000000003a9
[67841.075014] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff002818c5cb00 x3 : 0000000000000001
[67841.082388] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff002818c5cb00 x0 : 00000000000000a0
[67841.089759] Call trace:
[67841.092456] down_write+0x30/0x98
[67841.096017] start_creating.part.0+0x60/0x198
[67841.100613] debugfs_create_dir+0x48/0x1f8
[67841.104950] debugfs_create_files_v3_hw+0x88/0x348 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]
[67841.111447] debugfs_snapshot_regs_v3_hw+0x708/0x798 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]
[67841.118111] debugfs_trigger_dump_v3_hw_write+0x9c/0x120 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]
[67841.125115] full_proxy_write+0x68/0xc8
[67841.129175] vfs_write+0xd8/0x3f0
[67841.132708] ksys_write+0x70/0x108
[67841.136317] __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38
[67841.140440] invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128
[67841.144385] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0
[67841.149273] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
[67841.152773] el0_svc+0x38/0xd8
[67841.156009] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8
[67841.160361] el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
[67841.164189] Code: b9000882 d2800002 d2800023 f9800011 (c85ffc05)
[67841.170443] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
To fix this issue, create all directories and files during debugfs
initialization. In this way, the driver only needs to allocate memory
space to save information each time the user triggers dumping.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56545

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: hyperv: streamline driver probe to avoid devres issues
It was found that unloading 'hid_hyperv' module results in a devres
complaint:
...
hv_vmbus: unregistering driver hid_hyperv
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3983 at drivers/base/devres.c:691 devres_release_group+0x1f2/0x2c0
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? devres_release_group+0x1f2/0x2c0
? __warn+0xd1/0x1c0
? devres_release_group+0x1f2/0x2c0
? report_bug+0x32a/0x3c0
? handle_bug+0x53/0xa0
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x50
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? devres_release_group+0x1f2/0x2c0
? devres_release_group+0x90/0x2c0
? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
? __pfx_devres_release_group+0x10/0x10
hid_device_remove+0xf5/0x220
device_release_driver_internal+0x371/0x540
? klist_put+0xf3/0x170
bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
device_del+0x33f/0x8c0
? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10
? cleanup_srcu_struct+0x337/0x500
hid_destroy_device+0xc8/0x130
mousevsc_remove+0xd2/0x1d0 [hid_hyperv]
device_release_driver_internal+0x371/0x540
driver_detach+0xc5/0x180
bus_remove_driver+0x11e/0x2a0
? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x160/0x5e0
vmbus_driver_unregister+0x62/0x2b0 [hv_vmbus]
...
And the issue seems to be that the corresponding devres group is not
allocated. Normally, devres_open_group() is called from
__hid_device_probe() but Hyper-V HID driver overrides 'hid_dev->driver'
with 'mousevsc_hid_driver' stub and basically re-implements
__hid_device_probe() by calling hid_parse() and hid_hw_start() but not
devres_open_group(). hid_device_probe() does not call __hid_device_probe()
for it. Later, when the driver is removed, hid_device_remove() calls
devres_release_group() as it doesn't check whether hdev->driver was
initially overridden or not.
The issue seems to be related to the commit 62c68e7cee33 ("HID: ensure
timely release of driver-allocated resources") but the commit itself seems
to be correct.
Fix the issue by dropping the 'hid_dev->driver' override and using
hid_register_driver()/hid_unregister_driver() instead. Alternatively, it
would have been possible to rely on the default handling but
HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT implies HID_CONNECT_HIDRAW and it doesn't seem to work
for mousevsc as-is.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56372

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: tun: fix tun_napi_alloc_frags()
syzbot reported the following crash [1]
Issue came with the blamed commit. Instead of going through
all the iov components, we keep using the first one
and end up with a malformed skb.
[1]
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2849 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6230 Comm: syz-executor132 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-syzkaller-00407-g96b6fcc0ee41 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/25/2024
RIP: 0010:__pskb_pull_tail+0x1568/0x1570 net/core/skbuff.c:2848
Code: 38 c1 0f 8c 32 f1 ff ff 4c 89 f7 e8 92 96 74 f8 e9 25 f1 ff ff e8 e8 ae 09 f8 48 8b 5c 24 08 e9 eb fb ff ff e8 d9 ae 09 f8 90 <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 0018:ffffc90004cbef30 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff8995c347 RBX: 00000000fffffff2 RCX: ffff88802cf45a00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffffff2 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88807df0c06a R08: ffffffff8995b084 R09: 1ffff1100fbe185c
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100fbe185d R12: ffff888076e85d50
R13: ffff888076e85c80 R14: ffff888076e85cf4 R15: ffff888076e85c80
FS: 00007f0dca6ea6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0dca6ead58 CR3: 00000000119da000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_cow_data+0x2da/0xcb0 net/core/skbuff.c:5284
tipc_aead_decrypt net/tipc/crypto.c:894 [inline]
tipc_crypto_rcv+0x402/0x24e0 net/tipc/crypto.c:1844
tipc_rcv+0x57e/0x12a0 net/tipc/node.c:2109
tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0x2bd/0x450 net/tipc/bearer.c:668
__netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5720 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x8b7/0x980 net/core/dev.c:5762
__netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5814 [inline]
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0xa51/0xe30 net/core/dev.c:5905
gro_normal_list include/net/gro.h:515 [inline]
napi_complete_done+0x2b5/0x870 net/core/dev.c:6256
napi_complete include/linux/netdevice.h:567 [inline]
tun_get_user+0x2ea0/0x4890 drivers/net/tun.c:1982
tun_chr_write_iter+0x10d/0x1f0 drivers/net/tun.c:2057
do_iter_readv_writev+0x600/0x880
vfs_writev+0x376/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:1050
do_writev+0x1b6/0x360 fs/read_write.c:1096
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53238

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btmtk: adjust the position to init iso data anchor
MediaTek iso data anchor init should be moved to where MediaTek
claims iso data interface.
If there is an unexpected BT usb disconnect during setup flow,
it will cause a NULL pointer crash issue when releasing iso
anchor since the anchor wasn't been init yet. Adjust the position
to do iso data anchor init.
[ 17.137991] pc : usb_kill_anchored_urbs+0x60/0x168
[ 17.137998] lr : usb_kill_anchored_urbs+0x44/0x168
[ 17.137999] sp : ffffffc0890cb5f0
[ 17.138000] x29: ffffffc0890cb5f0 x28: ffffff80bb6c2e80
[ 17.144081] gpio gpiochip0: registered chardev handle for 1 lines
[ 17.148421] x27: 0000000000000000
[ 17.148422] x26: ffffffd301ff4298 x25: 0000000000000003 x24: 00000000000000f0
[ 17.148424] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 00000000ffffffff x21: 0000000000000001
[ 17.148425] x20: ffffffffffffffd8 x19: ffffff80c0f25560 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 17.148427] x17: ffffffd33864e408 x16: ffffffd33808f7c8 x15: 0000000000200000
[ 17.232789] x14: e0cd73cf80ffffff x13: 50f2137c0a0338c9 x12: 0000000000000001
[ 17.239912] x11: 0000000080150011 x10: 0000000000000002 x9 : 0000000000000001
[ 17.247035] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000008080 x6 : 8080000000000000
[ 17.254158] x5 : ffffffd33808ebc0 x4 : fffffffe033dcf20 x3 : 0000000080150011
[ 17.261281] x2 : ffffff8087a91400 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff80c0f25588
[ 17.268404] Call trace:
[ 17.270841] usb_kill_anchored_urbs+0x60/0x168
[ 17.275274] btusb_mtk_release_iso_intf+0x2c/0xd8 [btusb (HASH:5afe 6)]
[ 17.284226] btusb_mtk_disconnect+0x14/0x28 [btusb (HASH:5afe 6)]
[ 17.292652] btusb_disconnect+0x70/0x140 [btusb (HASH:5afe 6)]
[ 17.300818] usb_unbind_interface+0xc4/0x240
[ 17.305079] device_release_driver_internal+0x18c/0x258
[ 17.310296] device_release_driver+0x1c/0x30
[ 17.314557] bus_remove_device+0x140/0x160
[ 17.318643] device_del+0x1c0/0x330
[ 17.322121] usb_disable_device+0x80/0x180
[ 17.326207] usb_disconnect+0xec/0x300
[ 17.329948] hub_quiesce+0x80/0xd0
[ 17.333339] hub_disconnect+0x44/0x190
[ 17.337078] usb_unbind_interface+0xc4/0x240
[ 17.341337] device_release_driver_internal+0x18c/0x258
[ 17.346551] device_release_driver+0x1c/0x30
[ 17.350810] usb_driver_release_interface+0x70/0x88
[ 17.355677] proc_ioctl+0x13c/0x228
[ 17.359157] proc_ioctl_default+0x50/0x80
[ 17.363155] usbdev_ioctl+0x830/0xd08
[ 17.366808] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x94/0xd0
[ 17.370723] invoke_syscall+0x6c/0xf8
[ 17.374377] el0_svc_common+0x84/0xe0
[ 17.378030] do_el0_svc+0x20/0x30
[ 17.381334] el0_svc+0x34/0x60
[ 17.384382] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xf0
[ 17.388554] el0t_64_sync+0x180/0x188
[ 17.392208] Code: f9400677 f100a2f4 54fffea0 d503201f (b8350288)
[ 17.398289] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53047

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: init: protect sched with rcu_read_lock
Enabling CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST with its dependence CONFIG_RCU_EXPERT
creates this splat when an MPTCP socket is created:
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.12.0-rc2+ #11 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/mptcp/sched.c:44 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
no locks held by mptcp_connect/176.
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 176 Comm: mptcp_connect Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2+ #11
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6822)
mptcp_sched_find (net/mptcp/sched.c:44 (discriminator 7))
mptcp_init_sock (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2867 (discriminator 1))
? sock_init_data_uid (arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:28)
inet_create.part.0.constprop.0 (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:386)
? __sock_create (include/linux/rcupdate.h:347 (discriminator 1))
__sock_create (net/socket.c:1576)
__sys_socket (net/socket.c:1671)
? __pfx___sys_socket (net/socket.c:1712)
? do_user_addr_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1419 (discriminator 1))
__x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1728)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1))
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
That's because when the socket is initialised, rcu_read_lock() is not
used despite the explicit comment written above the declaration of
mptcp_sched_find() in sched.c. Adding the missing lock/unlock avoids the
warning.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50107

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86/intel/pmc: Fix pmc_core_iounmap to call iounmap for valid addresses
Commit 50c6dbdfd16e ("x86/ioremap: Improve iounmap() address range checks")
introduces a WARN when adrress ranges of iounmap are invalid. On Thinkpad
P1 Gen 7 (Meteor Lake-P) this caused the following warning to appear:
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 713 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:461 iounmap+0x58/0x1f0
Modules linked in: rfkill(+) snd_timer(+) fjes(+) snd soundcore intel_pmc_core(+)
int3403_thermal(+) int340x_thermal_zone intel_vsec pmt_telemetry acpi_pad pmt_class
acpi_tad int3400_thermal acpi_thermal_rel joydev loop nfnetlink zram xe drm_suballoc_helper
nouveau i915 mxm_wmi drm_ttm_helper gpu_sched drm_gpuvm drm_exec drm_buddy i2c_algo_bit
crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ttm crc32c_intel polyval_clmulni rtsx_pci_sdmmc ucsi_acpi
polyval_generic mmc_core hid_multitouch drm_display_helper ghash_clmulni_intel typec_ucsi
nvme sha512_ssse3 video sha256_ssse3 nvme_core intel_vpu sha1_ssse3 rtsx_pci cec typec
nvme_auth i2c_hid_acpi i2c_hid wmi pinctrl_meteorlake serio_raw ip6_tables ip_tables fuse
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 713 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2iounmap+ #42
Hardware name: LENOVO 21KWCTO1WW/21KWCTO1WW, BIOS N48ET19W (1.06 ) 07/18/2024
RIP: 0010:iounmap+0x58/0x1f0
Code: 85 6a 01 00 00 48 8b 05 e6 e2 28 04 48 39 c5 72 19 eb 26 cc cc cc 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 00 32 00 48 8d 44 02 ff 48 39 c5 72 23 <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 08 5b 5d 41 5c c3 cc cc cc cc 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff888131eff038 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: ffffc90000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff888e33b80000
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffff888e33bc29c0 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8881598a8000 R09: ffff888e2ccedc10
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffffb3367634 R12: 00000000fe000000
R13: ffff888101d0da28 R14: ffffffffc2e437e0 R15: ffff888110b03b28
FS: 00007f3c1d4b3980(0000) GS:ffff888e33b80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005651cfc93578 CR3: 0000000124e4c002 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn.cold+0xb6/0x176
? iounmap+0x58/0x1f0
? report_bug+0x1f4/0x2b0
? handle_bug+0x58/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? iounmap+0x58/0x1f0
pmc_core_ssram_get_pmc+0x477/0x6c0 [intel_pmc_core]
? __pfx_pmc_core_ssram_get_pmc+0x10/0x10 [intel_pmc_core]
? __pfx_do_pci_enable_device+0x10/0x10
? pci_wait_for_pending+0x60/0x110
? pci_enable_device_flags+0x1e3/0x2e0
? __pfx_mtl_core_init+0x10/0x10 [intel_pmc_core]
pmc_core_ssram_init+0x7f/0x110 [intel_pmc_core]
mtl_core_init+0xda/0x130 [intel_pmc_core]
? __mutex_init+0xb9/0x130
pmc_core_probe+0x27e/0x10b0 [intel_pmc_core]
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x96/0xf0
? __pfx_pmc_core_probe+0x10/0x10 [intel_pmc_core]
? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? device_pm_check_callbacks+0x82/0x370
? acpi_dev_pm_attach+0x234/0x2b0
platform_probe+0x9f/0x150
really_probe+0x1e0/0x8a0
__driver_probe_device+0x18c/0x370
? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x120
__driver_attach+0x190/0x4a0
? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
bus_for_each_dev+0x103/0x180
? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10
? klist_add_tail+0x136/0x270
bus_add_driver+0x2fc/0x540
driver_register+0x1a5/0x360
? __pfx_pmc_core_driver_init+0x10/0x10 [intel_pmc_core]
do_one_initcall+0xa4/0x380
? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
? kasan_unpoison+0x44/0x70
do_init_module+0x296/0x800
load_module+0x5090/0x6ce0
? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10
? ima_post_read_file+0x193/0x200
? __pfx_ima_post_read_file+0x10/0x10
? rw_verify_area+0x152/0x4c0
? kernel_read_file+0x257/0x750
? __pfx_kernel_read_file+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_filemap_get_read_batch+0x10/0x10
? init_module_from_file+0xd1/0x130
init_module_from_file+0xd1/0x130
? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-49875

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: map the EBADMSG to nfserr_io to avoid warning
Ext4 will throw -EBADMSG through ext4_readdir when a checksum error
occurs, resulting in the following WARNING.
Fix it by mapping EBADMSG to nfserr_io.
nfsd_buffered_readdir
iterate_dir // -EBADMSG -74
ext4_readdir // .iterate_shared
ext4_dx_readdir
ext4_htree_fill_tree
htree_dirblock_to_tree
ext4_read_dirblock
__ext4_read_dirblock
ext4_dirblock_csum_verify
warn_no_space_for_csum
__warn_no_space_for_csum
return ERR_PTR(-EFSBADCRC) // -EBADMSG -74
nfserrno // WARNING
[ 161.115610] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 161.116465] nfsd: non-standard errno: -74
[ 161.117315] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 780 at fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c:878 nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[ 161.118596] Modules linked in:
[ 161.119243] CPU: 1 PID: 780 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 5.10.0-00014-g79679361fd5d #138
[ 161.120684] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qe
mu.org 04/01/2014
[ 161.123601] RIP: 0010:nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[ 161.124676] Code: 0f 87 da 30 dd 00 83 e3 01 b8 00 00 00 05 75 d7 44 89 ee 48 c7 c7 c0 57 24 98 89 44 24 04 c6
05 ce 2b 61 03 01 e8 99 20 d8 00 <0f> 0b 8b 44 24 04 eb b5 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 a0 6d a4 99 e8 cc 15 33
[ 161.127797] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000e2f9c0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 161.128794] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 161.130089] RDX: 1ffff1103ee16f6d RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: fffff520001c5f2a
[ 161.131379] RBP: 0000000000000022 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8881f70c1827
[ 161.132664] R10: ffffed103ee18304 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000021
[ 161.133949] R13: 00000000ffffffb6 R14: ffff8881317c0000 R15: ffffc90000e2fbd8
[ 161.135244] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881f7080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 161.136695] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 161.137761] CR2: 00007fcaad70b348 CR3: 0000000144256006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 161.139041] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 161.140291] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 161.141519] PKRU: 55555554
[ 161.142076] Call Trace:
[ 161.142575] ? __warn+0x9b/0x140
[ 161.143229] ? nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[ 161.143872] ? report_bug+0x125/0x150
[ 161.144595] ? handle_bug+0x41/0x90
[ 161.145284] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[ 161.146009] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20
[ 161.146816] ? nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[ 161.147487] nfsd_buffered_readdir+0x28b/0x2b0
[ 161.148333] ? nfsd4_encode_dirent_fattr+0x380/0x380
[ 161.149258] ? nfsd_buffered_filldir+0xf0/0xf0
[ 161.150093] ? wait_for_concurrent_writes+0x170/0x170
[ 161.151004] ? generic_file_llseek_size+0x48/0x160
[ 161.151895] nfsd_readdir+0x132/0x190
[ 161.152606] ? nfsd4_encode_dirent_fattr+0x380/0x380
[ 161.153516] ? nfsd_unlink+0x380/0x380
[ 161.154256] ? override_creds+0x45/0x60
[ 161.155006] nfsd4_encode_readdir+0x21a/0x3d0
[ 161.155850] ? nfsd4_encode_readlink+0x210/0x210
[ 161.156731] ? write_bytes_to_xdr_buf+0x97/0xe0
[ 161.157598] ? __write_bytes_to_xdr_buf+0xd0/0xd0
[ 161.158494] ? lock_downgrade+0x90/0x90
[ 161.159232] ? nfs4svc_decode_voidarg+0x10/0x10
[ 161.160092] nfsd4_encode_operation+0x15a/0x440
[ 161.160959] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x718/0xe90
[ 161.161818] nfsd_dispatch+0x18e/0x2c0
[ 161.162586] svc_process_common+0x786/0xc50
[ 161.163403] ? nfsd_svc+0x380/0x380
[ 161.164137] ? svc_printk+0x160/0x160
[ 161.164846] ? svc_xprt_do_enqueue.part.0+0x365/0x380
[ 161.165808] ? nfsd_svc+0x380/0x380
[ 161.166523] ? rcu_is_watching+0x23/0x40
[ 161.167309] svc_process+0x1a5/0x200
[ 161.168019] nfsd+0x1f5/0x380
[ 161.168663] ? nfsd_shutdown_threads+0x260/0x260
[ 161.169554] kthread+0x1c4/0x210
[ 161.170224] ? kthread_insert_work_sanity_check+0x80/0x80
[ 161.171246] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-47715

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7915: fix oops on non-dbdc mt7986
mt7915_band_config() sets band_idx = 1 on the main phy for mt7986
with MT7975_ONE_ADIE or MT7976_ONE_ADIE.
Commit 0335c034e726 ("wifi: mt76: fix race condition related to
checking tx queue fill status") introduced a dereference of the
phys array indirectly indexed by band_idx via wcid->phy_idx in
mt76_wcid_cleanup(). This caused the following Oops on affected
mt7986 devices:
Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 0000000000000024
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000005
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005
CM = 0, WnR = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000042545000
[0000000000000024] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ... mt7915e mt76_connac_lib mt76 mac80211 cfg80211 ...
CPU: 2 PID: 1631 Comm: hostapd Not tainted 5.15.150 #0
Hardware name: ZyXEL EX5700 (Telenor) (DT)
pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : mt76_wcid_cleanup+0x84/0x22c [mt76]
lr : mt76_wcid_cleanup+0x64/0x22c [mt76]
sp : ffffffc00a803700
x29: ffffffc00a803700 x28: ffffff80008f7300 x27: ffffff80003f3c00
x26: ffffff80000a7880 x25: ffffffc008c26e00 x24: 0000000000000001
x23: ffffffc000a68114 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffff8004172cc8
x20: ffffffc00a803748 x19: ffffff8004152020 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 00000000000017c0 x16: ffffffc008ef5000 x15: 0000000000000be0
x14: ffffff8004172e28 x13: ffffff8004172e28 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffffff8004172e30 x9 : ffffff8004172e28
x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : ffffff8004156020 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000031 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffffff80008f7300 x0 : 0000000000000024
Call trace:
mt76_wcid_cleanup+0x84/0x22c [mt76]
__mt76_sta_remove+0x70/0xbc [mt76]
mt76_sta_state+0x8c/0x1a4 [mt76]
mt7915_eeprom_get_power_delta+0x11e4/0x23a0 [mt7915e]
drv_sta_state+0x144/0x274 [mac80211]
sta_info_move_state+0x1cc/0x2a4 [mac80211]
sta_set_sinfo+0xaf8/0xc24 [mac80211]
sta_info_destroy_addr_bss+0x4c/0x6c [mac80211]
ieee80211_color_change_finish+0x1c08/0x1e70 [mac80211]
cfg80211_check_station_change+0x1360/0x4710 [cfg80211]
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xb4/0x110
genl_rcv_msg+0xd0/0x1bc
netlink_rcv_skb+0x58/0x120
genl_rcv+0x34/0x50
netlink_unicast+0x1f0/0x2ec
netlink_sendmsg+0x198/0x3d0
____sys_sendmsg+0x1b0/0x210
___sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xf0
__sys_sendmsg+0x44/0xa0
__arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x20/0x30
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x4c/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x40/0xd0
el0_svc+0x14/0x4c
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x110
el0t_64_sync+0x15c/0x160
Code: d2800002 910092c0 52800023 f9800011 (885f7c01)
---[ end trace 7e42dd9a39ed2281 ]---
Fix by using mt76_dev_phy() which will map band_idx to the correct phy
for all hardware combinations.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46797

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/qspinlock: Fix deadlock in MCS queue
If an interrupt occurs in queued_spin_lock_slowpath() after we increment
qnodesp->count and before node->lock is initialized, another CPU might
see stale lock values in get_tail_qnode(). If the stale lock value happens
to match the lock on that CPU, then we write to the "next" pointer of
the wrong qnode. This causes a deadlock as the former CPU, once it becomes
the head of the MCS queue, will spin indefinitely until it's "next" pointer
is set by its successor in the queue.
Running stress-ng on a 16 core (16EC/16VP) shared LPAR, results in
occasional lockups similar to the following:
$ stress-ng --all 128 --vm-bytes 80% --aggressive \
--maximize --oomable --verify --syslog \
--metrics --times --timeout 5m
watchdog: CPU 15 Hard LOCKUP
......
NIP [c0000000000b78f4] queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x1184/0x1490
LR [c000000001037c5c] _raw_spin_lock+0x6c/0x90
Call Trace:
0xc000002cfffa3bf0 (unreliable)
_raw_spin_lock+0x6c/0x90
raw_spin_rq_lock_nested.part.135+0x4c/0xd0
sched_ttwu_pending+0x60/0x1f0
__flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x1dc/0x670
smp_ipi_demux_relaxed+0xa4/0x100
xive_muxed_ipi_action+0x20/0x40
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x80/0x240
handle_irq_event_percpu+0x2c/0x80
handle_percpu_irq+0x84/0xd0
generic_handle_irq+0x54/0x80
__do_irq+0xac/0x210
__do_IRQ+0x74/0xd0
0x0
do_IRQ+0x8c/0x170
hardware_interrupt_common_virt+0x29c/0x2a0
--- interrupt: 500 at queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x4b8/0x1490
......
NIP [c0000000000b6c28] queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x4b8/0x1490
LR [c000000001037c5c] _raw_spin_lock+0x6c/0x90
--- interrupt: 500
0xc0000029c1a41d00 (unreliable)
_raw_spin_lock+0x6c/0x90
futex_wake+0x100/0x260
do_futex+0x21c/0x2a0
sys_futex+0x98/0x270
system_call_exception+0x14c/0x2f0
system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
The following code flow illustrates how the deadlock occurs.
For the sake of brevity, assume that both locks (A and B) are
contended and we call the queued_spin_lock_slowpath() function.
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
spin_lock_irqsave(A) |
spin_unlock_irqrestore(A) |
spin_lock(B) |
| |
▼ |
id = qnodesp->count++; |
(Note that nodes[0].lock == A) |
| |
▼ |
Interrupt |
(happens before "nodes[0].lock = B") |
| |
▼ |
spin_lock_irqsave(A) |
| |
▼ |
id = qnodesp->count++ |
nodes[1].lock = A |
| |
▼ |
Tail of MCS queue |
| spin_lock_irqsave(A)
▼ |
Head of MCS queue ▼
| CPU0 is previous tail
▼ |
Spin indefinitely ▼
(until "nodes[1].next != NULL") prev = get_tail_qnode(A, CPU0)
|
▼
prev == &qnodes[CPU0].nodes[0]
(as qnodes
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46788

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/osnoise: Use a cpumask to know what threads are kthreads
The start_kthread() and stop_thread() code was not always called with the
interface_lock held. This means that the kthread variable could be
unexpectedly changed causing the kthread_stop() to be called on it when it
should not have been, leading to:
while true; do
rtla timerlat top -u -q & PID=$!;
sleep 5;
kill -INT $PID;
sleep 0.001;
kill -TERM $PID;
wait $PID;
done
Causing the following OOPS:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 885 Comm: timerlatu/5 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-test-00002-gbc754cc76d1b-dirty #125 a533010b71dab205ad2f507188ce8c82203b0254
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:hrtimer_active+0x58/0x300
Code: 48 c1 ee 03 41 54 48 01 d1 48 01 d6 55 53 48 83 ec 20 80 39 00 0f 85 30 02 00 00 49 8b 6f 30 4c 8d 75 10 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 <0f> b6 3c 10 4c 89 f0 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 40 38 f8 7c 09 40 84 ff 0f
RSP: 0018:ffff88811d97f940 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88823c6b5b28 RCX: ffffed10478d6b6b
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffffed10478d6b6c RDI: ffff88823c6b5b28
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88823c6b5b58 R09: ffff88823c6b5b60
R10: ffff88811d97f957 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: 00000000000a801d
R13: ffff88810d8b35d8 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: ffff88823c6b5b28
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88823c680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000561858ad7258 CR3: 000000007729e001 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die_addr+0x40/0xa0
? exc_general_protection+0x154/0x230
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
? hrtimer_active+0x58/0x300
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_locks_remove_file+0x10/0x10
hrtimer_cancel+0x15/0x40
timerlat_fd_release+0x8e/0x1f0
? security_file_release+0x43/0x80
__fput+0x372/0xb10
task_work_run+0x11e/0x1f0
? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0
? __pfx_task_work_run+0x10/0x10
? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x170
? do_exit+0x7a0/0x24b0
do_exit+0x7bd/0x24b0
? __pfx_migrate_enable+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_do_exit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_read_tsc+0x10/0x10
? ktime_get+0x64/0x140
? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x86/0xe0
do_group_exit+0xb0/0x220
get_signal+0x17ba/0x1b50
? vfs_read+0x179/0xa40
? timerlat_fd_read+0x30b/0x9d0
? __pfx_get_signal+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_timerlat_fd_read+0x10/0x10
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x8c/0x570
? __pfx_arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x10/0x10
? vfs_read+0x179/0xa40
? ksys_read+0xfe/0x1d0
? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xbc/0x130
do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110
? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
? fpregs_restore_userregs+0xdb/0x1e0
? fpregs_restore_userregs+0xdb/0x1e0
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x116/0x130
? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110
? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110
? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79
RIP: 0033:0x7ff0070eca9c
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7ff0070eca72.
RSP: 002b:00007ff006dff8c0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007ff0070eca9c
RDX: 0000000000000400 RSI: 00007ff006dff9a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ff006dffde0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ff000000ba0
R10: 00007ff007004b08 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 00007ff006dff9a0 R14: 0000000000000007 R15: 0000000000000008
</TASK>
Modules linked in: snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
This is because it would mistakenly call kthread_stop() on a user space
thread making it "exit" before it actually exits.
Since kthread
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46765

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: protect XDP configuration with a mutex
The main threat to data consistency in ice_xdp() is a possible asynchronous
PF reset. It can be triggered by a user or by TX timeout handler.
XDP setup and PF reset code access the same resources in the following
sections:
* ice_vsi_close() in ice_prepare_for_reset() - already rtnl-locked
* ice_vsi_rebuild() for the PF VSI - not protected
* ice_vsi_open() - already rtnl-locked
With an unfortunate timing, such accesses can result in a crash such as the
one below:
[ +1.999878] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 14
[ +2.002992] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 18
[Mar15 18:17] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: NETDEV WATCHDOG: CPU: 38: transmit queue 14 timed out 80692736 ms
[ +0.000093] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout: VSI_num: 6, Q 14, NTC: 0x0, HW_HEAD: 0x0, NTU: 0x0, INT: 0x4000001
[ +0.000012] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout recovery level 1, txqueue 14
[ +0.394718] ice 0000:b1:00.0: PTP reset successful
[ +0.006184] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098
[ +0.000045] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ +0.000023] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ +0.000023] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ +0.000018] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ +0.000023] CPU: 38 PID: 7540 Comm: kworker/38:1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7 #1
[ +0.000031] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0014.082620210524 08/26/2021
[ +0.000036] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice]
[ +0.000183] RIP: 0010:ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice]
[...]
[ +0.000013] Call Trace:
[ +0.000016] <TASK>
[ +0.000014] ? __die+0x1f/0x70
[ +0.000029] ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4f0
[ +0.000029] ? schedule+0x3b/0xd0
[ +0.000027] ? exc_page_fault+0x7b/0x180
[ +0.000022] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ +0.000031] ? ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice]
[ +0.000194] ice_free_tx_ring+0xe/0x60 [ice]
[ +0.000186] ice_destroy_xdp_rings+0x157/0x310 [ice]
[ +0.000151] ice_vsi_decfg+0x53/0xe0 [ice]
[ +0.000180] ice_vsi_rebuild+0x239/0x540 [ice]
[ +0.000186] ice_vsi_rebuild_by_type+0x76/0x180 [ice]
[ +0.000145] ice_rebuild+0x18c/0x840 [ice]
[ +0.000145] ? delay_tsc+0x4a/0xc0
[ +0.000022] ? delay_tsc+0x92/0xc0
[ +0.000020] ice_do_reset+0x140/0x180 [ice]
[ +0.000886] ice_service_task+0x404/0x1030 [ice]
[ +0.000824] process_one_work+0x171/0x340
[ +0.000685] worker_thread+0x277/0x3a0
[ +0.000675] ? preempt_count_add+0x6a/0xa0
[ +0.000677] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x50
[ +0.000679] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000653] kthread+0xf0/0x120
[ +0.000635] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000616] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[ +0.000612] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000604] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[ +0.000604] </TASK>
The previous way of handling this through returning -EBUSY is not viable,
particularly when destroying AF_XDP socket, because the kernel proceeds
with removal anyway.
There is plenty of code between those calls and there is no need to create
a large critical section that covers all of them, same as there is no need
to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() with rtnl_lock().
Add xdp_state_lock mutex to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() and ice_xdp().
Leaving unprotected sections in between would result in two states that
have to be considered:
1. when the VSI is closed, but not yet rebuild
2. when VSI is already rebuild, but not yet open
The latter case is actually already handled through !netif_running() case,
we just need to adjust flag checking a little. The former one is not as
trivial, because between ice_vsi_close() and ice_vsi_rebuild(), a lot of
hardware interaction happens, this can make adding/deleting rings exit
with an error. Luckily, VSI rebuild is pending and can apply new
configuration for us in a managed fashion.
Therefore, add an additional VSI state flag ICE_VSI_REBUILD_PENDING to
indicate that ice_x
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46698

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
video/aperture: optionally match the device in sysfb_disable()
In aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_devices(), we currently only
call sysfb_disable() on vga class devices. This leads to the
following problem when the pimary device is not VGA compatible:
1. A PCI device with a non-VGA class is the boot display
2. That device is probed first and it is not a VGA device so
sysfb_disable() is not called, but the device resources
are freed by aperture_detach_platform_device()
3. Non-primary GPU has a VGA class and it ends up calling sysfb_disable()
4. NULL pointer dereference via sysfb_disable() since the resources
have already been freed by aperture_detach_platform_device() when
it was called by the other device.
Fix this by passing a device pointer to sysfb_disable() and checking
the device to determine if we should execute it or not.
v2: Fix build when CONFIG_SCREEN_INFO is not set
v3: Move device check into the mutex
Drop primary variable in aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_devices()
Drop __init on pci sysfb_pci_dev_is_enabled()

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-45017

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix IPsec RoCE MPV trace call
Prevent the call trace below from happening, by not allowing IPsec
creation over a slave, if master device doesn't support IPsec.
WARNING: CPU: 44 PID: 16136 at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:240 down_read+0x75/0x94
Modules linked in: esp4_offload esp4 act_mirred act_vlan cls_flower sch_ingress mlx5_vdpa vringh vhost_iotlb vdpa mst_pciconf(OE) nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache netfs xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_counter nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 rfkill cuse fuse rpcrdma sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_srpt ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_core_mod ib_umad ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ipmi_ssif intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common amd64_edac edac_mce_amd kvm_amd kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul mlx5_ib ghash_clmulni_intel sha1_ssse3 dell_smbios ib_uverbs aesni_intel crypto_simd dcdbas wmi_bmof dell_wmi_descriptor cryptd pcspkr ib_core acpi_ipmi sp5100_tco ccp i2c_piix4 ipmi_si ptdma k10temp ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_cpufreq ext4 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod t10_pi sg mgag200 drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect mlx5_core sysimgblt fb_sys_fops cec
ahci libahci mlxfw drm pci_hyperv_intf libata tg3 sha256_ssse3 tls megaraid_sas i2c_algo_bit psample wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: mst_pci]
CPU: 44 PID: 16136 Comm: kworker/44:3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: GOE 5.15.0-20240509.el8uek.uek7_u3_update_v6.6_ipsec_bf.x86_64 #2
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7525/074H08, BIOS 2.0.3 01/15/2021
Workqueue: events xfrm_state_gc_task
RIP: 0010:down_read+0x75/0x94
Code: 00 48 8b 45 08 65 48 8b 14 25 80 fc 01 00 83 e0 02 48 09 d0 48 83 c8 01 48 89 45 08 5d 31 c0 89 c2 89 c6 89 c7 e9 cb 88 3b 00 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 08 a8 01 74 b2 a8 02 75 ae 48 89 c2 48 83 ca 02 f0
RSP: 0018:ffffb26387773da8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa08b658af900 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ff886bc5e1366f2f RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffa08b658af940 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0a9bfb31540
R13: ffffa0a9bfb37900 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa0a9bfb37905
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa0a9bfb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055a45ed814e8 CR3: 000000109038a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2f9
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2f9
? mlx5_devcom_for_each_peer_begin+0x29/0x60 [mlx5_core]
? down_read+0x75/0x94
? __warn+0x80/0x113
? down_read+0x75/0x94
? report_bug+0xa4/0x11d
? handle_bug+0x35/0x8b
? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x75
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x1b
? down_read+0x75/0x94
? down_read+0xe/0x94
mlx5_devcom_for_each_peer_begin+0x29/0x60 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_ipsec_fs_roce_tx_destroy+0xb1/0x130 [mlx5_core]
tx_destroy+0x1b/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
tx_ft_put+0x53/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_xfrm_free_state+0x45/0x90 [mlx5_core]
___xfrm_state_destroy+0x10f/0x1a2
xfrm_state_gc_task+0x81/0xa9
process_one_work+0x1f1/0x3c6
worker_thread+0x53/0x3e4
? process_one_work.cold+0x46/0x3c
kthread+0x127/0x144
? set_kthread_struct+0x60/0x52
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x2d
</TASK>
---[ end trace 5ef7896144d398e1 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-45012

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nouveau/firmware: use dma non-coherent allocator
Currently, enabling SG_DEBUG in the kernel will cause nouveau to hit a
BUG() on startup, when the iommu is enabled:
kernel BUG at include/linux/scatterlist.h:187!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 7 PID: 930 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.9.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ #30
Hardware name: MSI MS-7A39/A320M GAMING PRO (MS-7A39), BIOS 1.I0 01/22/2019
RIP: 0010:sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
Code: 69 88 32 01 83 e1 03 f6 c3 03 75 20 a8 01 75 1e 48 09 cb 41 89 54
24 08 49 89 1c 24 41 89 6c 24 0c 5b 5d 41 5c e9 7b b9 88 00 <0f> 0b 0f 0b
0f 0b 48 8b 05 5e 46 9a 01 eb b2 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
RSP: 0018:ffffa776017bf6a0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa77600d87000 RCX: 000000000000002b
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa77680d87000
RBP: 000000000000e000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff98f4c46aa508 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff98f4c46aa508
R13: ffff98f4c46aa008 R14: ffffa77600d4a000 R15: ffffa77600d4a018
FS: 00007feeb5aae980(0000) GS:ffff98f5c4dc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f22cb9a4520 CR3: 00000001043ba000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die+0x36/0x90
? do_trap+0xdd/0x100
? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70
? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
nvkm_firmware_ctor+0x14a/0x250 [nouveau]
nvkm_falcon_fw_ctor+0x42/0x70 [nouveau]
ga102_gsp_booter_ctor+0xb4/0x1a0 [nouveau]
r535_gsp_oneinit+0xb3/0x15f0 [nouveau]
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? nvkm_udevice_new+0x95/0x140 [nouveau]
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? ktime_get+0x47/0xb0
Fix this by using the non-coherent allocator instead, I think there
might be a better answer to this, but it involve ripping up some of
APIs using sg lists.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-43802

Description:

Vim is an improved version of the unix vi text editor. When flushing the typeahead buffer, Vim moves the current position in the typeahead buffer but does not check whether there is enough space left in the buffer to handle the next characters. So this may lead to the tb_off position within the typebuf variable to point outside of the valid buffer size, which can then later lead to a heap-buffer overflow in e.g. ins_typebuf(). Therefore, when flushing the typeahead buffer, check if there is enough space left before advancing the off position. If not, fall back to flush current typebuf contents. It's not quite clear yet, what can lead to this situation. It seems to happen when error messages occur (which will cause Vim to flush the typeahead buffer) in comnination with several long mappgins and so it may eventually move the off position out of a valid buffer size. Impact is low since it is not easily reproducible and requires to have several mappings active and run into some error condition. But when this happens, this will cause a crash. The issue has been fixed as of Vim patch v9.1.0697. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.

Locations:

vim-filesystem-2:8.2.2637-21.el9
vim-minimal-2:8.2.2637-21.el9

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-42321

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: flow_dissector: use DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE
The following splat is easy to reproduce upstream as well as in -stable
kernels. Florian Westphal provided the following commit:
d1dab4f71d37 ("net: add and use __skb_get_hash_symmetric_net")
but this complementary fix has been also suggested by Willem de Bruijn
and it can be easily backported to -stable kernel which consists in
using DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE instead to silence the following splat
given __skb_get_hash() is used by the nftables tracing infrastructure to
to identify packets in traces.
[69133.561393] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[69133.561404] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 43576 at net/core/flow_dissector.c:1104 __skb_flow_dissect+0x134f/
[...]
[69133.561944] CPU: 0 PID: 43576 Comm: socat Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7+ #379
[69133.561959] RIP: 0010:__skb_flow_dissect+0x134f/0x2ad0
[69133.561970] Code: 83 f9 04 0f 84 b3 00 00 00 45 85 c9 0f 84 aa 00 00 00 41 83 f9 02 0f 84 81 fc ff
ff 44 0f b7 b4 24 80 00 00 00 e9 8b f9 ff ff <0f> 0b e9 20 f3 ff ff 41 f6 c6 20 0f 84 e4 ef ff ff 48 8d 7b 12 e8
[69133.561979] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000006fc0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[69133.561988] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff82f33e20 RCX: ffffffff81ab7e19
[69133.561994] RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffffc90000007388 RDI: ffff888103a1b418
[69133.562001] RBP: ffffc90000007310 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[69133.562007] R10: ffffc90000007388 R11: ffffffff810cface R12: ffff888103a1b400
[69133.562013] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffff82f33e2a R15: ffffffff82f33e28
[69133.562020] FS: 00007f40f7131740(0000) GS:ffff888390800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[69133.562027] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[69133.562033] CR2: 00007f40f7346ee0 CR3: 000000015d200001 CR4: 00000000001706f0
[69133.562040] Call Trace:
[69133.562044] <IRQ>
[69133.562049] ? __warn+0x9f/0x1a0
[ 1211.841384] ? __skb_flow_dissect+0x107e/0x2860
[...]
[ 1211.841496] ? bpf_flow_dissect+0x160/0x160
[ 1211.841753] __skb_get_hash+0x97/0x280
[ 1211.841765] ? __skb_get_hash_symmetric+0x230/0x230
[ 1211.841776] ? mod_find+0xbf/0xe0
[ 1211.841786] ? get_stack_info_noinstr+0x12/0xe0
[ 1211.841798] ? bpf_ksym_find+0x56/0xe0
[ 1211.841807] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x2a/0x70
[ 1211.841819] nft_trace_init+0x1b9/0x1c0 [nf_tables]
[ 1211.841895] ? nft_trace_notify+0x830/0x830 [nf_tables]
[ 1211.841964] ? get_stack_info+0x2b/0x80
[ 1211.841975] ? nft_do_chain_arp+0x80/0x80 [nf_tables]
[ 1211.842044] nft_do_chain+0x79c/0x850 [nf_tables]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-42243

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/filemap: make MAX_PAGECACHE_ORDER acceptable to xarray
Patch series "mm/filemap: Limit page cache size to that supported by
xarray", v2.
Currently, xarray can't support arbitrary page cache size. More details
can be found from the WARN_ON() statement in xas_split_alloc(). In our
test whose code is attached below, we hit the WARN_ON() on ARM64 system
where the base page size is 64KB and huge page size is 512MB. The issue
was reported long time ago and some discussions on it can be found here
[1].
[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-xfs/msg75404.html
In order to fix the issue, we need to adjust MAX_PAGECACHE_ORDER to one
supported by xarray and avoid PMD-sized page cache if needed. The code
changes are suggested by David Hildenbrand.
PATCH[1] adjusts MAX_PAGECACHE_ORDER to that supported by xarray
PATCH[2-3] avoids PMD-sized page cache in the synchronous readahead path
PATCH[4] avoids PMD-sized page cache for shmem files if needed
Test program
============
# cat test.c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define TEST_XFS_FILENAME"/tmp/data"
#define TEST_SHMEM_FILENAME"/dev/shm/data"
#define TEST_MEM_SIZE0x20000000
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
const char *filename;
int fd = 0;
void *buf = (void *)-1, *p;
int pgsize = getpagesize();
int ret;
if (pgsize != 0x10000) {
fprintf(stderr, "64KB base page size is required\n");
return -EPERM;
}
system("echo force > /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/shmem_enabled");
system("rm -fr /tmp/data");
system("rm -fr /dev/shm/data");
system("echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches");
/* Open xfs or shmem file */
filename = TEST_XFS_FILENAME;
if (argc > 1 && !strcmp(argv[1], "shmem"))
filename = TEST_SHMEM_FILENAME;
fd = open(filename, O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_TRUNC);
if (fd < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open <%s>\n", filename);
return -EIO;
}
/* Extend file size */
ret = ftruncate(fd, TEST_MEM_SIZE);
if (ret) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error %d to ftruncate()\n", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
/* Create VMA */
buf = mmap(NULL, TEST_MEM_SIZE,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
if (buf == (void *)-1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to mmap <%s>\n", filename);
goto cleanup;
}
fprintf(stdout, "mapped buffer at 0x%p\n", buf);
ret = madvise(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE, MADV_HUGEPAGE);
if (ret) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to madvise(MADV_HUGEPAGE)\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* Populate VMA */
ret = madvise(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE, MADV_POPULATE_WRITE);
if (ret) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error %d to madvise(MADV_POPULATE_WRITE)\n", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
/* Punch the file to enforce xarray split */
ret = fallocate(fd, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE | FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE,
TEST_MEM_SIZE - pgsize, pgsize);
if (ret)
fprintf(stderr, "Error %d to fallocate()\n", ret);
cleanup:
if (buf != (void *)-1)
munmap(buf, TEST_MEM_SIZE);
if (fd > 0)
close(fd);
return 0;
}
# gcc test.c -o test
# cat /proc/1/smaps | grep KernelPageSize | head -n 1
KernelPageSize: 64 kB
# ./test shmem
:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 17 PID: 5253 at lib/xarray.c:1025 xas_split_alloc+0xf8/0x128
Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib \
nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct \
nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 \
ip_set nf_tables rfkill nfnetlink vfat fat virtio_balloon \
drm fuse xfs libcrc32c crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 \
virtio_net sha1_ce net_failover failover virtio_console virtio_blk \
dimlib virtio_mmio
CPU: 17 PID: 5253 Comm: test Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc5-gavin+ #12
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20240524-1.el9 05/24/2024
pstate: 83400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO +TC
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-42073

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mlxsw: spectrum_buffers: Fix memory corruptions on Spectrum-4 systems
The following two shared buffer operations make use of the Shared Buffer
Status Register (SBSR):
# devlink sb occupancy snapshot pci/0000:01:00.0
# devlink sb occupancy clearmax pci/0000:01:00.0
The register has two masks of 256 bits to denote on which ingress /
egress ports the register should operate on. Spectrum-4 has more than
256 ports, so the register was extended by cited commit with a new
'port_page' field.
However, when filling the register's payload, the driver specifies the
ports as absolute numbers and not relative to the first port of the port
page, resulting in memory corruptions [1].
Fix by specifying the ports relative to the first port of the port page.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlxsw_sp_sb_occ_snapshot+0xb6d/0xbc0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881068cb00f by task devlink/1566
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xc6/0x120
print_report+0xce/0x670
kasan_report+0xd7/0x110
mlxsw_sp_sb_occ_snapshot+0xb6d/0xbc0
mlxsw_devlink_sb_occ_snapshot+0x75/0xb0
devlink_nl_sb_occ_snapshot_doit+0x1f9/0x2a0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x20c/0x300
genl_rcv_msg+0x567/0x800
netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x450
genl_rcv+0x2d/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x547/0x830
netlink_sendmsg+0x8d4/0xdb0
__sys_sendto+0x49b/0x510
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe5/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[...]
Allocated by task 1:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
copy_verifier_state+0xbc2/0xfb0
do_check_common+0x2c51/0xc7e0
bpf_check+0x5107/0x9960
bpf_prog_load+0xf0e/0x2690
__sys_bpf+0x1a61/0x49d0
__x64_sys_bpf+0x7d/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 1:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
poison_slab_object+0x109/0x170
__kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x30
kfree+0xca/0x2b0
free_verifier_state+0xce/0x270
do_check_common+0x4828/0xc7e0
bpf_check+0x5107/0x9960
bpf_prog_load+0xf0e/0x2690
__sys_bpf+0x1a61/0x49d0
__x64_sys_bpf+0x7d/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-42071

