scandy

ID	Age	Component	Trivy Severity	Grype Severity	Red Hat Severity	Scandy Opinion
CVE-2025-21927	23	kernel-headers	High		Important	Ignorable
CVE-2024-6345	283	setuptools	High	High	Important	False Positive
CVE-2022-49657	57	kernel-headers	High		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2022-49611	57	kernel-headers	High		Important	Ignorable
CVE-2025-37860	6	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-37785	6	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-32728	14	openssh openssh-clients	Medium	Medium	Moderate	Removable
CVE-2025-32414	16	libxml2 libxml2-devel	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-29768	42	vim-filesystem vim-minimal	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-26465	66	openssh openssh-clients	Medium	Medium	Moderate	Removable
CVE-2025-25724	53	bsdtar libarchive	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-23136	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-23133	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-23131	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22125	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22124	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22121	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22104	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22097	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22090	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22075	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22063	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22058	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22057	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22055	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22053	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22029	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22027	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22026	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22021	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-22020	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21999	21	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21997	21	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21993	22	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21991	22	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21980	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21975	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21971	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21970	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21969	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21964	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21963	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21959	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21951	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21948	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21938	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21936	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21928	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21926	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21920	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21919	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21899	23	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21892	28	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21890	28	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21886	28	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21885	28	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21875	28	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21862	43	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21858	43	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21857	43	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21855	43	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21853	43	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21846	43	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21844	43	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21839	48	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21828	49	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21817	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21814	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21806	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21796	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21791	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21786	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21772	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21766	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21765	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21764	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21763	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21762	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21761	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21760	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21759	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21758	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21756	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21750	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21745	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21738	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21732	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21731	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21729	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21728	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21726	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21714	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21712	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21707	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21704	61	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21702	65	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21700	70	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21699	71	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21696	71	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21692	73	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21689	73	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21683	83	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21682	83	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21681	83	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21673	83	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21671	83	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21669	83	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21667	83	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21666	83	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21664	93	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21653	95	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-21648	95	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2025-3576	9	krb5-devel krb5-libs libkadm5	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2025-2312	164	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58097	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58096	8	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58083	49	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58077	49	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58072	49	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58061	49	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58057	49	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58017	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58014	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58013	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-58005	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57996	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57993	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57986	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57982	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57981	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57980	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57977	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57974	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57970	67	bsdtar libarchive	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-57948	83	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57947	91	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57946	93	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57938	93	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57932	93	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57930	93	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57929	95	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57924	95	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57903	99	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57898	99	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57894	99	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57893	99	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57890	99	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57888	99	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57884	99	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57849	103	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57843	103	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57798	103	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57795	99	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-57791	103	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56786	106	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56779	106	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56770	106	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56769	108	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56765	108	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56763	108	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56757	108	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56739	116	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56718	116	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56716	116	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56703	117	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56690	117	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56688	117	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56667	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56664	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56663	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56658	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56647	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56642	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56640	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56637	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56636	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56633	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56623	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56616	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56615	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56614	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56611	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56606	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56605	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56604	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56603	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56602	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56601	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56600	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56591	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56590	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56589	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56574	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56570	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56569	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56566	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56558	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56551	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-56369	103	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-55916	103	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-54683	103	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-54456	56	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53920	148	emacs-filesystem	Medium	Medium	Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53680	103	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53240	128	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53239	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53237	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53229	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53224	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53219	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53216	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53208	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53196	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53195	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53194	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53190	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53179	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53174	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53173	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53168	118	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53156	121	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53146	121	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53144	128	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53141	139	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53140	141	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53136	141	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53135	141	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53124	143	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53121	143	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53119	143	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53114	143	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53103	143	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53102	150	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53100	150	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53099	150	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53095	154	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53093	154	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53079	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53073	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53066	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53063	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53060	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53057	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53055	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53054	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53050	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-53042	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-52533	164	glib2	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-52332	103	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-52005	99	git git-core git-core-doc perl-Git	Medium	Medium	Moderate
CVE-2024-50304	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50301	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50299	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50290	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50282	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50279	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50278	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50277	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50274	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50272	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50267	156	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50262	166	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50258	166	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50255	166	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50251	166	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50237	166	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50228	166	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50219	166	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50209	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50208	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50207	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50205	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50203	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50199	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50195	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50191	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50189	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50186	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50185	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50183	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50179	167	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50167	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50162	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50160	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50154	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50153	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50150	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50147	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50146	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50143	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50141	168	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50136	170	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50135	170	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50125	170	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50117	170	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50115	170	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50106	170	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50095	170	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50083	177	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50074	177	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50073	177	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50067	178	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50063	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50058	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50057	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50055	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50048	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50045	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50041	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50040	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50039	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50038	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50036	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50035	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50033	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50028	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50024	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50019	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50018	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50009	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50008	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50007	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50006	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-50000	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49996	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49995	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49994	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49993	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49991	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49978	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49975	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49974	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49973	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49971	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49967	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49962	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49960	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49959	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49955	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49952	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49950	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49948	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49944	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49940	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49939	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49938	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49937	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49934	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49930	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49929	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49928	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49927	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49925	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49891	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49889	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49888	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49886	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49884	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49883	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49882	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49881	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49860	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49856	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49851	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49571	103	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49569	103	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-49568	103	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-48873	103	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47749	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47748	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47745	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47739	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47738	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47737	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47727	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47718	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47713	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47710	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47707	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47706	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47705	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47703	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47701	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47698	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47697	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47693	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47692	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47685	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47684	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47679	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47678	185	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47673	197	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47660	197	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47408	103	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-47141	103	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46871	197	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46859	209	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46857	209	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46855	209	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46842	209	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46839	209	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46835	209	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46834	209	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46830	209	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46822	209	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46819	209	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46807	209	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46805	209	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46800	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46798	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46787	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46783	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46777	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46771	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46770	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46762	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46761	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46760	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46759	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46758	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46756	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46755	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46754	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46750	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46746	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46745	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46744	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46743	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46739	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46738	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46737	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46725	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46724	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46723	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46722	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46719	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46717	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46715	218	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46713	223	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46689	223	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46678	223	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-46673	223	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-45026	225	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-45025	225	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-45016	225	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-45010	225	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-45009	225	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-45008	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-45006	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-45005	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-45003	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-45001	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-44998	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-44987	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-44977	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-44974	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-44970	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-44967	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-44964	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-44961	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-44958	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-44957	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-44954	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-44952	232	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-44944	237	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-44934	241	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-44932	241	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-44931	241	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43914	241	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43912	241	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43911	241	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43910	241	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43908	241	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43906	241	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43898	241	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43884	241	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43882	246	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43866	247	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43861	247	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43856	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43853	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43846	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43842	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43835	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43834	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43821	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-43819	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-42310	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-42309	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-42305	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-42304	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-42291	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-42289	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-42288	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-42286	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-42285	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-42281	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-42280	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-42274	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable
CVE-2024-42271	250	kernel-headers	Medium		Moderate	Ignorable

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21927

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-tcp: fix potential memory corruption in nvme_tcp_recv_pdu()
nvme_tcp_recv_pdu() doesn't check the validity of the header length.
When header digests are enabled, a target might send a packet with an
invalid header length (e.g. 255), causing nvme_tcp_verify_hdgst()
to access memory outside the allocated area and cause memory corruptions
by overwriting it with the calculated digest.
Fix this by rejecting packets with an unexpected header length.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21999

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
proc: fix UAF in proc_get_inode()
Fix race between rmmod and /proc/XXX's inode instantiation.
The bug is that pde->proc_ops don't belong to /proc, it belongs to a
module, therefore dereferencing it after /proc entry has been registered
is a bug unless use_pde/unuse_pde() pair has been used.
use_pde/unuse_pde can be avoided (2 atomic ops!) because pde->proc_ops
never changes so information necessary for inode instantiation can be
saved _before_ proc_register() in PDE itself and used later, avoiding
pde->proc_ops->... dereference.
rmmod lookup
sys_delete_module
proc_lookup_de
pde_get(de);
proc_get_inode(dir->i_sb, de);
mod->exit()
proc_remove
remove_proc_subtree
proc_entry_rundown(de);
free_module(mod);
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
if (de->proc_ops->proc_read_iter)
--> As module is already freed, will trigger UAF
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff80a702b
PGD 817fc4067 P4D 817fc4067 PUD 817fc0067 PMD 102ef4067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 2667 Comm: ls Tainted: G
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:proc_get_inode+0x302/0x6e0
RSP: 0018:ffff88811c837998 EFLAGS: 00010a06
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0538140 RCX: 0000000000000007
RDX: 1ffffffff80a702b RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffc0538158
RBP: ffff8881299a6000 R08: 0000000067bbe1e5 R09: 1ffff11023906f20
R10: ffffffffb560ca07 R11: ffffffffb2b43a58 R12: ffff888105bb78f0
R13: ffff888100518048 R14: ffff8881299a6004 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f95b9686840(0000) GS:ffff8883af100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: fffffbfff80a702b CR3: 0000000117dd2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
proc_lookup_de+0x11f/0x2e0
__lookup_slow+0x188/0x350
walk_component+0x2ab/0x4f0
path_lookupat+0x120/0x660
filename_lookup+0x1ce/0x560
vfs_statx+0xac/0x150
__do_sys_newstat+0x96/0x110
do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[adobriyan@gmail.com: don't do 2 atomic ops on the common path]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21991

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/microcode/AMD: Fix out-of-bounds on systems with CPU-less NUMA nodes
Currently, load_microcode_amd() iterates over all NUMA nodes, retrieves their
CPU masks and unconditionally accesses per-CPU data for the first CPU of each
mask.
According to Documentation/admin-guide/mm/numaperf.rst:
"Some memory may share the same node as a CPU, and others are provided as
memory only nodes."
Therefore, some node CPU masks may be empty and wouldn't have a "first CPU".
On a machine with far memory (and therefore CPU-less NUMA nodes):
- cpumask_of_node(nid) is 0
- cpumask_first(0) is CONFIG_NR_CPUS
- cpu_data(CONFIG_NR_CPUS) accesses the cpu_info per-CPU array at an
index that is 1 out of bounds
This does not have any security implications since flashing microcode is
a privileged operation but I believe this has reliability implications by
potentially corrupting memory while flashing a microcode update.
When booting with CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y on an AMD machine that flashes
a microcode update. I get the following splat:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c:X:Y
index 512 is out of range for type 'unsigned long[512]'
[...]
Call Trace:
dump_stack
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds
load_microcode_amd
request_microcode_amd
reload_store
kernfs_fop_write_iter
vfs_write
ksys_write
do_syscall_64
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
Change the loop to go over only NUMA nodes which have CPUs before determining
whether the first CPU on the respective node needs microcode update.
[ bp: Massage commit message, fix typo. ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21970

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Bridge, fix the crash caused by LAG state check
When removing LAG device from bridge, NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER event is
triggered. Driver finds the lower devices (PFs) to flush all the
offloaded entries. And mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb is checked, it returns
false if one of PF is unloaded. In such case,
mlx5_esw_bridge_lag_rep_get() and its caller return NULL, instead of
the alive PF, and the flush is skipped.
Besides, the bridge fdb entry's lastuse is updated in mlx5 bridge
event handler. But this SWITCHDEV_FDB_ADD_TO_BRIDGE event can be
ignored in this case because the upper interface for bond is deleted,
and the entry will never be aged because lastuse is never updated.
To make things worse, as the entry is alive, mlx5 bridge workqueue
keeps sending that event, which is then handled by kernel bridge
notifier. It causes the following crash when accessing the passed bond
netdev which is already destroyed.
To fix this issue, remove such checks. LAG state is already checked in
commit 15f8f168952f ("net/mlx5: Bridge, verify LAG state when adding
bond to bridge"), driver still need to skip offload if LAG becomes
invalid state after initialization.
Oops: stack segment: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 23695 Comm: kworker/u40:3 Tainted: G OE 6.11.0_mlnx #1
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: mlx5_bridge_wq mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work [mlx5_core]
RIP: 0010:br_switchdev_event+0x2c/0x110 [bridge]
Code: 44 00 00 48 8b 02 48 f7 00 00 02 00 00 74 69 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08 48 8b a8 08 01 00 00 48 85 ed 74 4a 48 83 fe 02 48 89 d3 <4c> 8b 65 00 74 23 76 49 48 83 fe 05 74 7e 48 83 fe 06 75 2f 0f b7
RSP: 0018:ffffc900092cfda0 EFLAGS: 00010297
RAX: ffff888123bfe000 RBX: ffffc900092cfe08 RCX: 00000000ffffffff
RDX: ffffc900092cfe08 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffa0c585f0
RBP: 6669746f6e690a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888123ae92c8
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff888123ae9c60
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffc900092cfe08 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88852c980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f15914c8734 CR3: 0000000002830005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0x1a/0x60
? die+0x38/0x60
? do_trap+0x10b/0x120
? do_error_trap+0x64/0xa0
? exc_stack_segment+0x33/0x50
? asm_exc_stack_segment+0x22/0x30
? br_switchdev_event+0x2c/0x110 [bridge]
? sched_balance_newidle.isra.149+0x248/0x390
notifier_call_chain+0x4b/0xa0
atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20
mlx5_esw_bridge_update+0xec/0x170 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work+0x19/0x40 [mlx5_core]
process_scheduled_works+0x81/0x390
worker_thread+0x106/0x250
? bh_worker+0x110/0x110
kthread+0xb7/0xe0
? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21969

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix slab-use-after-free Read in l2cap_send_cmd
After the hci sync command releases l2cap_conn, the hci receive data work
queue references the released l2cap_conn when sending to the upper layer.
Add hci dev lock to the hci receive data work queue to synchronize the two.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in l2cap_send_cmd+0x187/0x8d0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:954
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880271a4000 by task kworker/u9:2/5837
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5837 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Workqueue: hci1 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602
l2cap_build_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:2964 [inline]
l2cap_send_cmd+0x187/0x8d0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:954
l2cap_sig_send_rej net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5502 [inline]
l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5538 [inline]
l2cap_recv_frame+0x221f/0x10db0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6817
hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3797 [inline]
hci_rx_work+0x508/0xdb0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4040
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa66/0x1840 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Allocated by task 5837:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x243/0x390 mm/slub.c:4329
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:901 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1037 [inline]
l2cap_conn_add+0xa9/0x8e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6860
l2cap_connect_cfm+0x115/0x1090 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7239
hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2057 [inline]
hci_remote_features_evt+0x68e/0xac0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3726
hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7473 [inline]
hci_event_packet+0xac2/0x1540 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7525
hci_rx_work+0x3f3/0xdb0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4035
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa66/0x1840 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
Freed by task 54:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:582
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x59/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2353 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4613 [inline]
kfree+0x196/0x430 mm/slub.c:4761
l2cap_connect_cfm+0xcc/0x1090 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7235
hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2057 [inline]
hci_conn_failed+0x287/0x400 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1266
hci_abort_conn_sync+0x56c/0x11f0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5603
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x22b/0x400 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa66/0x1840 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entr
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21959

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conncount: Fully initialize struct nf_conncount_tuple in insert_tree()
Since commit b36e4523d4d5 ("netfilter: nf_conncount: fix garbage
collection confirm race"), `cpu` and `jiffies32` were introduced to
the struct nf_conncount_tuple.
The commit made nf_conncount_add() initialize `conn->cpu` and
`conn->jiffies32` when allocating the struct.
In contrast, count_tree() was not changed to initialize them.
By commit 34848d5c896e ("netfilter: nf_conncount: Split insert and
traversal"), count_tree() was split and the relevant allocation
code now resides in insert_tree().
Initialize `conn->cpu` and `conn->jiffies32` in insert_tree().
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in find_or_evict net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:117 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __nf_conncount_add+0xd9c/0x2850 net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:143
find_or_evict net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:117 [inline]
__nf_conncount_add+0xd9c/0x2850 net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:143
count_tree net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:438 [inline]
nf_conncount_count+0x82f/0x1e80 net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:521
connlimit_mt+0x7f6/0xbd0 net/netfilter/xt_connlimit.c:72
__nft_match_eval net/netfilter/nft_compat.c:403 [inline]
nft_match_eval+0x1a5/0x300 net/netfilter/nft_compat.c:433
expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:240 [inline]
nft_do_chain+0x426/0x2290 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:288
nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x1a5/0x230 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:23
nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline]
nf_hook_slow+0xf4/0x400 net/netfilter/core.c:626
nf_hook_slow_list+0x24d/0x860 net/netfilter/core.c:663
NF_HOOK_LIST include/linux/netfilter.h:350 [inline]
ip_sublist_rcv+0x17b7/0x17f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:633
ip_list_rcv+0x9ef/0xa40 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:669
__netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5936 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x15c5/0x1670 net/core/dev.c:5983
__netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:6035 [inline]
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1085/0x1700 net/core/dev.c:6126
netif_receive_skb_list+0x5a/0x460 net/core/dev.c:6178
xdp_recv_frames net/bpf/test_run.c:280 [inline]
xdp_test_run_batch net/bpf/test_run.c:361 [inline]
bpf_test_run_xdp_live+0x2e86/0x3480 net/bpf/test_run.c:390
bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xf1d/0x1ae0 net/bpf/test_run.c:1316
bpf_prog_test_run+0x5e5/0xa30 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4407
__sys_bpf+0x6aa/0xd90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5813
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5902 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5900 [inline]
__ia32_sys_bpf+0xa0/0xe0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5900
ia32_sys_call+0x394d/0x4180 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_32.h:358
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0xb0/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:387
do_fast_syscall_32+0x38/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:412
do_SYSENTER_32+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/common.c:450
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4121 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4164 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x915/0xe10 mm/slub.c:4171
insert_tree net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:372 [inline]
count_tree net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:450 [inline]
nf_conncount_count+0x1415/0x1e80 net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:521
connlimit_mt+0x7f6/0xbd0 net/netfilter/xt_connlimit.c:72
__nft_match_eval net/netfilter/nft_compat.c:403 [inline]
nft_match_eval+0x1a5/0x300 net/netfilter/nft_compat.c:433
expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:240 [inline]
nft_do_chain+0x426/0x2290 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:288
nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x1a5/0x230 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:23
nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline]
nf_hook_slow+0xf4/0x400 net/netfilter/core.c:626
nf_hook_slow_list+0x24d/0x860 net/netfilter/core.c:663
NF_HOOK_LIST include/linux/netfilter.h:350 [inline]
ip_sublist_rcv+0x17b7/0x17f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:633
ip_list_rcv+0x9ef/0xa40 net/ip
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21951

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bus: mhi: host: pci_generic: Use pci_try_reset_function() to avoid deadlock
There are multiple places from where the recovery work gets scheduled
asynchronously. Also, there are multiple places where the caller waits
synchronously for the recovery to be completed. One such place is during
the PM shutdown() callback.
If the device is not alive during recovery_work, it will try to reset the
device using pci_reset_function(). This function internally will take the
device_lock() first before resetting the device. By this time, if the lock
has already been acquired, then recovery_work will get stalled while
waiting for the lock. And if the lock was already acquired by the caller
which waits for the recovery_work to be completed, it will lead to
deadlock.
This is what happened on the X1E80100 CRD device when the device died
before shutdown() callback. Driver core calls the driver's shutdown()
callback while holding the device_lock() leading to deadlock.
And this deadlock scenario can occur on other paths as well, like during
the PM suspend() callback, where the driver core would hold the
device_lock() before calling driver's suspend() callback. And if the
recovery_work was already started, it could lead to deadlock. This is also
observed on the X1E80100 CRD.
So to fix both issues, use pci_try_reset_function() in recovery_work. This
function first checks for the availability of the device_lock() before
trying to reset the device. If the lock is available, it will acquire it
and reset the device. Otherwise, it will return -EAGAIN. If that happens,
recovery_work will fail with the error message "Recovery failed" as not
much could be done.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21948

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: appleir: Fix potential NULL dereference at raw event handle
Syzkaller reports a NULL pointer dereference issue in input_event().
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in _test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in is_event_supported drivers/input/input.c:67 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in input_event+0x42/0xa0 drivers/input/input.c:395
Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000028 by task syz-executor199/2949
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2949 Comm: syz-executor199 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00076-gf097a36ef88d #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:602
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0xef/0x1a0 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
_test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]
is_event_supported drivers/input/input.c:67 [inline]
input_event+0x42/0xa0 drivers/input/input.c:395
input_report_key include/linux/input.h:439 [inline]
key_down drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c:159 [inline]
appleir_raw_event+0x3e5/0x5e0 drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c:232
__hid_input_report.constprop.0+0x312/0x440 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2111
hid_ctrl+0x49f/0x550 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:484
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x389/0x6e0 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1650
usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x396/0x450 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1734
dummy_timer+0x17f7/0x3960 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1993
__run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1739 [inline]
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x20a/0xae0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1803
hrtimer_run_softirq+0x17d/0x350 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1820
handle_softirqs+0x206/0x8d0 kernel/softirq.c:561
__do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:595 [inline]
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:435 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0xfa/0x160 kernel/softirq.c:662
irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:678
instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 [inline]
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x90/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702
__mod_timer+0x8f6/0xdc0 kernel/time/timer.c:1185
add_timer+0x62/0x90 kernel/time/timer.c:1295
schedule_timeout+0x11f/0x280 kernel/time/sleep_timeout.c:98
usbhid_wait_io+0x1c7/0x380 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:645
usbhid_init_reports+0x19f/0x390 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:784
hiddev_ioctl+0x1133/0x15b0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:794
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:892 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x190/0x200 fs/ioctl.c:892
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
This happens due to the malformed report items sent by the emulated device
which results in a report, that has no fields, being added to the report list.
Due to this appleir_input_configured() is never called, hidinput_connect()
fails which results in the HID_CLAIMED_INPUT flag is not being set. However,
it does not make appleir_probe() fail and lets the event callback to be
called without the associated input device.
Thus, add a check for the HID_CLAIMED_INPUT flag and leave the event hook
early if the driver didn't claim any input_dev for some reason. Moreover,
some other hid drivers accessing input_dev in their event callbacks do have
similar checks, too.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21938

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix 'scheduling while atomic' in mptcp_pm_nl_append_new_local_addr
If multiple connection requests attempt to create an implicit mptcp
endpoint in parallel, more than one caller may end up in
mptcp_pm_nl_append_new_local_addr because none found the address in
local_addr_list during their call to mptcp_pm_nl_get_local_id. In this
case, the concurrent new_local_addr calls may delete the address entry
created by the previous caller. These deletes use synchronize_rcu, but
this is not permitted in some of the contexts where this function may be
called. During packet recv, the caller may be in a rcu read critical
section and have preemption disabled.
An example stack:
BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/2/0/0x00000302
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117 (discriminator 1))
dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:124)
__schedule_bug (kernel/sched/core.c:5943)
schedule_debug.constprop.0 (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:33 kernel/sched/core.c:5970)
__schedule (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27 include/linux/jump_label.h:207 kernel/sched/features.h:29 kernel/sched/core.c:6621)
schedule (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:84 kernel/sched/core.c:6804 kernel/sched/core.c:6818)
schedule_timeout (kernel/time/timer.c:2160)
wait_for_completion (kernel/sched/completion.c:96 kernel/sched/completion.c:116 kernel/sched/completion.c:127 kernel/sched/completion.c:148)
__wait_rcu_gp (include/linux/rcupdate.h:311 kernel/rcu/update.c:444)
synchronize_rcu (kernel/rcu/tree.c:3609)
mptcp_pm_nl_append_new_local_addr (net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:966 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1061)
mptcp_pm_nl_get_local_id (net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1164)
mptcp_pm_get_local_id (net/mptcp/pm.c:420)
subflow_check_req (net/mptcp/subflow.c:98 net/mptcp/subflow.c:213)
subflow_v4_route_req (net/mptcp/subflow.c:305)
tcp_conn_request (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:7216)
subflow_v4_conn_request (net/mptcp/subflow.c:651)
tcp_rcv_state_process (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6709)
tcp_v4_do_rcv (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1934)
tcp_v4_rcv (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2334)
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 (discriminator 1))
ip_local_deliver_finish (include/linux/rcupdate.h:813 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234)
ip_local_deliver (include/linux/netfilter.h:314 include/linux/netfilter.h:308 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254)
ip_sublist_rcv_finish (include/net/dst.h:461 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:580)
ip_sublist_rcv (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:640)
ip_list_rcv (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:675)
__netif_receive_skb_list_core (net/core/dev.c:5583 net/core/dev.c:5631)
netif_receive_skb_list_internal (net/core/dev.c:5685 net/core/dev.c:5774)
napi_complete_done (include/linux/list.h:37 include/net/gro.h:449 include/net/gro.h:444 net/core/dev.c:6114)
igb_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c:8244) igb
__napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6582)
net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6653 net/core/dev.c:6787)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:553)
__irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:588 kernel/softirq.c:427 kernel/softirq.c:636)
irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:651)
common_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:247 (discriminator 14))
</IRQ>
This problem seems particularly prevalent if the user advertises an
endpoint that has a different external vs internal address. In the case
where the external address is advertised and multiple connections
already exist, multiple subflow SYNs arrive in parallel which tends to
trigger the race during creation of the first local_addr_list entries
which have the internal address instead.
Fix by skipping the replacement of an existing implicit local address if
called via mptcp_pm_nl_get_local_id.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21919

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/fair: Fix potential memory corruption in child_cfs_rq_on_list
child_cfs_rq_on_list attempts to convert a 'prev' pointer to a cfs_rq.
This 'prev' pointer can originate from struct rq's leaf_cfs_rq_list,
making the conversion invalid and potentially leading to memory
corruption. Depending on the relative positions of leaf_cfs_rq_list and
the task group (tg) pointer within the struct, this can cause a memory
fault or access garbage data.
The issue arises in list_add_leaf_cfs_rq, where both
cfs_rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list and rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list are added to the same
leaf list. Also, rq->tmp_alone_branch can be set to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
This adds a check `if (prev == &rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list)` after the main
conditional in child_cfs_rq_on_list. This ensures that the container_of
operation will convert a correct cfs_rq struct.
This check is sufficient because only cfs_rqs on the same CPU are added
to the list, so verifying the 'prev' pointer against the current rq's list
head is enough.
Fixes a potential memory corruption issue that due to current struct
layout might not be manifesting as a crash but could lead to unpredictable
behavior when the layout changes.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21899

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix bad hist from corrupting named_triggers list
The following commands causes a crash:
~# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/rcu/rcu_callback
~# echo 'hist:name=bad:keys=common_pid:onmax(bogus).save(common_pid)' > trigger
bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
~# echo 'hist:name=bad:keys=common_pid' > trigger
Because the following occurs:
event_trigger_write() {
trigger_process_regex() {
event_hist_trigger_parse() {
data = event_trigger_alloc(..);
event_trigger_register(.., data) {
cmd_ops->reg(.., data, ..) [hist_register_trigger()] {
data->ops->init() [event_hist_trigger_init()] {
save_named_trigger(name, data) {
list_add(&data->named_list, &named_triggers);
}
}
}
}
ret = create_actions(); (return -EINVAL)
if (ret)
goto out_unreg;
[..]
ret = hist_trigger_enable(data, ...) {
list_add_tail_rcu(&data->list, &file->triggers); <<<---- SKIPPED!!! (this is important!)
[..]
out_unreg:
event_hist_unregister(.., data) {
cmd_ops->unreg(.., data, ..) [hist_unregister_trigger()] {
list_for_each_entry(iter, &file->triggers, list) {
if (!hist_trigger_match(data, iter, named_data, false)) <- never matches
continue;
[..]
test = iter;
}
if (test && test->ops->free) <<<-- test is NULL
test->ops->free(test) [event_hist_trigger_free()] {
[..]
if (data->name)
del_named_trigger(data) {
list_del(&data->named_list); <<<<-- NEVER gets removed!
}
}
}
}
[..]
kfree(data); <<<-- frees item but it is still on list
The next time a hist with name is registered, it causes an u-a-f bug and
the kernel can crash.
Move the code around such that if event_trigger_register() succeeds, the
next thing called is hist_trigger_enable() which adds it to the list.
A bunch of actions is called if get_named_trigger_data() returns false.
But that doesn't need to be called after event_trigger_register(), so it
can be moved up, allowing event_trigger_register() to be called just
before hist_trigger_enable() keeping them together and allowing the
file->triggers to be properly populated.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21892

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix the recovery flow of the UMR QP
This patch addresses an issue in the recovery flow of the UMR QP,
ensuring tasks do not get stuck, as highlighted by the call trace [1].
During recovery, before transitioning the QP to the RESET state, the
software must wait for all outstanding WRs to complete.
Failing to do so can cause the firmware to skip sending some flushed
CQEs with errors and simply discard them upon the RESET, as per the IB
specification.
This race condition can result in lost CQEs and tasks becoming stuck.
To resolve this, the patch sends a final WR which serves only as a
barrier before moving the QP state to RESET.
Once a CQE is received for that final WR, it guarantees that no
outstanding WRs remain, making it safe to transition the QP to RESET and
subsequently back to RTS, restoring proper functionality.
Note:
For the barrier WR, we simply reuse the failed and ready WR.
Since the QP is in an error state, it will only receive
IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR. However, as it serves only as a barrier we don't
care about its status.
[1]
INFO: task rdma_resource_l:1922 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc7+ #1626
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:rdma_resource_l state:D stack:0 pid:1922 tgid:1922 ppid:1369
flags:0x00004004
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x420/0xd30
schedule+0x47/0x130
schedule_timeout+0x280/0x300
? mark_held_locks+0x48/0x80
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xe5/0x1a0
wait_for_completion+0x75/0x130
mlx5r_umr_post_send_wait+0x3c2/0x5b0 [mlx5_ib]
? __pfx_mlx5r_umr_done+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_ib]
mlx5r_umr_revoke_mr+0x93/0xc0 [mlx5_ib]
__mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x299/0x520 [mlx5_ib]
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40
? wait_for_completion+0xfe/0x130
? rdma_restrack_put+0x63/0xe0 [ib_core]
ib_dereg_mr_user+0x5f/0x120 [ib_core]
? lock_release+0xc6/0x280
destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x1d/0x60 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x58/0x1d0 [ib_uverbs]
uobj_destroy+0x3f/0x70 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x3e4/0xbb0 [ib_uverbs]
? __pfx_uverbs_destroy_def_handler+0x10/0x10 [ib_uverbs]
? __lock_acquire+0x64e/0x2080
? mark_held_locks+0x48/0x80
? find_held_lock+0x2d/0xa0
? lock_acquire+0xc1/0x2f0
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xcb/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? __fget_files+0xc3/0x1b0
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe7/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xcb/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1b0/0xa70
do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f99c918b17b
RSP: 002b:00007ffc766d0468 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc766d0578 RCX:
00007f99c918b17b
RDX: 00007ffc766d0560 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI:
0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffc766d0540 R08: 00007f99c8f99010 R09:
000000000000bd7e
R10: 00007f99c94c1c70 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
00007ffc766d0530
R13: 000000000000001c R14: 0000000040246a80 R15:
0000000000000000
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21890

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: fix checksums set in idpf_rx_rsc()
idpf_rx_rsc() uses skb_transport_offset(skb) while the transport header
is not set yet.
This triggers the following warning for CONFIG_DEBUG_NET=y builds.
DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(!skb_transport_header_was_set(skb))
[ 69.261620] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 0 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3020 idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll (include/linux/skbuff.h:3020) idpf
[ 69.261629] Modules linked in: vfat fat dummy bridge intel_uncore_frequency_tpmi intel_uncore_frequency_common intel_vsec_tpmi idpf intel_vsec cdc_ncm cdc_eem cdc_ether usbnet mii xhci_pci xhci_hcd ehci_pci ehci_hcd libeth
[ 69.261644] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Tainted: G S W 6.14.0-smp-DEV #1697
[ 69.261648] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [W]=WARN
[ 69.261650] RIP: 0010:idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll (include/linux/skbuff.h:3020) idpf
[ 69.261677] ? __warn (kernel/panic.c:242 kernel/panic.c:748)
[ 69.261682] ? idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll (include/linux/skbuff.h:3020) idpf
[ 69.261687] ? report_bug (lib/bug.c:?)
[ 69.261690] ? handle_bug (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:285)
[ 69.261694] ? exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:309)
[ 69.261697] ? asm_exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:621)
[ 69.261700] ? __pfx_idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_txrx.c:4011) idpf
[ 69.261704] ? idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll (include/linux/skbuff.h:3020) idpf
[ 69.261708] ? idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_txrx.c:3072) idpf
[ 69.261712] __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:7194)
[ 69.261716] net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7265)
[ 69.261718] ? __qdisc_run (net/sched/sch_generic.c:293)
[ 69.261721] ? sched_clock (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:84 arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c:288)
[ 69.261726] handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:561)

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21886

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix implicit ODP hang on parent deregistration
Fix the destroy_unused_implicit_child_mr() to prevent hanging during
parent deregistration as of below [1].
Upon entering destroy_unused_implicit_child_mr(), the reference count
for the implicit MR parent is incremented using:
refcount_inc_not_zero().
A corresponding decrement must be performed if
free_implicit_child_mr_work() is not called.
The code has been updated to properly manage the reference count that
was incremented.
[1]
INFO: task python3:2157 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7+ #1633
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:python3 state:D stack:0 pid:2157 tgid:2157 ppid:1685 flags:0x00000000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x420/0xd30
schedule+0x47/0x130
__mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x379/0x5d0 [mlx5_ib]
? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
ib_dereg_mr_user+0x5f/0x120 [ib_core]
? lock_release+0xc6/0x280
destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x1d/0x60 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x58/0x1d0 [ib_uverbs]
uobj_destroy+0x3f/0x70 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x3e4/0xbb0 [ib_uverbs]
? __pfx_uverbs_destroy_def_handler+0x10/0x10 [ib_uverbs]
? lock_acquire+0xc1/0x2f0
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xcb/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x116/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? lock_release+0xc6/0x280
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe7/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xcb/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1b0/0xa70
? kmem_cache_free+0x221/0x400
do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f20f21f017b
RSP: 002b:00007ffcfc4a77c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcfc4a78d8 RCX: 00007f20f21f017b
RDX: 00007ffcfc4a78c0 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffcfc4a78a0 R08: 000056147d125190 R09: 00007f20f1f14c60
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffcfc4a7890
R13: 000000000000001c R14: 000056147d100fc0 R15: 00007f20e365c9d0
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21885

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/bnxt_re: Fix the page details for the srq created by kernel consumers
While using nvme target with use_srq on, below kernel panic is noticed.
[ 549.698111] bnxt_en 0000:41:00.0 enp65s0np0: FEC autoneg off encoding: Clause 91 RS(544,514)
[ 566.393619] Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
..
[ 566.393799] <TASK>
[ 566.393807] ? __die_body+0x1a/0x60
[ 566.393823] ? die+0x38/0x60
[ 566.393835] ? do_trap+0xe4/0x110
[ 566.393847] ? bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0x1d4/0x580 [bnxt_re]
[ 566.393867] ? bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0x1d4/0x580 [bnxt_re]
[ 566.393881] ? do_error_trap+0x7c/0x120
[ 566.393890] ? bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0x1d4/0x580 [bnxt_re]
[ 566.393911] ? exc_divide_error+0x34/0x50
[ 566.393923] ? bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0x1d4/0x580 [bnxt_re]
[ 566.393939] ? asm_exc_divide_error+0x16/0x20
[ 566.393966] ? bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0x1d4/0x580 [bnxt_re]
[ 566.393997] bnxt_qplib_create_srq+0xc9/0x340 [bnxt_re]
[ 566.394040] bnxt_re_create_srq+0x335/0x3b0 [bnxt_re]
[ 566.394057] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 566.394068] ? __init_swait_queue_head+0x4a/0x60
[ 566.394090] ib_create_srq_user+0xa7/0x150 [ib_core]
[ 566.394147] nvmet_rdma_queue_connect+0x7d0/0xbe0 [nvmet_rdma]
[ 566.394174] ? lock_release+0x22c/0x3f0
[ 566.394187] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
Page size and shift info is set only for the user space SRQs.
Set page size and page shift for kernel space SRQs also.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21875

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: always handle address removal under msk socket lock
Syzkaller reported a lockdep splat in the PM control path:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6693 at ./include/net/sock.h:1711 sock_owned_by_me include/net/sock.h:1711 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6693 at ./include/net/sock.h:1711 msk_owned_by_me net/mptcp/protocol.h:363 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6693 at ./include/net/sock.h:1711 mptcp_pm_nl_addr_send_ack+0x57c/0x610 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:788
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6693 Comm: syz.0.205 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2-syzkaller-00303-gad1b832bf1cf #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 12/27/2024
RIP: 0010:sock_owned_by_me include/net/sock.h:1711 [inline]
RIP: 0010:msk_owned_by_me net/mptcp/protocol.h:363 [inline]
RIP: 0010:mptcp_pm_nl_addr_send_ack+0x57c/0x610 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:788
Code: 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc e8 ca 7b d3 f5 eb b9 e8 c3 7b d3 f5 90 0f 0b 90 e9 dd fb ff ff e8 b5 7b d3 f5 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 3e fb ff ff 44 89 f1 80 e1 07 38 c1 0f 8c eb fb ff ff
RSP: 0000:ffffc900034f6f60 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: ffffffff8bee3c2b RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000080000
RDX: ffffc90004d42000 RSI: 000000000000a407 RDI: 000000000000a408
RBP: ffffc900034f7030 R08: ffffffff8bee37f6 R09: 0100000000000000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100bcc62e4 R12: ffff88805e6316e0
R13: ffff88805e630c00 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88805e630c00
FS: 00007f7e9a7e96c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b2fd18ff8 CR3: 0000000032c24000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mptcp_pm_remove_addr+0x103/0x1d0 net/mptcp/pm.c:59
mptcp_pm_remove_anno_addr+0x1f4/0x2f0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1486
mptcp_nl_remove_subflow_and_signal_addr net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1518 [inline]
mptcp_pm_nl_del_addr_doit+0x118d/0x1af0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1629
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0xb1f/0xec0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210
netlink_rcv_skb+0x206/0x480 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1322 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7f6/0x990 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1348
netlink_sendmsg+0x8de/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:733
____sys_sendmsg+0x53a/0x860 net/socket.c:2573
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2627 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x269/0x350 net/socket.c:2659
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f7e9998cde9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f7e9a7e9038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7e99ba5fa0 RCX: 00007f7e9998cde9
RDX: 000000002000c094 RSI: 0000400000000000 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007f7e99a0e2a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f7e99ba5fa0 R15: 00007fff49231088
Indeed the PM can try to send a RM_ADDR over a msk without acquiring
first the msk socket lock.
The bugged code-path comes from an early optimization: when there
are no subflows, the PM should (usually) not send RM_ADDR
notifications.
The above statement is incorrect, as without locks another process
could concur
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21862

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drop_monitor: fix incorrect initialization order
Syzkaller reports the following bug:
BUG: spinlock bad magic on CPU#1, syz-executor.0/7995
lock: 0xffff88805303f3e0, .magic: 00000000, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: 0
CPU: 1 PID: 7995 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G E 5.10.209+ #1
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x119/0x179 lib/dump_stack.c:118
debug_spin_lock_before kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:83 [inline]
do_raw_spin_lock+0x1f6/0x270 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:112
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:117 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x70 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
reset_per_cpu_data+0xe6/0x240 [drop_monitor]
net_dm_cmd_trace+0x43d/0x17a0 [drop_monitor]
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x22f/0x330 net/netlink/genetlink.c:739
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:783 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x341/0x5a0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:800
netlink_rcv_skb+0x14d/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2497
genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:811
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1322 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x54b/0x800 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1348
netlink_sendmsg+0x914/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1916
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x157/0x190 net/socket.c:663
____sys_sendmsg+0x712/0x870 net/socket.c:2378
___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170 net/socket.c:2432
__sys_sendmsg+0xea/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2461
do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x62/0xc7
RIP: 0033:0x7f3f9815aee9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f3f972bf0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3f9826d050 RCX: 00007f3f9815aee9
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020001300 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007f3f981b63bd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000006e R14: 00007f3f9826d050 R15: 00007ffe01ee6768
If drop_monitor is built as a kernel module, syzkaller may have time
to send a netlink NET_DM_CMD_START message during the module loading.
This will call the net_dm_monitor_start() function that uses
a spinlock that has not yet been initialized.
To fix this, let's place resource initialization above the registration
of a generic netlink family.
Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center
(linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21858

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
geneve: Fix use-after-free in geneve_find_dev().
syzkaller reported a use-after-free in geneve_find_dev() [0]
without repro.
geneve_configure() links struct geneve_dev.next to
net_generic(net, geneve_net_id)->geneve_list.
The net here could differ from dev_net(dev) if IFLA_NET_NS_PID,
IFLA_NET_NS_FD, or IFLA_TARGET_NETNSID is set.
When dev_net(dev) is dismantled, geneve_exit_batch_rtnl() finally
calls unregister_netdevice_queue() for each dev in the netns,
and later the dev is freed.
However, its geneve_dev.next is still linked to the backend UDP
socket netns.
Then, use-after-free will occur when another geneve dev is created
in the netns.
Let's call geneve_dellink() instead in geneve_destroy_tunnels().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in geneve_find_dev drivers/net/geneve.c:1295 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in geneve_configure+0x234/0x858 drivers/net/geneve.c:1343
Read of size 2 at addr ffff000054d6ee24 by task syz.1.4029/13441
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 13441 Comm: syz.1.4029 Not tainted 6.13.0-g0ad9617c78ac #24 dc35ca22c79fb82e8e7bc5c9c9adafea898b1e3d
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
show_stack+0x38/0x50 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:466 (C)
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xbc/0x108 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x16c/0x6f0 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0xc0/0x120 mm/kasan/report.c:602
__asan_report_load2_noabort+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:379
geneve_find_dev drivers/net/geneve.c:1295 [inline]
geneve_configure+0x234/0x858 drivers/net/geneve.c:1343
geneve_newlink+0xb8/0x128 drivers/net/geneve.c:1634
rtnl_newlink_create+0x23c/0x868 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3795
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3906 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x1054/0x1630 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4021
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x61c/0x918 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6911
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6938
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1322 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x618/0x838 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1348
netlink_sendmsg+0x5fc/0x8b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:713 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x410/0x6f8 net/socket.c:2568
___sys_sendmsg+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:2622
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2654 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2659 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2657 [inline]
__arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x12c/0x1c8 net/socket.c:2657
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x90/0x278 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0x13c/0x250 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x54/0x70 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x4c/0xa8 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:744
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:762
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600
Allocated by task 13247:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x30/0x68 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x44/0x58 mm/kasan/generic.c:568
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4298 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_noprof+0x2a0/0x560 mm/slub.c:4304
__kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x9c/0x230 mm/util.c:645
alloc_netdev_mqs+0xb8/0x11a0 net/core/dev.c:11470
rtnl_create_link+0x2b8/0xb50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3604
rtnl_newlink_create+0x19c/0x868 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3780
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3906 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x1054/0x1630 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4021
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x61c/0x918 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6911
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6938
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_n
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21855

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ibmvnic: Don't reference skb after sending to VIOS
Previously, after successfully flushing the xmit buffer to VIOS,
the tx_bytes stat was incremented by the length of the skb.
It is invalid to access the skb memory after sending the buffer to
the VIOS because, at any point after sending, the VIOS can trigger
an interrupt to free this memory. A race between reading skb->len
and freeing the skb is possible (especially during LPM) and will
result in use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ibmvnic_xmit+0x75c/0x1808 [ibmvnic]
Read of size 4 at addr c00000024eb48a70 by task hxecom/14495
<...>
Call Trace:
[c000000118f66cf0] [c0000000018cba6c] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xe8 (unreliable)
[c000000118f66d20] [c0000000006f0080] print_report+0x1a8/0x7f0
[c000000118f66df0] [c0000000006f08f0] kasan_report+0x128/0x1f8
[c000000118f66f00] [c0000000006f2868] __asan_load4+0xac/0xe0
[c000000118f66f20] [c0080000046eac84] ibmvnic_xmit+0x75c/0x1808 [ibmvnic]
[c000000118f67340] [c0000000014be168] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x150/0x358
<...>
Freed by task 0:
kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
kasan_save_track+0x2c/0x50
kasan_save_free_info+0x64/0x108
__kasan_mempool_poison_object+0x148/0x2d4
napi_skb_cache_put+0x5c/0x194
net_tx_action+0x154/0x5b8
handle_softirqs+0x20c/0x60c
do_softirq_own_stack+0x6c/0x88
<...>
The buggy address belongs to the object at c00000024eb48a00 which
belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224
==================================================================

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21839

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Load DR6 with guest value only before entering .vcpu_run() loop
Move the conditional loading of hardware DR6 with the guest's DR6 value
out of the core .vcpu_run() loop to fix a bug where KVM can load hardware
with a stale vcpu->arch.dr6.
When the guest accesses a DR and host userspace isn't debugging the guest,
KVM disables DR interception and loads the guest's values into hardware on
VM-Enter and saves them on VM-Exit. This allows the guest to access DRs
at will, e.g. so that a sequence of DR accesses to configure a breakpoint
only generates one VM-Exit.
For DR0-DR3, the logic/behavior is identical between VMX and SVM, and also
identical between KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED (userspace debugging the guest)
and KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT (guest using DRs), and so KVM handles loading
DR0-DR3 in common code, _outside_ of the core kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_run() loop.
But for DR6, the guest's value doesn't need to be loaded into hardware for
KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED, and SVM provides a dedicated VMCB field whereas
VMX requires software to manually load the guest value, and so loading the
guest's value into DR6 is handled by {svm,vmx}_vcpu_run(), i.e. is done
_inside_ the core run loop.
Unfortunately, saving the guest values on VM-Exit is initiated by common
x86, again outside of the core run loop. If the guest modifies DR6 (in
hardware, when DR interception is disabled), and then the next VM-Exit is
a fastpath VM-Exit, KVM will reload hardware DR6 with vcpu->arch.dr6 and
clobber the guest's actual value.
The bug shows up primarily with nested VMX because KVM handles the VMX
preemption timer in the fastpath, and the window between hardware DR6
being modified (in guest context) and DR6 being read by guest software is
orders of magnitude larger in a nested setup. E.g. in non-nested, the
VMX preemption timer would need to fire precisely between #DB injection
and the #DB handler's read of DR6, whereas with a KVM-on-KVM setup, the
window where hardware DR6 is "dirty" extends all the way from L1 writing
DR6 to VMRESUME (in L1).
L1's view:
==========
<L1 disables DR interception>
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640961: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
A: L1 Writes DR6
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640963: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff1
B: CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640967: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT intr_info 0x800000ec
D: L1 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640969: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640976: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
L2 reads DR6, L1 disables DR interception
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640980: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
L2 detects failure
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640987: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason HLT
L1 reads DR6 (confirms failure)
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640990: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
L0's view:
==========
L2 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
L2 => L1 nested VM-Exit
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit_inject: reason: DR_ACCESS ext_inf1: 0x0000000000000216
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21806

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: let net.core.dev_weight always be non-zero
The following problem was encountered during stability test:
(NULL net_device): NAPI poll function process_backlog+0x0/0x530 \
returned 1, exceeding its budget of 0.
------------[ cut here ]------------
list_add double add: new=ffff88905f746f48, prev=ffff88905f746f48, \
next=ffff88905f746e40.
WARNING: CPU: 18 PID: 5462 at lib/list_debug.c:35 \
__list_add_valid_or_report+0xf3/0x130
CPU: 18 UID: 0 PID: 5462 Comm: ping Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7+
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0xf3/0x130
Call Trace:
? __warn+0xcd/0x250
? __list_add_valid_or_report+0xf3/0x130
enqueue_to_backlog+0x923/0x1070
netif_rx_internal+0x92/0x2b0
__netif_rx+0x15/0x170
loopback_xmit+0x2ef/0x450
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x103/0x490
__dev_queue_xmit+0xeac/0x1950
ip_finish_output2+0x6cc/0x1620
ip_output+0x161/0x270
ip_push_pending_frames+0x155/0x1a0
raw_sendmsg+0xe13/0x1550
__sys_sendto+0x3bf/0x4e0
__x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0
do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The reproduction command is as follows:
sysctl -w net.core.dev_weight=0
ping 127.0.0.1
This is because when the napi's weight is set to 0, process_backlog() may
return 0 and clear the NAPI_STATE_SCHED bit of napi->state, causing this
napi to be re-polled in net_rx_action() until __do_softirq() times out.
Since the NAPI_STATE_SCHED bit has been cleared, napi_schedule_rps() can
be retriggered in enqueue_to_backlog(), causing this issue.
Making the napi's weight always non-zero solves this problem.
Triggering this issue requires system-wide admin (setting is
not namespaced).

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21796

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: clear acl_access/acl_default after releasing them
If getting acl_default fails, acl_access and acl_default will be released
simultaneously. However, acl_access will still retain a pointer pointing
to the released posix_acl, which will trigger a WARNING in
nfs3svc_release_getacl like this:
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 3199 at lib/refcount.c:28
refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
Modules linked in:
CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 3199 Comm: nfsd Not tainted
6.12.0-rc6-00079-g04ae226af01f-dirty #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
Code: cc cc 0f b6 1d b3 20 a5 03 80 fb 01 0f 87 65 48 d8 00 83 e3 01 75
e4 48 c7 c7 c0 3b 9b 85 c6 05 97 20 a5 03 01 e8 fb 3e 30 ff <0f> 0b eb
cd 0f b6 1d 8a3
RSP: 0018:ffffc90008637cd8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff83904fde
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88871ed36380
RBP: ffff888158beeb40 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520010c6f56
R10: ffffc90008637ab7 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff888140e77400 R14: ffff888140e77408 R15: ffffffff858b42c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88871ed00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000562384d32158 CR3: 000000055cc6a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
? __warn+0xa5/0x140
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
? report_bug+0x1b1/0x1e0
? handle_bug+0x53/0xa0
? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? tick_nohz_tick_stopped+0x1e/0x40
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170
nfs3svc_release_getacl+0xc9/0xe0
svc_process_common+0x5db/0xb60
? __pfx_svc_process_common+0x10/0x10
? __rcu_read_unlock+0x69/0xa0
? __pfx_nfsd_dispatch+0x10/0x10
? svc_xprt_received+0xa1/0x120
? xdr_init_decode+0x11d/0x190
svc_process+0x2a7/0x330
svc_handle_xprt+0x69d/0x940
svc_recv+0x180/0x2d0
nfsd+0x168/0x200
? __pfx_nfsd+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x1a2/0x1e0
? kthread+0xf4/0x1e0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...
Clear acl_access/acl_default after posix_acl_release is called to prevent
UAF from being triggered.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21756

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: Keep the binding until socket destruction
Preserve sockets bindings; this includes both resulting from an explicit
bind() and those implicitly bound through autobind during connect().
Prevents socket unbinding during a transport reassignment, which fixes a
use-after-free:
1. vsock_create() (refcnt=1) calls vsock_insert_unbound() (refcnt=2)
2. transport->release() calls vsock_remove_bound() without checking if
sk was bound and moved to bound list (refcnt=1)
3. vsock_bind() assumes sk is in unbound list and before
__vsock_insert_bound(vsock_bound_sockets()) calls
__vsock_remove_bound() which does:
list_del_init(&vsk->bound_table); // nop
sock_put(&vsk->sk); // refcnt=0
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __vsock_bind+0x62e/0x730
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88816b46a74c by task a.out/2057
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90
print_report+0x174/0x4f6
kasan_report+0xb9/0x190
__vsock_bind+0x62e/0x730
vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0
__sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0
__x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Allocated by task 2057:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x85/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x131/0x450
sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220
sk_alloc+0x2c/0x870
__vsock_create.constprop.0+0x2e/0xb60
vsock_create+0xe4/0x420
__sock_create+0x241/0x650
__sys_socket+0xf2/0x1a0
__x64_sys_socket+0x6e/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 2057:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70
kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x590
__sk_destruct+0x388/0x5a0
__vsock_bind+0x5e1/0x730
vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0
__sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0
__x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2057 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150
__vsock_bind+0x66d/0x730
vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0
__sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0
__x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2057 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150
vsock_remove_bound+0x187/0x1e0
__vsock_release+0x383/0x4a0
vsock_release+0x90/0x120
__sock_release+0xa3/0x250
sock_close+0x14/0x20
__fput+0x359/0xa80
task_work_run+0x107/0x1d0
do_exit+0x847/0x2560
do_group_exit+0xb8/0x250
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50
x64_sys_call+0xfec/0x14f0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21750

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: Check the return value of of_property_read_string_index()
Somewhen between 6.10 and 6.11 the driver started to crash on my
MacBookPro14,3. The property doesn't exist and 'tmp' remains
uninitialized, so we pass a random pointer to devm_kstrdup().
The crash I am getting looks like this:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f033c669379
PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
PF: error_code(0x0001) - permissions violation
PGD 8000000101341067 P4D 8000000101341067 PUD 101340067 PMD 1013bb067 PTE 800000010aee9025
Oops: Oops: 0001 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 827 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.11.8-gentoo #1
Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookPro14,3/Mac-551B86E5744E2388, BIOS 529.140.2.0.0 06/23/2024
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x4/0x30
Code: f7 75 ec 31 c0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 89 f8 c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa <80> 3f 00 74 14 48 89 f8 48 83 c0 01 80 38 00 75 f7 48 29 f8 c3 cc
RSP: 0018:ffffb4aac0683ad8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000ffffffea RBX: 00007f033c669379 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000cc0 RSI: 00007f033c669379 RDI: 00007f033c669379
RBP: 00000000ffffffea R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000c0ba916a
R10: ffffffffffffffff R11: ffffffffb61ea260 R12: ffff91f7815b50c8
R13: 0000000000000cc0 R14: ffff91fafefffe30 R15: ffffb4aac0683b30
FS: 00007f033ccbe8c0(0000) GS:ffff91faeed00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f033c669379 CR3: 0000000107b1e004 CR4: 00000000003706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x23/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x149/0x4c0
? raw_spin_rq_lock_nested+0xe/0x20
? sched_balance_newidle+0x22b/0x3c0
? update_load_avg+0x78/0x770
? exc_page_fault+0x6f/0x150
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
? __pfx_pci_conf1_write+0x10/0x10
? strlen+0x4/0x30
devm_kstrdup+0x25/0x70
brcmf_of_probe+0x273/0x350 [brcmfmac]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21732

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix a race for an ODP MR which leads to CQE with error
This patch addresses a race condition for an ODP MR that can result in a
CQE with an error on the UMR QP.
During the __mlx5_ib_dereg_mr() flow, the following sequence of calls
occurs:
mlx5_revoke_mr()
mlx5r_umr_revoke_mr()
mlx5r_umr_post_send_wait()
At this point, the lkey is freed from the hardware's perspective.
However, concurrently, mlx5_ib_invalidate_range() might be triggered by
another task attempting to invalidate a range for the same freed lkey.
This task will:
- Acquire the umem_odp->umem_mutex lock.
- Call mlx5r_umr_update_xlt() on the UMR QP.
- Since the lkey has already been freed, this can lead to a CQE error,
causing the UMR QP to enter an error state [1].
To resolve this race condition, the umem_odp->umem_mutex lock is now also
acquired as part of the mlx5_revoke_mr() scope. Upon successful revoke,
we set umem_odp->private which points to that MR to NULL, preventing any
further invalidation attempts on its lkey.
[1] From dmesg:
infiniband rocep8s0f0: dump_cqe:277:(pid 0): WC error: 6, Message: memory bind operation error
cqe_dump: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
cqe_dump: 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
cqe_dump: 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
cqe_dump: 00000030: 00 00 00 00 08 00 78 06 25 00 11 b9 00 0e dd d2
WARNING: CPU: 15 PID: 1506 at drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/umr.c:394 mlx5r_umr_post_send_wait+0x15a/0x2b0 [mlx5_ib]
Modules linked in: ip6table_mangle ip6table_natip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_mangle xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_umad ib_ipoib ib_cm mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core fuse mlx5_core
CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 1506 Comm: ibv_rc_pingpong Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7+ #1626
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5r_umr_post_send_wait+0x15a/0x2b0 [mlx5_ib]
[..]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5r_umr_update_xlt+0x23c/0x3e0 [mlx5_ib]
mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x2e1/0x330 [mlx5_ib]
__mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1e1/0x240
zap_page_range_single+0xf1/0x1a0
madvise_vma_behavior+0x677/0x6e0
do_madvise+0x1a2/0x4b0
__x64_sys_madvise+0x25/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21729

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: fix race between cancel_hw_scan and hw_scan completion
The rtwdev->scanning flag isn't protected by mutex originally, so
cancel_hw_scan can pass the condition, but suddenly hw_scan completion
unset the flag and calls ieee80211_scan_completed() that will free
local->hw_scan_req. Then, cancel_hw_scan raises null-ptr-deref and
use-after-free. Fix it by moving the check condition to where
protected by mutex.
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000088-0x000000000000008f]
CPU: 2 PID: 6922 Comm: kworker/2:2 Tainted: G OE
Hardware name: LENOVO 2356AD1/2356AD1, BIOS G7ETB6WW (2.76 ) 09/10/2019
Workqueue: events cfg80211_conn_work [cfg80211]
RIP: 0010:rtw89_fw_h2c_scan_offload_be+0xc33/0x13c3 [rtw89_core]
Code: 00 45 89 6c 24 1c 0f 85 23 01 00 00 48 8b 85 20 ff ff ff 48 8d
RSP: 0018:ffff88811fd9f068 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88811fd9f258 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000011 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000089
RBP: ffff88811fd9f170 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff88811fd9f108 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88810e47f960
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881d6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007531dfca55b0 CR3: 00000001be296004 CR4: 00000000001706e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x61/0x73
? __die_body+0x20/0x73
? die_addr+0x4f/0x7b
? exc_general_protection+0x191/0x1db
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30
? rtw89_fw_h2c_scan_offload_be+0xc33/0x13c3 [rtw89_core]
? rtw89_fw_h2c_scan_offload_be+0x458/0x13c3 [rtw89_core]
? __pfx_rtw89_fw_h2c_scan_offload_be+0x10/0x10 [rtw89_core]
? do_raw_spin_lock+0x75/0xdb
? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
rtw89_hw_scan_offload+0xb5e/0xbf7 [rtw89_core]
? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x24
? __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x40c/0x471
? __pfx_rtw89_hw_scan_offload+0x10/0x10 [rtw89_core]
? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x13/0x1f
? mutex_lock+0xa2/0xdc
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
rtw89_hw_scan_abort+0x58/0xb7 [rtw89_core]
rtw89_ops_cancel_hw_scan+0x120/0x13b [rtw89_core]
ieee80211_scan_cancel+0x468/0x4d0 [mac80211]
ieee80211_prep_connection+0x858/0x899 [mac80211]
ieee80211_mgd_auth+0xbea/0xdde [mac80211]
? __pfx_ieee80211_mgd_auth+0x10/0x10 [mac80211]
? cfg80211_find_elem+0x15/0x29 [cfg80211]
? is_bss+0x1b7/0x1d7 [cfg80211]
ieee80211_auth+0x18/0x27 [mac80211]
cfg80211_mlme_auth+0x3bb/0x3e7 [cfg80211]
cfg80211_conn_do_work+0x410/0xb81 [cfg80211]
? __pfx_cfg80211_conn_do_work+0x10/0x10 [cfg80211]
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x1f
? psi_group_change+0x8bc/0x944
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x22
? mutex_lock+0x8e/0xdc
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___radix_tree_lookup+0x10/0x10
cfg80211_conn_work+0x245/0x34d [cfg80211]
? __pfx_cfg80211_conn_work+0x10/0x10 [cfg80211]
? update_cfs_rq_load_avg+0x3bc/0x3d7
? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x1a
? sched_clock+0x10/0x24
? sched_clock_cpu+0x7e/0x42e
? newidle_balance+0x796/0x937
? __pfx_sched_clock_cpu+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_newidle_balance+0x10/0x10
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x1f
? psi_group_change+0x8bc/0x944
? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x24
? raw_spin_rq_unlock+0x47/0x54
? raw_spin_rq_unlock_irq+0x9/0x1f
? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x347/0x586
? __schedule+0x27bf/0x2892
? mutex_unlock+0x80/0xd0
? do_raw_spin_lock+0x75/0xdb
? __pfx___schedule+0x10/0x10
process_scheduled_works+0x58c/0x821
worker_thread+0x4c7/0x586
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x1f
kthread+0x285/0x294
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x29/0x6f
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21714

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix implicit ODP use after free
Prevent double queueing of implicit ODP mr destroy work by using
__xa_cmpxchg() to make sure this is the only time we are destroying this
specific mr.
Without this change, we could try to invalidate this mr twice, which in
turn could result in queuing a MR work destroy twice, and eventually the
second work could execute after the MR was freed due to the first work,
causing a user after free and trace below.
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 12178 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x12b/0x130
Modules linked in: bonding ib_ipoib vfio_pci ip_gre geneve nf_tables ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 ipip tunnel4 ib_umad rdma_ucm mlx5_vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_iommu_type1 mlx5_ib vfio ib_uverbs mlx5_core iptable_raw openvswitch nsh rpcrdma ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: ib_uverbs]
CPU: 2 PID: 12178 Comm: kworker/u20:5 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1_net_next_mlx5_58c644e #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound free_implicit_child_mr_work [mlx5_ib]
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x12b/0x130
Code: 48 c7 c7 38 95 2a 82 c6 05 bc c6 fe 00 01 e8 0c 66 aa ff 0f 0b 5b c3 48 c7 c7 e0 94 2a 82 c6 05 a7 c6 fe 00 01 e8 f5 65 aa ff <0f> 0b 5b c3 90 8b 07 3d 00 00 00 c0 74 12 83 f8 01 74 13 8d 50 ff
RSP: 0018:ffff8881008e3e40 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000027
RDX: ffff88852c91b5c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88852c91b5c0
RBP: ffff8881dacd4e00 R08: 00000000ffffffff R09: 0000000000000019
R10: 000000000000072e R11: 0000000063666572 R12: ffff88812bfd9e00
R13: ffff8881c792d200 R14: ffff88810011c005 R15: ffff8881002099c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88852c900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f5694b5e000 CR3: 00000001153f6003 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? refcount_warn_saturate+0x12b/0x130
free_implicit_child_mr_work+0x180/0x1b0 [mlx5_ib]
process_one_work+0x1cc/0x3c0
worker_thread+0x218/0x3c0
kthread+0xc6/0xf0
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21707

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: consolidate suboption status
MPTCP maintains the received sub-options status is the bitmask carrying
the received suboptions and in several bitfields carrying per suboption
additional info.
Zeroing the bitmask before parsing is not enough to ensure a consistent
status, and the MPTCP code has to additionally clear some bitfiled
depending on the actually parsed suboption.
The above schema is fragile, and syzbot managed to trigger a path where
a relevant bitfield is not cleared/initialized:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __mptcp_expand_seq net/mptcp/options.c:1030 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mptcp_expand_seq net/mptcp/protocol.h:864 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ack_update_msk net/mptcp/options.c:1060 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mptcp_incoming_options+0x2036/0x3d30 net/mptcp/options.c:1209
__mptcp_expand_seq net/mptcp/options.c:1030 [inline]
mptcp_expand_seq net/mptcp/protocol.h:864 [inline]
ack_update_msk net/mptcp/options.c:1060 [inline]
mptcp_incoming_options+0x2036/0x3d30 net/mptcp/options.c:1209
tcp_data_queue+0xb4/0x7be0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5233
tcp_rcv_established+0x1061/0x2510 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6264
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x7f3/0x11a0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1916
tcp_v4_rcv+0x51df/0x5750 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2351
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2a3/0x13d0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x336/0x500 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
ip_local_deliver+0x21f/0x490 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254
dst_input include/net/dst.h:460 [inline]
ip_rcv_finish+0x4a2/0x520 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:447
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
ip_rcv+0xcd/0x380 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:567
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5704 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x319/0xa00 net/core/dev.c:5817
process_backlog+0x4ad/0xa50 net/core/dev.c:6149
__napi_poll+0xe7/0x980 net/core/dev.c:6902
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6971 [inline]
net_rx_action+0xa5a/0x19b0 net/core/dev.c:7093
handle_softirqs+0x1a0/0x7c0 kernel/softirq.c:561
__do_softirq+0x14/0x1a kernel/softirq.c:595
do_softirq+0x9a/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:462
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x9f/0xb0 kernel/softirq.c:389
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:919 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2758/0x57d0 net/core/dev.c:4493
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3168 [inline]
neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:523 [inline]
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:537 [inline]
ip_finish_output2+0x187c/0x1b70 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:236
__ip_finish_output+0x287/0x810
ip_finish_output+0x4b/0x600 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:324
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]
ip_output+0x15f/0x3f0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:434
dst_output include/net/dst.h:450 [inline]
ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:130 [inline]
__ip_queue_xmit+0x1f2a/0x20d0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:536
ip_queue_xmit+0x60/0x80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:550
__tcp_transmit_skb+0x3cea/0x4900 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1468
tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1486 [inline]
tcp_write_xmit+0x3b90/0x9070 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2829
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0xc4/0x380 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3012
tcp_send_fin+0x9f6/0xf50 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3618
__tcp_close+0x140c/0x1550 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3130
__mptcp_close_ssk+0x74e/0x16f0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2496
mptcp_close_ssk+0x26b/0x2c0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2550
mptcp_pm_nl_rm_addr_or_subflow+0x635/0xd10 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:889
mptcp_pm_nl_rm_subflow_received net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:924 [inline]
mptcp_pm_flush_addrs_and_subflows net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1688 [inline]
mptcp_nl_flush_addrs_list net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1709 [inline]
mptcp_pm_nl_flush_addrs_doit+0xe10/0x1630 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1750
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 [inline]
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21700

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: Disallow replacing of child qdisc from one parent to another
Lion Ackermann was able to create a UAF which can be abused for privilege
escalation with the following script
Step 1. create root qdisc
tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1:0 drr
step2. a class for packet aggregation do demonstrate uaf
tc class add dev lo classid 1:1 drr
step3. a class for nesting
tc class add dev lo classid 1:2 drr
step4. a class to graft qdisc to
tc class add dev lo classid 1:3 drr
step5.
tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle 2:0 plug limit 1024
step6.
tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:2 handle 3:0 drr
step7.
tc class add dev lo classid 3:1 drr
step 8.
tc qdisc add dev lo parent 3:1 handle 4:0 pfifo
step 9. Display the class/qdisc layout
tc class ls dev lo
class drr 1:1 root leaf 2: quantum 64Kb
class drr 1:2 root leaf 3: quantum 64Kb
class drr 3:1 root leaf 4: quantum 64Kb
tc qdisc ls
qdisc drr 1: dev lo root refcnt 2
qdisc plug 2: dev lo parent 1:1
qdisc pfifo 4: dev lo parent 3:1 limit 1000p
qdisc drr 3: dev lo parent 1:2
step10. trigger the bug <=== prevented by this patch
tc qdisc replace dev lo parent 1:3 handle 4:0
step 11. Redisplay again the qdiscs/classes
tc class ls dev lo
class drr 1:1 root leaf 2: quantum 64Kb
class drr 1:2 root leaf 3: quantum 64Kb
class drr 1:3 root leaf 4: quantum 64Kb
class drr 3:1 root leaf 4: quantum 64Kb
tc qdisc ls
qdisc drr 1: dev lo root refcnt 2
qdisc plug 2: dev lo parent 1:1
qdisc pfifo 4: dev lo parent 3:1 refcnt 2 limit 1000p
qdisc drr 3: dev lo parent 1:2
Observe that a) parent for 4:0 does not change despite the replace request.
There can only be one parent. b) refcount has gone up by two for 4:0 and
c) both class 1:3 and 3:1 are pointing to it.
Step 12. send one packet to plug
echo "" | socat -u STDIN UDP4-DATAGRAM:127.0.0.1:8888,priority=$((0x10001))
step13. send one packet to the grafted fifo
echo "" | socat -u STDIN UDP4-DATAGRAM:127.0.0.1:8888,priority=$((0x10003))
step14. lets trigger the uaf
tc class delete dev lo classid 1:3
tc class delete dev lo classid 1:1
The semantics of "replace" is for a del/add _on the same node_ and not
a delete from one node(3:1) and add to another node (1:3) as in step10.
While we could "fix" with a more complex approach there could be
consequences to expectations so the patch takes the preventive approach of
"disallow such config".
Joint work with Lion Ackermann <nnamrec@gmail.com>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21696

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: clear uffd-wp PTE/PMD state on mremap()
When mremap()ing a memory region previously registered with userfaultfd as
write-protected but without UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_REMAP, an inconsistency in
flag clearing leads to a mismatch between the vma flags (which have
uffd-wp cleared) and the pte/pmd flags (which do not have uffd-wp
cleared). This mismatch causes a subsequent mprotect(PROT_WRITE) to
trigger a warning in page_table_check_pte_flags() due to setting the pte
to writable while uffd-wp is still set.
Fix this by always explicitly clearing the uffd-wp pte/pmd flags on any
such mremap() so that the values are consistent with the existing clearing
of VM_UFFD_WP. Be careful to clear the logical flag regardless of its
physical form; a PTE bit, a swap PTE bit, or a PTE marker. Cover PTE,
huge PMD and hugetlb paths.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21692

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: fix ets qdisc OOB Indexing
Haowei Yan <g1042620637@gmail.com> found that ets_class_from_arg() can
index an Out-Of-Bound class in ets_class_from_arg() when passed clid of
0. The overflow may cause local privilege escalation.
[ 18.852298] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 18.853271] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/sched/sch_ets.c:93:20
[ 18.853743] index 18446744073709551615 is out of range for type 'ets_class [16]'
[ 18.854254] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1275 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.12.6-dirty #17
[ 18.854821] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 18.856532] Call Trace:
[ 18.857441] <TASK>
[ 18.858227] dump_stack_lvl+0xc2/0xf0
[ 18.859607] dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[ 18.860908] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xa7/0xf0
[ 18.864022] ets_class_change+0x3d6/0x3f0
[ 18.864322] tc_ctl_tclass+0x251/0x910
[ 18.864587] ? lock_acquire+0x5e/0x140
[ 18.865113] ? __mutex_lock+0x9c/0xe70
[ 18.866009] ? __mutex_lock+0xa34/0xe70
[ 18.866401] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x170/0x6f0
[ 18.866806] ? __lock_acquire+0x578/0xc10
[ 18.867184] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
[ 18.867503] netlink_rcv_skb+0x59/0x110
[ 18.867776] rtnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x30
[ 18.868159] netlink_unicast+0x1c3/0x2b0
[ 18.868440] netlink_sendmsg+0x239/0x4b0
[ 18.868721] ____sys_sendmsg+0x3e2/0x410
[ 18.869012] ___sys_sendmsg+0x88/0xe0
[ 18.869276] ? rseq_ip_fixup+0x198/0x260
[ 18.869563] ? rseq_update_cpu_node_id+0x10a/0x190
[ 18.869900] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x5a/0xd0
[ 18.870196] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x220
[ 18.870547] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x150
[ 18.870821] ? __memcg_slab_free_hook+0x69/0x290
[ 18.871157] __sys_sendmsg+0x69/0xd0
[ 18.871416] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1d/0x30
[ 18.871699] x64_sys_call+0x9e2/0x2670
[ 18.871979] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150
[ 18.873280] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x150
[ 18.874742] ? lock_release+0x7b/0x160
[ 18.876157] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x5ce/0x8f0
[ 18.877833] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xc2/0x210
[ 18.879608] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0
[ 18.879808] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70
[ 18.880023] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70
[ 18.880223] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70
[ 18.880426] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 18.880683] RIP: 0033:0x44a957
[ 18.880851] Code: ff ff e8 fc 00 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 8974 24 10
[ 18.881766] RSP: 002b:00007ffcdd00fad8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[ 18.882149] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcdd010db8 RCX: 000000000044a957
[ 18.882507] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffcdd00fb70 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 18.885037] RBP: 00007ffcdd010bc0 R08: 000000000703c770 R09: 000000000703c7c0
[ 18.887203] R10: 0000000000000080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 18.888026] R13: 00007ffcdd010da8 R14: 00000000004ca7d0 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 18.888395] </TASK>
[ 18.888610] ---[ end trace ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21682

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: bnxt: always recalculate features after XDP clearing, fix null-deref
Recalculate features when XDP is detached.
Before:
# ip li set dev eth0 xdp obj xdp_dummy.bpf.o sec xdp
# ip li set dev eth0 xdp off
# ethtool -k eth0 | grep gro
rx-gro-hw: off [requested on]
After:
# ip li set dev eth0 xdp obj xdp_dummy.bpf.o sec xdp
# ip li set dev eth0 xdp off
# ethtool -k eth0 | grep gro
rx-gro-hw: on
The fact that HW-GRO doesn't get re-enabled automatically is just
a minor annoyance. The real issue is that the features will randomly
come back during another reconfiguration which just happens to invoke
netdev_update_features(). The driver doesn't handle reconfiguring
two things at a time very robustly.
Starting with commit 98ba1d931f61 ("bnxt_en: Fix RSS logic in
__bnxt_reserve_rings()") we only reconfigure the RSS hash table
if the "effective" number of Rx rings has changed. If HW-GRO is
enabled "effective" number of rings is 2x what user sees.
So if we are in the bad state, with HW-GRO re-enablement "pending"
after XDP off, and we lower the rings by / 2 - the HW-GRO rings
doing 2x and the ethtool -L doing / 2 may cancel each other out,
and the:
if (old_rx_rings != bp->hw_resc.resv_rx_rings &&
condition in __bnxt_reserve_rings() will be false.
The RSS map won't get updated, and we'll crash with:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000168
RIP: 0010:__bnxt_hwrm_vnic_set_rss+0x13a/0x1a0
bnxt_hwrm_vnic_rss_cfg_p5+0x47/0x180
__bnxt_setup_vnic_p5+0x58/0x110
bnxt_init_nic+0xb72/0xf50
__bnxt_open_nic+0x40d/0xab0
bnxt_open_nic+0x2b/0x60
ethtool_set_channels+0x18c/0x1d0
As we try to access a freed ring.
The issue is present since XDP support was added, really, but
prior to commit 98ba1d931f61 ("bnxt_en: Fix RSS logic in
__bnxt_reserve_rings()") it wasn't causing major issues.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21681

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: fix lockup on tx to unregistering netdev with carrier
Commit in a fixes tag attempted to fix the issue in the following
sequence of calls:
do_output
-> ovs_vport_send
-> dev_queue_xmit
-> __dev_queue_xmit
-> netdev_core_pick_tx
-> skb_tx_hash
When device is unregistering, the 'dev->real_num_tx_queues' goes to
zero and the 'while (unlikely(hash >= qcount))' loop inside the
'skb_tx_hash' becomes infinite, locking up the core forever.
But unfortunately, checking just the carrier status is not enough to
fix the issue, because some devices may still be in unregistering
state while reporting carrier status OK.
One example of such device is a net/dummy. It sets carrier ON
on start, but it doesn't implement .ndo_stop to set the carrier off.
And it makes sense, because dummy doesn't really have a carrier.
Therefore, while this device is unregistering, it's still easy to hit
the infinite loop in the skb_tx_hash() from the OVS datapath. There
might be other drivers that do the same, but dummy by itself is
important for the OVS ecosystem, because it is frequently used as a
packet sink for tcpdump while debugging OVS deployments. And when the
issue is hit, the only way to recover is to reboot.
Fix that by also checking if the device is running. The running
state is handled by the net core during unregistering, so it covers
unregistering case better, and we don't really need to send packets
to devices that are not running anyway.
While only checking the running state might be enough, the carrier
check is preserved. The running and the carrier states seem disjoined
throughout the code and different drivers. And other core functions
like __dev_direct_xmit() check both before attempting to transmit
a packet. So, it seems safer to check both flags in OVS as well.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21673

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix double free of TCP_Server_Info::hostname
When shutting down the server in cifs_put_tcp_session(), cifsd thread
might be reconnecting to multiple DFS targets before it realizes it
should exit the loop, so @server->hostname can't be freed as long as
cifsd thread isn't done. Otherwise the following can happen:
RIP: 0010:__slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
Code: 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc 4c 89 de 4c 89 cf 44 89 44 24 08 4c 89
1c 24 e8 fb cf 8e 00 44 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 1c 24 e9 5f fe ff ff <0f>
0b 41 f7 45 08 00 0d 21 00 0f 85 2d ff ff ff e9 1f ff ff ff 80
RSP: 0018:ffffb26180dbfd08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffff8ea34728e510 RBX: ffff8ea34728e500 RCX: 0000000000800068
RDX: 0000000000800068 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ea340042400
RBP: ffffe112041ca380 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 6170732e31303000 R11: 70726f632e786563 R12: ffff8ea34728e500
R13: ffff8ea340042400 R14: ffff8ea34728e500 R15: 0000000000800068
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ea66fd80000(0000)
000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffc25376080 CR3: 000000012a2ba001 CR4:
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? __reconnect_target_unlocked+0x3e/0x160 [cifs]
? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
? die+0x2b/0x50
? do_trap+0xce/0x120
? __slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
? __slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
? __slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? __slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
? extract_hostname+0x5c/0xa0 [cifs]
? extract_hostname+0x5c/0xa0 [cifs]
? __kmalloc+0x4b/0x140
__reconnect_target_unlocked+0x3e/0x160 [cifs]
reconnect_dfs_server+0x145/0x430 [cifs]
cifs_handle_standard+0x1ad/0x1d0 [cifs]
cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x592/0x730 [cifs]
? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
kthread+0xdd/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-58057

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: convert workqueues to unbound
When a workqueue is created with `WQ_UNBOUND`, its work items are
served by special worker-pools, whose host workers are not bound to
any specific CPU. In the default configuration (i.e. when
`queue_delayed_work` and friends do not specify which CPU to run the
work item on), `WQ_UNBOUND` allows the work item to be executed on any
CPU in the same node of the CPU it was enqueued on. While this
solution potentially sacrifices locality, it avoids contention with
other processes that might dominate the CPU time of the processor the
work item was scheduled on.
This is not just a theoretical problem: in a particular scenario
misconfigured process was hogging most of the time from CPU0, leaving
less than 0.5% of its CPU time to the kworker. The IDPF workqueues
that were using the kworker on CPU0 suffered large completion delays
as a result, causing performance degradation, timeouts and eventual
system crash.
* I have also run a manual test to gauge the performance
improvement. The test consists of an antagonist process
(`./stress --cpu 2`) consuming as much of CPU 0 as possible. This
process is run under `taskset 01` to bind it to CPU0, and its
priority is changed with `chrt -pQ 9900 10000 ${pid}` and
`renice -n -20 ${pid}` after start.
Then, the IDPF driver is forced to prefer CPU0 by editing all calls
to `queue_delayed_work`, `mod_delayed_work`, etc... to use CPU 0.
Finally, `ktraces` for the workqueue events are collected.
Without the current patch, the antagonist process can force
arbitrary delays between `workqueue_queue_work` and
`workqueue_execute_start`, that in my tests were as high as
`30ms`. With the current patch applied, the workqueue can be
migrated to another unloaded CPU in the same node, and, keeping
everything else equal, the maximum delay I could see was `6us`.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-58013

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix slab-use-after-free Read in mgmt_remove_adv_monitor_sync
This fixes the following crash:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_remove_adv_monitor_sync+0x3a/0xd0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5543
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88814128f898 by task kworker/u9:4/5961
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5961 Comm: kworker/u9:4 Not tainted 6.12.0-syzkaller-10684-gf1cd565ce577 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602
mgmt_remove_adv_monitor_sync+0x3a/0xd0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5543
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x22b/0x400 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa63/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Allocated by task 16026:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x243/0x390 mm/slub.c:4314
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:901 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1037 [inline]
mgmt_pending_new+0x65/0x250 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:269
mgmt_pending_add+0x36/0x120 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296
remove_adv_monitor+0x102/0x1b0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5568
hci_mgmt_cmd+0xc47/0x11d0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1712
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x7b8/0x11c0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1832
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:726
sock_write_iter+0x2d7/0x3f0 net/socket.c:1147
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:586 [inline]
vfs_write+0xaeb/0xd30 fs/read_write.c:679
ksys_write+0x18f/0x2b0 fs/read_write.c:731
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 16022:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:582
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x59/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2338 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4598 [inline]
kfree+0x196/0x420 mm/slub.c:4746
mgmt_pending_foreach+0xd1/0x130 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:259
__mgmt_power_off+0x183/0x430 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9550
hci_dev_close_sync+0x6c4/0x11c0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5208
hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:483 [inline]
hci_dev_close+0x112/0x210 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:508
sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1209
sock_ioctl+0x626/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1328
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-58005

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm: Change to kvalloc() in eventlog/acpi.c
The following failure was reported on HPE ProLiant D320:
[ 10.693310][ T1] tpm_tis STM0925:00: 2.0 TPM (device-id 0x3, rev-id 0)
[ 10.848132][ T1] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 10.853559][ T1] WARNING: CPU: 59 PID: 1 at mm/page_alloc.c:4727 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2ca/0x330
[ 10.862827][ T1] Modules linked in:
[ 10.866671][ T1] CPU: 59 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-lp155.2.g52785e2-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) 588cd98293a7c9eba9013378d807364c088c9375
[ 10.882741][ T1] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL320 Gen12/ProLiant DL320 Gen12, BIOS 1.20 10/28/2024
[ 10.892170][ T1] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_noprof+0x2ca/0x330
[ 10.898103][ T1] Code: 24 08 e9 4a fe ff ff e8 34 36 fa ff e9 88 fe ff ff 83 fe 0a 0f 86 b3 fd ff ff 80 3d 01 e7 ce 01 00 75 09 c6 05 f8 e6 ce 01 01 <0f> 0b 45 31 ff e9 e5 fe ff ff f7 c2 00 00 08 00 75 42 89 d9 80 e1
[ 10.917750][ T1] RSP: 0000:ffffb7cf40077980 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 10.923777][ T1] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000040cc0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 10.931727][ T1] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: 0000000000040cc0
The above transcript shows that ACPI pointed a 16 MiB buffer for the log
events because RSI maps to the 'order' parameter of __alloc_pages_noprof().
Address the bug by moving from devm_kmalloc() to devm_add_action() and
kvmalloc() and devm_add_action().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57996

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: sch_sfq: don't allow 1 packet limit
The current implementation does not work correctly with a limit of
1. iproute2 actually checks for this and this patch adds the check in
kernel as well.
This fixes the following syzkaller reported crash:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/sched/sch_sfq.c:210:6
index 65535 is out of range for type 'struct sfq_head[128]'
CPU: 0 PID: 2569 Comm: syz-executor101 Not tainted 5.10.0-smp-DEV #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
dump_stack+0x125/0x19f lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:148 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xed/0x120 lib/ubsan.c:347
sfq_link net/sched/sch_sfq.c:210 [inline]
sfq_dec+0x528/0x600 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:238
sfq_dequeue+0x39b/0x9d0 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:500
sfq_reset+0x13/0x50 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:525
qdisc_reset+0xfe/0x510 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1026
tbf_reset+0x3d/0x100 net/sched/sch_tbf.c:319
qdisc_reset+0xfe/0x510 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1026
dev_reset_queue+0x8c/0x140 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1296
netdev_for_each_tx_queue include/linux/netdevice.h:2350 [inline]
dev_deactivate_many+0x6dc/0xc20 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1362
__dev_close_many+0x214/0x350 net/core/dev.c:1468
dev_close_many+0x207/0x510 net/core/dev.c:1506
unregister_netdevice_many+0x40f/0x16b0 net/core/dev.c:10738
unregister_netdevice_queue+0x2be/0x310 net/core/dev.c:10695
unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:2893 [inline]
__tun_detach+0x6b6/0x1600 drivers/net/tun.c:689
tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:705 [inline]
tun_chr_close+0x104/0x1b0 drivers/net/tun.c:3640
__fput+0x203/0x840 fs/file_table.c:280
task_work_run+0x129/0x1b0 kernel/task_work.c:185
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:33 [inline]
do_exit+0x5ce/0x2200 kernel/exit.c:931
do_group_exit+0x144/0x310 kernel/exit.c:1046
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1057 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1055 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3b/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1055
do_syscall_64+0x6c/0xd0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
RIP: 0033:0x7fe5e7b52479
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7fe5e7b5244f.
RSP: 002b:00007ffd3c800398 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fe5e7b52479
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00007fe5e7bcd2d0 R08: ffffffffffffffb8 R09: 0000000000000014
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe5e7bcd2d0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fe5e7bcdd20 R15: 00007fe5e7b24270
The crash can be also be reproduced with the following (with a tc
recompiled to allow for sfq limits of 1):
tc qdisc add dev dummy0 handle 1: root tbf rate 1Kbit burst 100b lat 1s
../iproute2-6.9.0/tc/tc qdisc add dev dummy0 handle 2: parent 1:10 sfq limit 1
ifconfig dummy0 up
ping -I dummy0 -f -c2 -W0.1 8.8.8.8
sleep 1
Scenario that triggers the crash:
* the first packet is sent and queued in TBF and SFQ; qdisc qlen is 1
* TBF dequeues: it peeks from SFQ which moves the packet to the
gso_skb list and keeps qdisc qlen set to 1. TBF is out of tokens so
it schedules itself for later.
* the second packet is sent and TBF tries to queues it to SFQ. qdisc
qlen is now 2 and because the SFQ limit is 1 the packet is dropped
by SFQ. At this point qlen is 1, and all of the SFQ slots are empty,
however q->tail is not NULL.
At this point, assuming no more packets are queued, when sch_dequeue
runs again it will decrement the qlen for the current empty slot
causing an underflow and the subsequent out of bounds access.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57982

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: state: fix out-of-bounds read during lookup
lookup and resize can run in parallel.
The xfrm_state_hash_generation seqlock ensures a retry, but the hash
functions can observe a hmask value that is too large for the new hlist
array.
rehash does:
rcu_assign_pointer(net->xfrm.state_bydst, ndst) [..]
net->xfrm.state_hmask = nhashmask;
While state lookup does:
h = xfrm_dst_hash(net, daddr, saddr, tmpl->reqid, encap_family);
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, net->xfrm.state_bydst + h, bydst) {
This is only safe in case the update to state_bydst is larger than
net->xfrm.xfrm_state_hmask (or if the lookup function gets
serialized via state spinlock again).
Fix this by prefetching state_hmask and the associated pointers.
The xfrm_state_hash_generation seqlock retry will ensure that the pointer
and the hmask will be consistent.
The existing helpers, like xfrm_dst_hash(), are now unsafe for RCU side,
add lockdep assertions to document that they are only safe for insert
side.
xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr() uses the spinlock rather than RCU.
AFAICS this is an oversight from back when state lookup was converted to
RCU, this lock should be replaced with RCU in a future patch.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57977

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memcg: fix soft lockup in the OOM process
A soft lockup issue was found in the product with about 56,000 tasks were
in the OOM cgroup, it was traversing them when the soft lockup was
triggered.
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 23s! [VM Thread:1503066]
CPU: 2 PID: 1503066 Comm: VM Thread Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
Hardware name: Huawei Cloud OpenStack Nova, BIOS
RIP: 0010:console_unlock+0x343/0x540
RSP: 0000:ffffb751447db9a0 EFLAGS: 00000247 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000ffffffff
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000247
RBP: ffffffffafc71f90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000040
R10: 0000000000000080 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffafc74bd0
R13: ffffffffaf60a220 R14: 0000000000000247 R15: 0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f2fe6ad91f0 CR3: 00000004b2076003 CR4: 0000000000360ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
vprintk_emit+0x193/0x280
printk+0x52/0x6e
dump_task+0x114/0x130
mem_cgroup_scan_tasks+0x76/0x100
dump_header+0x1fe/0x210
oom_kill_process+0xd1/0x100
out_of_memory+0x125/0x570
mem_cgroup_out_of_memory+0xb5/0xd0
try_charge+0x720/0x770
mem_cgroup_try_charge+0x86/0x180
mem_cgroup_try_charge_delay+0x1c/0x40
do_anonymous_page+0xb5/0x390
handle_mm_fault+0xc4/0x1f0
This is because thousands of processes are in the OOM cgroup, it takes a
long time to traverse all of them. As a result, this lead to soft lockup
in the OOM process.
To fix this issue, call 'cond_resched' in the 'mem_cgroup_scan_tasks'
function per 1000 iterations. For global OOM, call
'touch_softlockup_watchdog' per 1000 iterations to avoid this issue.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57974

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udp: Deal with race between UDP socket address change and rehash
If a UDP socket changes its local address while it's receiving
datagrams, as a result of connect(), there is a period during which
a lookup operation might fail to find it, after the address is changed
but before the secondary hash (port and address) and the four-tuple
hash (local and remote ports and addresses) are updated.
Secondary hash chains were introduced by commit 30fff9231fad ("udp:
bind() optimisation") and, as a result, a rehash operation became
needed to make a bound socket reachable again after a connect().
This operation was introduced by commit 719f835853a9 ("udp: add
rehash on connect()") which isn't however a complete fix: the
socket will be found once the rehashing completes, but not while
it's pending.
This is noticeable with a socat(1) server in UDP4-LISTEN mode, and a
client sending datagrams to it. After the server receives the first
datagram (cf. _xioopen_ipdgram_listen()), it issues a connect() to
the address of the sender, in order to set up a directed flow.
Now, if the client, running on a different CPU thread, happens to
send a (subsequent) datagram while the server's socket changes its
address, but is not rehashed yet, this will result in a failed
lookup and a port unreachable error delivered to the client, as
apparent from the following reproducer:
LEN=$(($(cat /proc/sys/net/core/wmem_default) / 4))
dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=${LEN} of=tmp.in
while :; do
taskset -c 1 socat UDP4-LISTEN:1337,null-eof OPEN:tmp.out,create,trunc &
sleep 0.1 || sleep 1
taskset -c 2 socat OPEN:tmp.in UDP4:localhost:1337,shut-null
wait
done
where the client will eventually get ECONNREFUSED on a write()
(typically the second or third one of a given iteration):
2024/11/13 21:28:23 socat[46901] E write(6, 0x556db2e3c000, 8192): Connection refused
This issue was first observed as a seldom failure in Podman's tests
checking UDP functionality while using pasta(1) to connect the
container's network namespace, which leads us to a reproducer with
the lookup error resulting in an ICMP packet on a tap device:
LOCAL_ADDR="$(ip -j -4 addr show|jq -rM '.[] | .addr_info[0] | select(.scope == "global").local')"
while :; do
./pasta --config-net -p pasta.pcap -u 1337 socat UDP4-LISTEN:1337,null-eof OPEN:tmp.out,create,trunc &
sleep 0.2 || sleep 1
socat OPEN:tmp.in UDP4:${LOCAL_ADDR}:1337,shut-null
wait
cmp tmp.in tmp.out
done
Once this fails:
tmp.in tmp.out differ: char 8193, line 29
we can finally have a look at what's going on:
$ tshark -r pasta.pcap
1 0.000000 :: ? ff02::16 ICMPv6 110 Multicast Listener Report Message v2
2 0.168690 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
3 0.168767 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
4 0.168806 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
5 0.168827 c6:47:05:8d:dc:04 ? Broadcast ARP 42 Who has 88.198.0.161? Tell 88.198.0.164
6 0.168851 9a:55:9a:55:9a:55 ? c6:47:05:8d:dc:04 ARP 42 88.198.0.161 is at 9a:55:9a:55:9a:55
7 0.168875 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
8 0.168896 88.198.0.164 ? 88.198.0.161 ICMP 590 Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
9 0.168926 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
10 0.168959 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192
11 0.168989 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 4138 60260 ? 1337 Len=4096
12 0.169010 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 42 60260 ? 1337 Len=0
On the third datagram received, the network namespace of the container
initiates an ARP lookup to deliver the ICMP message.
In another variant of this reproducer, starting the client with:
strace -f pasta --config-net -u 1337 socat UDP4-LISTEN:1337,null-eof OPEN:tmp.out,create,tru
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57948