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ionic: use dev_consume_skb_any outside of napi
If we're not in a NAPI softirq context, we need to be careful
about how we call napi_consume_skb(), specifically we need to
call it with budget==0 to signal to it that we're not in a
safe context.
This was found while running some configuration stress testing
of traffic and a change queue config loop running, and this
curious note popped out:
[ 4371.402645] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: ethtool/20545
[ 4371.402897] caller is napi_skb_cache_put+0x16/0x80
[ 4371.403120] CPU: 25 PID: 20545 Comm: ethtool Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-rc3-netnext+ #8
[ 4371.403302] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10/ProLiant DL360 Gen10, BIOS U32 01/23/2021
[ 4371.403460] Call Trace:
[ 4371.403613] <TASK>
[ 4371.403758] dump_stack_lvl+0x4f/0x70
[ 4371.403904] check_preemption_disabled+0xc1/0xe0
[ 4371.404051] napi_skb_cache_put+0x16/0x80
[ 4371.404199] ionic_tx_clean+0x18a/0x240 [ionic]
[ 4371.404354] ionic_tx_cq_service+0xc4/0x200 [ionic]
[ 4371.404505] ionic_tx_flush+0x15/0x70 [ionic]
[ 4371.404653] ? ionic_lif_qcq_deinit.isra.23+0x5b/0x70 [ionic]
[ 4371.404805] ionic_txrx_deinit+0x71/0x190 [ionic]
[ 4371.404956] ionic_reconfigure_queues+0x5f5/0xff0 [ionic]
[ 4371.405111] ionic_set_ringparam+0x2e8/0x3e0 [ionic]
[ 4371.405265] ethnl_set_rings+0x1f1/0x300
[ 4371.405418] ethnl_default_set_doit+0xbb/0x160
[ 4371.405571] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xff/0x130
[...]
I found that ionic_tx_clean() calls napi_consume_skb() which calls
napi_skb_cache_put(), but before that last call is the note
/* Zero budget indicate non-NAPI context called us, like netpoll */
and
DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_softirq());
Those are pretty big hints that we're doing it wrong. We can pass a
context hint down through the calls to let ionic_tx_clean() know what
we're doing so it can call napi_consume_skb() correctly.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-41047

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: Fix XDP program unloading while removing the driver
The commit 6533e558c650 ("i40e: Fix reset path while removing
the driver") introduced a new PF state "__I40E_IN_REMOVE" to block
modifying the XDP program while the driver is being removed.
Unfortunately, such a change is useful only if the ".ndo_bpf()"
callback was called out of the rmmod context because unloading the
existing XDP program is also a part of driver removing procedure.
In other words, from the rmmod context the driver is expected to
unload the XDP program without reporting any errors. Otherwise,
the kernel warning with callstack is printed out to dmesg.
Example failing scenario:
1. Load the i40e driver.
2. Load the XDP program.
3. Unload the i40e driver (using "rmmod" command).
The example kernel warning log:
[ +0.004646] WARNING: CPU: 94 PID: 10395 at net/core/dev.c:9290 unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x7a9/0x870
[...]
[ +0.010959] RIP: 0010:unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x7a9/0x870
[...]
[ +0.002726] Call Trace:
[ +0.002457] <TASK>
[ +0.002119] ? __warn+0x80/0x120
[ +0.003245] ? unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x7a9/0x870
[ +0.005586] ? report_bug+0x164/0x190
[ +0.003678] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80
[ +0.003503] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[ +0.003846] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ +0.004200] ? unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x7a9/0x870
[ +0.005579] ? unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x3cc/0x870
[ +0.005586] unregister_netdevice_queue+0xf7/0x140
[ +0.004806] unregister_netdev+0x1c/0x30
[ +0.003933] i40e_vsi_release+0x87/0x2f0 [i40e]
[ +0.004604] i40e_remove+0x1a1/0x420 [i40e]
[ +0.004220] pci_device_remove+0x3f/0xb0
[ +0.003943] device_release_driver_internal+0x19f/0x200
[ +0.005243] driver_detach+0x48/0x90
[ +0.003586] bus_remove_driver+0x6d/0xf0
[ +0.003939] pci_unregister_driver+0x2e/0xb0
[ +0.004278] i40e_exit_module+0x10/0x5f0 [i40e]
[ +0.004570] __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x197/0x310
[ +0.005153] do_syscall_64+0x85/0x170
[ +0.003684] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x69/0x220
[ +0.004886] ? do_syscall_64+0x95/0x170
[ +0.003851] ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180
[ +0.003932] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79
[ +0.005064] RIP: 0033:0x7f59dc9347cb
[ +0.003648] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 65 16 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83
c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f
05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 35 16 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ +0.018753] RSP: 002b:00007ffffac99048 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
[ +0.007577] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559b9bb2f6e0 RCX: 00007f59dc9347cb
[ +0.007140] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559b9bb2f748
[ +0.007146] RBP: 00007ffffac99070 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000
[ +0.007133] R10: 00007f59dc9a5ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
[ +0.007141] R13: 00007ffffac992d8 R14: 0000559b9bb2f6e0 R15: 0000000000000000
[ +0.007151] </TASK>
[ +0.002204] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Fix this by checking if the XDP program is being loaded or unloaded.
Then, block only loading a new program while "__I40E_IN_REMOVE" is set.
Also, move testing "__I40E_IN_REMOVE" flag to the beginning of XDP_SETUP
callback to avoid unnecessary operations and checks.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-41004

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Build event generation tests only as modules
The kprobes and synth event generation test modules add events and lock
(get a reference) those event file reference in module init function,
and unlock and delete it in module exit function. This is because those
are designed for playing as modules.
If we make those modules as built-in, those events are left locked in the
kernel, and never be removed. This causes kprobe event self-test failure
as below.
[ 97.349708] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 97.353453] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c:2133 kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480
[ 97.357106] Modules linked in:
[ 97.358488] CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.9.0-g699646734ab5-dirty #14
[ 97.361556] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 97.363880] RIP: 0010:kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480
[ 97.365538] Code: a8 24 08 82 e9 ae fd ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 48 c7 c7 e5 aa 0b 82 e9 ee fc ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 48 c7 c7 2d 61 06 82 e9 8e fd ff ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 48 c7 c7 33 0b 0c 82 89 c6 e8 6e 03 1f ff 41 ff c7 e9 90
[ 97.370429] RSP: 0000:ffffc90000013b50 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 97.371852] RAX: 00000000fffffff0 RBX: ffff888005919c00 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 97.373829] RDX: ffff888003f40000 RSI: ffffffff8236a598 RDI: ffff888003f40a68
[ 97.375715] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 97.377675] R10: ffffffff811c9ae5 R11: ffffffff8120c4e0 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 97.379591] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000015 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 97.381536] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88807dcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 97.383813] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 97.385449] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002244000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[ 97.387347] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 97.389277] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 97.391196] Call Trace:
[ 97.391967] <TASK>
[ 97.392647] ? __warn+0xcc/0x180
[ 97.393640] ? kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480
[ 97.395181] ? report_bug+0xbd/0x150
[ 97.396234] ? handle_bug+0x3e/0x60
[ 97.397311] ? exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50
[ 97.398434] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 97.399652] ? trace_kprobe_is_busy+0x20/0x20
[ 97.400904] ? tracing_reset_all_online_cpus+0x15/0x90
[ 97.402304] ? kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480
[ 97.403773] ? init_kprobe_trace+0x50/0x50
[ 97.404972] do_one_initcall+0x112/0x240
[ 97.406113] do_initcall_level+0x95/0xb0
[ 97.407286] ? kernel_init+0x1a/0x1a0
[ 97.408401] do_initcalls+0x3f/0x70
[ 97.409452] kernel_init_freeable+0x16f/0x1e0
[ 97.410662] ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
[ 97.411738] kernel_init+0x1a/0x1a0
[ 97.412788] ret_from_fork+0x39/0x50
[ 97.413817] ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
[ 97.414844] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[ 97.416285] </TASK>
[ 97.417134] irq event stamp: 13437323
[ 97.418376] hardirqs last enabled at (13437337): [<ffffffff8110bc0c>] console_unlock+0x11c/0x150
[ 97.421285] hardirqs last disabled at (13437370): [<ffffffff8110bbf1>] console_unlock+0x101/0x150
[ 97.423838] softirqs last enabled at (13437366): [<ffffffff8108e17f>] handle_softirqs+0x23f/0x2a0
[ 97.426450] softirqs last disabled at (13437393): [<ffffffff8108e346>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x66/0xd0
[ 97.428850] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
And also, since we can not cleanup dynamic_event file, ftracetest are
failed too.
To avoid these issues, build these tests only as modules.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-41003

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix reg_set_min_max corruption of fake_reg
Juan reported that after doing some changes to buzzer [0] and implementing
a new fuzzing strategy guided by coverage, they noticed the following in
one of the probes:
[...]
13: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) ; R0=map_value(ks=4,vs=8) R6_w=scalar()
14: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0
15: (b4) w0 = -1 ; R0_w=0xffffffff
16: (74) w0 >>= 1 ; R0_w=0x7fffffff
17: (5c) w6 &= w0 ; R0_w=0x7fffffff R6_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff))
18: (44) w6 |= 2 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd))
19: (56) if w6 != 0x7ffffffd goto pc+1
REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (true_reg2): range bounds violation u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0)
REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg1): range bounds violation u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0)
REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg2): const tnum out of sync with range bounds u64=[0x0, 0xffffffffffffffff] s64=[0x8000000000000000, 0x7fffffffffffffff] u32=[0x0, 0xffffffff] s32=[0x80000000, 0x7fffffff] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0)
19: R6_w=0x7fffffff
20: (95) exit
from 19 to 21: R0=0x7fffffff R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm
21: R0=0x7fffffff R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm
21: (14) w6 -= 2147483632 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=14,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffd))
22: (76) if w6 s>= 0xe goto pc+1 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=13,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffd))
23: (95) exit
from 22 to 24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm
24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm
24: (14) w6 -= 14 ; R6_w=0
[...]
What can be seen here is a register invariant violation on line 19. After
the binary-or in line 18, the verifier knows that bit 2 is set but knows
nothing about the rest of the content which was loaded from a map value,
meaning, range is [2,0x7fffffff] with var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd). When in
line 19 the verifier analyzes the branch, it splits the register states
in reg_set_min_max() into the registers of the true branch (true_reg1,
true_reg2) and the registers of the false branch (false_reg1, false_reg2).
Since the test is w6 != 0x7ffffffd, the src_reg is a known constant.
Internally, the verifier creates a "fake" register initialized as scalar
to the value of 0x7ffffffd, and then passes it onto reg_set_min_max(). Now,
for line 19, it is mathematically impossible to take the false branch of
this program, yet the verifier analyzes it. It is impossible because the
second bit of r6 will be set due to the prior or operation and the
constant in the condition has that bit unset (hex(fd) == binary(1111 1101).
When the verifier first analyzes the false / fall-through branch, it will
compute an intersection between the var_off of r6 and of the constant. This
is because the verifier creates a "fake" register initialized to the value
of the constant. The intersection result later refines both registers in
regs_refine_cond_op():
[...]
t = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_subreg(reg2->var_off));
reg1->var_o
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-41000

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block/ioctl: prefer different overflow check
Running syzkaller with the newly reintroduced signed integer overflow
sanitizer shows this report:
[ 62.982337] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 62.985692] cgroup: Invalid name
[ 62.986211] UBSAN: signed-integer-overflow in ../block/ioctl.c:36:46
[ 62.989370] 9pnet_fd: p9_fd_create_tcp (7343): problem connecting socket to 127.0.0.1
[ 62.992992] 9223372036854775807 + 4095 cannot be represented in type 'long long'
[ 62.997827] 9pnet_fd: p9_fd_create_tcp (7345): problem connecting socket to 127.0.0.1
[ 62.999369] random: crng reseeded on system resumption
[ 63.000634] GUP no longer grows the stack in syz-executor.2 (7353): 20002000-20003000 (20001000)
[ 63.000668] CPU: 0 PID: 7353 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-00035-gb3ef86b5a957 #1
[ 63.000677] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 63.000682] Call Trace:
[ 63.000686] <TASK>
[ 63.000731] dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
[ 63.000919] __get_user_pages+0x903/0xd30
[ 63.001030] __gup_longterm_locked+0x153e/0x1ba0
[ 63.001041] ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x17/0x50
[ 63.001072] ? try_get_folio+0x29c/0x2d0
[ 63.001083] internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x1119/0x1530
[ 63.001109] iov_iter_extract_pages+0x23b/0x580
[ 63.001206] bio_iov_iter_get_pages+0x4de/0x1220
[ 63.001235] iomap_dio_bio_iter+0x9b6/0x1410
[ 63.001297] __iomap_dio_rw+0xab4/0x1810
[ 63.001316] iomap_dio_rw+0x45/0xa0
[ 63.001328] ext4_file_write_iter+0xdde/0x1390
[ 63.001372] vfs_write+0x599/0xbd0
[ 63.001394] ksys_write+0xc8/0x190
[ 63.001403] do_syscall_64+0xd4/0x1b0
[ 63.001421] ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x3a/0x60
[ 63.001479] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
[ 63.001535] RIP: 0033:0x7f7fd3ebf539
[ 63.001551] Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 14 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 63.001562] RSP: 002b:00007f7fd32570c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 63.001584] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7fd3ff3f80 RCX: 00007f7fd3ebf539
[ 63.001590] RDX: 4db6d1e4f7e43360 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000004
[ 63.001595] RBP: 00007f7fd3f1e496 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 63.001599] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 63.001604] R13: 0000000000000006 R14: 00007f7fd3ff3f80 R15: 00007ffd415ad2b8
...
[ 63.018142] ---[ end trace ]---
Historically, the signed integer overflow sanitizer did not work in the
kernel due to its interaction with `-fwrapv` but this has since been
changed [1] in the newest version of Clang; It was re-enabled in the
kernel with Commit 557f8c582a9ba8ab ("ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow
sanitizer").
Let's rework this overflow checking logic to not actually perform an
overflow during the check itself, thus avoiding the UBSAN splat.
[1]: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/82432

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-38594

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: move the EST lock to struct stmmac_priv
Reinitialize the whole EST structure would also reset the mutex
lock which is embedded in the EST structure, and then trigger
the following warning. To address this, move the lock to struct
stmmac_priv. We also need to reacquire the mutex lock when doing
this initialization.
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 505 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 505 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-00053-g0106679839f7-dirty #29
Hardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT)
pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
lr : __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
sp : ffffffc0864e3570
x29: ffffffc0864e3570 x28: ffffffc0817bdc78 x27: 0000000000000003
x26: ffffff80c54f1808 x25: ffffff80c9164080 x24: ffffffc080d723ac
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffffc083bc3000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
x17: ffffffc08117b080 x16: 0000000000000002 x15: ffffff80d2d40000
x14: 00000000000002da x13: ffffff80d2d404b8 x12: ffffffc082b5a5c8
x11: ffffffc082bca680 x10: ffffffc082bb2640 x9 : ffffffc082bb2698
x8 : 0000000000017fe8 x7 : c0000000ffffefff x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffffff8178fe0d48 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000027
x2 : ffffff8178fe0d50 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
__mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
mutex_lock_nested+0x28/0x34
tc_setup_taprio+0x118/0x68c
stmmac_setup_tc+0x50/0xf0
taprio_change+0x868/0xc9c

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-36938

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, skmsg: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
Fix NULL pointer data-races in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue() which
syzbot reported [1].
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sk_psock_drop / sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
write to 0xffff88814b3278b8 of 8 bytes by task 10724 on cpu 1:
sk_psock_stop_verdict net/core/skmsg.c:1257 [inline]
sk_psock_drop+0x13e/0x1f0 net/core/skmsg.c:843
sk_psock_put include/linux/skmsg.h:459 [inline]
sock_map_close+0x1a7/0x260 net/core/sock_map.c:1648
unix_release+0x4b/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048
__sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
sock_close+0x68/0x150 net/socket.c:1421
__fput+0x2c1/0x660 fs/file_table.c:422
__fput_sync+0x44/0x60 fs/file_table.c:507
__do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline]
__se_sys_close+0x101/0x1b0 fs/open.c:1541
__x64_sys_close+0x1f/0x30 fs/open.c:1541
do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
read to 0xffff88814b3278b8 of 8 bytes by task 10713 on cpu 0:
sk_psock_data_ready include/linux/skmsg.h:464 [inline]
sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue+0x32d/0x390 net/core/skmsg.c:555
sk_psock_skb_ingress_self+0x185/0x1e0 net/core/skmsg.c:606
sk_psock_verdict_apply net/core/skmsg.c:1008 [inline]
sk_psock_verdict_recv+0x3e4/0x4a0 net/core/skmsg.c:1202
unix_read_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:2546 [inline]
unix_stream_read_skb+0x9e/0xf0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2682
sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0x77/0x220 net/core/skmsg.c:1223
unix_stream_sendmsg+0x527/0x860 net/unix/af_unix.c:2339
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x140/0x180 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x312/0x410 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x1e9/0x280 net/socket.c:2667
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x46/0x50 net/socket.c:2674
do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
value changed: 0xffffffff83d7feb0 -> 0x0000000000000000
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 10713 Comm: syz-executor.4 Tainted: G W 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024
Prior to this, commit 4cd12c6065df ("bpf, sockmap: Fix NULL pointer
dereference in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready()") fixed one NULL pointer
similarly due to no protection of saved_data_ready. Here is another
different caller causing the same issue because of the same reason. So
we should protect it with sk_callback_lock read lock because the writer
side in the sk_psock_drop() uses "write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);".
To avoid errors that could happen in future, I move those two pairs of
lock into the sk_psock_data_ready(), which is suggested by John Fastabend.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-36906

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ARM: 9381/1: kasan: clear stale stack poison
We found below OOB crash:
[ 33.452494] ==================================================================
[ 33.453513] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in refresh_cpu_vm_stats.constprop.0+0xcc/0x2ec
[ 33.454660] Write of size 164 at addr c1d03d30 by task swapper/0/0
[ 33.455515]
[ 33.455767] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G O 6.1.25-mainline #1
[ 33.456880] Hardware name: Generic DT based system
[ 33.457555] unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c
[ 33.458326] show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0x4c
[ 33.459072] dump_stack_lvl from print_report+0x158/0x4a4
[ 33.459863] print_report from kasan_report+0x9c/0x148
[ 33.460616] kasan_report from kasan_check_range+0x94/0x1a0
[ 33.461424] kasan_check_range from memset+0x20/0x3c
[ 33.462157] memset from refresh_cpu_vm_stats.constprop.0+0xcc/0x2ec
[ 33.463064] refresh_cpu_vm_stats.constprop.0 from tick_nohz_idle_stop_tick+0x180/0x53c
[ 33.464181] tick_nohz_idle_stop_tick from do_idle+0x264/0x354
[ 33.465029] do_idle from cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x24
[ 33.465769] cpu_startup_entry from rest_init+0xf0/0xf4
[ 33.466528] rest_init from arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x18
[ 33.467397]
[ 33.467644] The buggy address belongs to stack of task swapper/0/0
[ 33.468493] and is located at offset 112 in frame:
[ 33.469172] refresh_cpu_vm_stats.constprop.0+0x0/0x2ec
[ 33.469917]
[ 33.470165] This frame has 2 objects:
[ 33.470696] [32, 76) 'global_zone_diff'
[ 33.470729] [112, 276) 'global_node_diff'
[ 33.471294]
[ 33.472095] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 33.472862] page:3cd72da8 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x41d03
[ 33.473944] flags: 0x1000(reserved|zone=0)
[ 33.474565] raw: 00001000 ed741470 ed741470 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000001
[ 33.475656] raw: 00000000
[ 33.476050] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 33.476816]
[ 33.477061] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 33.477732] c1d03c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 33.478630] c1d03c80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00
[ 33.479526] >c1d03d00: 00 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
[ 33.480415] ^
[ 33.481195] c1d03d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3
[ 33.482088] c1d03e00: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 33.482978] ==================================================================
We find the root cause of this OOB is that arm does not clear stale stack
poison in the case of cpuidle.
This patch refer to arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S to resolve this issue.
From cited commit [1] that explain the problem
Functions which the compiler has instrumented for KASAN place poison on
the stack shadow upon entry and remove this poison prior to returning.
In the case of cpuidle, CPUs exit the kernel a number of levels deep in
C code. Any instrumented functions on this critical path will leave
portions of the stack shadow poisoned.
If CPUs lose context and return to the kernel via a cold path, we
restore a prior context saved in __cpu_suspend_enter are forgotten, and
we never remove the poison they placed in the stack shadow area by
functions calls between this and the actual exit of the kernel.
Thus, (depending on stackframe layout) subsequent calls to instrumented
functions may hit this stale poison, resulting in (spurious) KASAN
splats to the console.
To avoid this, clear any stale poison from the idle thread for a CPU
prior to bringing a CPU online.
From cited commit [2]
Extend to check for CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
[1] commit 0d97e6d8024c ("arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison")
[2] commit d56a9ef84bd0 ("kasan, arm64: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK")

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-36008

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: check for NULL idev in ip_route_use_hint()
syzbot was able to trigger a NULL deref in fib_validate_source()
in an old tree [1].
It appears the bug exists in latest trees.
All calls to __in_dev_get_rcu() must be checked for a NULL result.
[1]
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 2 PID: 3257 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.10.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:fib_validate_source+0xbf/0x15a0 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:425
Code: 18 f2 f2 f2 f2 42 c7 44 20 23 f3 f3 f3 f3 48 89 44 24 78 42 c6 44 20 27 f3 e8 5d 88 48 fc 4c 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 48 89 44 24 18 <42> 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 ef e8 d2 15 98 fc 48 89 5c 24 10 41 bf
RSP: 0018:ffffc900015fee40 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88800f7a4000 RCX: ffff88800f4f90c0
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000004001eac RDI: ffff8880160c64c0
RBP: ffffc900015ff060 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88800f7a4000
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88800f4f90c0 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88800f7a4000
FS: 00007f938acfe6c0(0000) GS:ffff888058c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f938acddd58 CR3: 000000001248e000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
ip_route_use_hint+0x410/0x9b0 net/ipv4/route.c:2231
ip_rcv_finish_core+0x2c4/0x1a30 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:327
ip_list_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:612 [inline]
ip_sublist_rcv+0x3ed/0xe50 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:638
ip_list_rcv+0x422/0x470 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:673
__netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5572 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x6b1/0x890 net/core/dev.c:5620
__netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5672 [inline]
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x9f9/0xdc0 net/core/dev.c:5764
netif_receive_skb_list+0x55/0x3e0 net/core/dev.c:5816
xdp_recv_frames net/bpf/test_run.c:257 [inline]
xdp_test_run_batch net/bpf/test_run.c:335 [inline]
bpf_test_run_xdp_live+0x1818/0x1d00 net/bpf/test_run.c:363
bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x81f/0x1170 net/bpf/test_run.c:1376
bpf_prog_test_run+0x349/0x3c0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3736
__sys_bpf+0x45c/0x710 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5115
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5201 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5199 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5199

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35981

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_net: Do not send RSS key if it is not supported
There is a bug when setting the RSS options in virtio_net that can break
the whole machine, getting the kernel into an infinite loop.
Running the following command in any QEMU virtual machine with virtionet
will reproduce this problem:
# ethtool -X eth0 hfunc toeplitz
This is how the problem happens:
1) ethtool_set_rxfh() calls virtnet_set_rxfh()
2) virtnet_set_rxfh() calls virtnet_commit_rss_command()
3) virtnet_commit_rss_command() populates 4 entries for the rss
scatter-gather
4) Since the command above does not have a key, then the last
scatter-gatter entry will be zeroed, since rss_key_size == 0.
sg_buf_size = vi->rss_key_size;
5) This buffer is passed to qemu, but qemu is not happy with a buffer
with zero length, and do the following in virtqueue_map_desc() (QEMU
function):
if (!sz) {
virtio_error(vdev, "virtio: zero sized buffers are not allowed");
6) virtio_error() (also QEMU function) set the device as broken
vdev->broken = true;
7) Qemu bails out, and do not repond this crazy kernel.
8) The kernel is waiting for the response to come back (function
virtnet_send_command())
9) The kernel is waiting doing the following :
while (!virtqueue_get_buf(vi->cvq, &tmp) &&
!virtqueue_is_broken(vi->cvq))
cpu_relax();
10) None of the following functions above is true, thus, the kernel
loops here forever. Keeping in mind that virtqueue_is_broken() does
not look at the qemu `vdev->broken`, so, it never realizes that the
vitio is broken at QEMU side.
Fix it by not sending RSS commands if the feature is not available in
the device.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35934

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: reduce rtnl pressure in smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list()
Many syzbot reports show extreme rtnl pressure, and many of them hint
that smc acquires rtnl in netns creation for no good reason [1]
This patch returns early from smc_pnet_net_init()
if there is no netdevice yet.
I am not even sure why smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list() even exists,
because smc_pnet_netdev_event() is also calling
smc_pnet_add_base_pnetid() when handling NETDEV_UP event.
[1] extract of typical syzbot reports
2 locks held by syz-executor.3/12252:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.4/12253:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.1/12257:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.2/12261:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.0/12265:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.3/12268:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.4/12271:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.1/12274:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.2/12280:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35917

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/bpf: Fix bpf_plt pointer arithmetic
Kui-Feng Lee reported a crash on s390x triggered by the
dummy_st_ops/dummy_init_ptr_arg test [1]:
[<0000000000000002>] 0x2
[<00000000009d5cde>] bpf_struct_ops_test_run+0x156/0x250
[<000000000033145a>] __sys_bpf+0xa1a/0xd00
[<00000000003319dc>] __s390x_sys_bpf+0x44/0x50
[<0000000000c4382c>] __do_syscall+0x244/0x300
[<0000000000c59a40>] system_call+0x70/0x98
This is caused by GCC moving memcpy() after assignments in
bpf_jit_plt(), resulting in NULL pointers being written instead of
the return and the target addresses.
Looking at the GCC internals, the reordering is allowed because the
alias analysis thinks that the memcpy() destination and the assignments'
left-hand-sides are based on different objects: new_plt and
bpf_plt_ret/bpf_plt_target respectively, and therefore they cannot
alias.
This is in turn due to a violation of the C standard:
When two pointers are subtracted, both shall point to elements of the
same array object, or one past the last element of the array object
...
From the C's perspective, bpf_plt_ret and bpf_plt are distinct objects
and cannot be subtracted. In the practical terms, doing so confuses the
GCC's alias analysis.
The code was written this way in order to let the C side know a few
offsets defined in the assembly. While nice, this is by no means
necessary. Fix the noncompliance by hardcoding these offsets.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/c9923c1d-971d-4022-8dc8-1364e929d34c@gmail.com/

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35860

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: support deferring bpf_link dealloc to after RCU grace period
BPF link for some program types is passed as a "context" which can be
used by those BPF programs to look up additional information. E.g., for
multi-kprobes and multi-uprobes, link is used to fetch BPF cookie values.
Because of this runtime dependency, when bpf_link refcnt drops to zero
there could still be active BPF programs running accessing link data.
This patch adds generic support to defer bpf_link dealloc callback to
after RCU GP, if requested. This is done by exposing two different
deallocation callbacks, one synchronous and one deferred. If deferred
one is provided, bpf_link_free() will schedule dealloc_deferred()
callback to happen after RCU GP.
BPF is using two flavors of RCU: "classic" non-sleepable one and RCU
tasks trace one. The latter is used when sleepable BPF programs are
used. bpf_link_free() accommodates that by checking underlying BPF
program's sleepable flag, and goes either through normal RCU GP only for
non-sleepable, or through RCU tasks trace GP *and* then normal RCU GP
(taking into account rcu_trace_implies_rcu_gp() optimization), if BPF
program is sleepable.
We use this for multi-kprobe and multi-uprobe links, which dereference
link during program run. We also preventively switch raw_tp link to use
deferred dealloc callback, as upcoming changes in bpf-next tree expose
raw_tp link data (specifically, cookie value) to BPF program at runtime
as well.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26891

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Don't issue ATS Invalidation request when device is disconnected
For those endpoint devices connect to system via hotplug capable ports,
users could request a hot reset to the device by flapping device's link
through setting the slot's link control register, as pciehp_ist() DLLSC
interrupt sequence response, pciehp will unload the device driver and
then power it off. thus cause an IOMMU device-TLB invalidation (Intel
VT-d spec, or ATS Invalidation in PCIe spec r6.1) request for non-existence
target device to be sent and deadly loop to retry that request after ITE
fault triggered in interrupt context.
That would cause following continuous hard lockup warning and system hang
[ 4211.433662] pcieport 0000:17:01.0: pciehp: Slot(108): Link Down
[ 4211.433664] pcieport 0000:17:01.0: pciehp: Slot(108): Card not present
[ 4223.822591] NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 144
[ 4223.822622] CPU: 144 PID: 1422 Comm: irq/57-pciehp Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S
OE kernel version xxxx
[ 4223.822623] Hardware name: vendorname xxxx 666-106,
BIOS 01.01.02.03.01 05/15/2023
[ 4223.822623] RIP: 0010:qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490
[ 4223.822624] Code: 48 be 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 49 85 74 24 20 0f 95 c1 48 8b
57 10 83 c1 04 83 3c 1a 03 0f 84 a2 01 00 00 49 8b 04 24 8b 70 34 <40> f6 c6 1
0 74 17 49 8b 04 24 8b 80 80 00 00 00 89 c2 d3 fa 41 39
[ 4223.822624] RSP: 0018:ffffc4f074f0bbb8 EFLAGS: 00000093
[ 4223.822625] RAX: ffffc4f040059000 RBX: 0000000000000014 RCX: 0000000000000005
[ 4223.822625] RDX: ffff9f3841315800 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9f38401a8340
[ 4223.822625] RBP: ffff9f38401a8340 R08: ffffc4f074f0bc00 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 4223.822626] R10: 0000000000000010 R11: 0000000000000018 R12: ffff9f384005e200
[ 4223.822626] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000046 R15: 0000000000000004
[ 4223.822626] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa237ae400000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 4223.822627] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 4223.822627] CR2: 00007ffe86515d80 CR3: 000002fd3000a001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 4223.822627] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 4223.822628] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 4223.822628] PKRU: 55555554
[ 4223.822628] Call Trace:
[ 4223.822628] qi_flush_dev_iotlb+0xb1/0xd0
[ 4223.822628] __dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x224/0x250
[ 4223.822629] dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x3e/0x50
[ 4223.822629] intel_iommu_release_device+0x1f/0x30
[ 4223.822629] iommu_release_device+0x33/0x60
[ 4223.822629] iommu_bus_notifier+0x7f/0x90
[ 4223.822630] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0x90
[ 4223.822630] device_del+0x2e5/0x420
[ 4223.822630] pci_remove_bus_device+0x70/0x110
[ 4223.822630] pciehp_unconfigure_device+0x7c/0x130
[ 4223.822631] pciehp_disable_slot+0x6b/0x100
[ 4223.822631] pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change+0xd8/0x320
[ 4223.822631] pciehp_ist+0x176/0x180
[ 4223.822631] ? irq_finalize_oneshot.part.50+0x110/0x110
[ 4223.822632] irq_thread_fn+0x19/0x50
[ 4223.822632] irq_thread+0x104/0x190
[ 4223.822632] ? irq_forced_thread_fn+0x90/0x90
[ 4223.822632] ? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xe0/0xe0
[ 4223.822633] kthread+0x114/0x130
[ 4223.822633] ? __kthread_cancel_work+0x40/0x40
[ 4223.822633] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 4223.822633] Kernel panic - not syncing: Hard LOCKUP
[ 4223.822634] CPU: 144 PID: 1422 Comm: irq/57-pciehp Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S
OE kernel version xxxx
[ 4223.822634] Hardware name: vendorname xxxx 666-106,
BIOS 01.01.02.03.01 05/15/2023
[ 4223.822634] Call Trace:
[ 4223.822634] <NMI>
[ 4223.822635] dump_stack+0x6d/0x88
[ 4223.822635] panic+0x101/0x2d0
[ 4223.822635] ? ret_from_fork+0x11/0x30
[ 4223.822635] nmi_panic.cold.14+0xc/0xc
[ 4223.822636] watchdog_overflow_callback.cold.8+0x6d/0x81
[ 4223.822636] __perf_event_overflow+0x4f/0xf0
[ 4223.822636] handle_pmi_common
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26854

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix uninitialized dplls mutex usage
The pf->dplls.lock mutex is initialized too late, after its first use.
Move it to the top of ice_dpll_init.
Note that the "err_exit" error path destroys the mutex. And the mutex is
the last thing destroyed in ice_dpll_deinit.
This fixes the following warning with CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES:
ice 0000:10:00.0: The DDP package was successfully loaded: ICE OS Default Package version 1.3.36.0
ice 0000:10:00.0: 252.048 Gb/s available PCIe bandwidth (16.0 GT/s PCIe x16 link)
ice 0000:10:00.0: PTP init successful
------------[ cut here ]------------
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 410 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 __mutex_lock+0x773/0xd40
Modules linked in: crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ice(+) nvme nvme_c>
CPU: 0 PID: 410 Comm: kworker/0:4 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc5+ #3
Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL110 Gen10 Plus/ProLiant DL110 Gen10 Plus, BIOS U56 10/19/2023
Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x773/0xd40
Code: c0 0f 84 1d f9 ff ff 44 8b 35 0d 9c 69 01 45 85 f6 0f 85 0d f9 ff ff 48 c7 c6 12 a2 a9 85 48 c7 c7 12 f1 a>
RSP: 0018:ff7eb1a3417a7ae0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff85ac2bff RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ff7eb1a3417a7b80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffbfff
R10: ff7eb1a3417a7978 R11: ff32b80f7fd2e568 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ff32b7f02c50e0d8
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff32b80efe800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055b5852cc000 CR3: 000000003c43a004 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x84/0x170
? __mutex_lock+0x773/0xd40
? report_bug+0x1c7/0x1d0
? prb_read_valid+0x1b/0x30
? handle_bug+0x42/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? __mutex_lock+0x773/0xd40
? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50
? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x346/0x490
? ice_dpll_lock_status_get+0x28/0x50 [ice]
? __pfx_ice_dpll_lock_status_get+0x10/0x10 [ice]
? ice_dpll_lock_status_get+0x28/0x50 [ice]
ice_dpll_lock_status_get+0x28/0x50 [ice]
dpll_device_get_one+0x14f/0x2e0
dpll_device_event_send+0x7d/0x150
dpll_device_register+0x124/0x180
ice_dpll_init_dpll+0x7b/0xd0 [ice]
ice_dpll_init+0x224/0xa40 [ice]
? _dev_info+0x70/0x90
ice_load+0x468/0x690 [ice]
ice_probe+0x75b/0xa10 [ice]
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4f/0x80
? process_one_work+0x1a3/0x500
local_pci_probe+0x47/0xa0
work_for_cpu_fn+0x17/0x30
process_one_work+0x20d/0x500
worker_thread+0x1df/0x3e0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x103/0x140
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
irq event stamp: 125197
hardirqs last enabled at (125197): [<ffffffff8416409d>] finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x12d/0x3d0
hardirqs last disabled at (125196): [<ffffffff85134044>] __schedule+0xea4/0x19f0
softirqs last enabled at (105334): [<ffffffff84e1e65a>] napi_get_frags_check+0x1a/0x60
softirqs last disabled at (105332): [<ffffffff84e1e65a>] napi_get_frags_check+0x1a/0x60
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26742

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: smartpqi: Fix disable_managed_interrupts
Correct blk-mq registration issue with module parameter
disable_managed_interrupts enabled.
When we turn off the default PCI_IRQ_AFFINITY flag, the driver needs to
register with blk-mq using blk_mq_map_queues(). The driver is currently
calling blk_mq_pci_map_queues() which results in a stack trace and possibly
undefined behavior.
Stack Trace:
[ 7.860089] scsi host2: smartpqi
[ 7.871934] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 238 at block/blk-mq-pci.c:52 blk_mq_pci_map_queues+0xca/0xd0
[ 7.889231] Modules linked in: sd_mod t10_pi sg uas smartpqi(+) crc32c_intel scsi_transport_sas usb_storage dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler fuse
[ 7.924755] CPU: 0 PID: 238 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 4.18.0-372.88.1.el8_6_smartpqi_test.x86_64 #1
[ 7.944336] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen10/ProLiant DL380 Gen10, BIOS U30 03/08/2022
[ 7.963026] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
[ 7.978275] RIP: 0010:blk_mq_pci_map_queues+0xca/0xd0
[ 7.978278] Code: 48 89 de 89 c7 e8 f6 0f 4f 00 3b 05 c4 b7 8e 01 72 e1 5b 31 c0 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 7d df 73 00 31 c0 e9 76 df 73 00 <0f> 0b eb bc 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 49 89 ff 41 56 41 55 41 54
[ 7.978280] RSP: 0018:ffffa95fc3707d50 EFLAGS: 00010216
[ 7.978283] RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000010
[ 7.978284] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9190c32d4310
[ 7.978286] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffa95fc3707d38 R09: ffff91929b81ac00
[ 7.978287] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffa95fc3707ac0 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 7.978288] R13: ffff9190c32d4000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: ffff9190c4c950a8
[ 7.978290] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9193efc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 7.978292] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 8.172814] CR2: 000055d11166c000 CR3: 00000002dae10002 CR4: 00000000007706f0
[ 8.172816] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 8.172817] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 8.172818] PKRU: 55555554
[ 8.172819] Call Trace:
[ 8.172823] blk_mq_alloc_tag_set+0x12e/0x310
[ 8.264339] scsi_add_host_with_dma.cold.9+0x30/0x245
[ 8.279302] pqi_ctrl_init+0xacf/0xc8e [smartpqi]
[ 8.294085] ? pqi_pci_probe+0x480/0x4c8 [smartpqi]
[ 8.309015] pqi_pci_probe+0x480/0x4c8 [smartpqi]
[ 8.323286] local_pci_probe+0x42/0x80
[ 8.337855] work_for_cpu_fn+0x16/0x20
[ 8.351193] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
[ 8.364462] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 8.379252] worker_thread+0x1ce/0x390
[ 8.392623] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 8.406295] kthread+0x10a/0x120
[ 8.418428] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
[ 8.431532] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 8.444137] ---[ end trace 1bf0173d39354506 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26721

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/dsc: Fix the macro that calculates DSCC_/DSCA_ PPS reg address
Commit bd077259d0a9 ("drm/i915/vdsc: Add function to read any PPS
register") defines a new macro to calculate the DSC PPS register
addresses with PPS number as an input. This macro correctly calculates
the addresses till PPS 11 since the addresses increment by 4. So in that
case the following macro works correctly to give correct register
address:
_MMIO(_DSCA_PPS_0 + (pps) * 4)
However after PPS 11, the register address for PPS 12 increments by 12
because of RC Buffer memory allocation in between. Because of this
discontinuity in the address space, the macro calculates wrong addresses
for PPS 12 - 16 resulting into incorrect DSC PPS parameter value
read/writes causing DSC corruption.
This fixes it by correcting this macro to add the offset of 12 for PPS
>=12.
v3: Add correct paranthesis for pps argument (Jani Nikula)
(cherry picked from commit 6074be620c31dc2ae11af96a1a5ea95580976fb5)

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26695

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Fix null pointer dereference in __sev_platform_shutdown_locked
The SEV platform device can be shutdown with a null psp_master,
e.g., using DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE. Found using KASAN:
[ 137.148210] ccp 0000:23:00.1: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
[ 137.162647] ccp 0000:23:00.1: no command queues available
[ 137.170598] ccp 0000:23:00.1: sev enabled
[ 137.174645] ccp 0000:23:00.1: psp enabled
[ 137.178890] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000001e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
[ 137.182693] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000f0-0x00000000000000f7]
[ 137.182693] CPU: 93 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1+ #311
[ 137.182693] RIP: 0010:__sev_platform_shutdown_locked+0x51/0x180
[ 137.182693] Code: 08 80 3c 08 00 0f 85 0e 01 00 00 48 8b 1d 67 b6 01 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d bb f0 00 00 00 48 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 01 00 0f 85 fe 00 00 00 48 8b 9b f0 00 00 00 48 85 db 74 2c
[ 137.182693] RSP: 0018:ffffc900000cf9b0 EFLAGS: 00010216
[ 137.182693] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000001e
[ 137.182693] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 00000000000000f0
[ 137.182693] RBP: ffffc900000cf9c8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff58f5a66
[ 137.182693] R10: ffffc900000cf9c8 R11: ffffffffac7ad32f R12: ffff8881e5052c28
[ 137.182693] R13: ffff8881e5052c28 R14: ffff8881758e43e8 R15: ffffffffac64abf8
[ 137.182693] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff889de7000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 137.182693] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 137.182693] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001cf7c7e000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[ 137.182693] Call Trace:
[ 137.182693] <TASK>
[ 137.182693] ? show_regs+0x6c/0x80
[ 137.182693] ? __die_body+0x24/0x70
[ 137.182693] ? die_addr+0x4b/0x80
[ 137.182693] ? exc_general_protection+0x126/0x230
[ 137.182693] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x2b/0x30
[ 137.182693] ? __sev_platform_shutdown_locked+0x51/0x180
[ 137.182693] sev_firmware_shutdown.isra.0+0x1e/0x80
[ 137.182693] sev_dev_destroy+0x49/0x100
[ 137.182693] psp_dev_destroy+0x47/0xb0
[ 137.182693] sp_destroy+0xbb/0x240
[ 137.182693] sp_pci_remove+0x45/0x60
[ 137.182693] pci_device_remove+0xaa/0x1d0
[ 137.182693] device_remove+0xc7/0x170
[ 137.182693] really_probe+0x374/0xbe0
[ 137.182693] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 137.182693] __driver_probe_device+0x199/0x460
[ 137.182693] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0xd0
[ 137.182693] __driver_attach+0x191/0x3d0
[ 137.182693] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
[ 137.182693] bus_for_each_dev+0x100/0x190
[ 137.182693] ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10
[ 137.182693] ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20
[ 137.182693] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 137.182693] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x50
[ 137.182693] driver_attach+0x41/0x60
[ 137.182693] bus_add_driver+0x2a8/0x580
[ 137.182693] driver_register+0x141/0x480
[ 137.182693] __pci_register_driver+0x1d6/0x2a0
[ 137.182693] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 137.182693] ? esrt_sysfs_init+0x1cd/0x5d0
[ 137.182693] ? __pfx_sp_mod_init+0x10/0x10
[ 137.182693] sp_pci_init+0x22/0x30
[ 137.182693] sp_mod_init+0x14/0x30
[ 137.182693] ? __pfx_sp_mod_init+0x10/0x10
[ 137.182693] do_one_initcall+0xd1/0x470
[ 137.182693] ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
[ 137.182693] ? parameq+0x80/0xf0
[ 137.182693] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 137.182693] ? __kmalloc+0x3b0/0x4e0
[ 137.182693] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x92d/0x1050
[ 137.182693] ? kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte+0x171/0x190
[ 137.182693] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 137.182693] kernel_init_freeable+0xa64/0x1050
[ 137.182693] ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
[ 137.182693] kernel_init+0x24/0x160
[ 137.182693] ? __switch_to_asm+0x3e/0x70
[ 137.182693] ret_from_fork+0x40/0x80
[ 137.182693] ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x1
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26687

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen/events: close evtchn after mapping cleanup
shutdown_pirq and startup_pirq are not taking the
irq_mapping_update_lock because they can't due to lock inversion. Both
are called with the irq_desc->lock being taking. The lock order,
however, is first irq_mapping_update_lock and then irq_desc->lock.
This opens multiple races:
- shutdown_pirq can be interrupted by a function that allocates an event
channel:
CPU0 CPU1
shutdown_pirq {
xen_evtchn_close(e)
__startup_pirq {
EVTCHNOP_bind_pirq
-> returns just freed evtchn e
set_evtchn_to_irq(e, irq)
}
xen_irq_info_cleanup() {
set_evtchn_to_irq(e, -1)
}
}
Assume here event channel e refers here to the same event channel
number.
After this race the evtchn_to_irq mapping for e is invalid (-1).
- __startup_pirq races with __unbind_from_irq in a similar way. Because
__startup_pirq doesn't take irq_mapping_update_lock it can grab the
evtchn that __unbind_from_irq is currently freeing and cleaning up. In
this case even though the event channel is allocated, its mapping can
be unset in evtchn_to_irq.
The fix is to first cleanup the mappings and then close the event
channel. In this way, when an event channel gets allocated it's
potential previous evtchn_to_irq mappings are guaranteed to be unset already.
This is also the reverse order of the allocation where first the event
channel is allocated and then the mappings are setup.
On a 5.10 kernel prior to commit 3fcdaf3d7634 ("xen/events: modify internal
[un]bind interfaces"), we hit a BUG like the following during probing of NVMe
devices. The issue is that during nvme_setup_io_queues, pci_free_irq
is called for every device which results in a call to shutdown_pirq.
With many nvme devices it's therefore likely to hit this race during
boot because there will be multiple calls to shutdown_pirq and
startup_pirq are running potentially in parallel.
------------[ cut here ]------------
blkfront: xvda: barrier or flush: disabled; persistent grants: enabled; indirect descriptors: enabled; bounce buffer: enabled
kernel BUG at drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:499!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 44 PID: 375 Comm: kworker/u257:23 Not tainted 5.10.201-191.748.amzn2.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.11.amazon 08/24/2006
Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_reset_work
RIP: 0010:bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
Code: 5d 41 5e c3 cc cc cc cc 44 89 f7 e8 2b 55 ad ff 49 89 c5 48 85 c0 0f 84 64 ff ff ff 4c 8b 68 30 41 83 fe ff 0f 85 60 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00
RSP: 0000:ffffc9000d533b08 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffff888107419680 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff82d72b00
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000001ed
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 0000000000000002
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bc8b500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002610001 CR4: 00000000001706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9
? set_affinity_irq+0xdc/0x1c0
? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
? die+0x2b/0x50
? do_trap+0x90/0x110
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0x
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26681

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netdevsim: avoid potential loop in nsim_dev_trap_report_work()
Many syzbot reports include the following trace [1]
If nsim_dev_trap_report_work() can not grab the mutex,
it should rearm itself at least one jiffie later.
[1]
Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0:
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 PID: 32383 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-syzkaller-00031-g861c0981648f #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023
Workqueue: events nsim_dev_trap_report_work
RIP: 0010:bytes_is_nonzero mm/kasan/generic.c:89 [inline]
RIP: 0010:memory_is_nonzero mm/kasan/generic.c:104 [inline]
RIP: 0010:memory_is_poisoned_n mm/kasan/generic.c:129 [inline]
RIP: 0010:memory_is_poisoned mm/kasan/generic.c:161 [inline]
RIP: 0010:check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:180 [inline]
RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0x101/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
Code: 07 49 39 d1 75 0a 45 3a 11 b8 01 00 00 00 7c 0b 44 89 c2 e8 21 ed ff ff 83 f0 01 5b 5d 41 5c c3 48 85 d2 74 4f 48 01 ea eb 09 <48> 83 c0 01 48 39 d0 74 41 80 38 00 74 f2 eb b6 41 bc 08 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90012dcf998 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: fffffbfff258af1e RBX: fffffbfff258af1f RCX: ffffffff8168eda3
RDX: fffffbfff258af1f RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff92c578f0
RBP: fffffbfff258af1e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff258af1e
R10: ffffffff92c578f3 R11: ffffffff8acbcbc0 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: ffff88806db38400 R14: 1ffff920025b9f42 R15: ffffffff92c578e8
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000c00994e078 CR3: 000000002c250000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<NMI>
</NMI>
<TASK>
instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
atomic_read include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:32 [inline]
queued_spin_is_locked include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:57 [inline]
debug_spin_unlock kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:101 [inline]
do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x230 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:141
__raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:150 [inline]
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x22/0x70 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194
debug_object_activate+0x349/0x540 lib/debugobjects.c:726
debug_work_activate kernel/workqueue.c:578 [inline]
insert_work+0x30/0x230 kernel/workqueue.c:1650
__queue_work+0x62e/0x11d0 kernel/workqueue.c:1802
__queue_delayed_work+0x1bf/0x270 kernel/workqueue.c:1953
queue_delayed_work_on+0x106/0x130 kernel/workqueue.c:1989
queue_delayed_work include/linux/workqueue.h:563 [inline]
schedule_delayed_work include/linux/workqueue.h:677 [inline]
nsim_dev_trap_report_work+0x9c0/0xc80 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:842
process_one_work+0x886/0x15d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2633
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2706 [inline]
worker_thread+0x8b9/0x1290 kernel/workqueue.c:2787
kthread+0x2c6/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-53031

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/imc-pmu: Fix use of mutex in IRQs disabled section
Current imc-pmu code triggers a WARNING with CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
and CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING enabled, while running a thread_imc event.
Command to trigger the warning:
# perf stat -e thread_imc/CPM_CS_FROM_L4_MEM_X_DPTEG/ sleep 5
Performance counter stats for 'sleep 5':
0 thread_imc/CPM_CS_FROM_L4_MEM_X_DPTEG/
5.002117947 seconds time elapsed
0.000131000 seconds user
0.001063000 seconds sys
Below is snippet of the warning in dmesg:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 2869, name: perf-exec
preempt_count: 2, expected: 0
4 locks held by perf-exec/2869:
#0: c00000004325c540 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: bprm_execve+0x64/0xa90
#1: c00000004325c5d8 (&sig->exec_update_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: begin_new_exec+0x460/0xef0
#2: c0000003fa99d4e0 (&cpuctx_lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: perf_event_exec+0x290/0x510
#3: c000000017ab8418 (&ctx->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: perf_event_exec+0x29c/0x510
irq event stamp: 4806
hardirqs last enabled at (4805): [<c000000000f65b94>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x94/0xd0
hardirqs last disabled at (4806): [<c0000000003fae44>] perf_event_exec+0x394/0x510
softirqs last enabled at (0): [<c00000000013c404>] copy_process+0xc34/0x1ff0
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
CPU: 36 PID: 2869 Comm: perf-exec Not tainted 6.2.0-rc2-00011-g1247637727f2 #61
Hardware name: 8375-42A POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:v7.0-16-g9b85f7d961 PowerNV
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x98/0xe0 (unreliable)
__might_resched+0x2f8/0x310
__mutex_lock+0x6c/0x13f0
thread_imc_event_add+0xf4/0x1b0
event_sched_in+0xe0/0x210
merge_sched_in+0x1f0/0x600
visit_groups_merge.isra.92.constprop.166+0x2bc/0x6c0
ctx_flexible_sched_in+0xcc/0x140
ctx_sched_in+0x20c/0x2a0
ctx_resched+0x104/0x1c0
perf_event_exec+0x340/0x510
begin_new_exec+0x730/0xef0
load_elf_binary+0x3f8/0x1e10
...
do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=2001 set at [<00000000fd63e7cf>] do_nanosleep+0x60/0x1a0
WARNING: CPU: 36 PID: 2869 at kernel/sched/core.c:9912 __might_sleep+0x9c/0xb0
CPU: 36 PID: 2869 Comm: sleep Tainted: G W 6.2.0-rc2-00011-g1247637727f2 #61
Hardware name: 8375-42A POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:v7.0-16-g9b85f7d961 PowerNV
NIP: c000000000194a1c LR: c000000000194a18 CTR: c000000000a78670
REGS: c00000004d2134e0 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G W (6.2.0-rc2-00011-g1247637727f2)
MSR: 9000000000021033 <SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48002824 XER: 00000000
CFAR: c00000000013fb64 IRQMASK: 1
The above warning triggered because the current imc-pmu code uses mutex
lock in interrupt disabled sections. The function mutex_lock()
internally calls __might_resched(), which will check if IRQs are
disabled and in case IRQs are disabled, it will trigger the warning.
Fix the issue by changing the mutex lock to spinlock.
[mpe: Fix comments, trim oops in change log, add reported-by tags]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-53030

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-pf: Avoid use of GFP_KERNEL in atomic context
Using GFP_KERNEL in preemption disable context, causing below warning
when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP is enabled.
[ 32.542271] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:274
[ 32.550883] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
[ 32.558707] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
[ 32.562710] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
[ 32.566800] CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.2.0-rc2-00269-gae9dcb91c606 #7
[ 32.576188] Hardware name: Marvell CN106XX board (DT)
[ 32.581232] Call trace:
[ 32.583670] dump_backtrace.part.0+0xe0/0xf0
[ 32.587937] show_stack+0x18/0x30
[ 32.591245] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84
[ 32.594900] dump_stack+0x18/0x34
[ 32.598206] __might_resched+0x12c/0x160
[ 32.602122] __might_sleep+0x48/0xa0
[ 32.605689] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x2b8/0x2e0
[ 32.610301] __kmalloc+0x58/0x190
[ 32.613610] otx2_sq_aura_pool_init+0x1a8/0x314
[ 32.618134] otx2_open+0x1d4/0x9d0
To avoid use of GFP_ATOMIC for memory allocation, disable preemption
after all memory allocation is done.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-53029

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-pf: Fix the use of GFP_KERNEL in atomic context on rt
The commit 4af1b64f80fb ("octeontx2-pf: Fix lmtst ID used in aura
free") uses the get/put_cpu() to protect the usage of percpu pointer
in ->aura_freeptr() callback, but it also unnecessarily disable the
preemption for the blockable memory allocation. The commit 87b93b678e95
("octeontx2-pf: Avoid use of GFP_KERNEL in atomic context") tried to
fix these sleep inside atomic warnings. But it only fix the one for
the non-rt kernel. For the rt kernel, we still get the similar warnings
like below.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
3 locks held by swapper/0/1:
#0: ffff800009fc5fe8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x24/0x30
#1: ffff000100c276c0 (&mbox->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: otx2_init_hw_resources+0x8c/0x3a4
#2: ffffffbfef6537e0 (&cpu_rcache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: alloc_iova_fast+0x1ac/0x2ac
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffff800008b1908c>] otx2_rq_aura_pool_init+0x14c/0x284
CPU: 20 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.2.0-rc3-rt1-yocto-preempt-rt #1
Hardware name: Marvell OcteonTX CN96XX board (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace.part.0+0xe8/0xf4
show_stack+0x20/0x30
dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xd8
dump_stack+0x18/0x34
__might_resched+0x188/0x224
rt_spin_lock+0x64/0x110
alloc_iova_fast+0x1ac/0x2ac
iommu_dma_alloc_iova+0xd4/0x110
__iommu_dma_map+0x80/0x144
iommu_dma_map_page+0xe8/0x260
dma_map_page_attrs+0xb4/0xc0
__otx2_alloc_rbuf+0x90/0x150
otx2_rq_aura_pool_init+0x1c8/0x284
otx2_init_hw_resources+0xe4/0x3a4
otx2_open+0xf0/0x610
__dev_open+0x104/0x224
__dev_change_flags+0x1e4/0x274
dev_change_flags+0x2c/0x7c
ic_open_devs+0x124/0x2f8
ip_auto_config+0x180/0x42c
do_one_initcall+0x90/0x4dc
do_basic_setup+0x10c/0x14c
kernel_init_freeable+0x10c/0x13c
kernel_init+0x2c/0x140
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Of course, we can shuffle the get/put_cpu() to only wrap the invocation
of ->aura_freeptr() as what commit 87b93b678e95 does. But there are only
two ->aura_freeptr() callbacks, otx2_aura_freeptr() and
cn10k_aura_freeptr(). There is no usage of perpcu variable in the
otx2_aura_freeptr() at all, so the get/put_cpu() seems redundant to it.
We can move the get/put_cpu() into the corresponding callback which
really has the percpu variable usage and avoid the sprinkling of
get/put_cpu() in several places.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-53028

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "wifi: mac80211: fix memory leak in ieee80211_if_add()"
This reverts commit 13e5afd3d773c6fc6ca2b89027befaaaa1ea7293.
ieee80211_if_free() is already called from free_netdev(ndev)
because ndev->priv_destructor == ieee80211_if_free
syzbot reported:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000004: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000020-0x0000000000000027]
CPU: 0 PID: 10041 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc2-syzkaller-00388-g55b98837e37d #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
RIP: 0010:pcpu_get_page_chunk mm/percpu.c:262 [inline]
RIP: 0010:pcpu_chunk_addr_search mm/percpu.c:1619 [inline]
RIP: 0010:free_percpu mm/percpu.c:2271 [inline]
RIP: 0010:free_percpu+0x186/0x10f0 mm/percpu.c:2254
Code: 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 f5 0e 00 00 48 8b 3b 48 01 ef e8 cf b3 0b 00 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 78 20 48 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 11 00 0f 85 3b 0e 00 00 48 8b 58 20 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc
RSP: 0018:ffffc90004ba7068 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88823ffe2b80 RCX: 0000000000000004
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffffffff81c1f4e7 RDI: 0000000000000020
RBP: ffffe8fffe8fc220 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 1ffffffff2179ab2 R12: ffff8880b983d000
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000607f450fc220 R15: ffff88823ffe2988
FS: 00007fcb349de700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32220000 CR3: 000000004914f000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
netdev_run_todo+0x6bf/0x1100 net/core/dev.c:10352
ieee80211_register_hw+0x2663/0x4040 net/mac80211/main.c:1411
mac80211_hwsim_new_radio+0x2537/0x4d80 drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c:4583
hwsim_new_radio_nl+0xa09/0x10f0 drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c:5176
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x1e6/0x2d0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:968
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1048 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x4ff/0x7e0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1065
netlink_rcv_skb+0x165/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1076
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1330 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x547/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1356
netlink_sendmsg+0x91b/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1932
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd3/0x120 net/socket.c:734
____sys_sendmsg+0x712/0x8c0 net/socket.c:2476
___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2530
__sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2559
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-53011

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: enable all safety features by default
In the original implementation of dwmac5
commit 8bf993a5877e ("net: stmmac: Add support for DWMAC5 and implement Safety Features")
all safety features were enabled by default.
Later it seems some implementations didn't have support for all the
features, so in
commit 5ac712dcdfef ("net: stmmac: enable platform specific safety features")
the safety_feat_cfg structure was added to the callback and defined for
some platforms to selectively enable these safety features.
The problem is that only certain platforms were given that software
support. If the automotive safety package bit is set in the hardware
features register the safety feature callback is called for the platform,
and for platforms that didn't get a safety_feat_cfg defined this results
in the following NULL pointer dereference:
[ 7.933303] Call trace:
[ 7.935812] dwmac5_safety_feat_config+0x20/0x170 [stmmac]
[ 7.941455] __stmmac_open+0x16c/0x474 [stmmac]
[ 7.946117] stmmac_open+0x38/0x70 [stmmac]
[ 7.950414] __dev_open+0x100/0x1dc
[ 7.954006] __dev_change_flags+0x18c/0x204
[ 7.958297] dev_change_flags+0x24/0x6c
[ 7.962237] do_setlink+0x2b8/0xfa4
[ 7.965827] __rtnl_newlink+0x4ec/0x840
[ 7.969766] rtnl_newlink+0x50/0x80
[ 7.973353] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x12c/0x374
[ 7.977557] netlink_rcv_skb+0x5c/0x130
[ 7.981500] rtnetlink_rcv+0x18/0x2c
[ 7.985172] netlink_unicast+0x2e8/0x340
[ 7.989197] netlink_sendmsg+0x1a8/0x420
[ 7.993222] ____sys_sendmsg+0x218/0x280
[ 7.997249] ___sys_sendmsg+0xac/0x100
[ 8.001103] __sys_sendmsg+0x84/0xe0
[ 8.004776] __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x24/0x30
[ 8.008983] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
[ 8.012840] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xcc/0xec
[ 8.017665] do_el0_svc+0x38/0xb0
[ 8.021071] el0_svc+0x2c/0x84
[ 8.024212] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xf4/0x120
[ 8.028598] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
Go back to the original behavior, if the automotive safety package
is found to be supported in hardware enable all the features unless
safety_feat_cfg is passed in saying this particular platform only
supports a subset of the features.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52994

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
acpi: Fix suspend with Xen PV
Commit f1e525009493 ("x86/boot: Skip realmode init code when running as
Xen PV guest") missed one code path accessing real_mode_header, leading
to dereferencing NULL when suspending the system under Xen:
[ 348.284004] PM: suspend entry (deep)
[ 348.289532] Filesystems sync: 0.005 seconds
[ 348.291545] Freezing user space processes ... (elapsed 0.000 seconds) done.
[ 348.292457] OOM killer disabled.
[ 348.292462] Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.104 seconds) done.
[ 348.396612] printk: Suspending console(s) (use no_console_suspend to debug)
[ 348.749228] PM: suspend devices took 0.352 seconds
[ 348.769713] ACPI: EC: interrupt blocked
[ 348.816077] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001c
[ 348.816080] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 348.816081] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 348.816083] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 348.816086] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 348.816089] CPU: 0 PID: 6764 Comm: systemd-sleep Not tainted 6.1.3-1.fc32.qubes.x86_64 #1
[ 348.816092] Hardware name: Star Labs StarBook/StarBook, BIOS 8.01 07/03/2022
[ 348.816093] RIP: e030:acpi_get_wakeup_address+0xc/0x20
Fix that by adding an optional acpi callback allowing to skip setting
the wakeup address, as in the Xen PV case this will be handled by the
hypervisor anyway.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52992

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Skip task with pid=1 in send_signal_common()
The following kernel panic can be triggered when a task with pid=1 attaches
a prog that attempts to send killing signal to itself, also see [1] for more
details:
Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b
CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 6.1.0-09652-g59fe41b5255f #148
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x178 lib/dump_stack.c:106
panic+0x2c4/0x60f kernel/panic.c:275
do_exit.cold+0x63/0xe4 kernel/exit.c:789
do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:950
get_signal+0x2460/0x2600 kernel/signal.c:2858
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x78/0x5d0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:306
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:168 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250 kernel/entry/common.c:203
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
So skip task with pid=1 in bpf_send_signal_common() to avoid the panic.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221222043507.33037-1-sunhao.th@gmail.com

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52986

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Check for any of tcp_bpf_prots when cloning a listener
A listening socket linked to a sockmap has its sk_prot overridden. It
points to one of the struct proto variants in tcp_bpf_prots. The variant
depends on the socket's family and which sockmap programs are attached.
A child socket cloned from a TCP listener initially inherits their sk_prot.
But before cloning is finished, we restore the child's proto to the
listener's original non-tcp_bpf_prots one. This happens in
tcp_create_openreq_child -> tcp_bpf_clone.
Today, in tcp_bpf_clone we detect if the child's proto should be restored
by checking only for the TCP_BPF_BASE proto variant. This is not
correct. The sk_prot of listening socket linked to a sockmap can point to
to any variant in tcp_bpf_prots.
If the listeners sk_prot happens to be not the TCP_BPF_BASE variant, then
the child socket unintentionally is left if the inherited sk_prot by
tcp_bpf_clone.
This leads to issues like infinite recursion on close [1], because the
child state is otherwise not set up for use with tcp_bpf_prot operations.
Adjust the check in tcp_bpf_clone to detect all of tcp_bpf_prots variants.
Note that it wouldn't be sufficient to check the socket state when
overriding the sk_prot in tcp_bpf_update_proto in order to always use the
TCP_BPF_BASE variant for listening sockets. Since commit
b8b8315e39ff ("bpf, sockmap: Remove unhash handler for BPF sockmap usage")
it is possible for a socket to transition to TCP_LISTEN state while already
linked to a sockmap, e.g. connect() -> insert into map ->
connect(AF_UNSPEC) -> listen().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000073b14905ef2e7401@google.com/

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52982

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fscache: Use wait_on_bit() to wait for the freeing of relinquished volume
The freeing of relinquished volume will wake up the pending volume
acquisition by using wake_up_bit(), however it is mismatched with
wait_var_event() used in fscache_wait_on_volume_collision() and it will
never wake up the waiter in the wait-queue because these two functions
operate on different wait-queues.
According to the implementation in fscache_wait_on_volume_collision(),
if the wake-up of pending acquisition is delayed longer than 20 seconds
(e.g., due to the delay of on-demand fd closing), the first
wait_var_event_timeout() will timeout and the following wait_var_event()
will hang forever as shown below:
FS-Cache: Potential volume collision new=00000024 old=00000022
......
INFO: task mount:1148 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Not tainted 6.1.0-rc6+ #1
task:mount state:D stack:0 pid:1148 ppid:1
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x2f6/0xb80
schedule+0x67/0xe0
fscache_wait_on_volume_collision.cold+0x80/0x82
__fscache_acquire_volume+0x40d/0x4e0
erofs_fscache_register_volume+0x51/0xe0 [erofs]
erofs_fscache_register_fs+0x19c/0x240 [erofs]
erofs_fc_fill_super+0x746/0xaf0 [erofs]
vfs_get_super+0x7d/0x100
get_tree_nodev+0x16/0x20
erofs_fc_get_tree+0x20/0x30 [erofs]
vfs_get_tree+0x24/0xb0
path_mount+0x2fa/0xa90
do_mount+0x7c/0xa0
__x64_sys_mount+0x8b/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x30/0x60
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
Considering that wake_up_bit() is more selective, so fix it by using
wait_on_bit() instead of wait_var_event() to wait for the freeing of
relinquished volume. In addition because waitqueue_active() is used in
wake_up_bit() and clear_bit() doesn't imply any memory barrier, use
clear_and_wake_up_bit() to add the missing memory barrier between
cursor->flags and waitqueue_active().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52981

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: Fix request ref counting during error capture & debugfs dump
When GuC support was added to error capture, the reference counting
around the request object was broken. Fix it up.
The context based search manages the spinlocking around the search
internally. So it needs to grab the reference count internally as
well. The execlist only request based search relies on external
locking, so it needs an external reference count but within the
spinlock not outside it.
The only other caller of the context based search is the code for
dumping engine state to debugfs. That code wasn't previously getting
an explicit reference at all as it does everything while holding the
execlist specific spinlock. So, that needs updaing as well as that
spinlock doesn't help when using GuC submission. Rather than trying to
conditionally get/put depending on submission model, just change it to
always do the get/put.
v2: Explicitly document adding an extra blank line in some dense code
(Andy Shevchenko). Fix multiple potential null pointer derefs in case
of no request found (some spotted by Tvrtko, but there was more!).
Also fix a leaked request in case of !started and another in
__guc_reset_context now that intel_context_find_active_request is
actually reference counting the returned request.
v3: Add a _get suffix to intel_context_find_active_request now that it
grabs a reference (Daniele).
v4: Split the intel_guc_find_hung_context change to a separate patch
and rename intel_context_find_active_request_get to
intel_context_get_active_request (Tvrtko).
v5: s/locking/reference counting/ in commit message (Tvrtko)
(cherry picked from commit 3700e353781e27f1bc7222f51f2cc36cbeb9b4ec)

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52934

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/MADV_COLLAPSE: catch !none !huge !bad pmd lookups
In commit 34488399fa08 ("mm/madvise: add file and shmem support to
MADV_COLLAPSE") we make the following change to find_pmd_or_thp_or_none():
- if (!pmd_present(pmde))
- return SCAN_PMD_NULL;
+ if (pmd_none(pmde))
+ return SCAN_PMD_NONE;
This was for-use by MADV_COLLAPSE file/shmem codepaths, where
MADV_COLLAPSE might identify a pte-mapped hugepage, only to have
khugepaged race-in, free the pte table, and clear the pmd. Such codepaths
include:
A) If we find a suitably-aligned compound page of order HPAGE_PMD_ORDER
already in the pagecache.
B) In retract_page_tables(), if we fail to grab mmap_lock for the target
mm/address.
In these cases, collapse_pte_mapped_thp() really does expect a none (not
just !present) pmd, and we want to suitably identify that case separate
from the case where no pmd is found, or it's a bad-pmd (of course, many
things could happen once we drop mmap_lock, and the pmd could plausibly
undergo multiple transitions due to intervening fault, split, etc).
Regardless, the code is prepared install a huge-pmd only when the existing
pmd entry is either a genuine pte-table-mapping-pmd, or the none-pmd.
However, the commit introduces a logical hole; namely, that we've allowed
!none- && !huge- && !bad-pmds to be classified as genuine
pte-table-mapping-pmds. One such example that could leak through are swap
entries. The pmd values aren't checked again before use in
pte_offset_map_lock(), which is expecting nothing less than a genuine
pte-table-mapping-pmd.
We want to put back the !pmd_present() check (below the pmd_none() check),
but need to be careful to deal with subtleties in pmd transitions and
treatments by various arch.
The issue is that __split_huge_pmd_locked() temporarily clears the present
bit (or otherwise marks the entry as invalid), but pmd_present() and
pmd_trans_huge() still need to return true while the pmd is in this
transitory state. For example, x86's pmd_present() also checks the
_PAGE_PSE , riscv's version also checks the _PAGE_LEAF bit, and arm64 also
checks a PMD_PRESENT_INVALID bit.
Covering all 4 cases for x86 (all checks done on the same pmd value):
1) pmd_present() && pmd_trans_huge()
All we actually know here is that the PSE bit is set. Either:
a) We aren't racing with __split_huge_page(), and PRESENT or PROTNONE
is set.
=> huge-pmd
b) We are currently racing with __split_huge_page(). The danger here
is that we proceed as-if we have a huge-pmd, but really we are
looking at a pte-mapping-pmd. So, what is the risk of this
danger?
The only relevant path is:
madvise_collapse() -> collapse_pte_mapped_thp()
Where we might just incorrectly report back "success", when really
the memory isn't pmd-backed. This is fine, since split could
happen immediately after (actually) successful madvise_collapse().
So, it should be safe to just assume huge-pmd here.
2) pmd_present() && !pmd_trans_huge()
Either:
a) PSE not set and either PRESENT or PROTNONE is.
=> pte-table-mapping pmd (or PROT_NONE)
b) devmap. This routine can be called immediately after
unlocking/locking mmap_lock -- or called with no locks held (see
khugepaged_scan_mm_slot()), so previous VMA checks have since been
invalidated.
3) !pmd_present() && pmd_trans_huge()
Not possible.
4) !pmd_present() && !pmd_trans_huge()
Neither PRESENT nor PROTNONE set
=> not present
I've checked all archs that implement pmd_trans_huge() (arm64, riscv,
powerpc, longarch, x86, mips, s390) and this logic roughly translates
(though devmap treatment is unique to x86 and powerpc, and (3) doesn't
necessarily hold in general -- but that doesn't matter since
!pmd_present() always takes failure path).
Also, add a comment above find_pmd_or_thp_or_none()
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52928

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Skip invalid kfunc call in backtrack_insn
The verifier skips invalid kfunc call in check_kfunc_call(), which
would be captured in fixup_kfunc_call() if such insn is not eliminated
by dead code elimination. However, this can lead to the following
warning in backtrack_insn(), also see [1]:
------------[ cut here ]------------
verifier backtracking bug
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 8646 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2756 backtrack_insn
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2756
__mark_chain_precision kernel/bpf/verifier.c:3065
mark_chain_precision kernel/bpf/verifier.c:3165
adjust_reg_min_max_vals kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10715
check_alu_op kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10928
do_check kernel/bpf/verifier.c:13821 [inline]
do_check_common kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16289
[...]
So make backtracking conservative with this by returning ENOTSUPP.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACkBjsaXNceR8ZjkLG=dT3P=4A8SBsg0Z5h5PWLryF5=ghKq=g@mail.gmail.com/

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52886

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: core: Fix race by not overwriting udev->descriptor in hub_port_init()
Syzbot reported an out-of-bounds read in sysfs.c:read_descriptors():
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_descriptors+0x263/0x280 drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c:883
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801e78b8c8 by task udevd/5011
CPU: 0 PID: 5011 Comm: udevd Not tainted 6.4.0-rc6-syzkaller-00195-g40f71e7cd3c6 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:351
print_report mm/kasan/report.c:462 [inline]
kasan_report+0x11c/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:572
read_descriptors+0x263/0x280 drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c:883
...
Allocated by task 758:
...
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:966 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x5e/0x190 mm/slab_common.c:979
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:563 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:680 [inline]
usb_get_configuration+0x1f7/0x5170 drivers/usb/core/config.c:887
usb_enumerate_device drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2407 [inline]
usb_new_device+0x12b0/0x19d0 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2545
As analyzed by Khazhy Kumykov, the cause of this bug is a race between
read_descriptors() and hub_port_init(): The first routine uses a field
in udev->descriptor, not expecting it to change, while the second
overwrites it.
Prior to commit 45bf39f8df7f ("USB: core: Don't hold device lock while
reading the "descriptors" sysfs file") this race couldn't occur,
because the routines were mutually exclusive thanks to the device
locking. Removing that locking from read_descriptors() exposed it to
the race.
The best way to fix the bug is to keep hub_port_init() from changing
udev->descriptor once udev has been initialized and registered.
Drivers expect the descriptors stored in the kernel to be immutable;
we should not undermine this expectation. In fact, this change should
have been made long ago.
So now hub_port_init() will take an additional argument, specifying a
buffer in which to store the device descriptor it reads. (If udev has
not yet been initialized, the buffer pointer will be NULL and then
hub_port_init() will store the device descriptor in udev as before.)
This eliminates the data race responsible for the out-of-bounds read.
The changes to hub_port_init() appear more extensive than they really
are, because of indentation changes resulting from an attempt to avoid
writing to other parts of the usb_device structure after it has been
initialized. Similar changes should be made to the code that reads
the BOS descriptor, but that can be handled in a separate patch later
on. This patch is sufficient to fix the bug found by syzbot.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52866

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: uclogic: Fix user-memory-access bug in uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks()
When CONFIG_HID_UCLOGIC=y and CONFIG_KUNIT_ALL_TESTS=y, launch kernel and
then the below user-memory-access bug occurs.
In hid_test_uclogic_params_cleanup_event_hooks(),it call
uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks() with the first arg=NULL, so
when it calls uclogic_params_ugee_v2_has_battery(), the hid_get_drvdata()
will access hdev->dev with hdev=NULL, which will cause below
user-memory-access.
So add a fake_device with quirks member and call hid_set_drvdata()
to assign hdev->dev->driver_data which avoids the null-ptr-def bug
for drvdata->quirks in uclogic_params_ugee_v2_has_battery(). After applying
this patch, the below user-memory-access bug never occurs.
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000329: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000000001948-0x000000000000194f]
CPU: 5 PID: 2189 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G B W N 6.6.0-rc2+ #30
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks+0x87/0x600
Code: f3 f3 65 48 8b 14 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 54 24 60 31 d2 48 89 fa c7 44 24 30 00 00 00 00 48 c7 44 24 28 02 f8 02 01 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 2c 04 00 00 48 8b 9d 48 19 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00
RSP: 0000:ffff88810679fc88 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000329 RSI: ffff88810679fd88 RDI: 0000000000001948
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1020f639f0
R10: ffff888107b1cf87 R11: 0000000000000400 R12: 1ffff11020cf3f92
R13: ffff88810679fd88 R14: ffff888100b97b08 R15: ffff8881030bb080
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888119e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000005286001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
DR0: ffffffff8fdd6cf4 DR1: ffffffff8fdd6cf5 DR2: ffffffff8fdd6cf6
DR3: ffffffff8fdd6cf7 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die_addr+0x3d/0xa0
? exc_general_protection+0x144/0x220
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
? uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks+0x87/0x600
? sched_clock_cpu+0x69/0x550
? uclogic_parse_ugee_v2_desc_gen_params+0x70/0x70
? load_balance+0x2950/0x2950
? rcu_trc_cmpxchg_need_qs+0x67/0xa0
hid_test_uclogic_params_cleanup_event_hooks+0x9e/0x1a0
? uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks+0x600/0x600
? __switch_to+0x5cf/0xe60
? migrate_enable+0x260/0x260
? __kthread_parkme+0x83/0x150
? kunit_try_run_case_cleanup+0xe0/0xe0
kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x4a/0x90
? kunit_try_catch_throw+0x80/0x80
kthread+0x2b5/0x380
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks+0x87/0x600
Code: f3 f3 65 48 8b 14 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 54 24 60 31 d2 48 89 fa c7 44 24 30 00 00 00 00 48 c7 44 24 28 02 f8 02 01 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 2c 04 00 00 48 8b 9d 48 19 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00
RSP: 0000:ffff88810679fc88 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000329 RSI: ffff88810679fd88 RDI: 0000000000001948
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1020f639f0
R10: ffff888107b1cf87 R11: 0000000000000400 R12: 1ffff11020cf3f92
R13: ffff88810679fd88 R14: ffff888100b97b08 R15: ffff8881030bb080
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888119e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000005286001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
DR0: ffffffff8fdd6cf4 DR1:
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52851

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/mlx5: Fix init stage error handling to avoid double free of same QP and UAF
In the unlikely event that workqueue allocation fails and returns NULL in
mlx5_mkey_cache_init(), delete the call to
mlx5r_umr_resource_cleanup() (which frees the QP) in
mlx5_ib_stage_post_ib_reg_umr_init(). This will avoid attempted double
free of the same QP when __mlx5_ib_add() does its cleanup.
Resolves a splat:
Syzkaller reported a UAF in ib_destroy_qp_user
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mkey_cache": -EINTR
infiniband mlx5_0: mlx5_mkey_cache_init:981:(pid 1642):
failed to create work queue
infiniband mlx5_0: mlx5_ib_stage_post_ib_reg_umr_init:4075:(pid 1642):
mr cache init failed -12
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ib_destroy_qp_user (drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:2073)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810da310a8 by task repro_upstream/1642
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:590)
ib_destroy_qp_user (drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:2073)
mlx5r_umr_resource_cleanup (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/umr.c:198)
__mlx5_ib_add (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4178)
mlx5r_probe (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4402)
...
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1642:
__kmalloc (./include/linux/kasan.h:198 mm/slab_common.c:1026
mm/slab_common.c:1039)
create_qp (./include/linux/slab.h:603 ./include/linux/slab.h:720
./include/rdma/ib_verbs.h:2795 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1209)
ib_create_qp_kernel (drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1347)
mlx5r_umr_resource_init (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/umr.c:164)
mlx5_ib_stage_post_ib_reg_umr_init (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4070)
__mlx5_ib_add (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4168)
mlx5r_probe (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4402)
...
Freed by task 1642:
__kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:1826 mm/slub.c:3809 mm/slub.c:3822)
ib_destroy_qp_user (drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:2112)
mlx5r_umr_resource_cleanup (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/umr.c:198)
mlx5_ib_stage_post_ib_reg_umr_init (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4076
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4065)
__mlx5_ib_add (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4168)
mlx5r_probe (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4402)
...

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52849

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/mem: Fix shutdown order
Ira reports that removing cxl_mock_mem causes a crash with the following
trace:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000044
[..]
RIP: 0010:cxl_region_decode_reset+0x7f/0x180 [cxl_core]
[..]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
cxl_region_detach+0xe8/0x210 [cxl_core]
cxl_decoder_kill_region+0x27/0x40 [cxl_core]
cxld_unregister+0x29/0x40 [cxl_core]
devres_release_all+0xb8/0x110
device_unbind_cleanup+0xe/0x70
device_release_driver_internal+0x1d2/0x210
bus_remove_device+0xd7/0x150
device_del+0x155/0x3e0
device_unregister+0x13/0x60
devm_release_action+0x4d/0x90
? __pfx_unregister_port+0x10/0x10 [cxl_core]
delete_endpoint+0x121/0x130 [cxl_core]
devres_release_all+0xb8/0x110
device_unbind_cleanup+0xe/0x70
device_release_driver_internal+0x1d2/0x210
bus_remove_device+0xd7/0x150
device_del+0x155/0x3e0
? lock_release+0x142/0x290
cdev_device_del+0x15/0x50
cxl_memdev_unregister+0x54/0x70 [cxl_core]
This crash is due to the clearing out the cxl_memdev's driver context
(@cxlds) before the subsystem is done with it. This is ultimately due to
the region(s), that this memdev is a member, being torn down and expecting
to be able to de-reference @cxlds, like here:
static int cxl_region_decode_reset(struct cxl_region *cxlr, int count)
...
if (cxlds->rcd)
goto endpoint_reset;
...
Fix it by keeping the driver context valid until memdev-device
unregistration, and subsequently the entire stack of related
dependencies, unwinds.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52842

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio/vsock: Fix uninit-value in virtio_transport_recv_pkt()
KMSAN reported the following uninit-value access issue:
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1dfb/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1421
virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1dfb/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1421
vsock_loopback_work+0x3bb/0x5a0 net/vmw_vsock/vsock_loopback.c:120
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2630 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xff6/0x1e60 kernel/workqueue.c:2703
worker_thread+0xeca/0x14d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2784
kthread+0x3cc/0x520 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x66/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304
Uninit was stored to memory at:
virtio_transport_space_update net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1274 [inline]
virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1ee8/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1415
vsock_loopback_work+0x3bb/0x5a0 net/vmw_vsock/vsock_loopback.c:120
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2630 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xff6/0x1e60 kernel/workqueue.c:2703
worker_thread+0xeca/0x14d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2784
kthread+0x3cc/0x520 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x66/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x105/0xad0 mm/slab.h:767
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5a2/0xaf0 mm/slub.c:3523
kmalloc_reserve+0x13c/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:559
__alloc_skb+0x2fd/0x770 net/core/skbuff.c:650
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline]
virtio_vsock_alloc_skb include/linux/virtio_vsock.h:66 [inline]
virtio_transport_alloc_skb+0x90/0x11e0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:58
virtio_transport_reset_no_sock net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:957 [inline]
virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1279/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1387
vsock_loopback_work+0x3bb/0x5a0 net/vmw_vsock/vsock_loopback.c:120
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2630 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xff6/0x1e60 kernel/workqueue.c:2703
worker_thread+0xeca/0x14d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2784
kthread+0x3cc/0x520 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x66/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304
CPU: 1 PID: 10664 Comm: kworker/1:5 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-00146-g9f3ebbef746f #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014
Workqueue: vsock-loopback vsock_loopback_work
=====================================================
The following simple reproducer can cause the issue described above:
int main(void)
{
int sock;
struct sockaddr_vm addr = {
.svm_family = AF_VSOCK,
.svm_cid = VMADDR_CID_ANY,
.svm_port = 1234,
};
sock = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
return 0;
}
This issue occurs because the `buf_alloc` and `fwd_cnt` fields of the
`struct virtio_vsock_hdr` are not initialized when a new skb is allocated
in `virtio_transport_init_hdr()`. This patch resolves the issue by
initializing these fields during allocation.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52828

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Detect IP == ksym.end as part of BPF program
Now that bpf_throw kfunc is the first such call instruction that has
noreturn semantics within the verifier, this also kicks in dead code
elimination in unprecedented ways. For one, any instruction following
a bpf_throw call will never be marked as seen. Moreover, if a callchain
ends up throwing, any instructions after the call instruction to the
eventually throwing subprog in callers will also never be marked as
seen.
The tempting way to fix this would be to emit extra 'int3' instructions
which bump the jited_len of a program, and ensure that during runtime
when a program throws, we can discover its boundaries even if the call
instruction to bpf_throw (or to subprogs that always throw) is emitted
as the final instruction in the program.
An example of such a program would be this:
do_something():
...
r0 = 0
exit
foo():
r1 = 0
call bpf_throw
r0 = 0
exit
bar(cond):
if r1 != 0 goto pc+2
call do_something
exit
call foo
r0 = 0 // Never seen by verifier
exit//
main(ctx):
r1 = ...
call bar
r0 = 0
exit
Here, if we do end up throwing, the stacktrace would be the following:
bpf_throw
foo
bar
main
In bar, the final instruction emitted will be the call to foo, as such,
the return address will be the subsequent instruction (which the JIT
emits as int3 on x86). This will end up lying outside the jited_len of
the program, thus, when unwinding, we will fail to discover the return
address as belonging to any program and end up in a panic due to the
unreliable stack unwinding of BPF programs that we never expect.
To remedy this case, make bpf_prog_ksym_find treat IP == ksym.end as
part of the BPF program, so that is_bpf_text_address returns true when
such a case occurs, and we are able to unwind reliably when the final
instruction ends up being a call instruction.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52808

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: hisi_sas: Set debugfs_dir pointer to NULL after removing debugfs
If init debugfs failed during device registration due to memory allocation
failure, debugfs_remove_recursive() is called, after which debugfs_dir is
not set to NULL. debugfs_remove_recursive() will be called again during
device removal. As a result, illegal pointer is accessed.
[ 1665.467244] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: failed to init debugfs!
...
[ 1669.836708] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a0
[ 1669.872669] pc : down_write+0x24/0x70
[ 1669.876315] lr : down_write+0x1c/0x70
[ 1669.879961] sp : ffff000036f53a30
[ 1669.883260] x29: ffff000036f53a30 x28: ffffa027c31549f8
[ 1669.888547] x27: ffffa027c3140000 x26: 0000000000000000
[ 1669.893834] x25: ffffa027bf37c270 x24: ffffa027bf37c270
[ 1669.899122] x23: ffff0000095406b8 x22: ffff0000095406a8
[ 1669.904408] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffffa027bf37c310
[ 1669.909695] x19: 00000000000000a0 x18: ffff8027dcd86f10
[ 1669.914982] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1669.920268] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: ffffa0274014f870
[ 1669.925555] x13: 0000000000000040 x12: 0000000000000228
[ 1669.930842] x11: 0000000000000020 x10: 0000000000000bb0
[ 1669.936129] x9 : ffff000036f537f0 x8 : ffff80273088ca10
[ 1669.941416] x7 : 000000000000001d x6 : 00000000ffffffff
[ 1669.946702] x5 : ffff000008a36310 x4 : ffff80273088be00
[ 1669.951989] x3 : ffff000009513e90 x2 : 0000000000000000
[ 1669.957276] x1 : 00000000000000a0 x0 : ffffffff00000001
[ 1669.962563] Call trace:
[ 1669.965000] down_write+0x24/0x70
[ 1669.968301] debugfs_remove_recursive+0x5c/0x1b0
[ 1669.972905] hisi_sas_debugfs_exit+0x24/0x30 [hisi_sas_main]
[ 1669.978541] hisi_sas_v3_remove+0x130/0x150 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]
[ 1669.984175] pci_device_remove+0x48/0xd8
[ 1669.988082] device_release_driver_internal+0x1b4/0x250
[ 1669.993282] device_release_driver+0x28/0x38
[ 1669.997534] pci_stop_bus_device+0x84/0xb8
[ 1670.001611] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x24/0x40
[ 1670.007244] remove_store+0xfc/0x140
[ 1670.010802] dev_attr_store+0x44/0x60
[ 1670.014448] sysfs_kf_write+0x58/0x80
[ 1670.018095] kernfs_fop_write+0xe8/0x1f0
[ 1670.022000] __vfs_write+0x60/0x190
[ 1670.025472] vfs_write+0xac/0x1c0
[ 1670.028771] ksys_write+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1670.032071] __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30
[ 1670.035977] el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130
[ 1670.039710] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
[ 1670.043442] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
To fix this, set debugfs_dir to NULL after debugfs_remove_recursive().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52792

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/region: Do not try to cleanup after cxl_region_setup_targets() fails
Commit 5e42bcbc3fef ("cxl/region: decrement ->nr_targets on error in
cxl_region_attach()") tried to avoid 'eiw' initialization errors when
->nr_targets exceeded 16, by just decrementing ->nr_targets when
cxl_region_setup_targets() failed.
Commit 86987c766276 ("cxl/region: Cleanup target list on attach error")
extended that cleanup to also clear cxled->pos and p->targets[pos]. The
initialization error was incidentally fixed separately by:
Commit 8d4285425714 ("cxl/region: Fix port setup uninitialized variable
warnings") which was merged a few days after 5e42bcbc3fef.
But now the original cleanup when cxl_region_setup_targets() fails
prevents endpoint and switch decoder resources from being reused:
1) the cleanup does not set the decoder's region to NULL, which results
in future dpa_size_store() calls returning -EBUSY
2) the decoder is not properly freed, which results in future commit
errors associated with the upstream switch
Now that the initialization errors were fixed separately, the proper
cleanup for this case is to just return immediately. Then the resources
associated with this target get cleanup up as normal when the failed
region is deleted.
The ->nr_targets decrement in the error case also helped prevent
a p->targets[] array overflow, so add a new check to prevent against
that overflow.
Tested by trying to create an invalid region for a 2 switch * 2 endpoint
topology, and then following up with creating a valid region.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52782

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Track xmit submission to PTP WQ after populating metadata map
Ensure the skb is available in metadata mapping to skbs before tracking the
metadata index for detecting undelivered CQEs. If the metadata index is put
in the tracking list before putting the skb in the map, the metadata index
might be used for detecting undelivered CQEs before the relevant skb is
available in the map, which can lead to a null-ptr-deref.
Log:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
CPU: 0 PID: 1243 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc4+ #108
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events mlx5e_rx_dim_work [mlx5_core]
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_ptp_napi_poll+0x9a4/0x2290 [mlx5_core]
Code: 8c 24 38 cc ff ff 4c 8d 3c c1 4c 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 42 80 3c 31 00 0f 85 97 0f 00 00 4d 8b 3f 49 8d 7f 28 48 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 <42> 80 3c 31 00 0f 85 8b 0f 00 00 49 8b 47 28 48 85 c0 0f 84 05 07
RSP: 0018:ffff8884d3c09c88 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000069 RBX: ffff8881160349d8 RCX: 0000000000000005
RDX: ffffed10218f48cf RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000028
RBP: ffff888122707700 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed109a781383
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff88810c7a7a40
R13: ffff888122707700 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8884d3c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f4f878dd6e0 CR3: 000000014d108002 CR4: 0000000000370eb0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? die_addr+0x3c/0xa0
? exc_general_protection+0x144/0x210
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
? mlx5e_ptp_napi_poll+0x9a4/0x2290 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5e_ptp_napi_poll+0x8f6/0x2290 [mlx5_core]
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa4/0x580
net_rx_action+0x460/0xb80
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x60
? __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x580/0x580
? tasklet_action_common.isra.0+0x2ef/0x760
__do_softirq+0x26c/0x827
irq_exit_rcu+0xc2/0x100
common_interrupt+0x7f/0xa0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
RIP: 0010:__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xb/0x330
Code: 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 8b 44 24 14 8b 4c 24 10 09 c8 eb d5 e8 b7 43 ca 01 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 <41> 56 41 89 d6 41 55 41 89 f5 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 83 e4 f0 48 83
RSP: 0018:ffff88812c4079c0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 1ffffffff083c7fe RBX: ffff888100042dc0 RCX: 0000000000000218
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 0000000000000dc0 RDI: ffff888100042dc0
RBP: ffff88812c4079c8 R08: ffffffffa0289f96 R09: ffffed1025880ea9
R10: ffff888138839f80 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000dc0
R13: 0000000000000100 R14: 000000000000008c R15: ffff8881271fc450
? cmd_exec+0x796/0x2200 [mlx5_core]
kmalloc_trace+0x26/0xc0
cmd_exec+0x796/0x2200 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_cmd_do+0x22/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_cmd_exec+0x17/0x30 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_core_modify_cq_moderation+0x139/0x1b0 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet+0x280/0x280 [mlx5_core]
? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190
? process_one_work+0x659/0x1220
mlx5e_rx_dim_work+0x9d/0x100 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x730/0x1220
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400
? max_active_store+0xf0/0xf0
? assign_work+0x168/0x240
worker_thread+0x70f/0x12d0
? __kthread_parkme+0xd1/0x1d0
? process_one_work+0x1220/0x1220
kthread+0x2d9/0x3b0
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork_as
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52778

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: deal with large GSO size
After the blamed commit below, the TCP sockets (and the MPTCP subflows)
can build egress packets larger than 64K. That exceeds the maximum DSS
data size, the length being misrepresent on the wire and the stream being
corrupted, as later observed on the receiver:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9696 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:705 __mptcp_move_skbs_from_subflow+0x2604/0x26e0
CPU: 0 PID: 9696 Comm: syz-executor.7 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc5-gcd8bdf563d46 #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
netlink: 8 bytes leftover after parsing attributes in process `syz-executor.4'.
RIP: 0010:__mptcp_move_skbs_from_subflow+0x2604/0x26e0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:705
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000006e80 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffffffff83e9f674 RBX: ffff88802f45d870 RCX: ffff888102ad0000
netlink: 8 bytes leftover after parsing attributes in process `syz-executor.4'.
RDX: 0000000080000303 RSI: 0000000000013908 RDI: 0000000000003908
RBP: ffffc90000007110 R08: ffffffff83e9e078 R09: 1ffff1100e548c8a
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100e548c8b R12: 0000000000013908
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000003908 R15: 000000000031cf29
FS: 00007f239c47e700(0000) GS:ffff88811b200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f239c45cd78 CR3: 000000006a66c006 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
mptcp_data_ready+0x263/0xac0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:819
subflow_data_ready+0x268/0x6d0 net/mptcp/subflow.c:1409
tcp_data_queue+0x21a1/0x7a60 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5151
tcp_rcv_established+0x950/0x1d90 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6098
tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x554/0x12f0 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1483
tcp_v6_rcv+0x2e26/0x3810 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1749
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xd6b/0x1ae0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438
ip6_input+0x1c5/0x470 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:483
ipv6_rcv+0xef/0x2c0 include/linux/netfilter.h:304
__netif_receive_skb+0x1ea/0x6a0 net/core/dev.c:5532
process_backlog+0x353/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5974
__napi_poll+0xc6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:6536
net_rx_action+0x6a0/0xfd0 net/core/dev.c:6603
__do_softirq+0x184/0x524 kernel/softirq.c:553
do_softirq+0xdd/0x130 kernel/softirq.c:454
Address the issue explicitly bounding the maximum GSO size to what MPTCP
actually allows.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52750

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: Restrict CPU_BIG_ENDIAN to GNU as or LLVM IAS 15.x or newer
Prior to LLVM 15.0.0, LLVM's integrated assembler would incorrectly
byte-swap NOP when compiling for big-endian, and the resulting series of
bytes happened to match the encoding of FNMADD S21, S30, S0, S0.
This went unnoticed until commit:
34f66c4c4d5518c1 ("arm64: Use a positive cpucap for FP/SIMD")
Prior to that commit, the kernel would always enable the use of FPSIMD
early in boot when __cpu_setup() initialized CPACR_EL1, and so usage of
FNMADD within the kernel was not detected, but could result in the
corruption of user or kernel FPSIMD state.
After that commit, the instructions happen to trap during boot prior to
FPSIMD being detected and enabled, e.g.
| Unhandled 64-bit el1h sync exception on CPU0, ESR 0x000000001fe00000 -- ASIMD
| CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-00013-g34f66c4c4d55 #1
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 400000c9 (nZcv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : __pi_strcmp+0x1c/0x150
| lr : populate_properties+0xe4/0x254
| sp : ffffd014173d3ad0
| x29: ffffd014173d3af0 x28: fffffbfffddffcb8 x27: 0000000000000000
| x26: 0000000000000058 x25: fffffbfffddfe054 x24: 0000000000000008
| x23: fffffbfffddfe000 x22: fffffbfffddfe000 x21: fffffbfffddfe044
| x20: ffffd014173d3b70 x19: 0000000000000001 x18: 0000000000000005
| x17: 0000000000000010 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 00000000413e7000
| x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000001bcc x12: 0000000000000000
| x11: 00000000d00dfeed x10: ffffd414193f2cd0 x9 : 0000000000000000
| x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : ffffffffffffffc0 x6 : 0000000000000000
| x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0101010101010101 x3 : 000000000000002a
| x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : ffffd014171f2988 x0 : fffffbfffddffcb8
| Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception
| CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-00013-g34f66c4c4d55 #1
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| Call trace:
| dump_backtrace+0xec/0x108
| show_stack+0x18/0x2c
| dump_stack_lvl+0x50/0x68
| dump_stack+0x18/0x24
| panic+0x13c/0x340
| el1t_64_irq_handler+0x0/0x1c
| el1_abort+0x0/0x5c
| el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
| __pi_strcmp+0x1c/0x150
| unflatten_dt_nodes+0x1e8/0x2d8
| __unflatten_device_tree+0x5c/0x15c
| unflatten_device_tree+0x38/0x50
| setup_arch+0x164/0x1e0
| start_kernel+0x64/0x38c
| __primary_switched+0xbc/0xc4
Restrict CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN to a known good assembler, which is
either GNU as or LLVM's IAS 15.0.0 and newer, which contains the linked
commit.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52743