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mac802154: check local interfaces before deleting sdata list
syzkaller reported a corrupted list in ieee802154_if_remove. [1]
Remove an IEEE 802.15.4 network interface after unregister an IEEE 802.15.4
hardware device from the system.
CPU0CPU1
========
genl_family_rcv_msg_doitieee802154_unregister_hw
ieee802154_del_ifaceieee802154_remove_interfaces
rdev_del_virtual_intf_deprecatedlist_del(&sdata->list)
ieee802154_if_remove
list_del_rcu
The net device has been unregistered, since the rcu grace period,
unregistration must be run before ieee802154_if_remove.
To avoid this issue, add a check for local->interfaces before deleting
sdata list.
[1]
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:58!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6277 Comm: syz-executor157 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-syzkaller-00005-g557329bcecc2 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xf4/0x140 lib/list_debug.c:56
Code: e8 a1 7e 00 07 90 0f 0b 48 c7 c7 e0 37 60 8c 4c 89 fe e8 8f 7e 00 07 90 0f 0b 48 c7 c7 40 38 60 8c 4c 89 fe e8 7d 7e 00 07 90 <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 a0 38 60 8c 4c 89 fe e8 6b 7e 00 07 90 0f 0b 48 c7
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000490f3d0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: dead000000000122 RCX: d211eee56bb28d00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88805b278dd8 R08: ffffffff8174a12c R09: 1ffffffff2852f0d
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff2852f0e R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: dead000000000100 R15: ffff88805b278cc0
FS: 0000555572f94380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000056262e4a3000 CR3: 0000000078496000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:124 [inline]
__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:215 [inline]
list_del_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:157 [inline]
ieee802154_if_remove+0x86/0x1e0 net/mac802154/iface.c:687
rdev_del_virtual_intf_deprecated net/ieee802154/rdev-ops.h:24 [inline]
ieee802154_del_iface+0x2c0/0x5c0 net/ieee802154/nl-phy.c:323
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0xb14/0xec0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2551
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1331 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7f6/0x990 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1357
netlink_sendmsg+0x8e4/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:729 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:744
____sys_sendmsg+0x52a/0x7e0 net/socket.c:2607
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2661 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x292/0x380 net/socket.c:2690
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57930

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Have process_string() also allow arrays
In order to catch a common bug where a TRACE_EVENT() TP_fast_assign()
assigns an address of an allocated string to the ring buffer and then
references it in TP_printk(), which can be executed hours later when the
string is free, the function test_event_printk() runs on all events as
they are registered to make sure there's no unwanted dereferencing.
It calls process_string() to handle cases in TP_printk() format that has
"%s". It returns whether or not the string is safe. But it can have some
false positives.
For instance, xe_bo_move() has:
TP_printk("move_lacks_source:%s, migrate object %p [size %zu] from %s to %s device_id:%s",
__entry->move_lacks_source ? "yes" : "no", __entry->bo, __entry->size,
xe_mem_type_to_name[__entry->old_placement],
xe_mem_type_to_name[__entry->new_placement], __get_str(device_id))
Where the "%s" references into xe_mem_type_to_name[]. This is an array of
pointers that should be safe for the event to access. Instead of flagging
this as a bad reference, if a reference points to an array, where the
record field is the index, consider it safe.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57924

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: relax assertions on failure to encode file handles
Encoding file handles is usually performed by a filesystem >encode_fh()
method that may fail for various reasons.
The legacy users of exportfs_encode_fh(), namely, nfsd and
name_to_handle_at(2) syscall are ready to cope with the possibility
of failure to encode a file handle.
There are a few other users of exportfs_encode_{fh,fid}() that
currently have a WARN_ON() assertion when ->encode_fh() fails.
Relax those assertions because they are wrong.
The second linked bug report states commit 16aac5ad1fa9 ("ovl: support
encoding non-decodable file handles") in v6.6 as the regressing commit,
but this is not accurate.
The aforementioned commit only increases the chances of the assertion
and allows triggering the assertion with the reproducer using overlayfs,
inotify and drop_caches.
Triggering this assertion was always possible with other filesystems and
other reasons of ->encode_fh() failures and more particularly, it was
also possible with the exact same reproducer using overlayfs that is
mounted with options index=on,nfs_export=on also on kernels < v6.6.
Therefore, I am not listing the aforementioned commit as a Fixes commit.
Backport hint: this patch will have a trivial conflict applying to
v6.6.y, and other trivial conflicts applying to stable kernels < v6.6.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57903

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: restrict SO_REUSEPORT to inet sockets
After blamed commit, crypto sockets could accidentally be destroyed
from RCU call back, as spotted by zyzbot [1].
Trying to acquire a mutex in RCU callback is not allowed.
Restrict SO_REUSEPORT socket option to inet sockets.
v1 of this patch supported TCP, UDP and SCTP sockets,
but fcnal-test.sh test needed RAW and ICMP support.
[1]
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:562
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 24, name: ksoftirqd/1
preempt_count: 100, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
1 lock held by ksoftirqd/1/24:
#0: ffffffff8e937ba0 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:337 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e937ba0 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2561 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e937ba0 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_core+0xa37/0x17a0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2823
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffffff8161c8c8>] softirq_handle_begin kernel/softirq.c:402 [inline]
[<ffffffff8161c8c8>] handle_softirqs+0x128/0x9b0 kernel/softirq.c:537
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 24 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller-00174-ga024e377efed #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
__might_resched+0x5d4/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:8758
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:562 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x131/0xee0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:735
crypto_put_default_null_skcipher+0x18/0x70 crypto/crypto_null.c:179
aead_release+0x3d/0x50 crypto/algif_aead.c:489
alg_do_release crypto/af_alg.c:118 [inline]
alg_sock_destruct+0x86/0xc0 crypto/af_alg.c:502
__sk_destruct+0x58/0x5f0 net/core/sock.c:2260
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2567 [inline]
rcu_core+0xaaa/0x17a0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2823
handle_softirqs+0x2d4/0x9b0 kernel/softirq.c:561
run_ksoftirqd+0xca/0x130 kernel/softirq.c:950
smpboot_thread_fn+0x544/0xa30 kernel/smpboot.c:164
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57888

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
workqueue: Do not warn when cancelling WQ_MEM_RECLAIM work from !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM worker
After commit
746ae46c1113 ("drm/sched: Mark scheduler work queues with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM")
amdgpu started seeing the following warning:
[ ] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM sdma0:drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM events:amdgpu_device_delay_enable_gfx_off [amdgpu]
...
[ ] Workqueue: sdma0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched]
...
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] <TASK>
...
[ ] ? check_flush_dependency+0xf5/0x110
...
[ ] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x6e/0x80
[ ] amdgpu_gfx_off_ctrl+0xab/0x140 [amdgpu]
[ ] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x40/0x50 [amdgpu]
[ ] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0xf4/0x810 [amdgpu]
[ ] ? drm_sched_run_job_work+0x22c/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[ ] amdgpu_job_run+0xaa/0x1f0 [amdgpu]
[ ] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x257/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[ ] process_one_work+0x217/0x720
...
[ ] </TASK>
The intent of the verifcation done in check_flush_depedency is to ensure
forward progress during memory reclaim, by flagging cases when either a
memory reclaim process, or a memory reclaim work item is flushed from a
context not marked as memory reclaim safe.
This is correct when flushing, but when called from the
cancel(_delayed)_work_sync() paths it is a false positive because work is
either already running, or will not be running at all. Therefore
cancelling it is safe and we can relax the warning criteria by letting the
helper know of the calling context.
References: 746ae46c1113 ("drm/sched: Mark scheduler work queues with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM")

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57884

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: vmscan: account for free pages to prevent infinite Loop in throttle_direct_reclaim()
The task sometimes continues looping in throttle_direct_reclaim() because
allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) keeps returning false.
#0 [ffff80002cb6f8d0] __switch_to at ffff8000080095ac
#1 [ffff80002cb6f900] __schedule at ffff800008abbd1c
#2 [ffff80002cb6f990] schedule at ffff800008abc50c
#3 [ffff80002cb6f9b0] throttle_direct_reclaim at ffff800008273550
#4 [ffff80002cb6fa20] try_to_free_pages at ffff800008277b68
#5 [ffff80002cb6fae0] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffff8000082c4660
#6 [ffff80002cb6fc50] alloc_pages_vma at ffff8000082e4a98
#7 [ffff80002cb6fca0] do_anonymous_page at ffff80000829f5a8
#8 [ffff80002cb6fce0] __handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5974
#9 [ffff80002cb6fd90] handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5bd4
At this point, the pgdat contains the following two zones:
NODE: 4 ZONE: 0 ADDR: ffff00817fffe540 NAME: "DMA32"
SIZE: 20480 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 11/28/45
VM_STAT:
NR_FREE_PAGES: 359
NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 18813
NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 0
NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 50
NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 0
NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0
NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0
NR_MLOCK: 0
NR_BOUNCE: 0
NR_ZSPAGES: 0
NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0
NODE: 4 ZONE: 1 ADDR: ffff00817fffec00 NAME: "Normal"
SIZE: 8454144 PRESENT: 98304 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 68/166/264
VM_STAT:
NR_FREE_PAGES: 146
NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 94668
NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 3
NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 735
NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 78
NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0
NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0
NR_MLOCK: 0
NR_BOUNCE: 0
NR_ZSPAGES: 0
NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0
In allow_direct_reclaim(), while processing ZONE_DMA32, the sum of
inactive/active file-backed pages calculated in zone_reclaimable_pages()
based on the result of zone_page_state_snapshot() is zero.
Additionally, since this system lacks swap, the calculation of inactive/
active anonymous pages is skipped.
crash> p nr_swap_pages
nr_swap_pages = $1937 = {
counter = 0
}
As a result, ZONE_DMA32 is deemed unreclaimable and skipped, moving on to
the processing of the next zone, ZONE_NORMAL, despite ZONE_DMA32 having
free pages significantly exceeding the high watermark.
The problem is that the pgdat->kswapd_failures hasn't been incremented.
crash> px ((struct pglist_data *) 0xffff00817fffe540)->kswapd_failures
$1935 = 0x0
This is because the node deemed balanced. The node balancing logic in
balance_pgdat() evaluates all zones collectively. If one or more zones
(e.g., ZONE_DMA32) have enough free pages to meet their watermarks, the
entire node is deemed balanced. This causes balance_pgdat() to exit early
before incrementing the kswapd_failures, as it considers the overall
memory state acceptable, even though some zones (like ZONE_NORMAL) remain
under significant pressure.
The patch ensures that zone_reclaimable_pages() includes free pages
(NR_FREE_PAGES) in its calculation when no other reclaimable pages are
available (e.g., file-backed or anonymous pages). This change prevents
zones like ZONE_DMA32, which have sufficient free pages, from being
mistakenly deemed unreclaimable. By doing so, the patch ensures proper
node balancing, avoids masking pressure on other zones like ZONE_NORMAL,
and prevents infinite loops in throttle_direct_reclaim() caused by
allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) repeatedly returning false.
The kernel hangs due to a task stuck in throttle_direct_reclaim(), caused
by a node being incorrectly deemed balanced despite pressure in certain
zones, such as ZONE_NORMAL. This issue arises from
zone_reclaimable_pages
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57795

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Remove the direct link to net_device
The similar patch in siw is in the link:
https://git.kernel.org/rdma/rdma/c/16b87037b48889
This problem also occurred in RXE. The following analyze this problem.
In the following Call Traces:
"
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dev_get_flags+0x188/0x1d0 net/core/dev.c:8782
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880554640b0 by task kworker/1:4/5295
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5295 Comm: kworker/1:4 Not tainted
6.12.0-rc3-syzkaller-00399-g9197b73fd7bb #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Workqueue: infiniband ib_cache_event_task
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
dev_get_flags+0x188/0x1d0 net/core/dev.c:8782
rxe_query_port+0x12d/0x260 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:60
__ib_query_port drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:2111 [inline]
ib_query_port+0x168/0x7d0 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:2143
ib_cache_update+0x1a9/0xb80 drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c:1494
ib_cache_event_task+0xf3/0x1e0 drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c:1568
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa65/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f2/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
"
1). In the link [1],
"
infiniband syz2: set down
"
This means that on 839.350575, the event ib_cache_event_task was sent andi
queued in ib_wq.
2). In the link [1],
"
team0 (unregistering): Port device team_slave_0 removed
"
It indicates that before 843.251853, the net device should be freed.
3). In the link [1],
"
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dev_get_flags+0x188/0x1d0
"
This means that on 850.559070, this slab-use-after-free problem occurred.
In all, on 839.350575, the event ib_cache_event_task was sent and queued
in ib_wq,
before 843.251853, the net device veth was freed.
on 850.559070, this event was executed, and the mentioned freed net device
was called. Thus, the above call trace occurred.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=12e7025f980000

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56786

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: put bpf_link's program when link is safe to be deallocated
In general, BPF link's underlying BPF program should be considered to be
reachable through attach hook -> link -> prog chain, and, pessimistically,
we have to assume that as long as link's memory is not safe to free,
attach hook's code might hold a pointer to BPF program and use it.
As such, it's not (generally) correct to put link's program early before
waiting for RCU GPs to go through. More eager bpf_prog_put() that we
currently do is mostly correct due to BPF program's release code doing
similar RCU GP waiting, but as will be shown in the following patches,
BPF program can be non-sleepable (and, thus, reliant on only "classic"
RCU GP), while BPF link's attach hook can have sleepable semantics and
needs to be protected by RCU Tasks Trace, and for such cases BPF link
has to go through RCU Tasks Trace + "classic" RCU GPs before being
deallocated. And so, if we put BPF program early, we might free BPF
program before we free BPF link, leading to use-after-free situation.
So, this patch defers bpf_prog_put() until we are ready to perform
bpf_link's deallocation. At worst, this delays BPF program freeing by
one extra RCU GP, but that seems completely acceptable. Alternatively,
we'd need more elaborate ways to determine BPF hook, BPF link, and BPF
program lifetimes, and how they relate to each other, which seems like
an unnecessary complication.
Note, for most BPF links we still will perform eager bpf_prog_put() and
link dealloc, so for those BPF links there are no observable changes
whatsoever. Only BPF links that use deferred dealloc might notice
slightly delayed freeing of BPF programs.
Also, to reduce code and logic duplication, extract program put + link
dealloc logic into bpf_link_dealloc() helper.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56765

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/pseries/vas: Add close() callback in vas_vm_ops struct
The mapping VMA address is saved in VAS window struct when the
paste address is mapped. This VMA address is used during migration
to unmap the paste address if the window is active. The paste
address mapping will be removed when the window is closed or with
the munmap(). But the VMA address in the VAS window is not updated
with munmap() which is causing invalid access during migration.
The KASAN report shows:
[16386.254991] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in reconfig_close_windows+0x1a0/0x4e8
[16386.255043] Read of size 8 at addr c00000014a819670 by task drmgr/696928
[16386.255096] CPU: 29 UID: 0 PID: 696928 Comm: drmgr Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B 6.11.0-rc5-nxgzip #2
[16386.255128] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE
[16386.255148] Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX Power11 (architected) 0x820200 0xf000007 of:IBM,FW1110.00 (NH1110_016) hv:phyp pSeries
[16386.255181] Call Trace:
[16386.255202] [c00000016b297660] [c0000000018ad0ac] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xe8 (unreliable)
[16386.255246] [c00000016b297690] [c0000000006e8a90] print_report+0x19c/0x764
[16386.255285] [c00000016b297760] [c0000000006e9490] kasan_report+0x128/0x1f8
[16386.255309] [c00000016b297880] [c0000000006eb5c8] __asan_load8+0xac/0xe0
[16386.255326] [c00000016b2978a0] [c00000000013f898] reconfig_close_windows+0x1a0/0x4e8
[16386.255343] [c00000016b297990] [c000000000140e58] vas_migration_handler+0x3a4/0x3fc
[16386.255368] [c00000016b297a90] [c000000000128848] pseries_migrate_partition+0x4c/0x4c4
...
[16386.256136] Allocated by task 696554 on cpu 31 at 16377.277618s:
[16386.256149] kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
[16386.256163] kasan_save_track+0x34/0x80
[16386.256175] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x58/0x74
[16386.256196] __kasan_slab_alloc+0xb8/0xdc
[16386.256209] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x200/0x3d0
[16386.256225] vm_area_alloc+0x44/0x150
[16386.256245] mmap_region+0x214/0x10c4
[16386.256265] do_mmap+0x5fc/0x750
[16386.256277] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x14c/0x24c
[16386.256292] ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x20c/0x348
[16386.256303] sys_mmap+0xd0/0x160
...
[16386.256350] Freed by task 0 on cpu 31 at 16386.204848s:
[16386.256363] kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
[16386.256374] kasan_save_track+0x34/0x80
[16386.256384] kasan_save_free_info+0x64/0x10c
[16386.256396] __kasan_slab_free+0x120/0x204
[16386.256415] kmem_cache_free+0x128/0x450
[16386.256428] vm_area_free_rcu_cb+0xa8/0xd8
[16386.256441] rcu_do_batch+0x2c8/0xcf0
[16386.256458] rcu_core+0x378/0x3c4
[16386.256473] handle_softirqs+0x20c/0x60c
[16386.256495] do_softirq_own_stack+0x6c/0x88
[16386.256509] do_softirq_own_stack+0x58/0x88
[16386.256521] __irq_exit_rcu+0x1a4/0x20c
[16386.256533] irq_exit+0x20/0x38
[16386.256544] interrupt_async_exit_prepare.constprop.0+0x18/0x2c
...
[16386.256717] Last potentially related work creation:
[16386.256729] kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
[16386.256741] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xcc/0x12c
[16386.256753] __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x94/0xd04
[16386.256766] vm_area_free+0x28/0x3c
[16386.256778] remove_vma+0xf4/0x114
[16386.256797] do_vmi_align_munmap.constprop.0+0x684/0x870
[16386.256811] __vm_munmap+0xe0/0x1f8
[16386.256821] sys_munmap+0x54/0x6c
[16386.256830] system_call_exception+0x1a0/0x4a0
[16386.256841] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
[16386.256868] The buggy address belongs to the object at c00000014a819670
which belongs to the cache vm_area_struct of size 168
[16386.256887] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
freed 168-byte region [c00000014a819670, c00000014a819718)
[16386.256915] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[16386.256928] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14a81
[16386.256950] memcg:c0000000ba430001
[16386.256961] anon flags: 0x43ffff800000000(node=4|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff)
[16386.256975] page_type: 0xfdffffff(slab)
[16386
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56718

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: protect link down work from execute after lgr freed
link down work may be scheduled before lgr freed but execute
after lgr freed, which may result in crash. So it is need to
hold a reference before shedule link down work, and put the
reference after work executed or canceled.
The relevant crash call stack as follows:
list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffffb638c9c0fe20,
but was 0000000000000000
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:51!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 6 PID: 978112 Comm: kworker/6:119 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G #1
Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 2221b89 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events smc_link_down_work [smc]
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid.cold+0x31/0x47
RSP: 0018:ffffb638c9c0fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010086
RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff942fb75e5128 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff943520930aa0 RSI: ffff94352091fc80 RDI: ffff94352091fc80
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb638c9c0fc38
R10: ffffb638c9c0fc30 R11: ffffffffa015eb28 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: ffffb638c9c0fe20 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff942f9cd051c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff943520900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f4f25214000 CR3: 000000025fbae004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x17e/0x470
smc_link_down_work+0x3c/0x60 [smc]
process_one_work+0x1ac/0x350
worker_thread+0x49/0x2f0
? rescuer_thread+0x360/0x360
kthread+0x118/0x140
? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56703

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: Fix soft lockups in fib6_select_path under high next hop churn
Soft lockups have been observed on a cluster of Linux-based edge routers
located in a highly dynamic environment. Using the `bird` service, these
routers continuously update BGP-advertised routes due to frequently
changing nexthop destinations, while also managing significant IPv6
traffic. The lockups occur during the traversal of the multipath
circular linked-list in the `fib6_select_path` function, particularly
while iterating through the siblings in the list. The issue typically
arises when the nodes of the linked list are unexpectedly deleted
concurrently on a different core—indicated by their 'next' and
'previous' elements pointing back to the node itself and their reference
count dropping to zero. This results in an infinite loop, leading to a
soft lockup that triggers a system panic via the watchdog timer.
Apply RCU primitives in the problematic code sections to resolve the
issue. Where necessary, update the references to fib6_siblings to
annotate or use the RCU APIs.
Include a test script that reproduces the issue. The script
periodically updates the routing table while generating a heavy load
of outgoing IPv6 traffic through multiple iperf3 clients. It
consistently induces infinite soft lockups within a couple of minutes.
Kernel log:
0 [ffffbd13003e8d30] machine_kexec at ffffffff8ceaf3eb
1 [ffffbd13003e8d90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8d0120e3
2 [ffffbd13003e8e58] panic at ffffffff8cef65d4
3 [ffffbd13003e8ed8] watchdog_timer_fn at ffffffff8d05cb03
4 [ffffbd13003e8f08] __hrtimer_run_queues at ffffffff8cfec62f
5 [ffffbd13003e8f70] hrtimer_interrupt at ffffffff8cfed756
6 [ffffbd13003e8fd0] __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt at ffffffff8cea01af
7 [ffffbd13003e8ff0] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt at ffffffff8df1b83d
-- <IRQ stack> --
8 [ffffbd13003d3708] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt at ffffffff8e000ecb
[exception RIP: fib6_select_path+299]
RIP: ffffffff8ddafe7b RSP: ffffbd13003d37b8 RFLAGS: 00000287
RAX: ffff975850b43600 RBX: ffff975850b40200 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 000000003fffffff RSI: 0000000051d383e4 RDI: ffff975850b43618
RBP: ffffbd13003d3800 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffff975850b40200
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffbd13003d3830
R13: ffff975850b436a8 R14: ffff975850b43600 R15: 0000000000000007
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
9 [ffffbd13003d3808] ip6_pol_route at ffffffff8ddb030c
10 [ffffbd13003d3888] ip6_pol_route_input at ffffffff8ddb068c
11 [ffffbd13003d3898] fib6_rule_lookup at ffffffff8ddf02b5
12 [ffffbd13003d3928] ip6_route_input at ffffffff8ddb0f47
13 [ffffbd13003d3a18] ip6_rcv_finish_core.constprop.0 at ffffffff8dd950d0
14 [ffffbd13003d3a30] ip6_list_rcv_finish.constprop.0 at ffffffff8dd96274
15 [ffffbd13003d3a98] ip6_sublist_rcv at ffffffff8dd96474
16 [ffffbd13003d3af8] ipv6_list_rcv at ffffffff8dd96615
17 [ffffbd13003d3b60] __netif_receive_skb_list_core at ffffffff8dc16fec
18 [ffffbd13003d3be0] netif_receive_skb_list_internal at ffffffff8dc176b3
19 [ffffbd13003d3c50] napi_gro_receive at ffffffff8dc565b9
20 [ffffbd13003d3c80] ice_receive_skb at ffffffffc087e4f5 [ice]
21 [ffffbd13003d3c90] ice_clean_rx_irq at ffffffffc0881b80 [ice]
22 [ffffbd13003d3d20] ice_napi_poll at ffffffffc088232f [ice]
23 [ffffbd13003d3d80] __napi_poll at ffffffff8dc18000
24 [ffffbd13003d3db8] net_rx_action at ffffffff8dc18581
25 [ffffbd13003d3e40] __do_softirq at ffffffff8df352e9
26 [ffffbd13003d3eb0] run_ksoftirqd at ffffffff8ceffe47
27 [ffffbd13003d3ec0] smpboot_thread_fn at ffffffff8cf36a30
28 [ffffbd13003d3ee8] kthread at ffffffff8cf2b39f
29 [ffffbd13003d3f28] ret_from_fork at ffffffff8ce5fa64
30 [ffffbd13003d3f50] ret_from_fork_asm at ffffffff8ce03cbb

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56664

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix race between element replace and close()
Element replace (with a socket different from the one stored) may race
with socket's close() link popping & unlinking. __sock_map_delete()
unconditionally unrefs the (wrong) element:
// set map[0] = s0
map_update_elem(map, 0, s0)
// drop fd of s0
close(s0)
sock_map_close()
lock_sock(sk) (s0!)
sock_map_remove_links(sk)
link = sk_psock_link_pop()
sock_map_unlink(sk, link)
sock_map_delete_from_link
// replace map[0] with s1
map_update_elem(map, 0, s1)
sock_map_update_elem
(s1!) lock_sock(sk)
sock_map_update_common
psock = sk_psock(sk)
spin_lock(&stab->lock)
osk = stab->sks[idx]
sock_map_add_link(..., &stab->sks[idx])
sock_map_unref(osk, &stab->sks[idx])
psock = sk_psock(osk)
sk_psock_put(sk, psock)
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&psock))
sk_psock_drop(sk, psock)
spin_unlock(&stab->lock)
unlock_sock(sk)
__sock_map_delete
spin_lock(&stab->lock)
sk = *psk // s1 replaced s0; sk == s1
if (!sk_test || sk_test == sk) // sk_test (s0) != sk (s1); no branch
sk = xchg(psk, NULL)
if (sk)
sock_map_unref(sk, psk) // unref s1; sks[idx] will dangle
psock = sk_psock(sk)
sk_psock_put(sk, psock)
if (refcount_dec_and_test())
sk_psock_drop(sk, psock)
spin_unlock(&stab->lock)
release_sock(sk)
Then close(map) enqueues bpf_map_free_deferred, which finally calls
sock_map_free(). This results in some refcount_t warnings along with
a KASAN splat [1].
Fix __sock_map_delete(), do not allow sock_map_unref() on elements that
may have been replaced.
[1]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88811f5b9100 by task kworker/u64:12/1063
CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Not tainted 6.12.0+ #125
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90
print_report+0x174/0x4f6
kasan_report+0xb9/0x190
kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0
sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330
bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320
process_one_work+0x846/0x1420
worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80
kthread+0x29e/0x360
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1202:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x85/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x131/0x450
sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220
sk_alloc+0x2c/0x870
unix_create1+0x88/0x8a0
unix_create+0xc5/0x180
__sock_create+0x241/0x650
__sys_socketpair+0x1ce/0x420
__x64_sys_socketpair+0x92/0x100
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 46:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70
kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x590
__sk_destruct+0x388/0x5a0
sk_psock_destroy+0x73e/0xa50
process_one_work+0x846/0x1420
worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80
kthread+0x29e/0x360
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
The bu
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56663

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: nl80211: fix NL80211_ATTR_MLO_LINK_ID off-by-one
Since the netlink attribute range validation provides inclusive
checking, the *max* of attribute NL80211_ATTR_MLO_LINK_ID should be
IEEE80211_MLD_MAX_NUM_LINKS - 1 otherwise causing an off-by-one.
One crash stack for demonstration:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in ieee80211_tx_control_port+0x3b6/0xca0 net/mac80211/tx.c:5939
Read of size 6 at addr 001102080000000c by task fuzzer.386/9508
CPU: 1 PID: 9508 Comm: syz.1.386 Not tainted 6.1.70 #2
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_report+0xe0/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:398
kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495
kasan_check_range+0x287/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
memcpy+0x25/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:65
ieee80211_tx_control_port+0x3b6/0xca0 net/mac80211/tx.c:5939
rdev_tx_control_port net/wireless/rdev-ops.h:761 [inline]
nl80211_tx_control_port+0x7b3/0xc40 net/wireless/nl80211.c:15453
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x22e/0x320 net/netlink/genetlink.c:756
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:833 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x539/0x740 net/netlink/genetlink.c:850
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:861
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352
netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499
___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Update the policy to ensure correct validation.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56658

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: defer final 'struct net' free in netns dismantle
Ilya reported a slab-use-after-free in dst_destroy [1]
Issue is in xfrm6_net_init() and xfrm4_net_init() :
They copy xfrm[46]_dst_ops_template into net->xfrm.xfrm[46]_dst_ops.
But net structure might be freed before all the dst callbacks are
called. So when dst_destroy() calls later :
if (dst->ops->destroy)
dst->ops->destroy(dst);
dst->ops points to the old net->xfrm.xfrm[46]_dst_ops, which has been freed.
See a relevant issue fixed in :
ac888d58869b ("net: do not delay dst_entries_add() in dst_release()")
A fix is to queue the 'struct net' to be freed after one
another cleanup_net() round (and existing rcu_barrier())
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8882137ccab0 by task swapper/37/0
Dec 03 05:46:18 kernel:
CPU: 37 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/37 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0 #67
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL, BIOS 1.16.1-1.el9 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:124)
print_address_description.constprop.0 (mm/kasan/report.c:378)
? dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:489)
? dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112)
? kasan_addr_to_slab (mm/kasan/common.c:37)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:603)
? dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112)
? rcu_do_batch (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2567)
dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112)
rcu_do_batch (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2567)
? __pfx_rcu_do_batch (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2491)
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4339 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4406)
rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2825)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:554)
__irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:589 kernel/softirq.c:428 kernel/softirq.c:637)
irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:651)
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049)
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702)
RIP: 0010:default_idle (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:37 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:92 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:743)
Code: 00 4d 29 c8 4c 01 c7 4c 29 c2 e9 6e ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 90 0f 00 2d c7 c9 27 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 90
RSP: 0018:ffff888100d2fe00 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 00000000001870ed RBX: 1ffff110201a5fc2 RCX: ffffffffb61a3e46
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffffb3d4d123
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed11c7e1835d
R10: ffff888e3f0c1aeb R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff888100d20000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
? ct_kernel_exit.constprop.0 (kernel/context_tracking.c:148)
? cpuidle_idle_call (kernel/sched/idle.c:186)
default_idle_call (./include/linux/cpuidle.h:143 kernel/sched/idle.c:118)
cpuidle_idle_call (kernel/sched/idle.c:186)
? __pfx_cpuidle_idle_call (kernel/sched/idle.c:168)
? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5848)
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4347 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4406)
? tsc_verify_tsc_adjust (arch/x86/kernel/tsc_sync.c:59)
do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:326)
cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:423 (discriminator 1))
start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:202 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:282)
? __pfx_start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:232)
? soft_restart_cpu (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:452)
common_startup_64 (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:414)
</TASK>
Dec 03 05:46:18 kernel:
Allocated by task 12184:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)
kasan_save_track (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:49 mm/kasan/common.c:60 mm/kasan/common.c:69)
__kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:319 mm/kasan/common.c:345)
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof (mm/slub.c:4085 mm/slub.c:4134 mm/slub.c:4141)
copy_net_ns (net/core/net_namespace.c:421 net/core/net_namespace.c:480)
create_new_namespaces
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56647

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: Fix icmp host relookup triggering ip_rt_bug
arp link failure may trigger ip_rt_bug while xfrm enabled, call trace is:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/route.c:1241 ip_rt_bug+0x14/0x20
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-00077-g2e1b3cc9d7f7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ip_rt_bug+0x14/0x20
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
ip_send_skb+0x14/0x40
__icmp_send+0x42d/0x6a0
ipv4_link_failure+0xe2/0x1d0
arp_error_report+0x3c/0x50
neigh_invalidate+0x8d/0x100
neigh_timer_handler+0x2e1/0x330
call_timer_fn+0x21/0x120
__run_timer_base.part.0+0x1c9/0x270
run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x80
handle_softirqs+0xac/0x280
irq_exit_rcu+0x62/0x80
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x77/0x90
The script below reproduces this scenario:
ip xfrm policy add src 0.0.0.0/0 dst 0.0.0.0/0 \
dir out priority 0 ptype main flag localok icmp
ip l a veth1 type veth
ip a a 192.168.141.111/24 dev veth0
ip l s veth0 up
ping 192.168.141.155 -c 1
icmp_route_lookup() create input routes for locally generated packets
while xfrm relookup ICMP traffic.Then it will set input route
(dst->out = ip_rt_bug) to skb for DESTUNREACH.
For ICMP err triggered by locally generated packets, dst->dev of output
route is loopback. Generally, xfrm relookup verification is not required
on loopback interfaces (net.ipv4.conf.lo.disable_xfrm = 1).
Skip icmp relookup for locally generated packets to fix it.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56614

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: fix OOB map writes when deleting elements
Jordy says:
"
In the xsk_map_delete_elem function an unsigned integer
(map->max_entries) is compared with a user-controlled signed integer
(k). Due to implicit type conversion, a large unsigned value for
map->max_entries can bypass the intended bounds check:
if (k >= map->max_entries)
return -EINVAL;
This allows k to hold a negative value (between -2147483648 and -2),
which is then used as an array index in m->xsk_map[k], which results
in an out-of-bounds access.
spin_lock_bh(&m->lock);
map_entry = &m->xsk_map[k]; // Out-of-bounds map_entry
old_xs = unrcu_pointer(xchg(map_entry, NULL)); // Oob write
if (old_xs)
xsk_map_sock_delete(old_xs, map_entry);
spin_unlock_bh(&m->lock);
The xchg operation can then be used to cause an out-of-bounds write.
Moreover, the invalid map_entry passed to xsk_map_sock_delete can lead
to further memory corruption.
"
It indeed results in following splat:
[76612.897343] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc8fc2e461108
[76612.904330] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[76612.909639] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[76612.914855] PGD 0 P4D 0
[76612.917431] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[76612.921859] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 10318 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1+ #470
[76612.929189] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019
[76612.939781] RIP: 0010:xsk_map_delete_elem+0x2d/0x60
[76612.944738] Code: 00 00 41 54 55 53 48 63 2e 3b 6f 24 73 38 4c 8d a7 f8 00 00 00 48 89 fb 4c 89 e7 e8 2d bf 05 00 48 8d b4 eb 00 01 00 00 31 ff <48> 87 3e 48 85 ff 74 05 e8 16 ff ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 3e bc 05 00 31
[76612.963774] RSP: 0018:ffffc9002e407df8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[76612.969079] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9002e461000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[76612.976323] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffc8fc2e461108 RDI: 0000000000000000
[76612.983569] RBP: ffffffff80000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000007
[76612.990812] R10: ffffc9002e407e18 R11: ffff888108a38858 R12: ffffc9002e4610f8
[76612.998060] R13: ffff888108a38858 R14: 00007ffd1ae0ac78 R15: ffffc9002e4610c0
[76613.005303] FS: 00007f80b6f59740(0000) GS:ffff8897e0ec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[76613.013517] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[76613.019349] CR2: ffffc8fc2e461108 CR3: 000000011e3ef001 CR4: 00000000007726f0
[76613.026595] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[76613.033841] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[76613.041086] PKRU: 55555554
[76613.043842] Call Trace:
[76613.046331] <TASK>
[76613.048468] ? __die+0x20/0x60
[76613.051581] ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x450
[76613.055747] ? search_extable+0x22/0x30
[76613.059649] ? search_bpf_extables+0x5f/0x80
[76613.063988] ? exc_page_fault+0xa9/0x140
[76613.067975] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[76613.072229] ? xsk_map_delete_elem+0x2d/0x60
[76613.076573] ? xsk_map_delete_elem+0x23/0x60
[76613.080914] __sys_bpf+0x19b7/0x23c0
[76613.084555] __x64_sys_bpf+0x1a/0x20
[76613.088194] do_syscall_64+0x37/0xb0
[76613.091832] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[76613.096962] RIP: 0033:0x7f80b6d1e88d
[76613.100592] Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 b5 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[76613.119631] RSP: 002b:00007ffd1ae0ac68 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
[76613.131330] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f80b6d1e88d
[76613.142632] RDX: 0000000000000098 RSI: 00007ffd1ae0ad20 RDI: 0000000000000003
[76613.153967] RBP: 00007ffd1ae0adc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[76613.166030] R10: 00007f80b6f77040 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffd1ae0aed8
[76613.177130] R13: 000055ddf42ce1e9 R14: 000055ddf42d0d98 R15: 00
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56611

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mempolicy: fix migrate_to_node() assuming there is at least one VMA in a MM
We currently assume that there is at least one VMA in a MM, which isn't
true.
So we might end up having find_vma() return NULL, to then de-reference
NULL. So properly handle find_vma() returning NULL.
This fixes the report:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6021 Comm: syz-executor284 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00187-gf868cd251776 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024
RIP: 0010:migrate_to_node mm/mempolicy.c:1090 [inline]
RIP: 0010:do_migrate_pages+0x403/0x6f0 mm/mempolicy.c:1194
Code: ...
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000375fd08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000375fd78 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88807e171300 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88803390c044
RBP: ffff88807e171428 R08: 0000000000000014 R09: fffffbfff2039ef1
R10: ffffffff901cf78f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: ffffc9000375fe90 R14: ffffc9000375fe98 R15: ffffc9000375fdf8
FS: 00005555919e1380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005555919e1ca8 CR3: 000000007f12a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kernel_migrate_pages+0x5b2/0x750 mm/mempolicy.c:1709
__do_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1727 [inline]
__se_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1723 [inline]
__x64_sys_migrate_pages+0x96/0x100 mm/mempolicy.c:1723
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add unlikely()]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56589

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: hisi_sas: Add cond_resched() for no forced preemption model
For no forced preemption model kernel, in the scenario where the
expander is connected to 12 high performance SAS SSDs, the following
call trace may occur:
[ 214.409199][ C240] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#240 stuck for 22s! [irq/149-hisi_sa:3211]
[ 214.568533][ C240] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
[ 214.575224][ C240] pc : fput_many+0x8c/0xdc
[ 214.579480][ C240] lr : fput+0x1c/0xf0
[ 214.583302][ C240] sp : ffff80002de2b900
[ 214.587298][ C240] x29: ffff80002de2b900 x28: ffff1082aa412000
[ 214.593291][ C240] x27: ffff3062a0348c08 x26: ffff80003a9f6000
[ 214.599284][ C240] x25: ffff1062bbac5c40 x24: 0000000000001000
[ 214.605277][ C240] x23: 000000000000000a x22: 0000000000000001
[ 214.611270][ C240] x21: 0000000000001000 x20: 0000000000000000
[ 214.617262][ C240] x19: ffff3062a41ae580 x18: 0000000000010000
[ 214.623255][ C240] x17: 0000000000000001 x16: ffffdb3a6efe5fc0
[ 214.629248][ C240] x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: 0000000003ffffff
[ 214.635241][ C240] x13: 000000000000ffff x12: 000000000000029c
[ 214.641234][ C240] x11: 0000000000000006 x10: ffff80003a9f7fd0
[ 214.647226][ C240] x9 : ffffdb3a6f0482fc x8 : 0000000000000001
[ 214.653219][ C240] x7 : 0000000000000002 x6 : 0000000000000080
[ 214.659212][ C240] x5 : ffff55480ee9b000 x4 : fffffde7f94c6554
[ 214.665205][ C240] x3 : 0000000000000002 x2 : 0000000000000020
[ 214.671198][ C240] x1 : 0000000000000021 x0 : ffff3062a41ae5b8
[ 214.677191][ C240] Call trace:
[ 214.680320][ C240] fput_many+0x8c/0xdc
[ 214.684230][ C240] fput+0x1c/0xf0
[ 214.687707][ C240] aio_complete_rw+0xd8/0x1fc
[ 214.692225][ C240] blkdev_bio_end_io+0x98/0x140
[ 214.696917][ C240] bio_endio+0x160/0x1bc
[ 214.701001][ C240] blk_update_request+0x1c8/0x3bc
[ 214.705867][ C240] scsi_end_request+0x3c/0x1f0
[ 214.710471][ C240] scsi_io_completion+0x7c/0x1a0
[ 214.715249][ C240] scsi_finish_command+0x104/0x140
[ 214.720200][ C240] scsi_softirq_done+0x90/0x180
[ 214.724892][ C240] blk_mq_complete_request+0x5c/0x70
[ 214.730016][ C240] scsi_mq_done+0x48/0xac
[ 214.734194][ C240] sas_scsi_task_done+0xbc/0x16c [libsas]
[ 214.739758][ C240] slot_complete_v3_hw+0x260/0x760 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]
[ 214.746185][ C240] cq_thread_v3_hw+0xbc/0x190 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]
[ 214.752179][ C240] irq_thread_fn+0x34/0xa4
[ 214.756435][ C240] irq_thread+0xc4/0x130
[ 214.760520][ C240] kthread+0x108/0x13c
[ 214.764430][ C240] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
This is because in the hisi_sas driver, both the hardware interrupt
handler and the interrupt thread are executed on the same CPU. In the
performance test scenario, function irq_wait_for_interrupt() will always
return 0 if lots of interrupts occurs and the CPU will be continuously
consumed. As a result, the CPU cannot run the watchdog thread. When the
watchdog time exceeds the specified time, call trace occurs.
To fix it, add cond_resched() to execute the watchdog thread.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56566

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/slub: Avoid list corruption when removing a slab from the full list
Boot with slub_debug=UFPZ.
If allocated object failed in alloc_consistency_checks, all objects of
the slab will be marked as used, and then the slab will be removed from
the partial list.
When an object belonging to the slab got freed later, the remove_full()
function is called. Because the slab is neither on the partial list nor
on the full list, it eventually lead to a list corruption (actually a
list poison being detected).
So we need to mark and isolate the slab page with metadata corruption,
do not put it back in circulation.
Because the debug caches avoid all the fastpaths, reusing the frozen bit
to mark slab page with metadata corruption seems to be fine.
[ 4277.385669] list_del corruption, ffffea00044b3e50->next is LIST_POISON1 (dead000000000100)
[ 4277.387023] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 4277.387880] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:56!
[ 4277.388680] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 4277.389562] CPU: 5 PID: 90 Comm: kworker/5:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.6.1-1 #1
[ 4277.392113] Workqueue: xfs-inodegc/vda1 xfs_inodegc_worker [xfs]
[ 4277.393551] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0
[ 4277.394518] Code: 48 91 82 e8 37 f9 9a ff 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 28 49 91 82 e8 26 f9 9a ff 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 58 49 91
[ 4277.397292] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000333b38 EFLAGS: 00010082
[ 4277.398202] RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: ffffea00044b3e50 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 4277.399340] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff828f8715 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[ 4277.400545] RBP: ffffea00044b3e40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc900003339f0
[ 4277.401710] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffff82d44088 R12: ffff888112cf9910
[ 4277.402887] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff8881000424c0
[ 4277.404049] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88842fd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 4277.405357] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 4277.406389] CR2: 00007f2ad0b24000 CR3: 0000000102a3a006 CR4: 00000000007706e0
[ 4277.407589] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 4277.408780] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 4277.410000] PKRU: 55555554
[ 4277.410645] Call Trace:
[ 4277.411234] <TASK>
[ 4277.411777] ? die+0x32/0x80
[ 4277.412439] ? do_trap+0xd6/0x100
[ 4277.413150] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0
[ 4277.414158] ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90
[ 4277.414948] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0
[ 4277.415915] ? exc_invalid_op+0x4c/0x60
[ 4277.416710] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0
[ 4277.417675] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 4277.418482] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0
[ 4277.419466] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0
[ 4277.420410] free_to_partial_list+0x515/0x5e0
[ 4277.421242] ? xfs_iext_remove+0x41a/0xa10 [xfs]
[ 4277.422298] xfs_iext_remove+0x41a/0xa10 [xfs]
[ 4277.423316] ? xfs_inodegc_worker+0xb4/0x1a0 [xfs]
[ 4277.424383] xfs_bmap_del_extent_delay+0x4fe/0x7d0 [xfs]
[ 4277.425490] __xfs_bunmapi+0x50d/0x840 [xfs]
[ 4277.426445] xfs_itruncate_extents_flags+0x13a/0x490 [xfs]
[ 4277.427553] xfs_inactive_truncate+0xa3/0x120 [xfs]
[ 4277.428567] xfs_inactive+0x22d/0x290 [xfs]
[ 4277.429500] xfs_inodegc_worker+0xb4/0x1a0 [xfs]
[ 4277.430479] process_one_work+0x171/0x340
[ 4277.431227] worker_thread+0x277/0x390
[ 4277.431962] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 4277.432752] kthread+0xf0/0x120
[ 4277.433382] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 4277.434134] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[ 4277.434837] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 4277.435566] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[ 4277.436280] </TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56551

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix usage slab after free
[ +0.000021] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000027] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881b8605f88 by task amd_pci_unplug/2147
[ +0.000023] CPU: 6 PID: 2147 Comm: amd_pci_unplug Not tainted 6.10.0+ #1
[ +0.000016] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/ROG STRIX B550-F GAMING (WI-FI), BIOS 1401 12/03/2020
[ +0.000016] Call Trace:
[ +0.000008] <TASK>
[ +0.000009] dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0
[ +0.000017] print_report+0xce/0x5f0
[ +0.000017] ? drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000019] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000015] ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x72/0x200
[ +0.000016] ? drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000019] kasan_report+0xbe/0x110
[ +0.000015] ? drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000023] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x30
[ +0.000014] drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000020] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000013] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[ +0.000016] ? __pfx_drm_sched_entity_flush+0x10/0x10 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000020] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000013] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[ +0.000013] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000013] ? enable_work+0x124/0x220
[ +0.000015] ? __pfx_enable_work+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000013] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000014] ? free_large_kmalloc+0x85/0xf0
[ +0.000016] drm_sched_entity_destroy+0x18/0x30 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000020] amdgpu_vce_sw_fini+0x55/0x170 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000735] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ +0.000016] vce_v4_0_sw_fini+0x80/0x110 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000726] amdgpu_device_fini_sw+0x331/0xfc0 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000679] ? mutex_unlock+0x80/0xe0
[ +0.000017] ? __pfx_amdgpu_device_fini_sw+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000662] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000014] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[ +0.000013] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000013] ? mutex_unlock+0x80/0xe0
[ +0.000016] amdgpu_driver_release_kms+0x16/0x80 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000663] drm_minor_release+0xc9/0x140 [drm]
[ +0.000081] drm_release+0x1fd/0x390 [drm]
[ +0.000082] __fput+0x36c/0xad0
[ +0.000018] __fput_sync+0x3c/0x50
[ +0.000014] __x64_sys_close+0x7d/0xe0
[ +0.000014] x64_sys_call+0x1bc6/0x2680
[ +0.000014] do_syscall_64+0x70/0x130
[ +0.000014] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000014] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x60/0x190
[ +0.000015] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000014] ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50
[ +0.000012] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000013] ? exc_page_fault+0x7c/0x110
[ +0.000015] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ +0.000014] RIP: 0033:0x7ffff7b14f67
[ +0.000013] Code: ff e8 0d 16 02 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 73 ba f7 ff
[ +0.000026] RSP: 002b:00007fffffffe378 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
[ +0.000019] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ffff7b14f67
[ +0.000014] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffff7f6f47a RDI: 0000000000000003
[ +0.000014] RBP: 00007fffffffe3a0 R08: 0000555555569890 R09: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000014] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fffffffe5c8
[ +0.000013] R13: 00005555555552a9 R14: 0000555555557d48 R15: 00007ffff7ffd040
[ +0.000020] </TASK>
[ +0.000016] Allocated by task 383 on cpu 7 at 26.880319s:
[ +0.000014] kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x60
[ +0.000008] kasan_save_track+0x18/0x70
[ +0.000007] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x38/0x60
[ +0.000007] __kasan_kmalloc+0xc1/0xd0
[ +0.000007] kmalloc_trace_noprof+0x180/0x380
[ +0.000007] drm_sched_init+0x411/0xec0 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000012] amdgpu_device_init+0x695f/0xa610 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000658] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x1a/0x120 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000662] amdgpu_pci_p
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53237

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: fix use-after-free in device_for_each_child()
Syzbot has reported the following KASAN splat:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in device_for_each_child+0x18f/0x1a0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801f605308 by task kbnepd bnep0/4980
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 4980 Comm: kbnepd bnep0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc4-00161-gae90f6a6170d #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190
? device_for_each_child+0x18f/0x1a0
print_report+0x13a/0x4cb
? __virt_addr_valid+0x5e/0x590
? __phys_addr+0xc6/0x150
? device_for_each_child+0x18f/0x1a0
kasan_report+0xda/0x110
? device_for_each_child+0x18f/0x1a0
? __pfx_dev_memalloc_noio+0x10/0x10
device_for_each_child+0x18f/0x1a0
? __pfx_device_for_each_child+0x10/0x10
pm_runtime_set_memalloc_noio+0xf2/0x180
netdev_unregister_kobject+0x1ed/0x270
unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x123c/0x1d80
? __mutex_trylock_common+0xde/0x250
? __pfx_unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x10/0x10
? trace_contention_end+0xe6/0x140
? __mutex_lock+0x4e7/0x8f0
? __pfx_lock_acquire.part.0+0x10/0x10
? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0
? unregister_netdev+0x12/0x30
unregister_netdevice_queue+0x30d/0x3f0
? __pfx_unregister_netdevice_queue+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10
unregister_netdev+0x1c/0x30
bnep_session+0x1fb3/0x2ab0
? __pfx_bnep_session+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_woken_wake_function+0x10/0x10
? __kthread_parkme+0x132/0x200
? __pfx_bnep_session+0x10/0x10
? kthread+0x13a/0x370
? __pfx_bnep_session+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x2b7/0x370
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x48/0x80
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 4974:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
__kmalloc_noprof+0x1d1/0x440
hci_alloc_dev_priv+0x1d/0x2820
__vhci_create_device+0xef/0x7d0
vhci_write+0x2c7/0x480
vfs_write+0x6a0/0xfc0
ksys_write+0x12f/0x260
do_syscall_64+0xc7/0x250
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 4979:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x4f/0x70
kfree+0x141/0x490
hci_release_dev+0x4d9/0x600
bt_host_release+0x6a/0xb0
device_release+0xa4/0x240
kobject_put+0x1ec/0x5a0
put_device+0x1f/0x30
vhci_release+0x81/0xf0
__fput+0x3f6/0xb30
task_work_run+0x151/0x250
do_exit+0xa79/0x2c30
do_group_exit+0xd5/0x2a0
get_signal+0x1fcd/0x2210
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x93/0x780
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x140/0x290
do_syscall_64+0xd4/0x250
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
In 'hci_conn_del_sysfs()', 'device_unregister()' may be called when
an underlying (kobject) reference counter is greater than 1. This
means that reparenting (happened when the device is actually freed)
is delayed and, during that delay, parent controller device (hciX)
may be deleted. Since the latter may create a dangling pointer to
freed parent, avoid that scenario by reparenting to NULL explicitly.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53229

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix the qp flush warnings in req
When the qp is in error state, the status of WQEs in the queue should be
set to error. Or else the following will appear.
[ 920.617269] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 21 at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_comp.c:756 rxe_completer+0x989/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.617744] Modules linked in: rnbd_client(O) rtrs_client(O) rtrs_core(O) rdma_ucm rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm crc32_generic rdma_rxe ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel ib_uverbs ib_core loop brd null_blk ipv6
[ 920.618516] CPU: 1 PID: 21 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Tainted: G O 6.1.113-storage+ #65
[ 920.618986] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 920.619396] RIP: 0010:rxe_completer+0x989/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.619658] Code: 0f b6 84 24 3a 02 00 00 41 89 84 24 44 04 00 00 e9 2a f7 ff ff 39 ca bb 03 00 00 00 b8 0e 00 00 00 48 0f 45 d8 e9 15 f7 ff ff <0f> 0b e9 cb f8 ff ff 41 bf f5 ff ff ff e9 08 f8 ff ff 49 8d bc 24
[ 920.620482] RSP: 0018:ffff97b7c00bbc38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 920.620817] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 0000000000000008
[ 920.621183] RDX: ffff960dc396ebc0 RSI: 0000000000005400 RDI: ffff960dc4e2fbac
[ 920.621548] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffffac406450
[ 920.621884] R10: ffffffffac4060c0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff960dc4e2f800
[ 920.622254] R13: ffff960dc4e2f928 R14: ffff97b7c029c580 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 920.622609] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff960ef7d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 920.622979] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 920.623245] CR2: 00007fa056965e90 CR3: 00000001107f1000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 920.623680] Call Trace:
[ 920.623815] <TASK>
[ 920.623933] ? __warn+0x79/0xc0
[ 920.624116] ? rxe_completer+0x989/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.624356] ? report_bug+0xfb/0x150
[ 920.624594] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x60
[ 920.624796] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[ 920.624976] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 920.625203] ? rxe_completer+0x989/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.625474] ? rxe_completer+0x329/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.625749] rxe_do_task+0x80/0x110 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.626037] rxe_requester+0x625/0xde0 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.626310] ? rxe_cq_post+0xe2/0x180 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.626583] ? do_complete+0x18d/0x220 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.626812] ? rxe_completer+0x1a3/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.627050] rxe_do_task+0x80/0x110 [rdma_rxe]
[ 920.627285] tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0xa4/0x120
[ 920.627522] handle_softirqs+0xc2/0x250
[ 920.627728] ? sort_range+0x20/0x20
[ 920.627942] run_ksoftirqd+0x1f/0x30
[ 920.628158] smpboot_thread_fn+0xc7/0x1b0
[ 920.628334] kthread+0xd6/0x100
[ 920.628504] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 920.628709] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 920.628892] </TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53224

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Move events notifier registration to be after device registration
Move pkey change work initialization and cleanup from device resources
stage to notifier stage, since this is the stage which handles this work
events.
Fix a race between the device deregistration and pkey change work by moving
MLX5_IB_STAGE_DEVICE_NOTIFIER to be after MLX5_IB_STAGE_IB_REG in order to
ensure that the notifier is deregistered before the device during cleanup.
Which ensures there are no works that are being executed after the
device has already unregistered which can cause the panic below.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 630071 Comm: kworker/1:2 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W OE --------- --- 5.14.0-162.6.1.el9_1.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS 090008 02/27/2023
Workqueue: events pkey_change_handler [mlx5_ib]
RIP: 0010:setup_qp+0x38/0x1f0 [mlx5_ib]
Code: ee 41 54 45 31 e4 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 20 8b 77 08 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 18 48 8b 07 48 8d 4c 24 16 <4c> 8b 38 49 8b 87 80 0b 00 00 4c 89 ff 48 8b 80 08 05 00 00 8b 40
RSP: 0018:ffffbcc54068be20 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff954054494128 RCX: ffffbcc54068be36
RDX: ffff954004934000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff954054494128
RBP: 0000000000000023 R08: ffff954001be2c20 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffff954001be2c20 R11: ffff9540260133c0 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000023 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9540ffcb0905
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9540ffc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010625c001 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
mlx5_ib_gsi_pkey_change+0x20/0x40 [mlx5_ib]
process_one_work+0x1e8/0x3c0
worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0
? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380
kthread+0x149/0x170
? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Modules linked in: rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) mlx5_fwctl(OE) fwctl(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) mlx5_core(OE) mlxdevm(OE) ib_core(OE) mlx_compat(OE) psample mlxfw(OE) tls knem(OE) netconsole nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache netfs qrtr rfkill sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common rapl hv_balloon hv_utils i2c_piix4 pcspkr joydev fuse ext4 mbcache jbd2 sr_mod sd_mod cdrom t10_pi sg ata_generic pci_hyperv pci_hyperv_intf hyperv_drm drm_shmem_helper drm_kms_helper hv_storvsc syscopyarea hv_netvsc sysfillrect sysimgblt hid_hyperv fb_sys_fops scsi_transport_fc hyperv_keyboard drm ata_piix crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel libata ghash_clmulni_intel hv_vmbus serio_raw [last unloaded: ib_core]
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace f6f8be4eae12f7bc ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53219

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtiofs: use pages instead of pointer for kernel direct IO
When trying to insert a 10MB kernel module kept in a virtio-fs with cache
disabled, the following warning was reported:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 404 at mm/page_alloc.c:4551 ......
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 404 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5+ #123
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ......
RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages+0x2bf/0x380
......
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x8e/0x150
? __alloc_pages+0x2bf/0x380
__kmalloc_large_node+0x86/0x160
__kmalloc+0x33c/0x480
virtio_fs_enqueue_req+0x240/0x6d0
virtio_fs_wake_pending_and_unlock+0x7f/0x190
queue_request_and_unlock+0x55/0x60
fuse_simple_request+0x152/0x2b0
fuse_direct_io+0x5d2/0x8c0
fuse_file_read_iter+0x121/0x160
__kernel_read+0x151/0x2d0
kernel_read+0x45/0x50
kernel_read_file+0x1a9/0x2a0
init_module_from_file+0x6a/0xe0
idempotent_init_module+0x175/0x230
__x64_sys_finit_module+0x5d/0xb0
x64_sys_call+0x1c3/0x9e0
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
......
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The warning is triggered as follows:
1) syscall finit_module() handles the module insertion and it invokes
kernel_read_file() to read the content of the module first.
2) kernel_read_file() allocates a 10MB buffer by using vmalloc() and
passes it to kernel_read(). kernel_read() constructs a kvec iter by
using iov_iter_kvec() and passes it to fuse_file_read_iter().
3) virtio-fs disables the cache, so fuse_file_read_iter() invokes
fuse_direct_io(). As for now, the maximal read size for kvec iter is
only limited by fc->max_read. For virtio-fs, max_read is UINT_MAX, so
fuse_direct_io() doesn't split the 10MB buffer. It saves the address and
the size of the 10MB-sized buffer in out_args[0] of a fuse request and
passes the fuse request to virtio_fs_wake_pending_and_unlock().
4) virtio_fs_wake_pending_and_unlock() uses virtio_fs_enqueue_req() to
queue the request. Because virtiofs need DMA-able address, so
virtio_fs_enqueue_req() uses kmalloc() to allocate a bounce buffer for
all fuse args, copies these args into the bounce buffer and passed the
physical address of the bounce buffer to virtiofsd. The total length of
these fuse args for the passed fuse request is about 10MB, so
copy_args_to_argbuf() invokes kmalloc() with a 10MB size parameter and
it triggers the warning in __alloc_pages():
if (WARN_ON_ONCE_GFP(order > MAX_PAGE_ORDER, gfp))
return NULL;
5) virtio_fs_enqueue_req() will retry the memory allocation in a
kworker, but it won't help, because kmalloc() will always return NULL
due to the abnormal size and finit_module() will hang forever.
A feasible solution is to limit the value of max_read for virtio-fs, so
the length passed to kmalloc() will be limited. However it will affect
the maximal read size for normal read. And for virtio-fs write initiated
from kernel, it has the similar problem but now there is no way to limit
fc->max_write in kernel.
So instead of limiting both the values of max_read and max_write in
kernel, introducing use_pages_for_kvec_io in fuse_conn and setting it as
true in virtiofs. When use_pages_for_kvec_io is enabled, fuse will use
pages instead of pointer to pass the KVEC_IO data.
After switching to pages for KVEC_IO data, these pages will be used for
DMA through virtio-fs. If these pages are backed by vmalloc(),
{flush|invalidate}_kernel_vmap_range() are necessary to flush or
invalidate the cache before the DMA operation. So add two new fields in
fuse_args_pages to record the base address of vmalloc area and the
condition indicating whether invalidation is needed. Perform the flush
in fuse_get_user_pages() for write operations and the invalidation in
fuse_release_user_pages() for read operations.
It may seem necessary to introduce another fie
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53216

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: release svc_expkey/svc_export with rcu_work
The last reference for `cache_head` can be reduced to zero in `c_show`
and `e_show`(using `rcu_read_lock` and `rcu_read_unlock`). Consequently,
`svc_export_put` and `expkey_put` will be invoked, leading to two
issues:
1. The `svc_export_put` will directly free ex_uuid. However,
`e_show`/`c_show` will access `ex_uuid` after `cache_put`, which can
trigger a use-after-free issue, shown below.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in svc_export_show+0x362/0x430 [nfsd]
Read of size 1 at addr ff11000010fdc120 by task cat/870
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 870 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3a0
print_report+0xb9/0x280
kasan_report+0xae/0xe0
svc_export_show+0x362/0x430 [nfsd]
c_show+0x161/0x390 [sunrpc]
seq_read_iter+0x589/0x770
seq_read+0x1e5/0x270
proc_reg_read+0xe1/0x140
vfs_read+0x125/0x530
ksys_read+0xc1/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Allocated by task 830:
kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
__kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x1bc/0x400
kmemdup_noprof+0x22/0x50
svc_export_parse+0x8a9/0xb80 [nfsd]
cache_do_downcall+0x71/0xa0 [sunrpc]
cache_write_procfs+0x8e/0xd0 [sunrpc]
proc_reg_write+0xe1/0x140
vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0
ksys_write+0xc1/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 868:
kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x50
kfree+0xf3/0x3e0
svc_export_put+0x87/0xb0 [nfsd]
cache_purge+0x17f/0x1f0 [sunrpc]
nfsd_destroy_serv+0x226/0x2d0 [nfsd]
nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd]
write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd]
nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd]
vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0
ksys_write+0xc1/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
2. We cannot sleep while using `rcu_read_lock`/`rcu_read_unlock`.
However, `svc_export_put`/`expkey_put` will call path_put, which
subsequently triggers a sleeping operation due to the following
`dput`.
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.10.0-dirty #141 Not tainted
-----------------------------
...
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x9a/0xd0
___might_sleep+0x231/0x240
dput+0x39/0x600
path_put+0x1b/0x30
svc_export_put+0x17/0x80
e_show+0x1c9/0x200
seq_read_iter+0x63f/0x7c0
seq_read+0x226/0x2d0
vfs_read+0x113/0x2c0
ksys_read+0xc9/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1
Fix these issues by using `rcu_work` to help release
`svc_expkey`/`svc_export`. This approach allows for an asynchronous
context to invoke `path_put` and also facilitates the freeing of
`uuid/exp/key` after an RCU grace period.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53208

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix slab-use-after-free Read in set_powered_sync
This fixes the following crash:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in set_powered_sync+0x3a/0xc0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1353
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888029b4dd18 by task kworker/u9:0/54
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-01155-gf723224742fc #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
q kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
set_powered_sync+0x3a/0xc0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1353
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x22b/0x400 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:328
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3231 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa2c/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3312
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd10 kernel/workqueue.c:3389
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Allocated by task 5247:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x19c/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:4193
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:681 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:807 [inline]
mgmt_pending_new+0x65/0x250 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:269
mgmt_pending_add+0x36/0x120 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296
set_powered+0x3cd/0x5e0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1394
hci_mgmt_cmd+0xc47/0x11d0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1712
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x7b8/0x11c0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1832
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745
sock_write_iter+0x2dd/0x400 net/socket.c:1160
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
vfs_write+0xa72/0xc90 fs/read_write.c:590
ksys_write+0x1a0/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:643
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 5246:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579
poison_slab_object+0xe0/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:240
__kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:256
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2256 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4477 [inline]
kfree+0x149/0x360 mm/slub.c:4598
settings_rsp+0x2bc/0x390 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1443
mgmt_pending_foreach+0xd1/0x130 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:259
__mgmt_power_off+0x112/0x420 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9455
hci_dev_close_sync+0x665/0x11a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5191
hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:483 [inline]
hci_dev_close+0x112/0x210 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:508
sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222
sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83gv
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53196

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Don't retire aborted MMIO instruction
Returning an abort to the guest for an unsupported MMIO access is a
documented feature of the KVM UAPI. Nevertheless, it's clear that this
plumbing has seen limited testing, since userspace can trivially cause a
WARN in the MMIO return:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 30558 at arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h:536 kvm_handle_mmio_return+0x46c/0x5c4 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h:536
Call trace:
kvm_handle_mmio_return+0x46c/0x5c4 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h:536
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x98/0x15b4 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:1133
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x75c/0xa78 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4487
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x14c/0x1c8 fs/ioctl.c:893
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0x1e0/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x38/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
The splat is complaining that KVM is advancing PC while an exception is
pending, i.e. that KVM is retiring the MMIO instruction despite a
pending synchronous external abort. Womp womp.
Fix the glaring UAPI bug by skipping over all the MMIO emulation in
case there is a pending synchronous exception. Note that while userspace
is capable of pending an asynchronous exception (SError, IRQ, or FIQ),
it is still safe to retire the MMIO instruction in this case as (1) they
are by definition asynchronous, and (2) KVM relies on hardware support
for pending/delivering these exceptions instead of the software state
machine for advancing PC.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53195

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Get rid of userspace_irqchip_in_use
Improper use of userspace_irqchip_in_use led to syzbot hitting the
following WARN_ON() in kvm_timer_update_irq():
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3281 at arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c:459
kvm_timer_update_irq+0x21c/0x394
Call trace:
kvm_timer_update_irq+0x21c/0x394 arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c:459
kvm_timer_vcpu_reset+0x158/0x684 arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c:968
kvm_reset_vcpu+0x3b4/0x560 arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c:264
kvm_vcpu_set_target arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:1553 [inline]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_vcpu_init arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:1573 [inline]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x112c/0x1b3c arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:1695
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4ec/0xf74 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4658
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x108/0x184 fs/ioctl.c:893
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x78/0x1b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0xe8/0x1b0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x40/0x50 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x54/0x14c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
The following sequence led to the scenario:
- Userspace creates a VM and a vCPU.
- The vCPU is initialized with KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3 during
KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT.
- Without any other setup, such as vGIC or vPMU, userspace issues
KVM_RUN on the vCPU. Since the vPMU is requested, but not setup,
kvm_arm_pmu_v3_enable() fails in kvm_arch_vcpu_run_pid_change().
As a result, KVM_RUN returns after enabling the timer, but before
incrementing 'userspace_irqchip_in_use':
kvm_arch_vcpu_run_pid_change()
ret = kvm_arm_pmu_v3_enable()
if (!vcpu->arch.pmu.created)
return -EINVAL;
if (ret)
return ret;
[...]
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
static_branch_inc(&userspace_irqchip_in_use);
- Userspace ignores the error and issues KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT again.
Since the timer is already enabled, control moves through the
following flow, ultimately hitting the WARN_ON():
kvm_timer_vcpu_reset()
if (timer->enabled)
kvm_timer_update_irq()
if (!userspace_irqchip())
ret = kvm_vgic_inject_irq()
ret = vgic_lazy_init()
if (unlikely(!vgic_initialized(kvm)))
if (kvm->arch.vgic.vgic_model !=
KVM_DEV_TYPE_ARM_VGIC_V2)
return -EBUSY;
WARN_ON(ret);
Theoretically, since userspace_irqchip_in_use's functionality can be
simply replaced by '!irqchip_in_kernel()', get rid of the static key
to avoid the mismanagement, which also helps with the syzbot issue.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53190

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtlwifi: Drastically reduce the attempts to read efuse in case of failures
Syzkaller reported a hung task with uevent_show() on stack trace. That
specific issue was addressed by another commit [0], but even with that
fix applied (for example, running v6.12-rc5) we face another type of hung
task that comes from the same reproducer [1]. By investigating that, we
could narrow it to the following path:
(a) Syzkaller emulates a Realtek USB WiFi adapter using raw-gadget and
dummy_hcd infrastructure.
(b) During the probe of rtl8192cu, the driver ends-up performing an efuse
read procedure (which is related to EEPROM load IIUC), and here lies the
issue: the function read_efuse() calls read_efuse_byte() many times, as
loop iterations depending on the efuse size (in our example, 512 in total).
This procedure for reading efuse bytes relies in a loop that performs an
I/O read up to *10k* times in case of failures. We measured the time of
the loop inside read_efuse_byte() alone, and in this reproducer (which
involves the dummy_hcd emulation layer), it takes 15 seconds each. As a
consequence, we have the driver stuck in its probe routine for big time,
exposing a stack trace like below if we attempt to reboot the system, for
example:
task:kworker/0:3 state:D stack:0 pid:662 tgid:662 ppid:2 flags:0x00004000
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__schedule+0xe22/0xeb6
schedule_timeout+0xe7/0x132
__wait_for_common+0xb5/0x12e
usb_start_wait_urb+0xc5/0x1ef
? usb_alloc_urb+0x95/0xa4
usb_control_msg+0xff/0x184
_usbctrl_vendorreq_sync+0xa0/0x161
_usb_read_sync+0xb3/0xc5
read_efuse_byte+0x13c/0x146
read_efuse+0x351/0x5f0
efuse_read_all_map+0x42/0x52
rtl_efuse_shadow_map_update+0x60/0xef
rtl_get_hwinfo+0x5d/0x1c2
rtl92cu_read_eeprom_info+0x10a/0x8d5
? rtl92c_read_chip_version+0x14f/0x17e
rtl_usb_probe+0x323/0x851
usb_probe_interface+0x278/0x34b
really_probe+0x202/0x4a4
__driver_probe_device+0x166/0x1b2
driver_probe_device+0x2f/0xd8
[...]
We propose hereby to drastically reduce the attempts of doing the I/O
reads in case of failures, restricted to USB devices (given that
they're inherently slower than PCIe ones). By retrying up to 10 times
(instead of 10000), we got reponsiveness in the reproducer, while seems
reasonable to believe that there's no sane USB device implementation in
the field requiring this amount of retries at every I/O read in order
to properly work. Based on that assumption, it'd be good to have it
backported to stable but maybe not since driver implementation (the 10k
number comes from day 0), perhaps up to 6.x series makes sense.
[0] Commit 15fffc6a5624 ("driver core: Fix uevent_show() vs driver detach race")
[1] A note about that: this syzkaller report presents multiple reproducers
that differs by the type of emulated USB device. For this specific case,
check the entry from 2024/08/08 06:23 in the list of crashes; the C repro
is available at https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&x=1521fc83980000.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53168

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunrpc: fix one UAF issue caused by sunrpc kernel tcp socket
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tcp_write_timer_handler+0x156/0x3e0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888111f322cd by task swapper/0/0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc4-dirty #7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3d0
print_report+0xb4/0x270
kasan_report+0xbd/0xf0
tcp_write_timer_handler+0x156/0x3e0
tcp_write_timer+0x66/0x170
call_timer_fn+0xfb/0x1d0
__run_timers+0x3f8/0x480
run_timer_softirq+0x9b/0x100
handle_softirqs+0x153/0x390
__irq_exit_rcu+0x103/0x120
irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0x90
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:default_idle+0xf/0x20
Code: 4c 01 c7 4c 29 c2 e9 72 ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 66 90 0f 00 2d 33 f8 25 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 cc cc cc
cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 0018:ffffffffa2007e28 EFLAGS: 00000242
RAX: 00000000000f3b31 RBX: 1ffffffff4400fc7 RCX: ffffffffa09c3196
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff9f00590f
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed102360835d
R10: ffff88811b041aeb R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffa202d7c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000000147d0
default_idle_call+0x6b/0xa0
cpuidle_idle_call+0x1af/0x1f0
do_idle+0xbc/0x130
cpu_startup_entry+0x33/0x40
rest_init+0x11f/0x210
start_kernel+0x39a/0x420
x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30
x86_64_start_kernel+0x97/0xa0
common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
</TASK>
Allocated by task 595:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x87/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x12b/0x3f0
copy_net_ns+0x94/0x380
create_new_namespaces+0x24c/0x500
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x75/0xf0
ksys_unshare+0x24e/0x4f0
__x64_sys_unshare+0x1f/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x70/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 100:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x54/0x70
kmem_cache_free+0x156/0x5d0
cleanup_net+0x5d3/0x670
process_one_work+0x776/0xa90
worker_thread+0x2e2/0x560
kthread+0x1a8/0x1f0
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Reproduction script:
mkdir -p /mnt/nfsshare
mkdir -p /mnt/nfs/netns_1
mkfs.ext4 /dev/sdb
mount /dev/sdb /mnt/nfsshare
systemctl restart nfs-server
chmod 777 /mnt/nfsshare
exportfs -i -o rw,no_root_squash *:/mnt/nfsshare
ip netns add netns_1
ip link add name veth_1_peer type veth peer veth_1
ifconfig veth_1_peer 11.11.0.254 up
ip link set veth_1 netns netns_1
ip netns exec netns_1 ifconfig veth_1 11.11.0.1
ip netns exec netns_1 /root/iptables -A OUTPUT -d 11.11.0.254 -p tcp \
--tcp-flags FIN FIN -j DROP
(note: In my environment, a DESTROY_CLIENTID operation is always sent
immediately, breaking the nfs tcp connection.)
ip netns exec netns_1 timeout -s 9 300 mount -t nfs -o proto=tcp,vers=4.1 \
11.11.0.254:/mnt/nfsshare /mnt/nfs/netns_1
ip netns del netns_1
The reason here is that the tcp socket in netns_1 (nfs side) has been
shutdown and closed (done in xs_destroy), but the FIN message (with ack)
is discarded, and the nfsd side keeps sending retransmission messages.
As a result, when the tcp sock in netns_1 processes the received message,
it sends the message (FIN message) in the sending queue, and the tcp timer
is re-established. When the network namespace is deleted, the net structure
accessed by tcp's timer handler function causes problems.
To fix this problem, let's hold netns refcnt for the tcp kernel socket as
done in other modules. This is an ugly hack which can easily be backported
to earlier kernels. A proper fix which cleans up the interfaces will
follow, but may not be so easy to backport.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53124

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fix data-races around sk->sk_forward_alloc
Syzkaller reported this warning:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:156 inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5 #26
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
Code: 24 12 4c 89 e2 5b 48 c7 c7 98 ec bb 82 41 5c e9 d1 18 17 ff 4c 89 e6 5b 48 c7 c7 d0 ec bb 82 41 5c e9 bf 18 17 ff 0f 0b eb 83 <0f> 0b eb 97 0f 0b eb 87 0f 0b e9 68 ff ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000008bd90 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000300 RBX: ffff88810b172a90 RCX: 0000000000000007
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000300 RDI: ffff88810b172a00
RBP: ffff88810b172a00 R08: ffff888104273c00 R09: 0000000000100007
R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff88810b172a00
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888237c31f78
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888237c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffc63fecac8 CR3: 000000000342e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x88/0x130
? inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
? report_bug+0x18e/0x1a0
? handle_bug+0x53/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
__sk_destruct+0x2a/0x200
rcu_do_batch+0x1aa/0x530
? rcu_do_batch+0x13b/0x530
rcu_core+0x159/0x2f0
handle_softirqs+0xd3/0x2b0
? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
run_ksoftirqd+0x25/0x30
smpboot_thread_fn+0xdd/0x1d0
kthread+0xd3/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Its possible that two threads call tcp_v6_do_rcv()/sk_forward_alloc_add()
concurrently when sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN with sk->sk_lock unlocked,
which triggers a data-race around sk->sk_forward_alloc:
tcp_v6_rcv
tcp_v6_do_rcv
skb_clone_and_charge_r
sk_rmem_schedule
__sk_mem_schedule
sk_forward_alloc_add()
skb_set_owner_r
sk_mem_charge
sk_forward_alloc_add()
__kfree_skb
skb_release_all
skb_release_head_state
sock_rfree
sk_mem_uncharge
sk_forward_alloc_add()
sk_mem_reclaim
// set local var reclaimable
__sk_mem_reclaim
sk_forward_alloc_add()
In this syzkaller testcase, two threads call
tcp_v6_do_rcv() with skb->truesize=768, the sk_forward_alloc changes like
this:
(cpu 1) | (cpu 2) | sk_forward_alloc
... | ... | 0
__sk_mem_schedule() | | +4096 = 4096
| __sk_mem_schedule() | +4096 = 8192
sk_mem_charge() | | -768 = 7424
| sk_mem_charge() | -768 = 6656
... | ... |
sk_mem_uncharge() | | +768 = 7424
reclaimable=7424 | |
| sk_mem_uncharge() | +768 = 8192
| reclaimable=8192 |
__sk_mem_reclaim() | | -4096 = 4096
| __sk_mem_reclaim() | -8192 = -4096 != 0
The skb_clone_and_charge_r() should not be called in tcp_v6_do_rcv() when
sk->sk_state is TCP_LISTEN, it happens later in tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock().
Fix the same issue in dccp_v6_do_rcv().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53121

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: fs, lock FTE when checking if active
The referenced commits introduced a two-step process for deleting FTEs:
- Lock the FTE, delete it from hardware, set the hardware deletion function
to NULL and unlock the FTE.
- Lock the parent flow group, delete the software copy of the FTE, and
remove it from the xarray.
However, this approach encounters a race condition if a rule with the same
match value is added simultaneously. In this scenario, fs_core may set the
hardware deletion function to NULL prematurely, causing a panic during
subsequent rule deletions.
To prevent this, ensure the active flag of the FTE is checked under a lock,
which will prevent the fs_core layer from attaching a new steering rule to
an FTE that is in the process of deletion.
[ 438.967589] MOSHE: 2496 mlx5_del_flow_rules del_hw_func
[ 438.968205] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 438.968654] refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.
[ 438.969249] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8957 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[ 438.970054] Modules linked in: act_mirred cls_flower act_gact sch_ingress openvswitch nsh mlx5_vdpa vringh vhost_iotlb vdpa mlx5_ib mlx5_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: cls_flower]
[ 438.973288] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 8957 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1+ #8
[ 438.973888] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 438.974874] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[ 438.975363] Code: 40 66 3b 82 c6 05 16 e9 4d 01 01 e8 1f 7c a0 ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 10 66 3b 82 c6 05 fd e8 4d 01 01 e8 05 7c a0 ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 90
[ 438.976947] RSP: 0018:ffff888124a53610 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 438.977446] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888119d56de0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 438.978090] RDX: ffff88852c828700 RSI: ffff88852c81b3c0 RDI: ffff88852c81b3c0
[ 438.978721] RBP: ffff888120fa0e88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888124a534b0
[ 438.979353] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888119d56de0
[ 438.979979] R13: ffff888120fa0ec0 R14: ffff888120fa0ee8 R15: ffff888119d56de0
[ 438.980607] FS: 00007fe6dcc0f800(0000) GS:ffff88852c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 438.983984] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 438.984544] CR2: 00000000004275e0 CR3: 0000000186982001 CR4: 0000000000372eb0
[ 438.985205] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 438.985842] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 438.986507] Call Trace:
[ 438.986799] <TASK>
[ 438.987070] ? __warn+0x7d/0x110
[ 438.987426] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[ 438.987877] ? report_bug+0x17d/0x190
[ 438.988261] ? prb_read_valid+0x17/0x20
[ 438.988659] ? handle_bug+0x53/0x90
[ 438.989054] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[ 438.989458] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 438.989883] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[ 438.990348] mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x2f7/0x340 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.990932] __mlx5_eswitch_del_rule+0x49/0x170 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.991519] ? mlx5_lag_is_sriov+0x3c/0x50 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.992054] ? xas_load+0x9/0xb0
[ 438.992407] mlx5e_tc_rule_unoffload+0x45/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.993037] mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0x2a6/0x2e0 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.993623] mlx5e_flow_put+0x29/0x60 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.994161] mlx5e_delete_flower+0x261/0x390 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.994728] tc_setup_cb_destroy+0xb9/0x190
[ 438.995150] fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x94/0xc0 [cls_flower]
[ 438.995650] fl_change+0x11a4/0x13c0 [cls_flower]
[ 438.996105] tc_new_tfilter+0x347/0xbc0
[ 438.996503] ? __
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53100

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: tcp: avoid race between queue_lock lock and destroy
Commit 76d54bf20cdc ("nvme-tcp: don't access released socket during
error recovery") added a mutex_lock() call for the queue->queue_lock
in nvme_tcp_get_address(). However, the mutex_lock() races with
mutex_destroy() in nvme_tcp_free_queue(), and causes the WARN below.
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 34077 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 __mutex_lock+0xcf0/0x1220
Modules linked in: nvmet_tcp nvmet nvme_tcp nvme_fabrics iw_cm ib_cm ib_core pktcdvd nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables qrtr sunrpc ppdev 9pnet_virtio 9pnet pcspkr netfs parport_pc parport e1000 i2c_piix4 i2c_smbus loop fuse nfnetlink zram bochs drm_vram_helper drm_ttm_helper ttm drm_kms_helper xfs drm sym53c8xx floppy nvme scsi_transport_spi nvme_core nvme_auth serio_raw ata_generic pata_acpi dm_multipath qemu_fw_cfg [last unloaded: ib_uverbs]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 34077 Comm: udisksd Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7 #319
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0xcf0/0x1220
Code: 08 84 d2 0f 85 c8 04 00 00 8b 15 ef b6 c8 01 85 d2 0f 85 78 f4 ff ff 48 c7 c6 20 93 ee af 48 c7 c7 60 91 ee af e8 f0 a7 6d fd <0f> 0b e9 5e f4 ff ff 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 f2 48 c1
RSP: 0018:ffff88811305f760 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88812c652058 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88811305f8b0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1075c36341
R10: ffff8883ae1b1a0b R11: 0000000000010498 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88812c652058
FS: 00007f9713ae4980(0000) GS:ffff8883ae180000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fcd78483c7c CR3: 0000000122c38000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn.cold+0x5b/0x1af
? __mutex_lock+0xcf0/0x1220
? report_bug+0x1ec/0x390
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80
? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x40
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? __mutex_lock+0xcf0/0x1220
? nvme_tcp_get_address+0xc2/0x1e0 [nvme_tcp]
? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? __lock_acquire+0xd6a/0x59e0
? nvme_tcp_get_address+0xc2/0x1e0 [nvme_tcp]
nvme_tcp_get_address+0xc2/0x1e0 [nvme_tcp]
? __pfx_nvme_tcp_get_address+0x10/0x10 [nvme_tcp]
nvme_sysfs_show_address+0x81/0xc0 [nvme_core]
dev_attr_show+0x42/0x80
? __asan_memset+0x1f/0x40
sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x1f0/0x370
seq_read_iter+0x2cb/0x1130
? rw_verify_area+0x3b1/0x590
? __mutex_lock+0x433/0x1220
vfs_read+0x6a6/0xa20
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10
ksys_read+0xf7/0x1d0
? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
? __x64_sys_openat+0x105/0x1d0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f9713f55cfa
Code: 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 55 e8 48 89 75 f0 89 7d f8 e8 e8 74 f8 ff 48 8b 55 e8 48 8b 75 f0 4
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53095

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: Fix use-after-free of network namespace.
Recently, we got a customer report that CIFS triggers oops while
reconnecting to a server. [0]
The workload runs on Kubernetes, and some pods mount CIFS servers
in non-root network namespaces. The problem rarely happened, but
it was always while the pod was dying.
The root cause is wrong reference counting for network namespace.
CIFS uses kernel sockets, which do not hold refcnt of the netns that
the socket belongs to. That means CIFS must ensure the socket is
always freed before its netns; otherwise, use-after-free happens.
The repro steps are roughly:
1. mount CIFS in a non-root netns
2. drop packets from the netns
3. destroy the netns
4. unmount CIFS
We can reproduce the issue quickly with the script [1] below and see
the splat [2] if CONFIG_NET_NS_REFCNT_TRACKER is enabled.
When the socket is TCP, it is hard to guarantee the netns lifetime
without holding refcnt due to async timers.
Let's hold netns refcnt for each socket as done for SMC in commit
9744d2bf1976 ("smc: Fix use-after-free in tcp_write_timer_handler().").
Note that we need to move put_net() from cifs_put_tcp_session() to
clean_demultiplex_info(); otherwise, __sock_create() still could touch a
freed netns while cifsd tries to reconnect from cifs_demultiplex_thread().
Also, maybe_get_net() cannot be put just before __sock_create() because
the code is not under RCU and there is a small chance that the same
address happened to be reallocated to another netns.
[0]:
CIFS: VFS: \\XXXXXXXXXXX has not responded in 15 seconds. Reconnecting...
CIFS: Serverclose failed 4 times, giving up
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 14de99e461f84a07
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000004
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
CM = 0, WnR = 0
[14de99e461f84a07] address between user and kernel address ranges
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: cls_bpf sch_ingress nls_utf8 cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 dns_resolver tcp_diag inet_diag veth xt_state xt_connmark nf_conntrack_netlink xt_nat xt_statistic xt_MASQUERADE xt_mark xt_addrtype ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_comment nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink overlay nls_ascii nls_cp437 sunrpc vfat fat aes_ce_blk aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sm4_ce_cipher sm4 sm3_ce sm3 sha3_ce sha512_ce sha512_arm64 sha1_ce ena button sch_fq_codel loop fuse configfs dmi_sysfs sha2_ce sha256_arm64 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod dax efivarfs
CPU: 5 PID: 2690970 Comm: cifsd Not tainted 6.1.103-109.184.amzn2023.aarch64 #1
Hardware name: Amazon EC2 r7g.4xlarge/, BIOS 1.0 11/1/2018
pstate: 00400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : fib_rules_lookup+0x44/0x238
lr : __fib_lookup+0x64/0xbc
sp : ffff8000265db790
x29: ffff8000265db790 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 000000000000bd01
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff000b4baf8000 x24: ffff00047b5e4580
x23: ffff8000265db7e0 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff00047b5e4500
x20: ffff0010e3f694f8 x19: 14de99e461f849f7 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 3f92800abd010002
x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0010e3f69420 x9 : ffff800008a6f294
x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000006 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : ffff001924354280 x3 : ffff8000265db7e0
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff0010e3f694f8 x0 : ffff00047b5e4500
Call trace:
fib_rules_lookup+0x44/0x238
__fib_lookup+0x64/0xbc
ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x2c4/0x398
ip_route_output_key_hash+0x60/0x8c
tcp_v4_connect+0x290/0x488
__inet_stream_connect+0x108/0x3d0
inet_stream_connect+0x50/0x78
kernel_connect+0x6c/0xac
generic_ip_conne
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-53079

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/thp: fix deferred split unqueue naming and locking
Recent changes are putting more pressure on THP deferred split queues:
under load revealing long-standing races, causing list_del corruptions,
"Bad page state"s and worse (I keep BUGs in both of those, so usually
don't get to see how badly they end up without). The relevant recent
changes being 6.8's mTHP, 6.10's mTHP swapout, and 6.12's mTHP swapin,
improved swap allocation, and underused THP splitting.
Before fixing locking: rename misleading folio_undo_large_rmappable(),
which does not undo large_rmappable, to folio_unqueue_deferred_split(),
which is what it does. But that and its out-of-line __callee are mm
internals of very limited usability: add comment and WARN_ON_ONCEs to
check usage; and return a bool to say if a deferred split was unqueued,
which can then be used in WARN_ON_ONCEs around safety checks (sparing
callers the arcane conditionals in __folio_unqueue_deferred_split()).
Just omit the folio_unqueue_deferred_split() from free_unref_folios(), all
of whose callers now call it beforehand (and if any forget then bad_page()
will tell) - except for its caller put_pages_list(), which itself no
longer has any callers (and will be deleted separately).
Swapout: mem_cgroup_swapout() has been resetting folio->memcg_data 0
without checking and unqueueing a THP folio from deferred split list;
which is unfortunate, since the split_queue_lock depends on the memcg
(when memcg is enabled); so swapout has been unqueueing such THPs later,
when freeing the folio, using the pgdat's lock instead: potentially
corrupting the memcg's list. __remove_mapping() has frozen refcount to 0
here, so no problem with calling folio_unqueue_deferred_split() before
resetting memcg_data.
That goes back to 5.4 commit 87eaceb3faa5 ("mm: thp: make deferred split
shrinker memcg aware"): which included a check on swapcache before adding
to deferred queue, but no check on deferred queue before adding THP to
swapcache. That worked fine with the usual sequence of events in reclaim
(though there were a couple of rare ways in which a THP on deferred queue
could have been swapped out), but 6.12 commit dafff3f4c850 ("mm: split
underused THPs") avoids splitting underused THPs in reclaim, which makes
swapcache THPs on deferred queue commonplace.
Keep the check on swapcache before adding to deferred queue? Yes: it is
no longer essential, but preserves the existing behaviour, and is likely
to be a worthwhile optimization (vmstat showed much more traffic on the
queue under swapping load if the check was removed); update its comment.
Memcg-v1 move (deprecated): mem_cgroup_move_account() has been changing
folio->memcg_data without checking and unqueueing a THP folio from the
deferred list, sometimes corrupting "from" memcg's list, like swapout.
Refcount is non-zero here, so folio_unqueue_deferred_split() can only be
used in a WARN_ON_ONCE to validate the fix, which must be done earlier:
mem_cgroup_move_charge_pte_range() first try to split the THP (splitting
of course unqueues), or skip it if that fails. Not ideal, but moving
charge has been requested, and khugepaged should repair the THP later:
nobody wants new custom unqueueing code just for this deprecated case.
The 87eaceb3faa5 commit did have the code to move from one deferred list
to another (but was not conscious of its unsafety while refcount non-0);
but that was removed by 5.6 commit fac0516b5534 ("mm: thp: don't need care
deferred split queue in memcg charge move path"), which argued that the
existence of a PMD mapping guarantees that the THP cannot be on a deferred
list. As above, false in rare cases, and now commonly false.
Backport to 6.11 should be straightforward. Earlier backports must take
care that other _deferred_list fixes and dependencies are included. There
is not a strong case for backports, but they can fix cornercases.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50162

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: devmap: provide rxq after redirect
rxq contains a pointer to the device from where
the redirect happened. Currently, the BPF program
that was executed after a redirect via BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP*
does not have it set.
This is particularly bad since accessing ingress_ifindex, e.g.
SEC("xdp")
int prog(struct xdp_md *pkt)
{
return bpf_redirect_map(&dev_redirect_map, 0, 0);
}
SEC("xdp/devmap")
int prog_after_redirect(struct xdp_md *pkt)
{
bpf_printk("ifindex %i", pkt->ingress_ifindex);
return XDP_PASS;
}
depends on access to rxq, so a NULL pointer gets dereferenced:
<1>[ 574.475170] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
<1>[ 574.475188] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
<1>[ 574.475194] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
<6>[ 574.475199] PGD 0 P4D 0
<4>[ 574.475207] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
<4>[ 574.475217] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc5-reduced-00859-g780801200300 #23
<4>[ 574.475226] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC13ANHi7/NUC13ANBi7, BIOS ANRPL357.0026.2023.0314.1458 03/14/2023
<4>[ 574.475231] Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
<4>[ 574.475247] RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_5e13354d9cf5018a_prog_after_redirect+0x17/0x3c
<4>[ 574.475257] Code: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 80 00 00 00 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 66 90 55 48 89 e5 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8b 57 20 <48> 8b 52 00 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 48 bf f8 a6 d5 c4 5d a0 ff ff be 0b
<4>[ 574.475263] RSP: 0018:ffffa62440280c98 EFLAGS: 00010206
<4>[ 574.475269] RAX: ffffa62440280cd8 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
<4>[ 574.475274] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffa62440549048 RDI: ffffa62440280ce0
<4>[ 574.475278] RBP: ffffa62440280c98 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001
<4>[ 574.475281] R10: ffffa05dc8b98000 R11: ffffa05f577fca40 R12: ffffa05dcab24000
<4>[ 574.475285] R13: ffffa62440280ce0 R14: ffffa62440549048 R15: ffffa62440549000
<4>[ 574.475289] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa05f4f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
<4>[ 574.475294] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
<4>[ 574.475298] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000025522e000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
<4>[ 574.475303] PKRU: 55555554
<4>[ 574.475306] Call Trace:
<4>[ 574.475313] <IRQ>
<4>[ 574.475318] ? __die+0x23/0x70
<4>[ 574.475329] ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c0
<4>[ 574.475339] ? skb_pp_cow_data+0x34c/0x490
<4>[ 574.475346] ? kmem_cache_free+0x257/0x280
<4>[ 574.475357] ? exc_page_fault+0x67/0x150
<4>[ 574.475368] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
<4>[ 574.475381] ? bpf_prog_5e13354d9cf5018a_prog_after_redirect+0x17/0x3c
<4>[ 574.475386] bq_xmit_all+0x158/0x420
<4>[ 574.475397] __dev_flush+0x30/0x90
<4>[ 574.475407] veth_poll+0x216/0x250 [veth]
<4>[ 574.475421] __napi_poll+0x28/0x1c0
<4>[ 574.475430] net_rx_action+0x32d/0x3a0
<4>[ 574.475441] handle_softirqs+0xcb/0x2c0
<4>[ 574.475451] do_softirq+0x40/0x60
<4>[ 574.475458] </IRQ>
<4>[ 574.475461] <TASK>
<4>[ 574.475464] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x66/0x70
<4>[ 574.475471] __dev_queue_xmit+0x268/0xe40
<4>[ 574.475480] ? selinux_ip_postroute+0x213/0x420
<4>[ 574.475491] ? alloc_skb_with_frags+0x4a/0x1d0
<4>[ 574.475502] ip6_finish_output2+0x2be/0x640
<4>[ 574.475512] ? nf_hook_slow+0x42/0xf0
<4>[ 574.475521] ip6_finish_output+0x194/0x300
<4>[ 574.475529] ? __pfx_ip6_finish_output+0x10/0x10
<4>[ 574.475538] mld_sendpack+0x17c/0x240
<4>[ 574.475548] mld_ifc_work+0x192/0x410
<4>[ 574.475557] process_one_work+0x15d/0x380
<4>[ 574.475566] worker_thread+0x29d/0x3a0
<4>[ 574.475573] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
<4>[ 574.475580] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
<4>[ 574.475587] kthread+0xcd/0x100
<4>[ 574.475597] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4>[ 574.475606] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
<4>[ 574.475615] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4>[ 574.475623] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50147

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix command bitmask initialization
Command bitmask have a dedicated bit for MANAGE_PAGES command, this bit
isn't Initialize during command bitmask Initialization, only during
MANAGE_PAGES.
In addition, mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions() is trying to trigger
completion for MANAGE_PAGES command as well.
Hence, in case health error occurred before any MANAGE_PAGES command
have been invoke (for example, during mlx5_enable_hca()),
mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions() will try to trigger completion for
MANAGE_PAGES command, which will result in null-ptr-deref error.[1]
Fix it by Initialize command bitmask correctly.
While at it, re-write the code for better understanding.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions+0x1db/0x600 [mlx5_core]
Write of size 4 at addr 0000000000000214 by task kworker/u96:2/12078
CPU: 10 PID: 12078 Comm: kworker/u96:2 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2_for_upstream_debug_2024_04_07_19_01 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: mlx5_health0000:08:00.0 mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0
kasan_report+0xb9/0xf0
kasan_check_range+0xec/0x190
mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions+0x1db/0x600 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_cmd_flush+0x94/0x240 [mlx5_core]
enter_error_state+0x6c/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work+0xf3/0x480 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x787/0x1490
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400
? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0xda0/0xda0
? assign_work+0x168/0x240
worker_thread+0x586/0xd30
? rescuer_thread+0xae0/0xae0
kthread+0x2df/0x3b0
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50146

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Don't call cleanup on profile rollback failure
When profile rollback fails in mlx5e_netdev_change_profile, the netdev
profile var is left set to NULL. Avoid a crash when unloading the driver
by not calling profile->cleanup in such a case.
This was encountered while testing, with the original trigger that
the wq rescuer thread creation got interrupted (presumably due to
Ctrl+C-ing modprobe), which gets converted to ENOMEM (-12) by
mlx5e_priv_init, the profile rollback also fails for the same reason
(signal still active) so the profile is left as NULL, leading to a crash
later in _mlx5e_remove.
[ 732.473932] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1: E-Switch: Unload vfs: mode(OFFLOADS), nvfs(2), necvfs(0), active vports(2)
[ 734.525513] workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
[ 734.557372] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6235:(pid 6086): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
[ 734.559187] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1 eth3: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
[ 734.560153] workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
[ 734.589378] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6235:(pid 6086): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
[ 734.591136] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1 eth3: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12
[ 745.537492] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
[ 745.538222] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
<snipped>
[ 745.551290] Call Trace:
[ 745.551590] <TASK>
[ 745.551866] ? __die+0x20/0x60
[ 745.552218] ? page_fault_oops+0x150/0x400
[ 745.555307] ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0x240
[ 745.555729] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 745.556166] ? mlx5e_remove+0x6b/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
[ 745.556698] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x18/0x30
[ 745.557134] device_release_driver_internal+0x1df/0x240
[ 745.557654] bus_remove_device+0xd7/0x140
[ 745.558075] device_del+0x15b/0x3c0
[ 745.558456] mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked.part.0+0xb1/0x2f0 [mlx5_core]
[ 745.559112] mlx5_unregister_device+0x34/0x50 [mlx5_core]
[ 745.559686] mlx5_uninit_one+0x46/0xf0 [mlx5_core]
[ 745.560203] remove_one+0x4e/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
[ 745.560694] pci_device_remove+0x39/0xa0
[ 745.561112] device_release_driver_internal+0x1df/0x240
[ 745.561631] driver_detach+0x47/0x90
[ 745.562022] bus_remove_driver+0x84/0x100
[ 745.562444] pci_unregister_driver+0x3b/0x90
[ 745.562890] mlx5_cleanup+0xc/0x1b [mlx5_core]
[ 745.563415] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x14d/0x2f0
[ 745.563886] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1b0/0x460
[ 745.564313] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xe2/0x190
[ 745.564825] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
[ 745.565223] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[ 745.565725] RIP: 0033:0x7f1579b1288b

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50106

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix race between laundromat and free_stateid
There is a race between laundromat handling of revoked delegations
and a client sending free_stateid operation. Laundromat thread
finds that delegation has expired and needs to be revoked so it
marks the delegation stid revoked and it puts it on a reaper list
but then it unlock the state lock and the actual delegation revocation
happens without the lock. Once the stid is marked revoked a racing
free_stateid processing thread does the following (1) it calls
list_del_init() which removes it from the reaper list and (2) frees
the delegation stid structure. The laundromat thread ends up not
calling the revoke_delegation() function for this particular delegation
but that means it will no release the lock lease that exists on
the file.
Now, a new open for this file comes in and ends up finding that
lease list isn't empty and calls nfsd_breaker_owns_lease() which ends
up trying to derefence a freed delegation stateid. Leading to the
followint use-after-free KASAN warning:
kernel: ==================================================================
kernel: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nfsd_breaker_owns_lease+0x140/0x160 [nfsd]
kernel: Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000e73cd0c8 by task nfsd/6205
kernel:
kernel: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 6205 Comm: nfsd Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7+ #9
kernel: Hardware name: Apple Inc. Apple Virtualization Generic Platform, BIOS 2069.0.0.0.0 08/03/2024
kernel: Call trace:
kernel: dump_backtrace+0x98/0x120
kernel: show_stack+0x1c/0x30
kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x80/0xe8
kernel: print_address_description.constprop.0+0x84/0x390
kernel: print_report+0xa4/0x268
kernel: kasan_report+0xb4/0xf8
kernel: __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x1c/0x28
kernel: nfsd_breaker_owns_lease+0x140/0x160 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd_file_do_acquire+0xb3c/0x11d0 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd_file_acquire_opened+0x84/0x110 [nfsd]
kernel: nfs4_get_vfs_file+0x634/0x958 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd4_process_open2+0xa40/0x1a40 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd4_open+0xa08/0xe80 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd4_proc_compound+0xb8c/0x2130 [nfsd]
kernel: nfsd_dispatch+0x22c/0x718 [nfsd]
kernel: svc_process_common+0x8e8/0x1960 [sunrpc]
kernel: svc_process+0x3d4/0x7e0 [sunrpc]
kernel: svc_handle_xprt+0x828/0xe10 [sunrpc]
kernel: svc_recv+0x2cc/0x6a8 [sunrpc]
kernel: nfsd+0x270/0x400 [nfsd]
kernel: kthread+0x288/0x310
kernel: ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
This patch proposes a fixed that's based on adding 2 new additional
stid's sc_status values that help coordinate between the laundromat
and other operations (nfsd4_free_stateid() and nfsd4_delegreturn()).
First to make sure, that once the stid is marked revoked, it is not
removed by the nfsd4_free_stateid(), the laundromat take a reference
on the stateid. Then, coordinating whether the stid has been put
on the cl_revoked list or we are processing FREE_STATEID and need to
make sure to remove it from the list, each check that state and act
accordingly. If laundromat has added to the cl_revoke list before
the arrival of FREE_STATEID, then nfsd4_free_stateid() knows to remove
it from the list. If nfsd4_free_stateid() finds that operations arrived
before laundromat has placed it on cl_revoke list, it marks the state
freed and then laundromat will no longer add it to the list.
Also, for nfsd4_delegreturn() when looking for the specified stid,
we need to access stid that are marked removed or freeable, it means
the laundromat has started processing it but hasn't finished and this
delegreturn needs to return nfserr_deleg_revoked and not
nfserr_bad_stateid. The latter will not trigger a FREE_STATEID and the
lack of it will leave this stid on the cl_revoked list indefinitely.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50095

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mad: Improve handling of timed out WRs of mad agent
Current timeout handler of mad agent acquires/releases mad_agent_priv
lock for every timed out WRs. This causes heavy locking contention
when higher no. of WRs are to be handled inside timeout handler.
This leads to softlockup with below trace in some use cases where
rdma-cm path is used to establish connection between peer nodes
Trace:
-----
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#4 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u128:3:19767]
CPU: 4 PID: 19767 Comm: kworker/u128:3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE
------- --- 5.14.0-427.13.1.el9_4.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R740/01YM03, BIOS 2.4.8 11/26/2019
Workqueue: ib_mad1 timeout_sends [ib_core]
RIP: 0010:__do_softirq+0x78/0x2ac
RSP: 0018:ffffb253449e4f98 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000001f
RDX: 000000000000001d RSI: 000000003d1879ab RDI: fff363b66fd3a86b
RBP: ffffb253604cbcd8 R08: 0000009065635f3b R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000040 R11: ffffb253449e4ff8 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8caa1fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fd9ec9db900 CR3: 0000000891934006 CR4: 00000000007706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? __irq_exit_rcu+0xa1/0xc0
? watchdog_timer_fn+0x1b2/0x210
? __pfx_watchdog_timer_fn+0x10/0x10
? __hrtimer_run_queues+0x127/0x2c0
? hrtimer_interrupt+0xfc/0x210
? __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x5c/0x110
? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x37/0x90
? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20
? __do_softirq+0x78/0x2ac
? __do_softirq+0x60/0x2ac
__irq_exit_rcu+0xa1/0xc0
sysvec_call_function_single+0x72/0x90
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_call_function_single+0x16/0x20
RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x14/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffffb253604cbd88 EFLAGS: 00000247
RAX: 000000000001960d RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffff8cad2a064800
RDX: 000000008020001b RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8cad5d39f66c
RBP: ffff8cad5d39f600 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8caa443e0c00 R11: ffffb253604cbcd8 R12: ffff8cacb8682538
R13: 0000000000000005 R14: ffffb253604cbd90 R15: ffff8cad5d39f66c
cm_process_send_error+0x122/0x1d0 [ib_cm]
timeout_sends+0x1dd/0x270 [ib_core]
process_one_work+0x1e2/0x3b0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
worker_thread+0x50/0x3a0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xdd/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
</TASK>
Simplified timeout handler by creating local list of timed out WRs
and invoke send handler post creating the list. The new method acquires/
releases lock once to fetch the list and hence helps to reduce locking
contetiong when processing higher no. of WRs

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50083

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: fix mptcp DSS corruption due to large pmtu xmit
Syzkaller was able to trigger a DSS corruption:
TCP: request_sock_subflow_v4: Possible SYN flooding on port [::]:20002. Sending cookies.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5227 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:695 __mptcp_move_skbs_from_subflow+0x20a9/0x21f0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:695
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5227 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted 6.11.0-syzkaller-08829-gaf9c191ac2a0 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
RIP: 0010:__mptcp_move_skbs_from_subflow+0x20a9/0x21f0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:695
Code: 0f b6 dc 31 ff 89 de e8 b5 dd ea f5 89 d8 48 81 c4 50 01 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc e8 98 da ea f5 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 47 ff ff ff e8 8a da ea f5 90 0f 0b 90 e9 99 e0 ff ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000006db8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffffffff8ba9df18 RBX: 00000000000055f0 RCX: ffff888030023c00
RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 00000000000081e5 RDI: 00000000000055f0
RBP: 1ffff110062bf1ae R08: ffffffff8ba9cf12 R09: 1ffff110062bf1b8
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed10062bf1b9 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 00000000700cec61 R15: 00000000000081e5
FS: 000055556679c380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020287000 CR3: 0000000077892000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
move_skbs_to_msk net/mptcp/protocol.c:811 [inline]
mptcp_data_ready+0x29c/0xa90 net/mptcp/protocol.c:854
subflow_data_ready+0x34a/0x920 net/mptcp/subflow.c:1490
tcp_data_queue+0x20fd/0x76c0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5283
tcp_rcv_established+0xfba/0x2020 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6237
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x96d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1915
tcp_v4_rcv+0x2dc0/0x37f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2350
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x22e/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x341/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314
NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5662 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x2bf/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5775
process_backlog+0x662/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6107
__napi_poll+0xcb/0x490 net/core/dev.c:6771
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6840 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x89b/0x1240 net/core/dev.c:6962
handle_softirqs+0x2c5/0x980 kernel/softirq.c:554
do_softirq+0x11b/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:455
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x1bb/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:382
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:919 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1764/0x3e80 net/core/dev.c:4451
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3094 [inline]
neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:526 [inline]
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:540 [inline]
ip_finish_output2+0xd41/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:236
ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:130 [inline]
__ip_queue_xmit+0x118c/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:536
__tcp_transmit_skb+0x2544/0x3b30 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1466
tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1484 [inline]
tcp_mtu_probe net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2547 [inline]
tcp_write_xmit+0x641d/0x6bf0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2752
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0x9b/0x360 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3015
tcp_push_pending_frames include/net/tcp.h:2107 [inline]
tcp_data_snd_check net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5714 [inline]
tcp_rcv_established+0x1026/0x2020 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6239
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x96d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1915
sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1113 [inline]
__release_sock+0x214/0x350 net/core/sock.c:3072
release_sock+0x61/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:3626
mptcp_push_
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50073

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: n_gsm: Fix use-after-free in gsm_cleanup_mux
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gsm_cleanup_mux+0x77b/0x7b0
drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3160 [n_gsm]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88815fe99c00 by task poc/3379
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3379 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.11.0+ #56
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX
Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
Call Trace:
<TASK>
gsm_cleanup_mux+0x77b/0x7b0 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3160 [n_gsm]
__pfx_gsm_cleanup_mux+0x10/0x10 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3124 [n_gsm]
__pfx_sched_clock_cpu+0x10/0x10 kernel/sched/clock.c:389
update_load_avg+0x1c1/0x27b0 kernel/sched/fair.c:4500
__pfx_min_vruntime_cb_rotate+0x10/0x10 kernel/sched/fair.c:846
__rb_insert_augmented+0x492/0xbf0 lib/rbtree.c:161
gsmld_ioctl+0x395/0x1450 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3408 [n_gsm]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x92/0xf0 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:107
__pfx_gsmld_ioctl+0x10/0x10 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3822 [n_gsm]
ktime_get+0x5e/0x140 kernel/time/timekeeping.c:195
ldsem_down_read+0x94/0x4e0 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:79
__pfx_ldsem_down_read+0x10/0x10 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:338
__pfx_do_vfs_ioctl+0x10/0x10 fs/ioctl.c:805
tty_ioctl+0x643/0x1100 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2818
Allocated by task 65:
gsm_data_alloc.constprop.0+0x27/0x190 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:926 [n_gsm]
gsm_send+0x2c/0x580 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:819 [n_gsm]
gsm1_receive+0x547/0xad0 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3038 [n_gsm]
gsmld_receive_buf+0x176/0x280 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3609 [n_gsm]
tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0x101/0x1e0 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:391
tty_port_default_receive_buf+0x61/0xa0 drivers/tty/tty_port.c:39
flush_to_ldisc+0x1b0/0x750 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:445
process_scheduled_works+0x2b0/0x10d0 kernel/workqueue.c:3229
worker_thread+0x3dc/0x950 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2a3/0x370 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:257
Freed by task 3367:
kfree+0x126/0x420 mm/slub.c:4580
gsm_cleanup_mux+0x36c/0x7b0 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3160 [n_gsm]
gsmld_ioctl+0x395/0x1450 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3408 [n_gsm]
tty_ioctl+0x643/0x1100 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2818
[Analysis]
gsm_msg on the tx_ctrl_list or tx_data_list of gsm_mux
can be freed by multi threads through ioctl,which leads
to the occurrence of uaf. Protect it by gsm tx lock.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50067

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uprobe: avoid out-of-bounds memory access of fetching args
Uprobe needs to fetch args into a percpu buffer, and then copy to ring
buffer to avoid non-atomic context problem.
Sometimes user-space strings, arrays can be very large, but the size of
percpu buffer is only page size. And store_trace_args() won't check
whether these data exceeds a single page or not, caused out-of-bounds
memory access.
It could be reproduced by following steps:
1. build kernel with CONFIG_KASAN enabled
2. save follow program as test.c
```
\#include <stdio.h>
\#include <stdlib.h>
\#include <string.h>
// If string length large than MAX_STRING_SIZE, the fetch_store_strlen()
// will return 0, cause __get_data_size() return shorter size, and
// store_trace_args() will not trigger out-of-bounds access.
// So make string length less than 4096.
\#define STRLEN 4093
void generate_string(char *str, int n)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
{
char c = i % 26 + 'a';
str[i] = c;
}
str[n-1] = '\0';
}
void print_string(char *str)
{
printf("%s\n", str);
}
int main()
{
char tmp[STRLEN];
generate_string(tmp, STRLEN);
print_string(tmp);
return 0;
}
```
3. compile program
`gcc -o test test.c`
4. get the offset of `print_string()`
```
objdump -t test | grep -w print_string
0000000000401199 g F .text 000000000000001b print_string
```
5. configure uprobe with offset 0x1199
```
off=0x1199
cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/
echo "p /root/test:${off} arg1=+0(%di):ustring arg2=\$comm arg3=+0(%di):ustring"
> uprobe_events
echo 1 > events/uprobes/enable
echo 1 > tracing_on
```
6. run `test`, and kasan will report error.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strncpy_from_user+0x1d6/0x1f0
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88812311c004 by task test/499CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 499 Comm: test Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #18
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.16.0-4.al8 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x27/0x310
kasan_report+0x10f/0x120
? strncpy_from_user+0x1d6/0x1f0
strncpy_from_user+0x1d6/0x1f0
? rmqueue.constprop.0+0x70d/0x2ad0
process_fetch_insn+0xb26/0x1470
? __pfx_process_fetch_insn+0x10/0x10
? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
? __pte_offset_map+0x1f/0x2d0
? unwind_next_frame+0xc5f/0x1f80
? arch_stack_walk+0x68/0xf0
? is_bpf_text_address+0x23/0x30
? kernel_text_address.part.0+0xbb/0xd0
? __kernel_text_address+0x66/0xb0
? unwind_get_return_address+0x5e/0xa0
? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
? arch_stack_walk+0xa2/0xf0
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8b/0xf0
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? depot_alloc_stack+0x4c/0x1f0
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xe/0x30
? stack_depot_save_flags+0x35d/0x4f0
? kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x50
? kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
? mutex_lock+0x91/0xe0
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
prepare_uprobe_buffer.part.0+0x2cd/0x500
uprobe_dispatcher+0x2c3/0x6a0
? __pfx_uprobe_dispatcher+0x10/0x10
? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4d/0x90
handler_chain+0xdd/0x3e0
handle_swbp+0x26e/0x3d0
? __pfx_handle_swbp+0x10/0x10
? uprobe_pre_sstep_notifier+0x151/0x1b0
irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xe2/0x1b0
asm_exc_int3+0x39/0x40
RIP: 0033:0x401199
Code: 01 c2 0f b6 45 fb 88 02 83 45 fc 01 8b 45 fc 3b 45 e4 7c b7 8b 45 e4 48 98 48 8d 50 ff 48 8b 45 e8 48 01 d0 ce
RSP: 002b:00007ffdf00576a8 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 00007ffdf00576b0 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000ff2
RDX: 0000000000000ffc RSI: 0000000000000ffd RDI: 00007ffdf00576b0
RBP: 00007ffdf00586b0 R08: 00007feb2f9c0d20 R09: 00007feb2f9c0d20
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000401040
R13: 00007ffdf0058780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
This commit enforces the buffer's maxlen less than a page-size to avoid
store_trace_args() out-of-memory access.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50063

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Prevent tail call between progs attached to different hooks
bpf progs can be attached to kernel functions, and the attached functions
can take different parameters or return different return values. If
prog attached to one kernel function tail calls prog attached to another
kernel function, the ctx access or return value verification could be
bypassed.
For example, if prog1 is attached to func1 which takes only 1 parameter
and prog2 is attached to func2 which takes two parameters. Since verifier
assumes the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed based on func2's
prototype, verifier allows prog2 to access the second parameter from
the bpf ctx passed to it. The problem is that verifier does not prevent
prog1 from passing its bpf ctx to prog2 via tail call. In this case,
the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed from func1 instead of func2,
that is, the assumption for ctx access verification is bypassed.
Another example, if BPF LSM prog1 is attached to hook file_alloc_security,
and BPF LSM prog2 is attached to hook bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known. Verifier
knows the return value rules for these two hooks, e.g. it is legal for
bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known to return positive number 1, and it is illegal
for file_alloc_security to return positive number. So verifier allows
prog2 to return positive number 1, but does not allow prog1 to return
positive number. The problem is that verifier does not prevent prog1
from calling prog2 via tail call. In this case, prog2's return value 1
will be used as the return value for prog1's hook file_alloc_security.
That is, the return value rule is bypassed.
This patch adds restriction for tail call to prevent such bypasses.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-50045

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: br_netfilter: fix panic with metadata_dst skb
Fix a kernel panic in the br_netfilter module when sending untagged
traffic via a VxLAN device.
This happens during the check for fragmentation in br_nf_dev_queue_xmit.
It is dependent on:
1) the br_netfilter module being loaded;
2) net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-iptables set to 1;
3) a bridge with a VxLAN (single-vxlan-device) netdevice as a bridge port;
4) untagged frames with size higher than the VxLAN MTU forwarded/flooded
When forwarding the untagged packet to the VxLAN bridge port, before
the netfilter hooks are called, br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel is called and
changes the skb_dst to the tunnel dst. The tunnel_dst is a metadata type
of dst, i.e., skb_valid_dst(skb) is false, and metadata->dst.dev is NULL.
Then in the br_netfilter hooks, in br_nf_dev_queue_xmit, there's a check
for frames that needs to be fragmented: frames with higher MTU than the
VxLAN device end up calling br_nf_ip_fragment, which in turns call
ip_skb_dst_mtu.
The ip_dst_mtu tries to use the skb_dst(skb) as if it was a valid dst
with valid dst->dev, thus the crash.
This case was never supported in the first place, so drop the packet
instead.
PING 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2) from 0.0.0.0 h1-eth0: 2000(2028) bytes of data.
[ 176.291791] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
virtual address 0000000000000110
[ 176.292101] Mem abort info:
[ 176.292184] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 176.292322] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 176.292530] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 176.292709] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 176.292862] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 176.293013] Data abort info:
[ 176.293104] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 176.293488] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 176.293787] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 176.293995] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000043ef5000
[ 176.294166] [0000000000000110] pgd=0000000000000000,
p4d=0000000000000000
[ 176.294827] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 176.295252] Modules linked in: vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel veth
br_netfilter bridge stp llc ipv6 crct10dif_ce
[ 176.295923] CPU: 0 PID: 188 Comm: ping Not tainted
6.8.0-rc3-g5b3fbd61b9d1 #2
[ 176.296314] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[ 176.296535] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS
BTYPE=--)
[ 176.296808] pc : br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x390/0x4ec [br_netfilter]
[ 176.297382] lr : br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x2ac/0x4ec [br_netfilter]
[ 176.297636] sp : ffff800080003630
[ 176.297743] x29: ffff800080003630 x28: 0000000000000008 x27:
ffff6828c49ad9f8
[ 176.298093] x26: ffff6828c49ad000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24:
00000000000003e8
[ 176.298430] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff6828c4960b40 x21:
ffff6828c3b16d28
[ 176.298652] x20: ffff6828c3167048 x19: ffff6828c3b16d00 x18:
0000000000000014
[ 176.298926] x17: ffffb0476322f000 x16: ffffb7e164023730 x15:
0000000095744632
[ 176.299296] x14: ffff6828c3f1c880 x13: 0000000000000002 x12:
ffffb7e137926a70
[ 176.299574] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff6828c3f1c898 x9 :
0000000000000000
[ 176.300049] x8 : ffff6828c49bf070 x7 : 0008460f18d5f20e x6 :
f20e0100bebafeca
[ 176.300302] x5 : ffff6828c7f918fe x4 : ffff6828c49bf070 x3 :
0000000000000000
[ 176.300586] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff6828c3c7ad00 x0 :
ffff6828c7f918f0
[ 176.300889] Call trace:
[ 176.301123] br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x390/0x4ec [br_netfilter]
[ 176.301411] br_nf_post_routing+0x2a8/0x3e4 [br_netfilter]
[ 176.301703] nf_hook_slow+0x48/0x124
[ 176.302060] br_forward_finish+0xc8/0xe8 [bridge]
[ 176.302371] br_nf_hook_thresh+0x124/0x134 [br_netfilter]
[ 176.302605] br_nf_forward_finish+0x118/0x22c [br_netfilter]
[ 176.302824] br_nf_forward_ip.part.0+0x264/0x290 [br_netfilter]
[ 176.303136] br_nf_forward+0x2b8/0x4e0 [br_netfilter]
[ 176.303359] nf_hook_slow+0x48/0x124
[ 176.303
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-49940

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
l2tp: prevent possible tunnel refcount underflow
When a session is created, it sets a backpointer to its tunnel. When
the session refcount drops to 0, l2tp_session_free drops the tunnel
refcount if session->tunnel is non-NULL. However, session->tunnel is
set in l2tp_session_create, before the tunnel refcount is incremented
by l2tp_session_register, which leaves a small window where
session->tunnel is non-NULL when the tunnel refcount hasn't been
bumped.
Moving the assignment to l2tp_session_register is trivial but
l2tp_session_create calls l2tp_session_set_header_len which uses
session->tunnel to get the tunnel's encap. Add an encap arg to
l2tp_session_set_header_len to avoid using session->tunnel.
If l2tpv3 sessions have colliding IDs, it is possible for
l2tp_v3_session_get to race with l2tp_session_register and fetch a
session which doesn't yet have session->tunnel set. Add a check for
this case.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-49939

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: avoid to add interface to list twice when SER
If SER L2 occurs during the WoWLAN resume flow, the add interface flow
is triggered by ieee80211_reconfig(). However, due to
rtw89_wow_resume() return failure, it will cause the add interface flow
to be executed again, resulting in a double add list and causing a kernel
panic. Therefore, we have added a check to prevent double adding of the
list.
list_add double add: new=ffff99d6992e2010, prev=ffff99d6992e2010, next=ffff99d695302628.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:37!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G W O 6.6.30-02659-gc18865c4dfbd #1 770df2933251a0e3c888ba69d1053a817a6376a7
Hardware name: HP Grunt/Grunt, BIOS Google_Grunt.11031.169.0 06/24/2021
Workqueue: events_freezable ieee80211_restart_work [mac80211]
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x5e/0xb0
Code: c7 74 18 48 39 ce 74 13 b0 01 59 5a 5e 5f 41 58 41 59 41 5a 5d e9 e2 d6 03 00 cc 48 c7 c7 8d 4f 17 83 48 89 c2 e8 02 c0 00 00 <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 aa 8c 1c 83 e8 f4 bf 00 00 0f 0b 48 c7 c7 c8 bc 12
RSP: 0018:ffffa91b8007bc50 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000058 RBX: ffff99d6992e0900 RCX: a014d76c70ef3900
RDX: ffffa91b8007bae8 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffffa91b8007bc88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffa91b8007bae0
R10: 00000000ffffdfff R11: ffffffff83a79800 R12: ffff99d695302060
R13: ffff99d695300900 R14: ffff99d6992e1be0 R15: ffff99d6992e2010
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff99d6aac00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000078fbdba43480 CR3: 000000010e464000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0x1f/0x70
? die+0x3d/0x60
? do_trap+0xa4/0x110
? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x5e/0xb0
? do_error_trap+0x6d/0x90
? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x5e/0xb0
? handle_invalid_op+0x30/0x40
? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x5e/0xb0
? exc_invalid_op+0x3c/0x50
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x5e/0xb0
rtw89_ops_add_interface+0x309/0x310 [rtw89_core 7c32b1ee6854761c0321027c8a58c5160e41f48f]
drv_add_interface+0x5c/0x130 [mac80211 83e989e6e616bd5b4b8a2b0a9f9352a2c385a3bc]
ieee80211_reconfig+0x241/0x13d0 [mac80211 83e989e6e616bd5b4b8a2b0a9f9352a2c385a3bc]
? finish_wait+0x3e/0x90
? synchronize_rcu_expedited+0x174/0x260
? sync_rcu_exp_done_unlocked+0x50/0x50
? wake_bit_function+0x40/0x40
ieee80211_restart_work+0xf0/0x140 [mac80211 83e989e6e616bd5b4b8a2b0a9f9352a2c385a3bc]
process_scheduled_works+0x1e5/0x480
worker_thread+0xea/0x1e0
kthread+0xdb/0x110
? move_linked_works+0x90/0x90
? kthread_associate_blkcg+0xa0/0xa0
ret_from_fork+0x3b/0x50
? kthread_associate_blkcg+0xa0/0xa0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
Modules linked in: dm_integrity async_xor xor async_tx lz4 lz4_compress zstd zstd_compress zram zsmalloc rfcomm cmac uinput algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg btusb btrtl iio_trig_hrtimer industrialio_sw_trigger btmtk industrialio_configfs btbcm btintel uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc iio_trig_sysfs videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common uvc snd_hda_codec_hdmi veth snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg acpi_als snd_hda_codec industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf snd_hwdep industrialio i2c_piix4 snd_hda_core designware_i2s ip6table_nat snd_soc_max98357a xt_MASQUERADE xt_cgroup snd_soc_acp_rt5682_mach fuse rtw89_8922ae(O) rtw89_8922a(O) rtw89_pci(O) rtw89_core(O) 8021q mac80211(O) bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc cfg80211 r8152 mii joydev
gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-49934

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/inode: Prevent dump_mapping() accessing invalid dentry.d_name.name
It's observed that a crash occurs during hot-remove a memory device,
in which user is accessing the hugetlb. See calltrace as following:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 14045 at arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1278 do_user_addr_fault+0x2a0/0x790
Modules linked in: kmem device_dax cxl_mem cxl_pmem cxl_port cxl_pci dax_hmem dax_pmem nd_pmem cxl_acpi nd_btt cxl_core crc32c_intel nvme virtiofs fuse nvme_core nfit libnvdimm dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc s
mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
CPU: 1 PID: 14045 Comm: daxctl Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-lizhijian+ #492
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:do_user_addr_fault+0x2a0/0x790
Code: 48 8b 00 a8 04 0f 84 b5 fe ff ff e9 1c ff ff ff 4c 89 e9 4c 89 e2 be 01 00 00 00 bf 02 00 00 00 e8 b5 ef 24 00 e9 42 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 08 4c 89 ea 48 89 ee 4c 89 e7 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41
RSP: 0000:ffffc90000a575f0 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: ffff88800c303600 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffffffff82504162 RDI: ffffffff824b2c36
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc90000a57658
R13: 0000000000001000 R14: ffff88800bc2e040 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f51cb57d880(0000) GS:ffff88807fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000001000 CR3: 00000000072e2004 CR4: 00000000001706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x8d/0x190
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2a0/0x790
? report_bug+0x1c3/0x1d0
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2a0/0x790
? exc_page_fault+0x31/0x200
exc_page_fault+0x68/0x200
<...snip...>
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 800000000ad92067 P4D 800000000ad92067 PUD 7677067 PMD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 800000000ad92067 P4D 800000000ad92067 PUD 7677067 PMD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 14045 Comm: daxctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc2-lizhijian+ #492
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:dentry_name+0x1f4/0x440
<...snip...>
? dentry_name+0x2fa/0x440
vsnprintf+0x1f3/0x4f0
vprintk_store+0x23a/0x540
vprintk_emit+0x6d/0x330
_printk+0x58/0x80
dump_mapping+0x10b/0x1a0
? __pfx_free_object_rcu+0x10/0x10
__dump_page+0x26b/0x3e0
? vprintk_emit+0xe0/0x330
? _printk+0x58/0x80
? dump_page+0x17/0x50
dump_page+0x17/0x50
do_migrate_range+0x2f7/0x7f0
? do_migrate_range+0x42/0x7f0
? offline_pages+0x2f4/0x8c0
offline_pages+0x60a/0x8c0
memory_subsys_offline+0x9f/0x1c0
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x77/0x100
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x38/0x60
device_offline+0xe3/0x110
state_store+0x6e/0xc0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x143/0x200
vfs_write+0x39f/0x560
ksys_write+0x65/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x62/0x130
Previously, some sanity check have been done in dump_mapping() before
the print facility parsing '%pd' though, it's still possible to run into
an invalid dentry.d_name.name.
Since dump_mapping() only needs to dump the filename only, retrieve it
by itself in a safer way to prevent an unnecessary crash.
Note that either retrieving the filename with '%pd' or
strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(), the filename could be unreliable.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-49886

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: ISST: Fix the KASAN report slab-out-of-bounds bug
Attaching SST PCI device to VM causes "BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds".
kasan report:
[ 19.411889] ==================================================================
[ 19.413702] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.415634] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888829e65200 by task cpuhp/16/113
[ 19.417368]
[ 19.418627] CPU: 16 PID: 113 Comm: cpuhp/16 Tainted: G E 6.9.0 #10
[ 19.420435] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.20192059.B64.2207280713 07/28/2022
[ 19.422687] Call Trace:
[ 19.424091] <TASK>
[ 19.425448] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
[ 19.426963] ? _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.428694] print_report+0x19d/0x52e
[ 19.430206] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ 19.431837] ? _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.433539] kasan_report+0xf0/0x170
[ 19.435019] ? _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.436709] _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.438379] ? __pfx_sched_clock_cpu+0x10/0x10
[ 19.439910] isst_if_cpu_online+0x406/0x58f [isst_if_common]
[ 19.441573] ? __pfx_isst_if_cpu_online+0x10/0x10 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.443263] ? ttwu_queue_wakelist+0x2c1/0x360
[ 19.444797] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x221/0xec0
[ 19.446337] cpuhp_thread_fun+0x21b/0x610
[ 19.447814] ? __pfx_cpuhp_thread_fun+0x10/0x10
[ 19.449354] smpboot_thread_fn+0x2e7/0x6e0
[ 19.450859] ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
[ 19.452405] kthread+0x29c/0x350
[ 19.453817] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 19.455253] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70
[ 19.456685] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 19.458114] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 19.459573] </TASK>
[ 19.460853]
[ 19.462055] Allocated by task 1198:
[ 19.463410] kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
[ 19.464788] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[ 19.466139] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
[ 19.467465] __kmalloc+0x1cd/0x470
[ 19.468748] isst_if_cdev_register+0x1da/0x350 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.470233] isst_if_mbox_init+0x108/0xff0 [isst_if_mbox_msr]
[ 19.471670] do_one_initcall+0xa4/0x380
[ 19.472903] do_init_module+0x238/0x760
[ 19.474105] load_module+0x5239/0x6f00
[ 19.475285] init_module_from_file+0xd1/0x130
[ 19.476506] idempotent_init_module+0x23b/0x650
[ 19.477725] __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130
[ 19.476506] idempotent_init_module+0x23b/0x650
[ 19.477725] __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130
[ 19.478920] do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160
[ 19.480036] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 19.481292]
[ 19.482205] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888829e65000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 19.484818] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 512-byte region [ffff888829e65000, ffff888829e65200)
[ 19.487447]
[ 19.488328] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 19.489569] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888829e60c00 pfn:0x829e60
[ 19.491140] head: order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
[ 19.492466] anon flags: 0x57ffffc0000840(slab|head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 19.493914] page_type: 0xffffffff()
[ 19.494988] raw: 0057ffffc0000840 ffff88810004cc80 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
[ 19.496451] raw: ffff888829e60c00 0000000080200018 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 19.497906] head: 0057ffffc0000840 ffff88810004cc80 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
[ 19.499379] head: ffff888829e60c00 0000000080200018 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 19.500844] head: 0057ffffc0000003 ffffea0020a79801 ffffea0020a79848 00000000ffffffff
[ 19.502316] head: 0000000800000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 19.503784] page dumped because: k
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-49569

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-rdma: unquiesce admin_q before destroy it
Kernel will hang on destroy admin_q while we create ctrl failed, such
as following calltrace:
PID: 23644 TASK: ff2d52b40f439fc0 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "nvme"
#0 [ff61d23de260fb78] __schedule at ffffffff8323bc15
#1 [ff61d23de260fc08] schedule at ffffffff8323c014
#2 [ff61d23de260fc28] blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait at ffffffff82a3dba1
#3 [ff61d23de260fc78] blk_freeze_queue at ffffffff82a4113a
#4 [ff61d23de260fc90] blk_cleanup_queue at ffffffff82a33006
#5 [ff61d23de260fcb0] nvme_rdma_destroy_admin_queue at ffffffffc12686ce
#6 [ff61d23de260fcc8] nvme_rdma_setup_ctrl at ffffffffc1268ced
#7 [ff61d23de260fd28] nvme_rdma_create_ctrl at ffffffffc126919b
#8 [ff61d23de260fd68] nvmf_dev_write at ffffffffc024f362
#9 [ff61d23de260fe38] vfs_write at ffffffff827d5f25
RIP: 00007fda7891d574 RSP: 00007ffe2ef06958 RFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e8122a4d90 RCX: 00007fda7891d574
RDX: 000000000000012b RSI: 000055e8122a4d90 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007ffe2ef079c0 R8: 000000000000012b R9: 000055e8122a4d90
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 000055e8122923c0 R14: 000000000000012b R15: 00007fda78a54500
ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 CS: 0033 SS: 002b
This due to we have quiesced admi_q before cancel requests, but forgot
to unquiesce before destroy it, as a result we fail to drain the
pending requests, and hang on blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait() forever. Here
try to reuse nvme_rdma_teardown_admin_queue() to fix this issue and
simplify the code.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46857

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix bridge mode operations when there are no VFs
Currently, trying to set the bridge mode attribute when numvfs=0 leads to a
crash:
bridge link set dev eth2 hwmode vepa
[ 168.967392] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030
[...]
[ 168.969989] RIP: 0010:mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x1f/0x300 [mlx5_core]
[...]
[ 168.976037] Call Trace:
[ 168.976188] <TASK>
[ 168.978620] _mlx5_eswitch_set_vepa_locked+0x113/0x230 [mlx5_core]
[ 168.979074] mlx5_eswitch_set_vepa+0x7f/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
[ 168.979471] rtnl_bridge_setlink+0xe9/0x1f0
[ 168.979714] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x159/0x400
[ 168.980451] netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
[ 168.980675] netlink_unicast+0x241/0x360
[ 168.980918] netlink_sendmsg+0x1f6/0x430
[ 168.981162] ____sys_sendmsg+0x3bb/0x3f0
[ 168.982155] ___sys_sendmsg+0x88/0xd0
[ 168.985036] __sys_sendmsg+0x59/0xa0
[ 168.985477] do_syscall_64+0x79/0x150
[ 168.987273] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 168.987773] RIP: 0033:0x7f8f7950f917
(esw->fdb_table.legacy.vepa_fdb is null)
The bridge mode is only relevant when there are multiple functions per
port. Therefore, prevent setting and getting this setting when there are no
VFs.
Note that after this change, there are no settings to change on the PF
interface using `bridge link` when there are no VFs, so the interface no
longer appears in the `bridge link` output.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46830

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.
Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU. I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems. Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm #552 Not tainted
-----------------------------
include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by repro/1071:
#0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm #552
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46787

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
userfaultfd: fix checks for huge PMDs
Patch series "userfaultfd: fix races around pmd_trans_huge() check", v2.
The pmd_trans_huge() code in mfill_atomic() is wrong in three different
ways depending on kernel version:
1. The pmd_trans_huge() check is racy and can lead to a BUG_ON() (if you hit
the right two race windows) - I've tested this in a kernel build with
some extra mdelay() calls. See the commit message for a description
of the race scenario.
On older kernels (before 6.5), I think the same bug can even
theoretically lead to accessing transhuge page contents as a page table
if you hit the right 5 narrow race windows (I haven't tested this case).
2. As pointed out by Qi Zheng, pmd_trans_huge() is not sufficient for
detecting PMDs that don't point to page tables.
On older kernels (before 6.5), you'd just have to win a single fairly
wide race to hit this.
I've tested this on 6.1 stable by racing migration (with a mdelay()
patched into try_to_migrate()) against UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE - on my x86
VM, that causes a kernel oops in ptlock_ptr().
3. On newer kernels (>=6.5), for shmem mappings, khugepaged is allowed
to yank page tables out from under us (though I haven't tested that),
so I think the BUG_ON() checks in mfill_atomic() are just wrong.
I decided to write two separate fixes for these (one fix for bugs 1+2, one
fix for bug 3), so that the first fix can be backported to kernels
affected by bugs 1+2.
This patch (of 2):
This fixes two issues.
I discovered that the following race can occur:
mfill_atomic other thread
============ ============
<zap PMD>
pmdp_get_lockless() [reads none pmd]
<bail if trans_huge>
<if none:>
<pagefault creates transhuge zeropage>
__pte_alloc [no-op]
<zap PMD>
<bail if pmd_trans_huge(*dst_pmd)>
BUG_ON(pmd_none(*dst_pmd))
I have experimentally verified this in a kernel with extra mdelay() calls;
the BUG_ON(pmd_none(*dst_pmd)) triggers.
On kernels newer than commit 0d940a9b270b ("mm/pgtable: allow
pte_offset_map[_lock]() to fail"), this can't lead to anything worse than
a BUG_ON(), since the page table access helpers are actually designed to
deal with page tables concurrently disappearing; but on older kernels
(<=6.4), I think we could probably theoretically race past the two
BUG_ON() checks and end up treating a hugepage as a page table.
The second issue is that, as Qi Zheng pointed out, there are other types
of huge PMDs that pmd_trans_huge() can't catch: devmap PMDs and swap PMDs
(in particular, migration PMDs).
On <=6.4, this is worse than the first issue: If mfill_atomic() runs on a
PMD that contains a migration entry (which just requires winning a single,
fairly wide race), it will pass the PMD to pte_offset_map_lock(), which
assumes that the PMD points to a page table.
Breakage follows: First, the kernel tries to take the PTE lock (which will
crash or maybe worse if there is no "struct page" for the address bits in
the migration entry PMD - I think at least on X86 there usually is no
corresponding "struct page" thanks to the PTE inversion mitigation, amd64
looks different).
If that didn't crash, the kernel would next try to write a PTE into what
it wrongly thinks is a page table.
As part of fixing these issues, get rid of the check for pmd_trans_huge()
before __pte_alloc() - that's redundant, we're going to have to check for
that after the __pte_alloc() anyway.
Backport note: pmdp_get_lockless() is pmd_read_atomic() in older kernels.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46783

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp_bpf: fix return value of tcp_bpf_sendmsg()
When we cork messages in psock->cork, the last message triggers the
flushing will result in sending a sk_msg larger than the current
message size. In this case, in tcp_bpf_send_verdict(), 'copied' becomes
negative at least in the following case:
468 case __SK_DROP:
469 default:
470 sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, tosend);
471 sk_msg_apply_bytes(psock, tosend);
472 *copied -= (tosend + delta); // <==== HERE
473 return -EACCES;
Therefore, it could lead to the following BUG with a proper value of
'copied' (thanks to syzbot). We should not use negative 'copied' as a
return value here.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/socket.c:733!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3265 Comm: syz-executor510 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00060-gd07b43284ab3 #0
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 61400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:733 [inline]
pc : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:728 [inline]
pc : __sock_sendmsg+0x5c/0x60 net/socket.c:745
lr : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
lr : __sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x60 net/socket.c:745
sp : ffff800088ea3b30
x29: ffff800088ea3b30 x28: fbf00000062bc900 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffff800088ea3bc0 x25: ffff800088ea3bc0 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: f9f00000048dc000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff800088ea3d90
x20: f9f00000048dc000 x19: ffff800088ea3d90 x18: 0000000000000001
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 000000002002ffaf
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff8000815849c0 x9 : ffff8000815b49c0
x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 000000000000003f x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 00000000000007e0 x4 : fff07ffffd239000 x3 : fbf00000062bc900
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 00000000fffffdef
Call trace:
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:733 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x5c/0x60 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x274/0x2ac net/socket.c:2597
___sys_sendmsg+0xac/0x100 net/socket.c:2651
__sys_sendmsg+0x84/0xe0 net/socket.c:2680
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2689 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2687 [inline]
__arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x24/0x30 net/socket.c:2687
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x34/0xec arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x12c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x19c/0x1a0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
Code: f9404463 d63f0060 3108441f 54fffe81 (d4210000)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46771

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: bcm: Remove proc entry when dev is unregistered.
syzkaller reported a warning in bcm_connect() below. [0]
The repro calls connect() to vxcan1, removes vxcan1, and calls
connect() with ifindex == 0.
Calling connect() for a BCM socket allocates a proc entry.
Then, bcm_sk(sk)->bound is set to 1 to prevent further connect().
However, removing the bound device resets bcm_sk(sk)->bound to 0
in bcm_notify().
The 2nd connect() tries to allocate a proc entry with the same
name and sets NULL to bcm_sk(sk)->bcm_proc_read, leaking the
original proc entry.
Since the proc entry is available only for connect()ed sockets,
let's clean up the entry when the bound netdev is unregistered.
[0]:
proc_dir_entry 'can-bcm/2456' already registered
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 394 at fs/proc/generic.c:376 proc_register+0x645/0x8f0 fs/proc/generic.c:375
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 394 Comm: syz-executor403 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-g852e42cc2dd4
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:proc_register+0x645/0x8f0 fs/proc/generic.c:375
Code: 00 00 00 00 00 48 85 ed 0f 85 97 02 00 00 4d 85 f6 0f 85 9f 02 00 00 48 c7 c7 9b cb cf 87 48 89 de 4c 89 fa e8 1c 6f eb fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 48 c7 c7 98 37 99 89 e8 cb 7e 22 05 bb 00 00 00 10 48
RSP: 0018:ffa0000000cd7c30 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 9e129be1950f0200 RBX: ff1100011b51582c RCX: ff1100011857cd80
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000002
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffd400000000000f R09: ff1100013e78cac0
R10: ffac800000cd7980 R11: ff1100013e12b1f0 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ff1100011a99a2ec
FS: 00007fbd7086f740(0000) GS:ff1100013fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000200071c0 CR3: 0000000118556004 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
proc_create_net_single+0x144/0x210 fs/proc/proc_net.c:220
bcm_connect+0x472/0x840 net/can/bcm.c:1673
__sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2049 [inline]
__sys_connect+0x5d2/0x690 net/socket.c:2066
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2076 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2073 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x8f/0x100 net/socket.c:2073
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7fbd708b0e5d
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff8cd33f08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fbd708b0e5d
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 0000000000000040
R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff8cd34098
R13: 0000000000401280 R14: 0000000000406de8 R15: 00007fbd70ab9000
</TASK>
remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'net/can-bcm', leaking at least '2456'

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46770

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Add netif_device_attach/detach into PF reset flow
Ethtool callbacks can be executed while reset is in progress and try to
access deleted resources, e.g. getting coalesce settings can result in a
NULL pointer dereference seen below.
Reproduction steps:
Once the driver is fully initialized, trigger reset:
# echo 1 > /sys/class/net/<interface>/device/reset
when reset is in progress try to get coalesce settings using ethtool:
# ethtool -c <interface>
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 11 PID: 19713 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G S 6.10.0-rc7+ #7
RIP: 0010:ice_get_q_coalesce+0x2e/0xa0 [ice]
RSP: 0018:ffffbab1e9bcf6a8 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 000000000000000c RBX: ffff94512305b028 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9451c3f2e588 RDI: ffff9451c3f2e588
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff9451c3f2e580 R11: 000000000000001f R12: ffff945121fa9000
R13: ffffbab1e9bcf760 R14: 0000000000000013 R15: ffffffff9e65dd40
FS: 00007faee5fbe740(0000) GS:ffff94546fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000106c2e005 CR4: 00000000001706f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ice_get_coalesce+0x17/0x30 [ice]
coalesce_prepare_data+0x61/0x80
ethnl_default_doit+0xde/0x340
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xf2/0x150
genl_rcv_msg+0x1b3/0x2c0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x5b/0x110
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x19c/0x290
netlink_sendmsg+0x222/0x490
__sys_sendto+0x1df/0x1f0
__x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7faee60d8e27
Calling netif_device_detach() before reset makes the net core not call
the driver when ethtool command is issued, the attempt to execute an
ethtool command during reset will result in the following message:
netlink error: No such device
instead of NULL pointer dereference. Once reset is done and
ice_rebuild() is executing, the netif_device_attach() is called to allow
for ethtool operations to occur again in a safe manner.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46755

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: Do not return unused priv in mwifiex_get_priv_by_id()
mwifiex_get_priv_by_id() returns the priv pointer corresponding to
the bss_num and bss_type, but without checking if the priv is actually
currently in use.
Unused priv pointers do not have a wiphy attached to them which can
lead to NULL pointer dereferences further down the callstack. Fix
this by returning only used priv pointers which have priv->bss_mode
set to something else than NL80211_IFTYPE_UNSPECIFIED.
Said NULL pointer dereference happened when an Accesspoint was started
with wpa_supplicant -i mlan0 with this config:
network={
ssid="somessid"
mode=2
frequency=2412
key_mgmt=WPA-PSK WPA-PSK-SHA256
proto=RSN
group=CCMP
pairwise=CCMP
psk="12345678"
}
When waiting for the AP to be established, interrupting wpa_supplicant
with <ctrl-c> and starting it again this happens:
| Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000140
| Mem abort info:
| ESR = 0x0000000096000004
| EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
| SET = 0, FnV = 0
| EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
| FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
| Data abort info:
| ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
| CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
| GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
| user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000046d96000
| [0000000000000140] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
| Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
| Modules linked in: caam_jr caamhash_desc spidev caamalg_desc crypto_engine authenc libdes mwifiex_sdio
+mwifiex crct10dif_ce cdc_acm onboard_usb_hub fsl_imx8_ddr_perf imx8m_ddrc rtc_ds1307 lm75 rtc_snvs
+imx_sdma caam imx8mm_thermal spi_imx error imx_cpufreq_dt fuse ip_tables x_tables ipv6
| CPU: 0 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-00007-g937242013fce-dirty #18
| Hardware name: somemachine (DT)
| Workqueue: events sdio_irq_work
| pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : mwifiex_get_cfp+0xd8/0x15c [mwifiex]
| lr : mwifiex_get_cfp+0x34/0x15c [mwifiex]
| sp : ffff8000818b3a70
| x29: ffff8000818b3a70 x28: ffff000006bfd8a5 x27: 0000000000000004
| x26: 000000000000002c x25: 0000000000001511 x24: 0000000002e86bc9
| x23: ffff000006bfd996 x22: 0000000000000004 x21: ffff000007bec000
| x20: 000000000000002c x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
| x17: 000000040044ffff x16: 00500072b5503510 x15: ccc283740681e517
| x14: 0201000101006d15 x13: 0000000002e8ff43 x12: 002c01000000ffb1
| x11: 0100000000000000 x10: 02e8ff43002c0100 x9 : 0000ffb100100157
| x8 : ffff000003d20000 x7 : 00000000000002f1 x6 : 00000000ffffe124
| x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000003 x3 : 0000000000000000
| x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0001000000011001 x0 : 0000000000000000
| Call trace:
| mwifiex_get_cfp+0xd8/0x15c [mwifiex]
| mwifiex_parse_single_response_buf+0x1d0/0x504 [mwifiex]
| mwifiex_handle_event_ext_scan_report+0x19c/0x2f8 [mwifiex]
| mwifiex_process_sta_event+0x298/0xf0c [mwifiex]
| mwifiex_process_event+0x110/0x238 [mwifiex]
| mwifiex_main_process+0x428/0xa44 [mwifiex]
| mwifiex_sdio_interrupt+0x64/0x12c [mwifiex_sdio]
| process_sdio_pending_irqs+0x64/0x1b8
| sdio_irq_work+0x4c/0x7c
| process_one_work+0x148/0x2a0
| worker_thread+0x2fc/0x40c
| kthread+0x110/0x114
| ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
| Code: a94153f3 a8c37bfd d50323bf d65f03c0 (f940a000)
| ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46746

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: amd_sfh: free driver_data after destroying hid device
HID driver callbacks aren't called anymore once hid_destroy_device() has
been called. Hence, hid driver_data should be freed only after the
hid_destroy_device() function returned as driver_data is used in several
callbacks.
I observed a crash with kernel 6.10.0 on my T14s Gen 3, after enabling
KASAN to debug memory allocation, I got this output:
[ 13.050438] ==================================================================
[ 13.054060] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh]
[ 13.054809] psmouse serio1: trackpoint: Synaptics TrackPoint firmware: 0x02, buttons: 3/3
[ 13.056432] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88813152f408 by task (udev-worker)/479
[ 13.060970] CPU: 5 PID: 479 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.10.0-arch1-2 #1 893bb55d7f0073f25c46adbb49eb3785fefd74b0
[ 13.063978] Hardware name: LENOVO 21CQCTO1WW/21CQCTO1WW, BIOS R22ET70W (1.40 ) 03/21/2024
[ 13.067860] Call Trace:
[ 13.069383] input: TPPS/2 Synaptics TrackPoint as /devices/platform/i8042/serio1/input/input8
[ 13.071486] <TASK>
[ 13.071492] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
[ 13.074870] snd_hda_intel 0000:33:00.6: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
[ 13.078296] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
[ 13.082199] print_report+0x174/0x505
[ 13.085776] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ 13.089367] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.093255] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
[ 13.097464] kasan_report+0xc8/0x150
[ 13.101461] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
[ 13.105802] amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
[ 13.110303] amdtp_hid_request+0xb8/0x110 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
[ 13.114879] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.119450] sensor_hub_get_feature+0x1d3/0x540 [hid_sensor_hub 3f13be3016ff415bea03008d45d99da837ee3082]
[ 13.124097] hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x4d0/0xad0 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5]
[ 13.127404] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.131925] ? __pfx_hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5]
[ 13.136455] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x96/0xf0
[ 13.140197] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ 13.143602] ? devm_iio_device_alloc+0x34/0x50 [industrialio 3d261d5e5765625d2b052be40e526d62b1d2123b]
[ 13.147234] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.150446] ? __devm_add_action+0x167/0x1d0
[ 13.155061] hid_gyro_3d_probe+0x120/0x7f0 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172]
[ 13.158581] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.161814] platform_probe+0xa2/0x150
[ 13.165029] really_probe+0x1e3/0x8a0
[ 13.168243] __driver_probe_device+0x18c/0x370
[ 13.171500] driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x120
[ 13.175000] __driver_attach+0x190/0x4a0
[ 13.178521] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
[ 13.181771] bus_for_each_dev+0x106/0x180
[ 13.185033] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 13.188229] ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10
[ 13.191446] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.194382] bus_add_driver+0x29e/0x4d0
[ 13.197328] driver_register+0x1a5/0x360
[ 13.200283] ? __pfx_hid_gyro_3d_platform_driver_init+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172]
[ 13.203362] do_one_initcall+0xa7/0x380
[ 13.206432] ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
[ 13.210175] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.213211] ? kasan_unpoison+0x44/0x70
[ 13.216688] do_init_module+0x238/0x750
[ 13.2196
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46678

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: change ipsec_lock from spin lock to mutex
In the cited commit, bond->ipsec_lock is added to protect ipsec_list,
hence xdo_dev_state_add and xdo_dev_state_delete are called inside
this lock. As ipsec_lock is a spin lock and such xfrmdev ops may sleep,
"scheduling while atomic" will be triggered when changing bond's
active slave.
[ 101.055189] BUG: scheduling while atomic: bash/902/0x00000200
[ 101.055726] Modules linked in:
[ 101.058211] CPU: 3 PID: 902 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4+ #1
[ 101.058760] Hardware name:
[ 101.059434] Call Trace:
[ 101.059436] <TASK>
[ 101.060873] dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60
[ 101.061275] __schedule_bug+0x4e/0x60
[ 101.061682] __schedule+0x612/0x7c0
[ 101.062078] ? __mod_timer+0x25c/0x370
[ 101.062486] schedule+0x25/0xd0
[ 101.062845] schedule_timeout+0x77/0xf0
[ 101.063265] ? asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
[ 101.063724] ? __bpf_trace_itimer_state+0x10/0x10
[ 101.064215] __wait_for_common+0x87/0x190
[ 101.064648] ? usleep_range_state+0x90/0x90
[ 101.065091] cmd_exec+0x437/0xb20 [mlx5_core]
[ 101.065569] mlx5_cmd_do+0x1e/0x40 [mlx5_core]
[ 101.066051] mlx5_cmd_exec+0x18/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 101.066552] mlx5_crypto_create_dek_key+0xea/0x120 [mlx5_core]
[ 101.067163] ? bonding_sysfs_store_option+0x4d/0x80 [bonding]
[ 101.067738] ? kmalloc_trace+0x4d/0x350
[ 101.068156] mlx5_ipsec_create_sa_ctx+0x33/0x100 [mlx5_core]
[ 101.068747] mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0x47b/0xaa0 [mlx5_core]
[ 101.069312] bond_change_active_slave+0x392/0x900 [bonding]
[ 101.069868] bond_option_active_slave_set+0x1c2/0x240 [bonding]
[ 101.070454] __bond_opt_set+0xa6/0x430 [bonding]
[ 101.070935] __bond_opt_set_notify+0x2f/0x90 [bonding]
[ 101.071453] bond_opt_tryset_rtnl+0x72/0xb0 [bonding]
[ 101.071965] bonding_sysfs_store_option+0x4d/0x80 [bonding]
[ 101.072567] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1a0
[ 101.073033] vfs_write+0x2d8/0x400
[ 101.073416] ? alloc_fd+0x48/0x180
[ 101.073798] ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
[ 101.074175] do_syscall_64+0x52/0x110
[ 101.074576] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
As bond_ipsec_add_sa_all and bond_ipsec_del_sa_all are only called
from bond_change_active_slave, which requires holding the RTNL lock.
And bond_ipsec_add_sa and bond_ipsec_del_sa are xfrm state
xdo_dev_state_add and xdo_dev_state_delete APIs, which are in user
context. So ipsec_lock doesn't have to be spin lock, change it to
mutex, and thus the above issue can be resolved.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-45005

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: fix validity interception issue when gisa is switched off
We might run into a SIE validity if gisa has been disabled either via using
kernel parameter "kvm.use_gisa=0" or by setting the related sysfs
attribute to N (echo N >/sys/module/kvm/parameters/use_gisa).
The validity is caused by an invalid value in the SIE control block's
gisa designation. That happens because we pass the uninitialized gisa
origin to virt_to_phys() before writing it to the gisa designation.
To fix this we return 0 in kvm_s390_get_gisa_desc() if the origin is 0.
kvm_s390_get_gisa_desc() is used to determine which gisa designation to
set in the SIE control block. A value of 0 in the gisa designation disables
gisa usage.
The issue surfaces in the host kernel with the following kernel message as
soon a new kvm guest start is attemted.
kvm: unhandled validity intercept 0x1011
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 781237 at arch/s390/kvm/intercept.c:101 kvm_handle_sie_intercept+0x42e/0x4d0 [kvm]
Modules linked in: vhost_net tap tun xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT xt_tcpudp nft_compat x_tables nf_nat_tftp nf_conntrack_tftp vfio_pci_core irqbypass vhost_vsock vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vsock vhost vhost_iotlb kvm nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables sunrpc mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core mlx5_core uvdevice s390_trng eadm_sch vfio_ccw zcrypt_cex4 mdev vfio_iommu_type1 vfio sch_fq_codel drm i2c_core loop drm_panel_orientation_quirks configfs nfnetlink lcs ctcm fsm dm_service_time ghash_s390 prng chacha_s390 libchacha aes_s390 des_s390 libdes sha3_512_s390 sha3_256_s390 sha512_s390 sha256_s390 sha1_s390 sha_common dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log zfcp scsi_transport_fc scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua pkey zcrypt dm_multipath rng_core autofs4 [last unloaded: vfio_pci]
CPU: 0 PID: 781237 Comm: CPU 0/KVM Not tainted 6.10.0-08682-gcad9f11498ea #6
Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 701 (LPAR)
Krnl PSW : 0704c00180000000 000003d93deb0122 (kvm_handle_sie_intercept+0x432/0x4d0 [kvm])
R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:0 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
Krnl GPRS: 000003d900000027 000003d900000023 0000000000000028 000002cd00000000
000002d063a00900 00000359c6daf708 00000000000bebb5 0000000000001eff
000002cfd82e9000 000002cfd80bc000 0000000000001011 000003d93deda412
000003ff8962df98 000003d93de77ce0 000003d93deb011e 00000359c6daf960
Krnl Code: 000003d93deb0112: c020fffe7259larl%r2,000003d93de7e5c4
000003d93deb0118: c0e53fa8beacbrasl%r14,000003d9bd3c7e70
#000003d93deb011e: af000000mc0,0
>000003d93deb0122: a728ffealhi%r2,-22
000003d93deb0126: a7f4fe24brc15,000003d93deafd6e
000003d93deb012a: 9101f0b0tm176(%r15),1
000003d93deb012e: a774fe48brc7,000003d93deafdbe
000003d93deb0132: 40a0f0aesth%r10,174(%r15)
Call Trace:
[<000003d93deb0122>] kvm_handle_sie_intercept+0x432/0x4d0 [kvm]
([<000003d93deb011e>] kvm_handle_sie_intercept+0x42e/0x4d0 [kvm])
[<000003d93deacc10>] vcpu_post_run+0x1d0/0x3b0 [kvm]
[<000003d93deaceda>] __vcpu_run+0xea/0x2d0 [kvm]
[<000003d93dead9da>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x16a/0x430 [kvm]
[<000003d93de93ee0>] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x190/0x7c0 [kvm]
[<000003d9bd728b4e>] vfs_ioctl+0x2e/0x70
[<000003d9bd72a092>] __s390x_sys_ioctl+0xc2/0xd0
[<000003d9be0e9222>] __do_syscall+0x1f2/0x2e0
[<000003d9be0f9a90>] system_call+0x70/0x98
Last Breaking-Event-Address:
[<000003d9bd3c7f58>] __warn_printk+0xe8/0xf0

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-45003

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfs: Don't evict inode under the inode lru traversing context
The inode reclaiming process(See function prune_icache_sb) collects all
reclaimable inodes and mark them with I_FREEING flag at first, at that
time, other processes will be stuck if they try getting these inodes
(See function find_inode_fast), then the reclaiming process destroy the
inodes by function dispose_list(). Some filesystems(eg. ext4 with
ea_inode feature, ubifs with xattr) may do inode lookup in the inode
evicting callback function, if the inode lookup is operated under the
inode lru traversing context, deadlock problems may happen.
Case 1: In function ext4_evict_inode(), the ea inode lookup could happen
if ea_inode feature is enabled, the lookup process will be stuck
under the evicting context like this:
1. File A has inode i_reg and an ea inode i_ea
2. getfattr(A, xattr_buf) // i_ea is added into lru // lru->i_ea
3. Then, following three processes running like this:
PA PB
echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
shrink_slab
prune_dcache_sb
// i_reg is added into lru, lru->i_ea->i_reg
prune_icache_sb
list_lru_walk_one
inode_lru_isolate
i_ea->i_state |= I_FREEING // set inode state
inode_lru_isolate
__iget(i_reg)
spin_unlock(&i_reg->i_lock)
spin_unlock(lru_lock)
rm file A
i_reg->nlink = 0
iput(i_reg) // i_reg->nlink is 0, do evict
ext4_evict_inode
ext4_xattr_delete_inode
ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all
ext4_xattr_inode_iget
ext4_iget(i_ea->i_ino)
iget_locked
find_inode_fast
__wait_on_freeing_inode(i_ea) ----→ AA deadlock
dispose_list // cannot be executed by prune_icache_sb
wake_up_bit(&i_ea->i_state)
Case 2: In deleted inode writing function ubifs_jnl_write_inode(), file
deleting process holds BASEHD's wbuf->io_mutex while getting the
xattr inode, which could race with inode reclaiming process(The
reclaiming process could try locking BASEHD's wbuf->io_mutex in
inode evicting function), then an ABBA deadlock problem would
happen as following:
1. File A has inode ia and a xattr(with inode ixa), regular file B has
inode ib and a xattr.
2. getfattr(A, xattr_buf) // ixa is added into lru // lru->ixa
3. Then, following three processes running like this:
PA PB PC
echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
shrink_slab
prune_dcache_sb
// ib and ia are added into lru, lru->ixa->ib->ia
prune_icache_sb
list_lru_walk_one
inode_lru_isolate
ixa->i_state |= I_FREEING // set inode state
inode_lru_isolate
__iget(ib)
spin_unlock(&ib->i_lock)
spin_unlock(lru_lock)
rm file B
ib->nlink = 0
rm file A
iput(ia)
ubifs_evict_inode(ia)
ubifs_jnl_delete_inode(ia)
ubifs_jnl_write_inode(ia)
make_reservation(BASEHD) // Lock wbuf->io_mutex
ubifs_iget(ixa->i_ino)
iget_locked
find_inode_fast
__wait_on_freeing_inode(ixa)
| iput(ib) // ib->nlink is 0, do evict
| ubifs_evict_inode
| ubifs_jnl_delete_inode(ib)
↓ ubifs_jnl_write_inode
ABBA deadlock ←-----make_reservation(BASEHD)
dispose_list // cannot be executed by prune_icache_sb
wake_up_bit(&ixa->i_state)
Fix the possible deadlock by using new inode state flag I_LRU_ISOLATING
to pin the inode in memory while inode_lru_isolate(
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-44987

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: prevent UAF in ip6_send_skb()
syzbot reported an UAF in ip6_send_skb() [1]
After ip6_local_out() has returned, we no longer can safely
dereference rt, unless we hold rcu_read_lock().
A similar issue has been fixed in commit
a688caa34beb ("ipv6: take rcu lock in rawv6_send_hdrinc()")
Another potential issue in ip6_finish_output2() is handled in a
separate patch.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip6_send_skb+0x18d/0x230 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1964
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88806dde4858 by task syz.1.380/6530
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6530 Comm: syz.1.380 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00306-gdf6cbc62cc9b #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
ip6_send_skb+0x18d/0x230 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1964
rawv6_push_pending_frames+0x75c/0x9e0 net/ipv6/raw.c:588
rawv6_sendmsg+0x19c7/0x23c0 net/ipv6/raw.c:926
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
sock_write_iter+0x2dd/0x400 net/socket.c:1160
do_iter_readv_writev+0x60a/0x890
vfs_writev+0x37c/0xbb0 fs/read_write.c:971
do_writev+0x1b1/0x350 fs/read_write.c:1018
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f936bf79e79
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f936cd7f038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f936c115f80 RCX: 00007f936bf79e79
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f936bfe7916 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f936c115f80 R15: 00007fff2860a7a8
</TASK>
Allocated by task 6530:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:312 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:338
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3988 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4037 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x135/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:4044
dst_alloc+0x12b/0x190 net/core/dst.c:89
ip6_blackhole_route+0x59/0x340 net/ipv6/route.c:2670
make_blackhole net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3120 [inline]
xfrm_lookup_route+0xd1/0x1c0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3313
ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x13e/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1257
rawv6_sendmsg+0x1283/0x23c0 net/ipv6/raw.c:898
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2680
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 45:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579
poison_slab_object+0xe0/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:240
__kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:256
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2252 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4473 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x145/0x350 mm/slub.c:4548
dst_destroy+0x2ac/0x460 net/core/dst.c:124
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2569 [inline]
rcu_core+0xafd/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-44964

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: fix memory leaks and crashes while performing a soft reset
The second tagged commit introduced a UAF, as it removed restoring
q_vector->vport pointers after reinitializating the structures.
This is due to that all queue allocation functions are performed here
with the new temporary vport structure and those functions rewrite
the backpointers to the vport. Then, this new struct is freed and
the pointers start leading to nowhere.
But generally speaking, the current logic is very fragile. It claims
to be more reliable when the system is low on memory, but in fact, it
consumes two times more memory as at the moment of running this
function, there are two vports allocated with their queues and vectors.
Moreover, it claims to prevent the driver from running into "bad state",
but in fact, any error during the rebuild leaves the old vport in the
partially allocated state.
Finally, if the interface is down when the function is called, it always
allocates a new queue set, but when the user decides to enable the
interface later on, vport_open() allocates them once again, IOW there's
a clear memory leak here.
Just don't allocate a new queue set when performing a reset, that solves
crashes and memory leaks. Readd the old queue number and reopen the
interface on rollback - that solves limbo states when the device is left
disabled and/or without HW queues enabled.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-44932

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: fix UAFs when destroying the queues
The second tagged commit started sometimes (very rarely, but possible)
throwing WARNs from
net/core/page_pool.c:page_pool_disable_direct_recycling().
Turned out idpf frees interrupt vectors with embedded NAPIs *before*
freeing the queues making page_pools' NAPI pointers lead to freed
memory before these pools are destroyed by libeth.
It's not clear whether there are other accesses to the freed vectors
when destroying the queues, but anyway, we usually free queue/interrupt
vectors only when the queues are destroyed and the NAPIs are guaranteed
to not be referenced anywhere.
Invert the allocation and freeing logic making queue/interrupt vectors
be allocated first and freed last. Vectors don't require queues to be
present, so this is safe. Additionally, this change allows to remove
that useless queue->q_vector pointer cleanup, as vectors are still
valid when freeing the queues (+ both are freed within one function,
so it's not clear why nullify the pointers at all).

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-43911

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: fix NULL dereference at band check in starting tx ba session
In MLD connection, link_data/link_conf are dynamically allocated. They
don't point to vif->bss_conf. So, there will be no chanreq assigned to
vif->bss_conf and then the chan will be NULL. Tweak the code to check
ht_supported/vht_supported/has_he/has_eht on sta deflink.
Crash log (with rtw89 version under MLO development):
[ 9890.526087] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[ 9890.526102] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 9890.526105] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 9890.526109] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 9890.526114] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 9890.526119] CPU: 2 PID: 6367 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.9.0 #1
[ 9890.526123] Hardware name: LENOVO 2356AD1/2356AD1, BIOS G7ETB3WW (2.73 ) 11/28/2018
[ 9890.526126] Workqueue: phy2 rtw89_core_ba_work [rtw89_core]
[ 9890.526203] RIP: 0010:ieee80211_start_tx_ba_session (net/mac80211/agg-tx.c:618 (discriminator 1)) mac80211
[ 9890.526279] Code: f7 e8 d5 93 3e ea 48 83 c4 28 89 d8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 49 8b 84 24 e0 f1 ff ff 48 8b 80 90 1b 00 00 <83> 38 03 0f 84 37 fe ff ff bb ea ff ff ff eb cc 49 8b 84 24 10 f3
All code
========
0:f7 e8 imul %eax
2:d5 (bad)
3:93 xchg %eax,%ebx
4:3e ea ds (bad)
6:48 83 c4 28 add $0x28,%rsp
a:89 d8 mov %ebx,%eax
c:5b pop %rbx
d:41 5c pop %r12
f:41 5d pop %r13
11:41 5e pop %r14
13:41 5f pop %r15
15:5d pop %rbp
16:c3 retq
17:cc int3
18:cc int3
19:cc int3
1a:cc int3
1b:49 8b 84 24 e0 f1 ff mov -0xe20(%r12),%rax
22:ff
23:48 8b 80 90 1b 00 00 mov 0x1b90(%rax),%rax
2a:*83 38 03 cmpl $0x3,(%rax)<-- trapping instruction
2d:0f 84 37 fe ff ff je 0xfffffffffffffe6a
33:bb ea ff ff ff mov $0xffffffea,%ebx
38:eb cc jmp 0x6
3a:49 rex.WB
3b:8b .byte 0x8b
3c:84 24 10 test %ah,(%rax,%rdx,1)
3f:f3 repz
Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================
0:83 38 03 cmpl $0x3,(%rax)
3:0f 84 37 fe ff ff je 0xfffffffffffffe40
9:bb ea ff ff ff mov $0xffffffea,%ebx
e:eb cc jmp 0xffffffffffffffdc
10:49 rex.WB
11:8b .byte 0x8b
12:84 24 10 test %ah,(%rax,%rdx,1)
15:f3 repz
[ 9890.526285] RSP: 0018:ffffb8db09013d68 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 9890.526291] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff9308e0d656c8
[ 9890.526295] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffab99460b RDI: ffffffffab9a7685
[ 9890.526300] RBP: ffffb8db09013db8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000873
[ 9890.526304] R10: ffff9308e0d64800 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff9308e5ff6e70
[ 9890.526308] R13: ffff930952500e20 R14: ffff9309192a8c00 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 9890.526313] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff930b4e700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 9890.526316] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 9890.526318] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000391c58005 CR4: 00000000001706f0
[ 9890.526321] Call Trace:
[ 9890.526324] <TASK>
[ 9890.526327] ? show_regs (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:479)
[ 9890.526335] ? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:421 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434)
[ 9890.526340] ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:713)
[ 9890.526347] ? search_module_extables (kernel/module/main.c:3256 (discriminator
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-43910

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: add missing check_func_arg_reg_off() to prevent out-of-bounds memory accesses
Currently, it's possible to pass in a modified CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR to
a global function as an argument. The adverse effects of this is that
BPF helpers can continue to make use of this modified
CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR from within the context of the global function,
which can unintentionally result in out-of-bounds memory accesses and
therefore compromise overall system stability i.e.
[ 244.157771] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140
[ 244.161345] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810914be68 by task test_progs/302
[ 244.167151] CPU: 0 PID: 302 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G O E 6.10.0-rc3-00131-g66b586715063 #533
[ 244.174318] Call Trace:
[ 244.175787] <TASK>
[ 244.177356] dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
[ 244.179531] print_report+0xce/0x670
[ 244.182314] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x200/0x3e0
[ 244.184908] kasan_report+0xd7/0x110
[ 244.187408] ? bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140
[ 244.189714] ? bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140
[ 244.192020] bpf_dynptr_data+0x137/0x140
[ 244.194264] bpf_prog_b02a02fdd2bdc5fa_global_call_bpf_dynptr_data+0x22/0x26
[ 244.198044] bpf_prog_b0fe7b9d7dc3abde_callback_adjust_bpf_dynptr_reg_off+0x1f/0x23
[ 244.202136] bpf_user_ringbuf_drain+0x2c7/0x570
[ 244.204744] ? 0xffffffffc0009e58
[ 244.206593] ? __pfx_bpf_user_ringbuf_drain+0x10/0x10
[ 244.209795] bpf_prog_33ab33f6a804ba2d_user_ringbuf_callback_const_ptr_to_dynptr_reg_off+0x47/0x4b
[ 244.215922] bpf_trampoline_6442502480+0x43/0xe3
[ 244.218691] __x64_sys_prlimit64+0x9/0xf0
[ 244.220912] do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0
[ 244.223043] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 244.226458] RIP: 0033:0x7ffa3eb8f059
[ 244.228582] Code: 08 89 e8 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8f 1d 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 244.241307] RSP: 002b:00007ffa3e9c6eb8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012e
[ 244.246474] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffa3e9c7cdc RCX: 00007ffa3eb8f059
[ 244.250478] RDX: 00007ffa3eb162b4 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007ffa3e9c7fb0
[ 244.255396] RBP: 00007ffa3e9c6ed0 R08: 00007ffa3e9c76c0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 244.260195] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: ffffffffffffff80
[ 244.264201] R13: 000000000000001c R14: 00007ffc5d6b4260 R15: 00007ffa3e1c7000
[ 244.268303] </TASK>
Add a check_func_arg_reg_off() to the path in which the BPF verifier
verifies the arguments of global function arguments, specifically
those which take an argument of type ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR |
MEM_RDONLY. Also, process_dynptr_func() doesn't appear to perform any
explicit and strict type matching on the supplied register type, so
let's also enforce that a register either type PTR_TO_STACK or
CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR is by the caller.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-43834

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xdp: fix invalid wait context of page_pool_destroy()
If the driver uses a page pool, it creates a page pool with
page_pool_create().
The reference count of page pool is 1 as default.
A page pool will be destroyed only when a reference count reaches 0.
page_pool_destroy() is used to destroy page pool, it decreases a
reference count.
When a page pool is destroyed, ->disconnect() is called, which is
mem_allocator_disconnect().
This function internally acquires mutex_lock().
If the driver uses XDP, it registers a memory model with
xdp_rxq_info_reg_mem_model().
The xdp_rxq_info_reg_mem_model() internally increases a page pool
reference count if a memory model is a page pool.
Now the reference count is 2.
To destroy a page pool, the driver should call both page_pool_destroy()
and xdp_unreg_mem_model().
The xdp_unreg_mem_model() internally calls page_pool_destroy().
Only page_pool_destroy() decreases a reference count.
If a driver calls page_pool_destroy() then xdp_unreg_mem_model(), we
will face an invalid wait context warning.
Because xdp_unreg_mem_model() calls page_pool_destroy() with
rcu_read_lock().
The page_pool_destroy() internally acquires mutex_lock().
Splat looks like:
=============================
[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
6.10.0-rc6+ #4 Tainted: G W
-----------------------------
ethtool/1806 is trying to lock:
ffffffff90387b90 (mem_id_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{5:5}
3 locks held by ethtool/1806:
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 1806 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc6+ #4 f916f41f172891c800f2fed
Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0
__lock_acquire+0x1681/0x4de0
? _printk+0x64/0xe0
? __pfx_mark_lock.part.0+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
lock_acquire+0x1b3/0x580
? mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
? __wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x16/0xc0
? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
? dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xc0
__mutex_lock+0x15c/0x1690
? mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
? __pfx_prb_read_valid+0x10/0x10
? mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
? __pfx_llist_add_batch+0x10/0x10
? console_unlock+0x193/0x1b0
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xbe/0x140
? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? tick_nohz_tick_stopped+0x16/0x90
? __irq_work_queue_local+0x1e5/0x330
? irq_work_queue+0x39/0x50
? __wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x79/0xc0
? mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
mem_allocator_disconnect+0x73/0x150
? __pfx_mem_allocator_disconnect+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0xa5/0xf0
? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
page_pool_release+0x36e/0x6d0
page_pool_destroy+0xd7/0x440
xdp_unreg_mem_model+0x1a7/0x2a0
? __pfx_xdp_unreg_mem_model+0x10/0x10
? kfree+0x125/0x370
? bnxt_free_ring.isra.0+0x2eb/0x500
? bnxt_free_mem+0x5ac/0x2500
xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x4a/0xd0
bnxt_free_mem+0x1356/0x2500
bnxt_close_nic+0xf0/0x3b0
? __pfx_bnxt_close_nic+0x10/0x10
? ethnl_parse_bit+0x2c6/0x6d0
? __pfx___nla_validate_parse+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_ethnl_parse_bit+0x10/0x10
bnxt_set_features+0x2a8/0x3e0
__netdev_update_features+0x4dc/0x1370
? ethnl_parse_bitset+0x4ff/0x750
? __pfx_ethnl_parse_bitset+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___netdev_update_features+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0xa5/0xf0
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x42/0x70
? __pm_runtime_resume+0x7d/0x110
ethnl_set_features+0x32d/0xa20
To fix this problem, it uses rhashtable_lookup_fast() instead of
rhashtable_lookup() with rcu_read_lock().
Using xa without rcu_read_lock() here is safe.
xa is freed by __xdp_mem_allocator_rcu_free() and this is called by
call_rcu() of mem_xa_remove().
The mem_xa_remove() is called by page_pool_destroy() if a reference
count reaches 0.
The xa is already protected by the reference count mechanism well in the
control plane.
So removing rcu_read_lock() for page_pool_destroy() is safe.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-42148

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnx2x: Fix multiple UBSAN array-index-out-of-bounds
Fix UBSAN warnings that occur when using a system with 32 physical
cpu cores or more, or when the user defines a number of Ethernet
queues greater than or equal to FP_SB_MAX_E1x using the num_queues
module parameter.
Currently there is a read/write out of bounds that occurs on the array
"struct stats_query_entry query" present inside the "bnx2x_fw_stats_req"
struct in "drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x.h".
Looking at the definition of the "struct stats_query_entry query" array:
struct stats_query_entry query[FP_SB_MAX_E1x+
BNX2X_FIRST_QUEUE_QUERY_IDX];
FP_SB_MAX_E1x is defined as the maximum number of fast path interrupts and
has a value of 16, while BNX2X_FIRST_QUEUE_QUERY_IDX has a value of 3
meaning the array has a total size of 19.
Since accesses to "struct stats_query_entry query" are offset-ted by
BNX2X_FIRST_QUEUE_QUERY_IDX, that means that the total number of Ethernet
queues should not exceed FP_SB_MAX_E1x (16). However one of these queues
is reserved for FCOE and thus the number of Ethernet queues should be set
to [FP_SB_MAX_E1x -1] (15) if FCOE is enabled or [FP_SB_MAX_E1x] (16) if
it is not.
This is also described in a comment in the source code in
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x.h just above the Macro definition
of FP_SB_MAX_E1x. Below is the part of this explanation that it important
for this patch
/*
* The total number of L2 queues, MSIX vectors and HW contexts (CIDs) is
* control by the number of fast-path status blocks supported by the
* device (HW/FW). Each fast-path status block (FP-SB) aka non-default
* status block represents an independent interrupts context that can
* serve a regular L2 networking queue. However special L2 queues such
* as the FCoE queue do not require a FP-SB and other components like
* the CNIC may consume FP-SB reducing the number of possible L2 queues
*
* If the maximum number of FP-SB available is X then:
* a. If CNIC is supported it consumes 1 FP-SB thus the max number of
* regular L2 queues is Y=X-1
* b. In MF mode the actual number of L2 queues is Y= (X-1/MF_factor)
* c. If the FCoE L2 queue is supported the actual number of L2 queues
* is Y+1
* d. The number of irqs (MSIX vectors) is either Y+1 (one extra for
* slow-path interrupts) or Y+2 if CNIC is supported (one additional
* FP interrupt context for the CNIC).
* e. The number of HW context (CID count) is always X or X+1 if FCoE
* L2 queue is supported. The cid for the FCoE L2 queue is always X.
*/
However this driver also supports NICs that use the E2 controller which can
handle more queues due to having more FP-SB represented by FP_SB_MAX_E2.
Looking at the commits when the E2 support was added, it was originally
using the E1x parameters: commit f2e0899f0f27 ("bnx2x: Add 57712 support").
Back then FP_SB_MAX_E2 was set to 16 the same as E1x. However the driver
was later updated to take full advantage of the E2 instead of having it be
limited to the capabilities of the E1x. But as far as we can tell, the
array "stats_query_entry query" was still limited to using the FP-SB
available to the E1x cards as part of an oversignt when the driver was
updated to take full advantage of the E2, and now with the driver being
aware of the greater queue size supported by E2 NICs, it causes the UBSAN
warnings seen in the stack traces below.
This patch increases the size of the "stats_query_entry query" array by
replacing FP_SB_MAX_E1x with FP_SB_MAX_E2 to be large enough to handle
both types of NICs.
Stack traces:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_stats.c:1529:11
index 20 is out of range for type 'stats_query_entry [19]'
CPU: 12 PID: 858 Comm: systemd-network Not tainted 6.9.0-060900rc7-generic
#202405052133
Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-42106

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet_diag: Initialize pad field in struct inet_diag_req_v2
KMSAN reported uninit-value access in raw_lookup() [1]. Diag for raw
sockets uses the pad field in struct inet_diag_req_v2 for the
underlying protocol. This field corresponds to the sdiag_raw_protocol
field in struct inet_diag_req_raw.
inet_diag_get_exact_compat() converts inet_diag_req to
inet_diag_req_v2, but leaves the pad field uninitialized. So the issue
occurs when raw_lookup() accesses the sdiag_raw_protocol field.
Fix this by initializing the pad field in
inet_diag_get_exact_compat(). Also, do the same fix in
inet_diag_dump_compat() to avoid the similar issue in the future.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in raw_lookup net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:49 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in raw_sock_get+0x657/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71
raw_lookup net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:49 [inline]
raw_sock_get+0x657/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71
raw_diag_dump_one+0xa1/0x660 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:99
inet_diag_cmd_exact+0x7d9/0x980
inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1404 [inline]
inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x469/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426
sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282
netlink_rcv_skb+0x537/0x670 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564
sock_diag_rcv+0x35/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:297
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xe74/0x1240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361
netlink_sendmsg+0x10c6/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x7f0/0xb70 net/socket.c:2585
___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2639
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2668 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2677 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2675 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x27e/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2675
x64_sys_call+0x135e/0x3ce0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Uninit was stored to memory at:
raw_sock_get+0x650/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71
raw_diag_dump_one+0xa1/0x660 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:99
inet_diag_cmd_exact+0x7d9/0x980
inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1404 [inline]
inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x469/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426
sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282
netlink_rcv_skb+0x537/0x670 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564
sock_diag_rcv+0x35/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:297
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xe74/0x1240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361
netlink_sendmsg+0x10c6/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x7f0/0xb70 net/socket.c:2585
___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2639
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2668 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2677 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2675 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x27e/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2675
x64_sys_call+0x135e/0x3ce0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Local variable req.i created at:
inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1396 [inline]
inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x2a6/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426
sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282
CPU: 1 PID: 8888 Comm: syz-executor.6 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc4-00217-g35bb670d65fc #32
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-41010

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix too early release of tcx_entry
Pedro Pinto and later independently also Hyunwoo Kim and Wongi Lee reported
an issue that the tcx_entry can be released too early leading to a use
after free (UAF) when an active old-style ingress or clsact qdisc with a
shared tc block is later replaced by another ingress or clsact instance.
Essentially, the sequence to trigger the UAF (one example) can be as follows:
1. A network namespace is created
2. An ingress qdisc is created. This allocates a tcx_entry, and
&tcx_entry->miniq is stored in the qdisc's miniqp->p_miniq. At the
same time, a tcf block with index 1 is created.
3. chain0 is attached to the tcf block. chain0 must be connected to
the block linked to the ingress qdisc to later reach the function
tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del() which triggers the UAF.
4. Create and graft a clsact qdisc. This causes the ingress qdisc
created in step 1 to be removed, thus freeing the previously linked
tcx_entry:
rtnetlink_rcv_msg()
=> tc_modify_qdisc()
=> qdisc_create()
=> clsact_init() [a]
=> qdisc_graft()
=> qdisc_destroy()
=> __qdisc_destroy()
=> ingress_destroy() [b]
=> tcx_entry_free()
=> kfree_rcu() // tcx_entry freed
5. Finally, the network namespace is closed. This registers the
cleanup_net worker, and during the process of releasing the
remaining clsact qdisc, it accesses the tcx_entry that was
already freed in step 4, causing the UAF to occur:
cleanup_net()
=> ops_exit_list()
=> default_device_exit_batch()
=> unregister_netdevice_many()
=> unregister_netdevice_many_notify()
=> dev_shutdown()
=> qdisc_put()
=> clsact_destroy() [c]
=> tcf_block_put_ext()
=> tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del()
=> tcf_chain_head_change_item()
=> clsact_chain_head_change()
=> mini_qdisc_pair_swap() // UAF
There are also other variants, the gist is to add an ingress (or clsact)
qdisc with a specific shared block, then to replace that qdisc, waiting
for the tcx_entry kfree_rcu() to be executed and subsequently accessing
the current active qdisc's miniq one way or another.
The correct fix is to turn the miniq_active boolean into a counter. What
can be observed, at step 2 above, the counter transitions from 0->1, at
step [a] from 1->2 (in order for the miniq object to remain active during
the replacement), then in [b] from 2->1 and finally [c] 1->0 with the
eventual release. The reference counter in general ranges from [0,2] and
it does not need to be atomic since all access to the counter is protected
by the rtnl mutex. With this in place, there is no longer a UAF happening
and the tcx_entry is freed at the correct time.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-40923

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vmxnet3: disable rx data ring on dma allocation failure
When vmxnet3_rq_create() fails to allocate memory for rq->data_ring.base,
the subsequent call to vmxnet3_rq_destroy_all_rxdataring does not reset
rq->data_ring.desc_size for the data ring that failed, which presumably
causes the hypervisor to reference it on packet reception.
To fix this bug, rq->data_ring.desc_size needs to be set to 0 to tell
the hypervisor to disable this feature.
[ 95.436876] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:207!
[ 95.439074] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 95.440411] CPU: 7 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Not tainted 6.9.3-dirty #1
[ 95.441558] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual
Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 12/12/2018
[ 95.443481] RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x4d/0x4f
[ 95.444404] Code: 4f 70 50 8b 87 c0 00 00 00 50 8b 87 bc 00 00 00 50
ff b7 d0 00 00 00 4c 8b 8f c8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 68 e8 be 9f e8 63 58 f9
ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 14 24 48 c7 c1 d0 73 65 9f e8 a1 ff ff ff 48 8b 14 24
[ 95.447684] RSP: 0018:ffffa13340274dd0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 95.448762] RAX: 0000000000000089 RBX: ffff8fbbc72b02d0 RCX: 000000000000083f
[ 95.450148] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000000f6 RDI: 000000000000083f
[ 95.451520] RBP: 000000000000002d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffa13340274c60
[ 95.452886] R10: ffffffffa04ed468 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 95.454293] R13: ffff8fbbdab3c2d0 R14: ffff8fbbdbd829e0 R15: ffff8fbbdbd809e0
[ 95.455682] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8fbeefd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 95.457178] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 95.458340] CR2: 00007fd0d1f650c8 CR3: 0000000115f28000 CR4: 00000000000406f0
[ 95.459791] Call Trace:
[ 95.460515] <IRQ>
[ 95.461180] ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
[ 95.462150] ? die+0x2e/0x50
[ 95.462976] ? do_trap+0xca/0x110
[ 95.463973] ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90
[ 95.464966] ? skb_panic+0x4d/0x4f
[ 95.465901] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70
[ 95.466849] ? skb_panic+0x4d/0x4f
[ 95.467718] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 95.468758] ? skb_panic+0x4d/0x4f
[ 95.469655] skb_put.cold+0x10/0x10
[ 95.470573] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete+0x862/0x11e0 [vmxnet3]
[ 95.471853] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only+0x36/0xb0 [vmxnet3]
[ 95.473185] __napi_poll+0x2b/0x160
[ 95.474145] net_rx_action+0x2c6/0x3b0
[ 95.475115] handle_softirqs+0xe7/0x2a0
[ 95.476122] __irq_exit_rcu+0x97/0xb0
[ 95.477109] common_interrupt+0x85/0xa0
[ 95.478102] </IRQ>
[ 95.478846] <TASK>
[ 95.479603] asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40
[ 95.480657] RIP: 0010:pv_native_safe_halt+0xf/0x20
[ 95.481801] Code: 22 d7 e9 54 87 01 00 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa eb 07 0f 00 2d 93 ba 3b 00 fb f4 <e9> 2c 87 01 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90
[ 95.485563] RSP: 0018:ffffa133400ffe58 EFLAGS: 00000246
[ 95.486882] RAX: 0000000000004000 RBX: ffff8fbbc1d14064 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 95.488477] RDX: ffff8fbeefd80000 RSI: ffff8fbbc1d14000 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 95.490067] RBP: ffff8fbbc1d14064 R08: ffffffffa0652260 R09: 00000000000010d3
[ 95.491683] R10: 0000000000000018 R11: ffff8fbeefdb4764 R12: ffffffffa0652260
[ 95.493389] R13: ffffffffa06522e0 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 95.495035] acpi_safe_halt+0x14/0x20
[ 95.496127] acpi_idle_do_entry+0x2f/0x50
[ 95.497221] acpi_idle_enter+0x7f/0xd0
[ 95.498272] cpuidle_enter_state+0x81/0x420
[ 95.499375] cpuidle_enter+0x2d/0x40
[ 95.500400] do_idle+0x1e5/0x240
[ 95.501385] cpu_startup_entry+0x29/0x30
[ 95.502422] start_secondary+0x11c/0x140
[ 95.503454] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
[ 95.504466] </TASK>
[ 95.505197] Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4
nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6
nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ip
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-40906

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Always stop health timer during driver removal
Currently, if teardown_hca fails to execute during driver removal, mlx5
does not stop the health timer. Afterwards, mlx5 continue with driver
teardown. This may lead to a UAF bug, which results in page fault
Oops[1], since the health timer invokes after resources were freed.
Hence, stop the health monitor even if teardown_hca fails.
[1]
mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: E-Switch: Unload vfs: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0)
mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: E-Switch: Disable: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0)
mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: E-Switch: Disable: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0)
mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: E-Switch: cleanup
mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: wait_func:1155:(pid 1967079): TEARDOWN_HCA(0x103) timeout. Will cause a leak of a command resource
mlx5_core 0000:18:00.0: mlx5_function_close:1288:(pid 1967079): tear_down_hca failed, skip cleanup
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa26487064230
PGD 100c00067 P4D 100c00067 PUD 100e5a067 PMD 105ed7067 PTE 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G OE ------- --- 6.7.0-68.fc38.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0013.121520200651 12/15/2020
RIP: 0010:ioread32be+0x34/0x60
RSP: 0018:ffffa26480003e58 EFLAGS: 00010292
RAX: ffffa26487064200 RBX: ffff9042d08161a0 RCX: ffff904c108222c0
RDX: 000000010bbf1b80 RSI: ffffffffc055ddb0 RDI: ffffa26487064230
RBP: ffff9042d08161a0 R08: 0000000000000022 R09: ffff904c108222e8
R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000441 R12: ffffffffc055ddb0
R13: ffffa26487064200 R14: ffffa26480003f00 R15: ffff904c108222c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff904c10800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffa26487064230 CR3: 00000002c4420006 CR4: 00000000007706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? __die+0x23/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0
? exc_page_fault+0x175/0x180
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core]
? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core]
? ioread32be+0x34/0x60
mlx5_health_check_fatal_sensors+0x20/0x100 [mlx5_core]
? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core]
poll_health+0x42/0x230 [mlx5_core]
? __next_timer_interrupt+0xbc/0x110
? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core]
call_timer_fn+0x21/0x130
? __pfx_poll_health+0x10/0x10 [mlx5_core]
__run_timers+0x222/0x2c0
run_timer_softirq+0x1d/0x40
__do_softirq+0xc9/0x2c8
__irq_exit_rcu+0xa6/0xc0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x90
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xcc/0x440
? cpuidle_enter_state+0xbd/0x440
cpuidle_enter+0x2d/0x40
do_idle+0x20d/0x270
cpu_startup_entry+0x2a/0x30
rest_init+0xd0/0xd0
arch_call_rest_init+0xe/0x30
start_kernel+0x709/0xa90
x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30
x86_64_start_kernel+0x96/0xa0
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x18f/0x19b
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-39500