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Do not use WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag for workqueue
When both ice and the irdma driver are loaded, a warning in
check_flush_dependency is being triggered. This is due to ice driver
workqueue being allocated with the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag and the irdma one
is not.
According to kernel documentation, this flag should be set if the
workqueue will be involved in the kernel's memory reclamation flow.
Since it is not, there is no need for the ice driver's WQ to have this
flag set so remove it.
Example trace:
[ +0.000004] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM ice:ice_service_task [ice] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM infiniband:0x0
[ +0.000139] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 728 at kernel/workqueue.c:2632 check_flush_dependency+0x178/0x1a0
[ +0.000011] Modules linked in: bonding tls xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_cha
in_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink bridge stp llc rfkill vfat fat intel_rapl_msr intel
_rapl_common isst_if_common skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct1
0dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel rapl intel_cstate rpcrdma sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_srpt ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_
core_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_ssif irdma mei_me ib_uverbs
ib_core intel_uncore joydev pcspkr i2c_i801 acpi_ipmi mei lpc_ich i2c_smbus intel_pch_thermal ioatdma ipmi_si acpi_power_meter
acpi_pad xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 sg ahci ixgbe libahci ice i40e igb crc32c_intel mdio i2c_algo_bit liba
ta dca wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler fuse
[ +0.000161] [last unloaded: bonding]
[ +0.000006] CPU: 0 PID: 728 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G S 6.2.0-rc2_next-queue-13jan-00458-gc20aabd57164 #1
[ +0.000006] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0010.010620200716 01/06/2020
[ +0.000003] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice]
[ +0.000127] RIP: 0010:check_flush_dependency+0x178/0x1a0
[ +0.000005] Code: 89 8e 02 01 e8 49 3d 40 00 49 8b 55 18 48 8d 8d d0 00 00 00 48 8d b3 d0 00 00 00 4d 89 e0 48 c7 c7 e0 3b 08
9f e8 bb d3 07 01 <0f> 0b e9 be fe ff ff 80 3d 24 89 8e 02 00 0f 85 6b ff ff ff e9 06
[ +0.000004] RSP: 0018:ffff88810a39f990 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ +0.000005] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888141bc2400 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000004] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffffffffa1213a80
[ +0.000003] RBP: ffff888194bf3400 R08: ffffed117b306112 R09: ffffed117b306112
[ +0.000003] R10: ffff888bd983088b R11: ffffed117b306111 R12: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000003] R13: ffff888111f84d00 R14: ffff88810a3943ac R15: ffff888194bf3400
[ +0.000004] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888bd9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ +0.000003] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ +0.000003] CR2: 000056035b208b60 CR3: 000000017795e005 CR4: 00000000007706f0
[ +0.000003] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000003] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ +0.000002] PKRU: 55555554
[ +0.000003] Call Trace:
[ +0.000002] <TASK>
[ +0.000003] __flush_workqueue+0x203/0x840
[ +0.000006] ? mutex_unlock+0x84/0xd0
[ +0.000008] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000004] ? __pfx___flush_workqueue+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000006] ? mutex_lock+0xa3/0xf0
[ +0.000005] ib_cache_cleanup_one+0x39/0x190 [ib_core]
[ +0.000174] __ib_unregister_device+0x84/0xf0 [ib_core]
[ +0.000094] ib_unregister_device+0x25/0x30 [ib_core]
[ +0.000093] irdma_ib_unregister_device+0x97/0xc0 [irdma]
[ +0.000064] ? __pfx_irdma_ib_unregister_device+0x10/0x10 [irdma]
[ +0.000059] ? up_write+0x5c/0x90
[ +0.000005] irdma_remove+0x36/0x90 [irdma]
[ +0.000062] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x32/0x50
[ +0.000007] device_r
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52738

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/fence: Fix oops due to non-matching drm_sched init/fini
Currently amdgpu calls drm_sched_fini() from the fence driver sw fini
routine - such function is expected to be called only after the
respective init function - drm_sched_init() - was executed successfully.
Happens that we faced a driver probe failure in the Steam Deck
recently, and the function drm_sched_fini() was called even without
its counter-part had been previously called, causing the following oops:
amdgpu: probe of 0000:04:00.0 failed with error -110
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000090
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 609 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-gpiccoli #338
Hardware name: Valve Jupiter/Jupiter, BIOS F7A0113 11/04/2022
RIP: 0010:drm_sched_fini+0x84/0xa0 [gpu_sched]
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
amdgpu_fence_driver_sw_fini+0xc8/0xd0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_device_fini_sw+0x2b/0x3b0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_driver_release_kms+0x16/0x30 [amdgpu]
devm_drm_dev_init_release+0x49/0x70
[...]
To prevent that, check if the drm_sched was properly initialized for a
given ring before calling its fini counter-part.
Notice ideally we'd use sched.ready for that; such field is set as the latest
thing on drm_sched_init(). But amdgpu seems to "override" the meaning of such
field - in the above oops for example, it was a GFX ring causing the crash, and
the sched.ready field was set to true in the ring init routine, regardless of
the state of the DRM scheduler. Hence, we ended-up using sched.ops as per
Christian's suggestion [0], and also removed the no_scheduler check [1].
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/amd-gfx/984ee981-2906-0eaf-ccec-9f80975cb136@amd.com/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/amd-gfx/cd0e2994-f85f-d837-609f-7056d5fb7231@amd.com/

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52736

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: hda: Do not unset preset when cleaning up codec
Several functions that take part in codec's initialization and removal
are re-used by ASoC codec drivers implementations. Drivers mimic the
behavior of hda_codec_driver_probe/remove() found in
sound/pci/hda/hda_bind.c with their component->probe/remove() instead.
One of the reasons for that is the expectation of
snd_hda_codec_device_new() to receive a valid pointer to an instance of
struct snd_card. This expectation can be met only once sound card
components probing commences.
As ASoC sound card may be unbound without codec device being actually
removed from the system, unsetting ->preset in
snd_hda_codec_cleanup_for_unbind() interferes with module unload -> load
scenario causing null-ptr-deref. Preset is assigned only once, during
device/driver matching whereas ASoC codec driver's module reloading may
occur several times throughout the lifetime of an audio stack.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52570

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio/mdev: Fix a null-ptr-deref bug for mdev_unregister_parent()
Inject fault while probing mdpy.ko, if kstrdup() of create_dir() fails in
kobject_add_internal() in kobject_init_and_add() in mdev_type_add()
in parent_create_sysfs_files(), it will return 0 and probe successfully.
And when rmmod mdpy.ko, the mdpy_dev_exit() will call
mdev_unregister_parent(), the mdev_type_remove() may traverse uninitialized
parent->types[i] in parent_remove_sysfs_files(), and it will cause
below null-ptr-deref.
If mdev_type_add() fails, return the error code and kset_unregister()
to fix the issue.
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]
CPU: 2 PID: 10215 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W N 6.6.0-rc2+ #20
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__kobject_del+0x62/0x1c0
Code: 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 51 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6b 28 48 8d 7d 10 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 24 01 00 00 48 8b 75 10 48 89 df 48 8d 6b 3c e8
RSP: 0018:ffff88810695fd30 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffffa0270268 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000010
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10233a4ef1
R10: ffff888119d2778b R11: 0000000063666572 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: fffffbfff404e2d4 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffffffa0271660
FS: 00007fbc81981540(0000) GS:ffff888119d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc14a142dc0 CR3: 0000000110a62003 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
DR0: ffffffff8fb0bce8 DR1: ffffffff8fb0bce9 DR2: ffffffff8fb0bcea
DR3: ffffffff8fb0bceb DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die_addr+0x3d/0xa0
? exc_general_protection+0x144/0x220
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
? __kobject_del+0x62/0x1c0
kobject_del+0x32/0x50
parent_remove_sysfs_files+0xd6/0x170 [mdev]
mdev_unregister_parent+0xfb/0x190 [mdev]
? mdev_register_parent+0x270/0x270 [mdev]
? find_module_all+0x9d/0xe0
mdpy_dev_exit+0x17/0x63 [mdpy]
__do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x2fa/0x4b0
? module_flags+0x300/0x300
? __fput+0x4e7/0xa00
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7fbc813221b7
Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d d1 8c 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a1 8c 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffe780e0648 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe780e06a8 RCX: 00007fbc813221b7
RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 000055e214df9b58
RBP: 000055e214df9af0 R08: 00007ffe780df5c1 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007fbc8139ecc0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe780e0870
R13: 00007ffe780e0ed0 R14: 000055e214df9260 R15: 000055e214df9af0
</TASK>
Modules linked in: mdpy(-) mdev vfio_iommu_type1 vfio [last unloaded: mdpy]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:__kobject_del+0x62/0x1c0
Code: 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 51 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6b 28 48 8d 7d 10 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 24 01 00 00 48 8b 75 10 48 89 df 48 8d 6b 3c e8
RSP: 0018:ffff88810695fd30 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffffa0270268 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000010
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10233a4ef1
R10: ffff888119d2778b R11: 0000000063666572 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: fffffbfff404e2d4 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffffffa0271660
FS: 00007fbc81981540(0000) GS:ffff888119d00000(000
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52523

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Reject sk_msg egress redirects to non-TCP sockets
With a SOCKMAP/SOCKHASH map and an sk_msg program user can steer messages
sent from one TCP socket (s1) to actually egress from another TCP
socket (s2):
tcp_bpf_sendmsg(s1)// = sk_prot->sendmsg
tcp_bpf_send_verdict(s1)// __SK_REDIRECT case
tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(s2)
tcp_bpf_push_locked(s2)
tcp_bpf_push(s2)
tcp_rate_check_app_limited(s2) // expects tcp_sock
tcp_sendmsg_locked(s2) // ditto
There is a hard-coded assumption in the call-chain, that the egress
socket (s2) is a TCP socket.
However in commit 122e6c79efe1 ("sock_map: Update sock type checks for
UDP") we have enabled redirects to non-TCP sockets. This was done for the
sake of BPF sk_skb programs. There was no indention to support sk_msg
send-to-egress use case.
As a result, attempts to send-to-egress through a non-TCP socket lead to a
crash due to invalid downcast from sock to tcp_sock:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002f
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x60/0x70
? __die+0x1f/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x80/0x160
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2d7/0x800
? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50
? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x1c0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
? tcp_tso_segs+0x14/0xa0
tcp_write_xmit+0x67/0xce0
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0x32/0xf0
tcp_push+0x107/0x140
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x99f/0xbb0
tcp_bpf_push+0x19d/0x3a0
tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir+0x55/0xd0
tcp_bpf_send_verdict+0x407/0x550
tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x390
inet_sendmsg+0x6a/0x70
sock_sendmsg+0x9d/0xc0
? sockfd_lookup_light+0x12/0x80
__sys_sendto+0x10e/0x160
? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x20/0x60
? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x82/0x110
__x64_sys_sendto+0x1f/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Reject selecting a non-TCP sockets as redirect target from a BPF sk_msg
program to prevent the crash. When attempted, user will receive an EACCES
error from send/sendto/sendmsg() syscall.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52516

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dma-debug: don't call __dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() under free_entries_lock
__dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() calls into printk -> serial console
output (qcom geni) and grabs port->lock under free_entries_lock
spin lock, which is a reverse locking dependency chain as qcom_geni
IRQ handler can call into dma-debug code and grab free_entries_lock
under port->lock.
Move __dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() call out of free_entries_lock
scope so that we don't acquire serial console's port->lock under it.
Trimmed-down lockdep splat:
The existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (free_entries_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x80
dma_entry_alloc+0x38/0x110
debug_dma_map_page+0x60/0xf8
dma_map_page_attrs+0x1e0/0x230
dma_map_single_attrs.constprop.0+0x6c/0xc8
geni_se_rx_dma_prep+0x40/0xcc
qcom_geni_serial_isr+0x310/0x510
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x110/0x244
handle_irq_event_percpu+0x20/0x54
handle_irq_event+0x50/0x88
handle_fasteoi_irq+0xa4/0xcc
handle_irq_desc+0x28/0x40
generic_handle_domain_irq+0x24/0x30
gic_handle_irq+0xc4/0x148
do_interrupt_handler+0xa4/0xb0
el1_interrupt+0x34/0x64
el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
el1h_64_irq+0x64/0x68
arch_local_irq_enable+0x4/0x8
____do_softirq+0x18/0x24
...
-> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}-{2:2}:
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x80
qcom_geni_serial_console_write+0x184/0x1dc
console_flush_all+0x344/0x454
console_unlock+0x94/0xf0
vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c
vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48
vprintk+0xb4/0xbc
_printk+0x68/0x90
register_console+0x230/0x38c
uart_add_one_port+0x338/0x494
qcom_geni_serial_probe+0x390/0x424
platform_probe+0x70/0xc0
really_probe+0x148/0x280
__driver_probe_device+0xfc/0x114
driver_probe_device+0x44/0x100
__device_attach_driver+0x64/0xdc
bus_for_each_drv+0xb0/0xd8
__device_attach+0xe4/0x140
device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28
bus_probe_device+0x44/0xb0
device_add+0x538/0x668
of_device_add+0x44/0x50
of_platform_device_create_pdata+0x94/0xc8
of_platform_bus_create+0x270/0x304
of_platform_populate+0xac/0xc4
devm_of_platform_populate+0x60/0xac
geni_se_probe+0x154/0x160
platform_probe+0x70/0xc0
...
-> #0 (console_owner){-...}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0xdf8/0x109c
lock_acquire+0x234/0x284
console_flush_all+0x330/0x454
console_unlock+0x94/0xf0
vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c
vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48
vprintk+0xb4/0xbc
_printk+0x68/0x90
dma_entry_alloc+0xb4/0x110
debug_dma_map_sg+0xdc/0x2f8
__dma_map_sg_attrs+0xac/0xe4
dma_map_sgtable+0x30/0x4c
get_pages+0x1d4/0x1e4 [msm]
msm_gem_pin_pages_locked+0x38/0xac [msm]
msm_gem_pin_vma_locked+0x58/0x88 [msm]
msm_ioctl_gem_submit+0xde4/0x13ac [msm]
drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x15c
drm_ioctl+0x2e8/0x3f4
vfs_ioctl+0x30/0x50
...
Chain exists of:
console_owner --> &port_lock_key --> free_entries_lock
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(free_entries_lock);
lock(&port_lock_key);
lock(free_entries_lock);
lock(console_owner);
*** DEADLOCK ***
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0xb4/0xf0
show_stack+0x20/0x30
dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x84
dump_stack+0x18/0x24
print_circular_bug+0x1cc/0x234
check_noncircular+0x78/0xac
__lock_acquire+0xdf8/0x109c
lock_acquire+0x234/0x284
console_flush_all+0x330/0x454
consol
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52484

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Fix soft lockup triggered by arm_smmu_mm_invalidate_range
When running an SVA case, the following soft lockup is triggered:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#244 stuck for 26s!
pstate: 83400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : arm_smmu_cmdq_issue_cmdlist+0x178/0xa50
lr : arm_smmu_cmdq_issue_cmdlist+0x150/0xa50
sp : ffff8000d83ef290
x29: ffff8000d83ef290 x28: 000000003b9aca00 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffff8000d83ef3c0 x25: da86c0812194a0e8 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: 0000000000000040 x22: ffff8000d83ef340 x21: ffff0000c63980c0
x20: 0000000000000001 x19: ffff0000c6398080 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff3000b4a3bbb0
x14: ffff3000b4a30888 x13: ffff3000b4a3cf60 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffc08120e4d6bc
x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000048cfa
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 000000000000000a
x2 : 0000000080000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000001
Call trace:
arm_smmu_cmdq_issue_cmdlist+0x178/0xa50
__arm_smmu_tlb_inv_range+0x118/0x254
arm_smmu_tlb_inv_range_asid+0x6c/0x130
arm_smmu_mm_invalidate_range+0xa0/0xa4
__mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end+0x88/0x120
unmap_vmas+0x194/0x1e0
unmap_region+0xb4/0x144
do_mas_align_munmap+0x290/0x490
do_mas_munmap+0xbc/0x124
__vm_munmap+0xa8/0x19c
__arm64_sys_munmap+0x28/0x50
invoke_syscall+0x78/0x11c
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x58/0x1c0
do_el0_svc+0x34/0x60
el0_svc+0x2c/0xd4
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x114/0x140
el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Note that since 6.6-rc1 the arm_smmu_mm_invalidate_range above is renamed
to "arm_smmu_mm_arch_invalidate_secondary_tlbs", yet the problem remains.
The commit 06ff87bae8d3 ("arm64: mm: remove unused functions and variable
protoypes") fixed a similar lockup on the CPU MMU side. Yet, it can occur
to SMMU too, since arm_smmu_mm_arch_invalidate_secondary_tlbs() is called
typically next to MMU tlb flush function, e.g.
tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly {
tlb_flush {
__flush_tlb_range {
// check MAX_TLBI_OPS
}
}
mmu_notifier_arch_invalidate_secondary_tlbs {
arm_smmu_mm_arch_invalidate_secondary_tlbs {
// does not check MAX_TLBI_OPS
}
}
}
Clone a CMDQ_MAX_TLBI_OPS from the MAX_TLBI_OPS in tlbflush.h, since in an
SVA case SMMU uses the CPU page table, so it makes sense to align with the
tlbflush code. Then, replace per-page TLBI commands with a single per-asid
TLBI command, if the request size hits this threshold.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52481

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: errata: Add Cortex-A520 speculative unprivileged load workaround
Implement the workaround for ARM Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298. On an
affected Cortex-A520 core, a speculatively executed unprivileged load
might leak data from a privileged load via a cache side channel. The
issue only exists for loads within a translation regime with the same
translation (e.g. same ASID and VMID). Therefore, the issue only affects
the return to EL0.
The workaround is to execute a TLBI before returning to EL0 after all
loads of privileged data. A non-shareable TLBI to any address is
sufficient.
The workaround isn't necessary if page table isolation (KPTI) is
enabled, but for simplicity it will be. Page table isolation should
normally be disabled for Cortex-A520 as it supports the CSV3 feature
and the E0PD feature (used when KASLR is enabled).

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52474

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/hfi1: Fix bugs with non-PAGE_SIZE-end multi-iovec user SDMA requests
hfi1 user SDMA request processing has two bugs that can cause data
corruption for user SDMA requests that have multiple payload iovecs
where an iovec other than the tail iovec does not run up to the page
boundary for the buffer pointed to by that iovec.a
Here are the specific bugs:
1. user_sdma_txadd() does not use struct user_sdma_iovec->iov.iov_len.
Rather, user_sdma_txadd() will add up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from iovec
to the packet, even if some of those bytes are past
iovec->iov.iov_len and are thus not intended to be in the packet.
2. user_sdma_txadd() and user_sdma_send_pkts() fail to advance to the
next iovec in user_sdma_request->iovs when the current iovec
is not PAGE_SIZE and does not contain enough data to complete the
packet. The transmitted packet will contain the wrong data from the
iovec pages.
This has not been an issue with SDMA packets from hfi1 Verbs or PSM2
because they only produce iovecs that end short of PAGE_SIZE as the tail
iovec of an SDMA request.
Fixing these bugs exposes other bugs with the SDMA pin cache
(struct mmu_rb_handler) that get in way of supporting user SDMA requests
with multiple payload iovecs whose buffers do not end at PAGE_SIZE. So
this commit fixes those issues as well.
Here are the mmu_rb_handler bugs that non-PAGE_SIZE-end multi-iovec
payload user SDMA requests can hit:
1. Overlapping memory ranges in mmu_rb_handler will result in duplicate
pinnings.
2. When extending an existing mmu_rb_handler entry (struct mmu_rb_node),
the mmu_rb code (1) removes the existing entry under a lock, (2)
releases that lock, pins the new pages, (3) then reacquires the lock
to insert the extended mmu_rb_node.
If someone else comes in and inserts an overlapping entry between (2)
and (3), insert in (3) will fail.
The failure path code in this case unpins _all_ pages in either the
original mmu_rb_node or the new mmu_rb_node that was inserted between
(2) and (3).
3. In hfi1_mmu_rb_remove_unless_exact(), mmu_rb_node->refcount is
incremented outside of mmu_rb_handler->lock. As a result, mmu_rb_node
could be evicted by another thread that gets mmu_rb_handler->lock and
checks mmu_rb_node->refcount before mmu_rb_node->refcount is
incremented.
4. Related to #2 above, SDMA request submission failure path does not
check mmu_rb_node->refcount before freeing mmu_rb_node object.
If there are other SDMA requests in progress whose iovecs have
pointers to the now-freed mmu_rb_node(s), those pointers to the
now-freed mmu_rb nodes will be dereferenced when those SDMA requests
complete.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52468

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
class: fix use-after-free in class_register()
The lock_class_key is still registered and can be found in
lock_keys_hash hlist after subsys_private is freed in error
handler path.A task who iterate over the lock_keys_hash
later may cause use-after-free.So fix that up and unregister
the lock_class_key before kfree(cp).
On our platform, a driver fails to kset_register because of
creating duplicate filename '/class/xxx'.With Kasan enabled,
it prints a invalid-access bug report.
KASAN bug report:
BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in lockdep_register_key+0x19c/0x1bc
Write of size 8 at addr 15ffff808b8c0368 by task modprobe/252
Pointer tag: [15], memory tag: [fe]
CPU: 7 PID: 252 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W
6.6.0-mainline-maybe-dirty #1
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x1b0/0x1e4
show_stack+0x2c/0x40
dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0xe0
print_report+0x18c/0x4d8
kasan_report+0xe8/0x148
__hwasan_store8_noabort+0x88/0x98
lockdep_register_key+0x19c/0x1bc
class_register+0x94/0x1ec
init_module+0xbc/0xf48 [rfkill]
do_one_initcall+0x17c/0x72c
do_init_module+0x19c/0x3f8
...
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffff808b8c0100: 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a
ffffff808b8c0200: 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe
>ffffff808b8c0300: fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe
^
ffffff808b8c0400: 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
As CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC is not set, Kasan reports invalid-access
not use-after-free here.In this case, modprobe is manipulating
the corrupted lock_keys_hash hlish where lock_class_key is already
freed before.
It's worth noting that this only can happen if lockdep is enabled,
which is not true for normal system.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52452

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix accesses to uninit stack slots
Privileged programs are supposed to be able to read uninitialized stack
memory (ever since 6715df8d5) but, before this patch, these accesses
were permitted inconsistently. In particular, accesses were permitted
above state->allocated_stack, but not below it. In other words, if the
stack was already "large enough", the access was permitted, but
otherwise the access was rejected instead of being allowed to "grow the
stack". This undesired rejection was happening in two places:
- in check_stack_slot_within_bounds()
- in check_stack_range_initialized()
This patch arranges for these accesses to be permitted. A bunch of tests
that were relying on the old rejection had to change; all of them were
changed to add also run unprivileged, in which case the old behavior
persists. One tests couldn't be updated - global_func16 - because it
can't run unprivileged for other reasons.
This patch also fixes the tracking of the stack size for variable-offset
reads. This second fix is bundled in the same commit as the first one
because they're inter-related. Before this patch, writes to the stack
using registers containing a variable offset (as opposed to registers
with fixed, known values) were not properly contributing to the
function's needed stack size. As a result, it was possible for a program
to verify, but then to attempt to read out-of-bounds data at runtime
because a too small stack had been allocated for it.
Each function tracks the size of the stack it needs in
bpf_subprog_info.stack_depth, which is maintained by
update_stack_depth(). For regular memory accesses, check_mem_access()
was calling update_state_depth() but it was passing in only the fixed
part of the offset register, ignoring the variable offset. This was
incorrect; the minimum possible value of that register should be used
instead.
This tracking is now fixed by centralizing the tracking of stack size in
grow_stack_state(), and by lifting the calls to grow_stack_state() to
check_stack_access_within_bounds() as suggested by Andrii. The code is
now simpler and more convincingly tracks the correct maximum stack size.
check_stack_range_initialized() can now rely on enough stack having been
allocated for the access; this helps with the fix for the first issue.
A few tests were changed to also check the stack depth computation. The
one that fails without this patch is verifier_var_off:stack_write_priv_vs_unpriv.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49760

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: fix PTE marker handling in hugetlb_change_protection()
Patch series "mm/hugetlb: uffd-wp fixes for hugetlb_change_protection()".
Playing with virtio-mem and background snapshots (using uffd-wp) on
hugetlb in QEMU, I managed to trigger a VM_BUG_ON(). Looking into the
details, hugetlb_change_protection() seems to not handle uffd-wp correctly
in all cases.
Patch #1 fixes my test case. I don't have reproducers for patch #2, as it
requires running into migration entries.
I did not yet check in detail yet if !hugetlb code requires similar care.
This patch (of 2):
There are two problematic cases when stumbling over a PTE marker in
hugetlb_change_protection():
(1) We protect an uffd-wp PTE marker a second time using uffd-wp: we will
end up in the "!huge_pte_none(pte)" case and mess up the PTE marker.
(2) We unprotect a uffd-wp PTE marker: we will similarly end up in the
"!huge_pte_none(pte)" case even though we cleared the PTE, because
the "pte" variable is stale. We'll mess up the PTE marker.
For example, if we later stumble over such a "wrongly modified" PTE marker,
we'll treat it like a present PTE that maps some garbage page.
This can, for example, be triggered by mapping a memfd backed by huge
pages, registering uffd-wp, uffd-wp'ing an unmapped page and (a)
uffd-wp'ing it a second time; or (b) uffd-unprotecting it; or (c)
unregistering uffd-wp. Then, ff we trigger fallocate(FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE)
on that file range, we will run into a VM_BUG_ON:
[ 195.039560] page:00000000ba1f2987 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x0
[ 195.039565] flags: 0x7ffffc0001000(reserved|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 195.039568] raw: 0007ffffc0001000 ffffe742c0000008 ffffe742c0000008 0000000000000000
[ 195.039569] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 195.039569] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(compound && !PageHead(page))
[ 195.039573] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 195.039574] kernel BUG at mm/rmap.c:1346!
[ 195.039579] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 195.039581] CPU: 7 PID: 4777 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 6.0.12-200.fc36.x86_64 #1
[ 195.039583] Hardware name: LENOVO 20WNS1F81N/20WNS1F81N, BIOS N35ET50W (1.50 ) 09/15/2022
[ 195.039584] RIP: 0010:page_remove_rmap+0x45b/0x550
[ 195.039588] Code: [...]
[ 195.039589] RSP: 0018:ffffbc03c3633ba8 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 195.039591] RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffffe742c0000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 195.039592] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff8e7aac1a RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[ 195.039592] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffbc03c3633a08
[ 195.039593] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffff8f146328 R12: ffff9b04c42754b0
[ 195.039594] R13: ffffffff8fcc6328 R14: ffffbc03c3633c80 R15: ffff9b0484ab9100
[ 195.039595] FS: 00007fc7aaf68640(0000) GS:ffff9b0bbf7c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 195.039596] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 195.039597] CR2: 000055d402c49110 CR3: 0000000159392003 CR4: 0000000000772ee0
[ 195.039598] PKRU: 55555554
[ 195.039599] Call Trace:
[ 195.039600] <TASK>
[ 195.039602] __unmap_hugepage_range+0x33b/0x7d0
[ 195.039605] unmap_hugepage_range+0x55/0x70
[ 195.039608] hugetlb_vmdelete_list+0x77/0xa0
[ 195.039611] hugetlbfs_fallocate+0x410/0x550
[ 195.039612] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x23/0x40
[ 195.039616] vfs_fallocate+0x12e/0x360
[ 195.039618] __x64_sys_fallocate+0x40/0x70
[ 195.039620] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80
[ 195.039623] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
[ 195.039624] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 195.039626] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 195.039628] RIP: 0033:0x7fc7b590651f
[ 195.039653] Code: [...]
[ 195.039654] RSP: 002b:00007fc7aaf66e70 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000011d
[ 195.039655] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000558ef4b7f370 RCX: 00007fc7b590651f
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49744

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/uffd: fix pte marker when fork() without fork event
Patch series "mm: Fixes on pte markers".
Patch 1 resolves the syzkiller report from Pengfei.
Patch 2 further harden pte markers when used with the recent swapin error
markers. The major case is we should persist a swapin error marker after
fork(), so child shouldn't read a corrupted page.
This patch (of 2):
When fork(), dst_vma is not guaranteed to have VM_UFFD_WP even if src may
have it and has pte marker installed. The warning is improper along with
the comment. The right thing is to inherit the pte marker when needed, or
keep the dst pte empty.
A vague guess is this happened by an accident when there's the prior patch
to introduce src/dst vma into this helper during the uffd-wp feature got
developed and I probably messed up in the rebase, since if we replace
dst_vma with src_vma the warning & comment it all makes sense too.
Hugetlb did exactly the right here (copy_hugetlb_page_range()). Fix the
general path.
Reproducer:
https://github.com/xupengfe/syzkaller_logs/blob/main/221208_115556_copy_page_range/repro.c
Bugzilla report: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216808

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49723

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/reset: Fix error_state_read ptr + offset use
Fix our pointer offset usage in error_state_read
when there is no i915_gpu_coredump but buf offset
is non-zero.
This fixes a kernel page fault can happen when
multiple tests are running concurrently in a loop
and one is producing engine resets and consuming
the i915 error_state dump while the other is
forcing full GT resets. (takes a while to trigger).
The dmesg call trace:
[ 5590.803000] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address:
ffffffffa0b0e000
[ 5590.803009] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 5590.803013] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 5590.803016] PGD 5814067 P4D 5814067 PUD 5815063 PMD 109de4067
PTE 0
[ 5590.803022] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 5590.803026] CPU: 5 PID: 13656 Comm: i915_hangman Tainted: G U
5.17.0-rc5-ups69-guc-err-capt-rev6+ #136
[ 5590.803033] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client
Platform/AlderLake-M LP4x RVP, BIOS ADLPFWI1.R00.
3031.A02.220117122201/17/2022
[ 5590.803039] RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10
[ 5590.803045] Code: fe ff ff cc eb 1e 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 d1
48 c1 e9 03 83 e2 07 f3 48 a5 89 d1 f3 a4 c3
66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 d1 <f3> a4
c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 83 fa 20
72 7e 40 38 fe
[ 5590.803054] RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a8fdf0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 5590.803057] RAX: ffff888107ee9000 RBX: ffff888108cb1a00
RCX: 0000000000000f8f
[ 5590.803061] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffffffffa0b0e000
RDI: ffff888107ee9071
[ 5590.803065] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001
R09: 0000000000000001
[ 5590.803069] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000002
R12: 0000000000000019
[ 5590.803073] R13: 0000000000174fff R14: 0000000000001000
R15: ffff888107ee9000
[ 5590.803077] FS: 00007f62a99bee80(0000) GS:ffff88849f880000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5590.803082] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5590.803085] CR2: ffffffffa0b0e000 CR3: 000000010a1a8004
CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 5590.803089] PKRU: 55555554
[ 5590.803091] Call Trace:
[ 5590.803093] <TASK>
[ 5590.803096] error_state_read+0xa1/0xd0 [i915]
[ 5590.803175] kernfs_fop_read_iter+0xb2/0x1b0
[ 5590.803180] new_sync_read+0x116/0x1a0
[ 5590.803185] vfs_read+0x114/0x1b0
[ 5590.803189] ksys_read+0x63/0xe0
[ 5590.803193] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xc0
[ 5590.803197] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 5590.803201] RIP: 0033:0x7f62aaea5912
[ 5590.803204] Code: c0 e9 b2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 5a b9 0c 00 e8 05
19 02 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25
18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff
ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24
[ 5590.803213] RSP: 002b:00007fff5b659ae8 EFLAGS: 00000246
ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[ 5590.803218] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000100000
RCX: 00007f62aaea5912
[ 5590.803221] RDX: 000000000008b000 RSI: 00007f62a8c4000f
RDI: 0000000000000006
[ 5590.803225] RBP: 00007f62a8bcb00f R08: 0000000000200010
R09: 0000000000101000
[ 5590.803229] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246
R12: 0000000000000006
[ 5590.803233] R13: 0000000000075000 R14: 00007f62a8acb010
R15: 0000000000200000
[ 5590.803238] </TASK>
[ 5590.803240] Modules linked in: i915 ttm drm_buddy drm_dp_helper
drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt
fb_sys_fops prime_numbers nfnetlink br_netfilter
overlay mei_pxp mei_hdcp x86_pkg_temp_thermal
coretemp kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49663

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tunnels: do not assume mac header is set in skb_tunnel_check_pmtu()
Recently added debug in commit f9aefd6b2aa3 ("net: warn if mac header
was not set") caught a bug in skb_tunnel_check_pmtu(), as shown
in this syzbot report [1].
In ndo_start_xmit() paths, there is really no need to use skb->mac_header,
because skb->data is supposed to point at it.
[1] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 8604 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2784 skb_mac_header_len include/linux/skbuff.h:2784 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 8604 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2784 skb_tunnel_check_pmtu+0x5de/0x2f90 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:413
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 8604 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-syzkaller-00443-g8720bd951b8e #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:skb_mac_header_len include/linux/skbuff.h:2784 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_tunnel_check_pmtu+0x5de/0x2f90 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:413
Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 84 b9 fe ff ff 4c 89 ff e8 7c 0f d7 f9 e9 ac fe ff ff e8 c2 13 8a f9 <0f> 0b e9 28 fc ff ff e8 b6 13 8a f9 48 8b 54 24 70 48 b8 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90002e4f520 EFLAGS: 00010212
RAX: 0000000000000324 RBX: ffff88804d5fd500 RCX: ffffc90005b52000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff87f05e3e RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: ffffc90002e4f650 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 000000000000ffff
R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000ffff
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000ffcd R15: 000000000000001f
FS: 00007f3babba9700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000080 CR3: 0000000075319000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
geneve_xmit_skb drivers/net/geneve.c:927 [inline]
geneve_xmit+0xcf8/0x35d0 drivers/net/geneve.c:1107
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4805 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4819 [inline]
__dev_direct_xmit+0x500/0x730 net/core/dev.c:4309
dev_direct_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3007 [inline]
packet_direct_xmit+0x1b8/0x2c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:282
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3073 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x21f4/0x55d0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3104
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:734
____sys_sendmsg+0x6eb/0x810 net/socket.c:2489
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2543
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2572 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2581 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x132/0x220 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7f3baaa89109
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f3babba9168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3baab9bf60 RCX: 00007f3baaa89109
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000a00 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f3baaae305d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffe74f2543f R14: 00007f3babba9300 R15: 0000000000022000
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49648

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/histograms: Fix memory leak problem
This reverts commit 46bbe5c671e06f070428b9be142cc4ee5cedebac.
As commit 46bbe5c671e0 ("tracing: fix double free") said, the
"double free" problem reported by clang static analyzer is:
> In parse_var_defs() if there is a problem allocating
> var_defs.expr, the earlier var_defs.name is freed.
> This free is duplicated by free_var_defs() which frees
> the rest of the list.
However, if there is a problem allocating N-th var_defs.expr:
+ in parse_var_defs(), the freed 'earlier var_defs.name' is
actually the N-th var_defs.name;
+ then in free_var_defs(), the names from 0th to (N-1)-th are freed;
IF ALLOCATING PROBLEM HAPPENED HERE!!! -+
\
|
0th 1th (N-1)-th N-th V
+-------------+-------------+-----+-------------+-----------
var_defs: | name | expr | name | expr | ... | name | expr | name | ///
+-------------+-------------+-----+-------------+-----------
These two frees don't act on same name, so there was no "double free"
problem before. Conversely, after that commit, we get a "memory leak"
problem because the above "N-th var_defs.name" is not freed.
If enable CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK and inject a fault at where the N-th
var_defs.expr allocated, then execute on shell like:
$ echo 'hist:key=call_site:val=$v1,$v2:v1=bytes_req,v2=bytes_alloc' > \
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kmem/kmalloc/trigger
Then kmemleak reports:
unreferenced object 0xffff8fb100ef3518 (size 8):
comm "bash", pid 196, jiffies 4295681690 (age 28.538s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
76 31 00 00 b1 8f ff ff v1......
backtrace:
[<0000000038fe4895>] kstrdup+0x2d/0x60
[<00000000c99c049a>] event_hist_trigger_parse+0x206f/0x20e0
[<00000000ae70d2cc>] trigger_process_regex+0xc0/0x110
[<0000000066737a4c>] event_trigger_write+0x75/0xd0
[<000000007341e40c>] vfs_write+0xbb/0x2a0
[<0000000087fde4c2>] ksys_write+0x59/0xd0
[<00000000581e9cdf>] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[<00000000cf3b065c>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49623

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/xive/spapr: correct bitmap allocation size
kasan detects access beyond the end of the xibm->bitmap allocation:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _find_first_zero_bit+0x40/0x140
Read of size 8 at addr c00000001d1d0118 by task swapper/0/1
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-00001-g90df023b36dd #28
Call Trace:
[c00000001d98f770] [c0000000012baab8] dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0x108 (unreliable)
[c00000001d98f7b0] [c00000000068faac] print_report+0x37c/0x710
[c00000001d98f880] [c0000000006902c0] kasan_report+0x110/0x354
[c00000001d98f950] [c000000000692324] __asan_load8+0xa4/0xe0
[c00000001d98f970] [c0000000011c6ed0] _find_first_zero_bit+0x40/0x140
[c00000001d98f9b0] [c0000000000dbfbc] xive_spapr_get_ipi+0xcc/0x260
[c00000001d98fa70] [c0000000000d6d28] xive_setup_cpu_ipi+0x1e8/0x450
[c00000001d98fb30] [c000000004032a20] pSeries_smp_probe+0x5c/0x118
[c00000001d98fb60] [c000000004018b44] smp_prepare_cpus+0x944/0x9ac
[c00000001d98fc90] [c000000004009f9c] kernel_init_freeable+0x2d4/0x640
[c00000001d98fd90] [c0000000000131e8] kernel_init+0x28/0x1d0
[c00000001d98fe10] [c00000000000cd54] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
Allocated by task 0:
kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x70
__kasan_kmalloc+0xb4/0xf0
__kmalloc+0x268/0x540
xive_spapr_init+0x4d0/0x77c
pseries_init_irq+0x40/0x27c
init_IRQ+0x44/0x84
start_kernel+0x2a4/0x538
start_here_common+0x1c/0x20
The buggy address belongs to the object at c00000001d1d0118
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
8-byte region [c00000001d1d0118, c00000001d1d0120)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:c00c000000074740 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xc00000001d1d0558 pfn:0x1d1d
flags: 0x7ffff000000200(slab|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff)
raw: 007ffff000000200 c00000001d0003c8 c00000001d0003c8 c00000001d010480
raw: c00000001d1d0558 0000000001e1000a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
c00000001d1d0000: fc 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c00000001d1d0080: fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>c00000001d1d0100: fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
c00000001d1d0180: fc fc fc fc 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c00000001d1d0200: fc fc fc fc fc 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
This happens because the allocation uses the wrong unit (bits) when it
should pass (BITS_TO_LONGS(count) * sizeof(long)) or equivalent. With small
numbers of bits, the allocated object can be smaller than sizeof(long),
which results in invalid accesses.
Use bitmap_zalloc() to allocate and initialize the irq bitmap, paired with
bitmap_free() for consistency.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49606

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Fix sleep from invalid context BUG
Taking the qos_mutex to process RoCEv2 QP's on netdev events causes a
kernel splat.
Fix this by removing the handling for RoCEv2 in
irdma_cm_teardown_connections that uses the mutex. This handling is only
needed for iWARP to avoid having connections established while the link is
down or having connections remain functional after the IP address is
removed.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.
Call Trace:
kernel: dump_stack+0x66/0x90
kernel: ___might_sleep.cold.92+0x8d/0x9a
kernel: mutex_lock+0x1c/0x40
kernel: irdma_cm_teardown_connections+0x28e/0x4d0 [irdma]
kernel: ? check_preempt_curr+0x7a/0x90
kernel: ? select_idle_sibling+0x22/0x3c0
kernel: ? select_task_rq_fair+0x94c/0xc90
kernel: ? irdma_exec_cqp_cmd+0xc27/0x17c0 [irdma]
kernel: ? __wake_up_common+0x7a/0x190
kernel: irdma_if_notify+0x3cc/0x450 [irdma]
kernel: ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xb0
kernel: irdma_inet6addr_event+0xc6/0x150 [irdma]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49592

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: fix dma queue left shift overflow issue
When queue number is > 4, left shift overflows due to 32 bits
integer variable. Mask calculation is wrong for MTL_RXQ_DMA_MAP1.
If CONFIG_UBSAN is enabled, kernel dumps below warning:
[ 10.363842] ==================================================================
[ 10.363882] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in /build/linux-intel-iotg-5.15-8e6Tf4/
linux-intel-iotg-5.15-5.15.0/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac4_core.c:224:12
[ 10.363929] shift exponent 40 is too large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int'
[ 10.363953] CPU: 1 PID: 599 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 5.15.0-1003-intel-iotg
[ 10.363956] Hardware name: ADLINK Technology Inc. LEC-EL/LEC-EL, BIOS 0.15.11 12/22/2021
[ 10.363958] Call Trace:
[ 10.363960] <TASK>
[ 10.363963] dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x5f
[ 10.363971] dump_stack+0x10/0x12
[ 10.363974] ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x45
[ 10.363976] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x61/0x10e
[ 10.363979] ? wake_up_klogd+0x4a/0x50
[ 10.363983] ? vprintk_emit+0x8f/0x240
[ 10.363986] dwmac4_map_mtl_dma.cold+0x42/0x91 [stmmac]
[ 10.364001] stmmac_mtl_configuration+0x1ce/0x7a0 [stmmac]
[ 10.364009] ? dwmac410_dma_init_channel+0x70/0x70 [stmmac]
[ 10.364020] stmmac_hw_setup.cold+0xf/0xb14 [stmmac]
[ 10.364030] ? page_pool_alloc_pages+0x4d/0x70
[ 10.364034] ? stmmac_clear_tx_descriptors+0x6e/0xe0 [stmmac]
[ 10.364042] stmmac_open+0x39e/0x920 [stmmac]
[ 10.364050] __dev_open+0xf0/0x1a0
[ 10.364054] __dev_change_flags+0x188/0x1f0
[ 10.364057] dev_change_flags+0x26/0x60
[ 10.364059] do_setlink+0x908/0xc40
[ 10.364062] ? do_setlink+0xb10/0xc40
[ 10.364064] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x4c/0x1a0
[ 10.364068] __rtnl_newlink+0x597/0xa10
[ 10.364072] ? __nla_reserve+0x41/0x50
[ 10.364074] ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x1d0/0x4d0
[ 10.364079] ? pskb_expand_head+0x75/0x310
[ 10.364082] ? nla_reserve_64bit+0x21/0x40
[ 10.364086] ? skb_free_head+0x65/0x80
[ 10.364089] ? security_sock_rcv_skb+0x2c/0x50
[ 10.364094] ? __cond_resched+0x19/0x30
[ 10.364097] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x15a/0x420
[ 10.364100] rtnl_newlink+0x49/0x70
This change fixes MTL_RXQ_DMA_MAP1 mask issue and channel/queue
mapping warning.
BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216195

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49584

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ixgbe: Add locking to prevent panic when setting sriov_numvfs to zero
It is possible to disable VFs while the PF driver is processing requests
from the VF driver. This can result in a panic.
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000000000106c
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 8 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/8 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G I --------- -
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R740/06WXJT, BIOS 2.8.2 08/27/2020
RIP: 0010:ixgbe_msg_task+0x4c8/0x1690 [ixgbe]
Code: 00 00 48 8d 04 40 48 c1 e0 05 89 7c 24 24 89 fd 48 89 44 24 10 83 ff
01 0f 84 b8 04 00 00 4c 8b 64 24 10 4d 03 a5 48 22 00 00 <41> 80 7c 24 4c
00 0f 84 8a 03 00 00 0f b7 c7 83 f8 08 0f 84 8f 0a
RSP: 0018:ffffb337869f8df8 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: 0000000000001020 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000002b
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000029780
R10: 00006957d8f42832 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000001020
R13: ffff8a00e8978ac0 R14: 000000000000002b R15: ffff8a00e8979c80
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a07dfd00000(0000) knlGS:00000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000106c CR3: 0000000063e10004 CR4: 00000000007726e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x19/0x140
? try_to_wake_up+0x1cd/0x550
? ixgbevf_update_xcast_mode+0x71/0xc0 [ixgbevf]
ixgbe_msix_other+0x17e/0x310 [ixgbe]
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x40/0x180
handle_irq_event_percpu+0x30/0x80
handle_irq_event+0x36/0x53
handle_edge_irq+0x82/0x190
handle_irq+0x1c/0x30
do_IRQ+0x49/0xd0
common_interrupt+0xf/0xf
This can be eventually be reproduced with the following script:
while :
do
echo 63 > /sys/class/net/<devname>/device/sriov_numvfs
sleep 1
echo 0 > /sys/class/net/<devname>/device/sriov_numvfs
sleep 1
done
Add lock when disabling SR-IOV to prevent process VF mailbox communication.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49565

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/intel/lbr: Fix unchecked MSR access error on HSW
The fuzzer triggers the below trace.
[ 7763.384369] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x689
(tried to write 0x1fffffff8101349e) at rIP: 0xffffffff810704a4
(native_write_msr+0x4/0x20)
[ 7763.397420] Call Trace:
[ 7763.399881] <TASK>
[ 7763.401994] intel_pmu_lbr_restore+0x9a/0x1f0
[ 7763.406363] intel_pmu_lbr_sched_task+0x91/0x1c0
[ 7763.410992] __perf_event_task_sched_in+0x1cd/0x240
On a machine with the LBR format LBR_FORMAT_EIP_FLAGS2, when the TSX is
disabled, a TSX quirk is required to access LBR from registers.
The lbr_from_signext_quirk_needed() is introduced to determine whether
the TSX quirk should be applied. However, the
lbr_from_signext_quirk_needed() is invoked before the
intel_pmu_lbr_init(), which parses the LBR format information. Without
the correct LBR format information, the TSX quirk never be applied.
Move the lbr_from_signext_quirk_needed() into the intel_pmu_lbr_init().
Checking x86_pmu.lbr_has_tsx in the lbr_from_signext_quirk_needed() is
not required anymore.
Both LBR_FORMAT_EIP_FLAGS2 and LBR_FORMAT_INFO have LBR_TSX flag, but
only the LBR_FORMAT_EIP_FLAGS2 requirs the quirk. Update the comments
accordingly.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49557