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sock_map: avoid race between sock_map_close and sk_psock_put
sk_psock_get will return NULL if the refcount of psock has gone to 0, which
will happen when the last call of sk_psock_put is done. However,
sk_psock_drop may not have finished yet, so the close callback will still
point to sock_map_close despite psock being NULL.
This can be reproduced with a thread deleting an element from the sock map,
while the second one creates a socket, adds it to the map and closes it.
That will trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7220 at net/core/sock_map.c:1701 sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 7220 Comm: syz-executor380 Not tainted 6.9.0-syzkaller-07726-g3c999d1ae3c7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
RIP: 0010:sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701
Code: df e8 92 29 88 f8 48 8b 1b 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 79 29 88 f8 4c 8b 23 eb 89 e8 4f 15 23 f8 90 <0f> 0b 90 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 13 26 3d 02
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000441fda8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff89731ae1 RBX: ffffffff94b87540 RCX: ffff888029470000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8bcab5c0 RDI: ffffffff8c1faba0
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff92f9b61f R09: 1ffffffff25f36c3
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff25f36c4 R12: ffffffff89731840
R13: ffff88804b587000 R14: ffff88804b587000 R15: ffffffff89731870
FS: 000055555e080380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000207d4000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
unix_release+0x87/0xc0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048
__sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
sock_close+0xbe/0x240 net/socket.c:1421
__fput+0x42b/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422
__do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline]
__se_sys_close fs/open.c:1541 [inline]
__x64_sys_close+0x7f/0x110 fs/open.c:1541
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fb37d618070
Code: 00 00 48 c7 c2 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb d4 e8 10 2c 00 00 80 3d 31 f0 07 00 00 74 17 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 48 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c
RSP: 002b:00007ffcd4a525d8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007fb37d618070
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000100000000 R09: 0000000100000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Use sk_psock, which will only check that the pointer is not been set to
NULL yet, which should only happen after the callbacks are restored. If,
then, a reference can still be gotten, we may call sk_psock_stop and cancel
psock->work.
As suggested by Paolo Abeni, reorder the condition so the control flow is
less convoluted.
After that change, the reproducer does not trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE
anymore.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-39488

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: asm-bug: Add .align 2 to the end of __BUG_ENTRY
When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, we fail to add necessary padding bytes
to bug_table entries, and as a result the last entry in a bug table will
be ignored, potentially leading to an unexpected panic(). All prior
entries in the table will be handled correctly.
The arm64 ABI requires that struct fields of up to 8 bytes are
naturally-aligned, with padding added within a struct such that struct
are suitably aligned within arrays.
When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERPOSE=y, the layout of a bug_entry is:
struct bug_entry {
signed int bug_addr_disp;// 4 bytes
signed int file_disp;// 4 bytes
unsigned short line;// 2 bytes
unsigned short flags;// 2 bytes
}
... with 12 bytes total, requiring 4-byte alignment.
When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the layout of a bug_entry is:
struct bug_entry {
signed int bug_addr_disp;// 4 bytes
unsigned short flags;// 2 bytes
< implicit padding >// 2 bytes
}
... with 8 bytes total, with 6 bytes of data and 2 bytes of trailing
padding, requiring 4-byte alginment.
When we create a bug_entry in assembly, we align the start of the entry
to 4 bytes, which implicitly handles padding for any prior entries.
However, we do not align the end of the entry, and so when
CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the final entry lacks the trailing padding
bytes.
For the main kernel image this is not a problem as find_bug() doesn't
depend on the trailing padding bytes when searching for entries:
for (bug = __start___bug_table; bug < __stop___bug_table; ++bug)
if (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))
return bug;
However for modules, module_bug_finalize() depends on the trailing
bytes when calculating the number of entries:
mod->num_bugs = sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry);
... and as the last bug_entry lacks the necessary padding bytes, this entry
will not be counted, e.g. in the case of a single entry:
sechdrs[i].sh_size == 6
sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 8;
sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 0;
Consequently module_find_bug() will miss the last bug_entry when it does:
for (i = 0; i < mod->num_bugs; ++i, ++bug)
if (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))
goto out;
... which can lead to a kenrel panic due to an unhandled bug.
This can be demonstrated with the following module:
static int __init buginit(void)
{
WARN(1, "hello\n");
return 0;
}
static void __exit bugexit(void)
{
}
module_init(buginit);
module_exit(bugexit);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
... which will trigger a kernel panic when loaded:
------------[ cut here ]------------
hello
Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
Internal error: BRK handler: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: hello(O+)
CPU: 0 PID: 50 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 6.9.1 #8
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
lr : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
sp : ffff800080533ae0
x29: ffff800080533ae0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffffaba8c4e70510 x25: ffff800080533c30 x24: ffffaba8c4a28a58
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff3947c0eab3c0
x20: ffffaba8c4e3f000 x19: ffffaba846464000 x18: 0000000000000006
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffaba8c2492834 x15: 0720072007200720
x14: 0720072007200720 x13: ffffaba8c49b27c8 x12: 0000000000000312
x11: 0000000000000106 x10: ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x9 : ffffaba8c49b27c8
x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x6 : 80000000fffff000
x5 : 0000000000000107 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff3947c0eab3c0
Call trace:
buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
do_one_initcall+0x80/0x1c8
do_init_module+0x60/0x218
load_module+0x1ba4/0x1d70
__do_sys_init_module+0x198/0x1d0
__arm64_sys_init_module+0x1c/0x28
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
el0_svc
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-36884

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/arm-smmu: Use the correct type in nvidia_smmu_context_fault()
This was missed because of the function pointer indirection.
nvidia_smmu_context_fault() is also installed as a irq function, and the
'void *' was changed to a struct arm_smmu_domain. Since the iommu_domain
is embedded at a non-zero offset this causes nvidia_smmu_context_fault()
to miscompute the offset. Fixup the types.
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000120
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000004
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000107c9f000
[0000000000000120] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 47 Comm: kworker/u25:0 Not tainted 6.9.0-0.rc7.58.eln136.aarch64 #1
Hardware name: Unknown NVIDIA Jetson Orin NX/NVIDIA Jetson Orin NX, BIOS 3.1-32827747 03/19/2023
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
pstate: 604000c9 (nZCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : nvidia_smmu_context_fault+0x1c/0x158
lr : __free_irq+0x1d4/0x2e8
sp : ffff80008044b6f0
x29: ffff80008044b6f0 x28: ffff000080a60b18 x27: ffffd32b5172e970
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0000802f5aac x24: ffff0000802f5a30
x23: ffff0000802f5b60 x22: 0000000000000057 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: ffff0000802f5a00 x19: ffff000087d4cd80 x18: ffffffffffffffff
x17: 6234362066666666 x16: 6630303078302d30 x15: ffff00008156d888
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff0000801db910 x12: ffff00008156d6d0
x11: 0000000000000003 x10: ffff0000801db918 x9 : ffffd32b50f94d9c
x8 : 1fffe0001032fda1 x7 : ffff00008197ed00 x6 : 000000000000000f
x5 : 000000000000010e x4 : 000000000000010e x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : ffffd32b51720cd8 x1 : ffff000087e6f700 x0 : 0000000000000057
Call trace:
nvidia_smmu_context_fault+0x1c/0x158
__free_irq+0x1d4/0x2e8
free_irq+0x3c/0x80
devm_free_irq+0x64/0xa8
arm_smmu_domain_free+0xc4/0x158
iommu_domain_free+0x44/0xa0
iommu_deinit_device+0xd0/0xf8
__iommu_group_remove_device+0xcc/0xe0
iommu_bus_notifier+0x64/0xa8
notifier_call_chain+0x78/0x148
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x90
bus_notify+0x44/0x70
device_del+0x264/0x3e8
pci_remove_bus_device+0x84/0x120
pci_remove_root_bus+0x5c/0xc0
dw_pcie_host_deinit+0x38/0xe0
tegra_pcie_config_rp+0xc0/0x1f0
tegra_pcie_dw_probe+0x34c/0x700
platform_probe+0x70/0xe8
really_probe+0xc8/0x3a0
__driver_probe_device+0x84/0x160
driver_probe_device+0x44/0x130
__device_attach_driver+0xc4/0x170
bus_for_each_drv+0x90/0x100
__device_attach+0xa8/0x1c8
device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x30
bus_probe_device+0xb0/0xc0
deferred_probe_work_func+0xbc/0x120
process_one_work+0x194/0x490
worker_thread+0x284/0x3b0
kthread+0xf4/0x108
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Code: a9b97bfd 910003fd a9025bf5 f85a0035 (b94122a1)

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-36882

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: use memalloc_nofs_save() in page_cache_ra_order()
See commit f2c817bed58d ("mm: use memalloc_nofs_save in readahead path"),
ensure that page_cache_ra_order() do not attempt to reclaim file-backed
pages too, or it leads to a deadlock, found issue when test ext4 large
folio.
INFO: task DataXceiver for:7494 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:DataXceiver for state:D stack:0 pid:7494 ppid:1 flags:0x00000200
Call trace:
__switch_to+0x14c/0x240
__schedule+0x82c/0xdd0
schedule+0x58/0xf0
io_schedule+0x24/0xa0
__folio_lock+0x130/0x300
migrate_pages_batch+0x378/0x918
migrate_pages+0x350/0x700
compact_zone+0x63c/0xb38
compact_zone_order+0xc0/0x118
try_to_compact_pages+0xb0/0x280
__alloc_pages_direct_compact+0x98/0x248
__alloc_pages+0x510/0x1110
alloc_pages+0x9c/0x130
folio_alloc+0x20/0x78
filemap_alloc_folio+0x8c/0x1b0
page_cache_ra_order+0x174/0x308
ondemand_readahead+0x1c8/0x2b8
page_cache_async_ra+0x68/0xb8
filemap_readahead.isra.0+0x64/0xa8
filemap_get_pages+0x3fc/0x5b0
filemap_splice_read+0xf4/0x280
ext4_file_splice_read+0x2c/0x48 [ext4]
vfs_splice_read.part.0+0xa8/0x118
splice_direct_to_actor+0xbc/0x288
do_splice_direct+0x9c/0x108
do_sendfile+0x328/0x468
__arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x8c/0x148
invoke_syscall+0x4c/0x118
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
el0_svc+0x4c/0x1f8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8
el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-36013

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix slab-use-after-free in l2cap_connect()
Extend a critical section to prevent chan from early freeing.
Also make the l2cap_connect() return type void. Nothing is using the
returned value but it is ugly to return a potentially freed pointer.
Making it void will help with backports because earlier kernels did use
the return value. Now the compile will break for kernels where this
patch is not a complete fix.
Call stack summary:
[use]
l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd
l2cap_connect
┌ mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock);
│ chan = pchan->ops->new_connection(pchan); <- alloc chan
│ __l2cap_chan_add(conn, chan);
│ l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
│ list_add(&chan->list, &conn->chan_l); ... (1)
└ mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock);
chan->conf_state ... (4) <- use after free
[free]
l2cap_conn_del
┌ mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock);
│ foreach chan in conn->chan_l: ... (2)
│ l2cap_chan_put(chan);
│ l2cap_chan_destroy
│ kfree(chan) ... (3) <- chan freed
└ mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock);
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read
include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _test_bit
include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in l2cap_connect+0xa67/0x11a0
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4260
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810bf040a0 by task kworker/u3:1/311

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35957

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Fix WARN_ON in iommu probe path
Commit 1a75cc710b95 ("iommu/vt-d: Use rbtree to track iommu probed
devices") adds all devices probed by the iommu driver in a rbtree
indexed by the source ID of each device. It assumes that each device
has a unique source ID. This assumption is incorrect and the VT-d
spec doesn't state this requirement either.
The reason for using a rbtree to track devices is to look up the device
with PCI bus and devfunc in the paths of handling ATS invalidation time
out error and the PRI I/O page faults. Both are PCI ATS feature related.
Only track the devices that have PCI ATS capabilities in the rbtree to
avoid unnecessary WARN_ON in the iommu probe path. Otherwise, on some
platforms below kernel splat will be displayed and the iommu probe results
in failure.
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 166 at drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c:158 intel_iommu_probe_device+0x319/0xd90
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x7e/0x180
? intel_iommu_probe_device+0x319/0xd90
? report_bug+0x1f8/0x200
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? intel_iommu_probe_device+0x319/0xd90
? debug_mutex_init+0x37/0x50
__iommu_probe_device+0xf2/0x4f0
iommu_probe_device+0x22/0x70
iommu_bus_notifier+0x1e/0x40
notifier_call_chain+0x46/0x150
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x42/0x60
bus_notify+0x2f/0x50
device_add+0x5ed/0x7e0
platform_device_add+0xf5/0x240
mfd_add_devices+0x3f9/0x500
? preempt_count_add+0x4c/0xa0
? up_write+0xa2/0x1b0
? __debugfs_create_file+0xe3/0x150
intel_lpss_probe+0x49f/0x5b0
? pci_conf1_write+0xa3/0xf0
intel_lpss_pci_probe+0xcf/0x110 [intel_lpss_pci]
pci_device_probe+0x95/0x120
really_probe+0xd9/0x370
? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
__driver_probe_device+0x73/0x150
driver_probe_device+0x19/0xa0
__driver_attach+0xb6/0x180
? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
bus_for_each_dev+0x77/0xd0
bus_add_driver+0x114/0x210
driver_register+0x5b/0x110
? __pfx_intel_lpss_pci_driver_init+0x10/0x10 [intel_lpss_pci]
do_one_initcall+0x57/0x2b0
? kmalloc_trace+0x21e/0x280
? do_init_module+0x1e/0x210
do_init_module+0x5f/0x210
load_module+0x1d37/0x1fc0
? init_module_from_file+0x86/0xd0
init_module_from_file+0x86/0xd0
idempotent_init_module+0x17c/0x230
__x64_sys_finit_module+0x56/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35929

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rcu/nocb: Fix WARN_ON_ONCE() in the rcu_nocb_bypass_lock()
For the kernels built with CONFIG_RCU_NOCB_CPU_DEFAULT_ALL=y and
CONFIG_RCU_LAZY=y, the following scenarios will trigger WARN_ON_ONCE()
in the rcu_nocb_bypass_lock() and rcu_nocb_wait_contended() functions:
CPU2 CPU11
kthread
rcu_nocb_cb_kthread ksys_write
rcu_do_batch vfs_write
rcu_torture_timer_cb proc_sys_write
__kmem_cache_free proc_sys_call_handler
kmemleak_free drop_caches_sysctl_handler
delete_object_full drop_slab
__delete_object shrink_slab
put_object lazy_rcu_shrink_scan
call_rcu rcu_nocb_flush_bypass
__call_rcu_commn rcu_nocb_bypass_lock
raw_spin_trylock(&rdp->nocb_bypass_lock) fail
atomic_inc(&rdp->nocb_lock_contended);
rcu_nocb_wait_contended WARN_ON_ONCE(smp_processor_id() != rdp->cpu);
WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&rdp->nocb_lock_contended)) |
|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _same rdp and rdp->cpu != 11_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __|
Reproduce this bug with "echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches".
This commit therefore uses rcu_nocb_try_flush_bypass() instead of
rcu_nocb_flush_bypass() in lazy_rcu_shrink_scan(). If the nocb_bypass
queue is being flushed, then rcu_nocb_try_flush_bypass will return
directly.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35803

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/efistub: Call mixed mode boot services on the firmware's stack
Normally, the EFI stub calls into the EFI boot services using the stack
that was live when the stub was entered. According to the UEFI spec,
this stack needs to be at least 128k in size - this might seem large but
all asynchronous processing and event handling in EFI runs from the same
stack and so quite a lot of space may be used in practice.
In mixed mode, the situation is a bit different: the bootloader calls
the 32-bit EFI stub entry point, which calls the decompressor's 32-bit
entry point, where the boot stack is set up, using a fixed allocation
of 16k. This stack is still in use when the EFI stub is started in
64-bit mode, and so all calls back into the EFI firmware will be using
the decompressor's limited boot stack.
Due to the placement of the boot stack right after the boot heap, any
stack overruns have gone unnoticed. However, commit
5c4feadb0011983b ("x86/decompressor: Move global symbol references to C code")
moved the definition of the boot heap into C code, and now the boot
stack is placed right at the base of BSS, where any overruns will
corrupt the end of the .data section.
While it would be possible to work around this by increasing the size of
the boot stack, doing so would affect all x86 systems, and mixed mode
systems are a tiny (and shrinking) fraction of the x86 installed base.
So instead, record the firmware stack pointer value when entering from
the 32-bit firmware, and switch to this stack every time a EFI boot
service call is made.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26902

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: RISCV: Fix panic on pmu overflow handler
(1 << idx) of int is not desired when setting bits in unsigned long
overflowed_ctrs, use BIT() instead. This panic happens when running
'perf record -e branches' on sophgo sg2042.
[ 273.311852] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000098
[ 273.320851] Oops [#1]
[ 273.323179] Modules linked in:
[ 273.326303] CPU: 0 PID: 1475 Comm: perf Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3+ #9
[ 273.332521] Hardware name: Sophgo Mango (DT)
[ 273.336878] epc : riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask+0x8/0x62
[ 273.342291] ra : pmu_sbi_ovf_handler+0x2e0/0x34e
[ 273.347091] epc : ffffffff80aecd98 ra : ffffffff80aee056 sp : fffffff6e36928b0
[ 273.354454] gp : ffffffff821f82d0 tp : ffffffd90c353200 t0 : 0000002ade4f9978
[ 273.361815] t1 : 0000000000504d55 t2 : ffffffff8016cd8c s0 : fffffff6e3692a70
[ 273.369180] s1 : 0000000000000020 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : 00001a8e81800000
[ 273.376540] a2 : 0000003c00070198 a3 : 0000003c00db75a4 a4 : 0000000000000015
[ 273.383901] a5 : ffffffd7ff8804b0 a6 : 0000000000000015 a7 : 000000000000002a
[ 273.391327] s2 : 000000000000ffff s3 : 0000000000000000 s4 : ffffffd7ff8803b0
[ 273.398773] s5 : 0000000000504d55 s6 : ffffffd905069800 s7 : ffffffff821fe210
[ 273.406139] s8 : 000000007fffffff s9 : ffffffd7ff8803b0 s10: ffffffd903f29098
[ 273.413660] s11: 0000000080000000 t3 : 0000000000000003 t4 : ffffffff8017a0ca
[ 273.421022] t5 : ffffffff8023cfc2 t6 : ffffffd9040780e8
[ 273.426437] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000098 cause: 000000000000000d
[ 273.434512] [<ffffffff80aecd98>] riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask+0x8/0x62
[ 273.441169] [<ffffffff80076bd8>] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x98/0x1ee
[ 273.447562] [<ffffffff80071158>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x28/0x36
[ 273.454151] [<ffffffff8047a99a>] riscv_intc_irq+0x36/0x4e
[ 273.459659] [<ffffffff80c944de>] handle_riscv_irq+0x4a/0x74
[ 273.465442] [<ffffffff80c94c48>] do_irq+0x62/0x92
[ 273.470360] Code: 0420 60a2 6402 5529 0141 8082 0013 0000 0013 0000 (6d5c) b783
[ 273.477921] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 273.482630] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26688

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs,hugetlb: fix NULL pointer dereference in hugetlbs_fill_super
When configuring a hugetlb filesystem via the fsconfig() syscall, there is
a possible NULL dereference in hugetlbfs_fill_super() caused by assigning
NULL to ctx->hstate in hugetlbfs_parse_param() when the requested pagesize
is non valid.
E.g: Taking the following steps:
fd = fsopen("hugetlbfs", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC);
fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "pagesize", "1024", 0);
fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0);
Given that the requested "pagesize" is invalid, ctxt->hstate will be replaced
with NULL, losing its previous value, and we will print an error:
...
...
case Opt_pagesize:
ps = memparse(param->string, &rest);
ctx->hstate = h;
if (!ctx->hstate) {
pr_err("Unsupported page size %lu MB\n", ps / SZ_1M);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
...
...
This is a problem because later on, we will dereference ctxt->hstate in
hugetlbfs_fill_super()
...
...
sb->s_blocksize = huge_page_size(ctx->hstate);
...
...
Causing below Oops.
Fix this by replacing cxt->hstate value only when then pagesize is known
to be valid.
kernel: hugetlbfs: Unsupported page size 0 MB
kernel: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
kernel: #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
kernel: #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
kernel: PGD 800000010f66c067 P4D 800000010f66c067 PUD 1b22f8067 PMD 0
kernel: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
kernel: CPU: 4 PID: 5659 Comm: syscall Tainted: G E 6.8.0-rc2-default+ #22 5a47c3fef76212addcc6eb71344aabc35190ae8f
kernel: Hardware name: Intel Corp. GROVEPORT/GROVEPORT, BIOS GVPRCRB1.86B.0016.D04.1705030402 05/03/2017
kernel: RIP: 0010:hugetlbfs_fill_super+0xb4/0x1a0
kernel: Code: 48 8b 3b e8 3e c6 ed ff 48 85 c0 48 89 45 20 0f 84 d6 00 00 00 48 b8 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 7f 4c 89 e7 49 89 44 24 20 48 8b 03 <8b> 48 28 b8 00 10 00 00 48 d3 e0 49 89 44 24 18 48 8b 03 8b 40 28
kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffbe9960fcbd48 EFLAGS: 00010246
kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9af5272ae780 RCX: 0000000000372004
kernel: RDX: ffffffffffffffff RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: ffff9af555e9b000
kernel: RBP: ffff9af52ee66b00 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 0000000000370004
kernel: R10: ffffbe9960fcbd48 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff9af555e9b000
kernel: R13: ffffffffa66b86c0 R14: ffff9af507d2f400 R15: ffff9af507d2f400
kernel: FS: 00007ffbc0ba4740(0000) GS:ffff9b0bd7000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
kernel: CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 00000001b1ee0000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: <TASK>
kernel: ? __die_body+0x1a/0x60
kernel: ? page_fault_oops+0x16f/0x4a0
kernel: ? search_bpf_extables+0x65/0x70
kernel: ? fixup_exception+0x22/0x310
kernel: ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x150
kernel: ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
kernel: ? __pfx_hugetlbfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10
kernel: ? hugetlbfs_fill_super+0xb4/0x1a0
kernel: ? hugetlbfs_fill_super+0x28/0x1a0
kernel: ? __pfx_hugetlbfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10
kernel: vfs_get_super+0x40/0xa0
kernel: ? __pfx_bpf_lsm_capable+0x10/0x10
kernel: vfs_get_tree+0x25/0xd0
kernel: vfs_cmd_create+0x64/0xe0
kernel: __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x395/0x410
kernel: do_syscall_64+0x80/0x160
kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x82/0x240
kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x160
kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x82/0x240
kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x160
kernel: ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x150
kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7ffbc0cb87c9
kernel: Code: 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 97 96 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
kernel: RSP: 002b:00007ffc29d2f388 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001af
kernel: RAX: fffffffffff
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-53026

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: Fix ib block iterator counter overflow
When registering a new DMA MR after selecting the best aligned page size
for it, we iterate over the given sglist to split each entry to smaller,
aligned to the selected page size, DMA blocks.
In given circumstances where the sg entry and page size fit certain
sizes and the sg entry is not aligned to the selected page size, the
total size of the aligned pages we need to cover the sg entry is >= 4GB.
Under this circumstances, while iterating page aligned blocks, the
counter responsible for counting how much we advanced from the start of
the sg entry is overflowed because its type is u32 and we pass 4GB in
size. This can lead to an infinite loop inside the iterator function
because the overflow prevents the counter to be larger
than the size of the sg entry.
Fix the presented problem by changing the advancement condition to
eliminate overflow.
Backtrace:
[ 192.374329] efa_reg_user_mr_dmabuf
[ 192.376783] efa_register_mr
[ 192.382579] pgsz_bitmap 0xfffff000 rounddown 0x80000000
[ 192.386423] pg_sz [0x80000000] umem_length[0xc0000000]
[ 192.392657] start 0x0 length 0xc0000000 params.page_shift 31 params.page_num 3
[ 192.399559] hp_cnt[3], pages_in_hp[524288]
[ 192.403690] umem->sgt_append.sgt.nents[1]
[ 192.407905] number entries: [1], pg_bit: [31]
[ 192.411397] biter->__sg_nents [1] biter->__sg [0000000008b0c5d8]
[ 192.415601] biter->__sg_advance [665837568] sg_dma_len[3221225472]
[ 192.419823] biter->__sg_nents [1] biter->__sg [0000000008b0c5d8]
[ 192.423976] biter->__sg_advance [2813321216] sg_dma_len[3221225472]
[ 192.428243] biter->__sg_nents [1] biter->__sg [0000000008b0c5d8]
[ 192.432397] biter->__sg_advance [665837568] sg_dma_len[3221225472]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-53024

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation
To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to
insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation") inserts lfence
instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a
pointer to the stack.
However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first
initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then
overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because
the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write
may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a
speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the
program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using,
for example, a branch-based cache side channel.
To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot
that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills
are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance
impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small.
The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit
and the mitigation:
[...]
// r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input)
// r7 = accessible ptr for side channel
// r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked
//
r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb
*(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked
// lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack.
//
// Ommitted: Dummy bpf_ringbuf_output() here to train alias predictor
// for no r9-r10 dependency.
//
*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r6 // fp[-8] = scalar, overwrites ptr
// 2039f26f3aca: no lfence added because stack slot was not STACK_INVALID,
// store may be subject to SSB
//
// fix: also add an lfence when the slot contained a ptr
//
r8 = *(u64 *)(r9 - 8)
// r8 = architecturally a scalar, speculatively a ptr
//
// leak ptr using branch-based cache side channel:
r8 &= 1 // choose bit to leak
if r8 == 0 goto SLOW // no mispredict
// architecturally dead code if input r6 is 0,
// only executes speculatively iff ptr bit is 1
r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0) # encode bit in cache (0: slow, 1: fast)
SLOW:
[...]
After running this, the program can time the access to *(r7 + 0) to
determine whether the chosen pointer bit was 0 or 1. Repeat this 64
times to recover the whole address on amd64.
In summary, sanitization can only be skipped if one scalar is
overwritten with another scalar. Scalar-confusion due to speculative
store bypass can not lead to invalid accesses because the pointer
bounds deducted during verification are enforced using branchless
logic. See 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on
pointer arithmetic") for details.
Do not make the mitigation depend on !env->allow_{uninit_stack,ptr_leaks}
because speculative leaks are likely unexpected if these were enabled.
For example, leaking the address to a protected log file may be acceptable
while disabling the mitigation might unintentionally leak the address
into the cached-state of a map that is accessible to unprivileged
processes.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-53021

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_taprio: fix possible use-after-free
syzbot reported a nasty crash [1] in net_tx_action() which
made little sense until we got a repro.
This repro installs a taprio qdisc, but providing an
invalid TCA_RATE attribute.
qdisc_create() has to destroy the just initialized
taprio qdisc, and taprio_destroy() is called.
However, the hrtimer used by taprio had already fired,
therefore advance_sched() called __netif_schedule().
Then net_tx_action was trying to use a destroyed qdisc.
We can not undo the __netif_schedule(), so we must wait
until one cpu serviced the qdisc before we can proceed.
Many thanks to Alexander Potapenko for his help.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in queued_spin_trylock include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:94 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in do_raw_spin_trylock include/linux/spinlock.h:191 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __raw_spin_trylock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:89 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in _raw_spin_trylock+0x92/0xa0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:138
queued_spin_trylock include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:94 [inline]
do_raw_spin_trylock include/linux/spinlock.h:191 [inline]
__raw_spin_trylock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:89 [inline]
_raw_spin_trylock+0x92/0xa0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:138
spin_trylock include/linux/spinlock.h:359 [inline]
qdisc_run_begin include/net/sch_generic.h:187 [inline]
qdisc_run+0xee/0x540 include/net/pkt_sched.h:125
net_tx_action+0x77c/0x9a0 net/core/dev.c:5086
__do_softirq+0x1cc/0x7fb kernel/softirq.c:571
run_ksoftirqd+0x2c/0x50 kernel/softirq.c:934
smpboot_thread_fn+0x554/0x9f0 kernel/smpboot.c:164
kthread+0x31b/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:732 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3258 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x814/0x1250 mm/slub.c:4970
kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:358 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x346/0xcf0 net/core/skbuff.c:430
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1257 [inline]
nlmsg_new include/net/netlink.h:953 [inline]
netlink_ack+0x5f3/0x12b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2436
netlink_rcv_skb+0x55d/0x6c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2507
rtnetlink_rcv+0x30/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6108
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xf3b/0x1270 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
netlink_sendmsg+0x1288/0x1440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0xabc/0xe90 net/socket.c:2482
___sys_sendmsg+0x2a1/0x3f0 net/socket.c:2536
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2565 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2574 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2572 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x367/0x540 net/socket.c:2572
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
CPU: 0 PID: 13 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc2-syzkaller-47461-gac3859c02d7f #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/22/2022

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52991

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fix NULL pointer in skb_segment_list
Commit 3a1296a38d0c ("net: Support GRO/GSO fraglist chaining.")
introduced UDP listifyed GRO. The segmentation relies on frag_list being
untouched when passing through the network stack. This assumption can be
broken sometimes, where frag_list itself gets pulled into linear area,
leaving frag_list being NULL. When this happens it can trigger
following NULL pointer dereference, and panic the kernel. Reverse the
test condition should fix it.
[19185.577801][ C1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address:
...
[19185.663775][ C1] RIP: 0010:skb_segment_list+0x1cc/0x390
...
[19185.834644][ C1] Call Trace:
[19185.841730][ C1] <TASK>
[19185.848563][ C1] __udp_gso_segment+0x33e/0x510
[19185.857370][ C1] inet_gso_segment+0x15b/0x3e0
[19185.866059][ C1] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x97/0x110
[19185.874939][ C1] __skb_gso_segment+0xb2/0x160
[19185.883646][ C1] udp_queue_rcv_skb+0xc3/0x1d0
[19185.892319][ C1] udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x75/0x90
[19185.900979][ C1] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xd2/0x200
[19185.910003][ C1] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x44/0x60
[19185.918757][ C1] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x8b/0xa0
[19185.927834][ C1] process_backlog+0x88/0x130
[19185.935840][ C1] __napi_poll+0x27/0x150
[19185.943447][ C1] net_rx_action+0x27e/0x5f0
[19185.951331][ C1] ? mlx5_cq_tasklet_cb+0x70/0x160 [mlx5_core]
[19185.960848][ C1] __do_softirq+0xbc/0x25d
[19185.968607][ C1] irq_exit_rcu+0x83/0xb0
[19185.976247][ C1] common_interrupt+0x43/0xa0
[19185.984235][ C1] asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
...
[19186.094106][ C1] </TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52975

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: iscsi_tcp: Fix UAF during logout when accessing the shost ipaddress
Bug report and analysis from Ding Hui.
During iSCSI session logout, if another task accesses the shost ipaddress
attr, we can get a KASAN UAF report like this:
[ 276.942144] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x78/0xe0
[ 276.942535] Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881053b45b8 by task cat/4088
[ 276.943511] CPU: 2 PID: 4088 Comm: cat Tainted: G E 6.1.0-rc8+ #3
[ 276.943997] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
[ 276.944470] Call Trace:
[ 276.944943] <TASK>
[ 276.945397] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48
[ 276.945887] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x86/0x1e7
[ 276.946421] print_report+0x36/0x4f
[ 276.947358] kasan_report+0xad/0x130
[ 276.948234] kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1c0
[ 276.948674] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x78/0xe0
[ 276.949989] iscsi_sw_tcp_host_get_param+0xad/0x2e0 [iscsi_tcp]
[ 276.951765] show_host_param_ISCSI_HOST_PARAM_IPADDRESS+0xe9/0x130 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.952185] dev_attr_show+0x3f/0x80
[ 276.953005] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x1fb/0x3e0
[ 276.953401] seq_read_iter+0x402/0x1020
[ 276.954260] vfs_read+0x532/0x7b0
[ 276.955113] ksys_read+0xed/0x1c0
[ 276.955952] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[ 276.956347] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 276.956769] RIP: 0033:0x7f5d3a679222
[ 276.957161] Code: c0 e9 b2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 32 c0 0b 00 e8 a5 fe 01 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24
[ 276.958009] RSP: 002b:00007ffc864d16a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[ 276.958431] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f5d3a679222
[ 276.958857] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f5d3a4fe000 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 276.959281] RBP: 00007f5d3a4fe000 R08: 00000000ffffffff R09: 0000000000000000
[ 276.959682] R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020000
[ 276.960126] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000557a26dada58
[ 276.960536] </TASK>
[ 276.961357] Allocated by task 2209:
[ 276.961756] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 276.962170] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
[ 276.962557] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7e/0x90
[ 276.962923] __kmalloc+0x5b/0x140
[ 276.963308] iscsi_alloc_session+0x28/0x840 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.963712] iscsi_session_setup+0xda/0xba0 [libiscsi]
[ 276.964078] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_create+0x1fd/0x330 [iscsi_tcp]
[ 276.964431] iscsi_if_create_session.isra.0+0x50/0x260 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.964793] iscsi_if_recv_msg+0xc5a/0x2660 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.965153] iscsi_if_rx+0x198/0x4b0 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.965546] netlink_unicast+0x4d5/0x7b0
[ 276.965905] netlink_sendmsg+0x78d/0xc30
[ 276.966236] sock_sendmsg+0xe5/0x120
[ 276.966576] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5fe/0x860
[ 276.966923] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe0/0x170
[ 276.967300] __sys_sendmsg+0xc8/0x170
[ 276.967666] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[ 276.968028] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 276.968773] Freed by task 2209:
[ 276.969111] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 276.969449] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
[ 276.969789] kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50
[ 276.970146] __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190
[ 276.970470] __kmem_cache_free+0x133/0x270
[ 276.970816] device_release+0x98/0x210
[ 276.971145] kobject_cleanup+0x101/0x360
[ 276.971462] iscsi_session_teardown+0x3fb/0x530 [libiscsi]
[ 276.971775] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_destroy+0xd8/0x130 [iscsi_tcp]
[ 276.972143] iscsi_if_recv_msg+0x1bf1/0x2660 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.972485] iscsi_if_rx+0x198/0x4b0 [scsi_transport_iscsi]
[ 276.972808] netlink_unicast+0x4d5/0x7b0
[ 276.973201] netlink_sendmsg+0x78d/0xc30
[ 276.973544] sock_sendmsg+0xe5/0x120
[ 276.973864] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5fe/0x860
[ 276.974248] ___sys_
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52973

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vc_screen: move load of struct vc_data pointer in vcs_read() to avoid UAF
After a call to console_unlock() in vcs_read() the vc_data struct can be
freed by vc_deallocate(). Because of that, the struct vc_data pointer
load must be done at the top of while loop in vcs_read() to avoid a UAF
when vcs_size() is called.
Syzkaller reported a UAF in vcs_size().
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vcs_size (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:215)
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881137479a8 by task 4a005ed81e27e65/1537
CPU: 0 PID: 1537 Comm: 4a005ed81e27e65 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5 #1
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.15.0-2.module
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report_generic.c:350)
vcs_size (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:215)
vcs_read (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:415)
vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:468 fs/read_write.c:450)
...
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1191:
...
kmalloc_trace (mm/slab_common.c:1069)
vc_allocate (./include/linux/slab.h:580 ./include/linux/slab.h:720
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1128 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1108)
con_install (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3383)
tty_init_dev (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1301 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1413
drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1390)
tty_open (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2080 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2126)
chrdev_open (fs/char_dev.c:415)
do_dentry_open (fs/open.c:883)
vfs_open (fs/open.c:1014)
...
Freed by task 1548:
...
kfree (mm/slab_common.c:1021)
vc_port_destruct (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1094)
tty_port_destructor (drivers/tty/tty_port.c:296)
tty_port_put (drivers/tty/tty_port.c:312)
vt_disallocate_all (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:662 (discriminator 2))
vt_ioctl (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:903)
tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2776)
...
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888113747800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 424 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff888113747800, ffff888113747c00)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000b3fe6c7c refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000
index:0x0 pfn:0x113740
head:00000000b3fe6c7c order:3 compound_mapcount:0 subpages_mapcount:0
compound_pincount:0
anon flags: 0x17ffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
raw: 0017ffffc0010200 ffff888100042dc0 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888113747880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888113747900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ffff888113747980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff888113747a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888113747a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52935

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/khugepaged: fix ->anon_vma race
If an ->anon_vma is attached to the VMA, collapse_and_free_pmd() requires
it to be locked.
Page table traversal is allowed under any one of the mmap lock, the
anon_vma lock (if the VMA is associated with an anon_vma), and the
mapping lock (if the VMA is associated with a mapping); and so to be
able to remove page tables, we must hold all three of them.
retract_page_tables() bails out if an ->anon_vma is attached, but does
this check before holding the mmap lock (as the comment above the check
explains).
If we racily merged an existing ->anon_vma (shared with a child
process) from a neighboring VMA, subsequent rmap traversals on pages
belonging to the child will be able to see the page tables that we are
concurrently removing while assuming that nothing else can access them.
Repeat the ->anon_vma check once we hold the mmap lock to ensure that
there really is no concurrent page table access.
Hitting this bug causes a lockdep warning in collapse_and_free_pmd(),
in the line "lockdep_assert_held_write(&vma->anon_vma->root->rwsem)".
It can also lead to use-after-free access.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52925

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: don't fail inserts if duplicate has expired
nftables selftests fail:
run-tests.sh testcases/sets/0044interval_overlap_0
Expected: 0-2 . 0-3, got:
W: [FAILED] ./testcases/sets/0044interval_overlap_0: got 1
Insertion must ignore duplicate but expired entries.
Moreover, there is a strange asymmetry in nft_pipapo_activate:
It refetches the current element, whereas the other ->activate callbacks
(bitmap, hash, rhash, rbtree) use elem->priv.
Same for .remove: other set implementations take elem->priv,
nft_pipapo_remove fetches elem->priv, then does a relookup,
remove this.
I suspect this was the reason for the change that prompted the
removal of the expired check in pipapo_get() in the first place,
but skipping exired elements there makes no sense to me, this helper
is used for normal get requests, insertions (duplicate check)
and deactivate callback.
In first two cases expired elements must be skipped.
For ->deactivate(), this gets called for DELSETELEM, so it
seems to me that expired elements should be skipped as well, i.e.
delete request should fail with -ENOENT error.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52920

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking
Use instruction (jump) history to record instructions that performed
register spill/fill to/from stack, regardless if this was done through
read-only r10 register, or any other register after copying r10 into it
*and* potentially adjusting offset.
To make this work reliably, we push extra per-instruction flags into
instruction history, encoding stack slot index (spi) and stack frame
number in extra 10 bit flags we take away from prev_idx in instruction
history. We don't touch idx field for maximum performance, as it's
checked most frequently during backtracking.
This change removes basically the last remaining practical limitation of
precision backtracking logic in BPF verifier. It fixes known
deficiencies, but also opens up new opportunities to reduce number of
verified states, explored in the subsequent patches.
There are only three differences in selftests' BPF object files
according to veristat, all in the positive direction (less states).
File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF) States (A) States (B) States (DIFF)
-------------------------------------- ------------- --------- --------- ------------- ---------- ---------- -------------
test_cls_redirect_dynptr.bpf.linked3.o cls_redirect 2987 2864 -123 (-4.12%) 240 231 -9 (-3.75%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_tc 82848 82661 -187 (-0.23%) 5107 5073 -34 (-0.67%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_xdp 85116 84964 -152 (-0.18%) 5162 5130 -32 (-0.62%)
Note, I avoided renaming jmp_history to more generic insn_hist to
minimize number of lines changed and potential merge conflicts between
bpf and bpf-next trees.
Notice also cur_hist_entry pointer reset to NULL at the beginning of
instruction verification loop. This pointer avoids the problem of
relying on last jump history entry's insn_idx to determine whether we
already have entry for current instruction or not. It can happen that we
added jump history entry because current instruction is_jmp_point(), but
also we need to add instruction flags for stack access. In this case, we
don't want to entries, so we need to reuse last added entry, if it is
present.
Relying on insn_idx comparison has the same ambiguity problem as the one
that was fixed recently in [0], so we avoid that.
[0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20231110002638.4168352-3-andrii@kernel.org/

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52912

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Fixed bug on error when unloading amdgpu
Fixed bug on error when unloading amdgpu.
The error message is as follows:
[ 377.706202] kernel BUG at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_buddy.c:278!
[ 377.706215] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 377.706222] CPU: 4 PID: 8610 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G IOE 6.0.0-thomas #1
[ 377.706231] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z390-A, BIOS 2004 11/02/2021
[ 377.706238] RIP: 0010:drm_buddy_free_block+0x26/0x30 [drm_buddy]
[ 377.706264] Code: 00 00 00 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 0e 89 c8 25 00 0c 00 00 3d 00 04 00 00 75 10 48 8b 47 18 48 d3 e0 48 01 47 28 e9 fa fe ff ff <0f> 0b 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 48 89 f5 53
[ 377.706282] RSP: 0018:ffffad2dc4683cb8 EFLAGS: 00010287
[ 377.706289] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8b1743bd5138 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 377.706297] RDX: ffff8b1743bd5160 RSI: ffff8b1743bd5c78 RDI: ffff8b16d1b25f70
[ 377.706304] RBP: ffff8b1743bd59e0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 377.706311] R10: ffff8b16c8572400 R11: ffffad2dc4683cf0 R12: ffff8b16d1b25f70
[ 377.706318] R13: ffff8b16d1b25fd0 R14: ffff8b1743bd59c0 R15: ffff8b16d1b25f70
[ 377.706325] FS: 00007fec56c72c40(0000) GS:ffff8b1836500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 377.706334] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 377.706340] CR2: 00007f9b88c1ba50 CR3: 0000000110450004 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[ 377.706347] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 377.706354] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 377.706361] Call Trace:
[ 377.706365] <TASK>
[ 377.706369] drm_buddy_free_list+0x2a/0x60 [drm_buddy]
[ 377.706376] amdgpu_vram_mgr_fini+0xea/0x180 [amdgpu]
[ 377.706572] amdgpu_ttm_fini+0x12e/0x1a0 [amdgpu]
[ 377.706650] amdgpu_bo_fini+0x22/0x90 [amdgpu]
[ 377.706727] gmc_v11_0_sw_fini+0x26/0x30 [amdgpu]
[ 377.706821] amdgpu_device_fini_sw+0xa1/0x3c0 [amdgpu]
[ 377.706897] amdgpu_driver_release_kms+0x12/0x30 [amdgpu]
[ 377.706975] drm_dev_release+0x20/0x40 [drm]
[ 377.707006] release_nodes+0x35/0xb0
[ 377.707014] devres_release_all+0x8b/0xc0
[ 377.707020] device_unbind_cleanup+0xe/0x70
[ 377.707027] device_release_driver_internal+0xee/0x160
[ 377.707033] driver_detach+0x44/0x90
[ 377.707039] bus_remove_driver+0x55/0xe0
[ 377.707045] pci_unregister_driver+0x3b/0x90
[ 377.707052] amdgpu_exit+0x11/0x6c [amdgpu]
[ 377.707194] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x142/0x2b0
[ 377.707201] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x22/0x50
[ 377.707208] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x3e/0x190
[ 377.707215] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[ 377.707221] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52910

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/iova: Fix alloc iova overflows issue
In __alloc_and_insert_iova_range, there is an issue that retry_pfn
overflows. The value of iovad->anchor.pfn_hi is ~0UL, then when
iovad->cached_node is iovad->anchor, curr_iova->pfn_hi + 1 will
overflow. As a result, if the retry logic is executed, low_pfn is
updated to 0, and then new_pfn < low_pfn returns false to make the
allocation successful.
This issue occurs in the following two situations:
1. The first iova size exceeds the domain size. When initializing
iova domain, iovad->cached_node is assigned as iovad->anchor. For
example, the iova domain size is 10M, start_pfn is 0x1_F000_0000,
and the iova size allocated for the first time is 11M. The
following is the log information, new->pfn_lo is smaller than
iovad->cached_node.
Example log as follows:
[ 223.798112][T1705487] sh: [name:iova&]__alloc_and_insert_iova_range
start_pfn:0x1f0000,retry_pfn:0x0,size:0xb00,limit_pfn:0x1f0a00
[ 223.799590][T1705487] sh: [name:iova&]__alloc_and_insert_iova_range
success start_pfn:0x1f0000,new->pfn_lo:0x1efe00,new->pfn_hi:0x1f08ff
2. The node with the largest iova->pfn_lo value in the iova domain
is deleted, iovad->cached_node will be updated to iovad->anchor,
and then the alloc iova size exceeds the maximum iova size that can
be allocated in the domain.
After judging that retry_pfn is less than limit_pfn, call retry_pfn+1
to fix the overflow issue.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52906

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_mpls: Fix warning during failed attribute validation
The 'TCA_MPLS_LABEL' attribute is of 'NLA_U32' type, but has a
validation type of 'NLA_VALIDATE_FUNCTION'. This is an invalid
combination according to the comment above 'struct nla_policy':
"
Meaning of `validate' field, use via NLA_POLICY_VALIDATE_FN:
NLA_BINARY Validation function called for the attribute.
All other Unused - but note that it's a union
"
This can trigger the warning [1] in nla_get_range_unsigned() when
validation of the attribute fails. Despite being of 'NLA_U32' type, the
associated 'min'/'max' fields in the policy are negative as they are
aliased by the 'validate' field.
Fix by changing the attribute type to 'NLA_BINARY' which is consistent
with the above comment and all other users of NLA_POLICY_VALIDATE_FN().
As a result, move the length validation to the validation function.
No regressions in MPLS tests:
# ./tdc.py -f tc-tests/actions/mpls.json
[...]
# echo $?
0
[1]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 17743 at lib/nlattr.c:118
nla_get_range_unsigned+0x1d8/0x1e0 lib/nlattr.c:117
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 17743 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc8 #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.13.0-48-gd9c812dda519-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:nla_get_range_unsigned+0x1d8/0x1e0 lib/nlattr.c:117
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__netlink_policy_dump_write_attr+0x23d/0x990 net/netlink/policy.c:310
netlink_policy_dump_write_attr+0x22/0x30 net/netlink/policy.c:411
netlink_ack_tlv_fill net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454 [inline]
netlink_ack+0x546/0x760 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2506
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1b7/0x240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2546
rtnetlink_rcv+0x18/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6109
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x5e9/0x6b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
netlink_sendmsg+0x739/0x860 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x38f/0x500 net/socket.c:2482
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2536 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x197/0x230 net/socket.c:2565
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2574 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2572 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2572
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52901

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: xhci: Check endpoint is valid before dereferencing it
When the host controller is not responding, all URBs queued to all
endpoints need to be killed. This can cause a kernel panic if we
dereference an invalid endpoint.
Fix this by using xhci_get_virt_ep() helper to find the endpoint and
checking if the endpoint is valid before dereferencing it.
[233311.853271] xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.1.auto: xHCI host controller not responding, assume dead
[233311.853393] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000e8
[233311.853964] pc : xhci_hc_died+0x10c/0x270
[233311.853971] lr : xhci_hc_died+0x1ac/0x270
[233311.854077] Call trace:
[233311.854085] xhci_hc_died+0x10c/0x270
[233311.854093] xhci_stop_endpoint_command_watchdog+0x100/0x1a4
[233311.854105] call_timer_fn+0x50/0x2d4
[233311.854112] expire_timers+0xac/0x2e4
[233311.854118] run_timer_softirq+0x300/0xabc
[233311.854127] __do_softirq+0x148/0x528
[233311.854135] irq_exit+0x194/0x1a8
[233311.854143] __handle_domain_irq+0x164/0x1d0
[233311.854149] gic_handle_irq.22273+0x10c/0x188
[233311.854156] el1_irq+0xfc/0x1a8
[233311.854175] lpm_cpuidle_enter+0x25c/0x418 [msm_pm]
[233311.854185] cpuidle_enter_state+0x1f0/0x764
[233311.854194] do_idle+0x594/0x6ac
[233311.854201] cpu_startup_entry+0x7c/0x80
[233311.854209] secondary_start_kernel+0x170/0x198

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52885

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Fix UAF in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready()
After the listener svc_sock is freed, and before invoking svc_tcp_accept()
for the established child sock, there is a window that the newsock
retaining a freed listener svc_sock in sk_user_data which cloning from
parent. In the race window, if data is received on the newsock, we will
observe use-after-free report in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready().
Reproduce by two tasks:
1. while :; do rpc.nfsd 0 ; rpc.nfsd; done
2. while :; do echo "" | ncat -4 127.0.0.1 2049 ; done
KASAN report:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready+0x1cf/0x1f0 [sunrpc]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888139d96228 by task nc/102553
CPU: 7 PID: 102553 Comm: nc Not tainted 6.3.0+ #18
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x27/0x310
print_report+0x3e/0x70
kasan_report+0xae/0xe0
svc_tcp_listen_data_ready+0x1cf/0x1f0 [sunrpc]
tcp_data_queue+0x9f4/0x20e0
tcp_rcv_established+0x666/0x1f60
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x51c/0x850
tcp_v4_rcv+0x23fc/0x2e80
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x62/0x300
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x267/0x350
ip_local_deliver+0x18b/0x2d0
ip_rcv+0x2fb/0x370
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x166/0x1b0
process_backlog+0x24c/0x5e0
__napi_poll+0xa2/0x500
net_rx_action+0x854/0xc90
__do_softirq+0x1bb/0x5de
do_softirq+0xcb/0x100
</IRQ>
<TASK>
...
</TASK>
Allocated by task 102371:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x7b/0x90
svc_setup_socket+0x52/0x4f0 [sunrpc]
svc_addsock+0x20d/0x400 [sunrpc]
__write_ports_addfd+0x209/0x390 [nfsd]
write_ports+0x239/0x2c0 [nfsd]
nfsctl_transaction_write+0xac/0x110 [nfsd]
vfs_write+0x1c3/0xae0
ksys_write+0xed/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Freed by task 102551:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50
__kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190
__kmem_cache_free+0x133/0x270
svc_xprt_free+0x1e2/0x350 [sunrpc]
svc_xprt_destroy_all+0x25a/0x440 [sunrpc]
nfsd_put+0x125/0x240 [nfsd]
nfsd_svc+0x2cb/0x3c0 [nfsd]
write_threads+0x1ac/0x2a0 [nfsd]
nfsctl_transaction_write+0xac/0x110 [nfsd]
vfs_write+0x1c3/0xae0
ksys_write+0xed/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Fix the UAF by simply doing nothing in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready()
if state != TCP_LISTEN, that will avoid dereferencing svsk for all
child socket.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52854

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
padata: Fix refcnt handling in padata_free_shell()
In a high-load arm64 environment, the pcrypt_aead01 test in LTP can lead
to system UAF (Use-After-Free) issues. Due to the lengthy analysis of
the pcrypt_aead01 function call, I'll describe the problem scenario
using a simplified model:
Suppose there's a user of padata named `user_function` that adheres to
the padata requirement of calling `padata_free_shell` after `serial()`
has been invoked, as demonstrated in the following code:
```c
struct request {
struct padata_priv padata;
struct completion *done;
};
void parallel(struct padata_priv *padata) {
do_something();
}
void serial(struct padata_priv *padata) {
struct request *request = container_of(padata,
struct request,
padata);
complete(request->done);
}
void user_function() {
DECLARE_COMPLETION(done)
padata->parallel = parallel;
padata->serial = serial;
padata_do_parallel();
wait_for_completion(&done);
padata_free_shell();
}
```
In the corresponding padata.c file, there's the following code:
```c
static void padata_serial_worker(struct work_struct *serial_work) {
...
cnt = 0;
while (!list_empty(&local_list)) {
...
padata->serial(padata);
cnt++;
}
local_bh_enable();
if (refcount_sub_and_test(cnt, &pd->refcnt))
padata_free_pd(pd);
}
```
Because of the high system load and the accumulation of unexecuted
softirq at this moment, `local_bh_enable()` in padata takes longer
to execute than usual. Subsequently, when accessing `pd->refcnt`,
`pd` has already been released by `padata_free_shell()`, resulting
in a UAF issue with `pd->refcnt`.
The fix is straightforward: add `refcount_dec_and_test` before calling
`padata_free_pd` in `padata_free_shell`.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52831

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpu/hotplug: Don't offline the last non-isolated CPU
If a system has isolated CPUs via the "isolcpus=" command line parameter,
then an attempt to offline the last housekeeping CPU will result in a
WARN_ON() when rebuilding the scheduler domains and a subsequent panic due
to and unhandled empty CPU mas in partition_sched_domains_locked().
cpuset_hotplug_workfn()
rebuild_sched_domains_locked()
ndoms = generate_sched_domains(&doms, &attr);
cpumask_and(doms[0], top_cpuset.effective_cpus, housekeeping_cpumask(HK_FLAG_DOMAIN));
Thus results in an empty CPU mask which triggers the warning and then the
subsequent crash:
WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 80 at kernel/sched/topology.c:2366 build_sched_domains+0x120c/0x1408
Call trace:
build_sched_domains+0x120c/0x1408
partition_sched_domains_locked+0x234/0x880
rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x37c/0x798
rebuild_sched_domains+0x30/0x58
cpuset_hotplug_workfn+0x2a8/0x930
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffe80027ab37080
partition_sched_domains_locked+0x318/0x880
rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x37c/0x798
Aside of the resulting crash, it does not make any sense to offline the last
last housekeeping CPU.
Prevent this by masking out the non-housekeeping CPUs when selecting a
target CPU for initiating the CPU unplug operation via the work queue.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52741

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: Fix use-after-free in rdata->read_into_pages()
When the network status is unstable, use-after-free may occur when
read data from the server.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in readpages_fill_pages+0x14c/0x7e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x38/0x4c
print_report+0x16f/0x4a6
kasan_report+0xb7/0x130
readpages_fill_pages+0x14c/0x7e0
cifs_readv_receive+0x46d/0xa40
cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x121c/0x1490
kthread+0x16b/0x1a0
ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50
</TASK>
Allocated by task 2535:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x82/0x90
cifs_readdata_direct_alloc+0x2c/0x110
cifs_readdata_alloc+0x2d/0x60
cifs_readahead+0x393/0xfe0
read_pages+0x12f/0x470
page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1b1/0x240
filemap_get_pages+0x1c8/0x9a0
filemap_read+0x1c0/0x540
cifs_strict_readv+0x21b/0x240
vfs_read+0x395/0x4b0
ksys_read+0xb8/0x150
do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Freed by task 79:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50
__kasan_slab_free+0x10e/0x1a0
__kmem_cache_free+0x7a/0x1a0
cifs_readdata_release+0x49/0x60
process_one_work+0x46c/0x760
worker_thread+0x2a4/0x6f0
kthread+0x16b/0x1a0
ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0x95/0xb0
insert_work+0x2b/0x130
__queue_work+0x1fe/0x660
queue_work_on+0x4b/0x60
smb2_readv_callback+0x396/0x800
cifs_abort_connection+0x474/0x6a0
cifs_reconnect+0x5cb/0xa50
cifs_readv_from_socket.cold+0x22/0x6c
cifs_read_page_from_socket+0xc1/0x100
readpages_fill_pages.cold+0x2f/0x46
cifs_readv_receive+0x46d/0xa40
cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x121c/0x1490
kthread+0x16b/0x1a0
ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50
The following function calls will cause UAF of the rdata pointer.
readpages_fill_pages
cifs_read_page_from_socket
cifs_readv_from_socket
cifs_reconnect
__cifs_reconnect
cifs_abort_connection
mid->callback() --> smb2_readv_callback
queue_work(&rdata->work) # if the worker completes first,
# the rdata is freed
cifs_readv_complete
kref_put
cifs_readdata_release
kfree(rdata)
return rdata->... # UAF in readpages_fill_pages()
Similarly, this problem also occurs in the uncache_fill_pages().
Fix this by adjusts the order of condition judgment in the return
statement.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52739

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Fix page corruption caused by racy check in __free_pages
When we upgraded our kernel, we started seeing some page corruption like
the following consistently:
BUG: Bad page state in process ganesha.nfsd pfn:1304ca
page:0000000022261c55 refcount:0 mapcount:-128 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1304ca
flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
raw: 0017ffffc0000000 ffff8a513ffd4c98 ffffeee24b35ec08 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
CPU: 0 PID: 15567 Comm: ganesha.nfsd Kdump: loaded Tainted: P B O 5.10.158-1.nutanix.20221209.el7.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 04/05/2016
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x74/0x96
bad_page.cold+0x63/0x94
check_new_page_bad+0x6d/0x80
rmqueue+0x46e/0x970
get_page_from_freelist+0xcb/0x3f0
? _cond_resched+0x19/0x40
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x164/0x300
alloc_pages_current+0x87/0xf0
skb_page_frag_refill+0x84/0x110
...
Sometimes, it would also show up as corruption in the free list pointer
and cause crashes.
After bisecting the issue, we found the issue started from commit
e320d3012d25 ("mm/page_alloc.c: fix freeing non-compound pages"):
if (put_page_testzero(page))
free_the_page(page, order);
else if (!PageHead(page))
while (order-- > 0)
free_the_page(page + (1 << order), order);
So the problem is the check PageHead is racy because at this point we
already dropped our reference to the page. So even if we came in with
compound page, the page can already be freed and PageHead can return
false and we will end up freeing all the tail pages causing double free.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52587

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/ipoib: Fix mcast list locking
Releasing the `priv->lock` while iterating the `priv->multicast_list` in
`ipoib_mcast_join_task()` opens a window for `ipoib_mcast_dev_flush()` to
remove the items while in the middle of iteration. If the mcast is removed
while the lock was dropped, the for loop spins forever resulting in a hard
lockup (as was reported on RHEL 4.18.0-372.75.1.el8_6 kernel):
Task A (kworker/u72:2 below) | Task B (kworker/u72:0 below)
-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------
ipoib_mcast_join_task(work) | ipoib_ib_dev_flush_light(work)
spin_lock_irq(&priv->lock) | __ipoib_ib_dev_flush(priv, ...)
list_for_each_entry(mcast, | ipoib_mcast_dev_flush(dev = priv->dev)
&priv->multicast_list, list) |
ipoib_mcast_join(dev, mcast) |
spin_unlock_irq(&priv->lock) |
| spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags)
| list_for_each_entry_safe(mcast, tmcast,
| &priv->multicast_list, list)
| list_del(&mcast->list);
| list_add_tail(&mcast->list, &remove_list)
| spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags)
spin_lock_irq(&priv->lock) |
| ipoib_mcast_remove_list(&remove_list)
(Here, `mcast` is no longer on the | list_for_each_entry_safe(mcast, tmcast,
`priv->multicast_list` and we keep | remove_list, list)
spinning on the `remove_list` of | >>> wait_for_completion(&mcast->done)
the other thread which is blocked |
and the list is still valid on |
it's stack.)
Fix this by keeping the lock held and changing to GFP_ATOMIC to prevent
eventual sleeps.
Unfortunately we could not reproduce the lockup and confirm this fix but
based on the code review I think this fix should address such lockups.
crash> bc 31
PID: 747 TASK: ff1c6a1a007e8000 CPU: 31 COMMAND: "kworker/u72:2"
--
[exception RIP: ipoib_mcast_join_task+0x1b1]
RIP: ffffffffc0944ac1 RSP: ff646f199a8c7e00 RFLAGS: 00000002
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff1c6a1a04dc82f8 RCX: 0000000000000000
work (&priv->mcast_task{,.work})
RDX: ff1c6a192d60ac68 RSI: 0000000000000286 RDI: ff1c6a1a04dc8000
&mcast->list
RBP: ff646f199a8c7e90 R8: ff1c699980019420 R9: ff1c6a1920c9a000
R10: ff646f199a8c7e00 R11: ff1c6a191a7d9800 R12: ff1c6a192d60ac00
mcast
R13: ff1c6a1d82200000 R14: ff1c6a1a04dc8000 R15: ff1c6a1a04dc82d8
dev priv (&priv->lock) &priv->multicast_list (aka head)
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
--- <NMI exception stack> ---
#5 [ff646f199a8c7e00] ipoib_mcast_join_task+0x1b1 at ffffffffc0944ac1 [ib_ipoib]
#6 [ff646f199a8c7e98] process_one_work+0x1a7 at ffffffff9bf10967
crash> rx ff646f199a8c7e68
ff646f199a8c7e68: ff1c6a1a04dc82f8 <<< work = &priv->mcast_task.work
crash> list -hO ipoib_dev_priv.multicast_list ff1c6a1a04dc8000
(empty)
crash> ipoib_dev_priv.mcast_task.work.func,mcast_mutex.owner.counter ff1c6a1a04dc8000
mcast_task.work.func = 0xffffffffc0944910 <ipoib_mcast_join_task>,
mcast_mutex.owner.counter = 0xff1c69998efec000
crash> b 8
PID: 8 TASK: ff1c69998efec000 CPU: 33 COMMAND: "kworker/u72:0"
--
#3 [ff646f1980153d50] wait_for_completion+0x96 at ffffffff9c7d7646
#4 [ff646f1980153d90] ipoib_mcast_remove_list+0x56 at ffffffffc0944dc6 [ib_ipoib]
#5 [ff646f1980153de8] ipoib_mcast_dev_flush+0x1a7 at ffffffffc09455a7 [ib_ipoib]
#6 [ff646f1980153e58] __ipoib_ib_dev_flush+0x1a4 at ffffffffc09431a4 [ib_ipoib]
#7 [ff
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52568

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/sgx: Resolves SECS reclaim vs. page fault for EAUG race
The SGX EPC reclaimer (ksgxd) may reclaim the SECS EPC page for an
enclave and set secs.epc_page to NULL. The SECS page is used for EAUG
and ELDU in the SGX page fault handler. However, the NULL check for
secs.epc_page is only done for ELDU, not EAUG before being used.
Fix this by doing the same NULL check and reloading of the SECS page as
needed for both EAUG and ELDU.
The SECS page holds global enclave metadata. It can only be reclaimed
when there are no other enclave pages remaining. At that point,
virtually nothing can be done with the enclave until the SECS page is
paged back in.
An enclave can not run nor generate page faults without a resident SECS
page. But it is still possible for a #PF for a non-SECS page to race
with paging out the SECS page: when the last resident non-SECS page A
triggers a #PF in a non-resident page B, and then page A and the SECS
both are paged out before the #PF on B is handled.
Hitting this bug requires that race triggered with a #PF for EAUG.
Following is a trace when it happens.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
RIP: 0010:sgx_encl_eaug_page+0xc7/0x210
Call Trace:
? __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x16a/0x440
? xa_load+0x6e/0xa0
sgx_vma_fault+0x119/0x230
__do_fault+0x36/0x140
do_fault+0x12f/0x400
__handle_mm_fault+0x728/0x1110
handle_mm_fault+0x105/0x310
do_user_addr_fault+0x1ee/0x750
? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
exc_page_fault+0x76/0x180
asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52490

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: migrate: fix getting incorrect page mapping during page migration
When running stress-ng testing, we found below kernel crash after a few hours:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
pc : dentry_name+0xd8/0x224
lr : pointer+0x22c/0x370
sp : ffff800025f134c0
......
Call trace:
dentry_name+0xd8/0x224
pointer+0x22c/0x370
vsnprintf+0x1ec/0x730
vscnprintf+0x2c/0x60
vprintk_store+0x70/0x234
vprintk_emit+0xe0/0x24c
vprintk_default+0x3c/0x44
vprintk_func+0x84/0x2d0
printk+0x64/0x88
__dump_page+0x52c/0x530
dump_page+0x14/0x20
set_migratetype_isolate+0x110/0x224
start_isolate_page_range+0xc4/0x20c
offline_pages+0x124/0x474
memory_block_offline+0x44/0xf4
memory_subsys_offline+0x3c/0x70
device_offline+0xf0/0x120
......
After analyzing the vmcore, I found this issue is caused by page migration.
The scenario is that, one thread is doing page migration, and we will use the
target page's ->mapping field to save 'anon_vma' pointer between page unmap and
page move, and now the target page is locked and refcount is 1.
Currently, there is another stress-ng thread performing memory hotplug,
attempting to offline the target page that is being migrated. It discovers that
the refcount of this target page is 1, preventing the offline operation, thus
proceeding to dump the page. However, page_mapping() of the target page may
return an incorrect file mapping to crash the system in dump_mapping(), since
the target page->mapping only saves 'anon_vma' pointer without setting
PAGE_MAPPING_ANON flag.
There are seveval ways to fix this issue:
(1) Setting the PAGE_MAPPING_ANON flag for target page's ->mapping when saving
'anon_vma', but this can confuse PageAnon() for PFN walkers, since the target
page has not built mappings yet.
(2) Getting the page lock to call page_mapping() in __dump_page() to avoid crashing
the system, however, there are still some PFN walkers that call page_mapping()
without holding the page lock, such as compaction.
(3) Using target page->private field to save the 'anon_vma' pointer and 2 bits
page state, just as page->mapping records an anonymous page, which can remove
the page_mapping() impact for PFN walkers and also seems a simple way.
So I choose option 3 to fix this issue, and this can also fix other potential
issues for PFN walkers, such as compaction.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49759

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
VMCI: Use threaded irqs instead of tasklets
The vmci_dispatch_dgs() tasklet function calls vmci_read_data()
which uses wait_event() resulting in invalid sleep in an atomic
context (and therefore potentially in a deadlock).
Use threaded irqs to fix this issue and completely remove usage
of tasklets.
[ 20.264639] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_guest.c:145
[ 20.264643] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 762, name: vmtoolsd
[ 20.264645] preempt_count: 101, expected: 0
[ 20.264646] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
[ 20.264647] 1 lock held by vmtoolsd/762:
[ 20.264648] #0: ffff0000874ae440 (sk_lock-AF_VSOCK){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: vsock_connect+0x60/0x330 [vsock]
[ 20.264658] Preemption disabled at:
[ 20.264659] [<ffff80000151d7d8>] vmci_send_datagram+0x44/0xa0 [vmw_vmci]
[ 20.264665] CPU: 0 PID: 762 Comm: vmtoolsd Not tainted 5.19.0-0.rc8.20220727git39c3c396f813.60.fc37.aarch64 #1
[ 20.264667] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VBSA/VBSA, BIOS VEFI 12/31/2020
[ 20.264668] Call trace:
[ 20.264669] dump_backtrace+0xc4/0x130
[ 20.264672] show_stack+0x24/0x80
[ 20.264673] dump_stack_lvl+0x88/0xb4
[ 20.264676] dump_stack+0x18/0x34
[ 20.264677] __might_resched+0x1a0/0x280
[ 20.264679] __might_sleep+0x58/0x90
[ 20.264681] vmci_read_data+0x74/0x120 [vmw_vmci]
[ 20.264683] vmci_dispatch_dgs+0x64/0x204 [vmw_vmci]
[ 20.264686] tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0x13c/0x150
[ 20.264688] tasklet_action+0x40/0x50
[ 20.264689] __do_softirq+0x23c/0x6b4
[ 20.264690] __irq_exit_rcu+0x104/0x214
[ 20.264691] irq_exit_rcu+0x1c/0x50
[ 20.264693] el1_interrupt+0x38/0x6c
[ 20.264695] el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
[ 20.264696] el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c
[ 20.264697] preempt_count_sub+0xa4/0xe0
[ 20.264698] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x64/0xb0
[ 20.264701] vmci_send_datagram+0x7c/0xa0 [vmw_vmci]
[ 20.264703] vmci_datagram_dispatch+0x84/0x100 [vmw_vmci]
[ 20.264706] vmci_datagram_send+0x2c/0x40 [vmw_vmci]
[ 20.264709] vmci_transport_send_control_pkt+0xb8/0x120 [vmw_vsock_vmci_transport]
[ 20.264711] vmci_transport_connect+0x40/0x7c [vmw_vsock_vmci_transport]
[ 20.264713] vsock_connect+0x278/0x330 [vsock]
[ 20.264715] __sys_connect_file+0x8c/0xc0
[ 20.264718] __sys_connect+0x84/0xb4
[ 20.264720] __arm64_sys_connect+0x2c/0x3c
[ 20.264721] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x100
[ 20.264723] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x68/0x124
[ 20.264724] do_el0_svc+0x38/0x4c
[ 20.264725] el0_svc+0x60/0x180
[ 20.264726] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x11c/0x150
[ 20.264728] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49753

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: Fix double increment of client_count in dma_chan_get()
The first time dma_chan_get() is called for a channel the channel
client_count is incorrectly incremented twice for public channels,
first in balance_ref_count(), and again prior to returning. This
results in an incorrect client count which will lead to the
channel resources not being freed when they should be. A simple
test of repeated module load and unload of async_tx on a Dell
Power Edge R7425 also shows this resulting in a kref underflow
warning.
[ 124.329662] async_tx: api initialized (async)
[ 129.000627] async_tx: api initialized (async)
[ 130.047839] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 130.052472] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
[ 130.057279] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 19364 at lib/refcount.c:28
refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[ 130.065811] Modules linked in: async_tx(-) rfkill intel_rapl_msr
intel_rapl_common amd64_edac edac_mce_amd ipmi_ssif kvm_amd dcdbas kvm
mgag200 drm_shmem_helper acpi_ipmi irqbypass drm_kms_helper ipmi_si
syscopyarea sysfillrect rapl pcspkr ipmi_devintf sysimgblt fb_sys_fops
k10temp i2c_piix4 ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_cpufreq vfat
fat drm fuse xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg ahci crct10dif_pclmul
libahci crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel igb megaraid_sas
i40e libata i2c_algo_bit ccp sp5100_tco dca dm_mirror dm_region_hash
dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: async_tx]
[ 130.117361] CPU: 3 PID: 19364 Comm: modprobe Kdump: loaded Not
tainted 5.14.0-185.el9.x86_64 #1
[ 130.126091] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7425/02MJ3T, BIOS
1.18.0 01/17/2022
[ 130.133806] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[ 130.139041] Code: 01 01 e8 6d bd 55 00 0f 0b e9 72 9d 8a 00 80 3d
26 18 9c 01 00 75 85 48 c7 c7 f8 a3 03 9d c6 05 16 18 9c 01 01 e8 4a
bd 55 00 <0f> 0b e9 4f 9d 8a 00 80 3d 01 18 9c 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff
48 c7
[ 130.157807] RSP: 0018:ffffbf98898afe68 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 130.163036] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9da06028e598 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 130.170172] RDX: ffff9daf9de26480 RSI: ffff9daf9de198a0 RDI: ffff9daf9de198a0
[ 130.177316] RBP: ffff9da7cddf3970 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffff7fff
[ 130.184459] R10: ffffbf98898afd00 R11: ffffffff9d9e8c28 R12: ffff9da7cddf1970
[ 130.191596] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 130.198739] FS: 00007f646435c740(0000) GS:ffff9daf9de00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 130.206832] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 130.212586] CR2: 00007f6463b214f0 CR3: 00000008ab98c000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
[ 130.219729] Call Trace:
[ 130.222192] <TASK>
[ 130.224305] dma_chan_put+0x10d/0x110
[ 130.227988] dmaengine_put+0x7a/0xa0
[ 130.231575] __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x178/0x280
[ 130.237157] ? syscall_trace_enter.constprop.0+0x145/0x1d0
[ 130.242652] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
[ 130.246240] ? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x150
[ 130.250178] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 130.255243] RIP: 0033:0x7f6463a3f5ab
[ 130.258830] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 75 a8 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00
00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 45 a8 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89
01 48
[ 130.277591] RSP: 002b:00007fff22f972c8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX:
00000000000000b0
[ 130.285164] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b6786edd40 RCX: 00007f6463a3f5ab
[ 130.292303] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 000055b6786edda8
[ 130.299443] RBP: 000055b6786edd40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 130.306584] R10: 00007f6463b9eac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 000055b6786edda8
[ 130.313731] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055b6786edda8 R15: 00007fff22f995f8
[ 130.320875] </TASK>
[ 130.323081] ---[ end trace eff7156d56b5cf25 ]---
cat /sys/class/dma/dma0chan*/in_use would get the wrong result.
2
2
2
Test-by: Jie Hai <haijie1@huawei.com>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49740

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: Check the count value of channel spec to prevent out-of-bounds reads
This patch fixes slab-out-of-bounds reads in brcmfmac that occur in
brcmf_construct_chaninfo() and brcmf_enable_bw40_2g() when the count
value of channel specifications provided by the device is greater than
the length of 'list->element[]', decided by the size of the 'list'
allocated with kzalloc(). The patch adds checks that make the functions
free the buffer and return -EINVAL if that is the case. Note that the
negative return is handled by the caller, brcmf_setup_wiphybands() or
brcmf_cfg80211_attach().
Found by a modified version of syzkaller.
Crash Report from brcmf_construct_chaninfo():
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in brcmf_setup_wiphybands+0x1238/0x1430
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888115f24600 by task kworker/0:2/1896
CPU: 0 PID: 1896 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G W O 5.14.0+ #132
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x93/0x334
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
brcmf_setup_wiphybands+0x1238/0x1430
brcmf_cfg80211_attach+0x2118/0x3fd0
brcmf_attach+0x389/0xd40
brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690
usb_probe_interface+0x25f/0x710
really_probe+0x1be/0xa90
__driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460
driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
__device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250
bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0
__device_attach+0x207/0x330
bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260
device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0
usb_set_configuration+0x984/0x1770
usb_generic_driver_probe+0x69/0x90
usb_probe_device+0x9c/0x220
really_probe+0x1be/0xa90
__driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460
driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
__device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250
bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0
__device_attach+0x207/0x330
bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260
device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0
usb_new_device.cold+0x463/0xf66
hub_event+0x10d5/0x3330
process_one_work+0x873/0x13e0
worker_thread+0x8b/0xd10
kthread+0x379/0x450
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Allocated by task 1896:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x19e/0x330
brcmf_setup_wiphybands+0x290/0x1430
brcmf_cfg80211_attach+0x2118/0x3fd0
brcmf_attach+0x389/0xd40
brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690
usb_probe_interface+0x25f/0x710
really_probe+0x1be/0xa90
__driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460
driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
__device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250
bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0
__device_attach+0x207/0x330
bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260
device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0
usb_set_configuration+0x984/0x1770
usb_generic_driver_probe+0x69/0x90
usb_probe_device+0x9c/0x220
really_probe+0x1be/0xa90
__driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460
driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
__device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250
bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0
__device_attach+0x207/0x330
bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260
device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0
usb_new_device.cold+0x463/0xf66
hub_event+0x10d5/0x3330
process_one_work+0x873/0x13e0
worker_thread+0x8b/0xd10
kthread+0x379/0x450
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888115f24000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 1536 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff888115f24000, ffff888115f24800)
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888115f24500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888115f24580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff888115f24600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888115f24680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888115f24700: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Crash Report from brcmf_enable_bw40_2g():
==========
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49728

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: Fix signed integer overflow in __ip6_append_data
Resurrect ubsan overflow checks and ubsan report this warning,
fix it by change the variable [length] type to size_t.
UBSAN: signed-integer-overflow in net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1489:19
2147479552 + 8567 cannot be represented in type 'int'
CPU: 0 PID: 253 Comm: err Not tainted 5.16.0+ #1
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x214/0x230
show_stack+0x30/0x78
dump_stack_lvl+0xf8/0x118
dump_stack+0x18/0x30
ubsan_epilogue+0x18/0x60
handle_overflow+0xd0/0xf0
__ubsan_handle_add_overflow+0x34/0x44
__ip6_append_data.isra.48+0x1598/0x1688
ip6_append_data+0x128/0x260
udpv6_sendmsg+0x680/0xdd0
inet6_sendmsg+0x54/0x90
sock_sendmsg+0x70/0x88
____sys_sendmsg+0xe8/0x368
___sys_sendmsg+0x98/0xe0
__sys_sendmmsg+0xf4/0x3b8
__arm64_sys_sendmmsg+0x34/0x48
invoke_syscall+0x64/0x160
el0_svc_common.constprop.4+0x124/0x300
do_el0_svc+0x44/0xc8
el0_svc+0x3c/0x1e8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xb0
el0t_64_sync+0x16c/0x170
Changes since v1:
-Change the variable [length] type to unsigned, as Eric Dumazet suggested.
Changes since v2:
-Don't change exthdrlen type in ip6_make_skb, as Paolo Abeni suggested.
Changes since v3:
-Don't change ulen type in udpv6_sendmsg and l2tp_ip6_sendmsg, as
Jakub Kicinski suggested.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49722

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Fix memory corruption in VF driver
Disable VF's RX/TX queues, when it's disabled. VF can have queues enabled,
when it requests a reset. If PF driver assumes that VF is disabled,
while VF still has queues configured, VF may unmap DMA resources.
In such scenario device still can map packets to memory, which ends up
silently corrupting it.
Previously, VF driver could experience memory corruption, which lead to
crash:
[ 5119.170157] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00001b9780003237
[ 5119.170166] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 5119.170173] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT_RT SMP PTI
[ 5119.170181] CPU: 30 PID: 427592 Comm: kworker/u96:2 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W I --------- - - 4.18.0-372.9.1.rt7.166.el8.x86_64 #1
[ 5119.170189] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R740/014X06, BIOS 2.3.10 08/15/2019
[ 5119.170193] Workqueue: iavf iavf_adminq_task [iavf]
[ 5119.170219] RIP: 0010:__page_frag_cache_drain+0x5/0x30
[ 5119.170238] Code: 0f 0f b6 77 51 85 f6 74 07 31 d2 e9 05 df ff ff e9 90 fe ff ff 48 8b 05 49 db 33 01 eb b4 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 <f0> 29 77 34 74 01 c3 48 8b 07 f6 c4 80 74 0f 0f b6 77 51 85 f6 74
[ 5119.170244] RSP: 0018:ffffa43b0bdcfd78 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 5119.170250] RAX: ffffffff896b3e40 RBX: ffff8fb282524000 RCX: 0000000000000002
[ 5119.170254] RDX: 0000000049000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00001b9780003203
[ 5119.170259] RBP: ffff8fb248217b00 R08: 0000000000000022 R09: 0000000000000009
[ 5119.170262] R10: 2b849d6300000000 R11: 0000000000000020 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 5119.170265] R13: 0000000000001000 R14: 0000000000000009 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 5119.170269] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8fb1201c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5119.170274] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5119.170279] CR2: 00001b9780003237 CR3: 00000008f3e1a003 CR4: 00000000007726e0
[ 5119.170283] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 5119.170286] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 5119.170290] PKRU: 55555554
[ 5119.170292] Call Trace:
[ 5119.170298] iavf_clean_rx_ring+0xad/0x110 [iavf]
[ 5119.170324] iavf_free_rx_resources+0xe/0x50 [iavf]
[ 5119.170342] iavf_free_all_rx_resources.part.51+0x30/0x40 [iavf]
[ 5119.170358] iavf_virtchnl_completion+0xd8a/0x15b0 [iavf]
[ 5119.170377] ? iavf_clean_arq_element+0x210/0x280 [iavf]
[ 5119.170397] iavf_adminq_task+0x126/0x2e0 [iavf]
[ 5119.170416] process_one_work+0x18f/0x420
[ 5119.170429] worker_thread+0x30/0x370
[ 5119.170437] ? process_one_work+0x420/0x420
[ 5119.170445] kthread+0x151/0x170
[ 5119.170452] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
[ 5119.170460] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 5119.170477] Modules linked in: iavf sctp ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel mlx4_en mlx4_core nfp tls vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun xt_CHECKSUM ipt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_counter nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink bridge stp llc rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache sunrpc intel_rapl_msr iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dell_smbios wmi_bmof dell_wmi_descriptor dcdbas kvm_intel kvm irqbypass intel_rapl_common isst_if_common skx_edac irdma nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal i40e intel_powerclamp coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel ib_uverbs rapl ipmi_ssif intel_cstate intel_uncore mei_me pcspkr acpi_ipmi ib_core mei lpc_ich i2c_i801 ipmi_si ipmi_devintf wmi ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg mgag200 drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ice ahci drm libahci crc32c_intel libata tg3 megaraid_sas
[ 5119.170613] i2c_algo_bit dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse [last unloaded: iavf]
[ 5119.170627] CR2: 00001b9780003237

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49720

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: Fix handling of offline queues in blk_mq_alloc_request_hctx()
This patch prevents that test nvme/004 triggers the following:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in block/blk-mq.h:135:9
index 512 is out of range for type 'long unsigned int [512]'
Call Trace:
show_stack+0x52/0x58
dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x5e
dump_stack+0x10/0x12
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x3b
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49
blk_mq_alloc_request_hctx+0x304/0x310
__nvme_submit_sync_cmd+0x70/0x200 [nvme_core]
nvmf_connect_io_queue+0x23e/0x2a0 [nvme_fabrics]
nvme_loop_connect_io_queues+0x8d/0xb0 [nvme_loop]
nvme_loop_create_ctrl+0x58e/0x7d0 [nvme_loop]
nvmf_create_ctrl+0x1d7/0x4d0 [nvme_fabrics]
nvmf_dev_write+0xae/0x111 [nvme_fabrics]
vfs_write+0x144/0x560
ksys_write+0xb7/0x140
__x64_sys_write+0x42/0x50
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49708

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix bug_on ext4_mb_use_inode_pa
Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON:
==================================================================
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/mballoc.c:3211!
[...]
RIP: 0010:ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used.cold+0x85/0x136f
[...]
Call Trace:
ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x9df/0x5d30
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x1803/0x4d80
ext4_map_blocks+0x3a4/0x1a10
ext4_writepages+0x126d/0x2c30
do_writepages+0x7f/0x1b0
__filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x285/0x3b0
file_write_and_wait_range+0xb1/0x140
ext4_sync_file+0x1aa/0xca0
vfs_fsync_range+0xfb/0x260
do_fsync+0x48/0xa0
[...]
==================================================================
Above issue may happen as follows:
-------------------------------------
do_fsync
vfs_fsync_range
ext4_sync_file
file_write_and_wait_range
__filemap_fdatawrite_range
do_writepages
ext4_writepages
mpage_map_and_submit_extent
mpage_map_one_extent
ext4_map_blocks
ext4_mb_new_blocks
ext4_mb_normalize_request
>>> start + size <= ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical
ext4_mb_regular_allocator
ext4_mb_simple_scan_group
ext4_mb_use_best_found
ext4_mb_new_preallocation
ext4_mb_new_inode_pa
ext4_mb_use_inode_pa
>>> set ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len <= 0
ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used
>>> BUG_ON(ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len <= 0);
we can easily reproduce this problem with the following commands:
`fallocate -l100M disk`
`mkfs.ext4 -b 1024 -g 256 disk`
`mount disk /mnt`
`fsstress -d /mnt -l 0 -n 1000 -p 1`
The size must be smaller than or equal to EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP.
Therefore, "start + size <= ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical" may occur
when the size is truncated. So start should be the start position of
the group where ac_o_ex.fe_logical is located after alignment.
In addition, when the value of fe_logical or EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP
is very large, the value calculated by start_off is more accurate.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49703

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ibmvfc: Store vhost pointer during subcrq allocation
Currently the back pointer from a queue to the vhost adapter isn't set
until after subcrq interrupt registration. The value is available when a
queue is first allocated and can/should be also set for primary and async
queues as well as subcrqs.
This fixes a crash observed during kexec/kdump on Power 9 with legacy XICS
interrupt controller where a pending subcrq interrupt from the previous
kernel can be replayed immediately upon IRQ registration resulting in
dereference of a garbage backpointer in ibmvfc_interrupt_scsi().
Kernel attempted to read user page (58) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000058
Faulting instruction address: 0xc008000003216a08
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
...
NIP [c008000003216a08] ibmvfc_interrupt_scsi+0x40/0xb0 [ibmvfc]
LR [c0000000082079e8] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x98/0x270
Call Trace:
[c000000047fa3d80] [c0000000123e6180] 0xc0000000123e6180 (unreliable)
[c000000047fa3df0] [c0000000082079e8] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x98/0x270
[c000000047fa3ea0] [c000000008207d18] handle_irq_event+0x98/0x188
[c000000047fa3ef0] [c00000000820f564] handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc4/0x310
[c000000047fa3f40] [c000000008205c60] generic_handle_irq+0x50/0x80
[c000000047fa3f60] [c000000008015c40] __do_irq+0x70/0x1a0
[c000000047fa3f90] [c000000008016d7c] __do_IRQ+0x9c/0x130
[c000000014622f60] [0000000020000000] 0x20000000
[c000000014622ff0] [c000000008016e50] do_IRQ+0x40/0xa0
[c000000014623020] [c000000008017044] replay_soft_interrupts+0x194/0x2f0
[c000000014623210] [c0000000080172a8] arch_local_irq_restore+0x108/0x170
[c000000014623240] [c000000008eb1008] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x58/0xb0
[c000000014623270] [c00000000820b12c] __setup_irq+0x49c/0x9f0
[c000000014623310] [c00000000820b7c0] request_threaded_irq+0x140/0x230
[c000000014623380] [c008000003212a50] ibmvfc_register_scsi_channel+0x1e8/0x2f0 [ibmvfc]
[c000000014623450] [c008000003213d1c] ibmvfc_init_sub_crqs+0xc4/0x1f0 [ibmvfc]
[c0000000146234d0] [c0080000032145a8] ibmvfc_reset_crq+0x150/0x210 [ibmvfc]
[c000000014623550] [c0080000032147c8] ibmvfc_init_crq+0x160/0x280 [ibmvfc]
[c0000000146235f0] [c00800000321a9cc] ibmvfc_probe+0x2a4/0x530 [ibmvfc]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49701

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ibmvfc: Allocate/free queue resource only during probe/remove
Currently, the sub-queues and event pool resources are allocated/freed for
every CRQ connection event such as reset and LPM. This exposes the driver
to a couple issues. First the inefficiency of freeing and reallocating
memory that can simply be resued after being sanitized. Further, a system
under memory pressue runs the risk of allocation failures that could result
in a crippled driver. Finally, there is a race window where command
submission/compeletion can try to pull/return elements from/to an event
pool that is being deleted or already has been deleted due to the lack of
host state around freeing/allocating resources. The following is an example
of list corruption following a live partition migration (LPM):
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: vfat fat isofs cdrom ext4 mbcache jbd2 nft_counter nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink rpadlpar_io rpaphp xsk_diag nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache netfs rfkill bonding tls sunrpc pseries_rng drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc scsi_transport_fc ibmveth vmx_crypto dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler fuse
CPU: 0 PID: 2108 Comm: ibmvfc_0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-70.9.1.el9_0.ppc64le #1
NIP: c0000000007c4bb0 LR: c0000000007c4bac CTR: 00000000005b9a10
REGS: c00000025c10b760 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.14.0-70.9.1.el9_0.ppc64le)
MSR: 800000000282b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 2800028f XER: 0000000f
CFAR: c0000000001f55bc IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c0000000007c4bac c00000025c10ba00 c000000002a47c00 000000000000004e
GPR04: c0000031e3006f88 c0000031e308bd00 c00000025c10b768 0000000000000027
GPR08: 0000000000000000 c0000031e3009dc0 00000031e0eb0000 0000000000000000
GPR12: c0000031e2ffffa8 c000000002dd0000 c000000000187108 c00000020fcee2c0
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c008000002f81300
GPR24: 5deadbeef0000100 5deadbeef0000122 c000000263ba6910 c00000024cc88000
GPR28: 000000000000003c c0000002430a0000 c0000002430ac300 000000000000c300
NIP [c0000000007c4bb0] __list_del_entry_valid+0x90/0x100
LR [c0000000007c4bac] __list_del_entry_valid+0x8c/0x100
Call Trace:
[c00000025c10ba00] [c0000000007c4bac] __list_del_entry_valid+0x8c/0x100 (unreliable)
[c00000025c10ba60] [c008000002f42284] ibmvfc_free_queue+0xec/0x210 [ibmvfc]
[c00000025c10bb10] [c008000002f4246c] ibmvfc_deregister_scsi_channel+0xc4/0x160 [ibmvfc]
[c00000025c10bba0] [c008000002f42580] ibmvfc_release_sub_crqs+0x78/0x130 [ibmvfc]
[c00000025c10bc20] [c008000002f4f6cc] ibmvfc_do_work+0x5c4/0xc70 [ibmvfc]
[c00000025c10bce0] [c008000002f4fdec] ibmvfc_work+0x74/0x1e8 [ibmvfc]
[c00000025c10bda0] [c0000000001872b8] kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0
[c00000025c10be10] [c00000000000cd64] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
Instruction dump:
40820034 38600001 38210060 4e800020 7c0802a6 7c641b78 3c62fe7a 7d254b78
3863b590 f8010070 4ba309cd 60000000 <0fe00000> 7c0802a6 3c62fe7a 3863b640
---[ end trace 11a2b65a92f8b66c ]---
ibmvfc 30000003: Send warning. Receive queue closed, will retry.
Add registration/deregistration helpers that are called instead during
connection resets to sanitize and reconfigure the queues.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49700

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/slub: add missing TID updates on slab deactivation
The fastpath in slab_alloc_node() assumes that c->slab is stable as long as
the TID stays the same. However, two places in __slab_alloc() currently
don't update the TID when deactivating the CPU slab.
If multiple operations race the right way, this could lead to an object
getting lost; or, in an even more unlikely situation, it could even lead to
an object being freed onto the wrong slab's freelist, messing up the
`inuse` counter and eventually causing a page to be freed to the page
allocator while it still contains slab objects.
(I haven't actually tested these cases though, this is just based on
looking at the code. Writing testcases for this stuff seems like it'd be
a pain...)
The race leading to state inconsistency is (all operations on the same CPU
and kmem_cache):
- task A: begin do_slab_free():
- read TID
- read pcpu freelist (==NULL)
- check `slab == c->slab` (true)
- [PREEMPT A->B]
- task B: begin slab_alloc_node():
- fastpath fails (`c->freelist` is NULL)
- enter __slab_alloc()
- slub_get_cpu_ptr() (disables preemption)
- enter ___slab_alloc()
- take local_lock_irqsave()
- read c->freelist as NULL
- get_freelist() returns NULL
- write `c->slab = NULL`
- drop local_unlock_irqrestore()
- goto new_slab
- slub_percpu_partial() is NULL
- get_partial() returns NULL
- slub_put_cpu_ptr() (enables preemption)
- [PREEMPT B->A]
- task A: finish do_slab_free():
- this_cpu_cmpxchg_double() succeeds()
- [CORRUPT STATE: c->slab==NULL, c->freelist!=NULL]
From there, the object on c->freelist will get lost if task B is allowed to
continue from here: It will proceed to the retry_load_slab label,
set c->slab, then jump to load_freelist, which clobbers c->freelist.
But if we instead continue as follows, we get worse corruption:
- task A: run __slab_free() on object from other struct slab:
- CPU_PARTIAL_FREE case (slab was on no list, is now on pcpu partial)
- task A: run slab_alloc_node() with NUMA node constraint:
- fastpath fails (c->slab is NULL)
- call __slab_alloc()
- slub_get_cpu_ptr() (disables preemption)
- enter ___slab_alloc()
- c->slab is NULL: goto new_slab
- slub_percpu_partial() is non-NULL
- set c->slab to slub_percpu_partial(c)
- [CORRUPT STATE: c->slab points to slab-1, c->freelist has objects
from slab-2]
- goto redo
- node_match() fails
- goto deactivate_slab
- existing c->freelist is passed into deactivate_slab()
- inuse count of slab-1 is decremented to account for object from
slab-2
At this point, the inuse count of slab-1 is 1 lower than it should be.
This means that if we free all allocated objects in slab-1 except for one,
SLUB will think that slab-1 is completely unused, and may free its page,
leading to use-after-free.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49697

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix request_sock leak in sk lookup helpers
A customer reported a request_socket leak in a Calico cloud environment. We
found that a BPF program was doing a socket lookup with takes a refcnt on
the socket and that it was finding the request_socket but returning the parent
LISTEN socket via sk_to_full_sk() without decrementing the child request socket
1st, resulting in request_sock slab object leak. This patch retains the
existing behaviour of returning full socks to the caller but it also decrements
the child request_socket if one is present before doing so to prevent the leak.
Thanks to Curtis Taylor for all the help in diagnosing and testing this. And
thanks to Antoine Tenart for the reproducer and patch input.
v2 of this patch contains, refactor as per Daniel Borkmann's suggestions to
validate RCU flags on the listen socket so that it balances with bpf_sk_release()
and update comments as per Martin KaFai Lau's suggestion. One small change to
Daniels suggestion, put "sk = sk2" under "if (sk2 != sk)" to avoid an extra
instruction.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49696

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix use-after-free Read in tipc_named_reinit
syzbot found the following issue on:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tipc_named_reinit+0x94f/0x9b0
net/tipc/name_distr.c:413
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88805299a000 by task kworker/1:9/23764
CPU: 1 PID: 23764 Comm: kworker/1:9 Not tainted
5.18.0-rc4-syzkaller-00878-g17d49e6e8012 #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events tipc_net_finalize_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xeb/0x495
mm/kasan/report.c:313
print_report mm/kasan/report.c:429 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0xf4/0x1c6 mm/kasan/report.c:491
tipc_named_reinit+0x94f/0x9b0 net/tipc/name_distr.c:413
tipc_net_finalize+0x234/0x3d0 net/tipc/net.c:138
process_one_work+0x996/0x1610 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:298
</TASK>
[...]
==================================================================
In the commit
d966ddcc3821 ("tipc: fix a deadlock when flushing scheduled work"),
the cancel_work_sync() function just to make sure ONLY the work
tipc_net_finalize_work() is executing/pending on any CPU completed before
tipc namespace is destroyed through tipc_exit_net(). But this function
is not guaranteed the work is the last queued. So, the destroyed instance
may be accessed in the work which will try to enqueue later.
In order to completely fix, we re-order the calling of cancel_work_sync()
to make sure the work tipc_net_finalize_work() was last queued and it
must be completed by calling cancel_work_sync().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49691

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erspan: do not assume transport header is always set
Rewrite tests in ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit() and
erspan_fb_xmit() to not assume transport header is set.
syzbot reported:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1350 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2911 skb_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2911 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1350 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2911 ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit+0x15af/0x2eb0 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:963
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1350 Comm: aoe_tx0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-syzkaller-00160-g274295c6e53f #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:skb_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2911 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit+0x15af/0x2eb0 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:963
Code: 0f 47 f0 40 88 b5 7f fe ff ff e8 8c 16 4b f9 89 de bf ff ff ff ff e8 a0 12 4b f9 66 83 fb ff 0f 85 1d f1 ff ff e8 71 16 4b f9 <0f> 0b e9 43 f0 ff ff e8 65 16 4b f9 48 8d 85 30 ff ff ff ba 60 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005daf910 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000ffff RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88801f032100 RSI: ffffffff882e8d3f RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: ffffc90005dafab8 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 000000000000ffff
R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888024f21d40
R13: 000000000000a288 R14: 00000000000000b0 R15: ffff888025a2e000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88802c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b2e425000 CR3: 000000006d099000 CR4: 0000000000152ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4805 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4819 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3588 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x188/0x880 net/core/dev.c:3604
sch_direct_xmit+0x19f/0xbe0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:342
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3815 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x14a1/0x3900 net/core/dev.c:4219
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:2994 [inline]
tx+0x6a/0xc0 drivers/block/aoe/aoenet.c:63
kthread+0x1e7/0x3b0 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1229
kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:302
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49687

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_net: fix xdp_rxq_info bug after suspend/resume
The following sequence currently causes a driver bug warning
when using virtio_net:
# ip link set eth0 up
# echo mem > /sys/power/state (or e.g. # rtcwake -s 10 -m mem)
<resume>
# ip link set eth0 down
Missing register, driver bug
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 375 at net/core/xdp.c:138 xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x58/0x60
Call trace:
xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x58/0x60
virtnet_close+0x58/0xac
__dev_close_many+0xac/0x140
__dev_change_flags+0xd8/0x210
dev_change_flags+0x24/0x64
do_setlink+0x230/0xdd0
...
This happens because virtnet_freeze() frees the receive_queue
completely (including struct xdp_rxq_info) but does not call
xdp_rxq_info_unreg(). Similarly, virtnet_restore() sets up the
receive_queue again but does not call xdp_rxq_info_reg().
Actually, parts of virtnet_freeze_down() and virtnet_restore_up()
are almost identical to virtnet_close() and virtnet_open(): only
the calls to xdp_rxq_info_(un)reg() are missing. This means that
we can fix this easily and avoid such problems in the future by
just calling virtnet_close()/open() from the freeze/restore handlers.
Aside from adding the missing xdp_rxq_info calls the only difference
is that the refill work is only cancelled if netif_running(). However,
this should not make any functional difference since the refill work
should only be active if the network interface is actually up.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49675

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tick/nohz: unexport __init-annotated tick_nohz_full_setup()
EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text
section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot
use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up
with kernel panic.
modpost used to detect it, but it had been broken for a decade.
Commit 28438794aba4 ("modpost: fix section mismatch check for exported
init/exit sections") fixed it so modpost started to warn it again, then
this showed up:
MODPOST vmlinux.symvers
WARNING: modpost: vmlinux.o(___ksymtab_gpl+tick_nohz_full_setup+0x0): Section mismatch in reference from the variable __ksymtab_tick_nohz_full_setup to the function .init.text:tick_nohz_full_setup()
The symbol tick_nohz_full_setup is exported and annotated __init
Fix this by removing the __init annotation of tick_nohz_full_setup or drop the export.
Drop the export because tick_nohz_full_setup() is only called from the
built-in code in kernel/sched/isolation.c.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49670

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
linux/dim: Fix divide by 0 in RDMA DIM
Fix a divide 0 error in rdma_dim_stats_compare() when prev->cpe_ratio ==
0.
CallTrace:
Hardware name: H3C R4900 G3/RS33M2C9S, BIOS 2.00.37P21 03/12/2020
task: ffff880194b78000 task.stack: ffffc90006714000
RIP: 0010:backport_rdma_dim+0x10e/0x240 [mlx_compat]
RSP: 0018:ffff880c10e83ec0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000002710 RBX: ffff88096cd7f780 RCX: 0000000000000064
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000001d7c6c09
R13: ffff88096cd7f780 R14: ffff880b174fe800 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880c10e80000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000a0965b00 CR3: 000000000200a003 CR4: 00000000007606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
ib_poll_handler+0x43/0x80 [ib_core]
irq_poll_softirq+0xae/0x110
__do_softirq+0xd1/0x28c
irq_exit+0xde/0xf0
do_IRQ+0x54/0xe0
common_interrupt+0x8f/0x8f
</IRQ>
? cpuidle_enter_state+0xd9/0x2a0
? cpuidle_enter_state+0xc7/0x2a0
? do_idle+0x170/0x1d0
? cpu_startup_entry+0x6f/0x80
? start_secondary+0x1b9/0x210
? secondary_startup_64+0xa5/0xb0
Code: 0f 87 e1 00 00 00 8b 4c 24 14 44 8b 43 14 89 c8 4d 63 c8 44 29 c0 99 31 d0 29 d0 31 d2 48 98 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 80 48 c1 e0 02 <49> f7 f1 48 83 f8 0a 0f 86 c1 00 00 00 44 39 c1 7f 10 48 89 df
RIP: backport_rdma_dim+0x10e/0x240 [mlx_compat] RSP: ffff880c10e83ec0

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49667

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bonding: fix use-after-free after 802.3ad slave unbind
commit 0622cab0341c ("bonding: fix 802.3ad aggregator reselection"),
resolve case, when there is several aggregation groups in the same bond.
bond_3ad_unbind_slave will invalidate (clear) aggregator when
__agg_active_ports return zero. So, ad_clear_agg can be executed even, when
num_of_ports!=0. Than bond_3ad_unbind_slave can be executed again for,
previously cleared aggregator. NOTE: at this time bond_3ad_unbind_slave
will not update slave ports list, because lag_ports==NULL. So, here we
got slave ports, pointing to freed aggregator memory.
Fix with checking actual number of ports in group (as was before
commit 0622cab0341c ("bonding: fix 802.3ad aggregator reselection") ),
before ad_clear_agg().
The KASAN logs are as follows:
[ 767.617392] ==================================================================
[ 767.630776] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bond_3ad_state_machine_handler+0x13dc/0x1470
[ 767.638764] Read of size 2 at addr ffff00011ba9d430 by task kworker/u8:7/767
[ 767.647361] CPU: 3 PID: 767 Comm: kworker/u8:7 Tainted: G O 5.15.11 #15
[ 767.655329] Hardware name: DNI AmazonGo1 A7040 board (DT)
[ 767.660760] Workqueue: lacp_1 bond_3ad_state_machine_handler
[ 767.666468] Call trace:
[ 767.668930] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2d0
[ 767.672625] show_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 767.675965] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84
[ 767.679659] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2b8
[ 767.685451] kasan_report+0x1f0/0x260
[ 767.689148] __asan_load2+0x94/0xd0
[ 767.692667] bond_3ad_state_machine_handler+0x13dc/0x1470

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49658

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix insufficient bounds propagation from adjust_scalar_min_max_vals
Kuee reported a corner case where the tnum becomes constant after the call
to __reg_bound_offset(), but the register's bounds are not, that is, its
min bounds are still not equal to the register's max bounds.
This in turn allows to leak pointers through turning a pointer register as
is into an unknown scalar via adjust_ptr_min_max_vals().
Before:
func#0 @0
0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
0: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))
1: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
2: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()
3: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()
4: (47) r3 |= 32767 ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)
5: (75) if r3 s>= 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
6: (95) exit
from 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
7: (d5) if r3 s<= 0x8000 goto pc+1 ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
8: (95) exit
from 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
9: (07) r3 += -32767 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) <--- [*]
10: (95) exit
What can be seen here is that R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff;
0x8000)) after the operation R3 += -32767 results in a 'malformed' constant, that
is, R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)). Intersecting with var_off has
not been done at that point via __update_reg_bounds(), which would have improved
the umax to be equal to umin.
Refactor the tnum <> min/max bounds information flow into a reg_bounds_sync()
helper and use it consistently everywhere. After the fix, bounds have been
corrected to R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) and thus the register
is regarded as a 'proper' constant scalar of 0.
After:
func#0 @0
0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
0: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))
1: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
2: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()
3: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()
4: (47) r3 |= 32767 ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)
5: (75) if r3 s>= 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
6: (95) exit
from 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
7: (d5) if r3 s<= 0x8000 goto pc+1 ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
8: (95) exit
from 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49647

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup: Use separate src/dst nodes when preloading css_sets for migration
Each cset (css_set) is pinned by its tasks. When we're moving tasks around
across csets for a migration, we need to hold the source and destination
csets to ensure that they don't go away while we're moving tasks about. This
is done by linking cset->mg_preload_node on either the
mgctx->preloaded_src_csets or mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets list. Using the
same cset->mg_preload_node for both the src and dst lists was deemed okay as
a cset can't be both the source and destination at the same time.
Unfortunately, this overloading becomes problematic when multiple tasks are
involved in a migration and some of them are identity noop migrations while
others are actually moving across cgroups. For example, this can happen with
the following sequence on cgroup1:
#1> mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b
#2> echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs
#3> RUN_A_COMMAND_WHICH_CREATES_MULTIPLE_THREADS &
#4> PID=$!
#5> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b/tasks
#6> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs
the process including the group leader back into a. In this final migration,
non-leader threads would be doing identity migration while the group leader
is doing an actual one.
After #3, let's say the whole process was in cset A, and that after #4, the
leader moves to cset B. Then, during #6, the following happens:
1. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on B for the leader.
2. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on A for the other threads.
3. cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst() is called. It scans the src list.
4. It notices that B wants to migrate to A, so it tries to A to the dst
list but realizes that its ->mg_preload_node is already busy.
5. and then it notices A wants to migrate to A as it's an identity
migration, it culls it by list_del_init()'ing its ->mg_preload_node and
putting references accordingly.
6. The rest of migration takes place with B on the src list but nothing on
the dst list.
This means that A isn't held while migration is in progress. If all tasks
leave A before the migration finishes and the incoming task pins it, the
cset will be destroyed leading to use-after-free.
This is caused by overloading cset->mg_preload_node for both src and dst
preload lists. We wanted to exclude the cset from the src list but ended up
inadvertently excluding it from the dst list too.
This patch fixes the issue by separating out cset->mg_preload_node into
->mg_src_preload_node and ->mg_dst_preload_node, so that the src and dst
preloadings don't interfere with each other.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49636

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vlan: fix memory leak in vlan_newlink()
Blamed commit added back a bug I fixed in commit 9bbd917e0bec
("vlan: fix memory leak in vlan_dev_set_egress_priority")
If a memory allocation fails in vlan_changelink() after other allocations
succeeded, we need to call vlan_dev_free_egress_priority()
to free all allocated memory because after a failed ->newlink()
we do not call any methods like ndo_uninit() or dev->priv_destructor().
In following example, if the allocation for last element 2000:2001 fails,
we need to free eight prior allocations:
ip link add link dummy0 dummy0.100 type vlan id 100 \
egress-qos-map 1:2 2:3 3:4 4:5 5:6 6:7 7:8 8:9 2000:2001
syzbot report was:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888117bd1060 (size 32):
comm "syz-executor408", pid 3759, jiffies 4294956555 (age 34.090s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
09 00 00 00 00 a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff83fc60ad>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:600 [inline]
[<ffffffff83fc60ad>] vlan_dev_set_egress_priority+0xed/0x170 net/8021q/vlan_dev.c:193
[<ffffffff83fc6628>] vlan_changelink+0x178/0x1d0 net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c:128
[<ffffffff83fc67c8>] vlan_newlink+0x148/0x260 net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c:185
[<ffffffff838b1278>] rtnl_newlink_create net/core/rtnetlink.c:3363 [inline]
[<ffffffff838b1278>] __rtnl_newlink+0xa58/0xdc0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3580
[<ffffffff838b1629>] rtnl_newlink+0x49/0x70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3593
[<ffffffff838ac66c>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x21c/0x5c0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6089
[<ffffffff839f9c37>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x87/0x1d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501
[<ffffffff839f8da7>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
[<ffffffff839f8da7>] netlink_unicast+0x397/0x4c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
[<ffffffff839f9266>] netlink_sendmsg+0x396/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
[<ffffffff8384dbf6>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
[<ffffffff8384dbf6>] sock_sendmsg+0x56/0x80 net/socket.c:734
[<ffffffff8384e15c>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x36c/0x390 net/socket.c:2488
[<ffffffff838523cb>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x8b/0xd0 net/socket.c:2542
[<ffffffff838525b8>] __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2571 [inline]
[<ffffffff838525b8>] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2580 [inline]
[<ffffffff838525b8>] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2578 [inline]
[<ffffffff838525b8>] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xf0 net/socket.c:2578
[<ffffffff845ad8d5>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
[<ffffffff845ad8d5>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
[<ffffffff8460006a>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49626

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sfc: fix use after free when disabling sriov
Use after free is detected by kfence when disabling sriov. What was read
after being freed was vf->pci_dev: it was freed from pci_disable_sriov
and later read in efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vports, called from
efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vswitching.
Set the pointer to NULL at release time to not trying to read it later.
Reproducer and dmesg log (note that kfence doesn't detect it every time):
$ echo 1 > /sys/class/net/enp65s0f0np0/device/sriov_numvfs
$ echo 0 > /sys/class/net/enp65s0f0np0/device/sriov_numvfs
BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vswitching+0x82/0x170 [sfc]
Use-after-free read at 0x00000000ff3c1ba5 (in kfence-#224):
efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vswitching+0x82/0x170 [sfc]
efx_ef10_pci_sriov_disable+0x38/0x70 [sfc]
efx_pci_sriov_configure+0x24/0x40 [sfc]
sriov_numvfs_store+0xfe/0x140
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0
new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0
vfs_write+0x1eb/0x280
ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
kfence-#224: 0x00000000edb8ef95-0x00000000671f5ce1, size=2792, cache=kmalloc-4k
allocated by task 6771 on cpu 10 at 3137.860196s:
pci_alloc_dev+0x21/0x60
pci_iov_add_virtfn+0x2a2/0x320
sriov_enable+0x212/0x3e0
efx_ef10_sriov_configure+0x67/0x80 [sfc]
efx_pci_sriov_configure+0x24/0x40 [sfc]
sriov_numvfs_store+0xba/0x140
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0
new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0
vfs_write+0x1eb/0x280
ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
freed by task 6771 on cpu 12 at 3170.991309s:
device_release+0x34/0x90
kobject_cleanup+0x3a/0x130
pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0xd9/0x120
sriov_disable+0x30/0xe0
efx_ef10_pci_sriov_disable+0x57/0x70 [sfc]
efx_pci_sriov_configure+0x24/0x40 [sfc]
sriov_numvfs_store+0xfe/0x140
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0
new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0
vfs_write+0x1eb/0x280
ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49624

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atlantic: remove aq_nic_deinit() when resume
aq_nic_deinit() has been called while suspending, so we don't have to call
it again on resume.
Actually, call it again leads to another hang issue when resuming from
S3.
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992345] Call Trace:
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992346] <TASK>
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992348] aq_nic_deinit+0xb4/0xd0 [atlantic]
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992356] aq_pm_thaw+0x7f/0x100 [atlantic]
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992362] pci_pm_resume+0x5c/0x90
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992366] ? pci_pm_thaw+0x80/0x80
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992368] dpm_run_callback+0x4e/0x120
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992371] device_resume+0xad/0x200
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992373] async_resume+0x1e/0x40
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992374] async_run_entry_fn+0x33/0x120
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992377] process_one_work+0x220/0x3c0
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992380] worker_thread+0x4d/0x3f0
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992382] ? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992384] kthread+0x12a/0x150
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992386] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992387] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992391] </TASK>
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992392] ---[ end trace 1ec8c79604ed5e0d ]---
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992394] PM: dpm_run_callback(): pci_pm_resume+0x0/0x90 returns -110
Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992397] atlantic 0000:02:00.0: PM: failed to resume async: error -110

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49613

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: 8250: Fix PM usage_count for console handover
When console is enabled, univ8250_console_setup() calls
serial8250_console_setup() before .dev is set to uart_port. Therefore,
it will not call pm_runtime_get_sync(). Later, when the actual driver
is going to take over univ8250_console_exit() is called. As .dev is
already set, serial8250_console_exit() makes pm_runtime_put_sync() call
with usage count being zero triggering PM usage count warning
(extra debug for univ8250_console_setup(), univ8250_console_exit(), and
serial8250_register_ports()):
[ 0.068987] univ8250_console_setup ttyS0 nodev
[ 0.499670] printk: console [ttyS0] enabled
[ 0.717955] printk: console [ttyS0] printing thread started
[ 1.960163] serial8250_register_ports assigned dev for ttyS0
[ 1.976830] printk: console [ttyS0] disabled
[ 1.976888] printk: console [ttyS0] printing thread stopped
[ 1.977073] univ8250_console_exit ttyS0 usage:0
[ 1.977075] serial8250 serial8250: Runtime PM usage count underflow!
[ 1.977429] dw-apb-uart.6: ttyS0 at MMIO 0x4010006000 (irq = 33, base_baud = 115200) is a 16550A
[ 1.977812] univ8250_console_setup ttyS0 usage:2
[ 1.978167] printk: console [ttyS0] printing thread started
[ 1.978203] printk: console [ttyS0] enabled
To fix the issue, call pm_runtime_get_sync() in
serial8250_register_ports() as soon as .dev is set for an uart_port
if it has console enabled.
This problem became apparent only recently because 82586a721595 ("PM:
runtime: Avoid device usage count underflows") added the warning
printout. I confirmed this problem also occurs with v5.18 (w/o the
warning printout, obviously).

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49605

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
igc: Reinstate IGC_REMOVED logic and implement it properly
The initially merged version of the igc driver code (via commit
146740f9abc4, "igc: Add support for PF") contained the following
IGC_REMOVED checks in the igc_rd32/wr32() MMIO accessors:
u32 igc_rd32(struct igc_hw *hw, u32 reg)
{
u8 __iomem *hw_addr = READ_ONCE(hw->hw_addr);
u32 value = 0;
if (IGC_REMOVED(hw_addr))
return ~value;
value = readl(&hw_addr[reg]);
/* reads should not return all F's */
if (!(~value) && (!reg || !(~readl(hw_addr))))
hw->hw_addr = NULL;
return value;
}
And:
#define wr32(reg, val) \
do { \
u8 __iomem *hw_addr = READ_ONCE((hw)->hw_addr); \
if (!IGC_REMOVED(hw_addr)) \
writel((val), &hw_addr[(reg)]); \
} while (0)
E.g. igb has similar checks in its MMIO accessors, and has a similar
macro E1000_REMOVED, which is implemented as follows:
#define E1000_REMOVED(h) unlikely(!(h))
These checks serve to detect and take note of an 0xffffffff MMIO read
return from the device, which can be caused by a PCIe link flap or some
other kind of PCI bus error, and to avoid performing MMIO reads and
writes from that point onwards.
However, the IGC_REMOVED macro was not originally implemented:
#ifndef IGC_REMOVED
#define IGC_REMOVED(a) (0)
#endif /* IGC_REMOVED */
This led to the IGC_REMOVED logic to be removed entirely in a
subsequent commit (commit 3c215fb18e70, "igc: remove IGC_REMOVED
function"), with the rationale that such checks matter only for
virtualization and that igc does not support virtualization -- but a
PCIe device can become detached even without virtualization being in
use, and without proper checks, a PCIe bus error affecting an igc
adapter will lead to various NULL pointer dereferences, as the first
access after the error will set hw->hw_addr to NULL, and subsequent
accesses will blindly dereference this now-NULL pointer.
This patch reinstates the IGC_REMOVED checks in igc_rd32/wr32(), and
implements IGC_REMOVED the way it is done for igb, by checking for the
unlikely() case of hw_addr being NULL. This change prevents the oopses
seen when a PCIe link flap occurs on an igc adapter.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49567

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mempolicy: fix uninit-value in mpol_rebind_policy()
mpol_set_nodemask()(mm/mempolicy.c) does not set up nodemask when
pol->mode is MPOL_LOCAL. Check pol->mode before access
pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed in mpol_rebind_policy()(mm/mempolicy.c).
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_policy mm/mempolicy.c:352 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_task+0x2ac/0x2c0 mm/mempolicy.c:368
mpol_rebind_policy mm/mempolicy.c:352 [inline]
mpol_rebind_task+0x2ac/0x2c0 mm/mempolicy.c:368
cpuset_change_task_nodemask kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1711 [inline]
cpuset_attach+0x787/0x15e0 kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:2278
cgroup_migrate_execute+0x1023/0x1d20 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2515
cgroup_migrate kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2771 [inline]
cgroup_attach_task+0x540/0x8b0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2804
__cgroup1_procs_write+0x5cc/0x7a0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:520
cgroup1_tasks_write+0x94/0xb0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:539
cgroup_file_write+0x4c2/0x9e0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:3852
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x66a/0x9f0 fs/kernfs/file.c:296
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2162 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:503 [inline]
vfs_write+0x1318/0x2030 fs/read_write.c:590
ksys_write+0x28b/0x510 fs/read_write.c:643
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0xdb/0x120 fs/read_write.c:652
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:524 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3251 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3259 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x902/0x11c0 mm/slub.c:3264
mpol_new mm/mempolicy.c:293 [inline]
do_set_mempolicy+0x421/0xb70 mm/mempolicy.c:853
kernel_set_mempolicy mm/mempolicy.c:1504 [inline]
__do_sys_set_mempolicy mm/mempolicy.c:1510 [inline]
__se_sys_set_mempolicy+0x44c/0xb60 mm/mempolicy.c:1507
__x64_sys_set_mempolicy+0xd8/0x110 mm/mempolicy.c:1507
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_task (2)
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=d6eb90f952c2a5de9ea718a1b873c55cb13b59dc
This patch seems to fix below bug too.
KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_mm (2)
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f2fecd0d7013f54ec4162f60743a2b28df40926b
The uninit-value is pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed in mpol_rebind_policy().
When syzkaller reproducer runs to the beginning of mpol_new(),
mpol_new() mm/mempolicy.c
do_mbind() mm/mempolicy.c
kernel_mbind() mm/mempolicy.c
`mode` is 1(MPOL_PREFERRED), nodes_empty(*nodes) is `true` and `flags`
is 0. Then
mode = MPOL_LOCAL;
...
policy->mode = mode;
policy->flags = flags;
will be executed. So in mpol_set_nodemask(),
mpol_set_nodemask() mm/mempolicy.c
do_mbind()
kernel_mbind()
pol->mode is 4 (MPOL_LOCAL), that `nodemask` in `pol` is not initialized,
which will be accessed in mpol_rebind_policy().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49559

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Drop WARNs that assert a triple fault never "escapes" from L2
Remove WARNs that sanity check that KVM never lets a triple fault for L2
escape and incorrectly end up in L1. In normal operation, the sanity
check is perfectly valid, but it incorrectly assumes that it's impossible
for userspace to induce KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT without bouncing through
KVM_RUN (which guarantees kvm_check_nested_state() will see and handle
the triple fault).
The WARN can currently be triggered if userspace injects a machine check
while L2 is active and CR4.MCE=0. And a future fix to allow save/restore
of KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, e.g. so that a synthesized triple fault isn't
lost on migration, will make it trivially easy for userspace to trigger
the WARN.
Clearing KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT when forcibly leaving guest mode is
tempting, but wrong, especially if/when the request is saved/restored,
e.g. if userspace restores events (including a triple fault) and then
restores nested state (which may forcibly leave guest mode). Ignoring
the fact that KVM doesn't currently provide the necessary APIs, it's
userspace's responsibility to manage pending events during save/restore.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1399 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4522 nested_vmx_vmexit+0x7fe/0xd90 [kvm_intel]
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
CPU: 7 PID: 1399 Comm: state_test Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3+ #808
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:nested_vmx_vmexit+0x7fe/0xd90 [kvm_intel]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
vmx_set_nested_state+0xca/0x3e0 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xf49/0x13e0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4b9/0x660 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49543

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ath11k: fix the warning of dev_wake in mhi_pm_disable_transition()
When test device recovery with below command, it has warning in message
as below.
echo assert > /sys/kernel/debug/ath11k/wcn6855\ hw2.0/simulate_fw_crash
echo assert > /sys/kernel/debug/ath11k/qca6390\ hw2.0/simulate_fw_crash
warning message:
[ 1965.642121] ath11k_pci 0000:06:00.0: simulating firmware assert crash
[ 1968.471364] ieee80211 phy0: Hardware restart was requested
[ 1968.511305] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1968.511368] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1546 at drivers/bus/mhi/core/pm.c:505 mhi_pm_disable_transition+0xb37/0xda0 [mhi]
[ 1968.511443] Modules linked in: ath11k_pci ath11k mac80211 libarc4 cfg80211 qmi_helpers qrtr_mhi mhi qrtr nvme nvme_core
[ 1968.511563] CPU: 3 PID: 1546 Comm: kworker/u17:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc3-wt-ath+ #579
[ 1968.511629] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7HVK/NUC8i7HVB, BIOS HNKBLi70.86A.0067.2021.0528.1339 05/28/2021
[ 1968.511704] Workqueue: mhi_hiprio_wq mhi_pm_st_worker [mhi]
[ 1968.511787] RIP: 0010:mhi_pm_disable_transition+0xb37/0xda0 [mhi]
[ 1968.511870] Code: a9 fe ff ff 4c 89 ff 44 89 04 24 e8 03 46 f6 e5 44 8b 04 24 41 83 f8 01 0f 84 21 fe ff ff e9 4c fd ff ff 0f 0b e9 af f8 ff ff <0f> 0b e9 5c f8 ff ff 48 89 df e8 da 9e ee e3 e9 12 fd ff ff 4c 89
[ 1968.511923] RSP: 0018:ffffc900024efbf0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 1968.511969] RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: ffff88811d241250 RCX: ffffffffc0176922
[ 1968.512014] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888118a90a24
[ 1968.512059] RBP: ffff888118a90800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888118a90a27
[ 1968.512102] R10: ffffed1023152144 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888118a908ac
[ 1968.512229] R13: ffff888118a90928 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff888118a90a24
[ 1968.512310] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888234200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1968.512405] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1968.512493] CR2: 00007f5538f443a8 CR3: 000000016dc28001 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[ 1968.512587] Call Trace:
[ 1968.512672] <TASK>
[ 1968.512751] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x1f/0x40
[ 1968.512859] mhi_pm_st_worker+0x3ac/0x790 [mhi]
[ 1968.512959] ? mhi_pm_mission_mode_transition.isra.0+0x7d0/0x7d0 [mhi]
[ 1968.513063] process_one_work+0x86a/0x1400
[ 1968.513184] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x230/0x230
[ 1968.513312] ? move_linked_works+0x125/0x290
[ 1968.513416] worker_thread+0x6db/0xf60
[ 1968.513536] ? process_one_work+0x1400/0x1400
[ 1968.513627] kthread+0x241/0x2d0
[ 1968.513733] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 1968.513821] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 1968.513924] </TASK>
Reason is mhi_deassert_dev_wake() from mhi_device_put() is called
but mhi_assert_dev_wake() from __mhi_device_get_sync() is not called
in progress of recovery. Commit 8e0559921f9a ("bus: mhi: core:
Skip device wake in error or shutdown state") add check for the
pm_state of mhi in __mhi_device_get_sync(), and the pm_state is not
the normal state untill recovery is completed, so it leads the
dev_wake is not 0 and above warning print in mhi_pm_disable_transition()
while checking mhi_cntrl->dev_wake.
Add check in ath11k_pci_write32()/ath11k_pci_read32() to skip call
mhi_device_put() if mhi_device_get_sync() does not really do wake,
then the warning gone.
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03003-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-2

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49542

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: lpfc: Move cfg_log_verbose check before calling lpfc_dmp_dbg()
In an attempt to log message 0126 with LOG_TRACE_EVENT, the following hard
lockup call trace hangs the system.
Call Trace:
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x32/0x40
lpfc_dmp_dbg.part.32+0x28/0x220 [lpfc]
lpfc_cmpl_els_fdisc+0x145/0x460 [lpfc]
lpfc_sli_cancel_jobs+0x92/0xd0 [lpfc]
lpfc_els_flush_cmd+0x43c/0x670 [lpfc]
lpfc_els_flush_all_cmd+0x37/0x60 [lpfc]
lpfc_sli4_async_event_proc+0x956/0x1720 [lpfc]
lpfc_do_work+0x1485/0x1d70 [lpfc]
kthread+0x112/0x130
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
Kernel panic - not syncing: Hard LOCKUP
The same CPU tries to claim the phba->port_list_lock twice.
Move the cfg_log_verbose checks as part of the lpfc_printf_vlog() and
lpfc_printf_log() macros before calling lpfc_dmp_dbg(). There is no need
to take the phba->port_list_lock within lpfc_dmp_dbg().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49539

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtw89: ser: fix CAM leaks occurring in L2 reset
The CAM, meaning address CAM and bssid CAM here, will get leaks during
SER (system error recover) L2 reset process and ieee80211_restart_hw()
which is called by L2 reset process eventually.
The normal flow would be like
-> add interface (acquire 1)
-> enter ips (release 1)
-> leave ips (acquire 1)
-> connection (occupy 1) <(A) 1 leak after L2 reset if non-sec connection>
The ieee80211_restart_hw() flow (under connection)
-> ieee80211 reconfig
-> add interface (acquire 1)
-> leave ips (acquire 1)
-> connection (occupy (A) + 2) <(B) 1 more leak>
Originally, CAM is released before HW restart only if connection is under
security. Now, release CAM whatever connection it is to fix leak in (A).
OTOH, check if CAM is already valid to avoid acquiring multiple times to
fix (B).
Besides, if AP mode, release address CAM of all stations before HW restart.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49535

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: lpfc: Fix null pointer dereference after failing to issue FLOGI and PLOGI
If lpfc_issue_els_flogi() fails and returns non-zero status, the node
reference count is decremented to trigger the release of the nodelist
structure. However, if there is a prior registration or dev-loss-evt work
pending, the node may be released prematurely. When dev-loss-evt
completes, the released node is referenced causing a use-after-free null
pointer dereference.
Similarly, when processing non-zero ELS PLOGI completion status in
lpfc_cmpl_els_plogi(), the ndlp flags are checked for a transport
registration before triggering node removal. If dev-loss-evt work is
pending, the node may be released prematurely and a subsequent call to
lpfc_dev_loss_tmo_handler() results in a use after free ndlp dereference.
Add test for pending dev-loss before decrementing the node reference count
for FLOGI, PLOGI, PRLI, and ADISC handling.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49526

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/bitmap: don't set sb values if can't pass sanity check
If bitmap area contains invalid data, kernel will crash then mdadm
triggers "Segmentation fault".
This is cluster-md speical bug. In non-clustered env, mdadm will
handle broken metadata case. In clustered array, only kernel space
handles bitmap slot info. But even this bug only happened in clustered
env, current sanity check is wrong, the code should be changed.
How to trigger: (faulty injection)
dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=1 oflag=direct of=/dev/sda
dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=1 oflag=direct of=/dev/sdb
mdadm -C /dev/md0 -b clustered -e 1.2 -n 2 -l mirror /dev/sda /dev/sdb
mdadm -Ss
echo aaa > magic.txt
== below modifying slot 2 bitmap data ==
dd if=magic.txt of=/dev/sda seek=16384 bs=1 count=3 <== destroy magic
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda seek=16436 bs=1 count=4 <== ZERO chunksize
mdadm -A /dev/md0 /dev/sda /dev/sdb
== kernel crashes. mdadm outputs "Segmentation fault" ==
Reason of kernel crash:
In md_bitmap_read_sb (called by md_bitmap_create), bad bitmap magic didn't
block chunksize assignment, and zero value made DIV_ROUND_UP_SECTOR_T()
trigger "divide error".
Crash log:
kernel: md: md0 stopped.
kernel: md/raid1:md0: not clean -- starting background reconstruction
kernel: md/raid1:md0: active with 2 out of 2 mirrors
kernel: dlm: ... ...
kernel: md-cluster: Joined cluster 44810aba-38bb-e6b8-daca-bc97a0b254aa slot 1
kernel: md0: invalid bitmap file superblock: bad magic
kernel: md_bitmap_copy_from_slot can't get bitmap from slot 2
kernel: md-cluster: Could not gather bitmaps from slot 2
kernel: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 1603 Comm: mdadm Not tainted 5.14.6-1-default
kernel: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
kernel: RIP: 0010:md_bitmap_create+0x1d1/0x850 [md_mod]
kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffc22ac0843ba0 EFLAGS: 00010246
kernel: ... ...
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: ? dlm_lock_sync+0xd0/0xd0 [md_cluster 77fe..7a0]
kernel: md_bitmap_copy_from_slot+0x2c/0x290 [md_mod 24ea..d3a]
kernel: load_bitmaps+0xec/0x210 [md_cluster 77fe..7a0]
kernel: md_bitmap_load+0x81/0x1e0 [md_mod 24ea..d3a]
kernel: do_md_run+0x30/0x100 [md_mod 24ea..d3a]
kernel: md_ioctl+0x1290/0x15a0 [md_mod 24ea....d3a]
kernel: ? mddev_unlock+0xaa/0x130 [md_mod 24ea..d3a]
kernel: ? blkdev_ioctl+0xb1/0x2b0
kernel: block_ioctl+0x3b/0x40
kernel: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x7f/0xb0
kernel: do_syscall_64+0x59/0x80
kernel: ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ab/0x230
kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x40
kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x80
kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7f4a15fa722b
kernel: ... ...
kernel: ---[ end trace 8afa7612f559c868 ]---
kernel: RIP: 0010:md_bitmap_create+0x1d1/0x850 [md_mod]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49519

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ath10k: skip ath10k_halt during suspend for driver state RESTARTING
Double free crash is observed when FW recovery(caused by wmi
timeout/crash) is followed by immediate suspend event. The FW recovery
is triggered by ath10k_core_restart() which calls driver clean up via
ath10k_halt(). When the suspend event occurs between the FW recovery,
the restart worker thread is put into frozen state until suspend completes.
The suspend event triggers ath10k_stop() which again triggers ath10k_halt()
The double invocation of ath10k_halt() causes ath10k_htt_rx_free() to be
called twice(Note: ath10k_htt_rx_alloc was not called by restart worker
thread because of its frozen state), causing the crash.
To fix this, during the suspend flow, skip call to ath10k_halt() in
ath10k_stop() when the current driver state is ATH10K_STATE_RESTARTING.
Also, for driver state ATH10K_STATE_RESTARTING, call
ath10k_wait_for_suspend() in ath10k_stop(). This is because call to
ath10k_wait_for_suspend() is skipped later in
[ath10k_halt() > ath10k_core_stop()] for the driver state
ATH10K_STATE_RESTARTING.
The frozen restart worker thread will be cancelled during resume when the
device comes out of suspend.
Below is the crash stack for reference:
[ 428.469167] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 428.469180] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:4150!
[ 428.469193] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 428.469219] Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
[ 428.469230] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x319/0x31b
[ 428.469241] RSP: 0018:ffffa1fac015fc30 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 428.469247] RAX: ffffedb10419d108 RBX: ffff8c05262b0000
[ 428.469252] RDX: ffff8c04a8c07000 RSI: 0000000000000000
[ 428.469256] RBP: ffffa1fac015fc78 R08: 0000000000000000
[ 428.469276] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 428.469285] Call Trace:
[ 428.469295] ? dma_free_attrs+0x5f/0x7d
[ 428.469320] ath10k_core_stop+0x5b/0x6f
[ 428.469336] ath10k_halt+0x126/0x177
[ 428.469352] ath10k_stop+0x41/0x7e
[ 428.469387] drv_stop+0x88/0x10e
[ 428.469410] __ieee80211_suspend+0x297/0x411
[ 428.469441] rdev_suspend+0x6e/0xd0
[ 428.469462] wiphy_suspend+0xb1/0x105
[ 428.469483] ? name_show+0x2d/0x2d
[ 428.469490] dpm_run_callback+0x8c/0x126
[ 428.469511] ? name_show+0x2d/0x2d
[ 428.469517] __device_suspend+0x2e7/0x41b
[ 428.469523] async_suspend+0x1f/0x93
[ 428.469529] async_run_entry_fn+0x3d/0xd1
[ 428.469535] process_one_work+0x1b1/0x329
[ 428.469541] worker_thread+0x213/0x372
[ 428.469547] kthread+0x150/0x15f
[ 428.469552] ? pr_cont_work+0x58/0x58
[ 428.469558] ? kthread_blkcg+0x31/0x31
Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00288-QCARMSWPZ-1

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49518

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: ipc3-topology: Correct get_control_data for non bytes payload
It is possible to craft a topology where sof_get_control_data() would do
out of bounds access because it expects that it is only called when the
payload is bytes type.
Confusingly it also handles other types of controls, but the payload
parsing implementation is only valid for bytes.
Fix the code to count the non bytes controls and instead of storing a
pointer to sof_abi_hdr in sof_widget_data (which is only valid for bytes),
store the pointer to the data itself and add a new member to save the size
of the data.
In case of non bytes controls we store the pointer to the chanv itself,
which is just an array of values at the end.
In case of bytes control, drop the wrong cdata->data (wdata[i].pdata) check
against NULL since it is incorrect and invalid in this context.
The data is pointing to the end of cdata struct, so it should never be
null.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49515

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: cs35l41: Fix an out-of-bounds access in otp_packed_element_t
The CS35L41_NUM_OTP_ELEM is 100, but only 99 entries are defined in
the array otp_map_1/2[CS35L41_NUM_OTP_ELEM], this will trigger UBSAN
to report a shift-out-of-bounds warning in the cs35l41_otp_unpack()
since the last entry in the array will result in GENMASK(-1, 0).
UBSAN reports this problem:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in /home/hwang4/build/jammy/jammy/sound/soc/codecs/cs35l41-lib.c:836:8
shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
CPU: 10 PID: 595 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.15.0-23-generic #23
Hardware name: LENOVO \x02MFG_IN_GO/\x02MFG_IN_GO, BIOS N3GET19W (1.00 ) 03/11/2022
Call Trace:
<TASK>
show_stack+0x52/0x58
dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x5f
dump_stack+0x10/0x12
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x45
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x61/0xef
? regmap_unlock_mutex+0xe/0x10
cs35l41_otp_unpack.cold+0x1c6/0x2b2 [snd_soc_cs35l41_lib]
cs35l41_hda_probe+0x24f/0x33a [snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41]
cs35l41_hda_i2c_probe+0x65/0x90 [snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_i2c]
? cs35l41_hda_i2c_remove+0x20/0x20 [snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_i2c]
i2c_device_probe+0x252/0x2b0

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49513

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: governor: Use kobject release() method to free dbs_data
The struct dbs_data embeds a struct gov_attr_set and
the struct gov_attr_set embeds a kobject. Since every kobject must have
a release() method and we can't use kfree() to free it directly,
so introduce cpufreq_dbs_data_release() to release the dbs_data via
the kobject::release() method. This fixes the calltrace like below:
ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x34
WARNING: CPU: 12 PID: 810 at lib/debugobjects.c:505 debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
Modules linked in:
CPU: 12 PID: 810 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.16.0-next-20220120-yocto-standard+ #536
Hardware name: Marvell OcteonTX CN96XX board (DT)
pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
lr : debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
sp : ffff80001dfcf9a0
x29: ffff80001dfcf9a0 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: ffff0001464f0000
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff8000090e3f00 x24: ffff80000af60210
x23: ffff8000094dfb78 x22: ffff8000090e3f00 x21: ffff0001080b7118
x20: ffff80000aeb2430 x19: ffff800009e8f5e0 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000002 x16: 00004d62e58be040 x15: 013590470523aff8
x14: ffff8000090e1828 x13: 0000000001359047 x12: 00000000f5257d14
x11: 0000000000040591 x10: 0000000066c1ffea x9 : ffff8000080d15e0
x8 : ffff80000a1765a8 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffff800009e8c000 x4 : ffff800009e8c760 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0001474ed040
Call trace:
debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
__debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x1d0/0x25c
debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x24/0xa0
kfree+0x11c/0x440
cpufreq_dbs_governor_exit+0xa8/0xac
cpufreq_exit_governor+0x44/0x90
cpufreq_set_policy+0x29c/0x570
store_scaling_governor+0x110/0x154
store+0xb0/0xe0
sysfs_kf_write+0x58/0x84
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1c0
new_sync_write+0xf0/0x18c
vfs_write+0x1cc/0x220
ksys_write+0x74/0x100
__arm64_sys_write+0x28/0x3c
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x58/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x70/0x170
el0_svc+0x54/0x190
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x130
el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4
irq event stamp: 189006
hardirqs last enabled at (189005): [<ffff8000080849d0>] finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xe0/0x2c0
hardirqs last disabled at (189006): [<ffff8000090667a4>] el1_dbg+0x24/0xa0
softirqs last enabled at (188966): [<ffff8000080106d0>] __do_softirq+0x4b0/0x6a0
softirqs last disabled at (188957): [<ffff80000804a618>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x108/0x1a4
[ rjw: Because can be freed by the gov_attr_set_put() in
cpufreq_dbs_governor_exit() now, it is also necessary to put the
invocation of the governor ->exit() callback into the new
cpufreq_dbs_data_release() function. ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49511

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: defio: fix the pagelist corruption
Easily hit the below list corruption:
==
list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffffffffc0ceb090), but
was ffffec604507edc8. (prev=ffffec604507edc8).
WARNING: CPU: 65 PID: 3959 at lib/list_debug.c:26
__list_add_valid+0x53/0x80
CPU: 65 PID: 3959 Comm: fbdev Tainted: G U
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x53/0x80
Call Trace:
<TASK>
fb_deferred_io_mkwrite+0xea/0x150
do_page_mkwrite+0x57/0xc0
do_wp_page+0x278/0x2f0
__handle_mm_fault+0xdc2/0x1590
handle_mm_fault+0xdd/0x2c0
do_user_addr_fault+0x1d3/0x650
exc_page_fault+0x77/0x180
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30
asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
RIP: 0033:0x7fd98fc8fad1
==
Figure out the race happens when one process is adding &page->lru into
the pagelist tail in fb_deferred_io_mkwrite(), another process is
re-initializing the same &page->lru in fb_deferred_io_fault(), which is
not protected by the lock.
This fix is to init all the page lists one time during initialization,
it not only fixes the list corruption, but also avoids INIT_LIST_HEAD()
redundantly.
V2: change "int i" to "unsigned int i" (Geert Uytterhoeven)

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49504

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: lpfc: Inhibit aborts if external loopback plug is inserted
After running a short external loopback test, when the external loopback is
removed and a normal cable inserted that is directly connected to a target
device, the system oops in the llpfc_set_rrq_active() routine.
When the loopback was inserted an FLOGI was transmit. As we're looped back,
we receive the FLOGI request. The FLOGI is ABTS'd as we recognize the same
wppn thus understand it's a loopback. However, as the ABTS sends address
information the port is not set to (fffffe), the ABTS is dropped on the
wire. A short 1 frame loopback test is run and completes before the ABTS
times out. The looback is unplugged and the new cable plugged in, and the
an FLOGI to the new device occurs and completes. Due to a mixup in ref
counting the completion of the new FLOGI releases the fabric ndlp. Then the
original ABTS completes and references the released ndlp generating the
oops.
Correct by no-op'ing the ABTS when in loopback mode (it will be dropped
anyway). Added a flag to track the mode to recognize when it should be
no-op'd.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49471

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtw89: cfo: check mac_id to avoid out-of-bounds
Somehow, hardware reports incorrect mac_id and pollute memory. Check index
before we access the array.
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in rtw89/phy.c:2517:23
index 188 is out of range for type 's32 [64]'
CPU: 1 PID: 51550 Comm: irq/35-rtw89_pc Tainted: G OE
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
show_stack+0x52/0x58
dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x63
dump_stack+0x10/0x12
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x45
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49
? __alloc_skb+0x92/0x1d0
rtw89_phy_cfo_parse+0x44/0x7f [rtw89_core]
rtw89_core_rx+0x261/0x871 [rtw89_core]
? __alloc_skb+0xee/0x1d0
rtw89_pci_napi_poll+0x3fa/0x4ea [rtw89_pci]
__napi_poll+0x33/0x1a0
net_rx_action+0x126/0x260
? __queue_work+0x217/0x4c0
__do_softirq+0xd9/0x315
? disable_irq_nosync+0x10/0x10
do_softirq.part.0+0x6d/0x90
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x62/0x70
rtw89_pci_interrupt_threadfn+0x182/0x1a6 [rtw89_pci]
irq_thread_fn+0x28/0x60
irq_thread+0xc8/0x190
? irq_thread_fn+0x60/0x60
kthread+0x16b/0x190
? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xe0/0xe0
? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49468

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thermal/core: Fix memory leak in __thermal_cooling_device_register()
I got memory leak as follows when doing fault injection test:
unreferenced object 0xffff888010080000 (size 264312):
comm "182", pid 102533, jiffies 4296434960 (age 10.100s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 .....N..........
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 40 7f 1f b9 ff ff ff ff ........@.......
backtrace:
[<0000000038b2f4fc>] kmalloc_order_trace+0x1d/0x110 mm/slab_common.c:969
[<00000000ebcb8da5>] __kmalloc+0x373/0x420 include/linux/slab.h:510
[<0000000084137f13>] thermal_cooling_device_setup_sysfs+0x15d/0x2d0 include/linux/slab.h:586
[<00000000352b8755>] __thermal_cooling_device_register+0x332/0xa60 drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c:927
[<00000000fb9f331b>] devm_thermal_of_cooling_device_register+0x6b/0xf0 drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c:1041
[<000000009b8012d2>] max6650_probe.cold+0x557/0x6aa drivers/hwmon/max6650.c:211
[<00000000da0b7e04>] i2c_device_probe+0x472/0xac0 drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:561
If device_register() fails, thermal_cooling_device_destroy_sysfs() need be called
to free the memory allocated in thermal_cooling_device_setup_sysfs().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49465

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-throttle: Set BIO_THROTTLED when bio has been throttled
1.In current process, all bio will set the BIO_THROTTLED flag
after __blk_throtl_bio().
2.If bio needs to be throttled, it will start the timer and
stop submit bio directly. Bio will submit in
blk_throtl_dispatch_work_fn() when the timer expires.But in
the current process, if bio is throttled. The BIO_THROTTLED
will be set to bio after timer start. If the bio has been
completed, it may cause use-after-free blow.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in blk_throtl_bio+0x12f0/0x2c70
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88801b8902d4 by task fio/26380
dump_stack+0x9b/0xce
print_address_description.constprop.6+0x3e/0x60
kasan_report.cold.9+0x22/0x3a
blk_throtl_bio+0x12f0/0x2c70
submit_bio_checks+0x701/0x1550
submit_bio_noacct+0x83/0xc80
submit_bio+0xa7/0x330
mpage_readahead+0x380/0x500
read_pages+0x1c1/0xbf0
page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x471/0x6f0
do_page_cache_ra+0xda/0x110
ondemand_readahead+0x442/0xae0
page_cache_async_ra+0x210/0x300
generic_file_buffered_read+0x4d9/0x2130
generic_file_read_iter+0x315/0x490
blkdev_read_iter+0x113/0x1b0
aio_read+0x2ad/0x450
io_submit_one+0xc8e/0x1d60
__se_sys_io_submit+0x125/0x350
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Allocated by task 26380:
kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.2+0xc1/0xd0
kmem_cache_alloc+0x146/0x440
mempool_alloc+0x125/0x2f0
bio_alloc_bioset+0x353/0x590
mpage_alloc+0x3b/0x240
do_mpage_readpage+0xddf/0x1ef0
mpage_readahead+0x264/0x500
read_pages+0x1c1/0xbf0
page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x471/0x6f0
do_page_cache_ra+0xda/0x110
ondemand_readahead+0x442/0xae0
page_cache_async_ra+0x210/0x300
generic_file_buffered_read+0x4d9/0x2130
generic_file_read_iter+0x315/0x490
blkdev_read_iter+0x113/0x1b0
aio_read+0x2ad/0x450
io_submit_one+0xc8e/0x1d60
__se_sys_io_submit+0x125/0x350
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Freed by task 0:
kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30
__kasan_slab_free+0x111/0x160
kmem_cache_free+0x94/0x460
mempool_free+0xd6/0x320
bio_free+0xe0/0x130
bio_put+0xab/0xe0
bio_endio+0x3a6/0x5d0
blk_update_request+0x590/0x1370
scsi_end_request+0x7d/0x400
scsi_io_completion+0x1aa/0xe50
scsi_softirq_done+0x11b/0x240
blk_mq_complete_request+0xd4/0x120
scsi_mq_done+0xf0/0x200
virtscsi_vq_done+0xbc/0x150
vring_interrupt+0x179/0x390
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0xf7/0x490
handle_irq_event_percpu+0x7b/0x160
handle_irq_event+0xcc/0x170
handle_edge_irq+0x215/0xb20
common_interrupt+0x60/0x120
asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
Fix this by move BIO_THROTTLED set into the queue_lock.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49456

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: fix missed rcu protection
When removing the rcu_read_lock in bond_ethtool_get_ts_info() as
discussed [1], I didn't notice it could be called via setsockopt,
which doesn't hold rcu lock, as syzbot pointed:
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 3599 Comm: syz-executor317 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-syzkaller-01392-g01f4685797a5 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
bond_option_active_slave_get_rcu include/net/bonding.h:353 [inline]
bond_ethtool_get_ts_info+0x32c/0x3a0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5595
__ethtool_get_ts_info+0x173/0x240 net/ethtool/common.c:554
ethtool_get_phc_vclocks+0x99/0x110 net/ethtool/common.c:568
sock_timestamping_bind_phc net/core/sock.c:869 [inline]
sock_set_timestamping+0x3a3/0x7e0 net/core/sock.c:916
sock_setsockopt+0x543/0x2ec0 net/core/sock.c:1221
__sys_setsockopt+0x55e/0x6a0 net/socket.c:2223
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2238 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2235 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xba/0x150 net/socket.c:2235
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f8902c8eb39
Fix it by adding rcu_read_lock and take a ref on the real_dev.
Since dev_hold() and dev_put() can take NULL these days, we can
skip checking if real_dev exist.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/27565.1642742439@famine/

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49441

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: fix deadlock caused by calling printk() under tty_port->lock
pty_write() invokes kmalloc() which may invoke a normal printk() to print
failure message. This can cause a deadlock in the scenario reported by
syz-bot below:
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
---- ---- ----
lock(console_owner);
lock(&port_lock_key);
lock(&port->lock);
lock(&port_lock_key);
lock(&port->lock);
lock(console_owner);
As commit dbdda842fe96 ("printk: Add console owner and waiter logic to
load balance console writes") said, such deadlock can be prevented by
using printk_deferred() in kmalloc() (which is invoked in the section
guarded by the port->lock). But there are too many printk() on the
kmalloc() path, and kmalloc() can be called from anywhere, so changing
printk() to printk_deferred() is too complicated and inelegant.
Therefore, this patch chooses to specify __GFP_NOWARN to kmalloc(), so
that printk() will not be called, and this deadlock problem can be
avoided.
Syzbot reported the following lockdep error:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.4.143-00237-g08ccc19a-dirty #10 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.4/29420 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8aedb2a0 (console_owner){....}-{0:0}, at: console_trylock_spinning kernel/printk/printk.c:1752 [inline]
ffffffff8aedb2a0 (console_owner){....}-{0:0}, at: vprintk_emit+0x2ca/0x470 kernel/printk/printk.c:2023
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880119c9158 (&port->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: pty_write+0xf4/0x1f0 drivers/tty/pty.c:120
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&port->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
tty_port_tty_get drivers/tty/tty_port.c:288 [inline] <-- lock(&port->lock);
tty_port_default_wakeup+0x1d/0xb0 drivers/tty/tty_port.c:47
serial8250_tx_chars+0x530/0xa80 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1767
serial8250_handle_irq.part.0+0x31f/0x3d0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1854
serial8250_handle_irq drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1827 [inline] <-- lock(&port_lock_key);
serial8250_default_handle_irq+0xb2/0x220 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1870
serial8250_interrupt+0xfd/0x200 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c:126
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x109/0xa50 kernel/irq/handle.c:156
[...]
-> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}-{2:2}:
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
serial8250_console_write+0x184/0xa40 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:3198
<-- lock(&port_lock_key);
call_console_drivers kernel/printk/printk.c:1819 [inline]
console_unlock+0x8cb/0xd00 kernel/printk/printk.c:2504
vprintk_emit+0x1b5/0x470 kernel/printk/printk.c:2024<-- lock(console_owner);
vprintk_func+0x8d/0x250 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:394
printk+0xba/0xed kernel/printk/printk.c:2084
register_console+0x8b3/0xc10 kernel/printk/printk.c:2829
univ8250_console_init+0x3a/0x46 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c:681
console_init+0x49d/0x6d3 kernel/printk/printk.c:2915
start_kernel+0x5e9/0x879 init/main.c:713
secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:241
-> #0 (console_owner){....}-{0:0}:
[...]
lock_acquire+0x127/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4734
console_trylock_spinning kernel/printk/printk.c:1773
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49440

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/rtas: Keep MSR[RI] set when calling RTAS
RTAS runs in real mode (MSR[DR] and MSR[IR] unset) and in 32-bit big
endian mode (MSR[SF,LE] unset).
The change in MSR is done in enter_rtas() in a relatively complex way,
since the MSR value could be hardcoded.
Furthermore, a panic has been reported when hitting the watchdog interrupt
while running in RTAS, this leads to the following stack trace:
watchdog: CPU 24 Hard LOCKUP
watchdog: CPU 24 TB:997512652051031, last heartbeat TB:997504470175378 (15980ms ago)
...
Supported: No, Unreleased kernel
CPU: 24 PID: 87504 Comm: drmgr Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E X 5.14.21-150400.71.1.bz196362_2-default #1 SLE15-SP4 (unreleased) 0d821077ef4faa8dfaf370efb5fdca1fa35f4e2c
NIP: 000000001fb41050 LR: 000000001fb4104c CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c00000000fc33d60 TRAP: 0100 Tainted: G E X (5.14.21-150400.71.1.bz196362_2-default)
MSR: 8000000002981000 <SF,VEC,VSX,ME> CR: 48800002 XER: 20040020
CFAR: 000000000000011c IRQMASK: 1
GPR00: 0000000000000003 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000001 00000000000050dc
GPR04: 000000001ffb6100 0000000000000020 0000000000000001 000000001fb09010
GPR08: 0000000020000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR12: 80040000072a40a8 c00000000ff8b680 0000000000000007 0000000000000034
GPR16: 000000001fbf6e94 000000001fbf6d84 000000001fbd1db0 000000001fb3f008
GPR20: 000000001fb41018 ffffffffffffffff 000000000000017f fffffffffffff68f
GPR24: 000000001fb18fe8 000000001fb3e000 000000001fb1adc0 000000001fb1cf40
GPR28: 000000001fb26000 000000001fb460f0 000000001fb17f18 000000001fb17000
NIP [000000001fb41050] 0x1fb41050
LR [000000001fb4104c] 0x1fb4104c
Call Trace:
Instruction dump:
XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
Oops: Unrecoverable System Reset, sig: 6 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
...
Supported: No, Unreleased kernel
CPU: 24 PID: 87504 Comm: drmgr Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E X 5.14.21-150400.71.1.bz196362_2-default #1 SLE15-SP4 (unreleased) 0d821077ef4faa8dfaf370efb5fdca1fa35f4e2c
NIP: 000000001fb41050 LR: 000000001fb4104c CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c00000000fc33d60 TRAP: 0100 Tainted: G E X (5.14.21-150400.71.1.bz196362_2-default)
MSR: 8000000002981000 <SF,VEC,VSX,ME> CR: 48800002 XER: 20040020
CFAR: 000000000000011c IRQMASK: 1
GPR00: 0000000000000003 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000001 00000000000050dc
GPR04: 000000001ffb6100 0000000000000020 0000000000000001 000000001fb09010
GPR08: 0000000020000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR12: 80040000072a40a8 c00000000ff8b680 0000000000000007 0000000000000034
GPR16: 000000001fbf6e94 000000001fbf6d84 000000001fbd1db0 000000001fb3f008
GPR20: 000000001fb41018 ffffffffffffffff 000000000000017f fffffffffffff68f
GPR24: 000000001fb18fe8 000000001fb3e000 000000001fb1adc0 000000001fb1cf40
GPR28: 000000001fb26000 000000001fb460f0 000000001fb17f18 000000001fb17000
NIP [000000001fb41050] 0x1fb41050
LR [000000001fb4104c] 0x1fb4104c
Call Trace:
Instruction dump:
XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
---[ end trace 3ddec07f638c34a2 ]---
This happens because MSR[RI] is unset when entering RTAS but there is no
valid reason to not set it here.
RTAS is expected to be called with MSR[RI] as specified in PAPR+ section
"7.2.1 Machine State":
R1–7.2.1–9. If called with MSR[RI] equal to 1, then RTAS must protect
its own critical regions from recursion by setting the MSR[RI] bit to
0 when in the critical regions.
Fixing this by reviewing the way MSR is compute before calling RTAS. Now a
hardcoded value meaning real
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49420

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: annotate races around sk->sk_bound_dev_if
UDP sendmsg() is lockless, and reads sk->sk_bound_dev_if while
this field can be changed by another thread.
Adds minimal annotations to avoid KCSAN splats for UDP.
Following patches will add more annotations to potential lockless readers.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __ip6_datagram_connect / udpv6_sendmsg
write to 0xffff888136d47a94 of 4 bytes by task 7681 on cpu 0:
__ip6_datagram_connect+0x6e2/0x930 net/ipv6/datagram.c:221
ip6_datagram_connect+0x2a/0x40 net/ipv6/datagram.c:272
inet_dgram_connect+0x107/0x190 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:576
__sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1900 [inline]
__sys_connect+0x197/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1917
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1927 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1924 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1924
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff888136d47a94 of 4 bytes by task 7670 on cpu 1:
udpv6_sendmsg+0xc60/0x16e0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1436
inet6_sendmsg+0x5f/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:652
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:725 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x39a/0x510 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2467 [inline]
__sys_sendmmsg+0x267/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0xffffff9b
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 7670 Comm: syz-executor.3 Tainted: G W 5.18.0-rc1-syzkaller-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
I chose to not add Fixes: tag because race has minor consequences
and stable teams busy enough.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49418

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4: Fix free of uninitialized nfs4_label on referral lookup.
Send along the already-allocated fattr along with nfs4_fs_locations, and
drop the memcpy of fattr. We end up growing two more allocations, but this
fixes up a crash as:
PID: 790 TASK: ffff88811b43c000 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "ls"
#0 [ffffc90000857920] panic at ffffffff81b9bfde
#1 [ffffc900008579c0] do_trap at ffffffff81023a9b
#2 [ffffc90000857a10] do_error_trap at ffffffff81023b78
#3 [ffffc90000857a58] exc_stack_segment at ffffffff81be1f45
#4 [ffffc90000857a80] asm_exc_stack_segment at ffffffff81c009de
#5 [ffffc90000857b08] nfs_lookup at ffffffffa0302322 [nfs]
#6 [ffffc90000857b70] __lookup_slow at ffffffff813a4a5f
#7 [ffffc90000857c60] walk_component at ffffffff813a86c4
#8 [ffffc90000857cb8] path_lookupat at ffffffff813a9553
#9 [ffffc90000857cf0] filename_lookup at ffffffff813ab86b

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49412

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bfq: Avoid merging queues with different parents
It can happen that the parent of a bfqq changes between the moment we
decide two queues are worth to merge (and set bic->stable_merge_bfqq)
and the moment bfq_setup_merge() is called. This can happen e.g. because
the process submitted IO for a different cgroup and thus bfqq got
reparented. It can even happen that the bfqq we are merging with has
parent cgroup that is already offline and going to be destroyed in which
case the merge can lead to use-after-free issues such as:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800693c0c0 by task runc:[2:INIT]/10544
CPU: 0 PID: 10544 Comm: runc:[2:INIT] Tainted: G E 5.15.2-0.g5fb85fd-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) f1f3b891c72369aebecd2e43e4641a6358867c70
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x46/0x5a
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140
? __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50
kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
? __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50
__bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50
? update_curr+0x32f/0x5d0
bfq_deactivate_entity+0xa0/0x1d0
bfq_del_bfqq_busy+0x28a/0x420
? resched_curr+0x116/0x1d0
? bfq_requeue_bfqq+0x70/0x70
? check_preempt_wakeup+0x52b/0xbc0
__bfq_bfqq_expire+0x1a2/0x270
bfq_bfqq_expire+0xd16/0x2160
? try_to_wake_up+0x4ee/0x1260
? bfq_end_wr_async_queues+0xe0/0xe0
? _raw_write_unlock_bh+0x60/0x60
? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x81/0xe0
bfq_idle_slice_timer+0x109/0x280
? bfq_dispatch_request+0x4870/0x4870
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x37d/0x700
? enqueue_hrtimer+0x1b0/0x1b0
? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0xd/0x10
? ktime_get_update_offsets_now+0x6f/0x280
hrtimer_interrupt+0x2c8/0x740
Fix the problem by checking that the parent of the two bfqqs we are
merging in bfq_setup_merge() is the same.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49409

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix bug_on in __es_tree_search
Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON:
==================================================================
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:199!
[...]
RIP: 0010:ext4_es_end fs/ext4/extents_status.c:199 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__es_tree_search+0x1e0/0x260 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:217
[...]
Call Trace:
ext4_es_cache_extent+0x109/0x340 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:766
ext4_cache_extents+0x239/0x2e0 fs/ext4/extents.c:561
ext4_find_extent+0x6b7/0xa20 fs/ext4/extents.c:964
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x16b/0x4b70 fs/ext4/extents.c:4384
ext4_map_blocks+0xe26/0x19f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:567
ext4_getblk+0x320/0x4c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:980
ext4_bread+0x2d/0x170 fs/ext4/inode.c:1031
ext4_quota_read+0x248/0x320 fs/ext4/super.c:6257
v2_read_header+0x78/0x110 fs/quota/quota_v2.c:63
v2_check_quota_file+0x76/0x230 fs/quota/quota_v2.c:82
vfs_load_quota_inode+0x5d1/0x1530 fs/quota/dquot.c:2368
dquot_enable+0x28a/0x330 fs/quota/dquot.c:2490
ext4_quota_enable fs/ext4/super.c:6137 [inline]
ext4_enable_quotas+0x5d7/0x960 fs/ext4/super.c:6163
ext4_fill_super+0xa7c9/0xdc00 fs/ext4/super.c:4754
mount_bdev+0x2e9/0x3b0 fs/super.c:1158
mount_fs+0x4b/0x1e4 fs/super.c:1261
[...]
==================================================================
Above issue may happen as follows:
-------------------------------------
ext4_fill_super
ext4_enable_quotas
ext4_quota_enable
ext4_iget
__ext4_iget
ext4_ext_check_inode
ext4_ext_check
__ext4_ext_check
ext4_valid_extent_entries
Check for overlapping extents does't take effect
dquot_enable
vfs_load_quota_inode
v2_check_quota_file
v2_read_header
ext4_quota_read
ext4_bread
ext4_getblk
ext4_map_blocks
ext4_ext_map_blocks
ext4_find_extent
ext4_cache_extents
ext4_es_cache_extent
ext4_es_cache_extent
__es_tree_search
ext4_es_end
BUG_ON(es->es_lblk + es->es_len < es->es_lblk)
The error ext4 extents is as follows:
0af3 0300 0400 0000 00000000 extent_header
00000000 0100 0000 12000000 extent1
00000000 0100 0000 18000000 extent2
02000000 0400 0000 14000000 extent3
In the ext4_valid_extent_entries function,
if prev is 0, no error is returned even if lblock<=prev.
This was intended to skip the check on the first extent, but
in the error image above, prev=0+1-1=0 when checking the second extent,
so even though lblock<=prev, the function does not return an error.
As a result, bug_ON occurs in __es_tree_search and the system panics.
To solve this problem, we only need to check that:
1. The lblock of the first extent is not less than 0.
2. The lblock of the next extent is not less than
the next block of the previous extent.
The same applies to extent_idx.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49400

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: Don't set mddev private to NULL in raid0 pers->free
In normal stop process, it does like this:
do_md_stop
|
__md_stop (pers->free(); mddev->private=NULL)
|
md_free (free mddev)
__md_stop sets mddev->private to NULL after pers->free. The raid device
will be stopped and mddev memory is free. But in reshape, it doesn't
free the mddev and mddev will still be used in new raid.
In reshape, it first sets mddev->private to new_pers and then runs
old_pers->free(). Now raid0 sets mddev->private to NULL in raid0_free.
The new raid can't work anymore. It will panic when dereference
mddev->private because of NULL pointer dereference.
It can panic like this:
[63010.814972] kernel BUG at drivers/md/raid10.c:928!
[63010.819778] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[63010.825011] CPU: 3 PID: 44437 Comm: md0_resync Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-86.el9.x86_64 #1
[63010.833789] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R6415/07YXFK, BIOS 1.15.0 09/11/2020
[63010.841440] RIP: 0010:raise_barrier+0x161/0x170 [raid10]
[63010.865508] RSP: 0018:ffffc312408bbc10 EFLAGS: 00010246
[63010.870734] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa00bf7d39800 RCX: 0000000000000000
[63010.877866] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffa00bf7d39800
[63010.884999] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: fffffa4945e74400 R09: 0000000000000000
[63010.892132] R10: ffffa00eed02f798 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa00bbc435200
[63010.899266] R13: ffffa00bf7d39800 R14: 0000000000000400 R15: 0000000000000003
[63010.906399] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa00eed000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[63010.914485] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[63010.920229] CR2: 00007f5cfbe99828 CR3: 0000000105efe000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
[63010.927363] Call Trace:
[63010.929822] ? bio_reset+0xe/0x40
[63010.933144] ? raid10_alloc_init_r10buf+0x60/0xa0 [raid10]
[63010.938629] raid10_sync_request+0x756/0x1610 [raid10]
[63010.943770] md_do_sync.cold+0x3e4/0x94c
[63010.947698] md_thread+0xab/0x160
[63010.951024] ? md_write_inc+0x50/0x50
[63010.954688] kthread+0x149/0x170
[63010.957923] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
[63010.962107] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Removing the code that sets mddev->private to NULL in raid0 can fix
problem.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49394

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-iolatency: Fix inflight count imbalances and IO hangs on offline
iolatency needs to track the number of inflight IOs per cgroup. As this
tracking can be expensive, it is disabled when no cgroup has iolatency
configured for the device. To ensure that the inflight counters stay
balanced, iolatency_set_limit() freezes the request_queue while manipulating
the enabled counter, which ensures that no IO is in flight and thus all
counters are zero.
Unfortunately, iolatency_set_limit() isn't the only place where the enabled
counter is manipulated. iolatency_pd_offline() can also dec the counter and
trigger disabling. As this disabling happens without freezing the q, this
can easily happen while some IOs are in flight and thus leak the counts.
This can be easily demonstrated by turning on iolatency on an one empty
cgroup while IOs are in flight in other cgroups and then removing the
cgroup. Note that iolatency shouldn't have been enabled elsewhere in the
system to ensure that removing the cgroup disables iolatency for the whole
device.
The following keeps flipping on and off iolatency on sda:
echo +io > /sys/fs/cgroup/cgroup.subtree_control
while true; do
mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/test
echo '8:0 target=100000' > /sys/fs/cgroup/test/io.latency
sleep 1
rmdir /sys/fs/cgroup/test
sleep 1
done
and there's concurrent fio generating direct rand reads:
fio --name test --filename=/dev/sda --direct=1 --rw=randread \
--runtime=600 --time_based --iodepth=256 --numjobs=4 --bs=4k
while monitoring with the following drgn script:
while True:
for css in css_for_each_descendant_pre(prog['blkcg_root'].css.address_of_()):
for pos in hlist_for_each(container_of(css, 'struct blkcg', 'css').blkg_list):
blkg = container_of(pos, 'struct blkcg_gq', 'blkcg_node')
pd = blkg.pd[prog['blkcg_policy_iolatency'].plid]
if pd.value_() == 0:
continue
iolat = container_of(pd, 'struct iolatency_grp', 'pd')
inflight = iolat.rq_wait.inflight.counter.value_()
if inflight:
print(f'inflight={inflight} {disk_name(blkg.q.disk).decode("utf-8")} '
f'{cgroup_path(css.cgroup).decode("utf-8")}')
time.sleep(1)
The monitoring output looks like the following:
inflight=1 sda /user.slice
inflight=1 sda /user.slice
...
inflight=14 sda /user.slice
inflight=13 sda /user.slice
inflight=17 sda /user.slice
inflight=15 sda /user.slice
inflight=18 sda /user.slice
inflight=17 sda /user.slice
inflight=20 sda /user.slice
inflight=19 sda /user.slice <- fio stopped, inflight stuck at 19
inflight=19 sda /user.slice
inflight=19 sda /user.slice
If a cgroup with stuck inflight ends up getting throttled, the throttled IOs
will never get issued as there's no completion event to wake it up leading
to an indefinite hang.
This patch fixes the bug by unifying enable handling into a work item which
is automatically kicked off from iolatency_set_min_lat_nsec() which is
called from both iolatency_set_limit() and iolatency_pd_offline() paths.
Punting to a work item is necessary as iolatency_pd_offline() is called
under spinlocks while freezing a request_queue requires a sleepable context.
This also simplifies the code reducing LOC sans the comments and avoids the
unnecessary freezes which were happening whenever a cgroup's latency target
is newly set or cleared.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49390

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
macsec: fix UAF bug for real_dev
Create a new macsec device but not get reference to real_dev. That can
not ensure that real_dev is freed after macsec. That will trigger the
UAF bug for real_dev as following:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in macsec_get_iflink+0x5f/0x70 drivers/net/macsec.c:3662
Call Trace:
...
macsec_get_iflink+0x5f/0x70 drivers/net/macsec.c:3662
dev_get_iflink+0x73/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:637
default_operstate net/core/link_watch.c:42 [inline]
rfc2863_policy+0x233/0x2d0 net/core/link_watch.c:54
linkwatch_do_dev+0x2a/0x150 net/core/link_watch.c:161
Allocated by task 22209:
...
alloc_netdev_mqs+0x98/0x1100 net/core/dev.c:10549
rtnl_create_link+0x9d7/0xc00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3235
veth_newlink+0x20e/0xa90 drivers/net/veth.c:1748
Freed by task 8:
...
kfree+0xd6/0x4d0 mm/slub.c:4552
kvfree+0x42/0x50 mm/util.c:615
device_release+0x9f/0x240 drivers/base/core.c:2229
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:673 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:704 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline]
kobject_put+0x1c8/0x540 lib/kobject.c:721
netdev_run_todo+0x72e/0x10b0 net/core/dev.c:10327
After commit faab39f63c1f ("net: allow out-of-order netdev unregistration")
and commit e5f80fcf869a ("ipv6: give an IPv6 dev to blackhole_netdev"), we
can add dev_hold_track() in macsec_dev_init() and dev_put_track() in
macsec_free_netdev() to fix the problem.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49378

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sfc: fix considering that all channels have TX queues
Normally, all channels have RX and TX queues, but this is not true if
modparam efx_separate_tx_channels=1 is used. In that cases, some
channels only have RX queues and others only TX queues (or more
preciselly, they have them allocated, but not initialized).
Fix efx_channel_has_tx_queues to return the correct value for this case
too.
Messages shown at probe time before the fix:
sfc 0000:03:00.0 ens6f0np0: MC command 0x82 inlen 544 failed rc=-22 (raw=0) arg=0
------------[ cut here ]------------
netdevice: ens6f0np0: failed to initialise TXQ -1
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 626 at drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c:2393 efx_ef10_tx_init+0x201/0x300 [sfc]
[...] stripped
RIP: 0010:efx_ef10_tx_init+0x201/0x300 [sfc]
[...] stripped
Call Trace:
efx_init_tx_queue+0xaa/0xf0 [sfc]
efx_start_channels+0x49/0x120 [sfc]
efx_start_all+0x1f8/0x430 [sfc]
efx_net_open+0x5a/0xe0 [sfc]
__dev_open+0xd0/0x190
__dev_change_flags+0x1b3/0x220
dev_change_flags+0x21/0x60
[...] stripped
Messages shown at remove time before the fix:
sfc 0000:03:00.0 ens6f0np0: failed to flush 10 queues
sfc 0000:03:00.0 ens6f0np0: failed to flush queues

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49372

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: tcp_rtx_synack() can be called from process context
Laurent reported the enclosed report [1]
This bug triggers with following coditions:
0) Kernel built with CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT=y
1) A new passive FastOpen TCP socket is created.
This FO socket waits for an ACK coming from client to be a complete
ESTABLISHED one.
2) A socket operation on this socket goes through lock_sock()
release_sock() dance.
3) While the socket is owned by the user in step 2),
a retransmit of the SYN is received and stored in socket backlog.
4) At release_sock() time, the socket backlog is processed while
in process context.
5) A SYNACK packet is cooked in response of the SYN retransmit.
6) -> tcp_rtx_synack() is called in process context.
Before blamed commit, tcp_rtx_synack() was always called from BH handler,
from a timer handler.
Fix this by using TCP_INC_STATS() & NET_INC_STATS()
which do not assume caller is in non preemptible context.
[1]
BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: epollpep/2180
caller is tcp_rtx_synack.part.0+0x36/0xc0
CPU: 10 PID: 2180 Comm: epollpep Tainted: G OE 5.16.0-0.bpo.4-amd64 #1 Debian 5.16.12-1~bpo11+1
Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5039MC-H8TRF/X11SCD-F, BIOS 1.7 11/23/2021
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x5e
check_preemption_disabled+0xde/0xe0
tcp_rtx_synack.part.0+0x36/0xc0
tcp_rtx_synack+0x8d/0xa0
? kmem_cache_alloc+0x2e0/0x3e0
? apparmor_file_alloc_security+0x3b/0x1f0
inet_rtx_syn_ack+0x16/0x30
tcp_check_req+0x367/0x610
tcp_rcv_state_process+0x91/0xf60
? get_nohz_timer_target+0x18/0x1a0
? lock_timer_base+0x61/0x80
? preempt_count_add+0x68/0xa0
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0xbd/0x270
__release_sock+0x6d/0xb0
release_sock+0x2b/0x90
sock_setsockopt+0x138/0x1140
? __sys_getsockname+0x7e/0xc0
? aa_sk_perm+0x3e/0x1a0
__sys_setsockopt+0x198/0x1e0
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x21/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49371

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
driver core: fix deadlock in __device_attach
In __device_attach function, The lock holding logic is as follows:
...
__device_attach
device_lock(dev) // get lock dev
async_schedule_dev(__device_attach_async_helper, dev); // func
async_schedule_node
async_schedule_node_domain(func)
entry = kzalloc(sizeof(struct async_entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
/* when fail or work limit, sync to execute func, but
__device_attach_async_helper will get lock dev as
well, which will lead to A-A deadlock. */
if (!entry || atomic_read(&entry_count) > MAX_WORK) {
func;
else
queue_work_node(node, system_unbound_wq, &entry->work)
device_unlock(dev)
As shown above, when it is allowed to do async probes, because of
out of memory or work limit, async work is not allowed, to do
sync execute instead. it will lead to A-A deadlock because of
__device_attach_async_helper getting lock dev.
To fix the deadlock, move the async_schedule_dev outside device_lock,
as we can see, in async_schedule_node_domain, the parameter of
queue_work_node is system_unbound_wq, so it can accept concurrent
operations. which will also not change the code logic, and will
not lead to deadlock.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49357

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
On Apple T2 Macs, when Linux attempts to read the db and dbx efi variables
at early boot to load UEFI Secure Boot certificates, a page fault occurs
in Apple firmware code and EFI runtime services are disabled with the
following logs:
[Firmware Bug]: Page fault caused by firmware at PA: 0xffffb1edc0068000
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 104 at arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c:735 efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault+0x50/0xf0
(Removed some logs from here)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
page_fault_oops+0x4f/0x2c0
? search_bpf_extables+0x6b/0x80
? search_module_extables+0x50/0x80
? search_exception_tables+0x5b/0x60
kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x9e/0x110
__bad_area_nosemaphore+0x155/0x190
bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20
do_kern_addr_fault+0x8c/0xa0
exc_page_fault+0xd8/0x180
asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
(Removed some logs from here)
? __efi_call+0x28/0x30
? switch_mm+0x20/0x30
? efi_call_rts+0x19a/0x8e0
? process_one_work+0x222/0x3f0
? worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0
? kthread+0x17a/0x1a0
? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0
? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
---[ end trace 1f82023595a5927f ]---
efi: Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
efi: EFI Runtime Services are disabled!
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: Couldn't get mokx list
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x80000000
So we avoid reading these UEFI variables and thus prevent the crash.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49349

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix use-after-free in ext4_rename_dir_prepare
We got issue as follows:
EXT4-fs (loop0): mounted filesystem without journal. Opts: ,errors=continue
ext4_get_first_dir_block: bh->b_data=0xffff88810bee6000 len=34478
ext4_get_first_dir_block: *parent_de=0xffff88810beee6ae bh->b_data=0xffff88810bee6000
ext4_rename_dir_prepare: [1] parent_de=0xffff88810beee6ae
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_rename_dir_prepare+0x152/0x220
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810beee6ae by task rep/1895
CPU: 13 PID: 1895 Comm: rep Not tainted 5.10.0+ #241
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xbe/0xf9
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1e/0x220
kasan_report.cold+0x37/0x7f
ext4_rename_dir_prepare+0x152/0x220
ext4_rename+0xf44/0x1ad0
ext4_rename2+0x11c/0x170
vfs_rename+0xa84/0x1440
do_renameat2+0x683/0x8f0
__x64_sys_renameat+0x53/0x60
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7f45a6fc41c9
RSP: 002b:00007ffc5a470218 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000108
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f45a6fc41c9
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007ffc5a470240 R08: 00007ffc5a470160 R09: 0000000020000080
R10: 00000000200001c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400bb0
R13: 00007ffc5a470320 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:00000000440015ce refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x10beee
flags: 0x200000000000000()
raw: 0200000000000000 ffffea00043ff4c8 ffffea0004325608 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88810beee580: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff88810beee600: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff88810beee680: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
ffff88810beee700: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff88810beee780: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
ext4_rename_dir_prepare: [2] parent_de->inode=3537895424
ext4_rename_dir_prepare: [3] dir=0xffff888124170140
ext4_rename_dir_prepare: [4] ino=2
ext4_rename_dir_prepare: ent->dir->i_ino=2 parent=-757071872
Reason is first directory entry which 'rec_len' is 34478, then will get illegal
parent entry. Now, we do not check directory entry after read directory block
in 'ext4_get_first_dir_block'.
To solve this issue, check directory entry in 'ext4_get_first_dir_block'.
[ Trigger an ext4_error() instead of just warning if the directory is
missing a '.' or '..' entry. Also make sure we return an error code
if the file system is corrupted. -TYT ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49347

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix bug_on in ext4_writepages
we got issue as follows:
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:1141: group 0, block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 25 vs 31513 free cls
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inode.c:2708!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 2 PID: 2147 Comm: rep Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2-next-20220413+ #155
RIP: 0010:ext4_writepages+0x1977/0x1c10
RSP: 0018:ffff88811d3e7880 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff88811c098000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88811c098000 RDI: 0000000000000002
RBP: ffff888128140f50 R08: ffffffffb1ff6387 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffffed10250281ea R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00000000000000a4 R14: ffff88811d3e7bb8 R15: ffff888128141028
FS: 00007f443aed9740(0000) GS:ffff8883aef00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020007200 CR3: 000000011c2a4000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
do_writepages+0x130/0x3a0
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x83/0xa0
filemap_flush+0xab/0xe0
ext4_alloc_da_blocks+0x51/0x120
__ext4_ioctl+0x1534/0x3210
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x12c/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
It may happen as follows:
1. write inline_data inode
vfs_write
new_sync_write
ext4_file_write_iter
ext4_buffered_write_iter
generic_perform_write
ext4_da_write_begin
ext4_da_write_inline_data_begin -> If inline data size too
small will allocate block to write, then mapping will has
dirty page
ext4_da_convert_inline_data_to_extent ->clear EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA
2. fallocate
do_vfs_ioctl
ioctl_preallocate
vfs_fallocate
ext4_fallocate
ext4_convert_inline_data
ext4_convert_inline_data_nolock
ext4_map_blocks -> fail will goto restore data
ext4_restore_inline_data
ext4_create_inline_data
ext4_write_inline_data
ext4_set_inode_state -> set inode EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA
3. writepages
__ext4_ioctl
ext4_alloc_da_blocks
filemap_flush
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc
do_writepages
ext4_writepages
if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode))
BUG_ON(ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA))
The root cause of this issue is we destory inline data until call
ext4_writepages under delay allocation mode. But there maybe already
convert from inline to extent. To solve this issue, we call
filemap_flush first..