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/fpu: KVM: Set the base guest FPU uABI size to sizeof(struct kvm_xsave)
Set the starting uABI size of KVM's guest FPU to 'struct kvm_xsave',
i.e. to KVM's historical uABI size. When saving FPU state for usersapce,
KVM (well, now the FPU) sets the FP+SSE bits in the XSAVE header even if
the host doesn't support XSAVE. Setting the XSAVE header allows the VM
to be migrated to a host that does support XSAVE without the new host
having to handle FPU state that may or may not be compatible with XSAVE.
Setting the uABI size to the host's default size results in out-of-bounds
writes (setting the FP+SSE bits) and data corruption (that is thankfully
caught by KASAN) when running on hosts without XSAVE, e.g. on Core2 CPUs.
WARN if the default size is larger than KVM's historical uABI size; all
features that can push the FPU size beyond the historical size must be
opt-in.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate+0x86/0x130
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888011e33a00 by task qemu-build/681
CPU: 1 PID: 681 Comm: qemu-build Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-KASAN-amd64 #1
Hardware name: /DG35EC, BIOS ECG3510M.86A.0118.2010.0113.1426 01/13/2010
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x45
print_report.cold+0x45/0x575
kasan_report+0x9b/0xd0
fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate+0x86/0x130
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x72a/0x1c50 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x47f/0x7b0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x5de/0xc90
do_syscall_64+0x31/0x50
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>
Allocated by task 0:
(stack is not available)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888011e33800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
512-byte region [ffff888011e33800, ffff888011e33a00)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:0000000089cd4adb refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x11e30
head:0000000089cd4adb order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head|zone=1)
raw: 4000000000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888001041c80
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888011e33900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888011e33980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff888011e33a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888011e33a80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888011e33b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49552

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix combination of jit blinding and pointers to bpf subprogs.
The combination of jit blinding and pointers to bpf subprogs causes:
[ 36.989548] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000100000001
[ 36.990342] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
[ 36.990968] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
[ 36.994859] RIP: 0010:0x100000001
[ 36.995209] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffd7.
[ 37.004091] Call Trace:
[ 37.004351] <TASK>
[ 37.004576] ? bpf_loop+0x4d/0x70
[ 37.004932] ? bpf_prog_3899083f75e4c5de_F+0xe3/0x13b
The jit blinding logic didn't recognize that ld_imm64 with an address
of bpf subprogram is a special instruction and proceeded to randomize it.
By itself it wouldn't have been an issue, but jit_subprogs() logic
relies on two step process to JIT all subprogs and then JIT them
again when addresses of all subprogs are known.
Blinding process in the first JIT phase caused second JIT to miss
adjustment of special ld_imm64.
Fix this issue by ignoring special ld_imm64 instructions that don't have
user controlled constants and shouldn't be blinded.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49532

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: fix NULL pointer dereference in virtio_gpu_conn_get_modes
drm_cvt_mode may return NULL and we should check it.
This bug is found by syzkaller:
FAULT_INJECTION stacktrace:
[ 168.567394] FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 1
[ 168.567403] CPU: 1 PID: 6425 Comm: syz Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.19.90-vhulk2201.1.0.h1035.kasan.eulerosv2r10.aarch64 #1
[ 168.567406] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
[ 168.567408] Call trace:
[ 168.567414] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x310
[ 168.567418] show_stack+0x28/0x38
[ 168.567423] dump_stack+0xec/0x15c
[ 168.567427] should_fail+0x3ac/0x3d0
[ 168.567437] __should_failslab+0xb8/0x120
[ 168.567441] should_failslab+0x28/0xc0
[ 168.567445] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x50/0x640
[ 168.567454] drm_mode_create+0x40/0x90
[ 168.567458] drm_cvt_mode+0x48/0xc78
[ 168.567477] virtio_gpu_conn_get_modes+0xa8/0x140 [virtio_gpu]
[ 168.567485] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x3a4/0xd80
[ 168.567492] drm_mode_getconnector+0x2e0/0xa70
[ 168.567496] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x11c/0x1d8
[ 168.567514] drm_ioctl+0x558/0x6d0
[ 168.567522] do_vfs_ioctl+0x160/0xf30
[ 168.567525] ksys_ioctl+0x98/0xd8
[ 168.567530] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x50/0xc8
[ 168.567536] el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x320
[ 168.567540] el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160
[ 168.567544] el0_svc+0x10/0x218
KASAN stacktrace:
[ 168.567561] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in virtio_gpu_conn_get_modes+0xb4/0x140 [virtio_gpu]
[ 168.567565] Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000054 by task syz/6425
[ 168.567566]
[ 168.567571] CPU: 1 PID: 6425 Comm: syz Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.19.90-vhulk2201.1.0.h1035.kasan.eulerosv2r10.aarch64 #1
[ 168.567573] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
[ 168.567575] Call trace:
[ 168.567578] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x310
[ 168.567582] show_stack+0x28/0x38
[ 168.567586] dump_stack+0xec/0x15c
[ 168.567591] kasan_report+0x244/0x2f0
[ 168.567594] __asan_load4+0x58/0xb0
[ 168.567607] virtio_gpu_conn_get_modes+0xb4/0x140 [virtio_gpu]
[ 168.567612] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x3a4/0xd80
[ 168.567617] drm_mode_getconnector+0x2e0/0xa70
[ 168.567621] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x11c/0x1d8
[ 168.567624] drm_ioctl+0x558/0x6d0
[ 168.567628] do_vfs_ioctl+0x160/0xf30
[ 168.567632] ksys_ioctl+0x98/0xd8
[ 168.567636] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x50/0xc8
[ 168.567641] el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x320
[ 168.567645] el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160
[ 168.567649] el0_svc+0x10/0x218

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49520

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: compat: Do not treat syscall number as ESR_ELx for a bad syscall
If a compat process tries to execute an unknown system call above the
__ARM_NR_COMPAT_END number, the kernel sends a SIGILL signal to the
offending process. Information about the error is printed to dmesg in
compat_arm_syscall() -> arm64_notify_die() -> arm64_force_sig_fault() ->
arm64_show_signal().
arm64_show_signal() interprets a non-zero value for
current->thread.fault_code as an exception syndrome and displays the
message associated with the ESR_ELx.EC field (bits 31:26).
current->thread.fault_code is set in compat_arm_syscall() ->
arm64_notify_die() with the bad syscall number instead of a valid ESR_ELx
value. This means that the ESR_ELx.EC field has the value that the user set
for the syscall number and the kernel can end up printing bogus exception
messages*. For example, for the syscall number 0x68000000, which evaluates
to ESR_ELx.EC value of 0x1A (ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC) the kernel prints this error:
[ 18.349161] syscall[300]: unhandled exception: ERET/ERETAA/ERETAB, ESR 0x68000000, Oops - bad compat syscall(2) in syscall[10000+50000]
[ 18.350639] CPU: 2 PID: 300 Comm: syscall Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 #79
[ 18.351249] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT)
[..]
which is misleading, as the bad compat syscall has nothing to do with
pointer authentication.
Stop arm64_show_signal() from printing exception syndrome information by
having compat_arm_syscall() set the ESR_ELx value to 0, as it has no
meaning for an invalid system call number. The example above now becomes:
[ 19.935275] syscall[301]: unhandled exception: Oops - bad compat syscall(2) in syscall[10000+50000]
[ 19.936124] CPU: 1 PID: 301 Comm: syscall Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-00005-g7e08006d4102 #80
[ 19.936894] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT)
[..]
which although shows less information because the syscall number,
wrongfully advertised as the ESR value, is missing, it is better than
showing plainly wrong information. The syscall number can be easily
obtained with strace.
*A 32-bit value above or equal to 0x8000_0000 is interpreted as a negative
integer in compat_arm_syscal() and the condition scno < __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END
evaluates to true; the syscall will exit to userspace in this case with the
ENOSYS error code instead of arm64_notify_die() being called.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49501

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbnet: Run unregister_netdev() before unbind() again
Commit 2c9d6c2b871d ("usbnet: run unbind() before unregister_netdev()")
sought to fix a use-after-free on disconnect of USB Ethernet adapters.
It turns out that a different fix is necessary to address the issue:
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/18b3541e5372bc9b9fc733d422f4e698c089077c.1650177997.git.lukas@wunner.de/
So the commit was not necessary.
The commit made binding and unbinding of USB Ethernet asymmetrical:
Before, usbnet_probe() first invoked the ->bind() callback and then
register_netdev(). usbnet_disconnect() mirrored that by first invoking
unregister_netdev() and then ->unbind().
Since the commit, the order in usbnet_disconnect() is reversed and no
longer mirrors usbnet_probe().
One consequence is that a PHY disconnected (and stopped) in ->unbind()
is afterwards stopped once more by unregister_netdev() as it closes the
netdev before unregistering. That necessitates a contortion in ->stop()
because the PHY may only be stopped if it hasn't already been
disconnected.
Reverting the commit allows making the call to phy_stop() unconditional
in ->stop().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49476

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mt76: mt7921: fix kernel crash at mt7921_pci_remove
The crash log shown it is possible that mt7921_irq_handler is called while
devm_free_irq is being handled so mt76_free_device need to be postponed
until devm_free_irq is completed to solve the crash we free the mt76 device
too early.
[ 9299.339655] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
[ 9299.339705] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 9299.339735] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 9299.339768] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 9299.339786] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 9299.339812] CPU: 1 PID: 1624 Comm: prepare-suspend Not tainted 5.15.14-1.fc32.qubes.x86_64 #1
[ 9299.339863] Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.14.3 01/20/2022
[ 9299.339901] RIP: 0010:mt7921_irq_handler+0x1e/0x70 [mt7921e]
[ 9299.340048] RSP: 0018:ffffa81b80c27cb0 EFLAGS: 00010082
[ 9299.340081] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff98a4cb752020 RCX: ffffffffa96211c5
[ 9299.340123] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000d4204 RDI: ffff98a4cb752020
[ 9299.340165] RBP: ffff98a4c28a62a4 R08: ffff98a4c37a96c0 R09: 0000000080150011
[ 9299.340207] R10: 0000000040000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff98a4c4eaa080
[ 9299.340249] R13: ffff98a4c28a6360 R14: ffff98a4cb752020 R15: ffff98a4c28a6228
[ 9299.340297] FS: 00007260840d3740(0000) GS:ffff98a4ef700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 9299.340345] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 9299.340383] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000004c56001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 9299.340432] PKRU: 55555554
[ 9299.340449] Call Trace:
[ 9299.340467] <TASK>
[ 9299.340485] __free_irq+0x221/0x350
[ 9299.340527] free_irq+0x30/0x70
[ 9299.340553] devm_free_irq+0x55/0x80
[ 9299.340579] mt7921_pci_remove+0x2f/0x40 [mt7921e]
[ 9299.340616] pci_device_remove+0x3b/0xa0
[ 9299.340651] __device_release_driver+0x17a/0x240
[ 9299.340686] device_driver_detach+0x3c/0xa0
[ 9299.340714] unbind_store+0x113/0x130
[ 9299.340740] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x124/0x1b0
[ 9299.340775] new_sync_write+0x15c/0x1f0
[ 9299.340806] vfs_write+0x1d2/0x270
[ 9299.340831] ksys_write+0x67/0xe0
[ 9299.340857] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 9299.340887] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49443

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
list: fix a data-race around ep->rdllist
ep_poll() first calls ep_events_available() with no lock held and checks
if ep->rdllist is empty by list_empty_careful(), which reads
rdllist->prev. Thus all accesses to it need some protection to avoid
store/load-tearing.
Note INIT_LIST_HEAD_RCU() already has the annotation for both prev
and next.
Commit bf3b9f6372c4 ("epoll: Add busy poll support to epoll with socket
fds.") added the first lockless ep_events_available(), and commit
c5a282e9635e ("fs/epoll: reduce the scope of wq lock in epoll_wait()")
made some ep_events_available() calls lockless and added single call under
a lock, finally commit e59d3c64cba6 ("epoll: eliminate unnecessary lock
for zero timeout") made the last ep_events_available() lockless.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in do_epoll_wait / do_epoll_wait
write to 0xffff88810480c7d8 of 8 bytes by task 1802 on cpu 0:
INIT_LIST_HEAD include/linux/list.h:38 [inline]
list_splice_init include/linux/list.h:492 [inline]
ep_start_scan fs/eventpoll.c:622 [inline]
ep_send_events fs/eventpoll.c:1656 [inline]
ep_poll fs/eventpoll.c:1806 [inline]
do_epoll_wait+0x4eb/0xf40 fs/eventpoll.c:2234
do_epoll_pwait fs/eventpoll.c:2268 [inline]
__do_sys_epoll_pwait fs/eventpoll.c:2281 [inline]
__se_sys_epoll_pwait+0x12b/0x240 fs/eventpoll.c:2275
__x64_sys_epoll_pwait+0x74/0x80 fs/eventpoll.c:2275
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff88810480c7d8 of 8 bytes by task 1799 on cpu 1:
list_empty_careful include/linux/list.h:329 [inline]
ep_events_available fs/eventpoll.c:381 [inline]
ep_poll fs/eventpoll.c:1797 [inline]
do_epoll_wait+0x279/0xf40 fs/eventpoll.c:2234
do_epoll_pwait fs/eventpoll.c:2268 [inline]
__do_sys_epoll_pwait fs/eventpoll.c:2281 [inline]
__se_sys_epoll_pwait+0x12b/0x240 fs/eventpoll.c:2275
__x64_sys_epoll_pwait+0x74/0x80 fs/eventpoll.c:2275
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0xffff88810480c7d0 -> 0xffff888103c15098
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 1799 Comm: syz-fuzzer Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc7-syzkaller-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49436

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/papr_scm: Fix leaking nvdimm_events_map elements
Right now 'char *' elements allocated for individual 'stat_id' in
'papr_scm_priv.nvdimm_events_map[]' during papr_scm_pmu_check_events(), get
leaked in papr_scm_remove() and papr_scm_pmu_register(),
papr_scm_pmu_check_events() error paths.
Also individual 'stat_id' arent NULL terminated 'char *' instead they are fixed
8-byte sized identifiers. However papr_scm_pmu_register() assumes it to be a
NULL terminated 'char *' and at other places it assumes it to be a
'papr_scm_perf_stat.stat_id' sized string which is 8-byes in size.
Fix this by allocating the memory for papr_scm_priv.nvdimm_events_map to also
include space for 'stat_id' entries. This is possible since number of available
events/stat_ids are known upfront. This saves some memory and one extra level of
indirection from 'nvdimm_events_map' to 'stat_id'. Also rest of the code
can continue to call 'kfree(papr_scm_priv.nvdimm_events_map)' without needing to
iterate over the array and free up individual elements.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49414

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix race condition between ext4_write and ext4_convert_inline_data
Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON:
==================================================================
EXT4-fs error (device loop3): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:805: group 0,
block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 25 vs 31513 free clusters
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:53!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 25371 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.10.0+ #1
RIP: 0010:ext4_put_nojournal fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:53 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__ext4_journal_stop+0x10e/0x110 fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:116
[...]
Call Trace:
ext4_write_inline_data_end+0x59a/0x730 fs/ext4/inline.c:795
generic_perform_write+0x279/0x3c0 mm/filemap.c:3344
ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x2e3/0x3d0 fs/ext4/file.c:270
ext4_file_write_iter+0x30a/0x11c0 fs/ext4/file.c:520
do_iter_readv_writev+0x339/0x3c0 fs/read_write.c:732
do_iter_write+0x107/0x430 fs/read_write.c:861
vfs_writev fs/read_write.c:934 [inline]
do_pwritev+0x1e5/0x380 fs/read_write.c:1031
[...]
==================================================================
Above issue may happen as follows:
cpu1 cpu2
__________________________|__________________________
do_pwritev
vfs_writev
do_iter_write
ext4_file_write_iter
ext4_buffered_write_iter
generic_perform_write
ext4_da_write_begin
vfs_fallocate
ext4_fallocate
ext4_convert_inline_data
ext4_convert_inline_data_nolock
ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock
clear EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA
ext4_map_blocks
ext4_ext_map_blocks
ext4_mb_new_blocks
ext4_mb_regular_allocator
ext4_mb_good_group_nolock
ext4_mb_init_group
ext4_mb_init_cache
ext4_mb_generate_buddy --> error
ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA)
ext4_restore_inline_data
set EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA
ext4_block_write_begin
ext4_da_write_end
ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA)
ext4_write_inline_data_end
handle=NULL
ext4_journal_stop(handle)
__ext4_journal_stop
ext4_put_nojournal(handle)
ref_cnt = (unsigned long)handle
BUG_ON(ref_cnt == 0) ---> BUG_ON
The lock held by ext4_convert_inline_data is xattr_sem, but the lock
held by generic_perform_write is i_rwsem. Therefore, the two locks can
be concurrent.
To solve above issue, we add inode_lock() for ext4_convert_inline_data().
At the same time, move ext4_convert_inline_data() in front of
ext4_punch_hole(), remove similar handling from ext4_punch_hole().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49407

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dlm: fix plock invalid read
This patch fixes an invalid read showed by KASAN. A unlock will allocate a
"struct plock_op" and a followed send_op() will append it to a global
send_list data structure. In some cases a followed dev_read() moves it
to recv_list and dev_write() will cast it to "struct plock_xop" and access
fields which are only available in those structures. At this point an
invalid read happens by accessing those fields.
To fix this issue the "callback" field is moved to "struct plock_op" to
indicate that a cast to "plock_xop" is allowed and does the additional
"plock_xop" handling if set.
Example of the KASAN output which showed the invalid read:
[ 2064.296453] ==================================================================
[ 2064.304852] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.306491] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800ef227d8 by task dlm_controld/7484
[ 2064.308168]
[ 2064.308575] CPU: 0 PID: 7484 Comm: dlm_controld Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0+ #9
[ 2064.310292] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
[ 2064.311618] Call Trace:
[ 2064.312218] dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x7b
[ 2064.313150] print_address_description.constprop.8+0x21/0x150
[ 2064.314578] ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.315610] ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.316595] kasan_report.cold.14+0x7f/0x11b
[ 2064.317674] ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.318687] dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.319629] ? dev_read+0x4a0/0x4a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.320713] ? bpf_lsm_kernfs_init_security+0x10/0x10
[ 2064.321926] vfs_write+0x17e/0x930
[ 2064.322769] ? __fget_light+0x1aa/0x220
[ 2064.323753] ksys_write+0xf1/0x1c0
[ 2064.324548] ? __ia32_sys_read+0xb0/0xb0
[ 2064.325464] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[ 2064.326387] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 2064.327606] RIP: 0033:0x7f807e4ba96f
[ 2064.328470] Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 39 87 f8 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 7c 87 f8 ff 48
[ 2064.332902] RSP: 002b:00007ffd50cfe6e0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 2064.334658] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055cc3886eb30 RCX: 00007f807e4ba96f
[ 2064.336275] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00007ffd50cfe7e0 RDI: 0000000000000010
[ 2064.337980] RBP: 00007ffd50cfe7e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 2064.339560] R10: 000055cc3886eb30 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000055cc3886eb80
[ 2064.341237] R13: 000055cc3886eb00 R14: 000055cc3886f590 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 2064.342857]
[ 2064.343226] Allocated by task 12438:
[ 2064.344057] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2064.345079] __kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0
[ 2064.345933] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13b/0x220
[ 2064.346953] dlm_posix_unlock+0xec/0x720 [dlm]
[ 2064.348811] do_lock_file_wait.part.32+0xca/0x1d0
[ 2064.351070] fcntl_setlk+0x281/0xbc0
[ 2064.352879] do_fcntl+0x5e4/0xfe0
[ 2064.354657] __x64_sys_fcntl+0x11f/0x170
[ 2064.356550] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[ 2064.358259] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 2064.360745]
[ 2064.361511] Last potentially related work creation:
[ 2064.363957] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2064.365811] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0
[ 2064.368100] call_rcu+0x11b/0xf70
[ 2064.369785] dlm_process_incoming_buffer+0x47d/0xfd0 [dlm]
[ 2064.372404] receive_from_sock+0x290/0x770 [dlm]
[ 2064.374607] process_recv_sockets+0x32/0x40 [dlm]
[ 2064.377290] process_one_work+0x9a8/0x16e0
[ 2064.379357] worker_thread+0x87/0xbf0
[ 2064.381188] kthread+0x3ac/0x490
[ 2064.383460] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 2064.385588]
[ 2064.386518] Second to last potentially related work creation:
[ 2064.389219] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2064.391043] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0
[ 2064.393303] call_rcu+0x11b/0xf70
[ 2064.394885] dlm_process_incoming_buffer+0x47d/0xfd0 [dlm]
[ 2064.397694] receive_from_sock+0x290/0x770
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49402

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Clean up hash direct_functions on register failures
We see the following GPF when register_ftrace_direct fails:
[ ] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address \
0x200000000000010: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
[...]
[ ] RIP: 0010:ftrace_find_rec_direct+0x53/0x70
[ ] Code: 48 c1 e0 03 48 03 42 08 48 8b 10 31 c0 48 85 d2 74 [...]
[ ] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000138bc10 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ ] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff813e0df0 RCX: 000000000000003b
[ ] RDX: 0200000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: ffffffff813e0df0
[ ] RBP: ffffffffa00a3000 R08: ffffffff81180ce0 R09: 0000000000000001
[ ] R10: ffffc9000138bc18 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffff813e0df0
[ ] R13: ffffffff813e0df0 R14: ffff888171b56400 R15: 0000000000000000
[ ] FS: 00007fa9420c7780(0000) GS:ffff888ff6a00000(0000) knlGS:000000000
[ ] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ ] CR2: 000000000770d000 CR3: 0000000107d50003 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[ ] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ ] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] <TASK>
[ ] register_ftrace_direct+0x54/0x290
[ ] ? render_sigset_t+0xa0/0xa0
[ ] bpf_trampoline_update+0x3f5/0x4a0
[ ] ? 0xffffffffa00a3000
[ ] bpf_trampoline_link_prog+0xa9/0x140
[ ] bpf_tracing_prog_attach+0x1dc/0x450
[ ] bpf_raw_tracepoint_open+0x9a/0x1e0
[ ] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90
[ ] ? lock_release+0x150/0x430
[ ] __sys_bpf+0xbd6/0x2700
[ ] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd8/0x130
[ ] __x64_sys_bpf+0x1c/0x20
[ ] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[ ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ ] RIP: 0033:0x7fa9421defa9
[ ] Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 9 f8 [...]
[ ] RSP: 002b:00007ffed743bd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
[ ] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000069d2480 RCX: 00007fa9421defa9
[ ] RDX: 0000000000000078 RSI: 00007ffed743bd80 RDI: 0000000000000011
[ ] RBP: 00007ffed743be00 R08: 0000000000bb7270 R09: 0000000000000000
[ ] R10: 00000000069da210 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[ ] R13: 00007ffed743c4b0 R14: 00000000069d2480 R15: 0000000000000001
[ ] </TASK>
[ ] Modules linked in: klp_vm(OK)
[ ] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
One way to trigger this is:
1. load a livepatch that patches kernel function xxx;
2. run bpftrace -e 'kfunc:xxx {}', this will fail (expected for now);
3. repeat #2 => gpf.
This is because the entry is added to direct_functions, but not removed.
Fix this by remove the entry from direct_functions when
register_ftrace_direct fails.
Also remove the last trailing space from ftrace.c, so we don't have to
worry about it anymore.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49353

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/papr_scm: don't requests stats with '0' sized stats buffer
Sachin reported [1] that on a POWER-10 lpar he is seeing a kernel panic being
reported with vPMEM when papr_scm probe is being called. The panic is of the
form below and is observed only with following option disabled(profile) for the
said LPAR 'Enable Performance Information Collection' in the HMC:
Kernel attempted to write user page (1c) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on write at 0x0000001c
Faulting instruction address: 0xc008000001b90844
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
<snip>
NIP [c008000001b90844] drc_pmem_query_stats+0x5c/0x270 [papr_scm]
LR [c008000001b92794] papr_scm_probe+0x2ac/0x6ec [papr_scm]
Call Trace:
0xc00000000941bca0 (unreliable)
papr_scm_probe+0x2ac/0x6ec [papr_scm]
platform_probe+0x98/0x150
really_probe+0xfc/0x510
__driver_probe_device+0x17c/0x230
<snip>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
On investigation looks like this panic was caused due to a 'stat_buffer' of
size==0 being provided to drc_pmem_query_stats() to fetch all performance
stats-ids of an NVDIMM. However drc_pmem_query_stats() shouldn't have been called
since the vPMEM NVDIMM doesn't support and performance stat-id's. This was caused
due to missing check for 'p->stat_buffer_len' at the beginning of
papr_scm_pmu_check_events() which indicates that the NVDIMM doesn't support
performance-stats.
Fix this by introducing the check for 'p->stat_buffer_len' at the beginning of
papr_scm_pmu_check_events().
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/6B3A522A-6A5F-4CC9-B268-0C63AA6E07D3@linux.ibm.com

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49352

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix warning in ext4_handle_inode_extension
We got issue as follows:
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_reserve_inode_write:5741: Out of memory
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_setattr:5462: inode #13: comm syz-executor.0: mark_inode_dirty error
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_setattr:5519: Out of memory
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_ind_map_blocks:595: inode #13: comm syz-executor.0: Can't allocate blocks for non-extent mapped inodes with bigalloc
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 4361 at fs/ext4/file.c:301 ext4_file_write_iter+0x11c9/0x1220
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 4361 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.10.0+ #1
RIP: 0010:ext4_file_write_iter+0x11c9/0x1220
RSP: 0018:ffff924d80b27c00 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: ffffffff815a3379 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000003b000000
RDX: ffff924d81601000 RSI: 00000000000009cc RDI: 00000000000009cd
RBP: 000000000000000d R08: ffffffffbc5a2c6b R09: 0000902e0e52a96f
R10: ffff902e2b7c1b40 R11: ffff902e2b7c1b40 R12: 000000000000000a
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff902e0e52aa10 R15: ffffffffffffff8b
FS: 00007f81a7f65700(0000) GS:ffff902e3bc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffff600400 CR3: 000000012db88001 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
do_iter_readv_writev+0x2e5/0x360
do_iter_write+0x112/0x4c0
do_pwritev+0x1e5/0x390
__x64_sys_pwritev2+0x7e/0xa0
do_syscall_64+0x37/0x50
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Above issue may happen as follows:
Assume
inode.i_size=4096
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize=4096
step 1: set inode->i_isize = 8192
ext4_setattr
if (attr->ia_size != inode->i_size)
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = attr->ia_size;
rc = ext4_mark_inode_dirty
ext4_reserve_inode_write
ext4_get_inode_loc
__ext4_get_inode_loc
sb_getblk --> return -ENOMEM
...
if (!error) ->will not update i_size
i_size_write(inode, attr->ia_size);
Now:
inode.i_size=4096
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize=8192
step 2: Direct write 4096 bytes
ext4_file_write_iter
ext4_dio_write_iter
iomap_dio_rw ->return error
if (extend)
ext4_handle_inode_extension
WARN_ON_ONCE(i_size_read(inode) < EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize);
->Then trigger warning.
To solve above issue, if mark inode dirty failed in ext4_setattr just
set 'EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize' with old value.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49322

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix sleeping function called from invalid context on RT kernel
When setting bootparams="trace_event=initcall:initcall_start tp_printk=1" in the
cmdline, the output_printk() was called, and the spin_lock_irqsave() was called in the
atomic and irq disable interrupt context suitation. On the PREEMPT_RT kernel,
these locks are replaced with sleepable rt-spinlock, so the stack calltrace will
be triggered.
Fix it by raw_spin_lock_irqsave when PREEMPT_RT and "trace_event=initcall:initcall_start
tp_printk=1" enabled.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
preempt_count: 2, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffffff8992303e>] try_to_wake_up+0x7e/0xba0
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.17.1-rt17+ #19 34c5812404187a875f32bee7977f7367f9679ea7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x8c
dump_stack+0x10/0x12
__might_resched.cold+0x11d/0x155
rt_spin_lock+0x40/0x70
trace_event_buffer_commit+0x2fa/0x4c0
? map_vsyscall+0x93/0x93
trace_event_raw_event_initcall_start+0xbe/0x110
? perf_trace_initcall_finish+0x210/0x210
? probe_sched_wakeup+0x34/0x40
? ttwu_do_wakeup+0xda/0x310
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x35/0x170
? map_vsyscall+0x93/0x93
do_one_initcall+0x217/0x3c0
? trace_event_raw_event_initcall_level+0x170/0x170
? push_cpu_stop+0x400/0x400
? cblist_init_generic+0x241/0x290
kernel_init_freeable+0x1ac/0x347
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x65/0x80
? rest_init+0xf0/0xf0
kernel_init+0x1e/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49297

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nbd: fix io hung while disconnecting device
In our tests, "qemu-nbd" triggers a io hung:
INFO: task qemu-nbd:11445 blocked for more than 368 seconds.
Not tainted 5.18.0-rc3-next-20220422-00003-g2176915513ca #884
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:qemu-nbd state:D stack: 0 pid:11445 ppid: 1 flags:0x00000000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x480/0x1050
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3e/0xb0
schedule+0x9c/0x1b0
blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0x9d/0xf0
? ipi_rseq+0x70/0x70
blk_mq_freeze_queue+0x2b/0x40
nbd_add_socket+0x6b/0x270 [nbd]
nbd_ioctl+0x383/0x510 [nbd]
blkdev_ioctl+0x18e/0x3e0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x120
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fd8ff706577
RSP: 002b:00007fd8fcdfebf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000040000000 RCX: 00007fd8ff706577
RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: 000000000000ab00 RDI: 000000000000000f
RBP: 000000000000000f R08: 000000000000fbe8 R09: 000055fe497c62b0
R10: 00000002aff20000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000006d
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffe82dc5e70 R15: 00007fd8fcdff9c0
"qemu-ndb -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_DISCONNECT' first, however, following
message was found:
block nbd0: Send disconnect failed -32
Which indicate that something is wrong with the server. Then,
"qemu-nbd -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_CLEAR_SOCK', however ioctl can't clear
requests after commit 2516ab1543fd("nbd: only clear the queue on device
teardown"). And in the meantime, request can't complete through timeout
because nbd_xmit_timeout() will always return 'BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER', which
means such request will never be completed in this situation.
Now that the flag 'NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT' can make sure requests won't
complete multiple times, switch back to call nbd_clear_sock() in
nbd_clear_sock_ioctl(), so that inflight requests can be cleared.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49287

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm: fix reference counting for struct tpm_chip
The following sequence of operations results in a refcount warning:
1. Open device /dev/tpmrm.
2. Remove module tpm_tis_spi.
3. Write a TPM command to the file descriptor opened at step 1.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1161 at lib/refcount.c:25 kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
Modules linked in: tpm_tis_spi tpm_tis_core tpm mdio_bcm_unimac brcmfmac
sha256_generic libsha256 sha256_arm hci_uart btbcm bluetooth cfg80211 vc4
brcmutil ecdh_generic ecc snd_soc_core crc32_arm_ce libaes
raspberrypi_hwmon ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine bcm2711_thermal snd_pcm
snd_timer genet snd phy_generic soundcore [last unloaded: spi_bcm2835]
CPU: 3 PID: 1161 Comm: hold_open Not tainted 5.10.0ls-main-dirty #2
Hardware name: BCM2711
[<c0410c3c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c040b580>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c040b580>] (show_stack) from [<c1092174>] (dump_stack+0xc4/0xd8)
[<c1092174>] (dump_stack) from [<c0445a30>] (__warn+0x104/0x108)
[<c0445a30>] (__warn) from [<c0445aa8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x74/0xb8)
[<c0445aa8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c08435d0>] (kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4)
[<c08435d0>] (kobject_get) from [<bf0a715c>] (tpm_try_get_ops+0x14/0x54 [tpm])
[<bf0a715c>] (tpm_try_get_ops [tpm]) from [<bf0a7d6c>] (tpm_common_write+0x38/0x60 [tpm])
[<bf0a7d6c>] (tpm_common_write [tpm]) from [<c05a7ac0>] (vfs_write+0xc4/0x3c0)
[<c05a7ac0>] (vfs_write) from [<c05a7ee4>] (ksys_write+0x58/0xcc)
[<c05a7ee4>] (ksys_write) from [<c04001a0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x4c)
Exception stack(0xc226bfa8 to 0xc226bff0)
bfa0: 00000000 000105b4 00000003 beafe664 00000014 00000000
bfc0: 00000000 000105b4 000103f8 00000004 00000000 00000000 b6f9c000 beafe684
bfe0: 0000006c beafe648 0001056c b6eb6944
---[ end trace d4b8409def9b8b1f ]---
The reason for this warning is the attempt to get the chip->dev reference
in tpm_common_write() although the reference counter is already zero.
Since commit 8979b02aaf1d ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device") the
extra reference used to prevent a premature zero counter is never taken,
because the required TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag is never set.
Fix this by moving the TPM 2 character device handling from
tpm_chip_alloc() to tpm_add_char_device() which is called at a later point
in time when the flag has been set in case of TPM2.
Commit fdc915f7f719 ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>")
already introduced function tpm_devs_release() to release the extra
reference but did not implement the required put on chip->devs that results
in the call of this function.
Fix this by putting chip->devs in tpm_chip_unregister().
Finally move the new implementation for the TPM 2 handling into a new
function to avoid multiple checks for the TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag in the
good case and error cases.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49268

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: Intel: Fix NULL ptr dereference when ENOMEM
Do not call snd_dma_free_pages() when snd_dma_alloc_pages() returns
-ENOMEM because it leads to a NULL pointer dereference bug.
The dmesg says:
[ T1387] sof-audio-pci-intel-tgl 0000:00:1f.3: error: memory alloc failed: -12
[ T1387] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[ T1387] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ T1387] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ T1387] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ T1387] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ T1387] CPU: 6 PID: 1387 Comm: alsa-sink-HDA A Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc4-superb-owl-00055-g80d47f5de5e3
[ T1387] Hardware name: HP HP Laptop 14s-dq2xxx/87FD, BIOS F.15 09/15/2021
[ T1387] RIP: 0010:dma_free_noncontiguous+0x37/0x80
[ T1387] Code: [... snip ...]
[ T1387] RSP: 0000:ffffc90002b87770 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ T1387] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ T1387] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888101db30d0
[ T1387] RBP: 00000000fffffff4 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ T1387] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffc90002b874d0 R12: 0000000000000001
[ T1387] R13: 0000000000058000 R14: ffff888105260c68 R15: ffff888105260828
[ T1387] FS: 00007f42e2ffd640(0000) GS:ffff888466b80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ T1387] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ T1387] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000014acf0003 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ T1387] PKRU: 55555554
[ T1387] Call Trace:
[ T1387] <TASK>
[ T1387] cl_stream_prepare+0x10a/0x120 [snd_sof_intel_hda_common 146addf995b9279ae7f509621078cccbe4f875e1]
[... snip ...]
[ T1387] </TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49257

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
watch_queue: Fix NULL dereference in error cleanup
In watch_queue_set_size(), the error cleanup code doesn't take account of
the fact that __free_page() can't handle a NULL pointer when trying to free
up buffer pages that did get allocated.
Fix this by only calling __free_page() on the pages actually allocated.
Without the fix, this can lead to something like the following:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in __free_pages+0x1f/0x1b0 mm/page_alloc.c:5473
Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000034 by task syz-executor168/3599
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:446 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x66/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:71 [inline]
atomic_read include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:27 [inline]
page_ref_count include/linux/page_ref.h:67 [inline]
put_page_testzero include/linux/mm.h:717 [inline]
__free_pages+0x1f/0x1b0 mm/page_alloc.c:5473
watch_queue_set_size+0x499/0x630 kernel/watch_queue.c:275
pipe_ioctl+0xac/0x2b0 fs/pipe.c:632
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:874 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:860 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200 fs/ioctl.c:860
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49235

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ath9k_htc: fix uninit value bugs
Syzbot reported 2 KMSAN bugs in ath9k. All of them are caused by missing
field initialization.
In htc_connect_service() svc_meta_len and pad are not initialized. Based
on code it looks like in current skb there is no service data, so simply
initialize svc_meta_len to 0.
htc_issue_send() does not initialize htc_frame_hdr::control array. Based
on firmware code, it will initialize it by itself, so simply zero whole
array to make KMSAN happy
Fail logs:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-usb-infoleak in usb_submit_urb+0x6c1/0x2aa0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:430
usb_submit_urb+0x6c1/0x2aa0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:430
hif_usb_send_regout drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:127 [inline]
hif_usb_send+0x5f0/0x16f0 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:479
htc_issue_send drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c:34 [inline]
htc_connect_service+0x143e/0x1960 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c:275
...
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:524 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3251 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe0c/0x1510 mm/slub.c:4974
kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:354 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x545/0xf90 net/core/skbuff.c:426
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1126 [inline]
htc_connect_service+0x1029/0x1960 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c:258
...
Bytes 4-7 of 18 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 18 starts at ffff888027377e00
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-usb-infoleak in usb_submit_urb+0x6c1/0x2aa0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:430
usb_submit_urb+0x6c1/0x2aa0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:430
hif_usb_send_regout drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:127 [inline]
hif_usb_send+0x5f0/0x16f0 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:479
htc_issue_send drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c:34 [inline]
htc_connect_service+0x143e/0x1960 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c:275
...
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:524 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3251 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe0c/0x1510 mm/slub.c:4974
kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:354 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x545/0xf90 net/core/skbuff.c:426
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1126 [inline]
htc_connect_service+0x1029/0x1960 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c:258
...
Bytes 16-17 of 18 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 18 starts at ffff888027377e00

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49228

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix a btf decl_tag bug when tagging a function
syzbot reported a btf decl_tag bug with stack trace below:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 0 PID: 3592 Comm: syz-executor914 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller-11424-gb7892f7d5cb2 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:btf_type_vlen include/linux/btf.h:231 [inline]
RIP: 0010:btf_decl_tag_resolve+0x83e/0xaa0 kernel/bpf/btf.c:3910
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
btf_resolve+0x251/0x1020 kernel/bpf/btf.c:4198
btf_check_all_types kernel/bpf/btf.c:4239 [inline]
btf_parse_type_sec kernel/bpf/btf.c:4280 [inline]
btf_parse kernel/bpf/btf.c:4513 [inline]
btf_new_fd+0x19fe/0x2370 kernel/bpf/btf.c:6047
bpf_btf_load kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4039 [inline]
__sys_bpf+0x1cbb/0x5970 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4679
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4738 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4736 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4736
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The kasan error is triggered with an illegal BTF like below:
type 0: void
type 1: int
type 2: decl_tag to func type 3
type 3: func to func_proto type 8
The total number of types is 4 and the type 3 is illegal
since its func_proto type is out of range.
Currently, the target type of decl_tag can be struct/union, var or func.
Both struct/union and var implemented their own 'resolve' callback functions
and hence handled properly in kernel.
But func type doesn't have 'resolve' callback function. When
btf_decl_tag_resolve() tries to check func type, it tries to get
vlen of its func_proto type, which triggered the above kasan error.
To fix the issue, btf_decl_tag_resolve() needs to do btf_func_check()
before trying to accessing func_proto type.
In the current implementation, func type is checked with
btf_func_check() in the main checking function btf_check_all_types().
To fix the above kasan issue, let us implement 'resolve' callback
func type properly. The 'resolve' callback will be also called
in btf_check_all_types() for func types.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49223

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/port: Hold port reference until decoder release
KASAN + DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE reports a potential use-after-free in
cxl_decoder_release() where it goes to reference its parent, a cxl_port,
to free its id back to port->decoder_ida.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in to_cxl_port+0x18/0x90 [cxl_core]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888119270908 by task kworker/35:2/379
CPU: 35 PID: 379 Comm: kworker/35:2 Tainted: G OE 5.17.0-rc2+ #198
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Workqueue: events kobject_delayed_cleanup
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x59/0x73
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150
? to_cxl_port+0x18/0x90 [cxl_core]
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
? to_cxl_port+0x18/0x90 [cxl_core]
to_cxl_port+0x18/0x90 [cxl_core]
cxl_decoder_release+0x2a/0x60 [cxl_core]
device_release+0x5f/0x100
kobject_cleanup+0x80/0x1c0
The device core only guarantees parent lifetime until all children are
unregistered. If a child needs a parent to complete its ->release()
callback that child needs to hold a reference to extend the lifetime of
the parent.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49214

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/64s: Don't use DSISR for SLB faults
Since commit 46ddcb3950a2 ("powerpc/mm: Show if a bad page fault on data
is read or write.") we use page_fault_is_write(regs->dsisr) in
__bad_page_fault() to determine if the fault is for a read or write, and
change the message printed accordingly.
But SLB faults, aka Data Segment Interrupts, don't set DSISR (Data
Storage Interrupt Status Register) to a useful value. All ISA versions
from v2.03 through v3.1 specify that the Data Segment Interrupt sets
DSISR "to an undefined value". As far as I can see there's no mention of
SLB faults setting DSISR in any BookIV content either.
This manifests as accesses that should be a read being incorrectly
reported as writes, for example, using the xmon "dump" command:
0:mon> d 0x5deadbeef0000000
5deadbeef0000000
[359526.415354][ C6] BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0x5deadbeef0000000
[359526.415611][ C6] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000010a300
cpu 0x6: Vector: 380 (Data SLB Access) at [c00000000ffbf400]
pc: c00000000010a300: mread+0x90/0x190
If we disassemble the PC, we see a load instruction:
0:mon> di c00000000010a300
c00000000010a300 89490000 lbz r10,0(r9)
We can also see in exceptions-64s.S that the data_access_slb block
doesn't set IDSISR=1, which means it doesn't load DSISR into pt_regs. So
the value we're using to determine if the fault is a read/write is some
stale value in pt_regs from a previous page fault.
Rework the printing logic to separate the SLB fault case out, and only
print read/write in the cases where we can determine it.
The result looks like eg:
0:mon> d 0x5deadbeef0000000
5deadbeef0000000
[ 721.779525][ C6] BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access at 0x5deadbeef0000000
[ 721.779697][ C6] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000014cbe0
cpu 0x6: Vector: 380 (Data SLB Access) at [c00000000ffbf390]
0:mon> d 0
0000000000000000
[ 742.793242][ C6] BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000000
[ 742.793316][ C6] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000014cbe0
cpu 0x6: Vector: 380 (Data SLB Access) at [c00000000ffbf390]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49209

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix memleak in tcp_bpf_sendmsg while sk msg is full
If tcp_bpf_sendmsg() is running while sk msg is full. When sk_msg_alloc()
returns -ENOMEM error, tcp_bpf_sendmsg() goes to wait_for_memory. If partial
memory has been alloced by sk_msg_alloc(), that is, msg_tx->sg.size is
greater than osize after sk_msg_alloc(), memleak occurs. To fix we use
sk_msg_trim() to release the allocated memory, then goto wait for memory.
Other call paths of sk_msg_alloc() have the similar issue, such as
tls_sw_sendmsg(), so handle sk_msg_trim logic inside sk_msg_alloc(),
as Cong Wang suggested.
This issue can cause the following info:
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 7950 at net/core/stream.c:208 sk_stream_kill_queues+0xd4/0x1a0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x55/0x110
__tcp_close+0x279/0x470
tcp_close+0x1f/0x60
inet_release+0x3f/0x80
__sock_release+0x3d/0xb0
sock_close+0x11/0x20
__fput+0x92/0x250
task_work_run+0x6a/0xa0
do_exit+0x33b/0xb60
do_group_exit+0x2f/0xa0
get_signal+0xb6/0x950
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xac/0x2a0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xa9/0x200
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x46/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2094 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:155 inet_sock_destruct+0x13c/0x260
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__sk_destruct+0x24/0x1f0
sk_psock_destroy+0x19b/0x1c0
process_one_work+0x1b3/0x3c0
kthread+0xe6/0x110
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49204

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix more uncharged while msg has more_data
In tcp_bpf_send_verdict(), if msg has more data after
tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir():
tcp_bpf_send_verdict()
tosend = msg->sg.size //msg->sg.size = 22220
case __SK_REDIRECT:
sk_msg_return() //uncharged msg->sg.size(22220) sk->sk_forward_alloc
tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir() //after tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir, msg->sg.size=11000
goto more_data;
tosend = msg->sg.size //msg->sg.size = 11000
case __SK_REDIRECT:
sk_msg_return() //uncharged msg->sg.size(11000) to sk->sk_forward_alloc
The msg->sg.size(11000) has been uncharged twice, to fix we can charge the
remaining msg->sg.size before goto more data.
This issue can cause the following info:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9860 at net/core/stream.c:208 sk_stream_kill_queues+0xd4/0x1a0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x55/0x110
__tcp_close+0x279/0x470
tcp_close+0x1f/0x60
inet_release+0x3f/0x80
__sock_release+0x3d/0xb0
sock_close+0x11/0x20
__fput+0x92/0x250
task_work_run+0x6a/0xa0
do_exit+0x33b/0xb60
do_group_exit+0x2f/0xa0
get_signal+0xb6/0x950
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xac/0x2a0
? vfs_write+0x237/0x290
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xa9/0x200
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x46/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2136 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:155 inet_sock_destruct+0x13c/0x260
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__sk_destruct+0x24/0x1f0
sk_psock_destroy+0x19b/0x1c0
process_one_work+0x1b3/0x3c0
worker_thread+0x30/0x350
? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0
kthread+0xe6/0x110
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49175

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PM: core: keep irq flags in device_pm_check_callbacks()
The function device_pm_check_callbacks() can be called under the spin
lock (in the reported case it happens from genpd_add_device() ->
dev_pm_domain_set(), when the genpd uses spinlocks rather than mutexes.
However this function uncoditionally uses spin_lock_irq() /
spin_unlock_irq(), thus not preserving the CPU flags. Use the
irqsave/irqrestore instead.
The backtrace for the reference:
[ 2.752010] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 2.756769] raw_local_irq_restore() called with IRQs enabled
[ 2.762596] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 1 at kernel/locking/irqflag-debug.c:10 warn_bogus_irq_restore+0x34/0x50
[ 2.772338] Modules linked in:
[ 2.775487] CPU: 4 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G S 5.17.0-rc6-00384-ge330d0d82eff-dirty #684
[ 2.781384] Freeing initrd memory: 46024K
[ 2.785839] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 2.785841] pc : warn_bogus_irq_restore+0x34/0x50
[ 2.785844] lr : warn_bogus_irq_restore+0x34/0x50
[ 2.785846] sp : ffff80000805b7d0
[ 2.785847] x29: ffff80000805b7d0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000002
[ 2.785850] x26: ffffd40e80930b18 x25: ffff7ee2329192b8 x24: ffff7edfc9f60800
[ 2.785853] x23: ffffd40e80930b18 x22: ffffd40e80930d30 x21: ffff7edfc0dffa00
[ 2.785856] x20: ffff7edfc09e3768 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 2.845775] x17: 6572206f74206465 x16: 6c696166203a3030 x15: ffff80008805b4f7
[ 2.853108] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffffd40e809550b0 x12: 00000000000003d8
[ 2.860441] x11: 0000000000000148 x10: ffffd40e809550b0 x9 : ffffd40e809550b0
[ 2.867774] x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffffd40e809ad0b0 x6 : ffffd40e809ad0b0
[ 2.875107] x5 : 000000000000bff4 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 2.882440] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff7edfc03a8000
[ 2.889774] Call trace:
[ 2.892290] warn_bogus_irq_restore+0x34/0x50
[ 2.896770] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x94/0xa0
[ 2.901690] genpd_unlock_spin+0x20/0x30
[ 2.905724] genpd_add_device+0x100/0x2d0
[ 2.909850] __genpd_dev_pm_attach+0xa8/0x23c
[ 2.914329] genpd_dev_pm_attach_by_id+0xc4/0x190
[ 2.919167] genpd_dev_pm_attach_by_name+0x3c/0xd0
[ 2.924086] dev_pm_domain_attach_by_name+0x24/0x30
[ 2.929102] psci_dt_attach_cpu+0x24/0x90
[ 2.933230] psci_cpuidle_probe+0x2d4/0x46c
[ 2.937534] platform_probe+0x68/0xe0
[ 2.941304] really_probe.part.0+0x9c/0x2fc
[ 2.945605] __driver_probe_device+0x98/0x144
[ 2.950085] driver_probe_device+0x44/0x15c
[ 2.954385] __device_attach_driver+0xb8/0x120
[ 2.958950] bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xd0
[ 2.962896] __device_attach+0xd8/0x180
[ 2.966843] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
[ 2.971144] bus_probe_device+0x9c/0xa4
[ 2.975092] device_add+0x380/0x88c
[ 2.978679] platform_device_add+0x114/0x234
[ 2.983067] platform_device_register_full+0x100/0x190
[ 2.988344] psci_idle_init+0x6c/0xb0
[ 2.992113] do_one_initcall+0x74/0x3a0
[ 2.996060] kernel_init_freeable+0x2fc/0x384
[ 3.000543] kernel_init+0x28/0x130
[ 3.004132] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 3.007817] irq event stamp: 319826
[ 3.011404] hardirqs last enabled at (319825): [<ffffd40e7eda0268>] __up_console_sem+0x78/0x84
[ 3.020332] hardirqs last disabled at (319826): [<ffffd40e7fd6d9d8>] el1_dbg+0x24/0x8c
[ 3.028458] softirqs last enabled at (318312): [<ffffd40e7ec90410>] _stext+0x410/0x588
[ 3.036678] softirqs last disabled at (318299): [<ffffd40e7ed1bf68>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x158/0x174
[ 3.045607] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49157