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49341

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, arm64: Clear prog->jited_len along prog->jited
syzbot reported an illegal copy_to_user() attempt
from bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd() [1]
There was no repro yet on this bug, but I think
that commit 0aef499f3172 ("mm/usercopy: Detect vmalloc overruns")
is exposing a prior bug in bpf arm64.
bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd() looks at prog->jited_len
to determine if the JIT image can be copied out to user space.
My theory is that syzbot managed to get a prog where prog->jited_len
has been set to 43, while prog->bpf_func has ben cleared.
It is not clear why copy_to_user(uinsns, NULL, ulen) is triggering
this particular warning.
I thought find_vma_area(NULL) would not find a vm_struct.
As we do not hold vmap_area_lock spinlock, it might be possible
that the found vm_struct was garbage.
[1]
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset 792633534417210172, size 43)!
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 25002 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.18.0-syzkaller-10139-g8291eaafed36 #0
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:101
lr : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:89
sp : ffff80000b773a20
x29: ffff80000b773a30 x28: faff80000b745000 x27: ffff80000b773b48
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 000000000000002b x24: 0000000000000000
x23: 00000000000000e0 x22: ffff80000b75db67 x21: 0000000000000001
x20: 000000000000002b x19: ffff80000b75db3c x18: 00000000fffffffd
x17: 2820636f6c6c616d x16: 76206d6f72662064 x15: 6574636574656420
x14: 74706d6574746120 x13: 2129333420657a69 x12: 73202c3237313031
x11: 3237313434333533 x10: 3336323937207465 x9 : 657275736f707865
x8 : ffff80000a30c550 x7 : ffff80000b773830 x6 : ffff80000b773830
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff00007fbbaa10 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : f7ff000028fc0000 x0 : 0000000000000064
Call trace:
usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:89
check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:186 [inline]
__check_object_size mm/usercopy.c:252 [inline]
__check_object_size+0x198/0x36c mm/usercopy.c:214
check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:199 [inline]
check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:235 [inline]
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:159 [inline]
bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd.isra.0+0xf14/0xfdc kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3993
bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd+0x12c/0x510 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4253
__sys_bpf+0x900/0x2150 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4956
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5021 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5019 [inline]
__arm64_sys_bpf+0x28/0x40 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5019
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x44/0xec arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
do_el0_svc+0xa0/0xc0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206
el0_svc+0x44/0xb0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:624
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x1ac/0x1b0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:642
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581
Code: aa0003e3 d00038c0 91248000 97fff65f (d4210000)

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49333

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: E-Switch, pair only capable devices
OFFLOADS paring using devcom is possible only on devices
that support LAG. Filter based on lag capabilities.
This fixes an issue where mlx5_get_next_phys_dev() was
called without holding the interface lock.
This issue was found when commit
bc4c2f2e0179 ("net/mlx5: Lag, filter non compatible devices")
added an assert that verifies the interface lock is held.
WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 1706 at drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/dev.c:642 mlx5_get_next_phys_dev+0xd2/0x100 [mlx5_core]
Modules linked in: mlx5_vdpa vringh vhost_iotlb vdpa mlx5_ib mlx5_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_umad ib_ipoib ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core overlay fuse [last unloaded: mlx5_core]
CPU: 9 PID: 1706 Comm: devlink Not tainted 5.18.0-rc7+ #11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5_get_next_phys_dev+0xd2/0x100 [mlx5_core]
Code: 02 00 75 48 48 8b 85 80 04 00 00 5d c3 31 c0 5d c3 be ff ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 08 41 5b a0 e8 36 87 28 e3 85 c0 0f 85 6f ff ff ff <0f> 0b e9 68 ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 0c 91 cc 84 e8 cb 36 6f e1 e9 4d ff
RSP: 0018:ffff88811bf47458 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811b398000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffffa05b4108 RDI: ffff88812daaaa78
RBP: ffff88812d050380 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff88811d6b3437
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000fddd3581 R12: ffff88815238c000
R13: ffff88812d050380 R14: ffff8881018aa7e0 R15: ffff88811d6b3428
FS: 00007fc82e18ae80(0000) GS:ffff88842e080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f9630d1b421 CR3: 0000000149802004 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5_esw_offloads_devcom_event+0x99/0x3b0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_devcom_send_event+0x167/0x1d0 [mlx5_core]
esw_offloads_enable+0x1153/0x1500 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5_esw_offloads_controller_valid+0x170/0x170 [mlx5_core]
? wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x20/0x20
? mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked+0x318/0x810 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x586/0xc50 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5_eswitch_disable_pf_vf_vports+0x1d0/0x1d0 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5_esw_try_lock+0x1b/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5_eswitch_enable+0x270/0x270 [mlx5_core]
? __debugfs_create_file+0x260/0x3e0
mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0x27e/0x870 [mlx5_core]
? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x12c0/0x12c0
? esw_offloads_disable+0x250/0x250 [mlx5_core]
? devlink_nl_cmd_trap_get_dumpit+0x470/0x470
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
devlink_nl_cmd_eswitch_set_doit+0x217/0x620

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49330

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: fix tcp_mtup_probe_success vs wrong snd_cwnd
syzbot got a new report [1] finally pointing to a very old bug,
added in initial support for MTU probing.
tcp_mtu_probe() has checks about starting an MTU probe if
tcp_snd_cwnd(tp) >= 11.
But nothing prevents tcp_snd_cwnd(tp) to be reduced later
and before the MTU probe succeeds.
This bug would lead to potential zero-divides.
Debugging added in commit 40570375356c ("tcp: add accessors
to read/set tp->snd_cwnd") has paid off :)
While we are at it, address potential overflows in this code.
[1]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 14132 at include/net/tcp.h:1219 tcp_mtup_probe_success+0x366/0x570 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:2712
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 14132 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.18.0-syzkaller-07857-gbabf0bb978e3 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:tcp_snd_cwnd_set include/net/tcp.h:1219 [inline]
RIP: 0010:tcp_mtup_probe_success+0x366/0x570 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:2712
Code: 74 08 48 89 ef e8 da 80 17 f9 48 8b 45 00 65 48 ff 80 80 03 00 00 48 83 c4 30 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 e8 aa b0 c5 f8 <0f> 0b e9 16 fe ff ff 48 8b 4c 24 08 80 e1 07 38 c1 0f 8c c7 fc ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc900079e70f8 EFLAGS: 00010287
RAX: ffffffff88c0f7f6 RBX: ffff8880756e7a80 RCX: 0000000000040000
RDX: ffffc9000c6c4000 RSI: 0000000000031f9e RDI: 0000000000031f9f
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff88c0f606 R09: ffffc900079e7520
R10: ffffed101011226d R11: 1ffff1101011226c R12: 1ffff1100eadcf50
R13: ffff8880756e72c0 R14: 1ffff1100eadcf89 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 00007f643236e700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1ab3f1e2a0 CR3: 0000000064fe7000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tcp_clean_rtx_queue+0x223a/0x2da0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3356
tcp_ack+0x1962/0x3c90 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3861
tcp_rcv_established+0x7c8/0x1ac0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5973
tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x57b/0x1210 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1476
sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1061 [inline]
__release_sock+0x1d8/0x4c0 net/core/sock.c:2849
release_sock+0x5d/0x1c0 net/core/sock.c:3404
sk_stream_wait_memory+0x700/0xdc0 net/core/stream.c:145
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x111d/0x3fc0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1410
tcp_sendmsg+0x2c/0x40 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1448
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0x439/0x5c0 net/socket.c:2119
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2131 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2127 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0xda/0xf0 net/socket.c:2127
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7f6431289109
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f643236e168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f643139c100 RCX: 00007f6431289109
RDX: 00000000d0d0c2ac RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 000000000000000a
RBP: 00007f64312e308d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fff372533af R14: 00007f643236e300 R15: 0000000000022000

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49328

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mt76: fix use-after-free by removing a non-RCU wcid pointer
Fixes an issue caught by KASAN about use-after-free in mt76_txq_schedule
by protecting mtxq->wcid with rcu_lock between mt76_txq_schedule and
sta_info_[alloc, free].
[18853.876689] ==================================================================
[18853.876751] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mt76_txq_schedule+0x204/0xaf8 [mt76]
[18853.876773] Read of size 8 at addr ffffffaf989a2138 by task mt76-tx phy0/883
[18853.876786]
[18853.876810] CPU: 5 PID: 883 Comm: mt76-tx phy0 Not tainted 5.10.100-fix-510-56778d365941-kasan #5 0b01fbbcf41a530f52043508fec2e31a4215
[18853.876840] Call trace:
[18853.876861] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3ec
[18853.876878] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[18853.876899] dump_stack+0x11c/0x1ac
[18853.876918] print_address_description+0x74/0x514
[18853.876934] kasan_report+0x134/0x174
[18853.876948] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x44/0x50
[18853.876976] mt76_txq_schedule+0x204/0xaf8 [mt76 074e03e4640e97fe7405ee1fab547b81c4fa45d2]
[18853.877002] mt76_txq_schedule_all+0x2c/0x48 [mt76 074e03e4640e97fe7405ee1fab547b81c4fa45d2]
[18853.877030] mt7921_tx_worker+0xa0/0x1cc [mt7921_common f0875ebac9d7b4754e1010549e7db50fbd90a047]
[18853.877054] __mt76_worker_fn+0x190/0x22c [mt76 074e03e4640e97fe7405ee1fab547b81c4fa45d2]
[18853.877071] kthread+0x2f8/0x3b8
[18853.877087] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
[18853.877098]
[18853.877112] Allocated by task 941:
[18853.877131] kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x68
[18853.877147] __kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0xfc
[18853.877163] kasan_kmalloc+0x10/0x1c
[18853.877177] __kmalloc+0x264/0x3c4
[18853.877294] sta_info_alloc+0x460/0xf88 [mac80211]
[18853.877410] ieee80211_prep_connection+0x204/0x1ee0 [mac80211]
[18853.877523] ieee80211_mgd_auth+0x6c4/0xa4c [mac80211]
[18853.877635] ieee80211_auth+0x20/0x2c [mac80211]
[18853.877733] rdev_auth+0x7c/0x438 [cfg80211]
[18853.877826] cfg80211_mlme_auth+0x26c/0x390 [cfg80211]
[18853.877919] nl80211_authenticate+0x6d4/0x904 [cfg80211]
[18853.877938] genl_rcv_msg+0x748/0x93c
[18853.877954] netlink_rcv_skb+0x160/0x2a8
[18853.877969] genl_rcv+0x3c/0x54
[18853.877985] netlink_unicast_kernel+0x104/0x1ec
[18853.877999] netlink_unicast+0x178/0x268
[18853.878015] netlink_sendmsg+0x3cc/0x5f0
[18853.878030] sock_sendmsg+0xb4/0xd8
[18853.878043] ____sys_sendmsg+0x2f8/0x53c
[18853.878058] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe8/0x150
[18853.878071] __sys_sendmsg+0xc4/0x1f4
[18853.878087] __arm64_compat_sys_sendmsg+0x88/0x9c
[18853.878101] el0_svc_common+0x1b4/0x390
[18853.878115] do_el0_svc_compat+0x8c/0xdc
[18853.878131] el0_svc_compat+0x10/0x1c
[18853.878146] el0_sync_compat_handler+0xa8/0xcc
[18853.878161] el0_sync_compat+0x188/0x1c0
[18853.878171]
[18853.878183] Freed by task 10927:
[18853.878200] kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x68
[18853.878215] kasan_set_track+0x28/0x3c
[18853.878228] kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x48
[18853.878244] __kasan_slab_free+0x11c/0x154
[18853.878259] kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x24
[18853.878273] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xac/0x1b0
[18853.878287] kfree+0x104/0x390
[18853.878402] sta_info_free+0x198/0x210 [mac80211]
[18853.878515] __sta_info_destroy_part2+0x230/0x2d4 [mac80211]
[18853.878628] __sta_info_flush+0x300/0x37c [mac80211]
[18853.878740] ieee80211_set_disassoc+0x2cc/0xa7c [mac80211]
[18853.878851] ieee80211_mgd_deauth+0x4a4/0x10a0 [mac80211]
[18853.878962] ieee80211_deauth+0x20/0x2c [mac80211]
[18853.879057] rdev_deauth+0x7c/0x438 [cfg80211]
[18853.879150] cfg80211_mlme_deauth+0x274/0x414 [cfg80211]
[18853.879243] cfg80211_mlme_down+0xe4/0x118 [cfg80211]
[18853.879335] cfg80211_disconnect+0x218/0x2d8 [cfg80211]
[18853.879427] __cfg80211_leave+0x17c/0x240 [cfg80211]
[18853.879519] cfg80211_leave+0x3c/0x58 [cfg80211]
[18853.879611] wiphy_suspend+0xdc/0x200 [cfg80211]
[18853.879628] dpm_run_callback+0x58/0x408
[18853.879642] __device_suspend+0x4cc/0x864
[18853.879658] async_suspend+0x34/0xf4
[18
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49296

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix possible deadlock when holding Fwb to get inline_data
1, mount with wsync.
2, create a file with O_RDWR, and the request was sent to mds.0:
ceph_atomic_open()-->
ceph_mdsc_do_request(openc)
finish_open(file, dentry, ceph_open)-->
ceph_open()-->
ceph_init_file()-->
ceph_init_file_info()-->
ceph_uninline_data()-->
{
...
if (inline_version == 1 || /* initial version, no data */
inline_version == CEPH_INLINE_NONE)
goto out_unlock;
...
}
The inline_version will be 1, which is the initial version for the
new create file. And here the ci->i_inline_version will keep with 1,
it's buggy.
3, buffer write to the file immediately:
ceph_write_iter()-->
ceph_get_caps(file, need=Fw, want=Fb, ...);
generic_perform_write()-->
a_ops->write_begin()-->
ceph_write_begin()-->
netfs_write_begin()-->
netfs_begin_read()-->
netfs_rreq_submit_slice()-->
netfs_read_from_server()-->
rreq->netfs_ops->issue_read()-->
ceph_netfs_issue_read()-->
{
...
if (ci->i_inline_version != CEPH_INLINE_NONE &&
ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline(subreq))
return;
...
}
ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, Fwb);
The ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline() will send a getattr(Fsr) request to
mds.1.
4, then the mds.1 will request the rd lock for CInode::filelock from
the auth mds.0, the mds.0 will do the CInode::filelock state transation
from excl --> sync, but it need to revoke the Fxwb caps back from the
clients.
While the kernel client has aleady held the Fwb caps and waiting for
the getattr(Fsr).
It's deadlock!
URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55377

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49281

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: fix handlecache and multiuser
In multiuser each individual user has their own tcon structure for the
share and thus their own handle for a cached directory.
When we umount such a share we much make sure to release the pinned down dentry
for each such tcon and not just the master tcon.
Otherwise we will get nasty warnings on umount that dentries are still in use:
[ 3459.590047] BUG: Dentry 00000000115c6f41{i=12000000019d95,n=/} still in use\
(2) [unmount of cifs cifs]
...
[ 3459.590492] Call Trace:
[ 3459.590500] d_walk+0x61/0x2a0
[ 3459.590518] ? shrink_lock_dentry.part.0+0xe0/0xe0
[ 3459.590526] shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x49/0x110
[ 3459.590535] generic_shutdown_super+0x1a/0x110
[ 3459.590542] kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30
[ 3459.590549] cifs_kill_sb+0xf5/0x104 [cifs]
[ 3459.590773] deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0xa0
[ 3459.590782] cleanup_mnt+0x131/0x190
[ 3459.590789] task_work_run+0x5c/0x90
[ 3459.590798] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x151/0x160
[ 3459.590809] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x83/0xd0
[ 3459.590818] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30
[ 3459.590828] do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90
[ 3459.590833] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49272

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: pcm: Fix potential AB/BA lock with buffer_mutex and mmap_lock
syzbot caught a potential deadlock between the PCM
runtime->buffer_mutex and the mm->mmap_lock. It was brought by the
recent fix to cover the racy read/write and other ioctls, and in that
commit, I overlooked a (hopefully only) corner case that may take the
revert lock, namely, the OSS mmap. The OSS mmap operation
exceptionally allows to re-configure the parameters inside the OSS
mmap syscall, where mm->mmap_mutex is already held. Meanwhile, the
copy_from/to_user calls at read/write operations also take the
mm->mmap_lock internally, hence it may lead to a AB/BA deadlock.
A similar problem was already seen in the past and we fixed it with a
refcount (in commit b248371628aa). The former fix covered only the
call paths with OSS read/write and OSS ioctls, while we need to cover
the concurrent access via both ALSA and OSS APIs now.
This patch addresses the problem above by replacing the buffer_mutex
lock in the read/write operations with a refcount similar as we've
used for OSS. The new field, runtime->buffer_accessing, keeps the
number of concurrent read/write operations. Unlike the former
buffer_mutex protection, this protects only around the
copy_from/to_user() calls; the other codes are basically protected by
the PCM stream lock. The refcount can be a negative, meaning blocked
by the ioctls. If a negative value is seen, the read/write aborts
with -EBUSY. In the ioctl side, OTOH, they check this refcount, too,
and set to a negative value for blocking unless it's already being
accessed.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49271

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: prevent bad output lengths in smb2_ioctl_query_info()
When calling smb2_ioctl_query_info() with
smb_query_info::flags=PASSTHRU_FSCTL and
smb_query_info::output_buffer_length=0, the following would return
0x10
buffer = memdup_user(arg + sizeof(struct smb_query_info),
qi.output_buffer_length);
if (IS_ERR(buffer)) {
kfree(vars);
return PTR_ERR(buffer);
}
rather than a valid pointer thus making IS_ERR() check fail. This
would then cause a NULL ptr deference in @buffer when accessing it
later in smb2_ioctl_query_ioctl(). While at it, prevent having a
@buffer smaller than 8 bytes to correctly handle SMB2_SET_INFO
FileEndOfFileInformation requests when
smb_query_info::flags=PASSTHRU_SET_INFO.
Here is a small C reproducer which triggers a NULL ptr in @buffer when
passing an invalid smb_query_info::flags
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#define die(s) perror(s), exit(1)
#define QUERY_INFO 0xc018cf07
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd;
if (argc < 2)
exit(1);
fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
if (fd == -1)
die("open");
if (ioctl(fd, QUERY_INFO, (uint32_t[]) { 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0}) == -1)
die("ioctl");
close(fd);
return 0;
}
mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o ...
gcc repro.c && ./a.out /mnt/f0
[ 114.138620] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 114.139310] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
[ 114.139775] CPU: 2 PID: 995 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8 #1
[ 114.140148] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
[ 114.140818] RIP: 0010:smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x206/0x410 [cifs]
[ 114.141221] Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 c8 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 7b 28 4c 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 9c 01 00 00 49 8b 3f e8 58 02 fb ff 48 8b 14 24
[ 114.142348] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000b47b00 EFLAGS: 00010256
[ 114.142692] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888115503200 RCX: ffffffffa020580d
[ 114.143119] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffffa043a380
[ 114.143544] RBP: ffff888115503278 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003
[ 114.143983] R10: fffffbfff4087470 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888115503288
[ 114.144424] R13: 00000000ffffffea R14: ffff888115503228 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 114.144852] FS: 00007f7aeabdf740(0000) GS:ffff888151600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 114.145338] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 114.145692] CR2: 00007f7aeacfdf5e CR3: 000000012000e000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
[ 114.146131] Call Trace:
[ 114.146291] <TASK>
[ 114.146432] ? smb2_query_reparse_tag+0x890/0x890 [cifs]
[ 114.146800] ? cifs_mapchar+0x460/0x460 [cifs]
[ 114.147121] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[ 114.147412] ? cifs_strndup_to_utf16+0x15b/0x250 [cifs]
[ 114.147775] ? dentry_path_raw+0xa6/0xf0
[ 114.148024] ? cifs_convert_path_to_utf16+0x198/0x220 [cifs]
[ 114.148413] ? smb2_check_message+0x1080/0x1080 [cifs]
[ 114.148766] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[ 114.149065] cifs_ioctl+0x1577/0x3320 [cifs]
[ 114.149371] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0
[ 114.149631] ? cifs_readdir+0x2e60/0x2e60 [cifs]
[ 114.149956] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[ 114.150250] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x80b/0xbe0
[ 114.150562] ? __up_read+0x192/0x710
[ 114.150791] ? __ia32_sys_rseq+0xf0/0xf0
[ 114.151025] ? __x64_sys_openat+0x11f/0x1d0
[ 114.151296] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190
[ 114.151549] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 114.151768] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 114.152079] RIP: 0033:0x7f7aead043df
[ 114.152306] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49266

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: fix rq-qos breakage from skipping rq_qos_done_bio()
a647a524a467 ("block: don't call rq_qos_ops->done_bio if the bio isn't
tracked") made bio_endio() skip rq_qos_done_bio() if BIO_TRACKED is not set.
While this fixed a potential oops, it also broke blk-iocost by skipping the
done_bio callback for merged bios.
Before, whether a bio goes through rq_qos_throttle() or rq_qos_merge(),
rq_qos_done_bio() would be called on the bio on completion with BIO_TRACKED
distinguishing the former from the latter. rq_qos_done_bio() is not called
for bios which wenth through rq_qos_merge(). This royally confuses
blk-iocost as the merged bios never finish and are considered perpetually
in-flight.
One reliably reproducible failure mode is an intermediate cgroup geting
stuck active preventing its children from being activated due to the
leaf-only rule, leading to loss of control. The following is from
resctl-bench protection scenario which emulates isolating a web server like
workload from a memory bomb run on an iocost configuration which should
yield a reasonable level of protection.
# cat /sys/block/nvme2n1/device/model
Samsung SSD 970 PRO 512GB
# cat /sys/fs/cgroup/io.cost.model
259:0 ctrl=user model=linear rbps=834913556 rseqiops=93622 rrandiops=102913 wbps=618985353 wseqiops=72325 wrandiops=71025
# cat /sys/fs/cgroup/io.cost.qos
259:0 enable=1 ctrl=user rpct=95.00 rlat=18776 wpct=95.00 wlat=8897 min=60.00 max=100.00
# resctl-bench -m 29.6G -r out.json run protection::scenario=mem-hog,loops=1
...
Memory Hog Summary
==================
IO Latency: R p50=242u:336u/2.5m p90=794u:1.4m/7.5m p99=2.7m:8.0m/62.5m max=8.0m:36.4m/350m
W p50=221u:323u/1.5m p90=709u:1.2m/5.5m p99=1.5m:2.5m/9.5m max=6.9m:35.9m/350m
Isolation and Request Latency Impact Distributions:
min p01 p05 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 max mean stdev
isol% 15.90 15.90 15.90 40.05 57.24 59.07 60.01 74.63 74.63 90.35 90.35 58.12 15.82
lat-imp% 0 0 0 0 0 4.55 14.68 15.54 233.5 548.1 548.1 53.88 143.6
Result: isol=58.12:15.82% lat_imp=53.88%:143.6 work_csv=100.0% missing=3.96%
The isolation result of 58.12% is close to what this device would show
without any IO control.
Fix it by introducing a new flag BIO_QOS_MERGED to mark merged bios and
calling rq_qos_done_bio() on them too. For consistency and clarity, rename
BIO_TRACKED to BIO_QOS_THROTTLED. The flag checks are moved into
rq_qos_done_bio() so that it's next to the code paths that set the flags.
With the patch applied, the above same benchmark shows:
# resctl-bench -m 29.6G -r out.json run protection::scenario=mem-hog,loops=1
...
Memory Hog Summary
==================
IO Latency: R p50=123u:84.4u/985u p90=322u:256u/2.5m p99=1.6m:1.4m/9.5m max=11.1m:36.0m/350m
W p50=429u:274u/995u p90=1.7m:1.3m/4.5m p99=3.4m:2.7m/11.5m max=7.9m:5.9m/26.5m
Isolation and Request Latency Impact Distributions:
min p01 p05 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 max mean stdev
isol% 84.91 84.91 89.51 90.73 92.31 94.49 96.36 98.04 98.71 100.0 100.0 94.42 2.81
lat-imp% 0 0 0 0 0 2.81 5.73 11.11 13.92 17.53 22.61 4.10 4.68
Result: isol=94.42:2.81% lat_imp=4.10%:4.68 work_csv=58.34% missing=0%

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49265

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PM: domains: Fix sleep-in-atomic bug caused by genpd_debug_remove()
When a genpd with GENPD_FLAG_IRQ_SAFE gets removed, the following
sleep-in-atomic bug will be seen, as genpd_debug_remove() will be called
with a spinlock being held.
[ 0.029183] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1460
[ 0.029204] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
[ 0.029219] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
[ 0.029230] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc4+ #489
[ 0.029245] Hardware name: Thundercomm TurboX CM2290 (DT)
[ 0.029256] Call trace:
[ 0.029265] dump_backtrace.part.0+0xbc/0xd0
[ 0.029285] show_stack+0x3c/0xa0
[ 0.029298] dump_stack_lvl+0x7c/0xa0
[ 0.029311] dump_stack+0x18/0x34
[ 0.029323] __might_resched+0x10c/0x13c
[ 0.029338] __might_sleep+0x4c/0x80
[ 0.029351] down_read+0x24/0xd0
[ 0.029363] lookup_one_len_unlocked+0x9c/0xcc
[ 0.029379] lookup_positive_unlocked+0x10/0x50
[ 0.029392] debugfs_lookup+0x68/0xac
[ 0.029406] genpd_remove.part.0+0x12c/0x1b4
[ 0.029419] of_genpd_remove_last+0xa8/0xd4
[ 0.029434] psci_cpuidle_domain_probe+0x174/0x53c
[ 0.029449] platform_probe+0x68/0xe0
[ 0.029462] really_probe+0x190/0x430
[ 0.029473] __driver_probe_device+0x90/0x18c
[ 0.029485] driver_probe_device+0x40/0xe0
[ 0.029497] __driver_attach+0xf4/0x1d0
[ 0.029508] bus_for_each_dev+0x70/0xd0
[ 0.029523] driver_attach+0x24/0x30
[ 0.029534] bus_add_driver+0x164/0x22c
[ 0.029545] driver_register+0x78/0x130
[ 0.029556] __platform_driver_register+0x28/0x34
[ 0.029569] psci_idle_init_domains+0x1c/0x28
[ 0.029583] do_one_initcall+0x50/0x1b0
[ 0.029595] kernel_init_freeable+0x214/0x280
[ 0.029609] kernel_init+0x2c/0x13c
[ 0.029622] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
It doesn't seem necessary to call genpd_debug_remove() with the lock, so
move it out from locking to fix the problem.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49264

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exec: Force single empty string when argv is empty
Quoting[1] Ariadne Conill:
"In several other operating systems, it is a hard requirement that the
second argument to execve(2) be the name of a program, thus prohibiting
a scenario where argc < 1. POSIX 2017 also recommends this behaviour,
but it is not an explicit requirement[2]:
The argument arg0 should point to a filename string that is
associated with the process being started by one of the exec
functions.
...
Interestingly, Michael Kerrisk opened an issue about this in 2008[3],
but there was no consensus to support fixing this issue then.
Hopefully now that CVE-2021-4034 shows practical exploitative use[4]
of this bug in a shellcode, we can reconsider.
This issue is being tracked in the KSPP issue tracker[5]."
While the initial code searches[6][7] turned up what appeared to be
mostly corner case tests, trying to that just reject argv == NULL
(or an immediately terminated pointer list) quickly started tripping[8]
existing userspace programs.
The next best approach is forcing a single empty string into argv and
adjusting argc to match. The number of programs depending on argc == 0
seems a smaller set than those calling execve with a NULL argv.
Account for the additional stack space in bprm_stack_limits(). Inject an
empty string when argc == 0 (and set argc = 1). Warn about the case so
userspace has some notice about the change:
process './argc0' launched './argc0' with NULL argv: empty string added
Additionally WARN() and reject NULL argv usage for kernel threads.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220127000724.15106-1-ariadne@dereferenced.org/
[2] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/exec.html
[3] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8408
[4] https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt
[5] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/176
[6] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execve%5C+*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C+*NULL&literal=0
[7] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execlp%3F%5Cs*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C%5Cs*NULL&literal=0
[8] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220131144352.GE16385@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49248

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: firewire-lib: fix uninitialized flag for AV/C deferred transaction
AV/C deferred transaction was supported at a commit 00a7bb81c20f ("ALSA:
firewire-lib: Add support for deferred transaction") while 'deferrable'
flag can be uninitialized for non-control/notify AV/C transactions.
UBSAN reports it:
kernel: ================================================================================
kernel: UBSAN: invalid-load in /build/linux-aa0B4d/linux-5.15.0/sound/firewire/fcp.c:363:9
kernel: load of value 158 is not a valid value for type '_Bool'
kernel: CPU: 3 PID: 182227 Comm: irq/35-firewire Tainted: P OE 5.15.0-18-generic #18-Ubuntu
kernel: Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. AX370-Gaming 5/AX370-Gaming 5, BIOS F42b 08/01/2019
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: <IRQ>
kernel: show_stack+0x52/0x58
kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x5f
kernel: dump_stack+0x10/0x12
kernel: ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x45
kernel: __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value.cold+0x44/0x49
kernel: fcp_response.part.0.cold+0x1a/0x2b [snd_firewire_lib]
kernel: fcp_response+0x28/0x30 [snd_firewire_lib]
kernel: fw_core_handle_request+0x230/0x3d0 [firewire_core]
kernel: handle_ar_packet+0x1d9/0x200 [firewire_ohci]
kernel: ? handle_ar_packet+0x1d9/0x200 [firewire_ohci]
kernel: ? transmit_complete_callback+0x9f/0x120 [firewire_core]
kernel: ar_context_tasklet+0xa8/0x2e0 [firewire_ohci]
kernel: tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0xea/0xf0
kernel: tasklet_action+0x22/0x30
kernel: __do_softirq+0xd9/0x2e3
kernel: ? irq_finalize_oneshot.part.0+0xf0/0xf0
kernel: do_softirq+0x75/0xa0
kernel: </IRQ>
kernel: <TASK>
kernel: __local_bh_enable_ip+0x50/0x60
kernel: irq_forced_thread_fn+0x7e/0x90
kernel: irq_thread+0xba/0x190
kernel: ? irq_thread_fn+0x60/0x60
kernel: kthread+0x11e/0x140
kernel: ? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xf0/0xf0
kernel: ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
kernel: ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
kernel: </TASK>
kernel: ================================================================================
This commit fixes the bug. The bug has no disadvantage for the non-
control/notify AV/C transactions since the flag has an effect for AV/C
response with INTERIM (0x0f) status which is not used for the transactions
in AV/C general specification.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49238

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ath11k: free peer for station when disconnect from AP for QCA6390/WCN6855
Commit b4a0f54156ac ("ath11k: move peer delete after vdev stop of station
for QCA6390 and WCN6855") is to fix firmware crash by changing the WMI
command sequence, but actually skip all the peer delete operation, then
it lead commit 58595c9874c6 ("ath11k: Fixing dangling pointer issue upon
peer delete failure") not take effect, and then happened a use-after-free
warning from KASAN. because the peer->sta is not set to NULL and then used
later.
Change to only skip the WMI_PEER_DELETE_CMDID for QCA6390/WCN6855.
log of user-after-free:
[ 534.888665] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ath11k_dp_rx_update_peer_stats+0x912/0xc10 [ath11k]
[ 534.888696] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881396bb1b8 by task rtcwake/2860
[ 534.888705] CPU: 4 PID: 2860 Comm: rtcwake Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 5.15.0-wt-ath+ #523
[ 534.888712] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7HVK/NUC8i7HVB, BIOS HNKBLi70.86A.0067.2021.0528.1339 05/28/2021
[ 534.888716] Call Trace:
[ 534.888720] <IRQ>
[ 534.888726] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
[ 534.888736] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x170
[ 534.888745] ? ath11k_dp_rx_update_peer_stats+0x912/0xc10 [ath11k]
[ 534.888771] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
[ 534.888783] ? ath11k_dp_rx_update_peer_stats+0x912/0xc10 [ath11k]
[ 534.888810] ath11k_dp_rx_update_peer_stats+0x912/0xc10 [ath11k]
[ 534.888840] ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_status+0x529/0xa70 [ath11k]
[ 534.888874] ? ath11k_dp_rx_mon_status_bufs_replenish+0x3f0/0x3f0 [ath11k]
[ 534.888897] ? check_prev_add+0x20f0/0x20f0
[ 534.888922] ? __lock_acquire+0xb72/0x1870
[ 534.888937] ? find_held_lock+0x33/0x110
[ 534.888954] ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x297/0x520 [ath11k]
[ 534.888981] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x40/0x40
[ 534.888990] ? ath11k_dp_rx_pdev_alloc+0xd90/0xd90 [ath11k]
[ 534.889026] ath11k_dp_service_mon_ring+0x67/0xe0 [ath11k]
[ 534.889053] ? ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x520/0x520 [ath11k]
[ 534.889075] call_timer_fn+0x167/0x4a0
[ 534.889084] ? add_timer_on+0x3b0/0x3b0
[ 534.889103] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare.part.0+0x18c/0x370
[ 534.889117] __run_timers.part.0+0x539/0x8b0
[ 534.889123] ? ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x520/0x520 [ath11k]
[ 534.889157] ? call_timer_fn+0x4a0/0x4a0
[ 534.889164] ? mark_lock_irq+0x1c30/0x1c30
[ 534.889173] ? clockevents_program_event+0xdd/0x280
[ 534.889189] ? mark_held_locks+0xa5/0xe0
[ 534.889203] run_timer_softirq+0x97/0x180
[ 534.889213] __do_softirq+0x276/0x86a
[ 534.889230] __irq_exit_rcu+0x11c/0x180
[ 534.889238] irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20
[ 534.889244] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8e/0xc0
[ 534.889251] </IRQ>
[ 534.889254] <TASK>
[ 534.889259] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
[ 534.889265] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x38/0x70
[ 534.889271] Code: 74 24 10 e8 ea c2 bf fd 48 89 ef e8 12 53 c0 fd 81 e3 00 02 00 00 75 25 9c 58 f6 c4 02 75 2d 48 85 db 74 01 fb bf 01 00 00 00 <e8> 13 a7 b5 fd 65 8b 05 cc d9 9c 5e 85 c0 74 0a 5b 5d c3 e8 a0 ee
[ 534.889276] RSP: 0018:ffffc90002e5f880 EFLAGS: 00000206
[ 534.889284] RAX: 0000000000000006 RBX: 0000000000000200 RCX: ffffffff9f256f10
[ 534.889289] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffa1c6e420 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 534.889293] RBP: ffff8881095e6200 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffffa40d2b8f
[ 534.889298] R10: fffffbfff481a571 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8881095e6e68
[ 534.889302] R13: ffffc90002e5f908 R14: 0000000000000246 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 534.889316] ? mark_lock+0xd0/0x14a0
[ 534.889332] klist_next+0x1d4/0x450
[ 534.889340] ? dpm_wait_for_subordinate+0x2d0/0x2d0
[ 534.889350] device_for_each_child+0xa8/0x140
[ 534.889360] ? device_remove_class_symlinks+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 534.889370] ? __lock_release+0x4bd/0x9f0
[ 534.889378] ? dpm_suspend+0x26b/0x3f0
[ 534.889390] dpm_wait_for_subordinate+
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49236

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix UAF due to race between btf_try_get_module and load_module
While working on code to populate kfunc BTF ID sets for module BTF from
its initcall, I noticed that by the time the initcall is invoked, the
module BTF can already be seen by userspace (and the BPF verifier). The
existing btf_try_get_module calls try_module_get which only fails if
mod->state == MODULE_STATE_GOING, i.e. it can increment module reference
when module initcall is happening in parallel.
Currently, BTF parsing happens from MODULE_STATE_COMING notifier
callback. At this point, the module initcalls have not been invoked.
The notifier callback parses and prepares the module BTF, allocates an
ID, which publishes it to userspace, and then adds it to the btf_modules
list allowing the kernel to invoke btf_try_get_module for the BTF.
However, at this point, the module has not been fully initialized (i.e.
its initcalls have not finished). The code in module.c can still fail
and free the module, without caring for other users. However, nothing
stops btf_try_get_module from succeeding between the state transition
from MODULE_STATE_COMING to MODULE_STATE_LIVE.
This leads to a use-after-free issue when BPF program loads
successfully in the state transition, load_module's do_init_module call
fails and frees the module, and BPF program fd on close calls module_put
for the freed module. Future patch has test case to verify we don't
regress in this area in future.
There are multiple points after prepare_coming_module (in load_module)
where failure can occur and module loading can return error. We
illustrate and test for the race using the last point where it can
practically occur (in module __init function).
An illustration of the race:
CPU 0 CPU 1
load_module
notifier_call(MODULE_STATE_COMING)
btf_parse_module
btf_alloc_id// Published to userspace
list_add(&btf_mod->list, btf_modules)
mod->init(...)
...^
bpf_check |
check_pseudo_btf_id |
btf_try_get_module |
returns true | ...
... | module __init in progress
return prog_fd | ...
... V
if (ret < 0)
free_module(mod)
...
close(prog_fd)
...
bpf_prog_free_deferred
module_put(used_btf.mod) // use-after-free
We fix this issue by setting a flag BTF_MODULE_F_LIVE, from the notifier
callback when MODULE_STATE_LIVE state is reached for the module, so that
we return NULL from btf_try_get_module for modules that are not fully
formed. Since try_module_get already checks that module is not in
MODULE_STATE_GOING state, and that is the only transition a live module
can make before being removed from btf_modules list, this is enough to
close the race and prevent the bug.
A later selftest patch crafts the race condition artifically to verify
that it has been fixed, and that verifier fails to load program (with
ENXIO).
Lastly, a couple of comments:
1. Even if this race didn't exist, it seems more appropriate to only
access resources (ksyms and kfuncs) of a fully formed module which
has been initialized completely.
2. This patch was born out of need for synchronization against module
initcall for the next patch, so it is needed for correctness even
without the aforementioned race condition. The BTF resources
initialized by module initcall are set up once and then only looked
up, so just waiting until the initcall has finished ensures correct
behavior.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49227

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
igc: avoid kernel warning when changing RX ring parameters
Calling ethtool changing the RX ring parameters like this:
$ ethtool -G eth0 rx 1024
on igc triggers kernel warnings like this:
[ 225.198467] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 225.198473] Missing unregister, handled but fix driver
[ 225.198485] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 959 at net/core/xdp.c:168
xdp_rxq_info_reg+0x79/0xd0
[...]
[ 225.198601] Call Trace:
[ 225.198604] <TASK>
[ 225.198609] igc_setup_rx_resources+0x3f/0xe0 [igc]
[ 225.198617] igc_ethtool_set_ringparam+0x30e/0x450 [igc]
[ 225.198626] ethnl_set_rings+0x18a/0x250
[ 225.198631] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xca/0x110
[ 225.198637] genl_rcv_msg+0xce/0x1c0
[ 225.198640] ? rings_prepare_data+0x60/0x60
[ 225.198644] ? genl_get_cmd+0xd0/0xd0
[ 225.198647] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4e/0xf0
[ 225.198652] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
[ 225.198655] netlink_unicast+0x20e/0x330
[ 225.198659] netlink_sendmsg+0x23f/0x480
[ 225.198663] sock_sendmsg+0x5b/0x60
[ 225.198667] __sys_sendto+0xf0/0x160
[ 225.198671] ? handle_mm_fault+0xb2/0x280
[ 225.198676] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1eb/0x690
[ 225.198680] __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
[ 225.198683] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[ 225.198687] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 225.198693] RIP: 0033:0x7f7ae38ac3aa
igc_ethtool_set_ringparam() copies the igc_ring structure but neglects to
reset the xdp_rxq_info member before calling igc_setup_rx_resources().
This in turn calls xdp_rxq_info_reg() with an already registered xdp_rxq_info.
Make sure to unregister the xdp_rxq_info structure first in
igc_setup_rx_resources.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49215

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: Fix race at socket teardown
Fix a race in the xsk socket teardown code that can lead to a NULL pointer
dereference splat. The current xsk unbind code in xsk_unbind_dev() starts by
setting xs->state to XSK_UNBOUND, sets xs->dev to NULL and then waits for any
NAPI processing to terminate using synchronize_net(). After that, the release
code starts to tear down the socket state and free allocated memory.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c0
PGD 8000000932469067 P4D 8000000932469067 PUD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 25 PID: 69132 Comm: grpcpp_sync_ser Tainted: G I 5.16.0+ #2
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/0599V5, BIOS 1.2.10 03/09/2015
RIP: 0010:__xsk_sendmsg+0x2c/0x690
[...]
RSP: 0018:ffffa2348bd13d50 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: ffff8d5fc632d258
RDX: 0000000000400000 RSI: ffffa2348bd13e10 RDI: ffff8d5fc5489800
RBP: ffffa2348bd13db0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffffffff000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8d5fc5489800
R13: ffff8d5fcb0f5140 R14: ffff8d5fcb0f5140 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f991cff9400(0000) GS:ffff8d6f1f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000000114888005 CR4: 00000000001706e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? aa_sk_perm+0x43/0x1b0
xsk_sendmsg+0xf0/0x110
sock_sendmsg+0x65/0x70
__sys_sendto+0x113/0x190
? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x23/0x50
? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xa5/0x1d0
__x64_sys_sendto+0x29/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
There are two problems with the current code. First, setting xs->dev to NULL
before waiting for all users to stop using the socket is not correct. The
entry to the data plane functions xsk_poll(), xsk_sendmsg(), and xsk_recvmsg()
are all guarded by a test that xs->state is in the state XSK_BOUND and if not,
it returns right away. But one process might have passed this test but still
have not gotten to the point in which it uses xs->dev in the code. In this
interim, a second process executing xsk_unbind_dev() might have set xs->dev to
NULL which will lead to a crash for the first process. The solution here is
just to get rid of this NULL assignment since it is not used anymore. Before
commit 42fddcc7c64b ("xsk: use state member for socket synchronization"),
xs->dev was the gatekeeper to admit processes into the data plane functions,
but it was replaced with the state variable xs->state in the aforementioned
commit.
The second problem is that synchronize_net() does not wait for any process in
xsk_poll(), xsk_sendmsg(), or xsk_recvmsg() to complete, which means that the
state they rely on might be cleaned up prematurely. This can happen when the
notifier gets called (at driver unload for example) as it uses xsk_unbind_dev().
Solve this by extending the RCU critical region from just the ndo_xsk_wakeup
to the whole functions mentioned above, so that both the test of xs->state ==
XSK_BOUND and the last use of any member of xs is covered by the RCU critical
section. This will guarantee that when synchronize_net() completes, there will
be no processes left executing xsk_poll(), xsk_sendmsg(), or xsk_recvmsg() and
state can be cleaned up safely. Note that we need to drop the RCU lock for the
skb xmit path as it uses functions that might sleep. Due to this, we have to
retest the xs->state after we grab the mutex that protects the skb xmit code
from, among a number of things, an xsk_unbind_dev() being executed from the
notifier at the same time.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49201

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ibmvnic: fix race between xmit and reset
There is a race between reset and the transmit paths that can lead to
ibmvnic_xmit() accessing an scrq after it has been freed in the reset
path. It can result in a crash like:
Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000
Faulting instruction address: 0xc0080000016189f8
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
...
NIP [c0080000016189f8] ibmvnic_xmit+0x60/0xb60 [ibmvnic]
LR [c000000000c0046c] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11c/0x280
Call Trace:
[c008000001618f08] ibmvnic_xmit+0x570/0xb60 [ibmvnic] (unreliable)
[c000000000c0046c] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11c/0x280
[c000000000c9cfcc] sch_direct_xmit+0xec/0x330
[c000000000bfe640] __dev_xmit_skb+0x3a0/0x9d0
[c000000000c00ad4] __dev_queue_xmit+0x394/0x730
[c008000002db813c] __bond_start_xmit+0x254/0x450 [bonding]
[c008000002db8378] bond_start_xmit+0x40/0xc0 [bonding]
[c000000000c0046c] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11c/0x280
[c000000000c00ca4] __dev_queue_xmit+0x564/0x730
[c000000000cf97e0] neigh_hh_output+0xd0/0x180
[c000000000cfa69c] ip_finish_output2+0x31c/0x5c0
[c000000000cfd244] __ip_queue_xmit+0x194/0x4f0
[c000000000d2a3c4] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x434/0x9b0
[c000000000d2d1e0] __tcp_retransmit_skb+0x1d0/0x6a0
[c000000000d2d984] tcp_retransmit_skb+0x34/0x130
[c000000000d310e8] tcp_retransmit_timer+0x388/0x6d0
[c000000000d315ec] tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1bc/0x330
[c000000000d317bc] tcp_write_timer+0x5c/0x200
[c000000000243270] call_timer_fn+0x50/0x1c0
[c000000000243704] __run_timers.part.0+0x324/0x460
[c000000000243894] run_timer_softirq+0x54/0xa0
[c000000000ea713c] __do_softirq+0x15c/0x3e0
[c000000000166258] __irq_exit_rcu+0x158/0x190
[c000000000166420] irq_exit+0x20/0x40
[c00000000002853c] timer_interrupt+0x14c/0x2b0
[c000000000009a00] decrementer_common_virt+0x210/0x220
--- interrupt: 900 at plpar_hcall_norets_notrace+0x18/0x2c
The immediate cause of the crash is the access of tx_scrq in the following
snippet during a reset, where the tx_scrq can be either NULL or an address
that will soon be invalid:
ibmvnic_xmit()
{
...
tx_scrq = adapter->tx_scrq[queue_num];
txq = netdev_get_tx_queue(netdev, queue_num);
ind_bufp = &tx_scrq->ind_buf;
if (test_bit(0, &adapter->resetting)) {
...
}
But beyond that, the call to ibmvnic_xmit() itself is not safe during a
reset and the reset path attempts to avoid this by stopping the queue in
ibmvnic_cleanup(). However just after the queue was stopped, an in-flight
ibmvnic_complete_tx() could have restarted the queue even as the reset is
progressing.
Since the queue was restarted we could get a call to ibmvnic_xmit() which
can then access the bad tx_scrq (or other fields).
We cannot however simply have ibmvnic_complete_tx() check the ->resetting
bit and skip starting the queue. This can race at the "back-end" of a good
reset which just restarted the queue but has not cleared the ->resetting
bit yet. If we skip restarting the queue due to ->resetting being true,
the queue would remain stopped indefinitely potentially leading to transmit
timeouts.
IOW ->resetting is too broad for this purpose. Instead use a new flag
that indicates whether or not the queues are active. Only the open/
reset paths control when the queues are active. ibmvnic_complete_tx()
and others wake up the queue only if the queue is marked active.
So we will have:
A. reset/open thread in ibmvnic_cleanup() and __ibmvnic_open()
->resetting = true
->tx_queues_active = false
disable tx queues
...
->tx_queues_active = true
start tx queues
B. Tx interrupt in ibmvnic_complete_tx():
if (->tx_queues_active)
netif_wake_subqueue();
To ensure that ->tx_queues_active and state of the queues are consistent,
we need a lock which:
- must also be taken in the interrupt path (ibmvnic_complete_tx())
- shared across the multiple
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49198

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: Fix crash due to tcp_tsorted_anchor was initialized before release skb
Got crash when doing pressure test of mptcp:
===========================================================================
dst_release: dst:ffffa06ce6e5c058 refcnt:-1
kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffa06ce6e5c058
PGD 190a01067 P4D 190a01067 PUD 43fffb067 PMD 22e403063 PTE 8000000226e5c063
Oops: 0011 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 7 PID: 7823 Comm: kworker/7:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.2.1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
? skb_release_head_state+0x68/0x100
? skb_release_all+0xe/0x30
? kfree_skb+0x32/0xa0
? mptcp_sendmsg_frag+0x57e/0x750
? __mptcp_retrans+0x21b/0x3c0
? __switch_to_asm+0x35/0x70
? mptcp_worker+0x25e/0x320
? process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
? worker_thread+0x30/0x390
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
? kthread+0x112/0x130
? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
===========================================================================
In __mptcp_alloc_tx_skb skb was allocated and skb->tcp_tsorted_anchor will
be initialized, in under memory pressure situation sk_wmem_schedule will
return false and then kfree_skb. In this case skb->_skb_refdst is not null
because_skb_refdst and tcp_tsorted_anchor are stored in the same mem, and
kfree_skb will try to release dst and cause crash.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49196

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/pseries: Fix use after free in remove_phb_dynamic()
In remove_phb_dynamic() we use &phb->io_resource, after we've called
device_unregister(&host_bridge->dev). But the unregister may have freed
phb, because pcibios_free_controller_deferred() is the release function
for the host_bridge.
If there are no outstanding references when we call device_unregister()
then phb will be freed out from under us.
This has gone mainly unnoticed, but with slub_debug and page_poison
enabled it can lead to a crash:
PID: 7574 TASK: c0000000d492cb80 CPU: 13 COMMAND: "drmgr"
#0 [c0000000e4f075a0] crash_kexec at c00000000027d7dc
#1 [c0000000e4f075d0] oops_end at c000000000029608
#2 [c0000000e4f07650] __bad_page_fault at c0000000000904b4
#3 [c0000000e4f076c0] do_bad_slb_fault at c00000000009a5a8
#4 [c0000000e4f076f0] data_access_slb_common_virt at c000000000008b30
Data SLB Access [380] exception frame:
R0: c000000000167250 R1: c0000000e4f07a00 R2: c000000002a46100
R3: c000000002b39ce8 R4: 00000000000000c0 R5: 00000000000000a9
R6: 3894674d000000c0 R7: 0000000000000000 R8: 00000000000000ff
R9: 0000000000000100 R10: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b R11: 0000000000008000
R12: c00000000023da80 R13: c0000009ffd38b00 R14: 0000000000000000
R15: 000000011c87f0f0 R16: 0000000000000006 R17: 0000000000000003
R18: 0000000000000002 R19: 0000000000000004 R20: 0000000000000005
R21: 000000011c87ede8 R22: 000000011c87c5a8 R23: 000000011c87d3a0
R24: 0000000000000000 R25: 0000000000000001 R26: c0000000e4f07cc8
R27: c00000004d1cc400 R28: c0080000031d00e8 R29: c00000004d23d800
R30: c00000004d1d2400 R31: c00000004d1d2540
NIP: c000000000167258 MSR: 8000000000009033 OR3: c000000000e9f474
CTR: 0000000000000000 LR: c000000000167250 XER: 0000000020040003
CCR: 0000000024088420 MQ: 0000000000000000 DAR: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6ba3
DSISR: c0000000e4f07920 Syscall Result: fffffffffffffff2
[NIP : release_resource+56]
[LR : release_resource+48]
#5 [c0000000e4f07a00] release_resource at c000000000167258 (unreliable)
#6 [c0000000e4f07a30] remove_phb_dynamic at c000000000105648
#7 [c0000000e4f07ab0] dlpar_remove_slot at c0080000031a09e8 [rpadlpar_io]
#8 [c0000000e4f07b50] remove_slot_store at c0080000031a0b9c [rpadlpar_io]
#9 [c0000000e4f07be0] kobj_attr_store at c000000000817d8c
#10 [c0000000e4f07c00] sysfs_kf_write at c00000000063e504
#11 [c0000000e4f07c20] kernfs_fop_write_iter at c00000000063d868
#12 [c0000000e4f07c70] new_sync_write at c00000000054339c
#13 [c0000000e4f07d10] vfs_write at c000000000546624
#14 [c0000000e4f07d60] ksys_write at c0000000005469f4
#15 [c0000000e4f07db0] system_call_exception at c000000000030840
#16 [c0000000e4f07e10] system_call_vectored_common at c00000000000c168
To avoid it, we can take a reference to the host_bridge->dev until we're
done using phb. Then when we drop the reference the phb will be freed.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49193

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix 'scheduling while atomic' on aux critical err interrupt
There's a kernel BUG splat on processing aux critical error
interrupts in ice_misc_intr():
[ 2100.917085] BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/15/0/0x00010000
...
[ 2101.060770] Call Trace:
[ 2101.063229] <IRQ>
[ 2101.065252] dump_stack+0x41/0x60
[ 2101.068587] __schedule_bug.cold.100+0x4c/0x58
[ 2101.073060] __schedule+0x6a4/0x830
[ 2101.076570] schedule+0x35/0xa0
[ 2101.079727] schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10
[ 2101.084284] __mutex_lock.isra.7+0x310/0x420
[ 2101.088580] ? ice_misc_intr+0x201/0x2e0 [ice]
[ 2101.093078] ice_send_event_to_aux+0x25/0x70 [ice]
[ 2101.097921] ice_misc_intr+0x220/0x2e0 [ice]
[ 2101.102232] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x40/0x180
[ 2101.106965] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x30/0x80
[ 2101.111434] handle_irq_event+0x36/0x53
[ 2101.115292] handle_edge_irq+0x82/0x190
[ 2101.119148] handle_irq+0x1c/0x30
[ 2101.122480] do_IRQ+0x49/0xd0
[ 2101.125465] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf
[ 2101.129146] </IRQ>
...
As Andrew correctly mentioned previously[0], the following call
ladder happens:
ice_misc_intr() <- hardirq
ice_send_event_to_aux()
device_lock()
mutex_lock()
might_sleep()
might_resched() <- oops
Add a new PF state bit which indicates that an aux critical error
occurred and serve it in ice_service_task() in process context.
The new ice_pf::oicr_err_reg is read-write in both hardirq and
process contexts, but only 3 bits of non-critical data probably
aren't worth explicit synchronizing (and they're even in the same
byte [31:24]).
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/YeSRUVmrdmlUXHDn@lunn.ch

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49179

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block, bfq: don't move oom_bfqq
Our test report a UAF:
[ 2073.019181] ==================================================================
[ 2073.019188] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __bfq_put_async_bfqq+0xa0/0x168
[ 2073.019191] Write of size 8 at addr ffff8000ccf64128 by task rmmod/72584
[ 2073.019192]
[ 2073.019196] CPU: 0 PID: 72584 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.19.90-yk #5
[ 2073.019198] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
[ 2073.019200] Call trace:
[ 2073.019203] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x310
[ 2073.019206] show_stack+0x28/0x38
[ 2073.019210] dump_stack+0xec/0x15c
[ 2073.019216] print_address_description+0x68/0x2d0
[ 2073.019220] kasan_report+0x238/0x2f0
[ 2073.019224] __asan_store8+0x88/0xb0
[ 2073.019229] __bfq_put_async_bfqq+0xa0/0x168
[ 2073.019233] bfq_put_async_queues+0xbc/0x208
[ 2073.019236] bfq_pd_offline+0x178/0x238
[ 2073.019240] blkcg_deactivate_policy+0x1f0/0x420
[ 2073.019244] bfq_exit_queue+0x128/0x178
[ 2073.019249] blk_mq_exit_sched+0x12c/0x160
[ 2073.019252] elevator_exit+0xc8/0xd0
[ 2073.019256] blk_exit_queue+0x50/0x88
[ 2073.019259] blk_cleanup_queue+0x228/0x3d8
[ 2073.019267] null_del_dev+0xfc/0x1e0 [null_blk]
[ 2073.019274] null_exit+0x90/0x114 [null_blk]
[ 2073.019278] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x358/0x5a0
[ 2073.019282] el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x320
[ 2073.019287] el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160
[ 2073.019290] el0_svc+0x10/0x218
[ 2073.019291]
[ 2073.019294] Allocated by task 14163:
[ 2073.019301] kasan_kmalloc+0xe0/0x190
[ 2073.019305] kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x1cc/0x418
[ 2073.019308] bfq_pd_alloc+0x54/0x118
[ 2073.019313] blkcg_activate_policy+0x250/0x460
[ 2073.019317] bfq_create_group_hierarchy+0x38/0x110
[ 2073.019321] bfq_init_queue+0x6d0/0x948
[ 2073.019325] blk_mq_init_sched+0x1d8/0x390
[ 2073.019330] elevator_switch_mq+0x88/0x170
[ 2073.019334] elevator_switch+0x140/0x270
[ 2073.019338] elv_iosched_store+0x1a4/0x2a0
[ 2073.019342] queue_attr_store+0x90/0xe0
[ 2073.019348] sysfs_kf_write+0xa8/0xe8
[ 2073.019351] kernfs_fop_write+0x1f8/0x378
[ 2073.019359] __vfs_write+0xe0/0x360
[ 2073.019363] vfs_write+0xf0/0x270
[ 2073.019367] ksys_write+0xdc/0x1b8
[ 2073.019371] __arm64_sys_write+0x50/0x60
[ 2073.019375] el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x320
[ 2073.019380] el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160
[ 2073.019383] el0_svc+0x10/0x218
[ 2073.019385]
[ 2073.019387] Freed by task 72584:
[ 2073.019391] __kasan_slab_free+0x120/0x228
[ 2073.019394] kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18
[ 2073.019397] kfree+0x94/0x368
[ 2073.019400] bfqg_put+0x64/0xb0
[ 2073.019404] bfqg_and_blkg_put+0x90/0xb0
[ 2073.019408] bfq_put_queue+0x220/0x228
[ 2073.019413] __bfq_put_async_bfqq+0x98/0x168
[ 2073.019416] bfq_put_async_queues+0xbc/0x208
[ 2073.019420] bfq_pd_offline+0x178/0x238
[ 2073.019424] blkcg_deactivate_policy+0x1f0/0x420
[ 2073.019429] bfq_exit_queue+0x128/0x178
[ 2073.019433] blk_mq_exit_sched+0x12c/0x160
[ 2073.019437] elevator_exit+0xc8/0xd0
[ 2073.019440] blk_exit_queue+0x50/0x88
[ 2073.019443] blk_cleanup_queue+0x228/0x3d8
[ 2073.019451] null_del_dev+0xfc/0x1e0 [null_blk]
[ 2073.019459] null_exit+0x90/0x114 [null_blk]
[ 2073.019462] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x358/0x5a0
[ 2073.019467] el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x320
[ 2073.019471] el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160
[ 2073.019474] el0_svc+0x10/0x218
[ 2073.019475]
[ 2073.019479] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8000ccf63f00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1024 of size 1024
[ 2073.019484] The buggy address is located 552 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff8000ccf63f00, ffff8000ccf64300)
[ 2073.019486] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 2073.019492] page:ffff7e000333d800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8000c0003a00 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 2073.020123] flags: 0x7ffff0000008100(slab|head)
[ 2073.020403] raw: 07ffff0000008100 ffff7e0003334c08 ffff7e00001f5a08 ffff8000c0003a00
[ 2073.020409] ra
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49176

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bfq: fix use-after-free in bfq_dispatch_request
KASAN reports a use-after-free report when doing normal scsi-mq test
[69832.239032] ==================================================================
[69832.241810] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.243267] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88802622ba88 by task kworker/3:1H/155
[69832.244656]
[69832.245007] CPU: 3 PID: 155 Comm: kworker/3:1H Not tainted 5.10.0-10295-g576c6382529e #8
[69832.246626] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[69832.249069] Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_run_work_fn
[69832.250022] Call Trace:
[69832.250541] dump_stack+0x9b/0xce
[69832.251232] ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.252243] print_address_description.constprop.6+0x3e/0x60
[69832.253381] ? __cpuidle_text_end+0x5/0x5
[69832.254211] ? vprintk_func+0x6b/0x120
[69832.254994] ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.255952] ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.256914] kasan_report.cold.9+0x22/0x3a
[69832.257753] ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.258755] check_memory_region+0x1c1/0x1e0
[69832.260248] bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.261181] ? bfq_bfqq_expire+0x2440/0x2440
[69832.262032] ? blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queues+0xf9/0x170
[69832.263022] __blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched+0x52f/0x830
[69832.264011] ? blk_mq_sched_request_inserted+0x100/0x100
[69832.265101] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x398/0x4f0
[69832.266206] ? blk_mq_do_dispatch_ctx+0x570/0x570
[69832.267147] ? __switch_to+0x5f4/0xee0
[69832.267898] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xdf/0x140
[69832.268946] __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xc0/0x270
[69832.269840] blk_mq_run_work_fn+0x51/0x60
[69832.278170] process_one_work+0x6d4/0xfe0
[69832.278984] worker_thread+0x91/0xc80
[69832.279726] ? __kthread_parkme+0xb0/0x110
[69832.280554] ? process_one_work+0xfe0/0xfe0
[69832.281414] kthread+0x32d/0x3f0
[69832.282082] ? kthread_park+0x170/0x170
[69832.282849] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[69832.283573]
[69832.283886] Allocated by task 7725:
[69832.284599] kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40
[69832.285385] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.2+0xc1/0xd0
[69832.286350] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x13f/0x460
[69832.287237] bfq_get_queue+0x3d4/0x1140
[69832.287993] bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split+0x103/0x510
[69832.289015] bfq_init_rq+0x337/0x2d50
[69832.289749] bfq_insert_requests+0x304/0x4e10
[69832.290634] blk_mq_sched_insert_requests+0x13e/0x390
[69832.291629] blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x4b4/0x760
[69832.292538] blk_flush_plug_list+0x2c5/0x480
[69832.293392] io_schedule_prepare+0xb2/0xd0
[69832.294209] io_schedule_timeout+0x13/0x80
[69832.295014] wait_for_common_io.constprop.1+0x13c/0x270
[69832.296137] submit_bio_wait+0x103/0x1a0
[69832.296932] blkdev_issue_discard+0xe6/0x160
[69832.297794] blk_ioctl_discard+0x219/0x290
[69832.298614] blkdev_common_ioctl+0x50a/0x1750
[69832.304715] blkdev_ioctl+0x470/0x600
[69832.305474] block_ioctl+0xde/0x120
[69832.306232] vfs_ioctl+0x6c/0xc0
[69832.306877] __se_sys_ioctl+0x90/0xa0
[69832.307629] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
[69832.308362] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[69832.309382]
[69832.309701] Freed by task 155:
[69832.310328] kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40
[69832.311121] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
[69832.311868] kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30
[69832.312699] __kasan_slab_free+0x111/0x160
[69832.313524] kmem_cache_free+0x94/0x460
[69832.314367] bfq_put_queue+0x582/0x940
[69832.315112] __bfq_bfqd_reset_in_service+0x166/0x1d0
[69832.317275] bfq_bfqq_expire+0xb27/0x2440
[69832.318084] bfq_dispatch_request+0x697/0x44b0
[69832.318991] __blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched+0x52f/0x830
[69832.319984] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x398/0x4f0
[69832.321087] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xdf/0x140
[69832.322225] __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xc0/0x270
[69832.323114] blk_mq_run_work_fn+0x51/0x6
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49174

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix ext4_mb_mark_bb() with flex_bg with fast_commit
In case of flex_bg feature (which is by default enabled), extents for
any given inode might span across blocks from two different block group.
ext4_mb_mark_bb() only reads the buffer_head of block bitmap once for the
starting block group, but it fails to read it again when the extent length
boundary overflows to another block group. Then in this below loop it
accesses memory beyond the block group bitmap buffer_head and results
into a data abort.
for (i = 0; i < clen; i++)
if (!mb_test_bit(blkoff + i, bitmap_bh->b_data) == !state)
already++;
This patch adds this functionality for checking block group boundary in
ext4_mb_mark_bb() and update the buffer_head(bitmap_bh) for every different
block group.
w/o this patch, I was easily able to hit a data access abort using Power platform.
<...>
[ 74.327662] EXT4-fs error (device loop3): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:1141: group 11, block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 21248 vs 23294 free clusters
[ 74.533214] EXT4-fs (loop3): shut down requested (2)
[ 74.536705] Aborting journal on device loop3-8.
[ 74.702705] BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0xc00000005e980000
[ 74.703727] Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000007bffb8
cpu 0xd: Vector: 300 (Data Access) at [c000000015db7060]
pc: c0000000007bffb8: ext4_mb_mark_bb+0x198/0x5a0
lr: c0000000007bfeec: ext4_mb_mark_bb+0xcc/0x5a0
sp: c000000015db7300
msr: 800000000280b033
dar: c00000005e980000
dsisr: 40000000
current = 0xc000000027af6880
paca = 0xc00000003ffd5200 irqmask: 0x03 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 5167, comm = mount
<...>
enter ? for help
[c000000015db7380] c000000000782708 ext4_ext_clear_bb+0x378/0x410
[c000000015db7400] c000000000813f14 ext4_fc_replay+0x1794/0x2000
[c000000015db7580] c000000000833f7c do_one_pass+0xe9c/0x12a0
[c000000015db7710] c000000000834504 jbd2_journal_recover+0x184/0x2d0
[c000000015db77c0] c000000000841398 jbd2_journal_load+0x188/0x4a0
[c000000015db7880] c000000000804de8 ext4_fill_super+0x2638/0x3e10
[c000000015db7a40] c0000000005f8404 get_tree_bdev+0x2b4/0x350
[c000000015db7ae0] c0000000007ef058 ext4_get_tree+0x28/0x40
[c000000015db7b00] c0000000005f6344 vfs_get_tree+0x44/0x100
[c000000015db7b70] c00000000063c408 path_mount+0xdd8/0xe70
[c000000015db7c40] c00000000063c8f0 sys_mount+0x450/0x550
[c000000015db7d50] c000000000035770 system_call_exception+0x4a0/0x4e0
[c000000015db7e10] c00000000000c74c system_call_common+0xec/0x250

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49159

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Implement ref count for SRB
The timeout handler and the done function are racing. When
qla2x00_async_iocb_timeout() starts to run it can be preempted by the
normal response path (via the firmware?). qla24xx_async_gpsc_sp_done()
releases the SRB unconditionally. When scheduling back to
qla2x00_async_iocb_timeout() qla24xx_async_abort_cmd() will access an freed
sp->qpair pointer:
qla2xxx [0000:83:00.0]-2871:0: Async-gpsc timeout - hdl=63d portid=234500 50:06:0e:80:08:77:b6:21.
qla2xxx [0000:83:00.0]-2853:0: Async done-gpsc res 0, WWPN 50:06:0e:80:08:77:b6:21
qla2xxx [0000:83:00.0]-2854:0: Async-gpsc OUT WWPN 20:45:00:27:f8:75:33:00 speeds=2c00 speed=0400.
qla2xxx [0000:83:00.0]-28d8:0: qla24xx_handle_gpsc_event 50:06:0e:80:08:77:b6:21 DS 7 LS 6 rc 0 login 1|1 rscn 1|0 lid 5
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
IP: qla24xx_async_abort_cmd+0x1b/0x1c0 [qla2xxx]
Obvious solution to this is to introduce a reference counter. One reference
is taken for the normal code path (the 'good' case) and one for the timeout
path. As we always race between the normal good case and the timeout/abort
handler we need to serialize it. Also we cannot assume any order between
the handlers. Since this is slow path we can use proper synchronization via
locks.
When we are able to cancel a timer (del_timer returns 1) we know there
can't be any error handling in progress because the timeout handler hasn't
expired yet, thus we can safely decrement the refcounter by one.
If we are not able to cancel the timer, we know an abort handler is
running. We have to make sure we call sp->done() in the abort handlers
before calling kref_put().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49158

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix warning message due to adisc being flushed
Fix warning message due to adisc being flushed. Linux kernel triggered a
warning message where a different error code type is not matching up with
the expected type. Add additional translation of one error code type to
another.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1131623 at drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_init.c:498
qla2x00_async_adisc_sp_done+0x294/0x2b0 [qla2xxx]
CPU: 2 PID: 1131623 Comm: drmgr Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1-autotest #1
..
GPR28: c000000aaa9c8890 c0080000079ab678 c00000140a104800 c00000002bd19000
NIP [c00800000790857c] qla2x00_async_adisc_sp_done+0x294/0x2b0 [qla2xxx]
LR [c008000007908578] qla2x00_async_adisc_sp_done+0x290/0x2b0 [qla2xxx]
Call Trace:
[c00000001cdc3620] [c008000007908578] qla2x00_async_adisc_sp_done+0x290/0x2b0 [qla2xxx] (unreliable)
[c00000001cdc3710] [c0080000078f3080] __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0x1b8/0x580 [qla2xxx]
[c00000001cdc3840] [c0080000078f589c] qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0x34/0xd0 [qla2xxx]
[c00000001cdc3880] [c0080000079153d8] qla2x00_abort_isp_cleanup+0x3f0/0x570 [qla2xxx]
[c00000001cdc3920] [c0080000078fb7e8] qla2x00_remove_one+0x3d0/0x480 [qla2xxx]
[c00000001cdc39b0] [c00000000071c274] pci_device_remove+0x64/0x120
[c00000001cdc39f0] [c0000000007fb818] device_release_driver_internal+0x168/0x2a0
[c00000001cdc3a30] [c00000000070e304] pci_stop_bus_device+0xb4/0x100
[c00000001cdc3a70] [c00000000070e4f0] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0x20/0x40
[c00000001cdc3aa0] [c000000000073940] pci_hp_remove_devices+0x90/0x130
[c00000001cdc3b30] [c0080000070704d0] disable_slot+0x38/0x90 [rpaphp] [
c00000001cdc3b60] [c00000000073eb4c] power_write_file+0xcc/0x180
[c00000001cdc3be0] [c0000000007354bc] pci_slot_attr_store+0x3c/0x60
[c00000001cdc3c00] [c00000000055f820] sysfs_kf_write+0x60/0x80 [c00000001cdc3c20]
[c00000000055df10] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1a0/0x290
[c00000001cdc3c70] [c000000000447c4c] new_sync_write+0x14c/0x1d0
[c00000001cdc3d10] [c00000000044b134] vfs_write+0x224/0x330
[c00000001cdc3d60] [c00000000044b3f4] ksys_write+0x74/0x130
[c00000001cdc3db0] [c00000000002df70] system_call_exception+0x150/0x2d0
[c00000001cdc3e10] [c00000000000d45c] system_call_common+0xec/0x278

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49156

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix scheduling while atomic
The driver makes a call into midlayer (fc_remote_port_delete) which can put
the thread to sleep. The thread that originates the call is in interrupt
context. The combination of the two trigger a crash. Schedule the call in
non-interrupt context where it is more safe.
kernel: BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/7/0/0x00010000
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: <IRQ>
kernel: dump_stack+0x66/0x81
kernel: __schedule_bug.cold.90+0x5/0x1d
kernel: __schedule+0x7af/0x960
kernel: schedule+0x28/0x80
kernel: schedule_timeout+0x26d/0x3b0
kernel: wait_for_completion+0xb4/0x140
kernel: ? wake_up_q+0x70/0x70
kernel: __wait_rcu_gp+0x12c/0x160
kernel: ? sdev_evt_alloc+0xc0/0x180 [scsi_mod]
kernel: synchronize_sched+0x6c/0x80
kernel: ? call_rcu_bh+0x20/0x20
kernel: ? __bpf_trace_rcu_invoke_callback+0x10/0x10
kernel: sdev_evt_alloc+0xfd/0x180 [scsi_mod]
kernel: starget_for_each_device+0x85/0xb0 [scsi_mod]
kernel: ? scsi_init_io+0x360/0x3d0 [scsi_mod]
kernel: scsi_init_io+0x388/0x3d0 [scsi_mod]
kernel: device_for_each_child+0x54/0x90
kernel: fc_remote_port_delete+0x70/0xe0 [scsi_transport_fc]
kernel: qla2x00_schedule_rport_del+0x62/0xf0 [qla2xxx]
kernel: qla2x00_mark_device_lost+0x9c/0xd0 [qla2xxx]
kernel: qla24xx_handle_plogi_done_event+0x55f/0x570 [qla2xxx]
kernel: qla2x00_async_login_sp_done+0xd2/0x100 [qla2xxx]
kernel: qla24xx_logio_entry+0x13a/0x3c0 [qla2xxx]
kernel: qla24xx_process_response_queue+0x306/0x400 [qla2xxx]
kernel: qla24xx_msix_rsp_q+0x3f/0xb0 [qla2xxx]
kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x40/0x180
kernel: handle_irq_event_percpu+0x30/0x80
kernel: handle_irq_event+0x36/0x60

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49154

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: fix panic on out-of-bounds guest IRQ
As guest_irq is coming from KVM_IRQFD API call, it may trigger
crash in svm_update_pi_irte() due to out-of-bounds:
crash> bt
PID: 22218 TASK: ffff951a6ad74980 CPU: 73 COMMAND: "vcpu8"
#0 [ffffb1ba6707fa40] machine_kexec at ffffffff8565b397
#1 [ffffb1ba6707fa90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff85788a6d
#2 [ffffb1ba6707fb58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8578995d
#3 [ffffb1ba6707fb70] oops_end at ffffffff85623c0d
#4 [ffffb1ba6707fb90] no_context at ffffffff856692c9
#5 [ffffb1ba6707fbf8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff85f95b51
#6 [ffffb1ba6707fc50] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff86000ace
[exception RIP: svm_update_pi_irte+227]
RIP: ffffffffc0761b53 RSP: ffffb1ba6707fd08 RFLAGS: 00010086
RAX: ffffb1ba6707fd78 RBX: ffffb1ba66d91000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 00003c803f63f1c0 RSI: 000000000000019a RDI: ffffb1ba66db2ab8
RBP: 000000000000019a R8: 0000000000000040 R9: ffff94ca41b82200
R10: ffffffffffffffcf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffffffffffffcf R15: 000000000000005f
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
#7 [ffffb1ba6707fdb8] kvm_irq_routing_update at ffffffffc09f19a1 [kvm]
#8 [ffffb1ba6707fde0] kvm_set_irq_routing at ffffffffc09f2133 [kvm]
#9 [ffffb1ba6707fe18] kvm_vm_ioctl at ffffffffc09ef544 [kvm]
RIP: 00007f143c36488b RSP: 00007f143a4e04b8 RFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f05780041d0 RCX: 00007f143c36488b
RDX: 00007f05780041d0 RSI: 000000004008ae6a RDI: 0000000000000020
RBP: 00000000000004e8 R8: 0000000000000008 R9: 00007f05780041e0
R10: 00007f0578004560 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000004e0
R13: 000000000000001a R14: 00007f1424001c60 R15: 00007f0578003bc0
ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 CS: 0033 SS: 002b
Vmx have been fix this in commit 3a8b0677fc61 (KVM: VMX: Do not BUG() on
out-of-bounds guest IRQ), so we can just copy source from that to fix
this.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49132

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ath11k: pci: fix crash on suspend if board file is not found
Mario reported that the kernel was crashing on suspend if ath11k was not able
to find a board file:
[ 473.693286] PM: Suspending system (s2idle)
[ 473.693291] printk: Suspending console(s) (use no_console_suspend to debug)
[ 474.407787] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000002070
[ 474.407791] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 474.407794] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 474.407798] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 474.407801] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 474.407805] CPU: 2 PID: 2350 Comm: kworker/u32:14 Tainted: G W 5.16.0 #248
[...]
[ 474.407868] Call Trace:
[ 474.407870] <TASK>
[ 474.407874] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2a/0x60
[ 474.407882] ? lock_timer_base+0x72/0xa0
[ 474.407889] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x29/0x3d
[ 474.407892] ? try_to_del_timer_sync+0x54/0x80
[ 474.407896] ath11k_dp_rx_pktlog_stop+0x49/0xc0 [ath11k]
[ 474.407912] ath11k_core_suspend+0x34/0x130 [ath11k]
[ 474.407923] ath11k_pci_pm_suspend+0x1b/0x50 [ath11k_pci]
[ 474.407928] pci_pm_suspend+0x7e/0x170
[ 474.407935] ? pci_pm_freeze+0xc0/0xc0
[ 474.407939] dpm_run_callback+0x4e/0x150
[ 474.407947] __device_suspend+0x148/0x4c0
[ 474.407951] async_suspend+0x20/0x90
dmesg-efi-164255130401001:
Oops#1 Part1
[ 474.407955] async_run_entry_fn+0x33/0x120
[ 474.407959] process_one_work+0x220/0x3f0
[ 474.407966] worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0
[ 474.407971] kthread+0x17a/0x1a0
[ 474.407975] ? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0
[ 474.407979] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
[ 474.407983] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 474.407991] </TASK>
The issue here is that board file loading happens after ath11k_pci_probe()
succesfully returns (ath11k initialisation happends asynchronously) and the
suspend handler is still enabled, of course failing as ath11k is not properly
initialised. Fix this by checking ATH11K_FLAG_QMI_FAIL during both suspend and
resume.
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03003-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-2

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49124

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mce: Work around an erratum on fast string copy instructions
A rare kernel panic scenario can happen when the following conditions
are met due to an erratum on fast string copy instructions:
1) An uncorrected error.
2) That error must be in first cache line of a page.
3) Kernel must execute page_copy from the page immediately before that
page.
The fast string copy instructions ("REP; MOVS*") could consume an
uncorrectable memory error in the cache line _right after_ the desired
region to copy and raise an MCE.
Bit 0 of MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE can be cleared to disable fast string
copy and will avoid such spurious machine checks. However, that is less
preferable due to the permanent performance impact. Considering memory
poison is rare, it's desirable to keep fast string copy enabled until an
MCE is seen.
Intel has confirmed the following:
1. The CPU erratum of fast string copy only applies to Skylake,
Cascade Lake and Cooper Lake generations.
Directly return from the MCE handler:
2. Will result in complete execution of the "REP; MOVS*" with no data
loss or corruption.
3. Will not result in another MCE firing on the next poisoned cache line
due to "REP; MOVS*".
4. Will resume execution from a correct point in code.
5. Will result in the same instruction that triggered the MCE firing a
second MCE immediately for any other software recoverable data fetch
errors.
6. Is not safe without disabling the fast string copy, as the next fast
string copy of the same buffer on the same CPU would result in a PANIC
MCE.
This should mitigate the erratum completely with the only caveat that
the fast string copy is disabled on the affected hyper thread thus
performance degradation.
This is still better than the OS crashing on MCEs raised on an
irrelevant process due to "REP; MOVS*' accesses in a kernel context,
e.g., copy_page.
Injected errors on 1st cache line of 8 anonymous pages of process
'proc1' and observed MCE consumption from 'proc2' with no panic
(directly returned).
Without the fix, the host panicked within a few minutes on a
random 'proc2' process due to kernel access from copy_page.
[ bp: Fix comment style + touch ups, zap an unlikely(), improve the
quirk function's readability. ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49111

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: Fix use after free in hci_send_acl
This fixes the following trace caused by receiving
HCI_EV_DISCONN_PHY_LINK_COMPLETE which does call hci_conn_del without
first checking if conn->type is in fact AMP_LINK and in case it is
do properly cleanup upper layers with hci_disconn_cfm:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800e404818 by task bluetoothd/142
CPU: 0 PID: 142 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted
5.17.0-rc5-00006-gda4022eeac1a #7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150
kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50
l2cap_do_send+0x23f/0x3d0
l2cap_chan_send+0xc06/0x2cc0
l2cap_sock_sendmsg+0x201/0x2b0
sock_sendmsg+0xdc/0x110
sock_write_iter+0x20f/0x370
do_iter_readv_writev+0x343/0x690
do_iter_write+0x132/0x640
vfs_writev+0x198/0x570
do_writev+0x202/0x280
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RSP: 002b:00007ffce8a099b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014
Code: 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3
0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05
<48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffce8a099e0 RDI: 0000000000000015
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffce8a099e0 RCX: 00007f788fc3cf77
R10: 00007ffce8af7080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055e4ccf75580
RBP: 0000000000000015 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001
</TASK>
R13: 000055e4ccf754a0 R14: 000055e4ccf75cd0 R15: 000055e4ccf4a6b0
Allocated by task 45:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0
hci_chan_create+0x9a/0x2f0
l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x1a/0xdc0
l2cap_connect_cfm+0x236/0x1000
le_conn_complete_evt+0x15a7/0x1db0
hci_le_conn_complete_evt+0x226/0x2c0
hci_le_meta_evt+0x247/0x450
hci_event_packet+0x61b/0xe90
hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50
process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0
worker_thread+0x576/0x1240
kthread+0x29d/0x340
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Freed by task 45:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
__kasan_slab_free+0xfb/0x130
kfree+0xac/0x350
hci_conn_cleanup+0x101/0x6a0
hci_conn_del+0x27e/0x6c0
hci_disconn_phylink_complete_evt+0xe0/0x120
hci_event_packet+0x812/0xe90
hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50
process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0
worker_thread+0x576/0x1240
kthread+0x29d/0x340
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c0f0500
The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
The buggy address belongs to the page:
128-byte region [ffff88800c0f0500, ffff88800c0f0580)
flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1)
page:00000000fe45cd86 refcount:1 mapcount:0
mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xc0f0
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff
0000000000000000
raw: 0100000000000200 ffffea00003a2c80 dead000000000004
ffff8880078418c0
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
ffff88800c0f0400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc
Memory state around the buggy address:
>ffff88800c0f0500: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88800c0f0480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88800c0f0580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49096

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sfc: add missing xdp queue reinitialization
After rx/tx ring buffer size is changed, kernel panic occurs when
it acts XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT.
When tx/rx ring buffer size is changed(ethtool -G), sfc driver
reallocates and reinitializes rx and tx queues and their buffer
(tx_queue->buffer).
But it misses reinitializing xdp queues(efx->xdp_tx_queues).
So, while it is acting XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT, it uses the uninitialized
tx_queue->buffer.
A new function efx_set_xdp_channels() is separated from efx_set_channels()
to handle only xdp queues.
Splat looks like:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002a
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#4] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:efx_tx_map_chunk+0x54/0x90 [sfc]
CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Tainted: G D 5.17.0+ #55 e8beeee8289528f11357029357cf
Code: 48 8b 8d a8 01 00 00 48 8d 14 52 4c 8d 2c d0 44 89 e0 48 85 c9 74 0e 44 89 e2 4c 89 f6 48 80
RSP: 0018:ffff92f121e45c60 EFLAGS: 00010297
RIP: 0010:efx_tx_map_chunk+0x54/0x90 [sfc]
RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffff92ea506895c0 RCX: ffffffffc0330870
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000001139b10ce RDI: ffff92ea506895c0
RBP: ffffffffc0358a80 R08: 00000001139b110d R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff92ea414c0088 R12: 0000000000000040
R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00000001139b10ce R15: ffff92ea506895c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92f121ec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
Code: 48 8b 8d a8 01 00 00 48 8d 14 52 4c 8d 2c d0 44 89 e0 48 85 c9 74 0e 44 89 e2 4c 89 f6 48 80
CR2: 000000000000002a CR3: 00000003e6810004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
RSP: 0018:ffff92f121e85c60 EFLAGS: 00010297
PKRU: 55555554
RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffff92ea50689700 RCX: ffffffffc0330870
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000001145a90ce RDI: ffff92ea50689700
RBP: ffffffffc0358a80 R08: 00000001145a910d R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff92ea414c0088 R12: 0000000000000040
R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00000001145a90ce R15: ffff92ea50689700
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92f121e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000002a CR3: 00000003e6810005 CR4: 00000000007706e0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
efx_xdp_tx_buffers+0x12b/0x3d0 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
__efx_rx_packet+0x5c3/0x930 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
efx_rx_packet+0x28c/0x2e0 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
efx_ef10_ev_process+0x5f8/0xf40 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
? enqueue_task_fair+0x95/0x550
efx_poll+0xc4/0x360 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49094

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tls: fix slab-out-of-bounds bug in decrypt_internal
The memory size of tls_ctx->rx.iv for AES128-CCM is 12 setting in
tls_set_sw_offload(). The return value of crypto_aead_ivsize()
for "ccm(aes)" is 16. So memcpy() require 16 bytes from 12 bytes
memory space will trigger slab-out-of-bounds bug as following:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in decrypt_internal+0x385/0xc40 [tls]
Read of size 16 at addr ffff888114e84e60 by task tls/10911
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5db
? decrypt_internal+0x385/0xc40 [tls]
kasan_report+0xab/0x120
? decrypt_internal+0x385/0xc40 [tls]
kasan_check_range+0xf9/0x1e0
memcpy+0x20/0x60
decrypt_internal+0x385/0xc40 [tls]
? tls_get_rec+0x2e0/0x2e0 [tls]
? process_rx_list+0x1a5/0x420 [tls]
? tls_setup_from_iter.constprop.0+0x2e0/0x2e0 [tls]
decrypt_skb_update+0x9d/0x400 [tls]
tls_sw_recvmsg+0x3c8/0xb50 [tls]
Allocated by task 10911:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0
tls_set_sw_offload+0x2eb/0xa20 [tls]
tls_setsockopt+0x68c/0x700 [tls]
__sys_setsockopt+0xfe/0x1b0
Replace the crypto_aead_ivsize() with prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size
when memcpy() iv value in TLS_1_3_VERSION scenario.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49086

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix leak of nested actions
While parsing user-provided actions, openvswitch module may dynamically
allocate memory and store pointers in the internal copy of the actions.
So this memory has to be freed while destroying the actions.
Currently there are only two such actions: ct() and set(). However,
there are many actions that can hold nested lists of actions and
ovs_nla_free_flow_actions() just jumps over them leaking the memory.
For example, removal of the flow with the following actions will lead
to a leak of the memory allocated by nf_ct_tmpl_alloc():
actions:clone(ct(commit),0)
Non-freed set() action may also leak the 'dst' structure for the
tunnel info including device references.
Under certain conditions with a high rate of flow rotation that may
cause significant memory leak problem (2MB per second in reporter's
case). The problem is also hard to mitigate, because the user doesn't
have direct control over the datapath flows generated by OVS.
Fix that by iterating over all the nested actions and freeing
everything that needs to be freed recursively.
New build time assertion should protect us from this problem if new
actions will be added in the future.
Unfortunately, openvswitch module doesn't use NLA_F_NESTED, so all
attributes has to be explicitly checked. sample() and clone() actions
are mixing extra attributes into the user-provided action list. That
prevents some code generalization too.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49082

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpt3sas: Fix use after free in _scsih_expander_node_remove()
The function mpt3sas_transport_port_remove() called in
_scsih_expander_node_remove() frees the port field of the sas_expander
structure, leading to the following use-after-free splat from KASAN when
the ioc_info() call following that function is executed (e.g. when doing
rmmod of the driver module):
[ 3479.371167] ==================================================================
[ 3479.378496] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x710/0x750 [mpt3sas]
[ 3479.386936] Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881c037691c by task rmmod/1531
[ 3479.393524]
[ 3479.395035] CPU: 18 PID: 1531 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8+ #1436
[ 3479.401712] Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/H12SSL-NT, BIOS 2.1 06/02/2021
[ 3479.409263] Call Trace:
[ 3479.411743] <TASK>
[ 3479.413875] dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
[ 3479.417582] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x120
[ 3479.423389] ? _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x710/0x750 [mpt3sas]
[ 3479.429469] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
[ 3479.433438] ? _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x710/0x750 [mpt3sas]
[ 3479.439514] _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x710/0x750 [mpt3sas]
[ 3479.445411] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x40
[ 3479.452032] scsih_remove+0x525/0xc90 [mpt3sas]
[ 3479.458212] ? mpt3sas_expander_remove+0x1d0/0x1d0 [mpt3sas]
[ 3479.465529] ? down_write+0xde/0x150
[ 3479.470746] ? up_write+0x14d/0x460
[ 3479.475840] ? kernfs_find_ns+0x137/0x310
[ 3479.481438] pci_device_remove+0x65/0x110
[ 3479.487013] __device_release_driver+0x316/0x680
[ 3479.493180] driver_detach+0x1ec/0x2d0
[ 3479.498499] bus_remove_driver+0xe7/0x2d0
[ 3479.504081] pci_unregister_driver+0x26/0x250
[ 3479.510033] _mpt3sas_exit+0x2b/0x6cf [mpt3sas]
[ 3479.516144] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x2fd/0x510
[ 3479.522315] ? free_module+0xaa0/0xaa0
[ 3479.527593] ? __cond_resched+0x1c/0x90
[ 3479.532951] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
[ 3479.539607] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x21/0x70
[ 3479.546161] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x110
[ 3479.551828] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
[ 3479.556884] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 3479.563402] RIP: 0033:0x7f1fc482483b
...
[ 3479.943087] ==================================================================
Fix this by introducing the local variable port_id to store the port ID
value before executing mpt3sas_transport_port_remove(). This local variable
is then used in the call to ioc_info() instead of dereferencing the freed
port structure.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49081

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
highmem: fix checks in __kmap_local_sched_{in,out}
When CONFIG_DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL is enabled __kmap_local_sched_{in,out} check
that even slots in the tsk->kmap_ctrl.pteval are unmapped. The slots are
initialized with 0 value, but the check is done with pte_none. 0 pte
however does not necessarily mean that pte_none will return true. e.g.
on xtensa it returns false, resulting in the following runtime warnings:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 101 at mm/highmem.c:627 __kmap_local_sched_out+0x51/0x108
CPU: 0 PID: 101 Comm: touch Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-00010-gd3a1cdde80d2-dirty #13
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xc/0x40
__warn+0x8f/0x174
warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0xac
__kmap_local_sched_out+0x51/0x108
__schedule+0x71a/0x9c4
preempt_schedule_irq+0xa0/0xe0
common_exception_return+0x5c/0x93
do_wp_page+0x30e/0x330
handle_mm_fault+0xa70/0xc3c
do_page_fault+0x1d8/0x3c4
common_exception+0x7f/0x7f
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 101 at mm/highmem.c:664 __kmap_local_sched_in+0x50/0xe0
CPU: 0 PID: 101 Comm: touch Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc7-00010-gd3a1cdde80d2-dirty #13
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xc/0x40
__warn+0x8f/0x174
warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0xac
__kmap_local_sched_in+0x50/0xe0
finish_task_switch$isra$0+0x1ce/0x2f8
__schedule+0x86e/0x9c4
preempt_schedule_irq+0xa0/0xe0
common_exception_return+0x5c/0x93
do_wp_page+0x30e/0x330
handle_mm_fault+0xa70/0xc3c
do_page_fault+0x1d8/0x3c4
common_exception+0x7f/0x7f
Fix it by replacing !pte_none(pteval) with pte_val(pteval) != 0.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49063

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: arfs: fix use-after-free when freeing @rx_cpu_rmap
The CI testing bots triggered the following splat:
[ 718.203054] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80
[ 718.206349] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881bd127e00 by task sh/20834
[ 718.212852] CPU: 28 PID: 20834 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S W IOE 5.17.0-rc8_nextqueue-devqueue-02643-g23f3121aca93 #1
[ 718.219695] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0012.070720200218 07/07/2020
[ 718.223418] Call Trace:
[ 718.227139]
[ 718.230783] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x42
[ 718.234431] print_address_description.constprop.9+0x21/0x170
[ 718.238177] ? free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80
[ 718.241885] ? free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80
[ 718.245539] kasan_report.cold.18+0x7f/0x11b
[ 718.249197] ? free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80
[ 718.252852] free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80
[ 718.256471] ice_free_cpu_rx_rmap.part.11+0x37/0x50 [ice]
[ 718.260174] ice_remove_arfs+0x5f/0x70 [ice]
[ 718.263810] ice_rebuild_arfs+0x3b/0x70 [ice]
[ 718.267419] ice_rebuild+0x39c/0xb60 [ice]
[ 718.270974] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
[ 718.274472] ? ice_init_phy_user_cfg+0x360/0x360 [ice]
[ 718.278033] ? delay_tsc+0x4a/0xb0
[ 718.281513] ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0
[ 718.284984] ? delay_tsc+0x8f/0xb0
[ 718.288463] ice_do_reset+0x92/0xf0 [ice]
[ 718.292014] ice_pci_err_resume+0x91/0xf0 [ice]
[ 718.295561] pci_reset_function+0x53/0x80
<...>
[ 718.393035] Allocated by task 690:
[ 718.433497] Freed by task 20834:
[ 718.495688] Last potentially related work creation:
[ 718.568966] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881bd127e00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96
[ 718.574085] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
96-byte region [ffff8881bd127e00, ffff8881bd127e60)
[ 718.579265] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 718.598905] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 718.601809] ffff8881bd127d00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
[ 718.604796] ffff8881bd127d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 718.607794] >ffff8881bd127e00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
[ 718.610811] ^
[ 718.613819] ffff8881bd127e80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
[ 718.617107] ffff8881bd127f00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
This is due to that free_irq_cpu_rmap() is always being called
*after* (devm_)free_irq() and thus it tries to work with IRQ descs
already freed. For example, on device reset the driver frees the
rmap right before allocating a new one (the splat above).
Make rmap creation and freeing function symmetrical with
{request,free}_irq() calls i.e. do that on ifup/ifdown instead
of device probe/remove/resume. These operations can be performed
independently from the actual device aRFS configuration.
Also, make sure ice_vsi_free_irq() clears IRQ affinity notifiers
only when aRFS is disabled -- otherwise, CPU rmap sets and clears
its own and they must not be touched manually.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49052

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: fix unexpected zeroed page mapping with zram swap
Two processes under CLONE_VM cloning, user process can be corrupted by
seeing zeroed page unexpectedly.
CPU A CPU B
do_swap_page do_swap_page
SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path
swap_readpage valid data
swap_slot_free_notify
delete zram entry
swap_readpage zeroed(invalid) data
pte_lock
map the *zero data* to userspace
pte_unlock
pte_lock
if (!pte_same)
goto out_nomap;
pte_unlock
return and next refault will
read zeroed data
The swap_slot_free_notify is bogus for CLONE_VM case since it doesn't
increase the refcount of swap slot at copy_mm so it couldn't catch up
whether it's safe or not to discard data from backing device. In the
case, only the lock it could rely on to synchronize swap slot freeing is
page table lock. Thus, this patch gets rid of the swap_slot_free_notify
function. With this patch, CPU A will see correct data.
CPU A CPU B
do_swap_page do_swap_page
SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path
swap_readpage original data
pte_lock
map the original data
swap_free
swap_range_free
bd_disk->fops->swap_slot_free_notify
swap_readpage read zeroed data
pte_unlock
pte_lock
if (!pte_same)
goto out_nomap;
pte_unlock
return
on next refault will see mapped data by CPU B
The concern of the patch would increase memory consumption since it
could keep wasted memory with compressed form in zram as well as
uncompressed form in address space. However, most of cases of zram uses
no readahead and do_swap_page is followed by swap_free so it will free
the compressed form from in zram quickly.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49022

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac8021: fix possible oob access in ieee80211_get_rate_duration
Fix possible out-of-bound access in ieee80211_get_rate_duration routine
as reported by the following UBSAN report:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/mac80211/airtime.c:455:47
index 15 is out of range for type 'u16 [12]'
CPU: 2 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/u32:10 Not tainted 6.1.0-060100rc3-generic
Hardware name: Acer Aspire TC-281/Aspire TC-281, BIOS R01-A2 07/18/2017
Workqueue: mt76 mt76u_tx_status_data [mt76_usb]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
show_stack+0x4e/0x61
dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x6f
dump_stack+0x10/0x18
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x43
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x42/0x47
ieee80211_get_rate_duration.constprop.0+0x22f/0x2a0 [mac80211]
? ieee80211_tx_status_ext+0x32e/0x640 [mac80211]
ieee80211_calc_rx_airtime+0xda/0x120 [mac80211]
ieee80211_calc_tx_airtime+0xb4/0x100 [mac80211]
mt76x02_send_tx_status+0x266/0x480 [mt76x02_lib]
mt76x02_tx_status_data+0x52/0x80 [mt76x02_lib]
mt76u_tx_status_data+0x67/0xd0 [mt76_usb]
process_one_work+0x225/0x400
worker_thread+0x50/0x3e0
? process_one_work+0x400/0x400
kthread+0xe9/0x110
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49021

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: fix null-ptr-deref while probe() failed
I got a null-ptr-deref report as following when doing fault injection test:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 253 Comm: 507-spi-dm9051 Tainted: G B N 6.1.0-rc3+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:klist_put+0x2d/0xd0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
klist_remove+0xf1/0x1c0
device_release_driver_internal+0x23e/0x2d0
bus_remove_device+0x1bd/0x240
device_del+0x357/0x770
phy_device_remove+0x11/0x30
mdiobus_unregister+0xa5/0x140
release_nodes+0x6a/0xa0
devres_release_all+0xf8/0x150
device_unbind_cleanup+0x19/0xd0
//probe path:
phy_device_register()
device_add()
phy_connect
phy_attach_direct() //set device driver
probe() //it's failed, driver is not bound
device_bind_driver() // probe failed, it's not called
//remove path:
phy_device_remove()
device_del()
device_release_driver_internal()
__device_release_driver() //dev->drv is not NULL
klist_remove() <- knode_driver is not added yet, cause null-ptr-deref
In phy_attach_direct(), after setting the 'dev->driver', probe() fails,
device_bind_driver() is not called, so the knode_driver->n_klist is not
set, then it causes null-ptr-deref in __device_release_driver() while
deleting device. Fix this by setting dev->driver to NULL in the error
path in phy_attach_direct().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49017

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: re-fetch skb cb after tipc_msg_validate
As the call trace shows, the original skb was freed in tipc_msg_validate(),
and dereferencing the old skb cb would cause an use-after-free crash.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tipc_crypto_rcv_complete+0x1835/0x2240 [tipc]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
tipc_crypto_rcv_complete+0x1835/0x2240 [tipc]
tipc_crypto_rcv+0xd32/0x1ec0 [tipc]
tipc_rcv+0x744/0x1150 [tipc]
...
Allocated by task 47078:
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x158/0x4d0
__alloc_skb+0x1c1/0x270
tipc_buf_acquire+0x1e/0xe0 [tipc]
tipc_msg_create+0x33/0x1c0 [tipc]
tipc_link_build_proto_msg+0x38a/0x2100 [tipc]
tipc_link_timeout+0x8b8/0xef0 [tipc]
tipc_node_timeout+0x2a1/0x960 [tipc]
call_timer_fn+0x2d/0x1c0
...
Freed by task 47078:
tipc_msg_validate+0x7b/0x440 [tipc]
tipc_crypto_rcv_complete+0x4b5/0x2240 [tipc]
tipc_crypto_rcv+0xd32/0x1ec0 [tipc]
tipc_rcv+0x744/0x1150 [tipc]
This patch fixes it by re-fetching the skb cb from the new allocated skb
after calling tipc_msg_validate().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49014

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: tun: Fix use-after-free in tun_detach()
syzbot reported use-after-free in tun_detach() [1]. This causes call
trace like below:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in notifier_call_chain+0x1ee/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:75
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807324e2a8 by task syz-executor.0/3673
CPU: 0 PID: 3673 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5-syzkaller-00044-gcc675d22e422 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd1/0x138 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline]
print_report+0x15e/0x461 mm/kasan/report.c:395
kasan_report+0xbf/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:495
notifier_call_chain+0x1ee/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:75
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x86/0x130 net/core/dev.c:1942
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1983 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1997 [inline]
netdev_wait_allrefs_any net/core/dev.c:10237 [inline]
netdev_run_todo+0xbc6/0x1100 net/core/dev.c:10351
tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:704 [inline]
tun_chr_close+0xe4/0x190 drivers/net/tun.c:3467
__fput+0x27c/0xa90 fs/file_table.c:320
task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
do_exit+0xb3d/0x2a30 kernel/exit.c:820
do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:950
get_signal+0x21b1/0x2440 kernel/signal.c:2858
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x86/0x2300 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:869
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:168 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250 kernel/entry/common.c:203
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296
do_syscall_64+0x46/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The cause of the issue is that sock_put() from __tun_detach() drops
last reference count for struct net, and then notifier_call_chain()
from netdev_state_change() accesses that struct net.
This patch fixes the issue by calling sock_put() from tun_detach()
after all necessary accesses for the struct net has done.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49013

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix memory leak in sctp_stream_outq_migrate()
When sctp_stream_outq_migrate() is called to release stream out resources,
the memory pointed to by prio_head in stream out is not released.
The memory leak information is as follows:
unreferenced object 0xffff88801fe79f80 (size 64):
comm "sctp_repo", pid 7957, jiffies 4294951704 (age 36.480s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
80 9f e7 1f 80 88 ff ff 80 9f e7 1f 80 88 ff ff ................
90 9f e7 1f 80 88 ff ff 90 9f e7 1f 80 88 ff ff ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81b215c6>] kmalloc_trace+0x26/0x60
[<ffffffff88ae517c>] sctp_sched_prio_set+0x4cc/0x770
[<ffffffff88ad64f2>] sctp_stream_init_ext+0xd2/0x1b0
[<ffffffff88aa2604>] sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x1614/0x1a30
[<ffffffff88ab7ff1>] sctp_sendmsg+0xda1/0x1ef0
[<ffffffff87f765ed>] inet_sendmsg+0x9d/0xe0
[<ffffffff8754b5b3>] sock_sendmsg+0xd3/0x120
[<ffffffff8755446a>] __sys_sendto+0x23a/0x340
[<ffffffff87554651>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1b0
[<ffffffff89978b49>] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
[<ffffffff89a0008b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49006

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Free buffers when a used dynamic event is removed
After 65536 dynamic events have been added and removed, the "type" field
of the event then uses the first type number that is available (not
currently used by other events). A type number is the identifier of the
binary blobs in the tracing ring buffer (known as events) to map them to
logic that can parse the binary blob.
The issue is that if a dynamic event (like a kprobe event) is traced and
is in the ring buffer, and then that event is removed (because it is
dynamic, which means it can be created and destroyed), if another dynamic
event is created that has the same number that new event's logic on
parsing the binary blob will be used.
To show how this can be an issue, the following can crash the kernel:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# for i in `seq 65536`; do
echo 'p:kprobes/foo do_sys_openat2 $arg1:u32' > kprobe_events
# done
For every iteration of the above, the writing to the kprobe_events will
remove the old event and create a new one (with the same format) and
increase the type number to the next available on until the type number
reaches over 65535 which is the max number for the 16 bit type. After it
reaches that number, the logic to allocate a new number simply looks for
the next available number. When an dynamic event is removed, that number
is then available to be reused by the next dynamic event created. That is,
once the above reaches the max number, the number assigned to the event in
that loop will remain the same.
Now that means deleting one dynamic event and created another will reuse
the previous events type number. This is where bad things can happen.
After the above loop finishes, the kprobes/foo event which reads the
do_sys_openat2 function call's first parameter as an integer.
# echo 1 > kprobes/foo/enable
# cat /etc/passwd > /dev/null
# cat trace
cat-2211 [005] .... 2007.849603: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196
cat-2211 [005] .... 2007.849620: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196
cat-2211 [005] .... 2007.849838: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196
cat-2211 [005] .... 2007.849880: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196
# echo 0 > kprobes/foo/enable
Now if we delete the kprobe and create a new one that reads a string:
# echo 'p:kprobes/foo do_sys_openat2 +0($arg2):string' > kprobe_events
And now we can the trace:
# cat trace
sendmail-1942 [002] ..... 530.136320: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1= cat-2046 [004] ..... 530.930817: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="��"
cat-2046 [004] ..... 530.930961: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="��"
cat-2046 [004] ..... 530.934278: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="��"
cat-2046 [004] ..... 530.934563: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="��
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49003