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix premature hw access after PCI error
After a recoverable PCI error has been detected and recovered, qla driver
needs to check to see if the error condition still persist and/or wait
for the OS to give the resume signal.
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 124606 at qla_tmpl.c:440
qla27xx_fwdt_entry_t266+0x55/0x60 [qla2xxx]
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: RIP: 0010:qla27xx_fwdt_entry_t266+0x55/0x60
[qla2xxx]
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: Call Trace:
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? qla27xx_walk_template+0xb1/0x1b0 [qla2xxx]
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? qla27xx_execute_fwdt_template+0x12a/0x160
[qla2xxx]
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? qla27xx_fwdump+0xa0/0x1c0 [qla2xxx]
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? qla2xxx_pci_mmio_enabled+0xfb/0x120
[qla2xxx]
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? report_mmio_enabled+0x44/0x80
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? report_slot_reset+0x80/0x80
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? pci_walk_bus+0x70/0x90
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? aer_dev_correctable_show+0xc0/0xc0
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? pcie_do_recovery+0x1bb/0x240
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? aer_recover_work_func+0xaa/0xd0
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
..
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: qla2xxx [0000:42:00.2]-8041:22: detected PCI
disconnect.
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: qla2xxx [0000:42:00.2]-107ff:22:
qla27xx_fwdt_entry_t262: dump ram MB failed. Area 5h start 198013h end 198013h
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: qla2xxx [0000:42:00.2]-107ff:22: Unable to
capture FW dump
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: qla2xxx [0000:42:00.2]-1015:22: cmd=0x0,
waited 5221 msecs
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: qla2xxx [0000:42:00.2]-680d:22: mmio
enabled returning.
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: qla2xxx [0000:42:00.2]-d04c:22: MBX
Command timeout for cmd 0, iocontrol=ffffffff jiffies=10140f2e5
mb[0-3]=[0xffff 0xffff 0xffff 0xffff]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49155

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Suppress a kernel complaint in qla_create_qpair()
[ 12.323788] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: systemd-udevd/1020
[ 12.332297] caller is qla2xxx_create_qpair+0x32a/0x5d0 [qla2xxx]
[ 12.338417] CPU: 7 PID: 1020 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G I --------- --- 5.14.0-29.el9.x86_64 #1
[ 12.348827] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R610/0F0XJ6, BIOS 6.6.0 05/22/2018
[ 12.356356] Call Trace:
[ 12.358821] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[ 12.362514] check_preemption_disabled+0xd9/0xe0
[ 12.367164] qla2xxx_create_qpair+0x32a/0x5d0 [qla2xxx]
[ 12.372481] qla2x00_probe_one+0xa3a/0x1b80 [qla2xxx]
[ 12.377617] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x40
[ 12.384284] local_pci_probe+0x42/0x80
[ 12.390162] ? pci_match_device+0xd7/0x110
[ 12.396366] pci_device_probe+0xfd/0x1b0
[ 12.402372] really_probe+0x1e7/0x3e0
[ 12.408114] __driver_probe_device+0xfe/0x180
[ 12.414544] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
[ 12.420685] __driver_attach+0xc0/0x1c0
[ 12.426536] ? __device_attach_driver+0xe0/0xe0
[ 12.433061] ? __device_attach_driver+0xe0/0xe0
[ 12.439538] bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0
[ 12.445294] bus_add_driver+0x12b/0x1e0
[ 12.451021] driver_register+0x8f/0xe0
[ 12.456631] ? 0xffffffffc07bc000
[ 12.461773] qla2x00_module_init+0x1be/0x229 [qla2xxx]
[ 12.468776] do_one_initcall+0x44/0x200
[ 12.474401] ? load_module+0xad3/0xba0
[ 12.479908] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x45/0x410
[ 12.486268] do_init_module+0x5c/0x280
[ 12.491730] __do_sys_init_module+0x12e/0x1b0
[ 12.497785] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 12.503029] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 12.509764] RIP: 0033:0x7f554f73ab2e

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49142

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: preserve skb_end_offset() in skb_unclone_keeptruesize()
syzbot found another way to trigger the infamous WARN_ON_ONCE(delta < len)
in skb_try_coalesce() [1]
I was able to root cause the issue to kfence.
When kfence is in action, the following assertion is no longer true:
int size = xxxx;
void *ptr1 = kmalloc(size, gfp);
void *ptr2 = kmalloc(size, gfp);
if (ptr1 && ptr2)
ASSERT(ksize(ptr1) == ksize(ptr2));
We attempted to fix these issues in the blamed commits, but forgot
that TCP was possibly shifting data after skb_unclone_keeptruesize()
has been used, notably from tcp_retrans_try_collapse().
So we not only need to keep same skb->truesize value,
we also need to make sure TCP wont fill new tailroom
that pskb_expand_head() was able to get from a
addr = kmalloc(...) followed by ksize(addr)
Split skb_unclone_keeptruesize() into two parts:
1) Inline skb_unclone_keeptruesize() for the common case,
when skb is not cloned.
2) Out of line __skb_unclone_keeptruesize() for the 'slow path'.
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6490 at net/core/skbuff.c:5295 skb_try_coalesce+0x1235/0x1560 net/core/skbuff.c:5295
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 6490 Comm: syz-executor161 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc4-syzkaller-00229-g4f12b742eb2b #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:skb_try_coalesce+0x1235/0x1560 net/core/skbuff.c:5295
Code: bf 01 00 00 00 0f b7 c0 89 c6 89 44 24 20 e8 62 24 4e fa 8b 44 24 20 83 e8 01 0f 85 e5 f0 ff ff e9 87 f4 ff ff e8 cb 20 4e fa <0f> 0b e9 06 f9 ff ff e8 af b2 95 fa e9 69 f0 ff ff e8 95 b2 95 fa
RSP: 0018:ffffc900063af268 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000ffffffd5 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88806fc05700 RSI: ffffffff872abd55 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: ffff88806e675500 R08: 00000000ffffffd5 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff872ab659 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88806dd554e8
R13: ffff88806dd9bac0 R14: ffff88806dd9a2c0 R15: 0000000000000155
FS: 00007f18014f9700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020002000 CR3: 000000006be7a000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tcp_try_coalesce net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:4651 [inline]
tcp_try_coalesce+0x393/0x920 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:4630
tcp_queue_rcv+0x8a/0x6e0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:4914
tcp_data_queue+0x11fd/0x4bb0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5025
tcp_rcv_established+0x81e/0x1ff0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5947
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x65e/0x980 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1719
sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1037 [inline]
__release_sock+0x134/0x3b0 net/core/sock.c:2779
release_sock+0x54/0x1b0 net/core/sock.c:3311
sk_wait_data+0x177/0x450 net/core/sock.c:2821
tcp_recvmsg_locked+0xe28/0x1fd0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2457
tcp_recvmsg+0x137/0x610 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2572
inet_recvmsg+0x11b/0x5e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:850
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline]
____sys_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x600 net/socket.c:2632
___sys_recvmsg+0x127/0x200 net/socket.c:2674
__sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2704
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49090

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arch/arm64: Fix topology initialization for core scheduling
Arm64 systems rely on store_cpu_topology() to call update_siblings_masks()
to transfer the toplogy to the various cpu masks. This needs to be done
before the call to notify_cpu_starting() which tells the scheduler about
each cpu found, otherwise the core scheduling data structures are setup
in a way that does not match the actual topology.
With smt_mask not setup correctly we bail on `cpumask_weight(smt_mask) == 1`
for !leaders in:
notify_cpu_starting()
cpuhp_invoke_callback_range()
sched_cpu_starting()
sched_core_cpu_starting()
which leads to rq->core not being correctly set for !leader-rq's.
Without this change stress-ng (which enables core scheduling in its prctl
tests in newer versions -- i.e. with PR_SCHED_CORE support) causes a warning
and then a crash (trimmed for legibility):
[ 1853.805168] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1853.809784] task_rq(b)->core != rq->core
[ 1853.809792] WARNING: CPU: 117 PID: 0 at kernel/sched/fair.c:11102 cfs_prio_less+0x1b4/0x1c4
...
[ 1854.015210] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000010
...
[ 1854.231256] Call trace:
[ 1854.233689] pick_next_task+0x3dc/0x81c
[ 1854.237512] __schedule+0x10c/0x4cc
[ 1854.240988] schedule_idle+0x34/0x54

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49070

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: Fix unregistering of framebuffers without device
OF framebuffers do not have an underlying device in the Linux
device hierarchy. Do a regular unregister call instead of hot
unplugging such a non-existing device. Fixes a NULL dereference.
An example error message on ppc64le is shown below.
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000060
Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000080dfa4
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
[...]
CPU: 2 PID: 139 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.17.0-ae085d7f9365 #1
NIP: c00000000080dfa4 LR: c00000000080df9c CTR: c000000000797430
REGS: c000000004132fe0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.17.0-ae085d7f9365)
MSR: 8000000002009033 <SF,VEC,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28228282 XER: 20000000
CFAR: c00000000000c80c DAR: 0000000000000060 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c00000000080df9c c000000004133280 c00000000169d200 0000000000000029
GPR04: 00000000ffffefff c000000004132f90 c000000004132f88 0000000000000000
GPR08: c0000000015658f8 c0000000015cd200 c0000000014f57d0 0000000048228283
GPR12: 0000000000000000 c00000003fffe300 0000000020000000 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000113fc4a40 0000000000000005 0000000113fcfb80
GPR20: 000001000f7283b0 0000000000000000 c000000000e4a588 c000000000e4a5b0
GPR24: 0000000000000001 00000000000a0000 c008000000db0168 c0000000021f6ec0
GPR28: c0000000016d65a8 c000000004b36460 0000000000000000 c0000000016d64b0
NIP [c00000000080dfa4] do_remove_conflicting_framebuffers+0x184/0x1d0
[c000000004133280] [c00000000080df9c] do_remove_conflicting_framebuffers+0x17c/0x1d0 (unreliable)
[c000000004133350] [c00000000080e4d0] remove_conflicting_framebuffers+0x60/0x150
[c0000000041333a0] [c00000000080e6f4] remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers+0x134/0x1b0
[c000000004133450] [c008000000e70438] drm_aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers+0x90/0x100 [drm]
[c000000004133490] [c008000000da0ce4] bochs_pci_probe+0x6c/0xa64 [bochs]
[...]
[c000000004133db0] [c00000000002aaa0] system_call_exception+0x170/0x2d0
[c000000004133e10] [c00000000000c3cc] system_call_common+0xec/0x250
The bug [1] was introduced by commit 27599aacbaef ("fbdev: Hot-unplug
firmware fb devices on forced removal"). Most firmware framebuffers
have an underlying platform device, which can be hot-unplugged
before loading the native graphics driver. OF framebuffers do not
(yet) have that device. Fix the code by unregistering the framebuffer
as before without a hot unplug.
Tested with 5.17 on qemu ppc64le emulation.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49065

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Fix the svc_deferred_event trace class
Fix a NULL deref crash that occurs when an svc_rqst is deferred
while the sunrpc tracing subsystem is enabled. svc_revisit() sets
dr->xprt to NULL, so it can't be relied upon in the tracepoint to
provide the remote's address.
Unfortunately we can't revert the "svc_deferred_class" hunk in
commit ece200ddd54b ("sunrpc: Save remote presentation address in
svc_xprt for trace events") because there is now a specific check
of event format specifiers for unsafe dereferences. The warning
that check emits is:
event svc_defer_recv has unsafe dereference of argument 1
A "%pISpc" format specifier with a "struct sockaddr *" is indeed
flagged by this check.
Instead, take the brute-force approach used by the svcrdma_qp_error
tracepoint. Convert the dr::addr field into a presentation address
in the TP_fast_assign() arm of the trace event, and store that as
a string. This fix can be backported to -stable kernels.
In the meantime, commit c6ced22997ad ("tracing: Update print fmt
check to handle new __get_sockaddr() macro") is now in v5.18, so
this wonky fix can be replaced with __sockaddr() and friends
properly during the v5.19 merge window.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49049

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/secretmem: fix panic when growing a memfd_secret
When one tries to grow an existing memfd_secret with ftruncate, one gets
a panic [1]. For example, doing the following reliably induces the
panic:
fd = memfd_secret();
ftruncate(fd, 10);
ptr = mmap(NULL, 10, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
strcpy(ptr, "123456789");
munmap(ptr, 10);
ftruncate(fd, 20);
The basic reason for this is, when we grow with ftruncate, we call down
into simple_setattr, and then truncate_inode_pages_range, and eventually
we try to zero part of the memory. The normal truncation code does this
via the direct map (i.e., it calls page_address() and hands that to
memset()).
For memfd_secret though, we specifically don't map our pages via the
direct map (i.e. we call set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() on every
fault). So the address returned by page_address() isn't useful, and
when we try to memset() with it we panic.
This patch avoids the panic by implementing a custom setattr for
memfd_secret, which detects resizes specifically (setting the size for
the first time works just fine, since there are no existing pages to try
to zero), and rejects them with EINVAL.
One could argue growing should be supported, but I think that will
require a significantly more lengthy change. So, I propose a minimal
fix for the benefit of stable kernels, and then perhaps to extend
memfd_secret to support growing in a separate patch.
[1]:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa0a889277028
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD afa01067 P4D afa01067 PUD 83f909067 PMD 83f8bf067 PTE 800ffffef6d88060
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 281 Comm: repro Not tainted 5.17.0-dbg-DEV #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10
Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01
RSP: 0018:ffffb932c09afbf0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffda63c4249dc0 RCX: 0000000000000fd8
RDX: 0000000000000fd8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa0a889277028
RBP: ffffb932c09afc00 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffa0a889277028
R10: 0000000000020023 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffda63c4249dc0
R13: ffffa0a890d70d98 R14: 0000000000000028 R15: 0000000000000fd8
FS: 00007f7294899580(0000) GS:ffffa0af9bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffa0a889277028 CR3: 0000000107ef6006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
? zero_user_segments+0x82/0x190
truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xd4/0x2a0
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x380/0x830
truncate_setsize+0x63/0x80
simple_setattr+0x37/0x60
notify_change+0x3d8/0x4d0
do_sys_ftruncate+0x162/0x1d0
__x64_sys_ftruncate+0x1c/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Modules linked in: xhci_pci xhci_hcd virtio_net net_failover failover virtio_blk virtio_balloon uhci_hcd ohci_pci ohci_hcd evdev ehci_pci ehci_hcd 9pnet_virtio 9p netfs 9pnet
CR2: ffffa0a889277028
[lkp@intel.com: secretmem_iops can be static]
[axelrasmussen@google.com: return EINVAL]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48890

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: storvsc: Fix swiotlb bounce buffer leak in confidential VM
storvsc_queuecommand() maps the scatter/gather list using scsi_dma_map(),
which in a confidential VM allocates swiotlb bounce buffers. If the I/O
submission fails in storvsc_do_io(), the I/O is typically retried by higher
level code, but the bounce buffer memory is never freed. The mostly like
cause of I/O submission failure is a full VMBus channel ring buffer, which
is not uncommon under high I/O loads. Eventually enough bounce buffer
memory leaks that the confidential VM can't do any I/O. The same problem
can arise in a non-confidential VM with kernel boot parameter
swiotlb=force.
Fix this by doing scsi_dma_unmap() in the case of an I/O submission
error, which frees the bounce buffer memory.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48825

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qedf: Add stag_work to all the vports
Call trace seen when creating NPIV ports, only 32 out of 64 show online.
stag work was not initialized for vport, hence initialize the stag work.
WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 645 at kernel/workqueue.c:1635 __queue_delayed_work+0x68/0x80
CPU: 8 PID: 645 Comm: kworker/8:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G IOE --------- --
4.18.0-348.el8.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge MX740c/0177V9, BIOS 2.12.2 07/09/2021
Workqueue: events fc_lport_timeout [libfc]
RIP: 0010:__queue_delayed_work+0x68/0x80
Code: 89 b2 88 00 00 00 44 89 82 90 00 00 00 48 01 c8 48 89 42 50 41 81
f8 00 20 00 00 75 1d e9 60 24 07 00 44 89 c7 e9 98 f6 ff ff <0f> 0b eb
c5 0f 0b eb a1 0f 0b eb a7 0f 0b eb ac 44 89 c6 e9 40 23
RSP: 0018:ffffae514bc3be40 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: ffff8d25d6143750 RBX: 0000000000000202 RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: ffff8d2e31383748 RSI: ffff8d25c000d600 RDI: ffff8d2e31383788
RBP: ffff8d2e31380de0 R08: 0000000000002000 R09: ffff8d2e31383750
R10: ffffffffc0c957e0 R11: ffff8d2624800000 R12: ffff8d2e31380a58
R13: ffff8d2d915eb000 R14: ffff8d25c499b5c0 R15: ffff8d2e31380e18
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d2d1fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055fd0484b8b8 CR3: 00000008ffc10006 CR4: 00000000007706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
queue_delayed_work_on+0x36/0x40
qedf_elsct_send+0x57/0x60 [qedf]
fc_lport_enter_flogi+0x90/0xc0 [libfc]
fc_lport_timeout+0xb7/0x140 [libfc]
process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
worker_thread+0x30/0x390
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
kthread+0x116/0x130
? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
---[ end trace 008f00f722f2c2ff ]--
Initialize stag work for all the vports.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48823

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qedf: Fix refcount issue when LOGO is received during TMF
Hung task call trace was seen during LOGO processing.
[ 974.309060] [0000:00:00.0]:[qedf_eh_device_reset:868]: 1:0:2:0: LUN RESET Issued...
[ 974.309065] [0000:00:00.0]:[qedf_initiate_tmf:2422]: tm_flags 0x10 sc_cmd 00000000c16b930f op = 0x2a target_id = 0x2 lun=0
[ 974.309178] [0000:00:00.0]:[qedf_initiate_tmf:2431]: portid=016900 tm_flags =LUN RESET
[ 974.309222] [0000:00:00.0]:[qedf_initiate_tmf:2438]: orig io_req = 00000000ec78df8f xid = 0x180 ref_cnt = 1.
[ 974.309625] host1: rport 016900: Received LOGO request while in state Ready
[ 974.309627] host1: rport 016900: Delete port
[ 974.309642] host1: rport 016900: work event 3
[ 974.309644] host1: rport 016900: lld callback ev 3
[ 974.313243] [0000:61:00.2]:[qedf_execute_tmf:2383]:1: fcport is uploading, not executing flush.
[ 974.313295] [0000:61:00.2]:[qedf_execute_tmf:2400]:1: task mgmt command success...
[ 984.031088] INFO: task jbd2/dm-15-8:7645 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[ 984.031136] Not tainted 4.18.0-305.el8.x86_64 #1
[ 984.031166] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 984.031209] jbd2/dm-15-8 D 0 7645 2 0x80004080
[ 984.031212] Call Trace:
[ 984.031222] __schedule+0x2c4/0x700
[ 984.031230] ? unfreeze_partials.isra.83+0x16e/0x1a0
[ 984.031233] ? bit_wait_timeout+0x90/0x90
[ 984.031235] schedule+0x38/0xa0
[ 984.031238] io_schedule+0x12/0x40
[ 984.031240] bit_wait_io+0xd/0x50
[ 984.031243] __wait_on_bit+0x6c/0x80
[ 984.031248] ? free_buffer_head+0x21/0x50
[ 984.031251] out_of_line_wait_on_bit+0x91/0xb0
[ 984.031257] ? init_wait_var_entry+0x50/0x50
[ 984.031268] jbd2_journal_commit_transaction+0x112e/0x19f0 [jbd2]
[ 984.031280] kjournald2+0xbd/0x270 [jbd2]
[ 984.031284] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
[ 984.031291] ? commit_timeout+0x10/0x10 [jbd2]
[ 984.031294] kthread+0x116/0x130
[ 984.031300] ? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
[ 984.031305] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
There was a ref count issue when LOGO is received during TMF. This leads to
one of the I/Os hanging with the driver. Fix the ref count.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48818

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: don't use devres for mdiobus
As explained in commits:
74b6d7d13307 ("net: dsa: realtek: register the MDIO bus under devres")
5135e96a3dd2 ("net: dsa: don't allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres")
mdiobus_free() will panic when called from devm_mdiobus_free() <-
devres_release_all() <- __device_release_driver(), and that mdiobus was
not previously unregistered.
The mv88e6xxx is an MDIO device, so the initial set of constraints that
I thought would cause this (I2C or SPI buses which call ->remove on
->shutdown) do not apply. But there is one more which applies here.
If the DSA master itself is on a bus that calls ->remove from ->shutdown
(like dpaa2-eth, which is on the fsl-mc bus), there is a device link
between the switch and the DSA master, and device_links_unbind_consumers()
will unbind the Marvell switch driver on shutdown.
systemd-shutdown[1]: Powering off.
mv88e6085 0x0000000008b96000:00 sw_gl0: Link is Down
fsl-mc dpbp.9: Removing from iommu group 7
fsl-mc dpbp.8: Removing from iommu group 7
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:677!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.16.5-00040-gdc05f73788e5 #15
pc : mdiobus_free+0x44/0x50
lr : devm_mdiobus_free+0x10/0x20
Call trace:
mdiobus_free+0x44/0x50
devm_mdiobus_free+0x10/0x20
devres_release_all+0xa0/0x100
__device_release_driver+0x190/0x220
device_release_driver_internal+0xac/0xb0
device_links_unbind_consumers+0xd4/0x100
__device_release_driver+0x4c/0x220
device_release_driver_internal+0xac/0xb0
device_links_unbind_consumers+0xd4/0x100
__device_release_driver+0x94/0x220
device_release_driver+0x28/0x40
bus_remove_device+0x118/0x124
device_del+0x174/0x420
fsl_mc_device_remove+0x24/0x40
__fsl_mc_device_remove+0xc/0x20
device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
dprc_remove+0x90/0xb0
fsl_mc_driver_remove+0x20/0x5c
__device_release_driver+0x21c/0x220
device_release_driver+0x28/0x40
bus_remove_device+0x118/0x124
device_del+0x174/0x420
fsl_mc_bus_remove+0x80/0x100
fsl_mc_bus_shutdown+0xc/0x1c
platform_shutdown+0x20/0x30
device_shutdown+0x154/0x330
kernel_power_off+0x34/0x6c
__do_sys_reboot+0x15c/0x250
__arm64_sys_reboot+0x20/0x30
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x4c/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x4c/0x150
el0_svc+0x24/0xb0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa8/0xb0
el0t_64_sync+0x178/0x17c
So the same treatment must be applied to all DSA switch drivers, which
is: either use devres for both the mdiobus allocation and registration,
or don't use devres at all.
The Marvell driver already has a good structure for mdiobus removal, so
just plug in mdiobus_free and get rid of devres.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48817

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: ar9331: register the mdiobus under devres
As explained in commits:
74b6d7d13307 ("net: dsa: realtek: register the MDIO bus under devres")
5135e96a3dd2 ("net: dsa: don't allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres")
mdiobus_free() will panic when called from devm_mdiobus_free() <-
devres_release_all() <- __device_release_driver(), and that mdiobus was
not previously unregistered.
The ar9331 is an MDIO device, so the initial set of constraints that I
thought would cause this (I2C or SPI buses which call ->remove on
->shutdown) do not apply. But there is one more which applies here.
If the DSA master itself is on a bus that calls ->remove from ->shutdown
(like dpaa2-eth, which is on the fsl-mc bus), there is a device link
between the switch and the DSA master, and device_links_unbind_consumers()
will unbind the ar9331 switch driver on shutdown.
So the same treatment must be applied to all DSA switch drivers, which
is: either use devres for both the mdiobus allocation and registration,
or don't use devres at all.
The ar9331 driver doesn't have a complex code structure for mdiobus
removal, so just replace of_mdiobus_register with the devres variant in
order to be all-devres and ensure that we don't free a still-registered
bus.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48815

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: bcm_sf2: don't use devres for mdiobus
As explained in commits:
74b6d7d13307 ("net: dsa: realtek: register the MDIO bus under devres")
5135e96a3dd2 ("net: dsa: don't allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres")
mdiobus_free() will panic when called from devm_mdiobus_free() <-
devres_release_all() <- __device_release_driver(), and that mdiobus was
not previously unregistered.
The Starfighter 2 is a platform device, so the initial set of
constraints that I thought would cause this (I2C or SPI buses which call
->remove on ->shutdown) do not apply. But there is one more which
applies here.
If the DSA master itself is on a bus that calls ->remove from ->shutdown
(like dpaa2-eth, which is on the fsl-mc bus), there is a device link
between the switch and the DSA master, and device_links_unbind_consumers()
will unbind the bcm_sf2 switch driver on shutdown.
So the same treatment must be applied to all DSA switch drivers, which
is: either use devres for both the mdiobus allocation and registration,
or don't use devres at all.
The bcm_sf2 driver has the code structure in place for orderly mdiobus
removal, so just replace devm_mdiobus_alloc() with the non-devres
variant, and add manual free where necessary, to ensure that we don't
let devres free a still-registered bus.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48814

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: seville: register the mdiobus under devres
As explained in commits:
74b6d7d13307 ("net: dsa: realtek: register the MDIO bus under devres")
5135e96a3dd2 ("net: dsa: don't allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres")
mdiobus_free() will panic when called from devm_mdiobus_free() <-
devres_release_all() <- __device_release_driver(), and that mdiobus was
not previously unregistered.
The Seville VSC9959 switch is a platform device, so the initial set of
constraints that I thought would cause this (I2C or SPI buses which call
->remove on ->shutdown) do not apply. But there is one more which
applies here.
If the DSA master itself is on a bus that calls ->remove from ->shutdown
(like dpaa2-eth, which is on the fsl-mc bus), there is a device link
between the switch and the DSA master, and device_links_unbind_consumers()
will unbind the seville switch driver on shutdown.
So the same treatment must be applied to all DSA switch drivers, which
is: either use devres for both the mdiobus allocation and registration,
or don't use devres at all.
The seville driver has a code structure that could accommodate both the
mdiobus_unregister and mdiobus_free calls, but it has an external
dependency upon mscc_miim_setup() from mdio-mscc-miim.c, which calls
devm_mdiobus_alloc_size() on its behalf. So rather than restructuring
that, and exporting yet one more symbol mscc_miim_teardown(), let's work
with devres and replace of_mdiobus_register with the devres variant.
When we use all-devres, we can ensure that devres doesn't free a
still-registered bus (it either runs both callbacks, or none).

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48813

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: felix: don't use devres for mdiobus
As explained in commits:
74b6d7d13307 ("net: dsa: realtek: register the MDIO bus under devres")
5135e96a3dd2 ("net: dsa: don't allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres")
mdiobus_free() will panic when called from devm_mdiobus_free() <-
devres_release_all() <- __device_release_driver(), and that mdiobus was
not previously unregistered.
The Felix VSC9959 switch is a PCI device, so the initial set of
constraints that I thought would cause this (I2C or SPI buses which call
->remove on ->shutdown) do not apply. But there is one more which
applies here.
If the DSA master itself is on a bus that calls ->remove from ->shutdown
(like dpaa2-eth, which is on the fsl-mc bus), there is a device link
between the switch and the DSA master, and device_links_unbind_consumers()
will unbind the felix switch driver on shutdown.
So the same treatment must be applied to all DSA switch drivers, which
is: either use devres for both the mdiobus allocation and registration,
or don't use devres at all.
The felix driver has the code structure in place for orderly mdiobus
removal, so just replace devm_mdiobus_alloc_size() with the non-devres
variant, and add manual free where necessary, to ensure that we don't
let devres free a still-registered bus.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48812

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: lantiq_gswip: don't use devres for mdiobus
As explained in commits:
74b6d7d13307 ("net: dsa: realtek: register the MDIO bus under devres")
5135e96a3dd2 ("net: dsa: don't allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres")
mdiobus_free() will panic when called from devm_mdiobus_free() <-
devres_release_all() <- __device_release_driver(), and that mdiobus was
not previously unregistered.
The GSWIP switch is a platform device, so the initial set of constraints
that I thought would cause this (I2C or SPI buses which call ->remove on
->shutdown) do not apply. But there is one more which applies here.
If the DSA master itself is on a bus that calls ->remove from ->shutdown
(like dpaa2-eth, which is on the fsl-mc bus), there is a device link
between the switch and the DSA master, and device_links_unbind_consumers()
will unbind the GSWIP switch driver on shutdown.
So the same treatment must be applied to all DSA switch drivers, which
is: either use devres for both the mdiobus allocation and registration,
or don't use devres at all.
The gswip driver has the code structure in place for orderly mdiobus
removal, so just replace devm_mdiobus_alloc() with the non-devres
variant, and add manual free where necessary, to ensure that we don't
let devres free a still-registered bus.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48801

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: buffer: Fix file related error handling in IIO_BUFFER_GET_FD_IOCTL
If we fail to copy the just created file descriptor to userland, we
try to clean up by putting back 'fd' and freeing 'ib'. The code uses
put_unused_fd() for the former which is wrong, as the file descriptor
was already published by fd_install() which gets called internally by
anon_inode_getfd().
This makes the error handling code leaving a half cleaned up file
descriptor table around and a partially destructed 'file' object,
allowing userland to play use-after-free tricks on us, by abusing
the still usable fd and making the code operate on a dangling
'file->private_data' pointer.
Instead of leaving the kernel in a partially corrupted state, don't
attempt to explicitly clean up and leave this to the process exit
path that'll release any still valid fds, including the one created
by the previous call to anon_inode_getfd(). Simply return -EFAULT to
indicate the error.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48800

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: vmscan: remove deadlock due to throttling failing to make progress
A soft lockup bug in kcompactd was reported in a private bugzilla with
the following visible in dmesg;
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#33 stuck for 26s! [kcompactd0:479]
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#33 stuck for 52s! [kcompactd0:479]
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#33 stuck for 78s! [kcompactd0:479]
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#33 stuck for 104s! [kcompactd0:479]
The machine had 256G of RAM with no swap and an earlier failed
allocation indicated that node 0 where kcompactd was run was potentially
unreclaimable;
Node 0 active_anon:29355112kB inactive_anon:2913528kB active_file:0kB
inactive_file:0kB unevictable:64kB isolated(anon):0kB isolated(file):0kB
mapped:8kB dirty:0kB writeback:0kB shmem:26780kB shmem_thp:
0kB shmem_pmdmapped: 0kB anon_thp: 23480320kB writeback_tmp:0kB
kernel_stack:2272kB pagetables:24500kB all_unreclaimable? yes
Vlastimil Babka investigated a crash dump and found that a task
migrating pages was trying to drain PCP lists;
PID: 52922 TASK: ffff969f820e5000 CPU: 19 COMMAND: "kworker/u128:3"
Call Trace:
__schedule
schedule
schedule_timeout
wait_for_completion
__flush_work
__drain_all_pages
__alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.114
__alloc_pages
alloc_migration_target
migrate_pages
migrate_to_node
do_migrate_pages
cpuset_migrate_mm_workfn
process_one_work
worker_thread
kthread
ret_from_fork
This failure is specific to CONFIG_PREEMPT=n builds. The root of the
problem is that kcompact0 is not rescheduling on a CPU while a task that
has isolated a large number of the pages from the LRU is waiting on
kcompact0 to reschedule so the pages can be released. While
shrink_inactive_list() only loops once around too_many_isolated, reclaim
can continue without rescheduling if sc->skipped_deactivate == 1 which
could happen if there was no file LRU and the inactive anon list was not
low.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48769

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
efi: runtime: avoid EFIv2 runtime services on Apple x86 machines
Aditya reports [0] that his recent MacbookPro crashes in the firmware
when using the variable services at runtime. The culprit appears to be a
call to QueryVariableInfo(), which we did not use to call on Apple x86
machines in the past as they only upgraded from EFI v1.10 to EFI v2.40
firmware fairly recently, and QueryVariableInfo() (along with
UpdateCapsule() et al) was added in EFI v2.00.
The only runtime service introduced in EFI v2.00 that we actually use in
Linux is QueryVariableInfo(), as the capsule based ones are optional,
generally not used at runtime (all the LVFS/fwupd firmware update
infrastructure uses helper EFI programs that invoke capsule update at
boot time, not runtime), and not implemented by Apple machines in the
first place. QueryVariableInfo() is used to 'safely' set variables,
i.e., only when there is enough space. This prevents machines with buggy
firmwares from corrupting their NVRAMs when they run out of space.
Given that Apple machines have been using EFI v1.10 services only for
the longest time (the EFI v2.0 spec was released in 2006, and Linux
support for the newly introduced runtime services was added in 2011, but
the MacbookPro12,1 released in 2015 still claims to be EFI v1.10 only),
let's avoid the EFI v2.0 ones on all Apple x86 machines.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/6D757C75-65B1-468B-842D-10410081A8E4@live.com/

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48764

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Free kvm_cpuid_entry2 array on post-KVM_RUN KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}
Free the "struct kvm_cpuid_entry2" array on successful post-KVM_RUN
KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} to fix a memory leak, the callers of kvm_set_cpuid()
free the array only on failure.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810963a800 (size 2048):
comm "syz-executor025", pid 3610, jiffies 4294944928 (age 8.080s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0d 00 00 00 ................
47 65 6e 75 6e 74 65 6c 69 6e 65 49 00 00 00 00 GenuntelineI....
backtrace:
[<ffffffff814948ee>] kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline]
[<ffffffff814948ee>] kvmalloc_node+0x3e/0x100 mm/util.c:580
[<ffffffff814950f2>] kvmalloc include/linux/slab.h:732 [inline]
[<ffffffff814950f2>] vmemdup_user+0x22/0x100 mm/util.c:199
[<ffffffff8109f5ff>] kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid2+0x8f/0xf0 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c:423
[<ffffffff810711b9>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xb99/0x1e60 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5251
[<ffffffff8103e92d>] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4ad/0x950 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4066
[<ffffffff815afacc>] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
[<ffffffff815afacc>] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:874 [inline]
[<ffffffff815afacc>] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:860 [inline]
[<ffffffff815afacc>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:860
[<ffffffff844a3335>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
[<ffffffff844a3335>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
[<ffffffff84600068>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48763

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled
Forcibly leave nested virtualization operation if userspace toggles SMM
state via KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS or KVM_SYNC_X86_EVENTS. If userspace
forces the vCPU out of SMM while it's post-VMXON and then injects an SMI,
vmx_enter_smm() will overwrite vmx->nested.smm.vmxon and end up with both
vmxon=false and smm.vmxon=false, but all other nVMX state allocated.
Don't attempt to gracefully handle the transition as (a) most transitions
are nonsencial, e.g. forcing SMM while L2 is running, (b) there isn't
sufficient information to handle all transitions, e.g. SVM wants access
to the SMRAM save state, and (c) KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS must precede
KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE during state restore as the latter disallows putting
the vCPU into L2 if SMM is active, and disallows tagging the vCPU as
being post-VMXON in SMM if SMM is not active.
Abuse of KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS manifests as a WARN and memory leak in nVMX
due to failure to free vmcs01's shadow VMCS, but the bug goes far beyond
just a memory leak, e.g. toggling SMM on while L2 is active puts the vCPU
in an architecturally impossible state.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3606 at free_loaded_vmcs arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2665 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3606 at free_loaded_vmcs+0x158/0x1a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2656
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 3606 Comm: syz-executor725 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:free_loaded_vmcs arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2665 [inline]
RIP: 0010:free_loaded_vmcs+0x158/0x1a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2656
Code: <0f> 0b eb b3 e8 8f 4d 9f 00 e9 f7 fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 92 4d 9f 00
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x72/0x2f0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11123
kvm_vcpu_destroy arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:441 [inline]
kvm_destroy_vcpus+0x11f/0x290 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:460
kvm_free_vcpus arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11564 [inline]
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x2e8/0x470 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11676
kvm_destroy_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1217 [inline]
kvm_put_kvm+0x4fa/0xb00 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1250
kvm_vm_release+0x3f/0x50 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1273
__fput+0x286/0x9f0 fs/file_table.c:311
task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:32 [inline]
do_exit+0xb29/0x2a30 kernel/exit.c:806
do_group_exit+0xd2/0x2f0 kernel/exit.c:935
get_signal+0x4b0/0x28c0 kernel/signal.c:2862
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x2a9/0x1c40 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:868
handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x17d/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:207
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:289 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:300
do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48761

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: xhci-plat: fix crash when suspend if remote wake enable
Crashed at i.mx8qm platform when suspend if enable remote wakeup
Internal error: synchronous external abort: 96000210 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 244 Comm: kworker/u12:6 Not tainted 5.15.5-dirty #12
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QM MEK (DT)
Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
pstate: 600000c5 (nZCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : xhci_disable_hub_port_wake.isra.62+0x60/0xf8
lr : xhci_disable_hub_port_wake.isra.62+0x34/0xf8
sp : ffff80001394bbf0
x29: ffff80001394bbf0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff00081193b578
x26: ffff00081193b570 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: ffff00081193a29c x22: 0000000000020001 x21: 0000000000000001
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff800014e90490 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000002 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000960 x9 : ffff80001394baa0
x8 : ffff0008145d1780 x7 : ffff0008f95b8e80 x6 : 000000001853b453
x5 : 0000000000000496 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff00081193a29c
x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000814591620
Call trace:
xhci_disable_hub_port_wake.isra.62+0x60/0xf8
xhci_suspend+0x58/0x510
xhci_plat_suspend+0x50/0x78
platform_pm_suspend+0x2c/0x78
dpm_run_callback.isra.25+0x50/0xe8
__device_suspend+0x108/0x3c0
The basic flow:
1. run time suspend call xhci_suspend, xhci parent devices gate the clock.
2. echo mem >/sys/power/state, system _device_suspend call xhci_suspend
3. xhci_suspend call xhci_disable_hub_port_wake, which access register,
but clock already gated by run time suspend.
This problem was hidden by power domain driver, which call run time resume before it.
But the below commit remove it and make this issue happen.
commit c1df456d0f06e ("PM: domains: Don't runtime resume devices at genpd_prepare()")
This patch call run time resume before suspend to make sure clock is on
before access register.
Testeb-by: Abel Vesa <abel.vesa@nxp.com>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48752

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/perf: Fix power_pmu_disable to call clear_pmi_irq_pending only if PMI is pending
Running selftest with CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG enabled in kernel
triggered below warning:
[ 172.851380] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 172.851391] WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 2901 at arch/powerpc/include/asm/hw_irq.h:246 power_pmu_disable+0x270/0x280
[ 172.851402] Modules linked in: dm_mod bonding nft_ct nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables rfkill nfnetlink sunrpc xfs libcrc32c pseries_rng xts vmx_crypto uio_pdrv_genirq uio sch_fq_codel ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvscsi ibmveth scsi_transport_srp fuse
[ 172.851442] CPU: 8 PID: 2901 Comm: lost_exception_ Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5-03218-g798527287598 #2
[ 172.851451] NIP: c00000000013d600 LR: c00000000013d5a4 CTR: c00000000013b180
[ 172.851458] REGS: c000000017687860 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.16.0-rc5-03218-g798527287598)
[ 172.851465] MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48004884 XER: 20040000
[ 172.851482] CFAR: c00000000013d5b4 IRQMASK: 1
[ 172.851482] GPR00: c00000000013d5a4 c000000017687b00 c000000002a10600 0000000000000004
[ 172.851482] GPR04: 0000000082004000 c0000008ba08f0a8 0000000000000000 00000008b7ed0000
[ 172.851482] GPR08: 00000000446194f6 0000000000008000 c00000000013b118 c000000000d58e68
[ 172.851482] GPR12: c00000000013d390 c00000001ec54a80 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 172.851482] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000000015d5c708 c0000000025396d0
[ 172.851482] GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c00000000a3bbf40 0000000000000003
[ 172.851482] GPR24: 0000000000000000 c0000008ba097400 c0000000161e0d00 c00000000a3bb600
[ 172.851482] GPR28: c000000015d5c700 0000000000000001 0000000082384090 c0000008ba0020d8
[ 172.851549] NIP [c00000000013d600] power_pmu_disable+0x270/0x280
[ 172.851557] LR [c00000000013d5a4] power_pmu_disable+0x214/0x280
[ 172.851565] Call Trace:
[ 172.851568] [c000000017687b00] [c00000000013d5a4] power_pmu_disable+0x214/0x280 (unreliable)
[ 172.851579] [c000000017687b40] [c0000000003403ac] perf_pmu_disable+0x4c/0x60
[ 172.851588] [c000000017687b60] [c0000000003445e4] __perf_event_task_sched_out+0x1d4/0x660
[ 172.851596] [c000000017687c50] [c000000000d1175c] __schedule+0xbcc/0x12a0
[ 172.851602] [c000000017687d60] [c000000000d11ea8] schedule+0x78/0x140
[ 172.851608] [c000000017687d90] [c0000000001a8080] sys_sched_yield+0x20/0x40
[ 172.851615] [c000000017687db0] [c0000000000334dc] system_call_exception+0x18c/0x380
[ 172.851622] [c000000017687e10] [c00000000000c74c] system_call_common+0xec/0x268
The warning indicates that MSR_EE being set(interrupt enabled) when
there was an overflown PMC detected. This could happen in
power_pmu_disable since it runs under interrupt soft disable
condition ( local_irq_save ) and not with interrupts hard disabled.
commit 2c9ac51b850d ("powerpc/perf: Fix PMU callbacks to clear
pending PMI before resetting an overflown PMC") intended to clear
PMI pending bit in Paca when disabling the PMU. It could happen
that PMC gets overflown while code is in power_pmu_disable
callback function. Hence add a check to see if PMI pending bit
is set in Paca before clearing it via clear_pmi_pending.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48746

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix handling of wrong devices during bond netevent
Current implementation of bond netevent handler only check if
the handled netdev is VF representor and it missing a check if
the VF representor is on the same phys device of the bond handling
the netevent.
Fix by adding the missing check and optimizing the check if
the netdev is VF representor so it will not access uninitialized
private data and crashes.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000036c
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
Workqueue: eth3bond0 bond_mii_monitor [bonding]
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_is_uplink_rep+0xc/0x50 [mlx5_core]
RSP: 0018:ffff88812d69fd60 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881cf800000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88812d69fe10 RSI: 000000000000001b RDI: ffff8881cf800880
RBP: ffff8881cf800000 R08: 00000445cabccf2b R09: 0000000000000008
R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000008 R12: ffff88812d69fe10
R13: 00000000fffffffe R14: ffff88820c0f9000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88846fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000036c CR3: 0000000103d80006 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
mlx5e_eswitch_uplink_rep+0x31/0x40 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_rep_is_lag_netdev+0x94/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_rep_esw_bond_netevent+0xeb/0x3d0 [mlx5_core]
raw_notifier_call_chain+0x41/0x60
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x34/0x80
netdev_lower_state_changed+0x4e/0xa0
bond_mii_monitor+0x56b/0x640 [bonding]
process_one_work+0x1b9/0x390
worker_thread+0x4d/0x3d0
? rescuer_thread+0x350/0x350
kthread+0x124/0x150
? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48731

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/kmemleak: avoid scanning potential huge holes
When using devm_request_free_mem_region() and devm_memremap_pages() to
add ZONE_DEVICE memory, if requested free mem region's end pfn were
huge(e.g., 0x400000000), the node_end_pfn() will be also huge (see
move_pfn_range_to_zone()). Thus it creates a huge hole between
node_start_pfn() and node_end_pfn().
We found on some AMD APUs, amdkfd requested such a free mem region and
created a huge hole. In such a case, following code snippet was just
doing busy test_bit() looping on the huge hole.
for (pfn = start_pfn; pfn < end_pfn; pfn++) {
struct page *page = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
if (!page)
continue;
...
}
So we got a soft lockup:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#6 stuck for 26s! [bash:1221]
CPU: 6 PID: 1221 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.15.0-custom #1
RIP: 0010:pfn_to_online_page+0x5/0xd0
Call Trace:
? kmemleak_scan+0x16a/0x440
kmemleak_write+0x306/0x3a0
? common_file_perm+0x72/0x170
full_proxy_write+0x5c/0x90
vfs_write+0xb9/0x260
ksys_write+0x67/0xe0
__x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
I did some tests with the patch.
(1) amdgpu module unloaded
before the patch:
real 0m0.976s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.968s
after the patch:
real 0m0.981s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.973s
(2) amdgpu module loaded
before the patch:
real 0m35.365s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m35.354s
after the patch:
real 0m1.049s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m1.042s

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48729

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/hfi1: Fix panic with larger ipoib send_queue_size
When the ipoib send_queue_size is increased from the default the following
panic happens:
RIP: 0010:hfi1_ipoib_drain_tx_ring+0x45/0xf0 [hfi1]
Code: 31 e4 eb 0f 8b 85 c8 02 00 00 41 83 c4 01 44 39 e0 76 60 8b 8d cc 02 00 00 44 89 e3 be 01 00 00 00 d3 e3 48 03 9d c0 02 00 00 <c7> 83 18 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b bb 30 01 00 00 e8 25 af a7 e0
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000798f4a0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000008000 RBX: ffffc9000aa0f000 RCX: 000000000000000f
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88810ff08000 R08: ffff88889476d900 R09: 0000000000000101
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffc90006590ff8 R12: 0000000000000200
R13: ffffc9000798fba8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fd0f79cc3c0(0000) GS:ffff88885fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffc9000aa0f118 CR3: 0000000889c84001 CR4: 00000000001706e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
hfi1_ipoib_napi_tx_disable+0x45/0x60 [hfi1]
hfi1_ipoib_dev_stop+0x18/0x80 [hfi1]
ipoib_ib_dev_stop+0x1d/0x40 [ib_ipoib]
ipoib_stop+0x48/0xc0 [ib_ipoib]
__dev_close_many+0x9e/0x110
__dev_change_flags+0xd9/0x210
dev_change_flags+0x21/0x60
do_setlink+0x31c/0x10f0
? __nla_validate_parse+0x12d/0x1a0
? __nla_parse+0x21/0x30
? inet6_validate_link_af+0x5e/0xf0
? cpumask_next+0x1f/0x20
? __snmp6_fill_stats64.isra.53+0xbb/0x140
? __nla_validate_parse+0x47/0x1a0
__rtnl_newlink+0x530/0x910
? pskb_expand_head+0x73/0x300
? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x109/0x280
? __nla_put+0xc/0x20
? cpumask_next_and+0x20/0x30
? update_sd_lb_stats.constprop.144+0xd3/0x820
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x25/0x37
? __wake_up_common_lock+0x87/0xc0
? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x3d/0x3d0
rtnl_newlink+0x43/0x60
The issue happens when the shift that should have been a function of the
txq item size mistakenly used the ring size.
Fix by using the item size.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48728

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/hfi1: Fix AIP early init panic
An early failure in hfi1_ipoib_setup_rn() can lead to the following panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001b0
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
RIP: 0010:try_to_grab_pending+0x2b/0x140
Code: 1f 44 00 00 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 d5 53 48 89 fb 9c 58 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 c2 fa 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 55 00 40 84 f6 75 77 <f0> 48 0f ba 2b 00 72 09 31 c0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d c3 48 89 df e8 6c
RSP: 0018:ffffb6b3cf7cfa48 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: 00000000000001b0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000246 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000000001b0
RBP: ffffb6b3cf7cfa70 R08: 0000000000000f09 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffb6b3cf7cfa90 R14: ffffffff9b2fbfc0 R15: ffff8a4fdf244690
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a527f400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000001b0 CR3: 00000017e2410003 CR4: 00000000007706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
__cancel_work_timer+0x42/0x190
? dev_printk_emit+0x4e/0x70
iowait_cancel_work+0x15/0x30 [hfi1]
hfi1_ipoib_txreq_deinit+0x5a/0x220 [hfi1]
? dev_err+0x6c/0x90
hfi1_ipoib_netdev_dtor+0x15/0x30 [hfi1]
hfi1_ipoib_setup_rn+0x10e/0x150 [hfi1]
rdma_init_netdev+0x5a/0x80 [ib_core]
? hfi1_ipoib_free_rdma_netdev+0x20/0x20 [hfi1]
ipoib_intf_init+0x6c/0x350 [ib_ipoib]
ipoib_intf_alloc+0x5c/0xc0 [ib_ipoib]
ipoib_add_one+0xbe/0x300 [ib_ipoib]
add_client_context+0x12c/0x1a0 [ib_core]
enable_device_and_get+0xdc/0x1d0 [ib_core]
ib_register_device+0x572/0x6b0 [ib_core]
rvt_register_device+0x11b/0x220 [rdmavt]
hfi1_register_ib_device+0x6b4/0x770 [hfi1]
do_init_one.isra.20+0x3e3/0x680 [hfi1]
local_pci_probe+0x41/0x90
work_for_cpu_fn+0x16/0x20
process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
worker_thread+0x1cf/0x390
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
kthread+0x116/0x130
? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
The panic happens in hfi1_ipoib_txreq_deinit() because there is a NULL
deref when hfi1_ipoib_netdev_dtor() is called in this error case.
hfi1_ipoib_txreq_init() and hfi1_ipoib_rxq_init() are self unwinding so
fix by adjusting the error paths accordingly.
Other changes:
- hfi1_ipoib_free_rdma_netdev() is deleted including the free_netdev()
since the netdev core code deletes calls free_netdev()
- The switch to the accelerated entrances is moved to the success path.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48727

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Avoid consuming a stale esr value when SError occur
When any exception other than an IRQ occurs, the CPU updates the ESR_EL2
register with the exception syndrome. An SError may also become pending,
and will be synchronised by KVM. KVM notes the exception type, and whether
an SError was synchronised in exit_code.
When an exception other than an IRQ occurs, fixup_guest_exit() updates
vcpu->arch.fault.esr_el2 from the hardware register. When an SError was
synchronised, the vcpu esr value is used to determine if the exception
was due to an HVC. If so, ELR_EL2 is moved back one instruction. This
is so that KVM can process the SError first, and re-execute the HVC if
the guest survives the SError.
But if an IRQ synchronises an SError, the vcpu's esr value is stale.
If the previous non-IRQ exception was an HVC, KVM will corrupt ELR_EL2,
causing an unrelated guest instruction to be executed twice.
Check ARM_EXCEPTION_CODE() before messing with ELR_EL2, IRQs don't
update this register so don't need to check.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48721

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: Forward wakeup to smc socket waitqueue after fallback
When we replace TCP with SMC and a fallback occurs, there may be
some socket waitqueue entries remaining in smc socket->wq, such
as eppoll_entries inserted by userspace applications.
After the fallback, data flows over TCP/IP and only clcsocket->wq
will be woken up. Applications can't be notified by the entries
which were inserted in smc socket->wq before fallback. So we need
a mechanism to wake up smc socket->wq at the same time if some
entries remaining in it.
The current workaround is to transfer the entries from smc socket->wq
to clcsock->wq during the fallback. But this may cause a crash
like this:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000100: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.16.0+ #107
RIP: 0010:__wake_up_common+0x65/0x170
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__wake_up_common_lock+0x7a/0xc0
sock_def_readable+0x3c/0x70
tcp_data_queue+0x4a7/0xc40
tcp_rcv_established+0x32f/0x660
? sk_filter_trim_cap+0xcb/0x2e0
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x10b/0x260
tcp_v4_rcv+0xd2a/0xde0
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x3b/0x1d0
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x54/0x60
ip_local_deliver+0x6a/0x110
? tcp_v4_early_demux+0xa2/0x140
? tcp_v4_early_demux+0x10d/0x140
ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x49/0x60
ip_sublist_rcv+0x19d/0x230
ip_list_rcv+0x13e/0x170
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1c2/0x240
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1e6/0x320
napi_complete_done+0x11d/0x190
mlx5e_napi_poll+0x163/0x6b0 [mlx5_core]
__napi_poll+0x3c/0x1b0
net_rx_action+0x27c/0x300
__do_softirq+0x114/0x2d2
irq_exit_rcu+0xb4/0xe0
common_interrupt+0xba/0xe0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
The crash is caused by privately transferring waitqueue entries from
smc socket->wq to clcsock->wq. The owners of these entries, such as
epoll, have no idea that the entries have been transferred to a
different socket wait queue and still use original waitqueue spinlock
(smc socket->wq.wait.lock) to make the entries operation exclusive,
but it doesn't work. The operations to the entries, such as removing
from the waitqueue (now is clcsock->wq after fallback), may cause a
crash when clcsock waitqueue is being iterated over at the moment.
This patch tries to fix this by no longer transferring wait queue
entries privately, but introducing own implementations of clcsock's
callback functions in fallback situation. The callback functions will
forward the wakeup to smc socket->wq if clcsock->wq is actually woken
up and smc socket->wq has remaining entries.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48713

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/intel/pt: Fix crash with stop filters in single-range mode
Add a check for !buf->single before calling pt_buffer_region_size in a
place where a missing check can cause a kernel crash.
Fixes a bug introduced by commit 670638477aed ("perf/x86/intel/pt:
Opportunistically use single range output mode"), which added a
support for PT single-range output mode. Since that commit if a PT
stop filter range is hit while tracing, the kernel will crash because
of a null pointer dereference in pt_handle_status due to calling
pt_buffer_region_size without a ToPA configured.
The commit which introduced single-range mode guarded almost all uses of
the ToPA buffer variables with checks of the buf->single variable, but
missed the case where tracing was stopped by the PT hardware, which
happens when execution hits a configured stop filter.
Tested that hitting a stop filter while PT recording successfully
records a trace with this patch but crashes without this patch.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48707

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/region: Fix null pointer dereference for resetting decoder
Not all decoders have a reset callback.
The CXL specification allows a host bridge with a single root port to
have no explicit HDM decoders. Currently the region driver assumes there
are none. As such the CXL core creates a special pass through decoder
instance without a commit/reset callback.
Prior to this patch, the ->reset() callback was called unconditionally when
calling cxl_region_decode_reset. Thus a configuration with 1 Host Bridge,
1 Root Port, and one directly attached CXL type 3 device or multiple CXL
type 3 devices attached to downstream ports of a switch can cause a null
pointer dereference.
Before the fix, a kernel crash was observed when we destroy the region, and
a pass through decoder is reset.
The issue can be reproduced as below,
1) create a region with a CXL setup which includes a HB with a
single root port under which a memdev is attached directly.
2) destroy the region with cxl destroy-region regionX -f.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48705

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7921e: fix crash in chip reset fail
In case of drv own fail in reset, we may need to run mac_reset several
times. The sequence would trigger system crash as the log below.
Because we do not re-enable/schedule "tx_napi" before disable it again,
the process would keep waiting for state change in napi_diable(). To
avoid the problem and keep status synchronize for each run, goto final
resource handling if drv own failed.
[ 5857.353423] mt7921e 0000:3b:00.0: driver own failed
[ 5858.433427] mt7921e 0000:3b:00.0: Timeout for driver own
[ 5859.633430] mt7921e 0000:3b:00.0: driver own failed
[ 5859.633444] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 5859.633446] WARNING: CPU: 6 at kernel/kthread.c:659 kthread_park+0x11d
[ 5859.633717] Workqueue: mt76 mt7921_mac_reset_work [mt7921_common]
[ 5859.633728] RIP: 0010:kthread_park+0x11d/0x150
[ 5859.633736] RSP: 0018:ffff8881b676fc68 EFLAGS: 00010202
......
[ 5859.633766] Call Trace:
[ 5859.633768] <TASK>
[ 5859.633771] mt7921e_mac_reset+0x176/0x6f0 [mt7921e]
[ 5859.633778] mt7921_mac_reset_work+0x184/0x3a0 [mt7921_common]
[ 5859.633785] ? mt7921_mac_set_timing+0x520/0x520 [mt7921_common]
[ 5859.633794] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 5859.633802] process_one_work+0x7ee/0x1320
[ 5859.633810] worker_thread+0x53c/0x1240
[ 5859.633818] kthread+0x2b8/0x370
[ 5859.633824] ? process_one_work+0x1320/0x1320
[ 5859.633828] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x30/0x30
[ 5859.633834] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 5859.633842] </TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48704

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/radeon: add a force flush to delay work when radeon
Although radeon card fence and wait for gpu to finish processing current batch rings,
there is still a corner case that radeon lockup work queue may not be fully flushed,
and meanwhile the radeon_suspend_kms() function has called pci_set_power_state() to
put device in D3hot state.
Per PCI spec rev 4.0 on 5.3.1.4.1 D3hot State.
> Configuration and Message requests are the only TLPs accepted by a Function in
> the D3hot state. All other received Requests must be handled as Unsupported Requests,
> and all received Completions may optionally be handled as Unexpected Completions.
This issue will happen in following logs:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00008800e0008010
CPU 0 kworker/0:3(131): Oops 0
pc = [<ffffffff811bea5c>] ra = [<ffffffff81240844>] ps = 0000 Tainted: G W
pc is at si_gpu_check_soft_reset+0x3c/0x240
ra is at si_dma_is_lockup+0x34/0xd0
v0 = 0000000000000000 t0 = fff08800e0008010 t1 = 0000000000010000
t2 = 0000000000008010 t3 = fff00007e3c00000 t4 = fff00007e3c00258
t5 = 000000000000ffff t6 = 0000000000000001 t7 = fff00007ef078000
s0 = fff00007e3c016e8 s1 = fff00007e3c00000 s2 = fff00007e3c00018
s3 = fff00007e3c00000 s4 = fff00007fff59d80 s5 = 0000000000000000
s6 = fff00007ef07bd98
a0 = fff00007e3c00000 a1 = fff00007e3c016e8 a2 = 0000000000000008
a3 = 0000000000000001 a4 = 8f5c28f5c28f5c29 a5 = ffffffff810f4338
t8 = 0000000000000275 t9 = ffffffff809b66f8 t10 = ff6769c5d964b800
t11= 000000000000b886 pv = ffffffff811bea20 at = 0000000000000000
gp = ffffffff81d89690 sp = 00000000aa814126
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Trace:
[<ffffffff81240844>] si_dma_is_lockup+0x34/0xd0
[<ffffffff81119610>] radeon_fence_check_lockup+0xd0/0x290
[<ffffffff80977010>] process_one_work+0x280/0x550
[<ffffffff80977350>] worker_thread+0x70/0x7c0
[<ffffffff80977410>] worker_thread+0x130/0x7c0
[<ffffffff80982040>] kthread+0x200/0x210
[<ffffffff809772e0>] worker_thread+0x0/0x7c0
[<ffffffff80981f8c>] kthread+0x14c/0x210
[<ffffffff80911658>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x18/0x20
[<ffffffff80981e40>] kthread+0x0/0x210
Code: ad3e0008 43f0074a ad7e0018 ad9e0020 8c3001e8 40230101
<88210000> 4821ed21
So force lockup work queue flush to fix this problem.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48702

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: emu10k1: Fix out of bounds access in snd_emu10k1_pcm_channel_alloc()
The voice allocator sometimes begins allocating from near the end of the
array and then wraps around, however snd_emu10k1_pcm_channel_alloc()
accesses the newly allocated voices as if it never wrapped around.
This results in out of bounds access if the first voice has a high enough
index so that first_voice + requested_voice_count > NUM_G (64).
The more voices are requested, the more likely it is for this to occur.
This was initially discovered using PipeWire, however it can be reproduced
by calling aplay multiple times with 16 channels:
aplay -r 48000 -D plughw:CARD=Live,DEV=3 -c 16 /dev/zero
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in sound/pci/emu10k1/emupcm.c:127:40
index 65 is out of range for type 'snd_emu10k1_voice [64]'
CPU: 1 PID: 31977 Comm: aplay Tainted: G W IOE 6.0.0-rc2-emu10k1+ #7
Hardware name: ASUSTEK COMPUTER INC P5W DH Deluxe/P5W DH Deluxe, BIOS 3002 07/22/2010
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
dump_stack+0x10/0x16
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x3f
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49
snd_emu10k1_playback_hw_params+0x3bc/0x420 [snd_emu10k1]
snd_pcm_hw_params+0x29f/0x600 [snd_pcm]
snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x188/0x1410 [snd_pcm]
? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x35/0x170
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x50
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x35/0x170
snd_pcm_ioctl+0x27/0x40 [snd_pcm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48694

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Fix drain SQ hang with no completion
SW generated completions for outstanding WRs posted on SQ
after QP is in error target the wrong CQ. This causes the
ib_drain_sq to hang with no completion.
Fix this to generate completions on the right CQ.
[ 863.969340] INFO: task kworker/u52:2:671 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
[ 863.979224] Not tainted 5.14.0-130.el9.x86_64 #1
[ 863.986588] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 863.996997] task:kworker/u52:2 state:D stack: 0 pid: 671 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000
[ 864.007272] Workqueue: xprtiod xprt_autoclose [sunrpc]
[ 864.014056] Call Trace:
[ 864.017575] __schedule+0x206/0x580
[ 864.022296] schedule+0x43/0xa0
[ 864.026736] schedule_timeout+0x115/0x150
[ 864.032185] __wait_for_common+0x93/0x1d0
[ 864.037717] ? usleep_range_state+0x90/0x90
[ 864.043368] __ib_drain_sq+0xf6/0x170 [ib_core]
[ 864.049371] ? __rdma_block_iter_next+0x80/0x80 [ib_core]
[ 864.056240] ib_drain_sq+0x66/0x70 [ib_core]
[ 864.062003] rpcrdma_xprt_disconnect+0x82/0x3b0 [rpcrdma]
[ 864.069365] ? xprt_prepare_transmit+0x5d/0xc0 [sunrpc]
[ 864.076386] xprt_rdma_close+0xe/0x30 [rpcrdma]
[ 864.082593] xprt_autoclose+0x52/0x100 [sunrpc]
[ 864.088718] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x3c0
[ 864.094170] worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0
[ 864.099109] ? rescuer_thread+0x370/0x370
[ 864.104473] kthread+0x149/0x170
[ 864.109022] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
[ 864.114713] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48691

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: clean up hook list when offload flags check fails
splice back the hook list so nft_chain_release_hook() has a chance to
release the hooks.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810180b100 (size 96):
comm "syz-executor133", pid 3619, jiffies 4294945714 (age 12.690s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
28 64 23 02 81 88 ff ff 28 64 23 02 81 88 ff ff (d#.....(d#.....
90 a8 aa 83 ff ff ff ff 00 00 b5 0f 81 88 ff ff ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff83a8c59b>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:600 [inline]
[<ffffffff83a8c59b>] nft_netdev_hook_alloc+0x3b/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1901
[<ffffffff83a9239a>] nft_chain_parse_netdev net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1998 [inline]
[<ffffffff83a9239a>] nft_chain_parse_hook+0x33a/0x530 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2073
[<ffffffff83a9b14b>] nf_tables_addchain.constprop.0+0x10b/0x950 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2218
[<ffffffff83a9c41b>] nf_tables_newchain+0xa8b/0xc60 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2593
[<ffffffff83a3d6a6>] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xa46/0xd20 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:517
[<ffffffff83a3db79>] nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:638 [inline]
[<ffffffff83a3db79>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x1f9/0x220 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:656
[<ffffffff83a13b17>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
[<ffffffff83a13b17>] netlink_unicast+0x397/0x4c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
[<ffffffff83a13fd6>] netlink_sendmsg+0x396/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
[<ffffffff83865ab6>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
[<ffffffff83865ab6>] sock_sendmsg+0x56/0x80 net/socket.c:734
[<ffffffff8386601c>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x36c/0x390 net/socket.c:2482
[<ffffffff8386a918>] ___sys_sendmsg+0xa8/0x110 net/socket.c:2536
[<ffffffff8386aaa8>] __sys_sendmsg+0x88/0x100 net/socket.c:2565
[<ffffffff845e5955>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
[<ffffffff845e5955>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
[<ffffffff84800087>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48689

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: TX zerocopy should not sense pfmemalloc status
We got a recent syzbot report [1] showing a possible misuse
of pfmemalloc page status in TCP zerocopy paths.
Indeed, for pages coming from user space or other layers,
using page_is_pfmemalloc() is moot, and possibly could give
false positives.
There has been attempts to make page_is_pfmemalloc() more robust,
but not using it in the first place in this context is probably better,
removing cpu cycles.
Note to stable teams :
You need to backport 84ce071e38a6 ("net: introduce
__skb_fill_page_desc_noacc") as a prereq.
Race is more probable after commit c07aea3ef4d4
("mm: add a signature in struct page") because page_is_pfmemalloc()
is now using low order bit from page->lru.next, which can change
more often than page->index.
Low order bit should never be set for lru.next (when used as an anchor
in LRU list), so KCSAN report is mostly a false positive.
Backporting to older kernel versions seems not necessary.
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in lru_add_fn / tcp_build_frag
write to 0xffffea0004a1d2c8 of 8 bytes by task 18600 on cpu 0:
__list_add include/linux/list.h:73 [inline]
list_add include/linux/list.h:88 [inline]
lruvec_add_folio include/linux/mm_inline.h:105 [inline]
lru_add_fn+0x440/0x520 mm/swap.c:228
folio_batch_move_lru+0x1e1/0x2a0 mm/swap.c:246
folio_batch_add_and_move mm/swap.c:263 [inline]
folio_add_lru+0xf1/0x140 mm/swap.c:490
filemap_add_folio+0xf8/0x150 mm/filemap.c:948
__filemap_get_folio+0x510/0x6d0 mm/filemap.c:1981
pagecache_get_page+0x26/0x190 mm/folio-compat.c:104
grab_cache_page_write_begin+0x2a/0x30 mm/folio-compat.c:116
ext4_da_write_begin+0x2dd/0x5f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:2988
generic_perform_write+0x1d4/0x3f0 mm/filemap.c:3738
ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x235/0x3e0 fs/ext4/file.c:270
ext4_file_write_iter+0x2e3/0x1210
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2187 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
vfs_write+0x468/0x760 fs/read_write.c:578
ksys_write+0xe8/0x1a0 fs/read_write.c:631
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:643 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:640 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x3e/0x50 fs/read_write.c:640
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
read to 0xffffea0004a1d2c8 of 8 bytes by task 18611 on cpu 1:
page_is_pfmemalloc include/linux/mm.h:1740 [inline]
__skb_fill_page_desc include/linux/skbuff.h:2422 [inline]
skb_fill_page_desc include/linux/skbuff.h:2443 [inline]
tcp_build_frag+0x613/0xb20 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1018
do_tcp_sendpages+0x3e8/0xaf0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1075
tcp_sendpage_locked net/ipv4/tcp.c:1140 [inline]
tcp_sendpage+0x89/0xb0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1150
inet_sendpage+0x7f/0xc0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:833
kernel_sendpage+0x184/0x300 net/socket.c:3561
sock_sendpage+0x5a/0x70 net/socket.c:1054
pipe_to_sendpage+0x128/0x160 fs/splice.c:361
splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:415 [inline]
__splice_from_pipe+0x222/0x4d0 fs/splice.c:559
splice_from_pipe fs/splice.c:594 [inline]
generic_splice_sendpage+0x89/0xc0 fs/splice.c:743
do_splice_from fs/splice.c:764 [inline]
direct_splice_actor+0x80/0xa0 fs/splice.c:931
splice_direct_to_actor+0x305/0x620 fs/splice.c:886
do_splice_direct+0xfb/0x180 fs/splice.c:974
do_sendfile+0x3bf/0x910 fs/read_write.c:1249
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1317 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1303 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x10c/0x150 fs/read_write.c:1303
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0xffffea0004a1d288
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 18611 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc2-syzkaller-00248-ge022620b5d05-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/22/2022

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48675

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/core: Fix a nested dead lock as part of ODP flow
Fix a nested dead lock as part of ODP flow by using mmput_async().
From the below call trace [1] can see that calling mmput() once we have
the umem_odp->umem_mutex locked as required by
ib_umem_odp_map_dma_and_lock() might trigger in the same task the
exit_mmap()->__mmu_notifier_release()->mlx5_ib_invalidate_range() which
may dead lock when trying to lock the same mutex.
Moving to use mmput_async() will solve the problem as the above
exit_mmap() flow will be called in other task and will be executed once
the lock will be available.
[1]
[64843.077665] task:kworker/u133:2 state:D stack: 0 pid:80906 ppid:
2 flags:0x00004000
[64843.077672] Workqueue: mlx5_ib_page_fault mlx5_ib_eqe_pf_action [mlx5_ib]
[64843.077719] Call Trace:
[64843.077722] <TASK>
[64843.077724] __schedule+0x23d/0x590
[64843.077729] schedule+0x4e/0xb0
[64843.077735] schedule_preempt_disabled+0xe/0x10
[64843.077740] __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x263/0x490
[64843.077747] __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x13/0x20
[64843.077752] mutex_lock+0x34/0x40
[64843.077758] mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x48/0x270 [mlx5_ib]
[64843.077808] __mmu_notifier_release+0x1a4/0x200
[64843.077816] exit_mmap+0x1bc/0x200
[64843.077822] ? walk_page_range+0x9c/0x120
[64843.077828] ? __cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
[64843.077833] ? mutex_lock+0x13/0x40
[64843.077839] ? uprobe_clear_state+0xac/0x120
[64843.077860] mmput+0x5f/0x140
[64843.077867] ib_umem_odp_map_dma_and_lock+0x21b/0x580 [ib_core]
[64843.077931] pagefault_real_mr+0x9a/0x140 [mlx5_ib]
[64843.077962] pagefault_mr+0xb4/0x550 [mlx5_ib]
[64843.077992] pagefault_single_data_segment.constprop.0+0x2ac/0x560
[mlx5_ib]
[64843.078022] mlx5_ib_eqe_pf_action+0x528/0x780 [mlx5_ib]
[64843.078051] process_one_work+0x22b/0x3d0
[64843.078059] worker_thread+0x53/0x410
[64843.078065] ? process_one_work+0x3d0/0x3d0
[64843.078073] kthread+0x12a/0x150
[64843.078079] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
[64843.078085] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[64843.078093] </TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48673

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: Fix possible access to freed memory in link clear
After modifying the QP to the Error state, all RX WR would be completed
with WC in IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR status. Current implementation does not
wait for it is done, but destroy the QP and free the link group directly.
So there is a risk that accessing the freed memory in tasklet context.
Here is a crash example:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff8f220860
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD f7300e067 P4D f7300e067 PUD f7300f063 PMD 8c4e45063 PTE 800ffff08c9df060
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S OE 5.10.0-0607+ #23
Hardware name: Inspur NF5280M4/YZMB-00689-101, BIOS 4.1.20 07/09/2018
RIP: 0010:native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x176/0x1b0
Code: f3 90 48 8b 32 48 85 f6 74 f6 eb d5 c1 ee 12 83 e0 03 83 ee 01 48 c1 e0 05 48 63 f6 48 05 00 c8 02 00 48 03 04 f5 00 09 98 8e <48> 89 10 8b 42 08 85 c0 75 09 f3 90 8b 42 08 85 c0 74 f7 48 8b 32
RSP: 0018:ffffb3b6c001ebd8 EFLAGS: 00010086
RAX: ffffffff8f220860 RBX: 0000000000000246 RCX: 0000000000080000
RDX: ffff91db1f86c800 RSI: 000000000000173c RDI: ffff91db62bace00
RBP: ffff91db62bacc00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c00000010000028b
R10: 0000000000055198 R11: ffffb3b6c001ea58 R12: ffff91db80e05010
R13: 000000000000000a R14: 0000000000000006 R15: 0000000000000040
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff91db1f840000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffff8f220860 CR3: 00000001f9580004 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x30/0x40
mlx5_ib_poll_cq+0x4c/0xc50 [mlx5_ib]
smc_wr_rx_tasklet_fn+0x56/0xa0 [smc]
tasklet_action_common.isra.21+0x66/0x100
__do_softirq+0xd5/0x29c
asm_call_irq_on_stack+0x12/0x20
</IRQ>
do_softirq_own_stack+0x37/0x40
irq_exit_rcu+0x9d/0xa0
sysvec_call_function_single+0x34/0x80
asm_sysvec_call_function_single+0x12/0x20

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48662

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/gem: Really move i915_gem_context.link under ref protection
i915_perf assumes that it can use the i915_gem_context reference to
protect its i915->gem.contexts.list iteration. However, this requires
that we do not remove the context from the list until after we drop the
final reference and release the struct. If, as currently, we remove the
context from the list during context_close(), the link.next pointer may
be poisoned while we are holding the context reference and cause a GPF:
[ 4070.573157] i915 0000:00:02.0: [drm:i915_perf_open_ioctl [i915]] filtering on ctx_id=0x1fffff ctx_id_mask=0x1fffff
[ 4070.574881] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000100: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 4070.574897] CPU: 1 PID: 284392 Comm: amd_performance Tainted: G E 5.17.9 #180
[ 4070.574903] Hardware name: Intel Corporation NUC7i5BNK/NUC7i5BNB, BIOS BNKBL357.86A.0052.2017.0918.1346 09/18/2017
[ 4070.574907] RIP: 0010:oa_configure_all_contexts.isra.0+0x222/0x350 [i915]
[ 4070.574982] Code: 08 e8 32 6e 10 e1 4d 8b 6d 50 b8 ff ff ff ff 49 83 ed 50 f0 41 0f c1 04 24 83 f8 01 0f 84 e3 00 00 00 85 c0 0f 8e fa 00 00 00 <49> 8b 45 50 48 8d 70 b0 49 8d 45 50 48 39 44 24 10 0f 85 34 fe ff
[ 4070.574990] RSP: 0018:ffffc90002077b78 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 4070.574995] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 4070.575000] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffc90002077b20 RDI: ffff88810ddc7c68
[ 4070.575004] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffff888103242648 R09: fffffffffffffffc
[ 4070.575008] R10: ffffffff82c50bc0 R11: 0000000000025c80 R12: ffff888101bf1860
[ 4070.575012] R13: dead0000000000b0 R14: ffffc90002077c04 R15: ffff88810be5cabc
[ 4070.575016] FS: 00007f1ed50c0780(0000) GS:ffff88885ec80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 4070.575021] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 4070.575025] CR2: 00007f1ed5590280 CR3: 000000010ef6f005 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[ 4070.575029] Call Trace:
[ 4070.575033] <TASK>
[ 4070.575037] lrc_configure_all_contexts+0x13e/0x150 [i915]
[ 4070.575103] gen8_enable_metric_set+0x4d/0x90 [i915]
[ 4070.575164] i915_perf_open_ioctl+0xbc0/0x1500 [i915]
[ 4070.575224] ? asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
[ 4070.575232] ? i915_oa_init_reg_state+0x110/0x110 [i915]
[ 4070.575290] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x85/0x110
[ 4070.575296] ? update_load_avg+0x5f/0x5e0
[ 4070.575302] drm_ioctl+0x1d3/0x370
[ 4070.575307] ? i915_oa_init_reg_state+0x110/0x110 [i915]
[ 4070.575382] ? gen8_gt_irq_handler+0x46/0x130 [i915]
[ 4070.575445] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x3c4/0x8d0
[ 4070.575451] ? __do_softirq+0xaa/0x1d2
[ 4070.575456] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
[ 4070.575461] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 4070.575467] RIP: 0033:0x7f1ed5c10397
[ 4070.575471] Code: 3c 1c e8 1c ff ff ff 85 c0 79 87 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a9 da 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 4070.575478] RSP: 002b:00007ffd65c8d7a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[ 4070.575484] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 00007f1ed5c10397
[ 4070.575488] RDX: 00007ffd65c8d7c0 RSI: 0000000040106476 RDI: 0000000000000006
[ 4070.575492] RBP: 00005620972f9c60 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 0000000000000005
[ 4070.575496] R10: 000000000000000d R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000a
[ 4070.575500] R13: 000000000000000d R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffd65c8d7c0
[ 4070.575505] </TASK>
[ 4070.575507] Modules linked in: nls_ascii(E) nls_cp437(E) vfat(E) fat(E) i915(E) x86_pkg_temp_thermal(E) intel_powerclamp(E) crct10dif_pclmul(E) crc32_pclmul(E) crc32c_intel(E) aesni_intel(E) crypto_simd(E) intel_gtt(E) cryptd(E) ttm(E) rapl(E) intel_cstate(E) drm_kms_helper(E) cfbfillrect(E) syscopyarea(E) cfbimgblt(E) intel_uncore(E) sysfillrect(E) mei_me(E) sysimgblt(E) i2c_i801(E) fb_sys_fops(E) mei(E) intel_pch_thermal(E) i2c_smbus
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48658

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: slub: fix flush_cpu_slab()/__free_slab() invocations in task context.
Commit 5a836bf6b09f ("mm: slub: move flush_cpu_slab() invocations
__free_slab() invocations out of IRQ context") moved all flush_cpu_slab()
invocations to the global workqueue to avoid a problem related
with deactivate_slab()/__free_slab() being called from an IRQ context
on PREEMPT_RT kernels.
When the flush_all_cpu_locked() function is called from a task context
it may happen that a workqueue with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM bit set ends up
flushing the global workqueue, this will cause a dependency issue.
workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM nvme-delete-wq:nvme_delete_ctrl_work [nvme_core]
is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM events:flush_cpu_slab
WARNING: CPU: 37 PID: 410 at kernel/workqueue.c:2637
check_flush_dependency+0x10a/0x120
Workqueue: nvme-delete-wq nvme_delete_ctrl_work [nvme_core]
RIP: 0010:check_flush_dependency+0x10a/0x120[ 453.262125] Call Trace:
__flush_work.isra.0+0xbf/0x220
? __queue_work+0x1dc/0x420
flush_all_cpus_locked+0xfb/0x120
__kmem_cache_shutdown+0x2b/0x320
kmem_cache_destroy+0x49/0x100
bioset_exit+0x143/0x190
blk_release_queue+0xb9/0x100
kobject_cleanup+0x37/0x130
nvme_fc_ctrl_free+0xc6/0x150 [nvme_fc]
nvme_free_ctrl+0x1ac/0x2b0 [nvme_core]
Fix this bug by creating a workqueue for the flush operation with
the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM bit set.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48640

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: fix NULL deref in bond_rr_gen_slave_id
Fix a NULL dereference of the struct bonding.rr_tx_counter member because
if a bond is initially created with an initial mode != zero (Round Robin)
the memory required for the counter is never created and when the mode is
changed there is never any attempt to verify the memory is allocated upon
switching modes.
This causes the following Oops on an aarch64 machine:
[ 334.686773] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff2c91ac905000
[ 334.694703] Mem abort info:
[ 334.697486] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 334.701234] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 334.706536] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 334.709579] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 334.712719] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 334.717586] Data abort info:
[ 334.720454] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 334.724288] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 334.727244] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000008044d662000
[ 334.733944] [ffff2c91ac905000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
[ 334.740734] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 334.745602] Modules linked in: bonding tls veth rfkill sunrpc arm_spe_pmu vfat fat acpi_ipmi ipmi_ssif ixgbe igb i40e mdio ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler arm_cmn arm_dsu_pmu cppc_cpufreq acpi_tad fuse zram crct10dif_ce ast ghash_ce sbsa_gwdt nvme drm_vram_helper drm_ttm_helper nvme_core ttm xgene_hwmon
[ 334.772217] CPU: 7 PID: 2214 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4-00133-g64ae13ed4784 #4
[ 334.779950] Hardware name: GIGABYTE R272-P31-00/MP32-AR1-00, BIOS F18v (SCP: 1.08.20211002) 12/01/2021
[ 334.789244] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 334.796196] pc : bond_rr_gen_slave_id+0x40/0x124 [bonding]
[ 334.801691] lr : bond_xmit_roundrobin_slave_get+0x38/0xdc [bonding]
[ 334.807962] sp : ffff8000221733e0
[ 334.811265] x29: ffff8000221733e0 x28: ffffdbac8572d198 x27: ffff80002217357c
[ 334.818392] x26: 000000000000002a x25: ffffdbacb33ee000 x24: ffff07ff980fa000
[ 334.825519] x23: ffffdbacb2e398ba x22: ffff07ff98102000 x21: ffff07ff981029c0
[ 334.832646] x20: 0000000000000001 x19: ffff07ff981029c0 x18: 0000000000000014
[ 334.839773] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffdbacb1004364 x15: 0000aaaabe2f5a62
[ 334.846899] x14: ffff07ff8e55d968 x13: ffff07ff8e55db30 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 334.854026] x11: ffffdbacb21532e8 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : ffffdbac857178ec
[ 334.861153] x8 : ffff07ff9f6e5a28 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000007c2b3742
[ 334.868279] x5 : ffff2c91ac905000 x4 : ffff2c91ac905000 x3 : ffff07ff9f554400
[ 334.875406] x2 : ffff2c91ac905000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffff07ff981029c0
[ 334.882532] Call trace:
[ 334.884967] bond_rr_gen_slave_id+0x40/0x124 [bonding]
[ 334.890109] bond_xmit_roundrobin_slave_get+0x38/0xdc [bonding]
[ 334.896033] __bond_start_xmit+0x128/0x3a0 [bonding]
[ 334.901001] bond_start_xmit+0x54/0xb0 [bonding]
[ 334.905622] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xb4/0x220
[ 334.909798] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1a0/0x720
[ 334.913799] arp_xmit+0x3c/0xbc
[ 334.916932] arp_send_dst+0x98/0xd0
[ 334.920410] arp_solicit+0xe8/0x230
[ 334.923888] neigh_probe+0x60/0xb0
[ 334.927279] __neigh_event_send+0x3b0/0x470
[ 334.931453] neigh_resolve_output+0x70/0x90
[ 334.935626] ip_finish_output2+0x158/0x514
[ 334.939714] __ip_finish_output+0xac/0x1a4
[ 334.943800] ip_finish_output+0x40/0xfc
[ 334.947626] ip_output+0xf8/0x1a4
[ 334.950931] ip_send_skb+0x5c/0x100
[ 334.954410] ip_push_pending_frames+0x3c/0x60
[ 334.958758] raw_sendmsg+0x458/0x6d0
[ 334.962325] inet_sendmsg+0x50/0x80
[ 334.965805] sock_sendmsg+0x60/0x6c
[ 334.969286] __sys_sendto+0xc8/0x134
[ 334.972853] __arm64_sys_sendto+0x34/0x4c
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48635

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsdax: Fix infinite loop in dax_iomap_rw()
I got an infinite loop and a WARNING report when executing a tail command
in virtiofs.
WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 964 at fs/iomap/iter.c:34 iomap_iter+0x3a2/0x3d0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 10 PID: 964 Comm: tail Not tainted 5.19.0-rc7
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dax_iomap_rw+0xea/0x620
? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
fuse_dax_read_iter+0x47/0x80
fuse_file_read_iter+0xae/0xd0
new_sync_read+0xfe/0x180
? 0xffffffff81000000
vfs_read+0x14d/0x1a0
ksys_read+0x6d/0xf0
__x64_sys_read+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The tail command will call read() with a count of 0. In this case,
iomap_iter() will report this WARNING, and always return 1 which casuing
the infinite loop in dax_iomap_rw().
Fixing by checking count whether is 0 in dax_iomap_rw().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48628

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: drop messages from MDS when unmounting
When unmounting all the dirty buffers will be flushed and after
the last osd request is finished the last reference of the i_count
will be released. Then it will flush the dirty cap/snap to MDSs,
and the unmounting won't wait the possible acks, which will ihold
the inodes when updating the metadata locally but makes no sense
any more, of this. This will make the evict_inodes() to skip these
inodes.
If encrypt is enabled the kernel generate a warning when removing
the encrypt keys when the skipped inodes still hold the keyring:
WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 168846 at fs/crypto/keyring.c:242 fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0
CPU: 4 PID: 168846 Comm: umount Tainted: G S 6.1.0-rc5-ceph-g72ead199864c #1
Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5018R-WR/X10SRW-F, BIOS 2.0 12/17/2015
RIP: 0010:fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b277e28 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88810d52ac00 RCX: ffff88810b56aa00
RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffff822f3a09 RDI: ffff888108f59000
RBP: ffff8881d394fb88 R08: 0000000000000028 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 11ff4fe6834fcd91 R12: ffff8881d394fc40
R13: ffff888108f59000 R14: ffff8881d394f800 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fd83f6f1080(0000) GS:ffff88885fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f918d417000 CR3: 000000017f89a005 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
generic_shutdown_super+0x47/0x120
kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30
ceph_kill_sb+0x36/0x90 [ceph]
deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60
cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140
task_work_run+0x67/0xb0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x23d/0x240
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x60
do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7fd83dc39e9b
Later the kernel will crash when iput() the inodes and dereferencing
the "sb->s_master_keys", which has been released by the
generic_shutdown_super().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47639

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/mmu: Zap _all_ roots when unmapping gfn range in TDP MMU
Zap both valid and invalid roots when zapping/unmapping a gfn range, as
KVM must ensure it holds no references to the freed page after returning
from the unmap operation. Most notably, the TDP MMU doesn't zap invalid
roots in mmu_notifier callbacks. This leads to use-after-free and other
issues if the mmu_notifier runs to completion while an invalid root
zapper yields as KVM fails to honor the requirement that there must be
_no_ references to the page after the mmu_notifier returns.
The bug is most easily reproduced by hacking KVM to cause a collision
between set_nx_huge_pages() and kvm_mmu_notifier_release(), but the bug
exists between kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start() and memslot
updates as well. Invalidating a root ensures pages aren't accessible by
the guest, and KVM won't read or write page data itself, but KVM will
trigger e.g. kvm_set_pfn_dirty() when zapping SPTEs, and thus completing
a zap of an invalid root _after_ the mmu_notifier returns is fatal.
WARNING: CPU: 24 PID: 1496 at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:173 [kvm]
RIP: 0010:kvm_is_zone_device_pfn+0x96/0xa0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_set_pfn_dirty+0xa8/0xe0 [kvm]
__handle_changed_spte+0x2ab/0x5e0 [kvm]
__handle_changed_spte+0x2ab/0x5e0 [kvm]
__handle_changed_spte+0x2ab/0x5e0 [kvm]
zap_gfn_range+0x1f3/0x310 [kvm]
kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_invalidated_roots+0x50/0x90 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast+0x177/0x1a0 [kvm]
set_nx_huge_pages+0xb4/0x190 [kvm]
param_attr_store+0x70/0x100
module_attr_store+0x19/0x30
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x119/0x1b0
new_sync_write+0x11c/0x1b0
vfs_write+0x1cc/0x270
ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47623

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/fixmap: Fix VM debug warning on unmap
Unmapping a fixmap entry is done by calling __set_fixmap()
with FIXMAP_PAGE_CLEAR as flags.
Today, powerpc __set_fixmap() calls map_kernel_page().
map_kernel_page() is not happy when called a second time
for the same page.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at arch/powerpc/mm/pgtable.c:194 set_pte_at+0xc/0x1e8
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.16.0-rc3-s3k-dev-01993-g350ff07feb7d-dirty #682
NIP: c0017cd4 LR: c00187f0 CTR: 00000010
REGS: e1011d50 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.16.0-rc3-s3k-dev-01993-g350ff07feb7d-dirty)
MSR: 00029032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 42000208 XER: 00000000
GPR00: c0165fec e1011e10 c14c0000 c0ee2550 ff800000 c0f3d000 00000000 c001686c
GPR08: 00001000 b00045a9 00000001 c0f58460 c0f50000 00000000 c0007e10 00000000
GPR16: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
GPR24: 00000000 00000000 c0ee2550 00000000 c0f57000 00000ff8 00000000 ff800000
NIP [c0017cd4] set_pte_at+0xc/0x1e8
LR [c00187f0] map_kernel_page+0x9c/0x100
Call Trace:
[e1011e10] [c0736c68] vsnprintf+0x358/0x6c8 (unreliable)
[e1011e30] [c0165fec] __set_fixmap+0x30/0x44
[e1011e40] [c0c13bdc] early_iounmap+0x11c/0x170
[e1011e70] [c0c06cb0] ioremap_legacy_serial_console+0x88/0xc0
[e1011e90] [c0c03634] do_one_initcall+0x80/0x178
[e1011ef0] [c0c0385c] kernel_init_freeable+0xb4/0x250
[e1011f20] [c0007e34] kernel_init+0x24/0x140
[e1011f30] [c0016268] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
Instruction dump:
7fe3fb78 48019689 80010014 7c630034 83e1000c 5463d97e 7c0803a6 38210010
4e800020 81250000 712a0001 41820008 <0fe00000> 9421ffe0 93e1001c 48000030
Implement unmap_kernel_page() which clears an existing pte.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47622

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: Fix a deadlock in the error handler
The following deadlock has been observed on a test setup:
- All tags allocated
- The SCSI error handler calls ufshcd_eh_host_reset_handler()
- ufshcd_eh_host_reset_handler() queues work that calls
ufshcd_err_handler()
- ufshcd_err_handler() locks up as follows:
Workqueue: ufs_eh_wq_0 ufshcd_err_handler.cfi_jt
Call trace:
__switch_to+0x298/0x5d8
__schedule+0x6cc/0xa94
schedule+0x12c/0x298
blk_mq_get_tag+0x210/0x480
__blk_mq_alloc_request+0x1c8/0x284
blk_get_request+0x74/0x134
ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd+0x68/0x640
ufshcd_verify_dev_init+0x68/0x35c
ufshcd_probe_hba+0x12c/0x1cb8
ufshcd_host_reset_and_restore+0x88/0x254
ufshcd_reset_and_restore+0xd0/0x354
ufshcd_err_handler+0x408/0xc58
process_one_work+0x24c/0x66c
worker_thread+0x3e8/0xa4c
kthread+0x150/0x1b4
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
Fix this lockup by making ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd() allocate a reserved
request.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47617

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: pciehp: Fix infinite loop in IRQ handler upon power fault
The Power Fault Detected bit in the Slot Status register differs from
all other hotplug events in that it is sticky: It can only be cleared
after turning off slot power. Per PCIe r5.0, sec. 6.7.1.8:
If a power controller detects a main power fault on the hot-plug slot,
it must automatically set its internal main power fault latch [...].
The main power fault latch is cleared when software turns off power to
the hot-plug slot.
The stickiness used to cause interrupt storms and infinite loops which
were fixed in 2009 by commits 5651c48cfafe ("PCI pciehp: fix power fault
interrupt storm problem") and 99f0169c17f3 ("PCI: pciehp: enable
software notification on empty slots").
Unfortunately in 2020 the infinite loop issue was inadvertently
reintroduced by commit 8edf5332c393 ("PCI: pciehp: Fix MSI interrupt
race"): The hardirq handler pciehp_isr() clears the PFD bit until
pciehp's power_fault_detected flag is set. That happens in the IRQ
thread pciehp_ist(), which never learns of the event because the hardirq
handler is stuck in an infinite loop. Fix by setting the
power_fault_detected flag already in the hardirq handler.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47613

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: virtio: fix completion handling
The driver currently assumes that the notify callback is only received
when the device is done with all the queued buffers.
However, this is not true, since the notify callback could be called
without any of the queued buffers being completed (for example, with
virtio-pci and shared interrupts) or with only some of the buffers being
completed (since the driver makes them available to the device in
multiple separate virtqueue_add_sgs() calls).
This can lead to incorrect data on the I2C bus or memory corruption in
the guest if the device operates on buffers which are have been freed by
the driver. (The WARN_ON in the driver is also triggered.)
BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G W ): Poison overwritten
First byte 0x0 instead of 0x6b
Allocated in i2cdev_ioctl_rdwr+0x9d/0x1de age=243 cpu=0 pid=28
memdup_user+0x2e/0xbd
i2cdev_ioctl_rdwr+0x9d/0x1de
i2cdev_ioctl+0x247/0x2ed
vfs_ioctl+0x21/0x30
sys_ioctl+0xb18/0xb41
Freed in i2cdev_ioctl_rdwr+0x1bb/0x1de age=68 cpu=0 pid=28
kfree+0x1bd/0x1cc
i2cdev_ioctl_rdwr+0x1bb/0x1de
i2cdev_ioctl+0x247/0x2ed
vfs_ioctl+0x21/0x30
sys_ioctl+0xb18/0xb41
Fix this by calling virtio_get_buf() from the notify handler like other
virtio drivers and by actually waiting for all the buffers to be
completed.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47607

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix kernel address leakage in atomic cmpxchg's r0 aux reg
The implementation of BPF_CMPXCHG on a high level has the following parameters:
.-[old-val] .-[new-val]
BPF_R0 = cmpxchg{32,64}(DST_REG + insn->off, BPF_R0, SRC_REG)
`-[mem-loc] `-[old-val]
Given a BPF insn can only have two registers (dst, src), the R0 is fixed and
used as an auxilliary register for input (old value) as well as output (returning
old value from memory location). While the verifier performs a number of safety
checks, it misses to reject unprivileged programs where R0 contains a pointer as
old value.
Through brute-forcing it takes about ~16sec on my machine to leak a kernel pointer
with BPF_CMPXCHG. The PoC is basically probing for kernel addresses by storing the
guessed address into the map slot as a scalar, and using the map value pointer as
R0 while SRC_REG has a canary value to detect a matching address.
Fix it by checking R0 for pointers, and reject if that's the case for unprivileged
programs.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47578