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: fix SRCU protection of nvme_ns_head list
Walking the nvme_ns_head siblings list is protected by the head's srcu
in nvme_ns_head_submit_bio() but not nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths().
Removing namespaces from the list also fails to synchronize the srcu.
Concurrent scan work can therefore cause use-after-frees.
Hold the head's srcu lock in nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths() and
synchronize with the srcu, not the global RCU, in nvme_ns_remove().
Observed the following panic when making NVMe/RDMA connections
with native multipath on the Rocky Linux 8.6 kernel
(it seems the upstream kernel has the same race condition).
Disassembly shows the faulting instruction is cmp 0x50(%rdx),%rcx;
computing capacity != get_capacity(ns->disk).
Address 0x50 is dereferenced because ns->disk is NULL.
The NULL disk appears to be the result of concurrent scan work
freeing the namespace (note the log line in the middle of the panic).
[37314.206036] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
[37314.206036] nvme0n3: detected capacity change from 0 to 11811160064
[37314.299753] PGD 0 P4D 0
[37314.299756] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[37314.299759] CPU: 29 PID: 322046 Comm: kworker/u98:3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W X --------- - - 4.18.0-372.32.1.el8test86.x86_64 #1
[37314.299762] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R720/0JP31P, BIOS 2.7.0 05/23/2018
[37314.299763] Workqueue: nvme-wq nvme_scan_work [nvme_core]
[37314.299783] RIP: 0010:nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths+0x26/0xb0 [nvme_core]
[37314.299790] Code: 1f 44 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 53 48 8b 5f 50 48 8b 83 c8 c9 00 00 48 8b 13 48 8b 48 50 48 39 d3 74 20 48 8d 42 d0 48 8b 50 20 <48> 3b 4a 50 74 05 f0 80 60 70 ef 48 8b 50 30 48 8d 42 d0 48 39 d3
[37315.058803] RSP: 0018:ffffabe28f913d10 EFLAGS: 00010202
[37315.121316] RAX: ffff927a077da800 RBX: ffff92991dd70000 RCX: 0000000001600000
[37315.206704] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff92991b719800
[37315.292106] RBP: ffff929a6b70c000 R08: 000000010234cd4a R09: c0000000ffff7fff
[37315.377501] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffabe28f913a30 R12: 0000000000000000
[37315.462889] R13: ffff92992716600c R14: ffff929964e6e030 R15: ffff92991dd70000
[37315.548286] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92b87fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[37315.645111] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[37315.713871] CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000002208810006 CR4: 00000000000606e0
[37315.799267] Call Trace:
[37315.828515] nvme_update_ns_info+0x1ac/0x250 [nvme_core]
[37315.892075] nvme_validate_or_alloc_ns+0x2ff/0xa00 [nvme_core]
[37315.961871] ? __blk_mq_free_request+0x6b/0x90
[37316.015021] nvme_scan_work+0x151/0x240 [nvme_core]
[37316.073371] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
[37316.121318] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
[37316.168227] worker_thread+0x30/0x390
[37316.212024] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
[37316.258939] kthread+0x10a/0x120
[37316.297557] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
[37316.347590] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[37316.390360] Modules linked in: nvme_rdma nvme_tcp(X) nvme_fabrics nvme_core netconsole iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp dm_queue_length dm_service_time nf_conntrack_netlink br_netfilter bridge stp llc overlay nft_chain_nat ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat xt_addrtype xt_CT nft_counter xt_state xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_comment xt_multiport nft_compat nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink dm_multipath tg3 rpcrdma sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_srpt ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_core_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm intel_rapl_msr iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dcdbas intel_rapl_common sb_edac x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel ipmi_ssif kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul mlx5_ib ghash_clmulni_intel ib_uverbs rapl intel_cstate intel_uncore ib_core ipmi_si joydev mei_me pcspkr ipmi_devintf mei lpc_ich wmi ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter ex
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48986

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/gup: fix gup_pud_range() for dax
For dax pud, pud_huge() returns true on x86. So the function works as long
as hugetlb is configured. However, dax doesn't depend on hugetlb.
Commit 414fd080d125 ("mm/gup: fix gup_pmd_range() for dax") fixed
devmap-backed huge PMDs, but missed devmap-backed huge PUDs. Fix this as
well.
This fixes the below kernel panic:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x69e7c000cc478: 0000 [#1] SMP
< snip >
Call Trace:
<TASK>
get_user_pages_fast+0x1f/0x40
iov_iter_get_pages+0xc6/0x3b0
? mempool_alloc+0x5d/0x170
bio_iov_iter_get_pages+0x82/0x4e0
? bvec_alloc+0x91/0xc0
? bio_alloc_bioset+0x19a/0x2a0
blkdev_direct_IO+0x282/0x480
? __io_complete_rw_common+0xc0/0xc0
? filemap_range_has_page+0x82/0xc0
generic_file_direct_write+0x9d/0x1a0
? inode_update_time+0x24/0x30
__generic_file_write_iter+0xbd/0x1e0
blkdev_write_iter+0xb4/0x150
? io_import_iovec+0x8d/0x340
io_write+0xf9/0x300
io_issue_sqe+0x3c3/0x1d30
? sysvec_reschedule_ipi+0x6c/0x80
__io_queue_sqe+0x33/0x240
? fget+0x76/0xa0
io_submit_sqes+0xe6a/0x18d0
? __fget_light+0xd1/0x100
__x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x199/0x880
? __context_tracking_enter+0x1f/0x70
? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x24/0x30
? irqentry_exit+0x1d/0x30
? __context_tracking_exit+0xe/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
RIP: 0033:0x7fc97c11a7be
< snip >
</TASK>
---[ end trace 48b2e0e67debcaeb ]---
RIP: 0010:internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x340/0x990
< snip >
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Kernel Offset: disabled

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48985

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: Fix race on per-CQ variable napi work_done
After calling napi_complete_done(), the NAPIF_STATE_SCHED bit may be
cleared, and another CPU can start napi thread and access per-CQ variable,
cq->work_done. If the other thread (for example, from busy_poll) sets
it to a value >= budget, this thread will continue to run when it should
stop, and cause memory corruption and panic.
To fix this issue, save the per-CQ work_done variable in a local variable
before napi_complete_done(), so it won't be corrupted by a possible
concurrent thread after napi_complete_done().
Also, add a flag bit to advertise to the NIC firmware: the NAPI work_done
variable race is fixed, so the driver is able to reliably support features
like busy_poll.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48982

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: Fix crash when replugging CSR fake controllers
It seems fake CSR 5.0 clones can cause the suspend notifier to be
registered twice causing the following kernel panic:
[ 71.986122] Call Trace:
[ 71.986124] <TASK>
[ 71.986125] blocking_notifier_chain_register+0x33/0x60
[ 71.986130] hci_register_dev+0x316/0x3d0 [bluetooth 99b5497ea3d09708fa1366c1dc03288bf3cca8da]
[ 71.986154] btusb_probe+0x979/0xd85 [btusb e1e0605a4f4c01984a4b9c8ac58c3666ae287477]
[ 71.986159] ? __pm_runtime_set_status+0x1a9/0x300
[ 71.986162] ? ktime_get_mono_fast_ns+0x3e/0x90
[ 71.986167] usb_probe_interface+0xe3/0x2b0
[ 71.986171] really_probe+0xdb/0x380
[ 71.986174] ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90
[ 71.986177] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x170
[ 71.986180] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0x90
[ 71.986183] __device_attach_driver+0x89/0x110
[ 71.986186] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x70/0x70
[ 71.986189] bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xe0
[ 71.986192] __device_attach+0xb2/0x1e0
[ 71.986195] bus_probe_device+0x92/0xb0
[ 71.986198] device_add+0x422/0x9a0
[ 71.986201] ? sysfs_merge_group+0xd4/0x110
[ 71.986205] usb_set_configuration+0x57a/0x820
[ 71.986208] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x4f/0x70
[ 71.986211] usb_probe_device+0x3a/0x110
[ 71.986213] really_probe+0xdb/0x380
[ 71.986216] ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90
[ 71.986219] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x170
[ 71.986221] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0x90
[ 71.986224] __device_attach_driver+0x89/0x110
[ 71.986227] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x70/0x70
[ 71.986230] bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xe0
[ 71.986232] __device_attach+0xb2/0x1e0
[ 71.986235] bus_probe_device+0x92/0xb0
[ 71.986237] device_add+0x422/0x9a0
[ 71.986239] ? _dev_info+0x7d/0x98
[ 71.986242] ? blake2s_update+0x4c/0xc0
[ 71.986246] usb_new_device.cold+0x148/0x36d
[ 71.986250] hub_event+0xa8a/0x1910
[ 71.986255] process_one_work+0x1c4/0x380
[ 71.986259] worker_thread+0x51/0x390
[ 71.986262] ? rescuer_thread+0x3b0/0x3b0
[ 71.986264] kthread+0xdb/0x110
[ 71.986266] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 71.986268] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 71.986273] </TASK>
[ 71.986274] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 71.986284] btusb: probe of 2-1.6:1.0 failed with error -17

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48978

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in hid_report_raw_event
Syzbot reported shift-out-of-bounds in hid_report_raw_event.
microsoft 0003:045E:07DA.0001: hid_field_extract() called with n (128) >
32! (swapper/0)
======================================================================
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1323:20
shift exponent 127 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
6.1.0-rc4-syzkaller-00159-g4bbf3422df78 #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 10/26/2022
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1e3/0x2cb lib/dump_stack.c:106
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:151 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x3a6/0x420 lib/ubsan.c:322
snto32 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1323 [inline]
hid_input_fetch_field drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1572 [inline]
hid_process_report drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1665 [inline]
hid_report_raw_event+0xd56/0x18b0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1998
hid_input_report+0x408/0x4f0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2066
hid_irq_in+0x459/0x690 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:284
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x369/0x530 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1671
dummy_timer+0x86b/0x3110 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1988
call_timer_fn+0xf5/0x210 kernel/time/timer.c:1474
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1519 [inline]
__run_timers+0x76a/0x980 kernel/time/timer.c:1790
run_timer_softirq+0x63/0xf0 kernel/time/timer.c:1803
__do_softirq+0x277/0x75b kernel/softirq.c:571
__irq_exit_rcu+0xec/0x170 kernel/softirq.c:650
irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:662
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x91/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1107
======================================================================
If the size of the integer (unsigned n) is bigger than 32 in snto32(),
shift exponent will be too large for 32-bit type 'int', resulting in a
shift-out-of-bounds bug.
Fix this by adding a check on the size of the integer (unsigned n) in
snto32(). To add support for n greater than 32 bits, set n to 32, if n
is greater than 32.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48975

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpiolib: fix memory leak in gpiochip_setup_dev()
Here is a backtrace report about memory leak detected in
gpiochip_setup_dev():
unreferenced object 0xffff88810b406400 (size 512):
comm "python3", pid 1682, jiffies 4295346908 (age 24.090s)
backtrace:
kmalloc_trace
device_adddevice_private_init at drivers/base/core.c:3361
(inlined by) device_add at drivers/base/core.c:3411
cdev_device_add
gpiolib_cdev_register
gpiochip_setup_dev
gpiochip_add_data_with_key
gcdev_register() & gcdev_unregister() would call device_add() &
device_del() (no matter CONFIG_GPIO_CDEV is enabled or not) to
register/unregister device.
However, if device_add() succeeds, some resource (like
struct device_private allocated by device_private_init())
is not released by device_del().
Therefore, after device_add() succeeds by gcdev_register(), it
needs to call put_device() to release resource in the error handle
path.
Here we move forward the register of release function, and let it
release every piece of resource by put_device() instead of kfree().
While at it, fix another subtle issue, i.e. when gc->ngpio is equal
to 0, we still call kcalloc() and, in case of further error, kfree()
on the ZERO_PTR pointer, which is not NULL. It's not a bug per se,
but rather waste of the resources and potentially wrong expectation
about contents of the gdev->descs variable.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48969

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen-netfront: Fix NULL sring after live migration
A NAPI is setup for each network sring to poll data to kernel
The sring with source host is destroyed before live migration and
new sring with target host is setup after live migration.
The NAPI for the old sring is not deleted until setup new sring
with target host after migration. With busy_poll/busy_read enabled,
the NAPI can be polled before got deleted when resume VM.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
0000000000000008
IP: xennet_poll+0xae/0xd20
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
Call Trace:
finish_task_switch+0x71/0x230
timerqueue_del+0x1d/0x40
hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0xb5/0x110
xennet_alloc_rx_buffers+0x2a0/0x2a0
napi_busy_loop+0xdb/0x270
sock_poll+0x87/0x90
do_sys_poll+0x26f/0x580
tracing_map_insert+0x1d4/0x2f0
event_hist_trigger+0x14a/0x260
finish_task_switch+0x71/0x230
__schedule+0x256/0x890
recalc_sigpending+0x1b/0x50
xen_sched_clock+0x15/0x20
__rb_reserve_next+0x12d/0x140
ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x123/0x3d0
event_triggers_call+0x87/0xb0
trace_event_buffer_commit+0x1c4/0x210
xen_clocksource_get_cycles+0x15/0x20
ktime_get_ts64+0x51/0xf0
SyS_ppoll+0x160/0x1a0
SyS_ppoll+0x160/0x1a0
do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x41/0xa6
...
RIP: xennet_poll+0xae/0xd20 RSP: ffffb4f041933900
CR2: 0000000000000008
---[ end trace f8601785b354351c ]---
xen frontend should remove the NAPIs for the old srings before live
migration as the bond srings are destroyed
There is a tiny window between the srings are set to NULL and
the NAPIs are disabled, It is safe as the NAPI threads are still
frozen at that time

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48961

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mdio: fix unbalanced fwnode reference count in mdio_device_release()
There is warning report about of_node refcount leak
while probing mdio device:
OF: ERROR: memory leak, expected refcount 1 instead of 2,
of_node_get()/of_node_put() unbalanced - destroy cset entry:
attach overlay node /spi/soc@0/mdio@710700c0/ethernet@4
In of_mdiobus_register_device(), we increase fwnode refcount
by fwnode_handle_get() before associating the of_node with
mdio device, but it has never been decreased in normal path.
Since that, in mdio_device_release(), it needs to call
fwnode_handle_put() in addition instead of calling kfree()
directly.
After above, just calling mdio_device_free() in the error handle
path of of_mdiobus_register_device() is enough to keep the
refcount balanced.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48953

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtc: cmos: Fix event handler registration ordering issue
Because acpi_install_fixed_event_handler() enables the event
automatically on success, it is incorrect to call it before the
handler routine passed to it is ready to handle events.
Unfortunately, the rtc-cmos driver does exactly the incorrect thing
by calling cmos_wake_setup(), which passes rtc_handler() to
acpi_install_fixed_event_handler(), before cmos_do_probe(), because
rtc_handler() uses dev_get_drvdata() to get to the cmos object
pointer and the driver data pointer is only populated in
cmos_do_probe().
This leads to a NULL pointer dereference in rtc_handler() on boot
if the RTC fixed event happens to be active at the init time.
To address this issue, change the initialization ordering of the
driver so that cmos_wake_setup() is always called after a successful
cmos_do_probe() call.
While at it, change cmos_pnp_probe() to call cmos_do_probe() after
the initial if () statement used for computing the IRQ argument to
be passed to cmos_do_probe() which is cleaner than calling it in
each branch of that if () (local variable "irq" can be of type int,
because it is passed to that function as an argument of type int).
Note that commit 6492fed7d8c9 ("rtc: rtc-cmos: Do not check
ACPI_FADT_LOW_POWER_S0") caused this issue to affect a larger number
of systems, because previously it only affected systems with
ACPI_FADT_LOW_POWER_S0 set, but it is present regardless of that
commit.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48950

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Fix perf_pending_task() UaF
Per syzbot it is possible for perf_pending_task() to run after the
event is free()'d. There are two related but distinct cases:
- the task_work was already queued before destroying the event;
- destroying the event itself queues the task_work.
The first cannot be solved using task_work_cancel() since
perf_release() itself might be called from a task_work (____fput),
which means the current->task_works list is already empty and
task_work_cancel() won't be able to find the perf_pending_task()
entry.
The simplest alternative is extending the perf_event lifetime to cover
the task_work.
The second is just silly, queueing a task_work while you know the
event is going away makes no sense and is easily avoided by
re-arranging how the event is marked STATE_DEAD and ensuring it goes
through STATE_OFF on the way down.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48919

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: fix double free race when mount fails in cifs_get_root()
When cifs_get_root() fails during cifs_smb3_do_mount() we call
deactivate_locked_super() which eventually will call delayed_free() which
will free the context.
In this situation we should not proceed to enter the out: section in
cifs_smb3_do_mount() and free the same resources a second time.
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888364f4d110 by task swapper/1/0
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G OE 5.17.0-rc3+ #4
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.0 12/17/2019
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] Call Trace:
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] <IRQ>
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x78
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x24/0x150
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] kasan_report.cold+0x7d/0x117
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] __asan_load8+0x86/0xa0
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] rcu_core+0x547/0xca0
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? call_rcu+0x3c0/0x3c0
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? lock_is_held_type+0xea/0x140
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] rcu_core_si+0xe/0x10
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] __do_softirq+0x1d4/0x67b
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] __irq_exit_rcu+0x100/0x150
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x30
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] sysvec_hyperv_stimer0+0x9d/0xc0
...
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] Freed by task 58179:
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] ____kasan_slab_free+0x137/0x170
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x20
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xb3/0x1d0
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kfree+0xcd/0x520
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x149/0xbe0 [cifs]
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] smb3_get_tree+0x1a0/0x2e0 [cifs]
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] vfs_get_tree+0x52/0x140
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] path_mount+0x635/0x10c0
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __x64_sys_mount+0x1bf/0x210
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] Last potentially related work creation:
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb6/0xc0
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0xb/0x10
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] call_rcu+0x76/0x3c0
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_umount+0xce/0xe0 [cifs]
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_kill_sb+0xc8/0xe0 [cifs]
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] deactivate_locked_super+0x5d/0xd0
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0xab9/0xbe0 [cifs]
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] smb3_get_tree+0x1a0/0x2e0 [cifs]
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] vfs_get_tree+0x52/0x140
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] path_mount+0x635/0x10c0
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __x64_sys_mount+0x1bf/0x210
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0
[Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48916

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Fix double list_add when enabling VMD in scalable mode
When enabling VMD and IOMMU scalable mode, the following kernel panic
call trace/kernel log is shown in Eagle Stream platform (Sapphire Rapids
CPU) during booting:
pci 0000:59:00.5: Adding to iommu group 42
...
vmd 0000:59:00.5: PCI host bridge to bus 10000:80
pci 10000:80:01.0: [8086:352a] type 01 class 0x060400
pci 10000:80:01.0: reg 0x10: [mem 0x00000000-0x0001ffff 64bit]
pci 10000:80:01.0: enabling Extended Tags
pci 10000:80:01.0: PME# supported from D0 D3hot D3cold
pci 10000:80:01.0: DMAR: Setup RID2PASID failed
pci 10000:80:01.0: Failed to add to iommu group 42: -16
pci 10000:80:03.0: [8086:352b] type 01 class 0x060400
pci 10000:80:03.0: reg 0x10: [mem 0x00000000-0x0001ffff 64bit]
pci 10000:80:03.0: enabling Extended Tags
pci 10000:80:03.0: PME# supported from D0 D3hot D3cold
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3+ #7
Hardware name: Lenovo ThinkSystem SR650V3/SB27A86647, BIOS ESE101Y-1.00 01/13/2022
Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid.cold+0x26/0x3f
Code: 9a 4a ab ff 4c 89 c1 48 c7 c7 40 0c d9 9e e8 b9 b1 fe ff 0f
0b 48 89 f2 4c 89 c1 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 f0 0c d9 9e e8 a2 b1
fe ff <0f> 0b 48 89 d1 4c 89 c6 4c 89 ca 48 c7 c7 98 0c d9
9e e8 8b b1 fe
RSP: 0000:ff5ad434865b3a40 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000058 RBX: ff4d61160b74b880 RCX: ff4d61255e1fffa8
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffeffff RDI: ffffffff9fd34f20
RBP: ff4d611d8e245c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ff5ad434865b3888
R10: ff5ad434865b3880 R11: ff4d61257fdc6fe8 R12: ff4d61160b74b8a0
R13: ff4d61160b74b8a0 R14: ff4d611d8e245c10 R15: ff4d611d8001ba70
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff4d611d5ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ff4d611fa1401000 CR3: 0000000aa0210001 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
intel_pasid_alloc_table+0x9c/0x1d0
dmar_insert_one_dev_info+0x423/0x540
? device_to_iommu+0x12d/0x2f0
intel_iommu_attach_device+0x116/0x290
__iommu_attach_device+0x1a/0x90
iommu_group_add_device+0x190/0x2c0
__iommu_probe_device+0x13e/0x250
iommu_probe_device+0x24/0x150
iommu_bus_notifier+0x69/0x90
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x5a/0x80
device_add+0x3db/0x7b0
? arch_memremap_can_ram_remap+0x19/0x50
? memremap+0x75/0x140
pci_device_add+0x193/0x1d0
pci_scan_single_device+0xb9/0xf0
pci_scan_slot+0x4c/0x110
pci_scan_child_bus_extend+0x3a/0x290
vmd_enable_domain.constprop.0+0x63e/0x820
vmd_probe+0x163/0x190
local_pci_probe+0x42/0x80
work_for_cpu_fn+0x13/0x20
process_one_work+0x1e2/0x3b0
worker_thread+0x1c4/0x3a0
? rescuer_thread+0x370/0x370
kthread+0xc7/0xf0
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
...
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Kernel Offset: 0x1ca00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---
The following 'lspci' output shows devices '10000:80:*' are subdevices of
the VMD device 0000:59:00.5:
$ lspci
...
0000:59:00.5 RAID bus controller: Intel Corporation Volume Management Device NVMe RAID Controller (rev 20)
...
10000:80:01.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation Device 352a (rev 03)
10000:80:03.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation Device 352b (rev 03)
10000:80:05.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation Device 352c (rev 03)
10000:80:07.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation Device 352d (rev 03)
10000:81:00.0 Non-Volatile memory controller: Intel Corporation NVMe Datacenter SSD [3DNAND, Beta Rock Controller]
10000:82:00
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48914

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen/netfront: destroy queues before real_num_tx_queues is zeroed
xennet_destroy_queues() relies on info->netdev->real_num_tx_queues to
delete queues. Since d7dac083414eb5bb99a6d2ed53dc2c1b405224e5
("net-sysfs: update the queue counts in the unregistration path"),
unregister_netdev() indirectly sets real_num_tx_queues to 0. Those two
facts together means, that xennet_destroy_queues() called from
xennet_remove() cannot do its job, because it's called after
unregister_netdev(). This results in kfree-ing queues that are still
linked in napi, which ultimately crashes:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 52 Comm: xenwatch Tainted: G W 5.16.10-1.32.fc32.qubes.x86_64+ #226
RIP: 0010:free_netdev+0xa3/0x1a0
Code: ff 48 89 df e8 2e e9 00 00 48 8b 43 50 48 8b 08 48 8d b8 a0 fe ff ff 48 8d a9 a0 fe ff ff 49 39 c4 75 26 eb 47 e8 ed c1 66 ff <48> 8b 85 60 01 00 00 48 8d 95 60 01 00 00 48 89 ef 48 2d 60 01 00
RSP: 0000:ffffc90000bcfd00 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88800edad000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffc90000bcfc30 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: fffffffffffffea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88800edad050
R13: ffff8880065f8f88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8880066c6680
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880f3300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000e998c006 CR4: 00000000003706e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
xennet_remove+0x13d/0x300 [xen_netfront]
xenbus_dev_remove+0x6d/0xf0
__device_release_driver+0x17a/0x240
device_release_driver+0x24/0x30
bus_remove_device+0xd8/0x140
device_del+0x18b/0x410
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x16/0x30
? klist_iter_exit+0x14/0x20
? xenbus_dev_request_and_reply+0x80/0x80
device_unregister+0x13/0x60
xenbus_dev_changed+0x18e/0x1f0
xenwatch_thread+0xc0/0x1a0
? do_wait_intr_irq+0xa0/0xa0
kthread+0x16b/0x190
? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
Fix this by calling xennet_destroy_queues() from xennet_uninit(),
when real_num_tx_queues is still available. This ensures that queues are
destroyed when real_num_tx_queues is set to 0, regardless of how
unregister_netdev() was called.
Originally reported at
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/7257

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48913

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blktrace: fix use after free for struct blk_trace
When tracing the whole disk, 'dropped' and 'msg' will be created
under 'q->debugfs_dir' and 'bt->dir' is NULL, thus blk_trace_free()
won't remove those files. What's worse, the following UAF can be
triggered because of accessing stale 'dropped' and 'msg':
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in blk_dropped_read+0x89/0x100
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88816912f3d8 by task blktrace/1188
CPU: 27 PID: 1188 Comm: blktrace Not tainted 5.17.0-rc4-next-20220217+ #469
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20190727_073836-4
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xab/0x381
? blk_dropped_read+0x89/0x100
? blk_dropped_read+0x89/0x100
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
? blk_dropped_read+0x89/0x100
kasan_check_range+0x140/0x1b0
blk_dropped_read+0x89/0x100
? blk_create_buf_file_callback+0x20/0x20
? kmem_cache_free+0xa1/0x500
? do_sys_openat2+0x258/0x460
full_proxy_read+0x8f/0xc0
vfs_read+0xc6/0x260
ksys_read+0xb9/0x150
? vfs_write+0x3d0/0x3d0
? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x55/0x60
? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x39/0x1e0
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fbc080d92fd
Code: ce 20 00 00 75 10 b8 00 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 1
RSP: 002b:00007fbb95ff9cb0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fbb95ff9dc0 RCX: 00007fbc080d92fd
RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 00007fbb95ff9cc0 RDI: 0000000000000045
RBP: 0000000000000045 R08: 0000000000406299 R09: 00000000fffffffd
R10: 000000000153afa0 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007fbb780008c0
R13: 00007fbb78000938 R14: 0000000000608b30 R15: 00007fbb780029c8
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1050:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0
do_blk_trace_setup+0xcb/0x410
__blk_trace_setup+0xac/0x130
blk_trace_ioctl+0xe9/0x1c0
blkdev_ioctl+0xf1/0x390
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xa5/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Freed by task 1050:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
__kasan_slab_free+0x103/0x180
kfree+0x9a/0x4c0
__blk_trace_remove+0x53/0x70
blk_trace_ioctl+0x199/0x1c0
blkdev_common_ioctl+0x5e9/0xb30
blkdev_ioctl+0x1a5/0x390
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xa5/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88816912f380
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96
The buggy address is located 88 bytes inside of
96-byte region [ffff88816912f380, ffff88816912f3e0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:000000009a1b4e7c refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0f
flags: 0x17ffffc0000200(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
raw: 0017ffffc0000200 ffffea00044f1100 dead000000000002 ffff88810004c780
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88816912f280: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
ffff88816912f300: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
>ffff88816912f380: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88816912f400: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
ffff88816912f480: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
==================================================================

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48910

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: ensure we call ipv6_mc_down() at most once
There are two reasons for addrconf_notify() to be called with NETDEV_DOWN:
either the network device is actually going down, or IPv6 was disabled
on the interface.
If either of them stays down while the other is toggled, we repeatedly
call the code for NETDEV_DOWN, including ipv6_mc_down(), while never
calling the corresponding ipv6_mc_up() in between. This will cause a
new entry in idev->mc_tomb to be allocated for each multicast group
the interface is subscribed to, which in turn leaks one struct ifmcaddr6
per nontrivial multicast group the interface is subscribed to.
The following reproducer will leak at least $n objects:
ip addr add ff2e::4242/32 dev eth0 autojoin
sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.eth0.disable_ipv6=1
for i in $(seq 1 $n); do
ip link set up eth0; ip link set down eth0
done
Joining groups with IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP (unprivileged) or setting the
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.eth0.forwarding to 1 (=> subscribing to ff02::2)
can also be used to create a nontrivial idev->mc_list, which will the
leak objects with the right up-down-sequence.
Based on both sources for NETDEV_DOWN events the interface IPv6 state
should be considered:
- not ready if the network interface is not ready OR IPv6 is disabled
for it
- ready if the network interface is ready AND IPv6 is enabled for it
The functions ipv6_mc_up() and ipv6_down() should only be run when this
state changes.
Implement this by remembering when the IPv6 state is ready, and only
run ipv6_mc_down() if it actually changed from ready to not ready.
The other direction (not ready -> ready) already works correctly, as:
- the interface notification triggered codepath for NETDEV_UP /
NETDEV_CHANGE returns early if ipv6 is disabled, and
- the disable_ipv6=0 triggered codepath skips fully initializing the
interface as long as addrconf_link_ready(dev) returns false
- calling ipv6_mc_up() repeatedly does not leak anything

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48909

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix connection leak
There's a potential leak issue under following execution sequence :
smc_release smc_connect_work
if (sk->sk_state == SMC_INIT)
send_clc_confirim
tcp_abort();
...
sk.sk_state = SMC_ACTIVE
smc_close_active
switch(sk->sk_state) {
...
case SMC_ACTIVE:
smc_close_final()
// then wait peer closed
Unfortunately, tcp_abort() may discard CLC CONFIRM messages that are
still in the tcp send buffer, in which case our connection token cannot
be delivered to the server side, which means that we cannot get a
passive close message at all. Therefore, it is impossible for the to be
disconnected at all.
This patch tries a very simple way to avoid this issue, once the state
has changed to SMC_ACTIVE after tcp_abort(), we can actively abort the
smc connection, considering that the state is SMC_INIT before
tcp_abort(), abandoning the complete disconnection process should not
cause too much problem.
In fact, this problem may exist as long as the CLC CONFIRM message is
not received by the server. Whether a timer should be added after
smc_close_final() needs to be discussed in the future. But even so, this
patch provides a faster release for connection in above case, it should
also be valuable.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48906

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: Correctly set DATA_FIN timeout when number of retransmits is large
Syzkaller with UBSAN uncovered a scenario where a large number of
DATA_FIN retransmits caused a shift-out-of-bounds in the DATA_FIN
timeout calculation:
================================================================================
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/mptcp/protocol.c:470:29
shift exponent 32 is too large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int'
CPU: 1 PID: 13059 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc2-00630-g5fbf21c90c60 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events mptcp_worker
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:151
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb2/0x20e lib/ubsan.c:330
mptcp_set_datafin_timeout net/mptcp/protocol.c:470 [inline]
__mptcp_retrans.cold+0x72/0x77 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2445
mptcp_worker+0x58a/0xa70 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2528
process_one_work+0x9df/0x16d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2307
worker_thread+0x95/0xe10 kernel/workqueue.c:2454
kthread+0x2f4/0x3b0 kernel/kthread.c:377
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295
</TASK>
================================================================================
This change limits the maximum timeout by limiting the size of the
shift, which keeps all intermediate values in-bounds.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48889

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: Intel: sof-nau8825: fix module alias overflow
The maximum name length for a platform_device_id entry is 20 characters
including the trailing NUL byte. The sof_nau8825.c file exceeds that,
which causes an obscure error message:
sound/soc/intel/boards/snd-soc-sof_nau8825.mod.c:35:45: error: illegal character encoding in string literal [-Werror,-Winvalid-source-encoding]
MODULE_ALIAS("platform:adl_max98373_nau8825<U+0018><AA>");
^~~~
include/linux/module.h:168:49: note: expanded from macro 'MODULE_ALIAS'
^~~~~~
include/linux/module.h:165:56: note: expanded from macro 'MODULE_INFO'
^~~~
include/linux/moduleparam.h:26:47: note: expanded from macro '__MODULE_INFO'
= __MODULE_INFO_PREFIX __stringify(tag) "=" info
I could not figure out how to make the module handling robust enough
to handle this better, but as a quick fix, using slightly shorter
names that are still unique avoids the build issue.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48876

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: fix initialization of rx->link and rx->link_sta
There are some codepaths that do not initialize rx->link_sta properly. This
causes a crash in places which assume that rx->link_sta is valid if rx->sta
is valid.
One known instance is triggered by __ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu being called from
fast-rx. It results in a crash like this one:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a8
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 506 Comm: mt76-usb-rx phy Tainted: G E 6.1.0-debian64x+1.7 #3
Hardware name: ZOTAC ZBOX-ID92/ZBOX-IQ01/ZBOX-ID92/ZBOX-IQ01, BIOS B220P007 05/21/2014
RIP: 0010:ieee80211_deliver_skb+0x62/0x1f0 [mac80211]
Code: 00 48 89 04 24 e8 9e a7 c3 df 89 c0 48 03 1c c5 a0 ea 39 a1 4c 01 6b 08 48 ff 03 48
83 7d 28 00 74 11 48 8b 45 30 48 63 55 44 <48> 83 84 d0 a8 00 00 00 01 41 8b 86 c0
11 00 00 8d 50 fd 83 fa 01
RSP: 0018:ffff999040803b10 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffb9903f496480 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff999040803ce0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8d21828ac900
R13: 000000000000004a R14: ffff8d2198ed89c0 R15: ffff8d2198ed8000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d24afe80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000a8 CR3: 0000000429810002 CR4: 00000000001706e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu+0x1b5/0x240 [mac80211]
? ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0xcdd/0x1320 [mac80211]
? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x3b/0xa0
ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0xcdd/0x1320 [mac80211]
? prepare_transfer+0x109/0x1a0 [xhci_hcd]
ieee80211_rx_list+0xa80/0xda0 [mac80211]
mt76_rx_complete+0x207/0x2e0 [mt76]
mt76_rx_poll_complete+0x357/0x5a0 [mt76]
mt76u_rx_worker+0x4f5/0x600 [mt76_usb]
? mt76_get_min_avg_rssi+0x140/0x140 [mt76]
__mt76_worker_fn+0x50/0x80 [mt76]
kthread+0xed/0x120
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Since the initialization of rx->link and rx->link_sta is rather convoluted
and duplicated in many places, clean it up by using a helper function to
set it.
[remove unnecessary rx->sta->sta.mlo check]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48875

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: sdata can be NULL during AMPDU start
ieee80211_tx_ba_session_handle_start() may get NULL for sdata when a
deauthentication is ongoing.
Here a trace triggering the race with the hostapd test
multi_ap_fronthaul_on_ap:
(gdb) list *drv_ampdu_action+0x46
0x8b16 is in drv_ampdu_action (net/mac80211/driver-ops.c:396).
391 int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
392
393 might_sleep();
394
395 sdata = get_bss_sdata(sdata);
396 if (!check_sdata_in_driver(sdata))
397 return -EIO;
398
399 trace_drv_ampdu_action(local, sdata, params);
400
wlan0: moving STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 to state 3
wlan0: associated
wlan0: deauthenticating from 02:00:00:00:03:00 by local choice (Reason: 3=DEAUTH_LEAVING)
wlan3.sta1: Open BA session requested for 02:00:00:00:00:00 tid 0
wlan3.sta1: dropped frame to 02:00:00:00:00:00 (unauthorized port)
wlan0: moving STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 to state 2
wlan0: moving STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 to state 1
wlan0: Removed STA 02:00:00:00:03:00
wlan0: Destroyed STA 02:00:00:00:03:00
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffb48
PGD 11814067 P4D 11814067 PUD 11816067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 2 PID: 133397 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc8-wt+ #59
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-20220807_005459-localhost 04/01/2014
Workqueue: phy3 ieee80211_ba_session_work [mac80211]
RIP: 0010:drv_ampdu_action+0x46/0x280 [mac80211]
Code: 53 48 89 f3 be 89 01 00 00 e8 d6 43 bf ef e8 21 46 81 f0 83 bb a0 1b 00 00 04 75 0e 48 8b 9b 28 0d 00 00 48 81 eb 10 0e 00 00 <8b> 93 58 09 00 00 f6 c2 20 0f 84 3b 01 00 00 8b 05 dd 1c 0f 00 85
RSP: 0018:ffffc900025ebd20 EFLAGS: 00010287
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: fffffffffffff1f0 RCX: ffff888102228240
RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffff918c5de0 RDI: ffff888102228b40
RBP: ffffc900025ebd40 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888118c18ec0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc900025ebd60 R15: ffff888018b7efb8
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88817a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: fffffffffffffb48 CR3: 0000000105228006 CR4: 0000000000170ee0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ieee80211_tx_ba_session_handle_start+0xd0/0x190 [mac80211]
ieee80211_ba_session_work+0xff/0x2e0 [mac80211]
process_one_work+0x29f/0x620
worker_thread+0x4d/0x3d0
? process_one_work+0x620/0x620
kthread+0xfb/0x120
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48868

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: idxd: Let probe fail when workqueue cannot be enabled
The workqueue is enabled when the appropriate driver is loaded and
disabled when the driver is removed. When the driver is removed it
assumes that the workqueue was enabled successfully and proceeds to
free allocations made during workqueue enabling.
Failure during workqueue enabling does not prevent the driver from
being loaded. This is because the error path within drv_enable_wq()
returns success unless a second failure is encountered
during the error path. By returning success it is possible to load
the driver even if the workqueue cannot be enabled and
allocations that do not exist are attempted to be freed during
driver remove.
Some examples of problematic flows:
(a)
idxd_dmaengine_drv_probe() -> drv_enable_wq() -> idxd_wq_request_irq():
In above flow, if idxd_wq_request_irq() fails then
idxd_wq_unmap_portal() is called on error exit path, but
drv_enable_wq() returns 0 because idxd_wq_disable() succeeds. The
driver is thus loaded successfully.
idxd_dmaengine_drv_remove()->drv_disable_wq()->idxd_wq_unmap_portal()
Above flow on driver unload triggers the WARN in devm_iounmap() because
the device resource has already been removed during error path of
drv_enable_wq().
(b)
idxd_dmaengine_drv_probe() -> drv_enable_wq() -> idxd_wq_request_irq():
In above flow, if idxd_wq_request_irq() fails then
idxd_wq_init_percpu_ref() is never called to initialize the percpu
counter, yet the driver loads successfully because drv_enable_wq()
returns 0.
idxd_dmaengine_drv_remove()->__idxd_wq_quiesce()->percpu_ref_kill():
Above flow on driver unload triggers a BUG when attempting to drop the
initial ref of the uninitialized percpu ref:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
Fix the drv_enable_wq() error path by returning the original error that
indicates failure of workqueue enabling. This ensures that the probe
fails when an error is encountered and the driver remove paths are only
attempted when the workqueue was enabled successfully.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48865

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix kernel panic when enabling bearer
When enabling a bearer on a node, a kernel panic is observed:
[ 4.498085] RIP: 0010:tipc_mon_prep+0x4e/0x130 [tipc]
...
[ 4.520030] Call Trace:
[ 4.520689] <IRQ>
[ 4.521236] tipc_link_build_proto_msg+0x375/0x750 [tipc]
[ 4.522654] tipc_link_build_state_msg+0x48/0xc0 [tipc]
[ 4.524034] __tipc_node_link_up+0xd7/0x290 [tipc]
[ 4.525292] tipc_rcv+0x5da/0x730 [tipc]
[ 4.526346] ? __netif_receive_skb_core+0xb7/0xfc0
[ 4.527601] tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0x5e/0x90 [tipc]
[ 4.528737] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x20b/0x260
[ 4.530068] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1bf/0x2e0
[ 4.531450] ? dev_gro_receive+0x4c2/0x680
[ 4.532512] napi_complete_done+0x6f/0x180
[ 4.533570] virtnet_poll+0x29c/0x42e [virtio_net]
...
The node in question is receiving activate messages in another
thread after changing bearer status to allow message sending/
receiving in current thread:
thread 1 | thread 2
-------- | --------
|
tipc_enable_bearer() |
test_and_set_bit_lock() |
tipc_bearer_xmit_skb() |
| tipc_l2_rcv_msg()
| tipc_rcv()
| __tipc_node_link_up()
| tipc_link_build_state_msg()
| tipc_link_build_proto_msg()
| tipc_mon_prep()
| {
| ...
| // null-pointer dereference
| u16 gen = mon->dom_gen;
| ...
| }
// Not being executed yet |
tipc_mon_create() |
{ |
... |
// allocate |
mon = kzalloc(); |
... |
} |
Monitoring pointer in thread 2 is dereferenced before monitoring data
is allocated in thread 1. This causes kernel panic.
This commit fixes it by allocating the monitoring data before enabling
the bearer to receive messages.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48862

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost: fix hung thread due to erroneous iotlb entries
In vhost_iotlb_add_range_ctx(), range size can overflow to 0 when
start is 0 and last is ULONG_MAX. One instance where it can happen
is when userspace sends an IOTLB message with iova=size=uaddr=0
(vhost_process_iotlb_msg). So, an entry with size = 0, start = 0,
last = ULONG_MAX ends up in the iotlb. Next time a packet is sent,
iotlb_access_ok() loops indefinitely due to that erroneous entry.
Call Trace:
<TASK>
iotlb_access_ok+0x21b/0x3e0 drivers/vhost/vhost.c:1340
vq_meta_prefetch+0xbc/0x280 drivers/vhost/vhost.c:1366
vhost_transport_do_send_pkt+0xe0/0xfd0 drivers/vhost/vsock.c:104
vhost_worker+0x23d/0x3d0 drivers/vhost/vhost.c:372
kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:377
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295
</TASK>
Reported by syzbot at:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0abd373e2e50d704db87
To fix this, do two things:
1. Return -EINVAL in vhost_chr_write_iter() when userspace asks to map
a range with size 0.
2. Fix vhost_iotlb_add_range_ctx() to handle the range [0, ULONG_MAX]
by splitting it into two entries.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48858

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix a race on command flush flow
Fix a refcount use after free warning due to a race on command entry.
Such race occurs when one of the commands releases its last refcount and
frees its index and entry while another process running command flush
flow takes refcount to this command entry. The process which handles
commands flush may see this command as needed to be flushed if the other
process released its refcount but didn't release the index yet. Fix it
by adding the needed spin lock.
It fixes the following warning trace:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 540311 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x80/0xe0
...
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x80/0xe0
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions+0x293/0x340 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_cmd_flush+0x3a/0xf0 [mlx5_core]
enter_error_state+0x44/0x80 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work+0x37/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x1be/0x390
worker_thread+0x4d/0x3d0
? rescuer_thread+0x350/0x350
kthread+0x141/0x160
? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48853

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE
The problem I'm addressing was discovered by the LTP test covering
cve-2018-1000204.
A short description of what happens follows:
1) The test case issues a command code 00 (TEST UNIT READY) via the SG_IO
interface with: dxfer_len == 524288, dxdfer_dir == SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV
and a corresponding dxferp. The peculiar thing about this is that TUR
is not reading from the device.
2) In sg_start_req() the invocation of blk_rq_map_user() effectively
bounces the user-space buffer. As if the device was to transfer into
it. Since commit a45b599ad808 ("scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in
sg_build_indirect()") we make sure this first bounce buffer is
allocated with GFP_ZERO.
3) For the rest of the story we keep ignoring that we have a TUR, so the
device won't touch the buffer we prepare as if the we had a
DMA_FROM_DEVICE type of situation. My setup uses a virtio-scsi device
and the buffer allocated by SG is mapped by the function
virtqueue_add_split() which uses DMA_FROM_DEVICE for the "in" sgs (here
scatter-gather and not scsi generics). This mapping involves bouncing
via the swiotlb (we need swiotlb to do virtio in protected guest like
s390 Secure Execution, or AMD SEV).
4) When the SCSI TUR is done, we first copy back the content of the second
(that is swiotlb) bounce buffer (which most likely contains some
previous IO data), to the first bounce buffer, which contains all
zeros. Then we copy back the content of the first bounce buffer to
the user-space buffer.
5) The test case detects that the buffer, which it zero-initialized,
ain't all zeros and fails.
One can argue that this is an swiotlb problem, because without swiotlb
we leak all zeros, and the swiotlb should be transparent in a sense that
it does not affect the outcome (if all other participants are well
behaved).
Copying the content of the original buffer into the swiotlb buffer is
the only way I can think of to make swiotlb transparent in such
scenarios. So let's do just that if in doubt, but allow the driver
to tell us that the whole mapped buffer is going to be overwritten,
in which case we can preserve the old behavior and avoid the performance
impact of the extra bounce.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48850

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show
When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be
triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already
removed.
[ 755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called
[ 756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called
...
[ 757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 758.031397] IP: [<ffffffff8ee11acb>] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280
crash> bt
...
PID: 12649 TASK: ffff8924108f2100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "amsd"
...
#9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778
[exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab]
RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb RSP: ffff89240e1a3968 RFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff89243d874100 RCX: 0000000000001000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff89243d874090
RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0 R8: 000000000001f080 R9: ffff8905ffc03c00
R10: ffffffffc04680d4 R11: ffffffff8edde9fd R12: 00000000000080d0
R13: ffff89243d874090 R14: ffff89243d874080 R15: 0000000000000000
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
#10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core]
#11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core]
#12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core]
#13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core]
#14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core]
#15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core]
#16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core]
#17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46
#18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208
#19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3
#20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf
#21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596
#22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10
#23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5
#24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff
#25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f
#26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92
crash> net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000
state = 0x5 (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER)
To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48848

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/osnoise: Do not unregister events twice
Nicolas reported that using:
# trace-cmd record -e all -M 10 -p osnoise --poll
Resulted in the following kernel warning:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1217 at kernel/tracepoint.c:404 tracepoint_probe_unregister+0x280/0x370
[...]
CPU: 0 PID: 1217 Comm: trace-cmd Not tainted 5.17.0-rc6-next-20220307-nico+ #19
RIP: 0010:tracepoint_probe_unregister+0x280/0x370
[...]
CR2: 00007ff919b29497 CR3: 0000000109da4005 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
osnoise_workload_stop+0x36/0x90
tracing_set_tracer+0x108/0x260
tracing_set_trace_write+0x94/0xd0
? __check_object_size.part.0+0x10a/0x150
? selinux_file_permission+0x104/0x150
vfs_write+0xb5/0x290
ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7ff919a18127
[...]
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The warning complains about an attempt to unregister an
unregistered tracepoint.
This happens on trace-cmd because it first stops tracing, and
then switches the tracer to nop. Which is equivalent to:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/
# echo osnoise > current_tracer
# echo 0 > tracing_on
# echo nop > current_tracer
The osnoise tracer stops the workload when no trace instance
is actually collecting data. This can be caused both by
disabling tracing or disabling the tracer itself.
To avoid unregistering events twice, use the existing
trace_osnoise_callback_enabled variable to check if the events
(and the workload) are actually active before trying to
deactivate them.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48842

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Fix race condition during interface enslave
Commit 5dbbbd01cbba83 ("ice: Avoid RTNL lock when re-creating
auxiliary device") changes a process of re-creation of aux device
so ice_plug_aux_dev() is called from ice_service_task() context.
This unfortunately opens a race window that can result in dead-lock
when interface has left LAG and immediately enters LAG again.
Reproducer:
```
#!/bin/sh
ip link add lag0 type bond mode 1 miimon 100
ip link set lag0
for n in {1..10}; do
echo Cycle: $n
ip link set ens7f0 master lag0
sleep 1
ip link set ens7f0 nomaster
done
```
This results in:
[20976.208697] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice]
[20976.213422] Call Trace:
[20976.215871] __schedule+0x2d1/0x830
[20976.219364] schedule+0x35/0xa0
[20976.222510] schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10
[20976.227043] __mutex_lock.isra.7+0x310/0x420
[20976.235071] enum_all_gids_of_dev_cb+0x1c/0x100 [ib_core]
[20976.251215] ib_enum_roce_netdev+0xa4/0xe0 [ib_core]
[20976.256192] ib_cache_setup_one+0x33/0xa0 [ib_core]
[20976.261079] ib_register_device+0x40d/0x580 [ib_core]
[20976.266139] irdma_ib_register_device+0x129/0x250 [irdma]
[20976.281409] irdma_probe+0x2c1/0x360 [irdma]
[20976.285691] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x45/0x70
[20976.289790] really_probe+0x1f2/0x480
[20976.298509] driver_probe_device+0x49/0xc0
[20976.302609] bus_for_each_drv+0x79/0xc0
[20976.306448] __device_attach+0xdc/0x160
[20976.310286] bus_probe_device+0x9d/0xb0
[20976.314128] device_add+0x43c/0x890
[20976.321287] __auxiliary_device_add+0x43/0x60
[20976.325644] ice_plug_aux_dev+0xb2/0x100 [ice]
[20976.330109] ice_service_task+0xd0c/0xed0 [ice]
[20976.342591] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
[20976.350536] worker_thread+0x30/0x390
[20976.358128] kthread+0x10a/0x120
[20976.365547] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
...
[20976.438030] task:ip state:D stack: 0 pid:213658 ppid:213627 flags:0x00004084
[20976.446469] Call Trace:
[20976.448921] __schedule+0x2d1/0x830
[20976.452414] schedule+0x35/0xa0
[20976.455559] schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10
[20976.460090] __mutex_lock.isra.7+0x310/0x420
[20976.464364] device_del+0x36/0x3c0
[20976.467772] ice_unplug_aux_dev+0x1a/0x40 [ice]
[20976.472313] ice_lag_event_handler+0x2a2/0x520 [ice]
[20976.477288] notifier_call_chain+0x47/0x70
[20976.481386] __netdev_upper_dev_link+0x18b/0x280
[20976.489845] bond_enslave+0xe05/0x1790 [bonding]
[20976.494475] do_setlink+0x336/0xf50
[20976.502517] __rtnl_newlink+0x529/0x8b0
[20976.543441] rtnl_newlink+0x43/0x60
[20976.546934] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x2b1/0x360
[20976.559238] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4c/0x120
[20976.563079] netlink_unicast+0x196/0x230
[20976.567005] netlink_sendmsg+0x204/0x3d0
[20976.570930] sock_sendmsg+0x4c/0x50
[20976.574423] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1eb/0x250
[20976.586807] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xc0
[20976.606353] __sys_sendmsg+0x57/0xa0
[20976.609930] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1a0
[20976.613598] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
1. Command 'ip link ... set nomaster' causes that ice_plug_aux_dev()
is called from ice_service_task() context, aux device is created
and associated device->lock is taken.
2. Command 'ip link ... set master...' calls ice's notifier under
RTNL lock and that notifier calls ice_unplug_aux_dev(). That
function tries to take aux device->lock but this is already taken
by ice_plug_aux_dev() in step 1
3. Later ice_plug_aux_dev() tries to take RTNL lock but this is already
taken in step 2
4. Dead-lock
The patch fixes this issue by following changes:
- Bit ICE_FLAG_PLUG_AUX_DEV is kept to be set during ice_plug_aux_dev()
call in ice_service_task()
- The bit is checked in ice_clear_rdma_cap() and only if it is not set
then ice_unplug_aux_dev() is called. If it is set (in other words
plugging of aux device was requested and ice_plug_aux_dev() is
potentially running) then the function only clears the
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48839

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/packet: fix slab-out-of-bounds access in packet_recvmsg()
syzbot found that when an AF_PACKET socket is using PACKET_COPY_THRESH
and mmap operations, tpacket_rcv() is queueing skbs with
garbage in skb->cb[], triggering a too big copy [1]
Presumably, users of af_packet using mmap() already gets correct
metadata from the mapped buffer, we can simply make sure
to clear 12 bytes that might be copied to user space later.
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489
Write of size 165 at addr ffffc9000385fb78 by task syz-executor233/3631
CPU: 0 PID: 3631 Comm: syz-executor233 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-syzkaller-02396-g0b3660695e80 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xf/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
memcpy+0x39/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:66
memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]
packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline]
____sys_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x600 net/socket.c:2632
___sys_recvmsg+0x127/0x200 net/socket.c:2674
__sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2704
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fdfd5954c29
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 41 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffcf8e71e48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fdfd5954c29
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000500 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 000000000000000d
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffcf8e71e60
R13: 00000000000f4240 R14: 000000000000c1ff R15: 00007ffcf8e71e54
</TASK>
addr ffffc9000385fb78 is located in stack of task syz-executor233/3631 at offset 32 in frame:
____sys_recvmsg+0x0/0x600 include/linux/uio.h:246
this frame has 1 object:
[32, 160) 'addr'
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffc9000385fa80: 00 04 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffffc9000385fb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00
>ffffc9000385fb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3
^
ffffc9000385fc00: f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1
ffffc9000385fc80: f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48835

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpt3sas: Page fault in reply q processing
A page fault was encountered in mpt3sas on a LUN reset error path:
[ 145.763216] mpt3sas_cm1: Task abort tm failed: handle(0x0002),timeout(30) tr_method(0x0) smid(3) msix_index(0)
[ 145.778932] scsi 1:0:0:0: task abort: FAILED scmd(0x0000000024ba29a2)
[ 145.817307] scsi 1:0:0:0: attempting device reset! scmd(0x0000000024ba29a2)
[ 145.827253] scsi 1:0:0:0: [sg1] tag#2 CDB: Receive Diagnostic 1c 01 01 ff fc 00
[ 145.837617] scsi target1:0:0: handle(0x0002), sas_address(0x500605b0000272b9), phy(0)
[ 145.848598] scsi target1:0:0: enclosure logical id(0x500605b0000272b8), slot(0)
[ 149.858378] mpt3sas_cm1: Poll ReplyDescriptor queues for completion of smid(0), task_type(0x05), handle(0x0002)
[ 149.875202] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000007fffc445d
[ 149.885617] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 149.894346] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 149.903123] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 149.909387] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 149.917417] CPU: 24 PID: 3512 Comm: scsi_eh_1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S O 5.10.89-altav-1 #1
[ 149.934327] Hardware name: DDN 200NVX2 /200NVX2-MB , BIOS ATHG2.2.02.01 09/10/2021
[ 149.951871] RIP: 0010:_base_process_reply_queue+0x4b/0x900 [mpt3sas]
[ 149.961889] Code: 0f 84 22 02 00 00 8d 48 01 49 89 fd 48 8d 57 38 f0 0f b1 4f 38 0f 85 d8 01 00 00 49 8b 45 10 45 31 e4 41 8b 55 0c 48 8d 1c d0 <0f> b6 03 83 e0 0f 3c 0f 0f 85 a2 00 00 00 e9 e6 01 00 00 0f b7 ee
[ 149.991952] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000f1ebcb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 150.000937] RAX: 0000000000000055 RBX: 00000007fffc445d RCX: 000000002548f071
[ 150.011841] RDX: 00000000ffff8881 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff888125ed50d8
[ 150.022670] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffff7fff
[ 150.033445] R10: ffffc9000f1ebb68 R11: ffffc9000f1ebb60 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 150.044204] R13: ffff888125ed50d8 R14: 0000000000000080 R15: 34cdc00034cdea80
[ 150.054963] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88dfaf200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 150.066715] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 150.076078] CR2: 00000007fffc445d CR3: 000000012448a006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 150.086887] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 150.097670] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 150.108323] PKRU: 55555554
[ 150.114690] Call Trace:
[ 150.120497] ? printk+0x48/0x4a
[ 150.127049] mpt3sas_scsih_issue_tm.cold.114+0x2e/0x2b3 [mpt3sas]
[ 150.136453] mpt3sas_scsih_issue_locked_tm+0x86/0xb0 [mpt3sas]
[ 150.145759] scsih_dev_reset+0xea/0x300 [mpt3sas]
[ 150.153891] scsi_eh_ready_devs+0x541/0x9e0 [scsi_mod]
[ 150.162206] ? __scsi_host_match+0x20/0x20 [scsi_mod]
[ 150.170406] ? scsi_try_target_reset+0x90/0x90 [scsi_mod]
[ 150.178925] ? blk_mq_tagset_busy_iter+0x45/0x60
[ 150.186638] ? scsi_try_target_reset+0x90/0x90 [scsi_mod]
[ 150.195087] scsi_error_handler+0x3a5/0x4a0 [scsi_mod]
[ 150.203206] ? __schedule+0x1e9/0x610
[ 150.209783] ? scsi_eh_get_sense+0x210/0x210 [scsi_mod]
[ 150.217924] kthread+0x12e/0x150
[ 150.224041] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x130/0x130
[ 150.231206] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
This is caused by mpt3sas_base_sync_reply_irqs() using an invalid reply_q
pointer outside of the list_for_each_entry() loop. At the end of the full
list traversal the pointer is invalid.
Move the _base_process_reply_queue() call inside of the loop.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48827

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Fix the behavior of READ near OFFSET_MAX
Dan Aloni reports:
> Due to commit 8cfb9015280d ("NFS: Always provide aligned buffers to
> the RPC read layers") on the client, a read of 0xfff is aligned up
> to server rsize of 0x1000.
>
> As a result, in a test where the server has a file of size
> 0x7fffffffffffffff, and the client tries to read from the offset
> 0x7ffffffffffff000, the read causes loff_t overflow in the server
> and it returns an NFS code of EINVAL to the client. The client as
> a result indefinitely retries the request.
The Linux NFS client does not handle NFS?ERR_INVAL, even though all
NFS specifications permit servers to return that status code for a
READ.
Instead of NFS?ERR_INVAL, have out-of-range READ requests succeed
and return a short result. Set the EOF flag in the result to prevent
the client from retrying the READ request. This behavior appears to
be consistent with Solaris NFS servers.
Note that NFSv3 and NFSv4 use u64 offset values on the wire. These
must be converted to loff_t internally before use -- an implicit
type cast is not adequate for this purpose. Otherwise VFS checks
against sb->s_maxbytes do not work properly.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48811

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ibmvnic: don't release napi in __ibmvnic_open()
If __ibmvnic_open() encounters an error such as when setting link state,
it calls release_resources() which frees the napi structures needlessly.
Instead, have __ibmvnic_open() only clean up the work it did so far (i.e.
disable napi and irqs) and leave the rest to the callers.
If caller of __ibmvnic_open() is ibmvnic_open(), it should release the
resources immediately. If the caller is do_reset() or do_hard_reset(),
they will release the resources on the next reset.
This fixes following crash that occurred when running the drmgr command
several times to add/remove a vnic interface:
[102056] ibmvnic 30000003 env3: Disabling rx_scrq[6] irq
[102056] ibmvnic 30000003 env3: Disabling rx_scrq[7] irq
[102056] ibmvnic 30000003 env3: Replenished 8 pools
Kernel attempted to read user page (10) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000010
Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000a3c840
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
...
CPU: 9 PID: 102056 Comm: kworker/9:2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5-autotest-g6441998e2e37 #1
Workqueue: events_long __ibmvnic_reset [ibmvnic]
NIP: c000000000a3c840 LR: c0080000029b5378 CTR: c000000000a3c820
REGS: c0000000548e37e0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.16.0-rc5-autotest-g6441998e2e37)
MSR: 8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28248484 XER: 00000004
CFAR: c0080000029bdd24 DAR: 0000000000000010 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c0080000029b55d0 c0000000548e3a80 c0000000028f0200 0000000000000000
...
NIP [c000000000a3c840] napi_enable+0x20/0xc0
LR [c0080000029b5378] __ibmvnic_open+0xf0/0x430 [ibmvnic]
Call Trace:
[c0000000548e3a80] [0000000000000006] 0x6 (unreliable)
[c0000000548e3ab0] [c0080000029b55d0] __ibmvnic_open+0x348/0x430 [ibmvnic]
[c0000000548e3b40] [c0080000029bcc28] __ibmvnic_reset+0x500/0xdf0 [ibmvnic]
[c0000000548e3c60] [c000000000176228] process_one_work+0x288/0x570
[c0000000548e3d00] [c000000000176588] worker_thread+0x78/0x660
[c0000000548e3da0] [c0000000001822f0] kthread+0x1c0/0x1d0
[c0000000548e3e10] [c00000000000cf64] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
Instruction dump:
7d2948f8 792307e0 4e800020 60000000 3c4c01eb 384239e0 f821ffd1 39430010
38a0fff6 e92d1100 f9210028 39200000 <e9030010> f9010020 60420000 e9210020
---[ end trace 5f8033b08fd27706 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48810

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmr,ip6mr: acquire RTNL before calling ip[6]mr_free_table() on failure path
ip[6]mr_free_table() can only be called under RTNL lock.
RTNL: assertion failed at net/core/dev.c (10367)
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5890 at net/core/dev.c:10367 unregister_netdevice_many+0x1246/0x1850 net/core/dev.c:10367
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 5890 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller-11627-g422ee58dc0ef #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:unregister_netdevice_many+0x1246/0x1850 net/core/dev.c:10367
Code: 0f 85 9b ee ff ff e8 69 07 4b fa ba 7f 28 00 00 48 c7 c6 00 90 ae 8a 48 c7 c7 40 90 ae 8a c6 05 6d b1 51 06 01 e8 8c 90 d8 01 <0f> 0b e9 70 ee ff ff e8 3e 07 4b fa 4c 89 e7 e8 86 2a 59 fa e9 ee
RSP: 0018:ffffc900046ff6e0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888050f51d00 RSI: ffffffff815fa008 RDI: fffff520008dfece
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff815f3d6e R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffff4
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffc900046ff750 R15: ffff88807b7dc000
FS: 00007f4ab736e700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fee0b4f8990 CR3: 000000001e7d2000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mroute_clean_tables+0x244/0xb40 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1509
ip6mr_free_table net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:389 [inline]
ip6mr_rules_init net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:246 [inline]
ip6mr_net_init net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1306 [inline]
ip6mr_net_init+0x3f0/0x4e0 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1298
ops_init+0xaf/0x470 net/core/net_namespace.c:140
setup_net+0x54f/0xbb0 net/core/net_namespace.c:331
copy_net_ns+0x318/0x760 net/core/net_namespace.c:475
create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xb20 kernel/nsproxy.c:110
copy_namespaces+0x391/0x450 kernel/nsproxy.c:178
copy_process+0x2e0c/0x7300 kernel/fork.c:2167
kernel_clone+0xe7/0xab0 kernel/fork.c:2555
__do_sys_clone+0xc8/0x110 kernel/fork.c:2672
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f4ab89f9059
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7f4ab89f902f.
RSP: 002b:00007f4ab736e118 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4ab8b0bf60 RCX: 00007f4ab89f9059
RDX: 0000000020000280 RSI: 0000000020000270 RDI: 0000000040200000
RBP: 00007f4ab8a5308d R08: 0000000020000300 R09: 0000000020000300
R10: 00000000200002c0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffc3977cc1f R14: 00007f4ab736e300 R15: 0000000000022000
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48802

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/proc: task_mmu.c: don't read mapcount for migration entry
The syzbot reported the below BUG:
kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:785!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 4392 Comm: syz-executor560 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:PageDoubleMap include/linux/page-flags.h:785 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__page_mapcount+0x2d2/0x350 mm/util.c:744
Call Trace:
page_mapcount include/linux/mm.h:837 [inline]
smaps_account+0x470/0xb10 fs/proc/task_mmu.c:466
smaps_pte_entry fs/proc/task_mmu.c:538 [inline]
smaps_pte_range+0x611/0x1250 fs/proc/task_mmu.c:601
walk_pmd_range mm/pagewalk.c:128 [inline]
walk_pud_range mm/pagewalk.c:205 [inline]
walk_p4d_range mm/pagewalk.c:240 [inline]
walk_pgd_range mm/pagewalk.c:277 [inline]
__walk_page_range+0xe23/0x1ea0 mm/pagewalk.c:379
walk_page_vma+0x277/0x350 mm/pagewalk.c:530
smap_gather_stats.part.0+0x148/0x260 fs/proc/task_mmu.c:768
smap_gather_stats fs/proc/task_mmu.c:741 [inline]
show_smap+0xc6/0x440 fs/proc/task_mmu.c:822
seq_read_iter+0xbb0/0x1240 fs/seq_file.c:272
seq_read+0x3e0/0x5b0 fs/seq_file.c:162
vfs_read+0x1b5/0x600 fs/read_write.c:479
ksys_read+0x12d/0x250 fs/read_write.c:619
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The reproducer was trying to read /proc/$PID/smaps when calling
MADV_FREE at the mean time. MADV_FREE may split THPs if it is called
for partial THP. It may trigger the below race:
CPU A CPU B
----- -----
smaps walk: MADV_FREE:
page_mapcount()
PageCompound()
split_huge_page()
page = compound_head(page)
PageDoubleMap(page)
When calling PageDoubleMap() this page is not a tail page of THP anymore
so the BUG is triggered.
This could be fixed by elevated refcount of the page before calling
mapcount, but that would prevent it from counting migration entries, and
it seems overkilling because the race just could happen when PMD is
split so all PTE entries of tail pages are actually migration entries,
and smaps_account() does treat migration entries as mapcount == 1 as
Kirill pointed out.
Add a new parameter for smaps_account() to tell this entry is migration
entry then skip calling page_mapcount(). Don't skip getting mapcount
for device private entries since they do track references with mapcount.
Pagemap also has the similar issue although it was not reported. Fixed
it as well.
[shy828301@gmail.com: v4]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220203182641.824731-1-shy828301@gmail.com
[nathan@kernel.org: avoid unused variable warning in pagemap_pmd_range()]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220207171049.1102239-1-nathan@kernel.org

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48796

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu: Fix potential use-after-free during probe
Kasan has reported the following use after free on dev->iommu.
when a device probe fails and it is in process of freeing dev->iommu
in dev_iommu_free function, a deferred_probe_work_func runs in parallel
and tries to access dev->iommu->fwspec in of_iommu_configure path thus
causing use after free.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in of_iommu_configure+0xb4/0x4a4
Read of size 8 at addr ffffff87a2f1acb8 by task kworker/u16:2/153
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x33c
show_stack+0x18/0x24
dump_stack_lvl+0x16c/0x1e0
print_address_description+0x84/0x39c
__kasan_report+0x184/0x308
kasan_report+0x50/0x78
__asan_load8+0xc0/0xc4
of_iommu_configure+0xb4/0x4a4
of_dma_configure_id+0x2fc/0x4d4
platform_dma_configure+0x40/0x5c
really_probe+0x1b4/0xb74
driver_probe_device+0x11c/0x228
__device_attach_driver+0x14c/0x304
bus_for_each_drv+0x124/0x1b0
__device_attach+0x25c/0x334
device_initial_probe+0x24/0x34
bus_probe_device+0x78/0x134
deferred_probe_work_func+0x130/0x1a8
process_one_work+0x4c8/0x970
worker_thread+0x5c8/0xaec
kthread+0x1f8/0x220
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Allocated by task 1:
____kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0x114
__kasan_kmalloc+0x10/0x1c
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xe4/0x3d4
__iommu_probe_device+0x90/0x394
probe_iommu_group+0x70/0x9c
bus_for_each_dev+0x11c/0x19c
bus_iommu_probe+0xb8/0x7d4
bus_set_iommu+0xcc/0x13c
arm_smmu_bus_init+0x44/0x130 [arm_smmu]
arm_smmu_device_probe+0xb88/0xc54 [arm_smmu]
platform_drv_probe+0xe4/0x13c
really_probe+0x2c8/0xb74
driver_probe_device+0x11c/0x228
device_driver_attach+0xf0/0x16c
__driver_attach+0x80/0x320
bus_for_each_dev+0x11c/0x19c
driver_attach+0x38/0x48
bus_add_driver+0x1dc/0x3a4
driver_register+0x18c/0x244
__platform_driver_register+0x88/0x9c
init_module+0x64/0xff4 [arm_smmu]
do_one_initcall+0x17c/0x2f0
do_init_module+0xe8/0x378
load_module+0x3f80/0x4a40
__se_sys_finit_module+0x1a0/0x1e4
__arm64_sys_finit_module+0x44/0x58
el0_svc_common+0x100/0x264
do_el0_svc+0x38/0xa4
el0_svc+0x20/0x30
el0_sync_handler+0x68/0xac
el0_sync+0x160/0x180
Freed by task 1:
kasan_set_track+0x4c/0x84
kasan_set_free_info+0x28/0x4c
____kasan_slab_free+0x120/0x15c
__kasan_slab_free+0x18/0x28
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x204/0x2fc
kfree+0xfc/0x3a4
__iommu_probe_device+0x284/0x394
probe_iommu_group+0x70/0x9c
bus_for_each_dev+0x11c/0x19c
bus_iommu_probe+0xb8/0x7d4
bus_set_iommu+0xcc/0x13c
arm_smmu_bus_init+0x44/0x130 [arm_smmu]
arm_smmu_device_probe+0xb88/0xc54 [arm_smmu]
platform_drv_probe+0xe4/0x13c
really_probe+0x2c8/0xb74
driver_probe_device+0x11c/0x228
device_driver_attach+0xf0/0x16c
__driver_attach+0x80/0x320
bus_for_each_dev+0x11c/0x19c
driver_attach+0x38/0x48
bus_add_driver+0x1dc/0x3a4
driver_register+0x18c/0x244
__platform_driver_register+0x88/0x9c
init_module+0x64/0xff4 [arm_smmu]
do_one_initcall+0x17c/0x2f0
do_init_module+0xe8/0x378
load_module+0x3f80/0x4a40
__se_sys_finit_module+0x1a0/0x1e4
__arm64_sys_finit_module+0x44/0x58
el0_svc_common+0x100/0x264
do_el0_svc+0x38/0xa4
el0_svc+0x20/0x30
el0_sync_handler+0x68/0xac
el0_sync+0x160/0x180
Fix this by setting dev->iommu to NULL first and
then freeing dev_iommu structure in dev_iommu_free
function.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48751

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: Transitional solution for clcsock race issue
We encountered a crash in smc_setsockopt() and it is caused by
accessing smc->clcsock after clcsock was released.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 50309 Comm: nginx Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.16.0-rc4+ #53
RIP: 0010:smc_setsockopt+0x59/0x280 [smc]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__sys_setsockopt+0xfc/0x190
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x34/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f16ba83918e
</TASK>
This patch tries to fix it by holding clcsock_release_lock and
checking whether clcsock has already been released before access.
In case that a crash of the same reason happens in smc_getsockopt()
or smc_switch_to_fallback(), this patch also checkes smc->clcsock
in them too. And the caller of smc_switch_to_fallback() will identify
whether fallback succeeds according to the return value.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48744

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Avoid field-overflowing memcpy()
In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid
intentionally writing across neighboring fields.
Use flexible arrays instead of zero-element arrays (which look like they
are always overflowing) and split the cross-field memcpy() into two halves
that can be appropriately bounds-checked by the compiler.
We were doing:
#define ETH_HLEN 14
#define VLAN_HLEN 4
...
#define MLX5E_XDP_MIN_INLINE (ETH_HLEN + VLAN_HLEN)
...
struct mlx5e_tx_wqe *wqe = mlx5_wq_cyc_get_wqe(wq, pi);
...
struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg *eseg = &wqe->eth;
struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg *dseg = wqe->data;
...
memcpy(eseg->inline_hdr.start, xdptxd->data, MLX5E_XDP_MIN_INLINE);
target is wqe->eth.inline_hdr.start (which the compiler sees as being
2 bytes in size), but copying 18, intending to write across start
(really vlan_tci, 2 bytes). The remaining 16 bytes get written into
wqe->data[0], covering byte_count (4 bytes), lkey (4 bytes), and addr
(8 bytes).
struct mlx5e_tx_wqe {
struct mlx5_wqe_ctrl_seg ctrl; /* 0 16 */
struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg eth; /* 16 16 */
struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg data[]; /* 32 0 */
/* size: 32, cachelines: 1, members: 3 */
/* last cacheline: 32 bytes */
};
struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg {
u8 swp_outer_l4_offset; /* 0 1 */
u8 swp_outer_l3_offset; /* 1 1 */
u8 swp_inner_l4_offset; /* 2 1 */
u8 swp_inner_l3_offset; /* 3 1 */
u8 cs_flags; /* 4 1 */
u8 swp_flags; /* 5 1 */
__be16 mss; /* 6 2 */
__be32 flow_table_metadata; /* 8 4 */
union {
struct {
__be16 sz; /* 12 2 */
u8 start[2]; /* 14 2 */
} inline_hdr; /* 12 4 */
struct {
__be16 type; /* 12 2 */
__be16 vlan_tci; /* 14 2 */
} insert; /* 12 4 */
__be32 trailer; /* 12 4 */
}; /* 12 4 */
/* size: 16, cachelines: 1, members: 9 */
/* last cacheline: 16 bytes */
};
struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg {
__be32 byte_count; /* 0 4 */
__be32 lkey; /* 4 4 */
__be64 addr; /* 8 8 */
/* size: 16, cachelines: 1, members: 3 */
/* last cacheline: 16 bytes */
};
So, split the memcpy() so the compiler can reason about the buffer
sizes.
"pahole" shows no size nor member offset changes to struct mlx5e_tx_wqe
nor struct mlx5e_umr_wqe. "objdump -d" shows no meaningful object
code changes (i.e. only source line number induced differences and
optimizations).

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48687

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sr: fix out-of-bounds read when setting HMAC data.
The SRv6 layer allows defining HMAC data that can later be used to sign IPv6
Segment Routing Headers. This configuration is realised via netlink through
four attributes: SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN and
SEG6_ATTR_ALGID. Because the SECRETLEN attribute is decoupled from the actual
length of the SECRET attribute, it is possible to provide invalid combinations
(e.g., secret = "", secretlen = 64). This case is not checked in the code and
with an appropriately crafted netlink message, an out-of-bounds read of up
to 64 bytes (max secret length) can occur past the skb end pointer and into
skb_shared_info:
Breakpoint 1, seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208
208memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen);
(gdb) bt
#0 seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208
#1 0xffffffff81e012e9 in genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=nlh@entry=0xffff88800b1b7600,
extack=extack@entry=0xffffc90000ba7af0, ops=ops@entry=0xffffc90000ba7a80, hdrlen=4, net=0xffffffff84237580 <init_net>, family=<optimized out>,
family=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:731
#2 0xffffffff81e01435 in genl_family_rcv_msg (extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00,
family=0xffffffff82fef6c0 <seg6_genl_family>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:775
#3 genl_rcv_msg (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:792
#4 0xffffffff81dfffc3 in netlink_rcv_skb (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, cb=cb@entry=0xffffffff81e01350 <genl_rcv_msg>)
at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501
#5 0xffffffff81e00919 in genl_rcv (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:803
#6 0xffffffff81dff6ae in netlink_unicast_kernel (ssk=0xffff888010eec800, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, sk=0xffff888004aed000)
at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319
#7 netlink_unicast (ssk=ssk@entry=0xffff888010eec800, skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, portid=portid@entry=0, nonblock=<optimized out>)
at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
#8 0xffffffff81dff9a4 in netlink_sendmsg (sock=<optimized out>, msg=0xffffc90000ba7e48, len=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
...
(gdb) p/x ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->head + ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->end
$1 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0
(gdb) p/x secret
$2 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0
(gdb) p slen
$3 = 64 '@'
The OOB data can then be read back from userspace by dumping HMAC state. This
commit fixes this by ensuring SECRETLEN cannot exceed the actual length of
SECRET.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48653

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Don't double unplug aux on peer initiated reset
In the IDC callback that is accessed when the aux drivers request a reset,
the function to unplug the aux devices is called. This function is also
called in the ice_prepare_for_reset function. This double call is causing
a "scheduling while atomic" BUG.
[ 662.676430] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: cqp opcode = 0x1 maj_err_code = 0xffff min_err_code = 0x8003
[ 662.676609] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: [Modify QP Cmd Error][op_code=8] status=-29 waiting=1 completion_err=1 maj=0xffff min=0x8003
[ 662.815006] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: ICE OICR event notification: oicr = 0x10000003
[ 662.815014] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: critical PE Error, GLPE_CRITERR=0x00011424
[ 662.815017] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: Requesting a reset
[ 662.815475] BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/37/0/0x00010002
[ 662.815475] BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/37/0/0x00010002
[ 662.815477] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs rfkill 8021q garp mrp stp llc vfat fat rpcrdma intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common sunrpc i10nm_edac rdma_ucm nfit ib_srpt libnvdimm ib_isert iscsi_target_mod x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp target_core_mod snd_hda_intel ib_iser snd_intel_dspcfg libiscsi snd_intel_sdw_acpi scsi_transport_iscsi kvm_intel iTCO_wdt rdma_cm snd_hda_codec kvm iw_cm ipmi_ssif iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_core irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device rapl snd_pcm snd_timer isst_if_mbox_pci pcspkr isst_if_mmio irdma intel_uncore idxd acpi_ipmi joydev isst_if_common snd mei_me idxd_bus ipmi_si soundcore i2c_i801 mei ipmi_devintf i2c_smbus i2c_ismt ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_pad rv(OE) ib_uverbs ib_cm ib_core xfs libcrc32c ast i2c_algo_bit drm_vram_helper drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm_ttm_helpe
r ttm
[ 662.815546] nvme nvme_core ice drm crc32c_intel i40e t10_pi wmi pinctrl_emmitsburg dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
[ 662.815557] Preemption disabled at:
[ 662.815558] [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[ 662.815563] CPU: 37 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/37 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S OE 5.17.1 #2
[ 662.815566] Hardware name: Intel Corporation D50DNP/D50DNP, BIOS SE5C6301.86B.6624.D18.2111021741 11/02/2021
[ 662.815568] Call Trace:
[ 662.815572] <IRQ>
[ 662.815574] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x42
[ 662.815581] __schedule_bug.cold.147+0x7d/0x8a
[ 662.815588] __schedule+0x798/0x990
[ 662.815595] schedule+0x44/0xc0
[ 662.815597] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x14/0x20
[ 662.815600] __mutex_lock.isra.11+0x46c/0x490
[ 662.815603] ? __ibdev_printk+0x76/0xc0 [ib_core]
[ 662.815633] device_del+0x37/0x3d0
[ 662.815639] ice_unplug_aux_dev+0x1a/0x40 [ice]
[ 662.815674] ice_schedule_reset+0x3c/0xd0 [ice]
[ 662.815693] irdma_iidc_event_handler.cold.7+0xb6/0xd3 [irdma]
[ 662.815712] ? bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off+0x45/0xa0
[ 662.815719] ice_send_event_to_aux+0x54/0x70 [ice]
[ 662.815741] ice_misc_intr+0x21d/0x2d0 [ice]
[ 662.815756] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4c/0x180
[ 662.815762] handle_irq_event_percpu+0xf/0x40
[ 662.815764] handle_irq_event+0x34/0x60
[ 662.815766] handle_edge_irq+0x9a/0x1c0
[ 662.815770] __common_interrupt+0x62/0x100
[ 662.815774] common_interrupt+0xb4/0xd0
[ 662.815779] </IRQ>
[ 662.815780] <TASK>
[ 662.815780] asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
[ 662.815785] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xd6/0x380
[ 662.815789] Code: 49 89 c4 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 ff e8 65 d7 95 ff 45 84 ff 74 12 9c 58 f6 c4 02 0f 85 64 02 00 00 31 ff e8 ae c5 9c ff fb 45 85 f6 <0f> 88 12 01 00 00 49 63 d6 4c 2b 24 24 48 8d 04 52 48 8d 04 82 49
[ 662.815791] RSP: 0018:ff2c2c4f18edbe80 EFLAGS: 00000202
[ 662.815793] RAX: ff280805df140000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000001f
[ 662.815795] RDX: 0000009a52da2d08 R
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48652

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Fix crash by keep old cfg when update TCs more than queues
There are problems if allocated queues less than Traffic Classes.
Commit a632b2a4c920 ("ice: ethtool: Prohibit improper channel config
for DCB") already disallow setting less queues than TCs.
Another case is if we first set less queues, and later update more TCs
config due to LLDP, ice_vsi_cfg_tc() will failed but left dirty
num_txq/rxq and tc_cfg in vsi, that will cause invalid pointer access.
[ 95.968089] ice 0000:3b:00.1: More TCs defined than queues/rings allocated.
[ 95.968092] ice 0000:3b:00.1: Trying to use more Rx queues (8), than were allocated (1)!
[ 95.968093] ice 0000:3b:00.1: Failed to config TC for VSI index: 0
[ 95.969621] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 95.969705] CPU: 1 PID: 58405 Comm: lldpad Kdump: loaded Tainted: G U W O --------- -t - 4.18.0 #1
[ 95.969867] Hardware name: O.E.M/BC11SPSCB10, BIOS 8.23 12/30/2021
[ 95.969992] RIP: 0010:devm_kmalloc+0xa/0x60
[ 95.970052] Code: 5c ff ff ff 31 c0 5b 5d 41 5c c3 b8 f4 ff ff ff eb f4 0f 1f 40 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 89 d1 <8b> 97 60 02 00 00 48 8d 7e 18 48 39 f7 72 3f 55 89 ce 53 48 8b 4c
[ 95.970344] RSP: 0018:ffffc9003f553888 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 95.970425] RAX: dead000000000200 RBX: ffffea003c425b00 RCX: 00000000006080c0
[ 95.970536] RDX: 00000000006080c0 RSI: 0000000000000200 RDI: dead000000000200
[ 95.970648] RBP: dead000000000200 R08: 00000000000463c0 R09: ffff888ffa900000
[ 95.970760] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff888ff6b40100
[ 95.970870] R13: ffff888ff6a55018 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888ff6a55460
[ 95.970981] FS: 00007f51b7d24700(0000) GS:ffff88903ee80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 95.971108] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 95.971197] CR2: 00007fac5410d710 CR3: 0000000f2c1de002 CR4: 00000000007606e0
[ 95.971309] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 95.971419] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 95.971530] PKRU: 55555554
[ 95.971573] Call Trace:
[ 95.971622] ice_setup_rx_ring+0x39/0x110 [ice]
[ 95.971695] ice_vsi_setup_rx_rings+0x54/0x90 [ice]
[ 95.971774] ice_vsi_open+0x25/0x120 [ice]
[ 95.971843] ice_open_internal+0xb8/0x1f0 [ice]
[ 95.971919] ice_ena_vsi+0x4f/0xd0 [ice]
[ 95.971987] ice_dcb_ena_dis_vsi.constprop.5+0x29/0x90 [ice]
[ 95.972082] ice_pf_dcb_cfg+0x29a/0x380 [ice]
[ 95.972154] ice_dcbnl_setets+0x174/0x1b0 [ice]
[ 95.972220] dcbnl_ieee_set+0x89/0x230
[ 95.972279] ? dcbnl_ieee_del+0x150/0x150
[ 95.972341] dcb_doit+0x124/0x1b0
[ 95.972392] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x243/0x2f0
[ 95.972457] ? dcb_doit+0x14d/0x1b0
[ 95.972510] ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x1d3/0x280
[ 95.972591] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.31+0x100/0x100
[ 95.972661] netlink_rcv_skb+0xcf/0xf0
[ 95.972720] netlink_unicast+0x16d/0x220
[ 95.972781] netlink_sendmsg+0x2ba/0x3a0
[ 95.975891] sock_sendmsg+0x4c/0x50
[ 95.979032] ___sys_sendmsg+0x2e4/0x300
[ 95.982147] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x13e/0x190
[ 95.985242] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0x79/0x90
[ 95.988338] ? __check_object_size+0xac/0x1b0
[ 95.991440] ? _copy_to_user+0x22/0x30
[ 95.994539] ? move_addr_to_user+0xbb/0xd0
[ 95.997619] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x53/0x80
[ 96.000664] __sys_sendmsg+0x53/0x80
[ 96.003747] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1d0
[ 96.006862] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
Only update num_txq/rxq when passed check, and restore tc_cfg if setup
queue map failed.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47634

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ubi: Fix race condition between ctrl_cdev_ioctl and ubi_cdev_ioctl
Hulk Robot reported a KASAN report about use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0x13d/0x160
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888035e37d98 by task ubiattach/1385
[...]
Call Trace:
klist_dec_and_del+0xa7/0x4a0
klist_put+0xc7/0x1a0
device_del+0x4d4/0xed0
cdev_device_del+0x1a/0x80
ubi_attach_mtd_dev+0x2951/0x34b0 [ubi]
ctrl_cdev_ioctl+0x286/0x2f0 [ubi]
Allocated by task 1414:
device_add+0x60a/0x18b0
cdev_device_add+0x103/0x170
ubi_create_volume+0x1118/0x1a10 [ubi]
ubi_cdev_ioctl+0xb7f/0x1ba0 [ubi]
Freed by task 1385:
cdev_device_del+0x1a/0x80
ubi_remove_volume+0x438/0x6c0 [ubi]
ubi_cdev_ioctl+0xbf4/0x1ba0 [ubi]
[...]
==================================================================
The lock held by ctrl_cdev_ioctl is ubi_devices_mutex, but the lock held
by ubi_cdev_ioctl is ubi->device_mutex. Therefore, the two locks can be
concurrent.
ctrl_cdev_ioctl contains two operations: ubi_attach and ubi_detach.
ubi_detach is bug-free because it uses reference counting to prevent
concurrency. However, uif_init and uif_close in ubi_attach may race with
ubi_cdev_ioctl.
uif_init will race with ubi_cdev_ioctl as in the following stack.
cpu1 cpu2 cpu3
_______________________|________________________|______________________
ctrl_cdev_ioctl
ubi_attach_mtd_dev
uif_init
ubi_cdev_ioctl
ubi_create_volume
cdev_device_add
ubi_add_volume
// sysfs exist
kill_volumes
ubi_cdev_ioctl
ubi_remove_volume
cdev_device_del
// first free
ubi_free_volume
cdev_del
// double free
cdev_device_del
And uif_close will race with ubi_cdev_ioctl as in the following stack.
cpu1 cpu2 cpu3
_______________________|________________________|______________________
ctrl_cdev_ioctl
ubi_attach_mtd_dev
uif_init
ubi_cdev_ioctl
ubi_create_volume
cdev_device_add
ubi_debugfs_init_dev
//error goto out_uif;
uif_close
kill_volumes
ubi_cdev_ioctl
ubi_remove_volume
cdev_device_del
// first free
ubi_free_volume
// double free
The cause of this problem is that commit 714fb87e8bc0 make device
"available" before it becomes accessible via sysfs. Therefore, we
roll back the modification. We will fix the race condition between
ubi device creation and udev by removing ubi_get_device in
vol_attribute_show and dev_attribute_show.This avoids accessing
uninitialized ubi_devices[ubi_num].
ubi_get_device is used to prevent devices from being deleted during
sysfs execution. However, now kernfs ensures that devices will not
be deleted before all reference counting are released.
The key process is shown in the following stack.
device_del
device_remove_attrs
device_remove_groups
sysfs_remove_groups
sysfs_remove_group
remove_files
kernfs_remove_by_name
kernfs_remove_by_name_ns
__kernfs_remove
kernfs_drain

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47595

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_ets: don't remove idle classes from the round-robin list
Shuang reported that the following script:
1) tc qdisc add dev ddd0 handle 10: parent 1: ets bands 8 strict 4 priomap 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
2) mausezahn ddd0 -A 10.10.10.1 -B 10.10.10.2 -c 0 -a own -b 00:c1:a0:c1:a0:00 -t udp &
3) tc qdisc change dev ddd0 handle 10: ets bands 4 strict 2 quanta 2500 2500 priomap 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
crashes systematically when line 2) is commented:
list_del corruption, ffff8e028404bd30->next is LIST_POISON1 (dead000000000100)
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:47!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 954 Comm: tc Not tainted 5.16.0-rc4+ #478
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid.cold.1+0x12/0x47
Code: fe ff 0f 0b 48 89 c1 4c 89 c6 48 c7 c7 08 42 1b 87 e8 1d c5 fe ff 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 89 c2 48 c7 c7 98 42 1b 87 e8 09 c5 fe ff <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 48 43 1b 87 e8 fb c4 fe ff 0f 0b 48 89 f2 48 89 fe
RSP: 0018:ffffae46807a3888 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: 0000000000000007 RCX: 0000000000000202
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff871ac536 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffffae46807a3a10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffff7fff
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffae46807a36a8 R12: ffff8e028404b800
R13: ffff8e028404bd30 R14: dead000000000100 R15: ffff8e02fafa2400
FS: 00007efdc92e4480(0000) GS:ffff8e02fb600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000682f48 CR3: 00000001058be000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ets_qdisc_change+0x58b/0xa70 [sch_ets]
tc_modify_qdisc+0x323/0x880
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x169/0x4a0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x50/0x100
netlink_unicast+0x1a5/0x280
netlink_sendmsg+0x257/0x4d0
sock_sendmsg+0x5b/0x60
____sys_sendmsg+0x1f2/0x260
___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xc0
__sys_sendmsg+0x57/0xa0
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7efdc8031338
Code: 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b5 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 25 43 2c 00 8b 00 85 c0 75 17 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 58 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 41 54 41 89 d4 55
RSP: 002b:00007ffdf1ce9828 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000061b37a97 RCX: 00007efdc8031338
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffdf1ce9890 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000000078a940
R10: 000000000000000c R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000688880 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Modules linked in: sch_ets sch_tbf dummy rfkill iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common joydev pcspkr i2c_i801 virtio_balloon i2c_smbus lpc_ich ip_tables xfs libcrc32c crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel serio_raw ghash_clmulni_intel ahci libahci libata virtio_blk virtio_console virtio_net net_failover failover sunrpc dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: sch_ets]
---[ end trace f35878d1912655c2 ]---
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid.cold.1+0x12/0x47
Code: fe ff 0f 0b 48 89 c1 4c 89 c6 48 c7 c7 08 42 1b 87 e8 1d c5 fe ff 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 89 c2 48 c7 c7 98 42 1b 87 e8 09 c5 fe ff <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 48 43 1b 87 e8 fb c4 fe ff 0f 0b 48 89 f2 48 89 fe
RSP: 0018:ffffae46807a3888 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: 0000000000000007 RCX: 0000000000000202
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff871ac536 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffffae46807a3a10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffff7fff
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffae46807a36a8 R12: ffff8e028404b800
R13: ffff8e028404bd30 R14: dead000000000100 R15: ffff8e02fafa2400
FS: 00007efdc92e4480(0000) GS:ffff8e02fb600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47563

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: avoid bpf_prog refcount underflow
Ice driver has the routines for managing XDP resources that are shared
between ndo_bpf op and VSI rebuild flow. The latter takes place for
example when user changes queue count on an interface via ethtool's
set_channels().
There is an issue around the bpf_prog refcounting when VSI is being
rebuilt - since ice_prepare_xdp_rings() is called with vsi->xdp_prog as
an argument that is used later on by ice_vsi_assign_bpf_prog(), same
bpf_prog pointers are swapped with each other. Then it is also
interpreted as an 'old_prog' which in turn causes us to call
bpf_prog_put on it that will decrement its refcount.
Below splat can be interpreted in a way that due to zero refcount of a
bpf_prog it is wiped out from the system while kernel still tries to
refer to it:
[ 481.069429] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc9000640f038
[ 481.077390] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 481.083335] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 481.089276] PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 1001cb067 PMD 106d2b067 PTE 0
[ 481.097141] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 481.101980] CPU: 12 PID: 3339 Comm: sudo Tainted: G OE 5.15.0-rc5+ #1
[ 481.110840] Hardware name: Intel Corp. GRANTLEY/GRANTLEY, BIOS GRRFCRB1.86B.0276.D07.1605190235 05/19/2016
[ 481.122021] RIP: 0010:dev_xdp_prog_id+0x25/0x40
[ 481.127265] Code: 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 89 f6 48 c1 e6 04 48 01 fe 48 8b 86 98 08 00 00 48 85 c0 74 13 48 8b 50 18 31 c0 48 85 d2 74 07 <48> 8b 42 38 8b 40 20 c3 48 8b 96 90 08 00 00 eb e8 66 2e 0f 1f 84
[ 481.148991] RSP: 0018:ffffc90007b63868 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 481.155034] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff889080824000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 481.163278] RDX: ffffc9000640f000 RSI: ffff889080824010 RDI: ffff889080824000
[ 481.171527] RBP: ffff888107af7d00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810db5f6e0
[ 481.179776] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8890885b9988 R12: ffff88810db5f4bc
[ 481.188026] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 481.196276] FS: 00007f5466d5bec0(0000) GS:ffff88903fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 481.205633] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 481.212279] CR2: ffffc9000640f038 CR3: 000000014429c006 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[ 481.220530] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 481.228771] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 481.237029] Call Trace:
[ 481.239856] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0x768/0x12e0
[ 481.244602] rtnl_dump_ifinfo+0x525/0x650
[ 481.249246] ? __alloc_skb+0xa5/0x280
[ 481.253484] netlink_dump+0x168/0x3c0
[ 481.257725] netlink_recvmsg+0x21e/0x3e0
[ 481.262263] ____sys_recvmsg+0x87/0x170
[ 481.266707] ? __might_fault+0x20/0x30
[ 481.271046] ? _copy_from_user+0x66/0xa0
[ 481.275591] ? iovec_from_user+0xf6/0x1c0
[ 481.280226] ___sys_recvmsg+0x82/0x100
[ 481.284566] ? sock_sendmsg+0x5e/0x60
[ 481.288791] ? __sys_sendto+0xee/0x150
[ 481.293129] __sys_recvmsg+0x56/0xa0
[ 481.297267] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
[ 481.301395] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 481.307238] RIP: 0033:0x7f5466f39617
[ 481.311373] Code: 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb bd 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2f 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10
[ 481.342944] RSP: 002b:00007ffedc7f4308 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
[ 481.361783] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffedc7f5460 RCX: 00007f5466f39617
[ 481.380278] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffedc7f5360 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 481.398500] RBP: 00007ffedc7f53f0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055d556f04d50
[ 481.416463] R10: 0000000000000077 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffedc7f5360
[ 481.434131] R13: 00007ffedc7f5350 R14: 00007ffedc7f5344 R15: 0000000000000e98
[ 481.451520] Modules linked in: ice
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47562