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: scsi_debug: Don't call kcalloc() if size arg is zero
If the size arg to kcalloc() is zero, it returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR. Because of
that, for a following NULL pointer check to work on the returned pointer,
kcalloc() must not be called with the size arg equal to zero. Return early
without error before the kcalloc() call if size arg is zero.
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in sg_copy_buffer+0x138/0x240 lib/scatterlist.c:974
Write of size 4 at addr 0000000000000010 by task syz-executor.1/22789
CPU: 1 PID: 22789 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.15.0-syzk #1
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.13.0-2
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x89/0xb5 lib/dump_stack.c:106
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:446 [inline]
kasan_report.cold.14+0x112/0x117 mm/kasan/report.c:459
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x1a3/0x210 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
memcpy+0x3b/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:66
memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline]
sg_copy_buffer+0x138/0x240 lib/scatterlist.c:974
do_dout_fetch drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:2954 [inline]
do_dout_fetch drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:2946 [inline]
resp_verify+0x49e/0x930 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:4276
schedule_resp+0x4d8/0x1a70 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:5478
scsi_debug_queuecommand+0x8c9/0x1ec0 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:7533
scsi_dispatch_cmd drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1520 [inline]
scsi_queue_rq+0x16b0/0x2d40 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1699
blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0xb9b/0x2700 block/blk-mq.c:1639
__blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x28f/0x590 block/blk-mq-sched.c:325
blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x105/0x190 block/blk-mq-sched.c:358
__blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xe5/0x150 block/blk-mq.c:1761
__blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue+0x4f8/0x5c0 block/blk-mq.c:1838
blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x18d/0x350 block/blk-mq.c:1891
blk_mq_sched_insert_request+0x3db/0x4e0 block/blk-mq-sched.c:474
blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x16b/0x1c0 block/blk-exec.c:62
blk_execute_rq+0xdb/0x360 block/blk-exec.c:102
sg_scsi_ioctl drivers/scsi/scsi_ioctl.c:621 [inline]
scsi_ioctl+0x8bb/0x15c0 drivers/scsi/scsi_ioctl.c:930
sg_ioctl_common+0x172d/0x2710 drivers/scsi/sg.c:1112
sg_ioctl+0xa2/0x180 drivers/scsi/sg.c:1165
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:874 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:860 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x19d/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:860
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47576

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: scsi_debug: Sanity check block descriptor length in resp_mode_select()
In resp_mode_select() sanity check the block descriptor len to avoid UAF.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in resp_mode_select+0xa4c/0xb40 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:2509
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888026670f50 by task scsicmd/15032
CPU: 1 PID: 15032 Comm: scsicmd Not tainted 5.15.0-01d0625 #15
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x89/0xb5 lib/dump_stack.c:107
print_address_description.constprop.9+0x28/0x160 mm/kasan/report.c:257
kasan_report.cold.14+0x7d/0x117 mm/kasan/report.c:443
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:306
resp_mode_select+0xa4c/0xb40 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:2509
schedule_resp+0x4af/0x1a10 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:5483
scsi_debug_queuecommand+0x8c9/0x1e70 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:7537
scsi_queue_rq+0x16b4/0x2d10 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1521
blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0xb9b/0x2700 block/blk-mq.c:1640
__blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x28f/0x590 block/blk-mq-sched.c:325
blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x105/0x190 block/blk-mq-sched.c:358
__blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xe5/0x150 block/blk-mq.c:1762
__blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue+0x4f8/0x5c0 block/blk-mq.c:1839
blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x18d/0x350 block/blk-mq.c:1891
blk_mq_sched_insert_request+0x3db/0x4e0 block/blk-mq-sched.c:474
blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x16b/0x1c0 block/blk-exec.c:63
sg_common_write.isra.18+0xeb3/0x2000 drivers/scsi/sg.c:837
sg_new_write.isra.19+0x570/0x8c0 drivers/scsi/sg.c:775
sg_ioctl_common+0x14d6/0x2710 drivers/scsi/sg.c:941
sg_ioctl+0xa2/0x180 drivers/scsi/sg.c:1166
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x19d/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:52
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:113

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47558

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: Disable Tx queues when reconfiguring the interface
The Tx queues were not disabled in situations where the driver needed to
stop the interface to apply a new configuration. This could result in a
kernel panic when doing any of the 3 following actions:
* reconfiguring the number of queues (ethtool -L)
* reconfiguring the size of the ring buffers (ethtool -G)
* installing/removing an XDP program (ip l set dev ethX xdp)
Prevent the panic by making sure netif_tx_disable is called when stopping
an interface.
Without this patch, the following kernel panic can be observed when doing
any of the actions above:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80001238d040
[....]
Call trace:
dwmac4_set_addr+0x8/0x10
dev_hard_start_xmit+0xe4/0x1ac
sch_direct_xmit+0xe8/0x39c
__dev_queue_xmit+0x3ec/0xaf0
dev_queue_xmit+0x14/0x20
[...]
[ end trace 0000000000000002 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47536

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix wrong list_del in smc_lgr_cleanup_early
smc_lgr_cleanup_early() meant to delete the link
group from the link group list, but it deleted
the list head by mistake.
This may cause memory corruption since we didn't
remove the real link group from the list and later
memseted the link group structure.
We got a list corruption panic when testing:
[ 231.277259] list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffff8881398a8000, but was 0000000000000000
[ 231.278222] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 231.278726] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:53!
[ 231.279326] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 231.279803] CPU: 0 PID: 5 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 5.10.46+ #435
[ 231.280466] Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 8c24b4c 04/01/2014
[ 231.281248] Workqueue: events smc_link_down_work
[ 231.281732] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x70/0x90
[ 231.282258] Code: 4c 60 82 e8 7d cc 6a 00 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 88 4c
60 82 e8 6c cc 6a 00 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 c0 4c 60 82 e8 5b cc 6a 00 <0f>
0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 00 4d 60 82 e8 4a cc 6a 00 0f 0b cc cc cc
[ 231.284146] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000033d58 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 231.284685] RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff8881398a8000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 231.285415] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff88813bc18040 RDI: ffff88813bc18040
[ 231.286141] RBP: ffffffff8305ad40 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 231.286873] R10: ffffffff82803da0 R11: ffffc90000033b90 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 231.287606] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8881398a8000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 231.288337] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 231.289160] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 231.289754] CR2: 0000000000e72058 CR3: 000000010fa96006 CR4: 00000000003706f0
[ 231.290485] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 231.291211] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 231.291940] Call Trace:
[ 231.292211] smc_lgr_terminate_sched+0x53/0xa0
[ 231.292677] smc_switch_conns+0x75/0x6b0
[ 231.293085] ? update_load_avg+0x1a6/0x590
[ 231.293517] ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x17/0x150
[ 231.293907] ? update_load_avg+0x1a6/0x590
[ 231.294317] ? newidle_balance+0xca/0x3d0
[ 231.294716] smcr_link_down+0x50/0x1a0
[ 231.295090] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0x77/0x90
[ 231.295534] smc_link_down_work+0x46/0x60
[ 231.295933] process_one_work+0x18b/0x350

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47517

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: do not perform operations on net devices being unregistered
There is a short period between a net device starts to be unregistered
and when it is actually gone. In that time frame ethtool operations
could still be performed, which might end up in unwanted or undefined
behaviours[1].
Do not allow ethtool operations after a net device starts its
unregistration. This patch targets the netlink part as the ioctl one
isn't affected: the reference to the net device is taken and the
operation is executed within an rtnl lock section and the net device
won't be found after unregister.
[1] For example adding Tx queues after unregister ends up in NULL
pointer exceptions and UaFs, such as:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kobject_get+0x14/0x90
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801961248c by task ethtool/755
CPU: 0 PID: 755 Comm: ethtool Not tainted 5.15.0-rc6+ #778
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/014
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x72
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140
kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
kobject_get+0x14/0x90
kobject_add_internal+0x3d1/0x450
kobject_init_and_add+0xba/0xf0
netdev_queue_update_kobjects+0xcf/0x200
netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0xb4/0x310
veth_set_channels+0x1c3/0x550
ethnl_set_channels+0x524/0x610

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47481

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Initialize the ODP xarray when creating an ODP MR
Normally the zero fill would hide the missing initialization, but an
errant set to desc_size in reg_create() causes a crash:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000800000000
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 5 PID: 890 Comm: ib_write_bw Not tainted 5.15.0-rc4+ #47
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x14/0x3b0 [mlx5_ib]
Code: 48 63 cd 4c 89 f7 48 89 0c 24 e8 37 30 03 e1 48 8b 0c 24 eb a0 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 30 <48> 8b 2f 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 28 31 c0 8b 87 c8
RSP: 0018:ffff88811afa3a60 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 000000000000001c RBX: 0000000800000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000800000000
RBP: 0000000800000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000fffff7ff
R10: ffff88811afa38f8 R11: ffff88811afa38f0 R12: ffffffffa02c7ac0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88811afa3cd8 R15: ffff88810772fa00
FS: 00007f47b9080740(0000) GS:ffff88852cd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000800000000 CR3: 000000010761e003 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
mlx5_ib_free_odp_mr+0x95/0xc0 [mlx5_ib]
mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x128/0x3b0 [mlx5_ib]
ib_dereg_mr_user+0x45/0xb0 [ib_core]
? xas_load+0x8/0x80
destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x1a/0x50 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x2f/0x150 [ib_uverbs]
uobj_destroy+0x3c/0x70 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x467/0xb00 [ib_uverbs]
? uverbs_finalize_object+0x60/0x60 [ib_uverbs]
? ttwu_queue_wakelist+0xa9/0xe0
? pty_write+0x85/0x90
? file_tty_write.isra.33+0x214/0x330
? process_echoes+0x60/0x60
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xa7/0x110 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x10d/0x8e0
? vfs_write+0x17f/0x260
do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Add the missing xarray initialization and remove the desc_size set.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47438

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix memory leak in mlx5_core_destroy_cq() error path
Prior to this patch in case mlx5_core_destroy_cq() failed it returns
without completing all destroy operations and that leads to memory leak.
Instead, complete the destroy flow before return error.
Also move mlx5_debug_cq_remove() to the beginning of mlx5_core_destroy_cq()
to be symmetrical with mlx5_core_create_cq().
kmemleak complains on:
unreferenced object 0xc000000038625100 (size 64):
comm "ethtool", pid 28301, jiffies 4298062946 (age 785.380s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
60 01 48 94 00 00 00 c0 b8 05 34 c3 00 00 00 c0 `.H.......4.....
02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 db 7d c1 00 00 00 c0 ..........}.....
backtrace:
[<000000009e8643cb>] add_res_tree+0xd0/0x270 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000e7cb8e6c>] mlx5_debug_cq_add+0x5c/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
[<000000002a12918f>] mlx5_core_create_cq+0x1d0/0x2d0 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000cef0a696>] mlx5e_create_cq+0x210/0x3f0 [mlx5_core]
[<000000009c642c26>] mlx5e_open_cq+0xb4/0x130 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000058dfa578>] mlx5e_ptp_open+0x7f4/0xe10 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000081839561>] mlx5e_open_channels+0x9cc/0x13e0 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000009cf05d4>] mlx5e_switch_priv_channels+0xa4/0x230
[mlx5_core]
[<0000000042bbedd8>] mlx5e_safe_switch_params+0x14c/0x300
[mlx5_core]
[<0000000004bc9db8>] set_pflag_tx_port_ts+0x9c/0x160 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000a0553443>] mlx5e_set_priv_flags+0xd0/0x1b0 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000a8f3d84b>] ethnl_set_privflags+0x234/0x2d0
[<00000000fd27f27c>] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x108/0x1d0
[<00000000f495e2bb>] genl_family_rcv_msg+0xe4/0x1f0
[<00000000646c5c2c>] genl_rcv_msg+0x78/0x120
[<00000000d53e384e>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x74/0x1a0

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47430

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/entry: Clear X86_FEATURE_SMAP when CONFIG_X86_SMAP=n
Commit
3c73b81a9164 ("x86/entry, selftests: Further improve user entry sanity checks")
added a warning if AC is set when in the kernel.
Commit
662a0221893a3d ("x86/entry: Fix AC assertion")
changed the warning to only fire if the CPU supports SMAP.
However, the warning can still trigger on a machine that supports SMAP
but where it's disabled in the kernel config and when running the
syscall_nt selftest, for example:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 49 at irqentry_enter_from_user_mode
CPU: 0 PID: 49 Comm: init Tainted: G T 5.15.0-rc4+ #98 e6202628ee053b4f310759978284bd8bb0ce6905
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:irqentry_enter_from_user_mode
...
Call Trace:
? irqentry_enter
? exc_general_protection
? asm_exc_general_protection
? asm_exc_general_protectio
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SMAP) could be added to the warning condition, but
even this would not be enough in case SMAP is disabled at boot time with
the "nosmap" parameter.
To be consistent with "nosmap" behaviour, clear X86_FEATURE_SMAP when
!CONFIG_X86_SMAP.
Found using entry-fuzz + satrandconfig.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47349

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mwifiex: bring down link before deleting interface
We can deadlock when rmmod'ing the driver or going through firmware
reset, because the cfg80211_unregister_wdev() has to bring down the link
for us, ... which then grab the same wiphy lock.
nl80211_del_interface() already handles a very similar case, with a nice
description:
/*
* We hold RTNL, so this is safe, without RTNL opencount cannot
* reach 0, and thus the rdev cannot be deleted.
*
* We need to do it for the dev_close(), since that will call
* the netdev notifiers, and we need to acquire the mutex there
* but don't know if we get there from here or from some other
* place (e.g. "ip link set ... down").
*/
mutex_unlock(&rdev->wiphy.mtx);
...
Do similarly for mwifiex teardown, by ensuring we bring the link down
first.
Sample deadlock trace:
[ 247.103516] INFO: task rmmod:2119 blocked for more than 123 seconds.
[ 247.110630] Not tainted 5.12.4 #5
[ 247.115796] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 247.124557] task:rmmod state:D stack: 0 pid: 2119 ppid: 2114 flags:0x00400208
[ 247.133905] Call trace:
[ 247.136644] __switch_to+0x130/0x170
[ 247.140643] __schedule+0x714/0xa0c
[ 247.144548] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x88/0xf4
[ 247.149714] __mutex_lock_common+0x43c/0x750
[ 247.154496] mutex_lock_nested+0x5c/0x68
[ 247.158884] cfg80211_netdev_notifier_call+0x280/0x4e0 [cfg80211]
[ 247.165769] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x78
[ 247.170742] call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x68/0xa4
[ 247.176305] __dev_close_many+0x7c/0x138
[ 247.180693] dev_close_many+0x7c/0x10c
[ 247.184893] unregister_netdevice_many+0xfc/0x654
[ 247.190158] unregister_netdevice_queue+0xb4/0xe0
[ 247.195424] _cfg80211_unregister_wdev+0xa4/0x204 [cfg80211]
[ 247.201816] cfg80211_unregister_wdev+0x20/0x2c [cfg80211]
[ 247.208016] mwifiex_del_virtual_intf+0xc8/0x188 [mwifiex]
[ 247.214174] mwifiex_uninit_sw+0x158/0x1b0 [mwifiex]
[ 247.219747] mwifiex_remove_card+0x38/0xa0 [mwifiex]
[ 247.225316] mwifiex_pcie_remove+0xd0/0xe0 [mwifiex_pcie]
[ 247.231451] pci_device_remove+0x50/0xe0
[ 247.235849] device_release_driver_internal+0x110/0x1b0
[ 247.241701] driver_detach+0x5c/0x9c
[ 247.245704] bus_remove_driver+0x84/0xb8
[ 247.250095] driver_unregister+0x3c/0x60
[ 247.254486] pci_unregister_driver+0x2c/0x90
[ 247.259267] cleanup_module+0x18/0xcdc [mwifiex_pcie]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47272

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: dwc3: gadget: Bail from dwc3_gadget_exit() if dwc->gadget is NULL
There exists a possible scenario in which dwc3_gadget_init() can fail:
during during host -> peripheral mode switch in dwc3_set_mode(), and
a pending gadget driver fails to bind. Then, if the DRD undergoes
another mode switch from peripheral->host the resulting
dwc3_gadget_exit() will attempt to reference an invalid and dangling
dwc->gadget pointer as well as call dma_free_coherent() on unmapped
DMA pointers.
The exact scenario can be reproduced as follows:
- Start DWC3 in peripheral mode
- Configure ConfigFS gadget with FunctionFS instance (or use g_ffs)
- Run FunctionFS userspace application (open EPs, write descriptors, etc)
- Bind gadget driver to DWC3's UDC
- Switch DWC3 to host mode
=> dwc3_gadget_exit() is called. usb_del_gadget() will put the
ConfigFS driver instance on the gadget_driver_pending_list
- Stop FunctionFS application (closes the ep files)
- Switch DWC3 to peripheral mode
=> dwc3_gadget_init() fails as usb_add_gadget() calls
check_pending_gadget_drivers() and attempts to rebind the UDC
to the ConfigFS gadget but fails with -19 (-ENODEV) because the
FFS instance is not in FFS_ACTIVE state (userspace has not
re-opened and written the descriptors yet, i.e. desc_ready!=0).
- Switch DWC3 back to host mode
=> dwc3_gadget_exit() is called again, but this time dwc->gadget
is invalid.
Although it can be argued that userspace should take responsibility
for ensuring that the FunctionFS application be ready prior to
allowing the composite driver bind to the UDC, failure to do so
should not result in a panic from the kernel driver.
Fix this by setting dwc->gadget to NULL in the failure path of
dwc3_gadget_init() and add a check to dwc3_gadget_exit() to bail out
unless the gadget pointer is valid.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47266

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/ipoib: Fix warning caused by destroying non-initial netns
After the commit 5ce2dced8e95 ("RDMA/ipoib: Set rtnl_link_ops for ipoib
interfaces"), if the IPoIB device is moved to non-initial netns,
destroying that netns lets the device vanish instead of moving it back to
the initial netns, This is happening because default_device_exit() skips
the interfaces due to having rtnl_link_ops set.
Steps to reporoduce:
ip netns add foo
ip link set mlx5_ib0 netns foo
ip netns delete foo
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 704 at net/core/dev.c:11435 netdev_exit+0x3f/0x50
Modules linked in: xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT
nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_counter nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack
nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink tun d
fuse
CPU: 1 PID: 704 Comm: kworker/u64:3 Tainted: G S W 5.13.0-rc1+ #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R630/02C2CP, BIOS 2.1.5 04/11/2016
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:netdev_exit+0x3f/0x50
Code: 48 8b bb 30 01 00 00 e8 ef 81 b1 ff 48 81 fb c0 3a 54 a1 74 13 48
8b 83 90 00 00 00 48 81 c3 90 00 00 00 48 39 d8 75 02 5b c3 <0f> 0b 5b
c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 0f 1f 44 00
RSP: 0018:ffffb297079d7e08 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: ffff8eb542c00040 RBX: ffff8eb541333150 RCX: 000000008010000d
RDX: 000000008010000e RSI: 000000008010000d RDI: ffff8eb440042c00
RBP: ffffb297079d7e48 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffff9fdeac00
R10: ffff8eb5003be000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffa1545620
R13: ffffffffa1545628 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffa1543b20
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ed37fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005601b5f4c2e8 CR3: 0000001fc8c10002 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
ops_exit_list.isra.9+0x36/0x70
cleanup_net+0x234/0x390
process_one_work+0x1cb/0x360
? process_one_work+0x360/0x360
worker_thread+0x30/0x370
? process_one_work+0x360/0x360
kthread+0x116/0x130
? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
To avoid the above warning and later on the kernel panic that could happen
on shutdown due to a NULL pointer dereference, make sure to set the
netns_refund flag that was introduced by commit 3a5ca857079e ("can: dev:
Move device back to init netns on owning netns delete") to properly
restore the IPoIB interfaces to the initial netns.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47261

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/mlx5: Fix initializing CQ fragments buffer
The function init_cq_frag_buf() can be called to initialize the current CQ
fragments buffer cq->buf, or the temporary cq->resize_buf that is filled
during CQ resize operation.
However, the offending commit started to use function get_cqe() for
getting the CQEs, the issue with this change is that get_cqe() always
returns CQEs from cq->buf, which leads us to initialize the wrong buffer,
and in case of enlarging the CQ we try to access elements beyond the size
of the current cq->buf and eventually hit a kernel panic.
[exception RIP: init_cq_frag_buf+103]
[ffff9f799ddcbcd8] mlx5_ib_resize_cq at ffffffffc0835d60 [mlx5_ib]
[ffff9f799ddcbdb0] ib_resize_cq at ffffffffc05270df [ib_core]
[ffff9f799ddcbdc0] llt_rdma_setup_qp at ffffffffc0a6a712 [llt]
[ffff9f799ddcbe10] llt_rdma_cc_event_action at ffffffffc0a6b411 [llt]
[ffff9f799ddcbe98] llt_rdma_client_conn_thread at ffffffffc0a6bb75 [llt]
[ffff9f799ddcbec8] kthread at ffffffffa66c5da1
[ffff9f799ddcbf50] ret_from_fork_nospec_begin at ffffffffa6d95ddd
Fix it by getting the needed CQE by calling mlx5_frag_buf_get_wqe() that
takes the correct source buffer as a parameter.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47250

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv4: fix memory leak in netlbl_cipsov4_add_std
Reported by syzkaller:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888105df7000 (size 64):
comm "syz-executor842", pid 360, jiffies 4294824824 (age 22.546s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000e67ed558>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:590 [inline]
[<00000000e67ed558>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:720 [inline]
[<00000000e67ed558>] netlbl_cipsov4_add_std net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c:145 [inline]
[<00000000e67ed558>] netlbl_cipsov4_add+0x390/0x2340 net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c:416
[<0000000006040154>] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x20e/0x320 net/netlink/genetlink.c:739
[<00000000204d7a1c>] genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:783 [inline]
[<00000000204d7a1c>] genl_rcv_msg+0x2bf/0x4f0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:800
[<00000000c0d6a995>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x134/0x3d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504
[<00000000d78b9d2c>] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:811
[<000000009733081b>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
[<000000009733081b>] netlink_unicast+0x4a0/0x6a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340
[<00000000d5fd43b8>] netlink_sendmsg+0x789/0xc70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929
[<000000000a2d1e40>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
[<000000000a2d1e40>] sock_sendmsg+0x139/0x170 net/socket.c:674
[<00000000321d1969>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x658/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2350
[<00000000964e16bc>] ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
[<000000001615e288>] __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x190 net/socket.c:2433
[<000000004ee8b6a5>] do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
[<00000000171c7cee>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The memory of doi_def->map.std pointing is allocated in
netlbl_cipsov4_add_std, but no place has freed it. It should be
freed in cipso_v4_doi_free which frees the cipso DOI resource.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47241

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: strset: fix message length calculation
Outer nest for ETHTOOL_A_STRSET_STRINGSETS is not accounted for.
This may result in ETHTOOL_MSG_STRSET_GET producing a warning like:
calculated message payload length (684) not sufficient
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 30967 at net/ethtool/netlink.c:369 ethnl_default_doit+0x87a/0xa20
and a splat.
As usually with such warnings three conditions must be met for the warning
to trigger:
- there must be no skb size rounding up (e.g. reply_size of 684);
- string set must be per-device (so that the header gets populated);
- the device name must be at least 12 characters long.
all in all with current user space it looks like reading priv flags
is the only place this could potentially happen. Or with syzbot :)

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47237

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hamradio: fix memory leak in mkiss_close
My local syzbot instance hit memory leak in
mkiss_open()[1]. The problem was in missing
free_netdev() in mkiss_close().
In mkiss_open() netdevice is allocated and then
registered, but in mkiss_close() netdevice was
only unregistered, but not freed.
Fail log:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8880281ba000 (size 4096):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 11443, jiffies 4295046091 (age 17.660s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
61 78 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ax0.............
00 27 fa 2a 80 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .'.*............
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81a27201>] kvmalloc_node+0x61/0xf0
[<ffffffff8706e7e8>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x98/0xe80
[<ffffffff84e64192>] mkiss_open+0xb2/0x6f0 [1]
[<ffffffff842355db>] tty_ldisc_open+0x9b/0x110
[<ffffffff84236488>] tty_set_ldisc+0x2e8/0x670
[<ffffffff8421f7f3>] tty_ioctl+0xda3/0x1440
[<ffffffff81c9f273>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200
[<ffffffff8911263a>] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0
[<ffffffff89200068>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8880141a9a00 (size 96):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 11443, jiffies 4295046091 (age 17.660s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
e8 a2 1b 28 80 88 ff ff e8 a2 1b 28 80 88 ff ff ...(.......(....
98 92 9c aa b0 40 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....@..........
backtrace:
[<ffffffff8709f68b>] __hw_addr_create_ex+0x5b/0x310
[<ffffffff8709fb38>] __hw_addr_add_ex+0x1f8/0x2b0
[<ffffffff870a0c7b>] dev_addr_init+0x10b/0x1f0
[<ffffffff8706e88b>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x13b/0xe80
[<ffffffff84e64192>] mkiss_open+0xb2/0x6f0 [1]
[<ffffffff842355db>] tty_ldisc_open+0x9b/0x110
[<ffffffff84236488>] tty_set_ldisc+0x2e8/0x670
[<ffffffff8421f7f3>] tty_ioctl+0xda3/0x1440
[<ffffffff81c9f273>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200
[<ffffffff8911263a>] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0
[<ffffffff89200068>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8880219bfc00 (size 512):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 11443, jiffies 4295046091 (age 17.660s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 a0 1b 28 80 88 ff ff 80 8f b1 8d ff ff ff ff ...(............
80 8f b1 8d ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81a27201>] kvmalloc_node+0x61/0xf0
[<ffffffff8706eec7>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x777/0xe80
[<ffffffff84e64192>] mkiss_open+0xb2/0x6f0 [1]
[<ffffffff842355db>] tty_ldisc_open+0x9b/0x110
[<ffffffff84236488>] tty_set_ldisc+0x2e8/0x670
[<ffffffff8421f7f3>] tty_ioctl+0xda3/0x1440
[<ffffffff81c9f273>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200
[<ffffffff8911263a>] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0
[<ffffffff89200068>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888029b2b200 (size 256):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 11443, jiffies 4295046091 (age 17.660s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81a27201>] kvmalloc_node+0x61/0xf0
[<ffffffff8706f062>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x912/0xe80
[<ffffffff84e64192>] mkiss_open+0xb2/0x6f0 [1]
[<ffffffff842355db>] tty_ldisc_open+0x9b/0x110
[<ffffffff84236488>] tty_set_ldisc+0x2e8/0x670
[<ffffffff8421f7f3>] tty_ioctl+0xda3/0x1440
[<ffffffff81c9f273>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200
[<ffffffff8911263a>] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0
[<ffffffff89200068>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47226

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer
Both Intel and AMD consider it to be architecturally valid for XRSTOR to
fail with #PF but nonetheless change the register state. The actual
conditions under which this might occur are unclear [1], but it seems
plausible that this might be triggered if one sibling thread unmaps a page
and invalidates the shared TLB while another sibling thread is executing
XRSTOR on the page in question.
__fpu__restore_sig() can execute XRSTOR while the hardware registers
are preserved on behalf of a different victim task (using the
fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx mechanism), and, in theory, XRSTOR could fail but
modify the registers.
If this happens, then there is a window in which __fpu__restore_sig()
could schedule out and the victim task could schedule back in without
reloading its own FPU registers. This would result in part of the FPU
state that __fpu__restore_sig() was attempting to load leaking into the
victim task's user-visible state.
Invalidate preserved FPU registers on XRSTOR failure to prevent this
situation from corrupting any state.
[1] Frequent readers of the errata lists might imagine "complex
microarchitectural conditions".

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47222

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: fix vlan tunnel dst refcnt when egressing
The egress tunnel code uses dst_clone() and directly sets the result
which is wrong because the entry might have 0 refcnt or be already deleted,
causing number of problems. It also triggers the WARN_ON() in dst_hold()[1]
when a refcnt couldn't be taken. Fix it by using dst_hold_safe() and
checking if a reference was actually taken before setting the dst.
[1] dmesg WARN_ON log and following refcnt errors
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 38 at include/net/dst.h:230 br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel+0x10b/0x134 [bridge]
Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp bridge stp llc bonding ipv6 virtio_net
CPU: 5 PID: 38 Comm: ksoftirqd/5 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 5.13.0-rc3+ #360
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel+0x10b/0x134 [bridge]
Code: e8 85 bc 01 e1 45 84 f6 74 90 45 31 f6 85 db 48 c7 c7 a0 02 19 a0 41 0f 94 c6 31 c9 31 d2 44 89 f6 e8 64 bc 01 e1 85 db 75 02 <0f> 0b 31 c9 31 d2 44 89 f6 48 c7 c7 70 02 19 a0 e8 4b bc 01 e1 49
RSP: 0018:ffff8881003d39e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffa01902a0
RBP: ffff8881040c6700 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 2ce93d0054fe0d00 R11: 54fe0d00000e0000 R12: ffff888109515000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000401
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88822bf40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f42ba70f030 CR3: 0000000109926000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
br_handle_vlan+0xbc/0xca [bridge]
__br_forward+0x23/0x164 [bridge]
deliver_clone+0x41/0x48 [bridge]
br_handle_frame_finish+0x36f/0x3aa [bridge]
? skb_dst+0x2e/0x38 [bridge]
? br_handle_ingress_vlan_tunnel+0x3e/0x1c8 [bridge]
? br_handle_frame_finish+0x3aa/0x3aa [bridge]
br_handle_frame+0x2c3/0x377 [bridge]
? __skb_pull+0x33/0x51
? vlan_do_receive+0x4f/0x36a
? br_handle_frame_finish+0x3aa/0x3aa [bridge]
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x539/0x7c6
? __list_del_entry_valid+0x16e/0x1c2
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x6d/0xd6
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1d9/0x1fa
gro_normal_list+0x22/0x3e
dev_gro_receive+0x55b/0x600
? detach_buf_split+0x58/0x140
napi_gro_receive+0x94/0x12e
virtnet_poll+0x15d/0x315 [virtio_net]
__napi_poll+0x2c/0x1c9
net_rx_action+0xe6/0x1fb
__do_softirq+0x115/0x2d8
run_ksoftirqd+0x18/0x20
smpboot_thread_fn+0x183/0x19c
? smpboot_unregister_percpu_thread+0x66/0x66
kthread+0x10a/0x10f
? kthread_mod_delayed_work+0xb6/0xb6
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
---[ end trace 49f61b07f775fd2b ]---
dst_release: dst:00000000c02d677a refcnt:-1
dst_release underflow

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47202

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thermal: Fix NULL pointer dereferences in of_thermal_ functions
of_parse_thermal_zones() parses the thermal-zones node and registers a
thermal_zone device for each subnode. However, if a thermal zone is
consuming a thermal sensor and that thermal sensor device hasn't probed
yet, an attempt to set trip_point_*_temp for that thermal zone device
can cause a NULL pointer dereference. Fix it.
console:/sys/class/thermal/thermal_zone87 # echo 120000 > trip_point_0_temp
...
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000020
...
Call trace:
of_thermal_set_trip_temp+0x40/0xc4
trip_point_temp_store+0xc0/0x1dc
dev_attr_store+0x38/0x88
sysfs_kf_write+0x64/0xc0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x108/0x1d0
vfs_write+0x2f4/0x368
ksys_write+0x7c/0xec
__arm64_sys_write+0x20/0x30
el0_svc_common.llvm.7279915941325364641+0xbc/0x1bc
do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0
el0_svc+0x14/0x24
el0_sync_handler+0x88/0xec
el0_sync+0x1c0/0x200
While at it, fix the possible NULL pointer dereference in other
functions as well: of_thermal_get_temp(), of_thermal_set_emul_temp(),
of_thermal_get_trend().

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47199

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: CT, Fix multiple allocations and memleak of mod acts
CT clear action offload adds additional mod hdr actions to the
flow's original mod actions in order to clear the registers which
hold ct_state.
When such flow also includes encap action, a neigh update event
can cause the driver to unoffload the flow and then reoffload it.
Each time this happens, the ct clear handling adds that same set
of mod hdr actions to reset ct_state until the max of mod hdr
actions is reached.
Also the driver never releases the allocated mod hdr actions and
causing a memleak.
Fix above two issues by moving CT clear mod acts allocation
into the parsing actions phase and only use it when offloading the rule.
The release of mod acts will be done in the normal flow_put().
backtrace:
[<000000007316e2f3>] krealloc+0x83/0xd0
[<00000000ef157de1>] mlx5e_mod_hdr_alloc+0x147/0x300 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000970ce4ae>] mlx5e_tc_match_to_reg_set_and_get_id+0xd7/0x240 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000067c5fa17>] mlx5e_tc_match_to_reg_set+0xa/0x20 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000d032eb98>] mlx5_tc_ct_entry_set_registers.isra.0+0x36/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000fd23b869>] mlx5_tc_ct_flow_offload+0x272/0x1f10 [mlx5_core]
[<000000004fc24acc>] mlx5e_tc_offload_fdb_rules.part.0+0x150/0x620 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000dc741c17>] mlx5e_tc_encap_flows_add+0x489/0x690 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000e92e49d7>] mlx5e_rep_update_flows+0x6e4/0x9b0 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000f60f5602>] mlx5e_rep_neigh_update+0x39a/0x5d0 [mlx5_core]

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47197

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: nullify cq->dbg pointer in mlx5_debug_cq_remove()
Prior to this patch in case mlx5_core_destroy_cq() failed it proceeds
to rest of destroy operations. mlx5_core_destroy_cq() could be called again
by user and cause additional call of mlx5_debug_cq_remove().
cq->dbg was not nullify in previous call and cause the crash.
Fix it by nullify cq->dbg pointer after removal.
Also proceed to destroy operations only if FW return 0
for MLX5_CMD_OP_DESTROY_CQ command.
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x2000300004058: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 5 PID: 1228 Comm: python Not tainted 5.15.0-rc5_for_upstream_min_debug_2021_10_14_11_06 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:lockref_get+0x1/0x60
Code: 5d e9 53 ff ff ff 48 8d 7f 70 e8 0a 2e 48 00 c7 85 d0 00 00 00 02
00 00 00 c6 45 70 00 fb 5d c3 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 53 <48> 8b 17
48 89 fb 85 d2 75 3d 48 89 d0 bf 64 00 00 00 48 89 c1 48
RSP: 0018:ffff888137dd7a38 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888107d5f458 RCX: 00000000fffffffe
RDX: 000000000002c2b0 RSI: ffffffff8155e2e0 RDI: 0002000300004058
RBP: ffff888137dd7a88 R08: 0002000300004058 R09: ffff8881144a9f88
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881141d4000
R13: ffff888137dd7c68 R14: ffff888137dd7d58 R15: ffff888137dd7cc0
FS: 00007f4644f2a4c0(0000) GS:ffff8887a2d40000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055b4500f4380 CR3: 0000000114f7a003 CR4: 0000000000170ea0
Call Trace:
simple_recursive_removal+0x33/0x2e0
? debugfs_remove+0x60/0x60
debugfs_remove+0x40/0x60
mlx5_debug_cq_remove+0x32/0x70 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_core_destroy_cq+0x41/0x1d0 [mlx5_core]
devx_obj_cleanup+0x151/0x330 [mlx5_ib]
? __pollwait+0xd0/0xd0
? xas_load+0x5/0x70
? xa_load+0x62/0xa0
destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x20/0x80 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x3b/0x360 [ib_uverbs]
uobj_destroy+0x54/0xa0 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0xaf2/0x1160 [ib_uverbs]
? uverbs_finalize_object+0xd0/0xd0 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x1b0 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x3e4/0x8e0

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47196

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: Set send and receive CQ before forwarding to the driver
Preset both receive and send CQ pointers prior to call to the drivers and
overwrite it later again till the mlx4 is going to be changed do not
overwrite ibqp properties.
This change is needed for mlx5, because in case of QP creation failure, it
will go to the path of QP destroy which relies on proper CQ pointers.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in create_qp.cold+0x164/0x16e [mlx5_ib]
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880064c55c0 by task a.out/246
CPU: 0 PID: 246 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.15.0+ #291
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
create_qp.cold+0x164/0x16e [mlx5_ib]
mlx5_ib_create_qp+0x358/0x28a0 [mlx5_ib]
create_qp.part.0+0x45b/0x6a0 [ib_core]
ib_create_qp_user+0x97/0x150 [ib_core]
ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_CREATE+0x92c/0x1250 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1c38/0x3150 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x169/0x260 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x866/0x14d0
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Allocated by task 246:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0xa4/0xd0
create_qp.part.0+0x92/0x6a0 [ib_core]
ib_create_qp_user+0x97/0x150 [ib_core]
ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_CREATE+0x92c/0x1250 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1c38/0x3150 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x169/0x260 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x866/0x14d0
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Freed by task 246:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
__kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x150
slab_free_freelist_hook+0xb4/0x1b0
kfree+0xe7/0x2a0
create_qp.part.0+0x52b/0x6a0 [ib_core]
ib_create_qp_user+0x97/0x150 [ib_core]
ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_CREATE+0x92c/0x1250 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1c38/0x3150 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x169/0x260 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x866/0x14d0
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47191

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: scsi_debug: Fix out-of-bound read in resp_readcap16()
The following warning was observed running syzkaller:
[ 3813.830724] sg_write: data in/out 65466/242 bytes for SCSI command 0x9e-- guessing data in;
[ 3813.830724] program syz-executor not setting count and/or reply_len properly
[ 3813.836956] ==================================================================
[ 3813.839465] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x157/0x1e0
[ 3813.841773] Read of size 4096 at addr ffff8883cf80f540 by task syz-executor/1549
[ 3813.846612] Call Trace:
[ 3813.846995] dump_stack+0x108/0x15f
[ 3813.847524] print_address_description+0xa5/0x372
[ 3813.848243] kasan_report.cold+0x236/0x2a8
[ 3813.849439] check_memory_region+0x240/0x270
[ 3813.850094] memcpy+0x30/0x80
[ 3813.850553] sg_copy_buffer+0x157/0x1e0
[ 3813.853032] sg_copy_from_buffer+0x13/0x20
[ 3813.853660] fill_from_dev_buffer+0x135/0x370
[ 3813.854329] resp_readcap16+0x1ac/0x280
[ 3813.856917] schedule_resp+0x41f/0x1630
[ 3813.858203] scsi_debug_queuecommand+0xb32/0x17e0
[ 3813.862699] scsi_dispatch_cmd+0x330/0x950
[ 3813.863329] scsi_request_fn+0xd8e/0x1710
[ 3813.863946] __blk_run_queue+0x10b/0x230
[ 3813.864544] blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x1d8/0x400
[ 3813.865220] sg_common_write.isra.0+0xe61/0x2420
[ 3813.871637] sg_write+0x6c8/0xef0
[ 3813.878853] __vfs_write+0xe4/0x800
[ 3813.883487] vfs_write+0x17b/0x530
[ 3813.884008] ksys_write+0x103/0x270
[ 3813.886268] __x64_sys_write+0x77/0xc0
[ 3813.886841] do_syscall_64+0x106/0x360
[ 3813.887415] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
This issue can be reproduced with the following syzkaller log:
r0 = openat(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000040)='./file0\x00', 0x26e1, 0x0)
r1 = syz_open_procfs(0xffffffffffffffff, &(0x7f0000000000)='fd/3\x00')
open_by_handle_at(r1, &(0x7f00000003c0)=ANY=[@ANYRESHEX], 0x602000)
r2 = syz_open_dev$sg(&(0x7f0000000000), 0x0, 0x40782)
write$binfmt_aout(r2, &(0x7f0000000340)=ANY=[@ANYBLOB="00000000deff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000047f007af9e107a41ec395f1bded7be24277a1501ff6196a83366f4e6362bc0ff2b247f68a972989b094b2da4fb3607fcf611a22dd04310d28c75039d"], 0x126)
In resp_readcap16() we get "int alloc_len" value -1104926854, and then pass
the huge arr_len to fill_from_dev_buffer(), but arr is only 32 bytes. This
leads to OOB in sg_copy_buffer().
To solve this issue, define alloc_len as u32.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47182

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: core: Fix scsi_mode_sense() buffer length handling
Several problems exist with scsi_mode_sense() buffer length handling:
1) The allocation length field of the MODE SENSE(10) command is 16-bits,
occupying bytes 7 and 8 of the CDB. With this command, access to mode
pages larger than 255 bytes is thus possible. However, the CDB
allocation length field is set by assigning len to byte 8 only, thus
truncating buffer length larger than 255.
2) If scsi_mode_sense() is called with len smaller than 8 with
sdev->use_10_for_ms set, or smaller than 4 otherwise, the buffer length
is increased to 8 and 4 respectively, and the buffer is zero filled
with these increased values, thus corrupting the memory following the
buffer.
Fix these 2 problems by using put_unaligned_be16() to set the allocation
length field of MODE SENSE(10) CDB and by returning an error when len is
too small.
Furthermore, if len is larger than 255B, always try MODE SENSE(10) first,
even if the device driver did not set sdev->use_10_for_ms. In case of
invalid opcode error for MODE SENSE(10), access to mode pages larger than
255 bytes are not retried using MODE SENSE(6). To avoid buffer length
overflows for the MODE_SENSE(10) case, check that len is smaller than 65535
bytes.
While at it, also fix the folowing:
* Use get_unaligned_be16() to retrieve the mode data length and block
descriptor length fields of the mode sense reply header instead of using
an open coded calculation.
* Fix the kdoc dbd argument explanation: the DBD bit stands for Disable
Block Descriptor, which is the opposite of what the dbd argument
description was.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47089

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kfence: fix memory leak when cat kfence objects
Hulk robot reported a kmemleak problem:
unreferenced object 0xffff93d1d8cc02e8 (size 248):
comm "cat", pid 23327, jiffies 4624670141 (age 495992.217s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 40 85 19 d4 93 ff ff 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 .@..............
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
seq_open+0x2a/0x80
full_proxy_open+0x167/0x1e0
do_dentry_open+0x1e1/0x3a0
path_openat+0x961/0xa20
do_filp_open+0xae/0x120
do_sys_openat2+0x216/0x2f0
do_sys_open+0x57/0x80
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
unreferenced object 0xffff93d419854000 (size 4096):
comm "cat", pid 23327, jiffies 4624670141 (age 495992.217s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
6b 66 65 6e 63 65 2d 23 32 35 30 3a 20 30 78 30 kfence-#250: 0x0
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 37 35 34 62 64 61 31 32 2d 0000000754bda12-
backtrace:
seq_read_iter+0x313/0x440
seq_read+0x14b/0x1a0
full_proxy_read+0x56/0x80
vfs_read+0xa5/0x1b0
ksys_read+0xa0/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
I find that we can easily reproduce this problem with the following
commands:
cat /sys/kernel/debug/kfence/objects
echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
The leaked memory is allocated in the stack below:
do_syscall_64
do_sys_open
do_dentry_open
full_proxy_open
seq_open ---> alloc seq_file
vfs_read
full_proxy_read
seq_read
seq_read_iter
traverse ---> alloc seq_buf
And it should have been released in the following process:
do_syscall_64
syscall_exit_to_user_mode
exit_to_user_mode_prepare
task_work_run
____fput
__fput
full_proxy_release ---> free here
However, the release function corresponding to file_operations is not
implemented in kfence. As a result, a memory leak occurs. Therefore,
the solution to this problem is to implement the corresponding release
function.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47014

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_ct: fix wild memory access when clearing fragments
while testing re-assembly/re-fragmentation using act_ct, it's possible to
observe a crash like the following one:
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x0001000000000448-0x000100000000044f]
CPU: 50 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/50 Tainted: G S 5.12.0-rc7+ #424
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017
RIP: 0010:inet_frag_rbtree_purge+0x50/0xc0
Code: 00 fc ff df 48 89 c3 31 ed 48 89 df e8 a9 7a 38 ff 4c 89 fe 48 89 df 49 89 c6 e8 5b 3a 38 ff 48 8d 7b 40 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 20 00 75 59 48 8d bb d0 00 00 00 4c 8b 6b 40 48 89 f8 48
RSP: 0018:ffff888c31449db8 EFLAGS: 00010203
RAX: 0000200000000089 RBX: 000100000000040e RCX: ffffffff989eb960
RDX: 0000000000000140 RSI: ffffffff97cfb977 RDI: 000100000000044e
RBP: 0000000000000900 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1186289350
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffed1186289350 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: 000100000000040e R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888155e02160
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888c31440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005600cb70a5b8 CR3: 0000000a2c014005 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
inet_frag_destroy+0xa9/0x150
call_timer_fn+0x2d/0x180
run_timer_softirq+0x4fe/0xe70
__do_softirq+0x197/0x5a0
irq_exit_rcu+0x1de/0x200
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6b/0x80
</IRQ>
when act_ct temporarily stores an IP fragment, restoring the skb qdisc cb
results in putting random data in FRAG_CB(), and this causes those "wild"
memory accesses later, when the rbtree is purged. Never overwrite the skb
cb in case tcf_ct_handle_fragments() returns -EINPROGRESS.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-46910

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ARM: 9063/1: mm: reduce maximum number of CPUs if DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL is enabled
The debugging code for kmap_local() doubles the number of per-CPU fixmap
slots allocated for kmap_local(), in order to use half of them as guard
regions. This causes the fixmap region to grow downwards beyond the start
of its reserved window if the supported number of CPUs is large, and collide
with the newly added virtual DT mapping right below it, which is obviously
not good.
One manifestation of this is EFI boot on a kernel built with NR_CPUS=32
and CONFIG_DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL=y, which may pass the FDT in highmem, resulting
in block entries below the fixmap region that the fixmap code misidentifies
as fixmap table entries, and subsequently tries to dereference using a
phys-to-virt translation that is only valid for lowmem. This results in a
cryptic splat such as the one below.
ftrace: allocating 45548 entries in 89 pages
8<--- cut here ---
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fc6006f0
pgd = (ptrval)
[fc6006f0] *pgd=80000040207003, *pmd=00000000
Internal error: Oops: a06 [#1] SMP ARM
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.11.0+ #382
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
PC is at cpu_ca15_set_pte_ext+0x24/0x30
LR is at __set_fixmap+0xe4/0x118
pc : [<c041ac9c>] lr : [<c04189d8>] psr: 400000d3
sp : c1601ed8 ip : 00400000 fp : 00800000
r10: 0000071f r9 : 00421000 r8 : 00c00000
r7 : 00c00000 r6 : 0000071f r5 : ffade000 r4 : 4040171f
r3 : 00c00000 r2 : 4040171f r1 : c041ac78 r0 : fc6006f0
Flags: nZcv IRQs off FIQs off Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none
Control: 30c5387d Table: 40203000 DAC: 00000001
Process swapper (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x(ptrval))
So let's limit CONFIG_NR_CPUS to 16 when CONFIG_DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL=y. Also,
fix the BUILD_BUG_ON() check that was supposed to catch this, by checking
whether the region grows below the start address rather than above the end
address.

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-4454

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: j1939: fix errant WARN_ON_ONCE in j1939_session_deactivate
The conclusion "j1939_session_deactivate() should be called with a
session ref-count of at least 2" is incorrect. In some concurrent
scenarios, j1939_session_deactivate can be called with the session
ref-count less than 2. But there is not any problem because it
will check the session active state before session putting in
j1939_session_deactivate_locked().
Here is the concurrent scenario of the problem reported by syzbot
and my reproduction log.
cpu0 cpu1
j1939_xtp_rx_eoma
j1939_xtp_rx_abort_one
j1939_session_get_by_addr [kref == 2]
j1939_session_get_by_addr [kref == 3]
j1939_session_deactivate [kref == 2]
j1939_session_put [kref == 1]
j1939_session_completed
j1939_session_deactivate
WARN_ON_ONCE(kref < 2)
=====================================================
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 21 at net/can/j1939/transport.c:1088 j1939_session_deactivate+0x5f/0x70
CPU: 1 PID: 21 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc7+ #32
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:j1939_session_deactivate+0x5f/0x70
Call Trace:
j1939_session_deactivate_activate_next+0x11/0x28
j1939_xtp_rx_eoma+0x12a/0x180
j1939_tp_recv+0x4a2/0x510
j1939_can_recv+0x226/0x380
can_rcv_filter+0xf8/0x220
can_receive+0x102/0x220
? process_backlog+0xf0/0x2c0
can_rcv+0x53/0xf0
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x67/0x90
? process_backlog+0x97/0x2c0
__netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x80

Locations:

kernel-headers-5.14.0-503.38.1.el9_5

registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/nodejs-20

With RPM updates as of