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix vsi->txq_map sizing
The approach of having XDP queue per CPU regardless of user's setting
exposed a hidden bug that could occur in case when Rx queue count differ
from Tx queue count. Currently vsi->txq_map's size is equal to the
doubled vsi->alloc_txq, which is not correct due to the fact that XDP
rings were previously based on the Rx queue count. Below splat can be
seen when ethtool -L is used and XDP rings are configured:
[ 682.875339] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000000f
[ 682.883403] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 682.889345] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 682.895289] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 682.898218] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 682.903055] CPU: 42 PID: 2878 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G OE 5.15.0-rc5+ #1
[ 682.912214] Hardware name: Intel Corp. GRANTLEY/GRANTLEY, BIOS GRRFCRB1.86B.0276.D07.1605190235 05/19/2016
[ 682.923380] RIP: 0010:devres_remove+0x44/0x130
[ 682.928527] Code: 49 89 f4 55 48 89 fd 4c 89 ff 53 48 83 ec 10 e8 92 b9 49 00 48 8b 9d a8 02 00 00 48 8d 8d a0 02 00 00 49 89 c2 48 39 cb 74 0f <4c> 3b 63 10 74 25 48 8b 5b 08 48 39 cb 75 f1 4c 89 ff 4c 89 d6 e8
[ 682.950237] RSP: 0018:ffffc90006a679f0 EFLAGS: 00010002
[ 682.956285] RAX: 0000000000000286 RBX: ffffffffffffffff RCX: ffff88908343a370
[ 682.964538] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff81690d60 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 682.972789] RBP: ffff88908343a0d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 682.981040] R10: 0000000000000286 R11: 3fffffffffffffff R12: ffffffff81690d60
[ 682.989282] R13: ffffffff81690a00 R14: ffff8890819807a8 R15: ffff88908343a36c
[ 682.997535] FS: 00007f08c7bfa740(0000) GS:ffff88a03fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 683.006910] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 683.013557] CR2: 000000000000000f CR3: 0000001080a66003 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[ 683.021819] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 683.030075] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 683.038336] Call Trace:
[ 683.041167] devm_kfree+0x33/0x50
[ 683.045004] ice_vsi_free_arrays+0x5e/0xc0 [ice]
[ 683.050380] ice_vsi_rebuild+0x4c8/0x750 [ice]
[ 683.055543] ice_vsi_recfg_qs+0x9a/0x110 [ice]
[ 683.060697] ice_set_channels+0x14f/0x290 [ice]
[ 683.065962] ethnl_set_channels+0x333/0x3f0
[ 683.070807] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xea/0x150
[ 683.076152] genl_rcv_msg+0xde/0x1d0
[ 683.080289] ? channels_prepare_data+0x60/0x60
[ 683.085432] ? genl_get_cmd+0xd0/0xd0
[ 683.089667] netlink_rcv_skb+0x50/0xf0
[ 683.094006] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
[ 683.097638] netlink_unicast+0x239/0x340
[ 683.102177] netlink_sendmsg+0x22e/0x470
[ 683.106717] sock_sendmsg+0x5e/0x60
[ 683.110756] __sys_sendto+0xee/0x150
[ 683.114894] ? handle_mm_fault+0xd0/0x2a0
[ 683.119535] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1f3/0x690
[ 683.134173] __x64_sys_sendto+0x25/0x30
[ 683.148231] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
[ 683.161992] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Fix this by taking into account the value that num_possible_cpus()
yields in addition to vsi->alloc_txq instead of doubling the latter.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47559

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: Fix NULL pointer dereferencing in smc_vlan_by_tcpsk()
Coverity reports a possible NULL dereferencing problem:
in smc_vlan_by_tcpsk():
6. returned_null: netdev_lower_get_next returns NULL (checked 29 out of 30 times).
7. var_assigned: Assigning: ndev = NULL return value from netdev_lower_get_next.
1623 ndev = (struct net_device *)netdev_lower_get_next(ndev, &lower);
CID 1468509 (#1 of 1): Dereference null return value (NULL_RETURNS)
8. dereference: Dereferencing a pointer that might be NULL ndev when calling is_vlan_dev.
1624 if (is_vlan_dev(ndev)) {
Remove the manual implementation and use netdev_walk_all_lower_dev() to
iterate over the lower devices. While on it remove an obsolete function
parameter comment.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47557

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_ets: don't peek at classes beyond 'nbands'
when the number of DRR classes decreases, the round-robin active list can
contain elements that have already been freed in ets_qdisc_change(). As a
consequence, it's possible to see a NULL dereference crash, caused by the
attempt to call cl->qdisc->ops->peek(cl->qdisc) when cl->qdisc is NULL:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 910 Comm: mausezahn Not tainted 5.16.0-rc1+ #475
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ets_qdisc_dequeue+0x129/0x2c0 [sch_ets]
Code: c5 01 41 39 ad e4 02 00 00 0f 87 18 ff ff ff 49 8b 85 c0 02 00 00 49 39 c4 0f 84 ba 00 00 00 49 8b ad c0 02 00 00 48 8b 7d 10 <48> 8b 47 18 48 8b 40 38 0f ae e8 ff d0 48 89 c3 48 85 c0 0f 84 9d
RSP: 0000:ffffbb36c0b5fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010287
RAX: ffff956678efed30 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff9b938dc9 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff956678efed30 R08: e2f3207fe360129c R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff956678efeac0
R13: ffff956678efe800 R14: ffff956611545000 R15: ffff95667ac8f100
FS: 00007f2aa9120740(0000) GS:ffff95667b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 000000011070c000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
qdisc_peek_dequeued+0x29/0x70 [sch_ets]
tbf_dequeue+0x22/0x260 [sch_tbf]
__qdisc_run+0x7f/0x630
net_tx_action+0x290/0x4c0
__do_softirq+0xee/0x4f8
irq_exit_rcu+0xf4/0x130
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x52/0xc0
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
RIP: 0033:0x7f2aa7fc9ad4
Code: b9 ff ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 83 c4 08 48 89 ee 48 89 df 5b 5d e9 ed fc ff ff 0f 1f 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa <53> 48 83 ec 10 48 8b 05 10 64 33 00 48 8b 00 48 85 c0 0f 85 84 00
RSP: 002b:00007ffe5d33fab8 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: 0000561f72c31460 RCX: 0000561f72c31720
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000561f72c31722 RDI: 0000561f72c31720
RBP: 000000000000002a R08: 00007ffe5d33fa40 R09: 0000000000000014
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000561f7187e380
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000561f72c31460
</TASK>
Modules linked in: sch_ets sch_tbf dummy rfkill iTCO_wdt intel_rapl_msr iTCO_vendor_support intel_rapl_common joydev virtio_balloon lpc_ich i2c_i801 i2c_smbus pcspkr ip_tables xfs libcrc32c crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ahci libahci ghash_clmulni_intel serio_raw libata virtio_blk virtio_console virtio_net net_failover failover sunrpc dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
CR2: 0000000000000018
Ensuring that 'alist' was never zeroed [1] was not sufficient, we need to
remove from the active list those elements that are no more SP nor DRR.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/60d274838bf09777f0371253416e8af71360bc08.1633609148.git.dcaratti@redhat.com/
v3: fix race between ets_qdisc_change() and ets_qdisc_dequeue() delisting
DRR classes beyond 'nbands' in ets_qdisc_change() with the qdisc lock
acquired, thanks to Cong Wang.
v2: when a NULL qdisc is found in the DRR active list, try to dequeue skb
from the next list item.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47552

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-mq: cancel blk-mq dispatch work in both blk_cleanup_queue and disk_release()
For avoiding to slow down queue destroy, we don't call
blk_mq_quiesce_queue() in blk_cleanup_queue(), instead of delaying to
cancel dispatch work in blk_release_queue().
However, this way has caused kernel oops[1], reported by Changhui. The log
shows that scsi_device can be freed before running blk_release_queue(),
which is expected too since scsi_device is released after the scsi disk
is closed and the scsi_device is removed.
Fixes the issue by canceling blk-mq dispatch work in both blk_cleanup_queue()
and disk_release():
1) when disk_release() is run, the disk has been closed, and any sync
dispatch activities have been done, so canceling dispatch work is enough to
quiesce filesystem I/O dispatch activity.
2) in blk_cleanup_queue(), we only focus on passthrough request, and
passthrough request is always explicitly allocated & freed by
its caller, so once queue is frozen, all sync dispatch activity
for passthrough request has been done, then it is enough to just cancel
dispatch work for avoiding any dispatch activity.
[1] kernel panic log
[12622.769416] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000300
[12622.777186] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[12622.782918] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[12622.788649] PGD 0 P4D 0
[12622.791474] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[12622.796138] CPU: 10 PID: 744 Comm: kworker/10:1H Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.15.0+ #1
[12622.804877] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/0H21J3, BIOS 1.5.4 10/002/2015
[12622.813321] Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_run_work_fn
[12622.818572] RIP: 0010:sbitmap_get+0x75/0x190
[12622.823336] Code: 85 80 00 00 00 41 8b 57 08 85 d2 0f 84 b1 00 00 00 45 31 e4 48 63 cd 48 8d 1c 49 48 c1 e3 06 49 03 5f 10 4c 8d 6b 40 83 f0 01 <48> 8b 33 44 89 f2 4c 89 ef 0f b6 c8 e8 fa f3 ff ff 83 f8 ff 75 58
[12622.844290] RSP: 0018:ffffb00a446dbd40 EFLAGS: 00010202
[12622.850120] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000300 RCX: 0000000000000004
[12622.858082] RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: ffffa0b7a2dfe030
[12622.866042] RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffa0b742721334
[12622.874003] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000008 R12: 0000000000000000
[12622.881964] R13: 0000000000000340 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa0b7a2dfe030
[12622.889926] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa0baafb40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[12622.898956] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[12622.905367] CR2: 0000000000000300 CR3: 0000000641210001 CR4: 00000000001706e0
[12622.913328] Call Trace:
[12622.916055] <TASK>
[12622.918394] scsi_mq_get_budget+0x1a/0x110
[12622.922969] __blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched+0x1d4/0x320
[12622.928404] ? pick_next_task_fair+0x39/0x390
[12622.933268] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xf4/0x140
[12622.939194] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x30/0x60
[12622.944829] __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x30/0xa0
[12622.949593] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x3c0
[12622.954059] worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0
[12622.958144] ? rescuer_thread+0x370/0x370
[12622.962616] kthread+0x158/0x180
[12622.966218] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
[12622.970884] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[12622.974875] </TASK>
[12622.977309] Modules linked in: scsi_debug rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs sunrpc dm_multipath intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common dell_wmi_descriptor sb_edac rfkill video x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp dcdbas coretemp kvm_intel kvm mgag200 irqbypass i2c_algo_bit rapl drm_kms_helper ipmi_ssif intel_cstate intel_uncore syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops pcspkr cec mei_me lpc_ich mei ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter drm fuse xfs libcrc32c sr_mod cdrom sd_mod t10_pi sg ixgbe ahci libahci crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel libata megaraid_sas ghash_clmulni_intel tg3 wdat_w
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47507

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: Fix nsfd startup race (again)
Commit bd5ae9288d64 ("nfsd: register pernet ops last, unregister first")
has re-opened rpc_pipefs_event() race against nfsd_net_id registration
(register_pernet_subsys()) which has been fixed by commit bb7ffbf29e76
("nfsd: fix nsfd startup race triggering BUG_ON").
Restore the order of register_pernet_subsys() vs register_cld_notifier().
Add WARN_ON() to prevent a future regression.
Crash info:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000012
CPU: 8 PID: 345 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.4.144-... #1
pc : rpc_pipefs_event+0x54/0x120 [nfsd]
lr : rpc_pipefs_event+0x48/0x120 [nfsd]
Call trace:
rpc_pipefs_event+0x54/0x120 [nfsd]
blocking_notifier_call_chain
rpc_fill_super
get_tree_keyed
rpc_fs_get_tree
vfs_get_tree
do_mount
ksys_mount
__arm64_sys_mount
el0_svc_handler
el0_svc

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47492

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm, thp: bail out early in collapse_file for writeback page
Currently collapse_file does not explicitly check PG_writeback, instead,
page_has_private and try_to_release_page are used to filter writeback
pages. This does not work for xfs with blocksize equal to or larger
than pagesize, because in such case xfs has no page->private.
This makes collapse_file bail out early for writeback page. Otherwise,
xfs end_page_writeback will panic as follows.
page:fffffe00201bcc80 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff0003f88c86a8 index:0x0 pfn:0x84ef32
aops:xfs_address_space_operations [xfs] ino:30000b7 dentry name:"libtest.so"
flags: 0x57fffe0000008027(locked|referenced|uptodate|active|writeback)
raw: 57fffe0000008027 ffff80001b48bc28 ffff80001b48bc28 ffff0003f88c86a8
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff ffff0000c3e9a000
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(((unsigned int) page_ref_count(page) + 127u <= 127u))
page->mem_cgroup:ffff0000c3e9a000
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1212!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
BUG: Bad page state in process khugepaged pfn:84ef32
xfs(E)
page:fffffe00201bcc80 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0 index:0x0 pfn:0x84ef32
libcrc32c(E) rfkill(E) aes_ce_blk(E) crypto_simd(E) ...
CPU: 25 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/25 Kdump: loaded Tainted: ...
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
Call trace:
end_page_writeback+0x1c0/0x214
iomap_finish_page_writeback+0x13c/0x204
iomap_finish_ioend+0xe8/0x19c
iomap_writepage_end_bio+0x38/0x50
bio_endio+0x168/0x1ec
blk_update_request+0x278/0x3f0
blk_mq_end_request+0x34/0x15c
virtblk_request_done+0x38/0x74 [virtio_blk]
blk_done_softirq+0xc4/0x110
__do_softirq+0x128/0x38c
__irq_exit_rcu+0x118/0x150
irq_exit+0x1c/0x30
__handle_domain_irq+0x8c/0xf0
gic_handle_irq+0x84/0x108
el1_irq+0xcc/0x180
arch_cpu_idle+0x18/0x40
default_idle_call+0x4c/0x1a0
cpuidle_idle_call+0x168/0x1e0
do_idle+0xb4/0x104
cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x9c
secondary_start_kernel+0x104/0x180
Code: d4210000 b0006161 910c8021 94013f4d (d4210000)
---[ end trace 4a88c6a074082f8c ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception in interrupt

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47465

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest()
In commit 10d91611f426 ("powerpc/64s: Reimplement book3s idle code in
C") kvm_start_guest() became idle_kvm_start_guest(). The old code
allocated a stack frame on the emergency stack, but didn't use the
frame to store anything, and also didn't store anything in its caller's
frame.
idle_kvm_start_guest() on the other hand is written more like a normal C
function, it creates a frame on entry, and also stores CR/LR into its
callers frame (per the ABI). The problem is that there is no caller
frame on the emergency stack.
The emergency stack for a given CPU is allocated with:
paca_ptrs[i]->emergency_sp = alloc_stack(limit, i) + THREAD_SIZE;
So emergency_sp actually points to the first address above the emergency
stack allocation for a given CPU, we must not store above it without
first decrementing it to create a frame. This is different to the
regular kernel stack, paca->kstack, which is initialised to point at an
initial frame that is ready to use.
idle_kvm_start_guest() stores the backchain, CR and LR all of which
write outside the allocation for the emergency stack. It then creates a
stack frame and saves the non-volatile registers. Unfortunately the
frame it creates is not large enough to fit the non-volatiles, and so
the saving of the non-volatile registers also writes outside the
emergency stack allocation.
The end result is that we corrupt whatever is at 0-24 bytes, and 112-248
bytes above the emergency stack allocation.
In practice this has gone unnoticed because the memory immediately above
the emergency stack happens to be used for other stack allocations,
either another CPUs mc_emergency_sp or an IRQ stack. See the order of
calls to irqstack_early_init() and emergency_stack_init().
The low addresses of another stack are the top of that stack, and so are
only used if that stack is under extreme pressue, which essentially
never happens in practice - and if it did there's a high likelyhood we'd
crash due to that stack overflowing.
Still, we shouldn't be corrupting someone else's stack, and it is purely
luck that we aren't corrupting something else.
To fix it we save CR/LR into the caller's frame using the existing r1 on
entry, we then create a SWITCH_FRAME_SIZE frame (which has space for
pt_regs) on the emergency stack with the backchain pointing to the
existing stack, and then finally we switch to the new frame on the
emergency stack.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47449

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix locking for Tx timestamp tracking flush
Commit 4dd0d5c33c3e ("ice: add lock around Tx timestamp tracker flush")
added a lock around the Tx timestamp tracker flow which is used to
cleanup any left over SKBs and prepare for device removal.
This lock is problematic because it is being held around a call to
ice_clear_phy_tstamp. The clear function takes a mutex to send a PHY
write command to firmware. This could lead to a deadlock if the mutex
actually sleeps, and causes the following warning on a kernel with
preemption debugging enabled:
[ 715.419426] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:573
[ 715.427900] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 3100, name: rmmod
[ 715.435652] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ 715.439591] Preemption disabled at:
[ 715.439594] [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[ 715.446678] CPU: 52 PID: 3100 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W OE 5.15.0-rc4+ #42 bdd7ec3018e725f159ca0d372ce8c2c0e784891c
[ 715.458058] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600STQ/S2600STQ, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0010.010620200716 01/06/2020
[ 715.468483] Call Trace:
[ 715.470940] dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x9a
[ 715.474613] ___might_sleep.cold+0x224/0x26a
[ 715.478895] __mutex_lock+0xb3/0x1440
[ 715.482569] ? stack_depot_save+0x378/0x500
[ 715.486763] ? ice_sq_send_cmd+0x78/0x14c0 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.494979] ? kfree+0xc1/0x520
[ 715.498128] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x12a0/0x12a0
[ 715.502837] ? kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
[ 715.507110] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x10b/0x140
[ 715.511385] ? slab_free_freelist_hook+0xc7/0x220
[ 715.516092] ? kfree+0xc1/0x520
[ 715.519235] ? ice_deinit_lag+0x16c/0x220 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.527359] ? ice_remove+0x1cf/0x6a0 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.535133] ? pci_device_remove+0xab/0x1d0
[ 715.539318] ? __device_release_driver+0x35b/0x690
[ 715.544110] ? driver_detach+0x214/0x2f0
[ 715.548035] ? bus_remove_driver+0x11d/0x2f0
[ 715.552309] ? pci_unregister_driver+0x26/0x250
[ 715.556840] ? ice_module_exit+0xc/0x2f [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.564799] ? __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x2d8/0x4e0
[ 715.570554] ? do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 715.574303] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 715.579529] ? start_flush_work+0x542/0x8f0
[ 715.583719] ? ice_sq_send_cmd+0x78/0x14c0 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.591923] ice_sq_send_cmd+0x78/0x14c0 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.599960] ? wait_for_completion_io+0x250/0x250
[ 715.604662] ? lock_acquire+0x196/0x200
[ 715.608504] ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0xa5/0x160
[ 715.612864] ice_sbq_rw_reg+0x1e6/0x2f0 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.620813] ? ice_reset+0x130/0x130 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.628497] ? __debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x1e8/0x3c0
[ 715.633550] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x130
[ 715.637748] ice_write_phy_reg_e810+0x70/0xf0 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.646220] ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0xa5/0x160
[ 715.650581] ? ice_ptp_release+0x910/0x910 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.658797] ? ice_ptp_release+0x255/0x910 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.667013] ice_clear_phy_tstamp+0x2c/0x110 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.675403] ice_ptp_release+0x408/0x910 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.683440] ice_remove+0x560/0x6a0 [ice 9a7e1ec00971c89ecd3fe0d4dc7da2b3786a421d]
[ 715.691037] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x46/0x73
[ 715.696005] pci_device_remove+0xab/0x1d0
[ 715.700018] __device_release_driver+0x35b/0x690
[ 715.704637] driver_detach+0x214/0x2f0
[ 715.708389] bus_remove_driver+0x11d/0x2f0
[ 715.712489] pci_unregister_driver+0x26/0x250
[ 71
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47395

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mac80211: limit injected vht mcs/nss in ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap
Limit max values for vht mcs and nss in ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap
routine in order to fix the following warning reported by syzbot:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 at include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 at include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:2244
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 10717 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:2244
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000186f3e8 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: 0000000000000618 RBX: ffff88804ef76500 RCX: ffffc900143a5000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff888f478e RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000100
R10: ffffffff888f46f9 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffff8
R13: ffff88804ef7653c R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000004
FS: 00007fbf5718f700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b2de23000 CR3: 000000006a671000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Call Trace:
ieee80211_monitor_select_queue+0xa6/0x250 net/mac80211/iface.c:740
netdev_core_pick_tx+0x169/0x2e0 net/core/dev.c:4089
__dev_queue_xmit+0x6f9/0x3710 net/core/dev.c:4165
__bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2114 [inline]
__bpf_redirect_no_mac net/core/filter.c:2139 [inline]
__bpf_redirect+0x5ba/0xd20 net/core/filter.c:2162
____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2429 [inline]
bpf_clone_redirect+0x2ae/0x420 net/core/filter.c:2401
bpf_prog_eeb6f53a69e5c6a2+0x59/0x234
bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:717 [inline]
__bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:624 [inline]
bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:631 [inline]
bpf_test_run+0x381/0xa30 net/bpf/test_run.c:119
bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0xb84/0x1ee0 net/bpf/test_run.c:663
bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3307 [inline]
__sys_bpf+0x2137/0x5df0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4605
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4691 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x4665f9

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47302

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
igc: Fix use-after-free error during reset
Cleans the next descriptor to watch (next_to_watch) when cleaning the
TX ring.
Failure to do so can cause invalid memory accesses. If igc_poll() runs
while the controller is being reset this can lead to the driver try to
free a skb that was already freed.
Log message:
[ 101.525242] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
[ 101.525251] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 646 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xab/0xf0
[ 101.525259] Modules linked in: sch_etf(E) sch_mqprio(E) rfkill(E) intel_rapl_msr(E) intel_rapl_common(E)
x86_pkg_temp_thermal(E) intel_powerclamp(E) coretemp(E) binfmt_misc(E) kvm_intel(E) kvm(E) irqbypass(E) crc32_pclmul(E)
ghash_clmulni_intel(E) aesni_intel(E) mei_wdt(E) libaes(E) crypto_simd(E) cryptd(E) glue_helper(E) snd_hda_codec_hdmi(E)
rapl(E) intel_cstate(E) snd_hda_intel(E) snd_intel_dspcfg(E) sg(E) soundwire_intel(E) intel_uncore(E) at24(E)
soundwire_generic_allocation(E) iTCO_wdt(E) soundwire_cadence(E) intel_pmc_bxt(E) serio_raw(E) snd_hda_codec(E)
iTCO_vendor_support(E) watchdog(E) snd_hda_core(E) snd_hwdep(E) snd_soc_core(E) snd_compress(E) snd_pcsp(E)
soundwire_bus(E) snd_pcm(E) evdev(E) snd_timer(E) mei_me(E) snd(E) soundcore(E) mei(E) configfs(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E)
autofs4(E) ext4(E) crc32c_generic(E) crc16(E) mbcache(E) jbd2(E) sd_mod(E) t10_pi(E) crc_t10dif(E) crct10dif_generic(E)
i915(E) ahci(E) libahci(E) ehci_pci(E) igb(E) xhci_pci(E) ehci_hcd(E)
[ 101.525303] drm_kms_helper(E) dca(E) xhci_hcd(E) libata(E) crct10dif_pclmul(E) cec(E) crct10dif_common(E) tsn(E) igc(E)
e1000e(E) ptp(E) i2c_i801(E) crc32c_intel(E) psmouse(E) i2c_algo_bit(E) i2c_smbus(E) scsi_mod(E) lpc_ich(E) pps_core(E)
usbcore(E) drm(E) button(E) video(E)
[ 101.525318] CPU: 1 PID: 646 Comm: irq/37-enp7s0-T Tainted: G E 5.10.30-rt37-tsn1-rt-ipipe #ipipe
[ 101.525320] Hardware name: SIEMENS AG SIMATIC IPC427D/A5E31233588, BIOS V17.02.09 03/31/2017
[ 101.525322] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xab/0xf0
[ 101.525325] Code: 05 31 48 44 01 01 e8 f0 c6 42 00 0f 0b c3 80 3d 1f 48 44 01 00 75 90 48 c7 c7 78 a8 f3 a6 c6 05 0f 48
44 01 01 e8 d1 c6 42 00 <0f> 0b c3 80 3d fe 47 44 01 00 0f 85 6d ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 d0 a8 f3
[ 101.525327] RSP: 0018:ffffbdedc0917cb8 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 101.525329] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff98fd6becbf40 RCX: 0000000000000001
[ 101.525330] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffa6f2700c RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[ 101.525332] RBP: ffff98fd6becc14c R08: ffffffffa7463d00 R09: ffffbdedc0917c50
[ 101.525333] R10: ffffffffa74c3578 R11: 0000000000000034 R12: 00000000ffffff00
[ 101.525335] R13: ffff98fd6b0b1000 R14: 0000000000000039 R15: ffff98fd6be35c40
[ 101.525337] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff98fd6e240000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 101.525339] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 101.525341] CR2: 00007f34135a3a70 CR3: 0000000150210003 CR4: 00000000001706e0
[ 101.525343] Call Trace:
[ 101.525346] sock_wfree+0x9c/0xa0
[ 101.525353] unix_destruct_scm+0x7b/0xa0
[ 101.525358] skb_release_head_state+0x40/0x90
[ 101.525362] skb_release_all+0xe/0x30
[ 101.525364] napi_consume_skb+0x57/0x160
[ 101.525367] igc_poll+0xb7/0xc80 [igc]
[ 101.525376] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
[ 101.525381] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0x100
[ 101.525385] net_rx_action+0x14c/0x410
[ 101.525388] __do_softirq+0xe9/0x2f4
[ 101.525391] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xe3/0x110
[ 101.525395] ? irq_finalize_oneshot.part.47+0xe0/0xe0
[ 101.525398] irq_forced_thread_fn+0x6a/0x80
[ 101.525401] irq_thread+0xe8/0x180
[ 101.525403] ? wake_threads_waitq+0x30/0x30
[ 101.525406] ? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xd0/0xd0
[ 101.525408] kthread+0x183/0x1a0
[ 101.525412] ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
[ 101.525415] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47277

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kvm: avoid speculation-based attacks from out-of-range memslot accesses
KVM's mechanism for accessing guest memory translates a guest physical
address (gpa) to a host virtual address using the right-shifted gpa
(also known as gfn) and a struct kvm_memory_slot. The translation is
performed in __gfn_to_hva_memslot using the following formula:
hva = slot->userspace_addr + (gfn - slot->base_gfn) * PAGE_SIZE
It is expected that gfn falls within the boundaries of the guest's
physical memory. However, a guest can access invalid physical addresses
in such a way that the gfn is invalid.
__gfn_to_hva_memslot is called from kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot, which first
retrieves a memslot through __gfn_to_memslot. While __gfn_to_memslot
does check that the gfn falls within the boundaries of the guest's
physical memory or not, a CPU can speculate the result of the check and
continue execution speculatively using an illegal gfn. The speculation
can result in calculating an out-of-bounds hva. If the resulting host
virtual address is used to load another guest physical address, this
is effectively a Spectre gadget consisting of two consecutive reads,
the second of which is data dependent on the first.
Right now it's not clear if there are any cases in which this is
exploitable. One interesting case was reported by the original author
of this patch, and involves visiting guest page tables on x86. Right
now these are not vulnerable because the hva read goes through get_user(),
which contains an LFENCE speculation barrier. However, there are
patches in progress for x86 uaccess.h to mask kernel addresses instead of
using LFENCE; once these land, a guest could use speculation to read
from the VMM's ring 3 address space. Other architectures such as ARM
already use the address masking method, and would be susceptible to
this same kind of data-dependent access gadgets. Therefore, this patch
proactively protects from these attacks by masking out-of-bounds gfns
in __gfn_to_hva_memslot, which blocks speculation of invalid hvas.
Sean Christopherson noted that this patch does not cover
kvm_read_guest_offset_cached. This however is limited to a few bytes
past the end of the cache, and therefore it is unlikely to be useful in
the context of building a chain of data dependent accesses.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47238

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv4: fix memory leak in ip_mc_add1_src
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888101bc4c00 (size 32):
comm "syz-executor527", pid 360, jiffies 4294807421 (age 19.329s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ac 14 14 bb 00 00 02 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000f17c5244>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:558 [inline]
[<00000000f17c5244>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:688 [inline]
[<00000000f17c5244>] ip_mc_add1_src net/ipv4/igmp.c:1971 [inline]
[<00000000f17c5244>] ip_mc_add_src+0x95f/0xdb0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2095
[<000000001cb99709>] ip_mc_source+0x84c/0xea0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2416
[<0000000052cf19ed>] do_ip_setsockopt net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1294 [inline]
[<0000000052cf19ed>] ip_setsockopt+0x114b/0x30c0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1423
[<00000000477edfbc>] raw_setsockopt+0x13d/0x170 net/ipv4/raw.c:857
[<00000000e75ca9bb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x158/0x270 net/socket.c:2117
[<00000000bdb993a8>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2128 [inline]
[<00000000bdb993a8>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2125 [inline]
[<00000000bdb993a8>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xba/0x150 net/socket.c:2125
[<000000006a1ffdbd>] do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
[<00000000b11467c4>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
In commit 24803f38a5c0 ("igmp: do not remove igmp souce list info when set
link down"), the ip_mc_clear_src() in ip_mc_destroy_dev() was removed,
because it was also called in igmpv3_clear_delrec().
Rough callgraph:
inetdev_destroy
-> ip_mc_destroy_dev
-> igmpv3_clear_delrec
-> ip_mc_clear_src
-> RCU_INIT_POINTER(dev->ip_ptr, NULL)
However, ip_mc_clear_src() called in igmpv3_clear_delrec() doesn't
release in_dev->mc_list->sources. And RCU_INIT_POINTER() assigns the
NULL to dev->ip_ptr. As a result, in_dev cannot be obtained through
inetdev_by_index() and then in_dev->mc_list->sources cannot be released
by ip_mc_del1_src() in the sock_close. Rough call sequence goes like:
sock_close
-> __sock_release
-> inet_release
-> ip_mc_drop_socket
-> inetdev_by_index
-> ip_mc_leave_src
-> ip_mc_del_src
-> ip_mc_del1_src
So we still need to call ip_mc_clear_src() in ip_mc_destroy_dev() to free
in_dev->mc_list->sources.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47230

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Immediately reset the MMU context when the SMM flag is cleared
Immediately reset the MMU context when the vCPU's SMM flag is cleared so
that the SMM flag in the MMU role is always synchronized with the vCPU's
flag. If RSM fails (which isn't correctly emulated), KVM will bail
without calling post_leave_smm() and leave the MMU in a bad state.
The bad MMU role can lead to a NULL pointer dereference when grabbing a
shadow page's rmap for a page fault as the initial lookups for the gfn
will happen with the vCPU's SMM flag (=0), whereas the rmap lookup will
use the shadow page's SMM flag, which comes from the MMU (=1). SMM has
an entirely different set of memslots, and so the initial lookup can find
a memslot (SMM=0) and then explode on the rmap memslot lookup (SMM=1).
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 1 PID: 8410 Comm: syz-executor382 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__gfn_to_rmap arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:935 [inline]
RIP: 0010:gfn_to_rmap+0x2b0/0x4d0 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:947
Code: <42> 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 ff e8 f1 79 a9 00 4c 89 fb 4d 8b 37 44
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000ffef98 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888015b9f414 RCX: ffff888019669c40
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffff811d9cdb R09: ffffed10065a6002
R10: ffffed10065a6002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 000000000124b300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000028e31000 CR4: 00000000001526e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
rmap_add arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:965 [inline]
mmu_set_spte+0x862/0xe60 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:2604
__direct_map arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:2862 [inline]
direct_page_fault+0x1f74/0x2b70 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:3769
kvm_mmu_do_page_fault arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h:124 [inline]
kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x199/0x1440 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:5065
vmx_handle_exit+0x26/0x160 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6122
vcpu_enter_guest+0x3bdd/0x9630 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9428
vcpu_run+0x416/0xc20 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9494
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x4e8/0xa40 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9722
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x70f/0xbb0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3460
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:1069 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfb/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:1055
do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x440ce9

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47227

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/fpu: Prevent state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig()
The non-compacted slowpath uses __copy_from_user() and copies the entire
user buffer into the kernel buffer, verbatim. This means that the kernel
buffer may now contain entirely invalid state on which XRSTOR will #GP.
validate_user_xstate_header() can detect some of that corruption, but that
leaves the onus on callers to clear the buffer.
Prior to XSAVES support, it was possible just to reinitialize the buffer,
completely, but with supervisor states that is not longer possible as the
buffer clearing code split got it backwards. Fixing that is possible but
not corrupting the state in the first place is more robust.
Avoid corruption of the kernel XSAVE buffer by using copy_user_to_xstate()
which validates the XSAVE header contents before copying the actual states
to the kernel. copy_user_to_xstate() was previously only called for
compacted-format kernel buffers, but it works for both compacted and
non-compacted forms.
Using it for the non-compacted form is slower because of multiple
__copy_from_user() operations, but that cost is less important than robust
code in an already slow path.
[ Changelog polished by Dave Hansen ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47219

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: scsi_debug: Fix out-of-bound read in resp_report_tgtpgs()
The following issue was observed running syzkaller:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:377 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0 lib/scatterlist.c:831
Read of size 2132 at addr ffff8880aea95dc8 by task syz-executor.0/9815
CPU: 0 PID: 9815 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.202-00874-gfc0fe04215a9 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xe4/0x14a lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description+0x73/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:253
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:352 [inline]
kasan_report+0x272/0x370 mm/kasan/report.c:410
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:302
memcpy include/linux/string.h:377 [inline]
sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0 lib/scatterlist.c:831
fill_from_dev_buffer+0x14f/0x340 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:1021
resp_report_tgtpgs+0x5aa/0x770 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:1772
schedule_resp+0x464/0x12f0 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:4429
scsi_debug_queuecommand+0x467/0x1390 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:5835
scsi_dispatch_cmd+0x3fc/0x9b0 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1896
scsi_request_fn+0x1042/0x1810 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:2034
__blk_run_queue_uncond block/blk-core.c:464 [inline]
__blk_run_queue+0x1a4/0x380 block/blk-core.c:484
blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x1c2/0x2d0 block/blk-exec.c:78
sg_common_write.isra.19+0xd74/0x1dc0 drivers/scsi/sg.c:847
sg_write.part.23+0x6e0/0xd00 drivers/scsi/sg.c:716
sg_write+0x64/0xa0 drivers/scsi/sg.c:622
__vfs_write+0xed/0x690 fs/read_write.c:485
kill_bdev:block_device:00000000e138492c
vfs_write+0x184/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:549
ksys_write+0x107/0x240 fs/read_write.c:599
do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x560 arch/x86/entry/common.c:293
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
We get 'alen' from command its type is int. If userspace passes a large
length we will get a negative 'alen'.
Switch n, alen, and rlen to u32.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47103

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet: fully convert sk->sk_rx_dst to RCU rules
syzbot reported various issues around early demux,
one being included in this changelog [1]
sk->sk_rx_dst is using RCU protection without clearly
documenting it.
And following sequences in tcp_v4_do_rcv()/tcp_v6_do_rcv()
are not following standard RCU rules.
[a] dst_release(dst);
[b] sk->sk_rx_dst = NULL;
They look wrong because a delete operation of RCU protected
pointer is supposed to clear the pointer before
the call_rcu()/synchronize_rcu() guarding actual memory freeing.
In some cases indeed, dst could be freed before [b] is done.
We could cheat by clearing sk_rx_dst before calling
dst_release(), but this seems the right time to stick
to standard RCU annotations and debugging facilities.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dst_check include/net/dst.h:470 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_v4_early_demux+0x95b/0x960 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1792
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88807f1cb73a by task syz-executor.5/9204
CPU: 0 PID: 9204 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x320 mm/kasan/report.c:247
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:433 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:450
dst_check include/net/dst.h:470 [inline]
tcp_v4_early_demux+0x95b/0x960 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1792
ip_rcv_finish_core.constprop.0+0x15de/0x1e80 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:340
ip_list_rcv_finish.constprop.0+0x1b2/0x6e0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:583
ip_sublist_rcv net/ipv4/ip_input.c:609 [inline]
ip_list_rcv+0x34e/0x490 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:644
__netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5508 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x549/0x8e0 net/core/dev.c:5556
__netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5608 [inline]
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x75e/0xd80 net/core/dev.c:5699
gro_normal_list net/core/dev.c:5853 [inline]
gro_normal_list net/core/dev.c:5849 [inline]
napi_complete_done+0x1f1/0x880 net/core/dev.c:6590
virtqueue_napi_complete drivers/net/virtio_net.c:339 [inline]
virtnet_poll+0xca2/0x11b0 drivers/net/virtio_net.c:1557
__napi_poll+0xaf/0x440 net/core/dev.c:7023
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:7090 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x801/0xb40 net/core/dev.c:7177
__do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:432 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0x123/0x180 kernel/softirq.c:637
irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:649
common_interrupt+0x52/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:240
asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:629
RIP: 0033:0x7f5e972bfd57
Code: 39 d1 73 14 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 8b 50 f8 48 83 e8 08 48 39 ca 77 f3 48 39 c3 73 3e 48 89 13 48 8b 50 f8 48 89 38 49 8b 0e <48> 8b 3e 48 83 c3 08 48 83 c6 08 eb bc 48 39 d1 72 9e 48 39 d0 73
RSP: 002b:00007fff8a413210 EFLAGS: 00000283
RAX: 00007f5e97108990 RBX: 00007f5e97108338 RCX: ffffffff81d3aa45
RDX: ffffffff81d3aa45 RSI: 00007f5e97108340 RDI: ffffffff81d3aa45
RBP: 00007f5e97107eb8 R08: 00007f5e97108d88 R09: 0000000093c2e8d9
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00007f5e97107eb0
R13: 00007f5e97108338 R14: 00007f5e97107ea8 R15: 0000000000000019
</TASK>
Allocated by task 13:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:46 [inline]
set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:434 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x90/0xc0 mm/kasan/common.c:467
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:259 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:519 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3234 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3242 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x202/0x3a0 mm/slub.c:3247
dst_alloc+0x146/0x1f0 net/core/dst.c:92
rt_dst_alloc+0x73/0x430 net/ipv4/route.c:1613
ip_route_input_slow+0x1817/0x3a20 net/ipv4/route.c:234
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47092

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: VMX: Always clear vmx->fail on emulation_required
Revert a relatively recent change that set vmx->fail if the vCPU is in L2
and emulation_required is true, as that behavior is completely bogus.
Setting vmx->fail and synthesizing a VM-Exit is contradictory and wrong:
(a) it's impossible to have both a VM-Fail and VM-Exit
(b) vmcs.EXIT_REASON is not modified on VM-Fail
(c) emulation_required refers to guest state and guest state checks are
always VM-Exits, not VM-Fails.
For KVM specifically, emulation_required is handled before nested exits
in __vmx_handle_exit(), thus setting vmx->fail has no immediate effect,
i.e. KVM calls into handle_invalid_guest_state() and vmx->fail is ignored.
Setting vmx->fail can ultimately result in a WARN in nested_vmx_vmexit()
firing when tearing down the VM as KVM never expects vmx->fail to be set
when L2 is active, KVM always reflects those errors into L1.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 21158 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4548
nested_vmx_vmexit+0x16bd/0x17e0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4547
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 21158 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:nested_vmx_vmexit+0x16bd/0x17e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4547
Code: <0f> 0b e9 2e f8 ff ff e8 57 b3 5d 00 0f 0b e9 00 f1 ff ff 89 e9 80
Call Trace:
vmx_leave_nested arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:6220 [inline]
nested_vmx_free_vcpu+0x83/0xc0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:330
vmx_free_vcpu+0x11f/0x2a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6799
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x6b/0x240 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10989
kvm_vcpu_destroy+0x29/0x90 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:441
kvm_free_vcpus arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11426 [inline]
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x3ef/0x6b0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11545
kvm_destroy_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1189 [inline]
kvm_put_kvm+0x751/0xe40 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1220
kvm_vcpu_release+0x53/0x60 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3489
__fput+0x3fc/0x870 fs/file_table.c:280
task_work_run+0x146/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:164
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:32 [inline]
do_exit+0x705/0x24f0 kernel/exit.c:832
do_group_exit+0x168/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:929
get_signal+0x1740/0x2120 kernel/signal.c:2852
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x9c/0x730 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:868
handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x191/0x220 kernel/entry/common.c:207
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:289 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2e/0x70 kernel/entry/common.c:300
do_syscall_64+0x53/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47078

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Clear all QP fields if creation failed
rxe_qp_do_cleanup() relies on valid pointer values in QP for the properly
created ones, but in case rxe_qp_from_init() failed it was filled with
garbage and caused tot the following error.
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 12560 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x1d1/0x1e0 lib/refcount.c:28
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 12560 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.12.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x1d1/0x1e0 lib/refcount.c:28
Code: e9 db fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 2c c2 ea fd e9 8a fe ff ff e8 72 6a a7 fd 48 c7 c7 e0 b2 c1 89 c6 05 dc 3a e6 09 01 e8 ee 74 fb 04 <0f> 0b e9 af fe ff ff 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 41 56 41 55 41 54 55
RSP: 0018:ffffc900097ceba8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff815bb075 RDI: fffff520012f9d67
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff815b4eae R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880322a4800
R13: ffff8880322a4940 R14: ffff888033044e00 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f6eb2be3700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fdbe5d41000 CR3: 000000001d181000 CR4: 00000000001506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
__refcount_sub_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:283 [inline]
__refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:315 [inline]
refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:333 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:64 [inline]
rxe_qp_do_cleanup+0x96f/0xaf0 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:805
execute_in_process_context+0x37/0x150 kernel/workqueue.c:3327
rxe_elem_release+0x9f/0x180 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_pool.c:391
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline]
rxe_create_qp+0x2cd/0x310 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:425
_ib_create_qp drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h:331 [inline]
ib_create_named_qp+0x2ad/0x1370 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1231
ib_create_qp include/rdma/ib_verbs.h:3644 [inline]
create_mad_qp+0x177/0x2d0 drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c:2920
ib_mad_port_open drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c:3001 [inline]
ib_mad_init_device+0xd6f/0x1400 drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c:3092
add_client_context+0x405/0x5e0 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:717
enable_device_and_get+0x1cd/0x3b0 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1331
ib_register_device drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1413 [inline]
ib_register_device+0x7c7/0xa50 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:1365
rxe_register_device+0x3d5/0x4a0 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:1147
rxe_add+0x12fe/0x16d0 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe.c:247
rxe_net_add+0x8c/0xe0 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_net.c:503
rxe_newlink drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe.c:269 [inline]
rxe_newlink+0xb7/0xe0 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe.c:250
nldev_newlink+0x30e/0x550 drivers/infiniband/core/nldev.c:1555
rdma_nl_rcv_msg+0x36d/0x690 drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:195
rdma_nl_rcv_skb drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:239 [inline]
rdma_nl_rcv+0x2ee/0x430 drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:259
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47041

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-tcp: fix incorrect locking in state_change sk callback
We are not changing anything in the TCP connection state so
we should not take a write_lock but rather a read lock.
This caused a deadlock when running nvmet-tcp and nvme-tcp
on the same system, where state_change callbacks on the
host and on the controller side have causal relationship
and made lockdep report on this with blktests:
================================
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
5.12.0-rc3 #1 Tainted: G I
--------------------------------
inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-R} usage.
nvme/1324 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
ffff888363151000 (clock-AF_INET){++-?}-{2:2}, at: nvme_tcp_state_change+0x21/0x150 [nvme_tcp]
{IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:
__lock_acquire+0x79b/0x18d0
lock_acquire+0x1ca/0x480
_raw_write_lock_bh+0x39/0x80
nvmet_tcp_state_change+0x21/0x170 [nvmet_tcp]
tcp_fin+0x2a8/0x780
tcp_data_queue+0xf94/0x1f20
tcp_rcv_established+0x6ba/0x1f00
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x502/0x760
tcp_v4_rcv+0x257e/0x3430
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x69/0x6a0
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x1e2/0x2f0
ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x420
ip_rcv+0x4fb/0x6b0
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x162/0x1b0
process_backlog+0x1ff/0x770
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa9/0x5c0
net_rx_action+0x7b3/0xb30
__do_softirq+0x1f0/0x940
do_softirq+0xa1/0xd0
__local_bh_enable_ip+0xd8/0x100
ip_finish_output2+0x6b7/0x18a0
__ip_queue_xmit+0x706/0x1aa0
__tcp_transmit_skb+0x2068/0x2e20
tcp_write_xmit+0xc9e/0x2bb0
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0x92/0x310
inet_shutdown+0x158/0x300
__nvme_tcp_stop_queue+0x36/0x270 [nvme_tcp]
nvme_tcp_stop_queue+0x87/0xb0 [nvme_tcp]
nvme_tcp_teardown_admin_queue+0x69/0xe0 [nvme_tcp]
nvme_do_delete_ctrl+0x100/0x10c [nvme_core]
nvme_sysfs_delete.cold+0x8/0xd [nvme_core]
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2c7/0x460
new_sync_write+0x36c/0x610
vfs_write+0x5c0/0x870
ksys_write+0xf9/0x1d0
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
irq event stamp: 10687
hardirqs last enabled at (10687): [<ffffffff9ec376bd>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x40
hardirqs last disabled at (10686): [<ffffffff9ec374d8>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x68/0x90
softirqs last enabled at (10684): [<ffffffff9f000608>] __do_softirq+0x608/0x940
softirqs last disabled at (10649): [<ffffffff9cdedd31>] do_softirq+0xa1/0xd0
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(clock-AF_INET);
<Interrupt>
lock(clock-AF_INET);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by nvme/1324:
#0: ffff8884a01fe470 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0xf9/0x1d0
#1: ffff8886e435c090 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x216/0x460
#2: ffff888104d90c38 (kn->active#255){++++}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_remove_self+0x22d/0x330
#3: ffff8884634538d0 (&queue->queue_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: nvme_tcp_stop_queue+0x52/0xb0 [nvme_tcp]
#4: ffff888363150d30 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: inet_shutdown+0x59/0x300
stack backtrace:
CPU: 26 PID: 1324 Comm: nvme Tainted: G I 5.12.0-rc3 #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R640/06NR82, BIOS 2.10.0 11/12/2020
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x93/0xc2
mark_lock_irq.cold+0x2c/0xb3
? verify_lock_unused+0x390/0x390
? stack_trace_consume_entry+0x160/0x160
? lock_downgrade+0x100/0x100
? save_trace+0x88/0x5e0
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x40
mark_lock+0x530/0x1470
? mark_lock_irq+0x1d10/0x1d10
? enqueue_timer+0x660/0x660
mark_usage+0x215/0x2a0
__lock_acquire+0x79b/0x18d0
? tcp_schedule_loss_probe.part.0+0x38c/0x520
lock_acquire+0x1ca/0x480
? nvme_tcp_state_change+0x21/0x150 [nvme_tcp]
? rcu_read_unlock+0x40/0x40
? tcp_mtu_probe+0x1ae0/0x1ae0
? kmalloc_reserve+0xa0/0xa0
? sysfs_file_ops+0x170/0x170
_raw_read_lock+0x3d/0xa0
? nvme_tcp_state_change+0x21/0x150 [nvme_tcp]
nvme_tcp_state_change+0x21/0x150 [nvme_tcp]
? sysfs_file_ops
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47038

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: avoid deadlock between hci_dev->lock and socket lock
Commit eab2404ba798 ("Bluetooth: Add BT_PHY socket option") added a
dependency between socket lock and hci_dev->lock that could lead to
deadlock.
It turns out that hci_conn_get_phy() is not in any way relying on hdev
being immutable during the runtime of this function, neither does it even
look at any of the members of hdev, and as such there is no need to hold
that lock.
This fixes the lockdep splat below:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.12.0-rc1-00026-g73d464503354 #10 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
bluetoothd/1118 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8f078383c078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth]
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8f07e831d920 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: l2cap_sock_getsockopt+0x8b/0x610
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #3 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP){+.+.}-{0:0}:
lock_sock_nested+0x72/0xa0
l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0x18/0x70 [bluetooth]
l2cap_config_rsp+0x27a/0x520 [bluetooth]
l2cap_sig_channel+0x658/0x1330 [bluetooth]
l2cap_recv_frame+0x1ba/0x310 [bluetooth]
hci_rx_work+0x1cc/0x640 [bluetooth]
process_one_work+0x244/0x5f0
worker_thread+0x3c/0x380
kthread+0x13e/0x160
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
-> #2 (&chan->lock#2/1){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0xa3/0xa10
l2cap_chan_connect+0x33a/0x940 [bluetooth]
l2cap_sock_connect+0x141/0x2a0 [bluetooth]
__sys_connect+0x9b/0xc0
__x64_sys_connect+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
-> #1 (&conn->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0xa3/0xa10
l2cap_chan_connect+0x322/0x940 [bluetooth]
l2cap_sock_connect+0x141/0x2a0 [bluetooth]
__sys_connect+0x9b/0xc0
__x64_sys_connect+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
-> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__lock_acquire+0x147a/0x1a50
lock_acquire+0x277/0x3d0
__mutex_lock+0xa3/0xa10
hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth]
l2cap_sock_getsockopt+0x5a9/0x610 [bluetooth]
__sys_getsockopt+0xcc/0x200
__x64_sys_getsockopt+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
&hdev->lock --> &chan->lock#2/1 --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP);
lock(&chan->lock#2/1);
lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP);
lock(&hdev->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by bluetoothd/1118:
#0: ffff8f07e831d920 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: l2cap_sock_getsockopt+0x8b/0x610 [bluetooth]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 PID: 1118 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted 5.12.0-rc1-00026-g73d464503354 #10
Hardware name: LENOVO 20K5S22R00/20K5S22R00, BIOS R0IET38W (1.16 ) 05/31/2017
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x7f/0xa1
check_noncircular+0x105/0x120
? __lock_acquire+0x147a/0x1a50
__lock_acquire+0x147a/0x1a50
lock_acquire+0x277/0x3d0
? hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth]
? __lock_acquire+0x2e1/0x1a50
? lock_is_held_type+0xb4/0x120
? hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth]
__mutex_lock+0xa3/0xa10
? hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth]
? lock_acquire+0x277/0x3d0
? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
? hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth]
hci_conn_get_phy+0x
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47036

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udp: skip L4 aggregation for UDP tunnel packets
If NETIF_F_GRO_FRAGLIST or NETIF_F_GRO_UDP_FWD are enabled, and there
are UDP tunnels available in the system, udp_gro_receive() could end-up
doing L4 aggregation (either SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 or SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST) at
the outer UDP tunnel level for packets effectively carrying and UDP
tunnel header.
That could cause inner protocol corruption. If e.g. the relevant
packets carry a vxlan header, different vxlan ids will be ignored/
aggregated to the same GSO packet. Inner headers will be ignored, too,
so that e.g. TCP over vxlan push packets will be held in the GRO
engine till the next flush, etc.
Just skip the SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 and SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST code path if the
current packet could land in a UDP tunnel, and let udp_gro_receive()
do GRO via udp_sk(sk)->gro_receive.
The check implemented in this patch is broader than what is strictly
needed, as the existing UDP tunnel could be e.g. configured on top of
a different device: we could end-up skipping GRO at-all for some packets.
Anyhow, that is a very thin corner case and covering it will add quite
a bit of complexity.
v1 -> v2:
- hopefully clarify the commit message

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47011

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: memcontrol: slab: fix obtain a reference to a freeing memcg
Patch series "Use obj_cgroup APIs to charge kmem pages", v5.
Since Roman's series "The new cgroup slab memory controller" applied.
All slab objects are charged with the new APIs of obj_cgroup. The new
APIs introduce a struct obj_cgroup to charge slab objects. It prevents
long-living objects from pinning the original memory cgroup in the
memory. But there are still some corner objects (e.g. allocations
larger than order-1 page on SLUB) which are not charged with the new
APIs. Those objects (include the pages which are allocated from buddy
allocator directly) are charged as kmem pages which still hold a
reference to the memory cgroup.
E.g. We know that the kernel stack is charged as kmem pages because the
size of the kernel stack can be greater than 2 pages (e.g. 16KB on
x86_64 or arm64). If we create a thread (suppose the thread stack is
charged to memory cgroup A) and then move it from memory cgroup A to
memory cgroup B. Because the kernel stack of the thread hold a
reference to the memory cgroup A. The thread can pin the memory cgroup
A in the memory even if we remove the cgroup A. If we want to see this
scenario by using the following script. We can see that the system has
added 500 dying cgroups (This is not a real world issue, just a script
to show that the large kmallocs are charged as kmem pages which can pin
the memory cgroup in the memory).
#!/bin/bash
cat /proc/cgroups | grep memory
cd /sys/fs/cgroup/memory
echo 1 > memory.move_charge_at_immigrate
for i in range{1..500}
do
mkdir kmem_test
echo $$ > kmem_test/cgroup.procs
sleep 3600 &
echo $$ > cgroup.procs
echo `cat kmem_test/cgroup.procs` > cgroup.procs
rmdir kmem_test
done
cat /proc/cgroups | grep memory
This patchset aims to make those kmem pages to drop the reference to
memory cgroup by using the APIs of obj_cgroup. Finally, we can see that
the number of the dying cgroups will not increase if we run the above test
script.
This patch (of 7):
The rcu_read_lock/unlock only can guarantee that the memcg will not be
freed, but it cannot guarantee the success of css_get (which is in the
refill_stock when cached memcg changed) to memcg.
rcu_read_lock()
memcg = obj_cgroup_memcg(old)
__memcg_kmem_uncharge(memcg)
refill_stock(memcg)
if (stock->cached != memcg)
// css_get can change the ref counter from 0 back to 1.
css_get(&memcg->css)
rcu_read_unlock()
This fix is very like the commit:
eefbfa7fd678 ("mm: memcg/slab: fix use after free in obj_cgroup_charge")
Fix this by holding a reference to the memcg which is passed to the
__memcg_kmem_uncharge() before calling __memcg_kmem_uncharge().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-46999

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: do asoc update earlier in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a
There's a panic that occurs in a few of envs, the call trace is as below:
[] general protection fault, ... 0x29acd70f1000a: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[] RIP: 0010:sctp_ulpevent_notify_peer_addr_change+0x4b/0x1fa [sctp]
[] sctp_assoc_control_transport+0x1b9/0x210 [sctp]
[] sctp_do_8_2_transport_strike.isra.16+0x15c/0x220 [sctp]
[] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.21+0x1231/0x1a10 [sctp]
[] sctp_do_sm+0xc3/0x2a0 [sctp]
[] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x81/0xf0 [sctp]
This is caused by a transport use-after-free issue. When processing a
duplicate COOKIE-ECHO chunk in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a(), both COOKIE-ACK
and SHUTDOWN chunks are allocated with the transort from the new asoc.
However, later in the sideeffect machine, the old asoc is used to send
them out and old asoc's shutdown_last_sent_to is set to the transport
that SHUTDOWN chunk attached to in sctp_cmd_setup_t2(), which actually
belongs to the new asoc. After the new_asoc is freed and the old asoc
T2 timeout, the old asoc's shutdown_last_sent_to that is already freed
would be accessed in sctp_sf_t2_timer_expire().
Thanks Alexander and Jere for helping dig into this issue.
To fix it, this patch is to do the asoc update first, then allocate
the COOKIE-ACK and SHUTDOWN chunks with the 'updated' old asoc. This
would make more sense, as a chunk from an asoc shouldn't be sent out
with another asoc. We had fixed quite a few issues caused by this.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-46976

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: Fix crash in auto_retire
The retire logic uses the 2 lower bits of the pointer to the retire
function to store flags. However, the auto_retire function is not
guaranteed to be aligned to a multiple of 4, which causes crashes as
we jump to the wrong address, for example like this:
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804300Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876901] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804310Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876906] CPU: 7 PID: 146 Comm: kworker/u16:6 Tainted: G U 5.4.105-13595-g3cd84167b2df #1
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804311Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876907] Hardware name: Google Volteer2/Volteer2, BIOS Google_Volteer2.13672.76.0 02/22/2021
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804312Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876911] Workqueue: events_unbound active_work
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804313Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876914] RIP: 0010:auto_retire+0x1/0x20
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804314Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876916] Code: e8 01 f2 ff ff eb 02 31 db 48 89 d8 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 f0 ff 87 c8 00 00 00 0f 88 ab 47 4a 00 31 c0 5d c3 0f <1f> 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 f0 ff 8f c8 00 00 00 0f 88 9a 47 4a 00 74
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804319Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876918] RSP: 0018:ffff9b4d809fbe38 EFLAGS: 00010286
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804320Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876919] RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: ffff927915079600 RCX: 0000000000000007
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804320Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876921] RDX: ffff9b4d809fbe40 RSI: 0000000000000286 RDI: ffff927915079600
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804321Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876922] RBP: ffff9b4d809fbe68 R08: 8080808080808080 R09: fefefefefefefeff
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804321Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876924] R10: 0000000000000010 R11: ffffffff92e44bd8 R12: ffff9279150796a0
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804322Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876925] R13: ffff92791c368180 R14: ffff927915079640 R15: 000000001c867605
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804323Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876926] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92791ffc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804323Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876928] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804324Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876929] CR2: 0000239514955000 CR3: 00000007f82da001 CR4: 0000000000760ee0
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804325Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876930] PKRU: 55555554
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804325Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876931] Call Trace:
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804326Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876935] __active_retire+0x77/0xcf
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804326Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876939] process_one_work+0x1da/0x394
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804327Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876941] worker_thread+0x216/0x375
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804327Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876944] kthread+0x147/0x156
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804335Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876946] ? pr_cont_work+0x58/0x58
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804335Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876948] ? kthread_blkcg+0x2e/0x2e
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804336Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876950] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804336Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876952] Modules linked in: cdc_mbim cdc_ncm cdc_wdm xt_cgroup rfcomm cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg xt_MASQUERADE uinput snd_soc_rt5682_sdw snd_soc_rt5682 snd_soc_max98373_sdw snd_soc_max98373 snd_soc_rl6231 regmap_sdw snd_soc_sof_sdw snd_soc_hdac_hdmi snd_soc_dmic snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_sof_pci snd_sof_intel_hda_common intel_ipu6_psys snd_sof_xtensa_dsp soundwire_intel soundwire_generic_allocation soundwire_cadence snd_sof_intel_hda snd_sof snd_soc_hdac_hda snd_soc_acpi_intel_match snd_soc_acpi snd_hda_ext_core soundwire_bus snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core intel_ipu6_isys videobuf2_dma_contig videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common videobuf2_memops mei_hdcp intel_ipu6 ov2740 ov8856 at24 sx9310 dw9768 v4l2_fwnode cros_ec_typec intel_pmc_mux roles acpi_als typec fuse iio_trig_sysfs cros_ec_light_prox cros_ec_lid_angle cros_ec_sensors cros
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-46961

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
irqchip/gic-v3: Do not enable irqs when handling spurious interrups
We triggered the following error while running our 4.19 kernel
with the pseudo-NMI patches backported to it:
[ 14.816231] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 14.816231] kernel BUG at irq.c:99!
[ 14.816232] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
[ 14.816232] Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x(____ptrval____))
[ 14.816233] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G O 4.19.95.aarch64 #14
[ 14.816233] Hardware name: evb (DT)
[ 14.816234] pstate: 80400085 (Nzcv daIf +PAN -UAO)
[ 14.816234] pc : asm_nmi_enter+0x94/0x98
[ 14.816235] lr : asm_nmi_enter+0x18/0x98
[ 14.816235] sp : ffff000008003c50
[ 14.816235] pmr_save: 00000070
[ 14.816237] x29: ffff000008003c50 x28: ffff0000095f56c0
[ 14.816238] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff000008004000
[ 14.816239] x25: 00000000015e0000 x24: ffff8008fb916000
[ 14.816240] x23: 0000000020400005 x22: ffff0000080817cc
[ 14.816241] x21: ffff000008003da0 x20: 0000000000000060
[ 14.816242] x19: 00000000000003ff x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 14.816243] x17: 0000000000000008 x16: 003d090000000000
[ 14.816244] x15: ffff0000095ea6c8 x14: ffff8008fff5ab40
[ 14.816244] x13: ffff8008fff58b9d x12: 0000000000000000
[ 14.816245] x11: ffff000008c8a200 x10: 000000008e31fca5
[ 14.816246] x9 : ffff000008c8a208 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 14.816247] x7 : 0000000000000004 x6 : ffff8008fff58b9e
[ 14.816248] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000080000000
[ 14.816249] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000080000000
[ 14.816250] x1 : 0000000000120000 x0 : ffff0000095f56c0
[ 14.816251] Call trace:
[ 14.816251] asm_nmi_enter+0x94/0x98
[ 14.816251] el1_irq+0x8c/0x180 (IRQ C)
[ 14.816252] gic_handle_irq+0xbc/0x2e4
[ 14.816252] el1_irq+0xcc/0x180 (IRQ B)
[ 14.816253] arch_timer_handler_virt+0x38/0x58
[ 14.816253] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x90/0x240
[ 14.816253] generic_handle_irq+0x34/0x50
[ 14.816254] __handle_domain_irq+0x68/0xc0
[ 14.816254] gic_handle_irq+0xf8/0x2e4
[ 14.816255] el1_irq+0xcc/0x180 (IRQ A)
[ 14.816255] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1c8
[ 14.816255] default_idle_call+0x24/0x44
[ 14.816256] do_idle+0x1d0/0x2c8
[ 14.816256] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 14.816256] rest_init+0xb8/0xc8
[ 14.816257] start_kernel+0x4c8/0x4f4
[ 14.816257] Code: 940587f1 d5384100 b9401001 36a7fd01 (d4210000)
[ 14.816258] Modules linked in: start_dp(O) smeth(O)
[ 15.103092] ---[ end trace 701753956cb14aa8 ]---
[ 15.103093] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 15.103099] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 15.103100] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 15.103100] CPU features: 0x36,a2400218
[ 15.103100] Memory Limit: none
which is cause by a 'BUG_ON(in_nmi())' in nmi_enter().
From the call trace, we can find three interrupts (noted A, B, C above):
interrupt (A) is preempted by (B), which is further interrupted by (C).
Subsequent investigations show that (B) results in nmi_enter() being
called, but that it actually is a spurious interrupt. Furthermore,
interrupts are reenabled in the context of (B), and (C) fires with
NMI priority. We end-up with a nested NMI situation, something
we definitely do not want to (and cannot) handle.
The bug here is that spurious interrupts should never result in any
state change, and we should just return to the interrupted context.
Moving the handling of spurious interrupts as early as possible in
the GICv3 handler fixes this issue.
[maz: rewrote commit message, corrected Fixes: tag]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-46925

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix kernel panic caused by race of smc_sock
A crash occurs when smc_cdc_tx_handler() tries to access smc_sock
but smc_release() has already freed it.
[ 4570.695099] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000002eae9e88
[ 4570.696048] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ 4570.696728] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ 4570.697401] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 4570.697716] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 4570.698228] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc4+ #111
[ 4570.699013] Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 8c24b4c 04/0
[ 4570.699933] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock+0x1a/0x30
<...>
[ 4570.711446] Call Trace:
[ 4570.711746] <IRQ>
[ 4570.711992] smc_cdc_tx_handler+0x41/0xc0
[ 4570.712470] smc_wr_tx_tasklet_fn+0x213/0x560
[ 4570.712981] ? smc_cdc_tx_dismisser+0x10/0x10
[ 4570.713489] tasklet_action_common.isra.17+0x66/0x140
[ 4570.714083] __do_softirq+0x123/0x2f4
[ 4570.714521] irq_exit_rcu+0xc4/0xf0
[ 4570.714934] common_interrupt+0xba/0xe0
Though smc_cdc_tx_handler() checked the existence of smc connection,
smc_release() may have already dismissed and released the smc socket
before smc_cdc_tx_handler() further visits it.
smc_cdc_tx_handler() |smc_release()
if (!conn) |
|
|smc_cdc_tx_dismiss_slots()
| smc_cdc_tx_dismisser()
|
|sock_put(&smc->sk) <- last sock_put,
| smc_sock freed
bh_lock_sock(&smc->sk) (panic) |
To make sure we won't receive any CDC messages after we free the
smc_sock, add a refcount on the smc_connection for inflight CDC
message(posted to the QP but haven't received related CQE), and
don't release the smc_connection until all the inflight CDC messages
haven been done, for both success or failed ones.
Using refcount on CDC messages brings another problem: when the link
is going to be destroyed, smcr_link_clear() will reset the QP, which
then remove all the pending CQEs related to the QP in the CQ. To make
sure all the CQEs will always come back so the refcount on the
smc_connection can always reach 0, smc_ib_modify_qp_reset() was replaced
by smc_ib_modify_qp_error().
And remove the timeout in smc_wr_tx_wait_no_pending_sends() since we
need to wait for all pending WQEs done, or we may encounter use-after-
free when handling CQEs.
For IB device removal routine, we need to wait for all the QPs on that
device been destroyed before we can destroy CQs on the device, or
the refcount on smc_connection won't reach 0 and smc_sock cannot be
released.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-26603

Description:

Vim is a greatly improved version of the good old UNIX editor Vi. Vim allows to redirect screen messages using the `:redir` ex command to register, variables and files. It also allows to show the contents of registers using the `:registers` or `:display` ex command. When redirecting the output of `:display` to a register, Vim will free the register content before storing the new content in the register. Now when redirecting the `:display` command to a register that is being displayed, Vim will free the content while shortly afterwards trying to access it, which leads to a use-after-free. Vim pre 9.1.1115 checks in the ex_display() function, that it does not try to redirect to a register while displaying this register at the same time. However this check is not complete, and so Vim does not check the `+` and `*` registers (which typically donate the X11/clipboard registers, and when a clipboard connection is not possible will fall back to use register 0 instead. In Patch 9.1.1115 Vim will therefore skip outputting to register zero when trying to redirect to the clipboard registers `*` or `+`. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Locations:

vim-filesystem-2:8.0.1763-19.el8_6.4
vim-minimal-2:8.0.1763-19.el8_6.4

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21981

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix memory leak in aRFS after reset
Fix aRFS (accelerated Receive Flow Steering) structures memory leak by
adding a checker to verify if aRFS memory is already allocated while
configuring VSI. aRFS objects are allocated in two cases:
- as part of VSI initialization (at probe), and
- as part of reset handling
However, VSI reconfiguration executed during reset involves memory
allocation one more time, without prior releasing already allocated
resources. This led to the memory leak with the following signature:
[root@os-delivery ~]# cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
unreferenced object 0xff3c1ca7252e6000 (size 8192):
comm "kworker/0:0", pid 8, jiffies 4296833052
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace (crc 0):
[<ffffffff991ec485>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x275/0x340
[<ffffffffc0a6e06a>] ice_init_arfs+0x3a/0xe0 [ice]
[<ffffffffc09f1027>] ice_vsi_cfg_def+0x607/0x850 [ice]
[<ffffffffc09f244b>] ice_vsi_setup+0x5b/0x130 [ice]
[<ffffffffc09c2131>] ice_init+0x1c1/0x460 [ice]
[<ffffffffc09c64af>] ice_probe+0x2af/0x520 [ice]
[<ffffffff994fbcd3>] local_pci_probe+0x43/0xa0
[<ffffffff98f07103>] work_for_cpu_fn+0x13/0x20
[<ffffffff98f0b6d9>] process_one_work+0x179/0x390
[<ffffffff98f0c1e9>] worker_thread+0x239/0x340
[<ffffffff98f14abc>] kthread+0xcc/0x100
[<ffffffff98e45a6d>] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[<ffffffff98e083ba>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
...

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21976

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: hyperv_fb: Allow graceful removal of framebuffer
When a Hyper-V framebuffer device is unbind, hyperv_fb driver tries to
release the framebuffer forcefully. If this framebuffer is in use it
produce the following WARN and hence this framebuffer is never released.
[ 44.111220] WARNING: CPU: 35 PID: 1882 at drivers/video/fbdev/core/fb_info.c:70 framebuffer_release+0x2c/0x40
< snip >
[ 44.111289] Call Trace:
[ 44.111290] <TASK>
[ 44.111291] ? show_regs+0x6c/0x80
[ 44.111295] ? __warn+0x8d/0x150
[ 44.111298] ? framebuffer_release+0x2c/0x40
[ 44.111300] ? report_bug+0x182/0x1b0
[ 44.111303] ? handle_bug+0x6e/0xb0
[ 44.111306] ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x80
[ 44.111308] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
[ 44.111311] ? framebuffer_release+0x2c/0x40
[ 44.111313] ? hvfb_remove+0x86/0xa0 [hyperv_fb]
[ 44.111315] vmbus_remove+0x24/0x40 [hv_vmbus]
[ 44.111323] device_remove+0x40/0x80
[ 44.111325] device_release_driver_internal+0x20b/0x270
[ 44.111327] ? bus_find_device+0xb3/0xf0
Fix this by moving the release of framebuffer and assosiated memory
to fb_ops.fb_destroy function, so that framebuffer framework handles
it gracefully.
While we fix this, also replace manual registrations/unregistration of
framebuffer with devm_register_framebuffer.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21931

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwpoison, memory_hotplug: lock folio before unmap hwpoisoned folio
Commit b15c87263a69 ("hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to
be offlined) add page poison checks in do_migrate_range in order to make
offline hwpoisoned page possible by introducing isolate_lru_page and
try_to_unmap for hwpoisoned page. However folio lock must be held before
calling try_to_unmap. Add it to fix this problem.
Warning will be produced if folio is not locked during unmap:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at ./include/linux/swapops.h:400!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 411 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc1-00016-g3c434c7ee82a-dirty #41
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c
lr : try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c
Call trace:
try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c (P)
try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c (L)
rmap_walk_anon+0xdc/0x1f8
rmap_walk+0x3c/0x58
try_to_unmap+0x88/0x90
unmap_poisoned_folio+0x30/0xa8
do_migrate_range+0x4a0/0x568
offline_pages+0x5a4/0x670
memory_block_action+0x17c/0x374
memory_subsys_offline+0x3c/0x78
device_offline+0xa4/0xd0
state_store+0x8c/0xf0
dev_attr_store+0x18/0x2c
sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x54
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x118/0x1a8
vfs_write+0x3a8/0x4bc
ksys_write+0x6c/0xf8
__arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28
invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
el0_svc+0x30/0xd0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xcc
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
Code: f9407be0 b5fff320 d4210000 17ffff97 (d4210000)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21922

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ppp: Fix KMSAN uninit-value warning with bpf
Syzbot caught an "KMSAN: uninit-value" warning [1], which is caused by the
ppp driver not initializing a 2-byte header when using socket filter.
The following code can generate a PPP filter BPF program:
'''
struct bpf_program fp;
pcap_t *handle;
handle = pcap_open_dead(DLT_PPP_PPPD, 65535);
pcap_compile(handle, &fp, "ip and outbound", 0, 0);
bpf_dump(&fp, 1);
'''
Its output is:
'''
(000) ldh [2]
(001) jeq #0x21 jt 2 jf 5
(002) ldb [0]
(003) jeq #0x1 jt 4 jf 5
(004) ret #65535
(005) ret #0
'''
Wen can find similar code at the following link:
https://github.com/ppp-project/ppp/blob/master/pppd/options.c#L1680
The maintainer of this code repository is also the original maintainer
of the ppp driver.
As you can see the BPF program skips 2 bytes of data and then reads the
'Protocol' field to determine if it's an IP packet. Then it read the first
byte of the first 2 bytes to determine the direction.
The issue is that only the first byte indicating direction is initialized
in current ppp driver code while the second byte is not initialized.
For normal BPF programs generated by libpcap, uninitialized data won't be
used, so it's not a problem. However, for carefully crafted BPF programs,
such as those generated by syzkaller [2], which start reading from offset
0, the uninitialized data will be used and caught by KMSAN.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=853242d9c9917165d791
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&x=11994913980000

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21916

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: atm: cxacru: fix a flaw in existing endpoint checks
Syzbot once again identified a flaw in usb endpoint checking, see [1].
This time the issue stems from a commit authored by me (2eabb655a968
("usb: atm: cxacru: fix endpoint checking in cxacru_bind()")).
While using usb_find_common_endpoints() may usually be enough to
discard devices with wrong endpoints, in this case one needs more
than just finding and identifying the sufficient number of endpoints
of correct types - one needs to check the endpoint's address as well.
Since cxacru_bind() fills URBs with CXACRU_EP_CMD address in mind,
switch the endpoint verification approach to usb_check_XXX_endpoints()
instead to fix incomplete ep testing.
[1] Syzbot report:
usb 5-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1378 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504 usb_submit_urb+0xc4e/0x18c0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503
...
RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xc4e/0x18c0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
cxacru_cm+0x3c8/0xe50 drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:649
cxacru_card_status drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:760 [inline]
cxacru_bind+0xcf9/0x1150 drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:1223
usbatm_usb_probe+0x314/0x1d30 drivers/usb/atm/usbatm.c:1058
cxacru_usb_probe+0x184/0x220 drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:1377
usb_probe_interface+0x641/0xbb0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396
really_probe+0x2b9/0xad0 drivers/base/dd.c:658
__driver_probe_device+0x1a2/0x390 drivers/base/dd.c:800
driver_probe_device+0x50/0x430 drivers/base/dd.c:830
...

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21910

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: regulatory: improve invalid hints checking
Syzbot keeps reporting an issue [1] that occurs when erroneous symbols
sent from userspace get through into user_alpha2[] via
regulatory_hint_user() call. Such invalid regulatory hints should be
rejected.
While a sanity check from commit 47caf685a685 ("cfg80211: regulatory:
reject invalid hints") looks to be enough to deter these very cases,
there is a way to get around it due to 2 reasons.
1) The way isalpha() works, symbols other than latin lower and
upper letters may be used to determine a country/domain.
For instance, greek letters will also be considered upper/lower
letters and for such characters isalpha() will return true as well.
However, ISO-3166-1 alpha2 codes should only hold latin
characters.
2) While processing a user regulatory request, between
reg_process_hint_user() and regulatory_hint_user() there happens to
be a call to queue_regulatory_request() which modifies letters in
request->alpha2[] with toupper(). This works fine for latin symbols,
less so for weird letter characters from the second part of _ctype[].
Syzbot triggers a warning in is_user_regdom_saved() by first sending
over an unexpected non-latin letter that gets malformed by toupper()
into a character that ends up failing isalpha() check.
Prevent this by enhancing is_an_alpha2() to ensure that incoming
symbols are latin letters and nothing else.
[1] Syzbot report:
------------[ cut here ]------------
Unexpected user alpha2: A�
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 964 at net/wireless/reg.c:442 is_user_regdom_saved net/wireless/reg.c:440 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 964 at net/wireless/reg.c:442 restore_alpha2 net/wireless/reg.c:3424 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 964 at net/wireless/reg.c:442 restore_regulatory_settings+0x3c0/0x1e50 net/wireless/reg.c:3516
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 964 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-syzkaller-00044-gc1e939a21eb1 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Workqueue: events_power_efficient crda_timeout_work
RIP: 0010:is_user_regdom_saved net/wireless/reg.c:440 [inline]
RIP: 0010:restore_alpha2 net/wireless/reg.c:3424 [inline]
RIP: 0010:restore_regulatory_settings+0x3c0/0x1e50 net/wireless/reg.c:3516
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
crda_timeout_work+0x27/0x50 net/wireless/reg.c:542
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa65/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f2/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21891

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvlan: ensure network headers are in skb linear part
syzbot found that ipvlan_process_v6_outbound() was assuming
the IPv6 network header isis present in skb->head [1]
Add the needed pskb_network_may_pull() calls for both
IPv4 and IPv6 handlers.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __ipv6_addr_type+0xa2/0x490 net/ipv6/addrconf_core.c:47
__ipv6_addr_type+0xa2/0x490 net/ipv6/addrconf_core.c:47
ipv6_addr_type include/net/ipv6.h:555 [inline]
ip6_route_output_flags_noref net/ipv6/route.c:2616 [inline]
ip6_route_output_flags+0x51/0x720 net/ipv6/route.c:2651
ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:93 [inline]
ipvlan_route_v6_outbound+0x24e/0x520 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:476
ipvlan_process_v6_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:491 [inline]
ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:541 [inline]
ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:605 [inline]
ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xd72/0x1780 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:671
ipvlan_start_xmit+0x5b/0x210 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:223
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5150 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5159 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3735 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa20 net/core/dev.c:3751
sch_direct_xmit+0x399/0xd40 net/sched/sch_generic.c:343
qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:408 [inline]
__qdisc_run+0x14da/0x35d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:416
qdisc_run+0x141/0x4d0 include/net/pkt_sched.h:127
net_tx_action+0x78b/0x940 net/core/dev.c:5484
handle_softirqs+0x1a0/0x7c0 kernel/softirq.c:561
__do_softirq+0x14/0x1a kernel/softirq.c:595
do_softirq+0x9a/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:462
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x9f/0xb0 kernel/softirq.c:389
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:919 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2758/0x57d0 net/core/dev.c:4611
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3311 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3132 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x93e0/0xa7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3164
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21888

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix a WARN during dereg_mr for DM type
Memory regions (MR) of type DM (device memory) do not have an associated
umem.
In the __mlx5_ib_dereg_mr() -> mlx5_free_priv_descs() flow, the code
incorrectly takes the wrong branch, attempting to call
dma_unmap_single() on a DMA address that is not mapped.
This results in a WARN [1], as shown below.
The issue is resolved by properly accounting for the DM type and
ensuring the correct branch is selected in mlx5_free_priv_descs().
[1]
WARNING: CPU: 12 PID: 1346 at drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c:1230 iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90
Modules linked in: ip6table_mangle ip6table_nat ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_mangle xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry ovelay rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core fuse mlx5_core
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 1346 Comm: ibv_rc_pingpong Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7+ #1631
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90
Code: 2b 49 3b 29 72 26 49 3b 69 08 73 20 4d 89 f0 44 89 e9 4c 89 e2 48 89 ee 48 89 df 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 07 b8 88 ff <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc 66 0f 1f 44 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001913a10 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88810194b0a8 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88810194b0a8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f537abdd740(0000) GS:ffff88885fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f537aeb8000 CR3: 000000010c248001 CR4: 0000000000372eb0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x84/0x190
? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90
? report_bug+0xf8/0x1c0
? handle_bug+0x55/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90
dma_unmap_page_attrs+0xe6/0x290
mlx5_free_priv_descs+0xb0/0xe0 [mlx5_ib]
__mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x37e/0x520 [mlx5_ib]
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40
? wait_for_completion+0xfe/0x130
? rdma_restrack_put+0x63/0xe0 [ib_core]
ib_dereg_mr_user+0x5f/0x120 [ib_core]
? lock_release+0xc6/0x280
destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x1d/0x60 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x58/0x1d0 [ib_uverbs]
uobj_destroy+0x3f/0x70 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x3e4/0xbb0 [ib_uverbs]
? __pfx_uverbs_destroy_def_handler+0x10/0x10 [ib_uverbs]
? lock_acquire+0xc1/0x2f0
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xcb/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x116/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? lock_release+0xc6/0x280
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe7/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xcb/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1b0/0xa70
do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f537adaf17b
Code: 0f 1e fa 48 8b 05 1d ad 0c 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ed ac 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffff218f0b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffff218f1d8 RCX: 00007f537adaf17b
RDX: 00007ffff218f1c0 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffff218f1a0 R08: 00007f537aa8d010 R09: 0000561ee2e4f270
R10: 00007f537aace3a8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffff218f190
R13: 000000000000001c R14: 0000561ee2e4d7c0 R15: 00007ffff218f450
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21881

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uprobes: Reject the shared zeropage in uprobe_write_opcode()
We triggered the following crash in syzkaller tests:
BUG: Bad page state in process syz.7.38 pfn:1eff3
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1eff3
flags: 0x3fffff00004004(referenced|reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
raw: 003fffff00004004 ffffe6c6c07bfcc8 ffffe6c6c07bfcc8 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000fffffffe 0000000000000000
page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x32/0x50
bad_page+0x69/0xf0
free_unref_page_prepare+0x401/0x500
free_unref_page+0x6d/0x1b0
uprobe_write_opcode+0x460/0x8e0
install_breakpoint.part.0+0x51/0x80
register_for_each_vma+0x1d9/0x2b0
__uprobe_register+0x245/0x300
bpf_uprobe_multi_link_attach+0x29b/0x4f0
link_create+0x1e2/0x280
__sys_bpf+0x75f/0xac0
__x64_sys_bpf+0x1a/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x56/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2
BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000452453e0 type:MM_FILEPAGES val:-1
The following syzkaller test case can be used to reproduce:
r2 = creat(&(0x7f0000000000)='./file0\x00', 0x8)
write$nbd(r2, &(0x7f0000000580)=ANY=[], 0x10)
r4 = openat(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000040)='./file0\x00', 0x42, 0x0)
mmap$IORING_OFF_SQ_RING(&(0x7f0000ffd000/0x3000)=nil, 0x3000, 0x0, 0x12, r4, 0x0)
r5 = userfaultfd(0x80801)
ioctl$UFFDIO_API(r5, 0xc018aa3f, &(0x7f0000000040)={0xaa, 0x20})
r6 = userfaultfd(0x80801)
ioctl$UFFDIO_API(r6, 0xc018aa3f, &(0x7f0000000140))
ioctl$UFFDIO_REGISTER(r6, 0xc020aa00, &(0x7f0000000100)={{&(0x7f0000ffc000/0x4000)=nil, 0x4000}, 0x2})
ioctl$UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE(r5, 0xc020aa04, &(0x7f0000000000)={{&(0x7f0000ffd000/0x1000)=nil, 0x1000}})
r7 = bpf$PROG_LOAD(0x5, &(0x7f0000000140)={0x2, 0x3, &(0x7f0000000200)=ANY=[@ANYBLOB="1800000000120000000000000000000095"], &(0x7f0000000000)='GPL\x00', 0x7, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, '\x00', 0x0, @fallback=0x30, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x10, 0x0, @void, @value}, 0x94)
bpf$BPF_LINK_CREATE_XDP(0x1c, &(0x7f0000000040)={r7, 0x0, 0x30, 0x1e, @val=@uprobe_multi={&(0x7f0000000080)='./file0\x00', &(0x7f0000000100)=[0x2], 0x0, 0x0, 0x1}}, 0x40)
The cause is that zero pfn is set to the PTE without increasing the RSS
count in mfill_atomic_pte_zeropage() and the refcount of zero folio does
not increase accordingly. Then, the operation on the same pfn is performed
in uprobe_write_opcode()->__replace_page() to unconditional decrease the
RSS count and old_folio's refcount.
Therefore, two bugs are introduced:
1. The RSS count is incorrect, when process exit, the check_mm() report
error "Bad rss-count".
2. The reserved folio (zero folio) is freed when folio->refcount is zero,
then free_pages_prepare->free_page_is_bad() report error
"Bad page state".
There is more, the following warning could also theoretically be triggered:
__replace_page()
-> ...
-> folio_remove_rmap_pte()
-> VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO(is_zero_folio(folio), folio)
Considering that uprobe hit on the zero folio is a very rare case, just
reject zero old folio immediately after get_user_page_vma_remote().
[ mingo: Cleaned up the changelog ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21877

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbnet: gl620a: fix endpoint checking in genelink_bind()
Syzbot reports [1] a warning in usb_submit_urb() triggered by
inconsistencies between expected and actually present endpoints
in gl620a driver. Since genelink_bind() does not properly
verify whether specified eps are in fact provided by the device,
in this case, an artificially manufactured one, one may get a
mismatch.
Fix the issue by resorting to a usbnet utility function
usbnet_get_endpoints(), usually reserved for this very problem.
Check for endpoints and return early before proceeding further if
any are missing.
[1] Syzbot report:
usb 5-1: Manufacturer: syz
usb 5-1: SerialNumber: syz
usb 5-1: config 0 descriptor??
gl620a 5-1:0.23 usb0: register 'gl620a' at usb-dummy_hcd.0-1, ...
------------[ cut here ]------------
usb 5-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1841 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503 usb_submit_urb+0xe4b/0x1730 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1841 Comm: kworker/2:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-syzkaller-07834-g06afb0f36106 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xe4b/0x1730 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
usbnet_start_xmit+0x6be/0x2780 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1467
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5002 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5011 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3590 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x9a/0x7b0 net/core/dev.c:3606
sch_direct_xmit+0x1ae/0xc30 net/sched/sch_generic.c:343
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3827 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x13d4/0x43e0 net/core/dev.c:4400
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3168 [inline]
neigh_resolve_output net/core/neighbour.c:1514 [inline]
neigh_resolve_output+0x5bc/0x950 net/core/neighbour.c:1494
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:539 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0xb1b/0x2070 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:141
__ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:215 [inline]
ip6_finish_output+0x3f9/0x1360 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:226
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]
ip6_output+0x1f8/0x540 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247
dst_output include/net/dst.h:450 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
mld_sendpack+0x9f0/0x11d0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1819
mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2120 [inline]
mld_ifc_work+0x740/0xca0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2651
process_one_work+0x9c5/0x1ba0 kernel/workqueue.c:3229
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3310 [inline]
worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf00 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21872

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
efi: Don't map the entire mokvar table to determine its size
Currently, when validating the mokvar table, we (re)map the entire table
on each iteration of the loop, adding space as we discover new entries.
If the table grows over a certain size, this fails due to limitations of
early_memmap(), and we get a failure and traceback:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at mm/early_ioremap.c:139 __early_ioremap+0xef/0x220
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __early_ioremap+0xef/0x220
? __warn.cold+0x93/0xfa
? __early_ioremap+0xef/0x220
? report_bug+0xff/0x140
? early_fixup_exception+0x5d/0xb0
? early_idt_handler_common+0x2f/0x3a
? __early_ioremap+0xef/0x220
? efi_mokvar_table_init+0xce/0x1d0
? setup_arch+0x864/0xc10
? start_kernel+0x6b/0xa10
? x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30
? x86_64_start_kernel+0xed/0xf0
? common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
mokvar: Failed to map EFI MOKvar config table pa=0x7c4c3000, size=265187.
Mapping the entire structure isn't actually necessary, as we don't ever
need more than one entry header mapped at once.
Changes efi_mokvar_table_init() to only map each entry header, not the
entire table, when determining the table size. Since we're not mapping
any data past the variable name, it also changes the code to enforce
that each variable name is NUL terminated, rather than attempting to
verify it in place.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21866

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/code-patching: Fix KASAN hit by not flagging text patching area as VM_ALLOC
Erhard reported the following KASAN hit while booting his PowerMac G4
with a KASAN-enabled kernel 6.13-rc6:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8
Write of size 8 at addr f1000000 by task chronyd/1293
CPU: 0 UID: 123 PID: 1293 Comm: chronyd Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4 #2
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: PowerMac3,6 7455 0x80010303 PowerMac
Call Trace:
[c2437590] [c1631a84] dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x8c (unreliable)
[c24375b0] [c0504998] print_report+0xdc/0x504
[c2437610] [c050475c] kasan_report+0xf8/0x108
[c2437690] [c0505a3c] kasan_check_range+0x24/0x18c
[c24376a0] [c03fb5e4] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8
[c24376c0] [c004c014] patch_instructions+0x15c/0x16c
[c2437710] [c00731a8] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x60/0x7c
[c2437730] [c0281168] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x50/0xac
[c2437750] [c0073cf4] bpf_int_jit_compile+0xb30/0xdec
[c2437880] [c0280394] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x15c/0x478
[c24378d0] [c1263428] bpf_prepare_filter+0xbf8/0xc14
[c2437990] [c12677ec] bpf_prog_create_from_user+0x258/0x2b4
[c24379d0] [c027111c] do_seccomp+0x3dc/0x1890
[c2437ac0] [c001d8e0] system_call_exception+0x2dc/0x420
[c2437f30] [c00281ac] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2c
--- interrupt: c00 at 0x5a1274
NIP: 005a1274 LR: 006a3b3c CTR: 005296c8
REGS: c2437f40 TRAP: 0c00 Tainted: G W (6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4)
MSR: 0200f932 <VEC,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 24004422 XER: 00000000
GPR00: 00000166 af8f3fa0 a7ee3540 00000001 00000000 013b6500 005a5858 0200f932
GPR08: 00000000 00001fe9 013d5fc8 005296c8 2822244c 00b2fcd8 00000000 af8f4b57
GPR16: 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000002
GPR24: 00afdbb0 00000000 00000000 00000000 006e0004 013ce060 006e7c1c 00000001
NIP [005a1274] 0x5a1274
LR [006a3b3c] 0x6a3b3c
--- interrupt: c00
The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
[f1000000, f1002000) created by:
text_area_cpu_up+0x20/0x190
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x76e30
flags: 0x80000000(zone=2)
raw: 80000000 00000000 00000122 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000001
raw: 00000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
f0ffff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
f0ffff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>f1000000: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
^
f1000080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
f1000100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
==================================================================
f8 corresponds to KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID which means the area is not
initialised hence not supposed to be used yet.
Powerpc text patching infrastructure allocates a virtual memory area
using get_vm_area() and flags it as VM_ALLOC. But that flag is meant
to be used for vmalloc() and vmalloc() allocated memory is not
supposed to be used before a call to __vmalloc_node_range() which is
never called for that area.
That went undetected until commit e4137f08816b ("mm, kasan, kmsan:
instrument copy_from/to_kernel_nofault")
The area allocated by text_area_cpu_up() is not vmalloc memory, it is
mapped directly on demand when needed by map_kernel_page(). There is
no VM flag corresponding to such usage, so just pass no flag. That way
the area will be unpoisonned and usable immediately.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21829

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix the warning "__rxe_cleanup+0x12c/0x170 [rdma_rxe]"
The Call Trace is as below:
"
<TASK>
? show_regs.cold+0x1a/0x1f
? __rxe_cleanup+0x12c/0x170 [rdma_rxe]
? __warn+0x84/0xd0
? __rxe_cleanup+0x12c/0x170 [rdma_rxe]
? report_bug+0x105/0x180
? handle_bug+0x46/0x80
? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
? __rxe_cleanup+0x12c/0x170 [rdma_rxe]
? __rxe_cleanup+0x124/0x170 [rdma_rxe]
rxe_destroy_qp.cold+0x24/0x29 [rdma_rxe]
ib_destroy_qp_user+0x118/0x190 [ib_core]
rdma_destroy_qp.cold+0x43/0x5e [rdma_cm]
rtrs_cq_qp_destroy.cold+0x1d/0x2b [rtrs_core]
rtrs_srv_close_work.cold+0x1b/0x31 [rtrs_server]
process_one_work+0x21d/0x3f0
worker_thread+0x4a/0x3c0
? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0
kthread+0xf0/0x120
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
"
When too many rdma resources are allocated, rxe needs more time to
handle these rdma resources. Sometimes with the current timeout, rxe
can not release the rdma resources correctly.
Compared with other rdma drivers, a bigger timeout is used.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21776

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: hub: Ignore non-compliant devices with too many configs or interfaces
Robert Morris created a test program which can cause
usb_hub_to_struct_hub() to dereference a NULL or inappropriate
pointer:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xcccccccccccccccc: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 117 Comm: kworker/7:1 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-00017-gf44d154d6e3d #14
Hardware name: FreeBSD BHYVE/BHYVE, BIOS 14.0 10/17/2021
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
RIP: 0010:usb_hub_adjust_deviceremovable+0x78/0x110
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die_addr+0x31/0x80
? exc_general_protection+0x1b4/0x3c0
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
? usb_hub_adjust_deviceremovable+0x78/0x110
hub_probe+0x7c7/0xab0
usb_probe_interface+0x14b/0x350
really_probe+0xd0/0x2d0
? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10
__driver_probe_device+0x6e/0x110
driver_probe_device+0x1a/0x90
__device_attach_driver+0x7e/0xc0
bus_for_each_drv+0x7f/0xd0
__device_attach+0xaa/0x1a0
bus_probe_device+0x8b/0xa0
device_add+0x62e/0x810
usb_set_configuration+0x65d/0x990
usb_generic_driver_probe+0x4b/0x70
usb_probe_device+0x36/0xd0
The cause of this error is that the device has two interfaces, and the
hub driver binds to interface 1 instead of interface 0, which is where
usb_hub_to_struct_hub() looks.
We can prevent the problem from occurring by refusing to accept hub
devices that violate the USB spec by having more than one
configuration or interface.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21733

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/osnoise: Fix resetting of tracepoints
If a timerlat tracer is started with the osnoise option OSNOISE_WORKLOAD
disabled, but then that option is enabled and timerlat is removed, the
tracepoints that were enabled on timerlat registration do not get
disabled. If the option is disabled again and timelat is started, then it
triggers a warning in the tracepoint code due to registering the
tracepoint again without ever disabling it.
Do not use the same user space defined options to know to disable the
tracepoints when timerlat is removed. Instead, set a global flag when it
is enabled and use that flag to know to disable the events.
~# echo NO_OSNOISE_WORKLOAD > /sys/kernel/tracing/osnoise/options
~# echo timerlat > /sys/kernel/tracing/current_tracer
~# echo OSNOISE_WORKLOAD > /sys/kernel/tracing/osnoise/options
~# echo nop > /sys/kernel/tracing/current_tracer
~# echo NO_OSNOISE_WORKLOAD > /sys/kernel/tracing/osnoise/options
~# echo timerlat > /sys/kernel/tracing/current_tracer
Triggers:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 1337 at kernel/tracepoint.c:294 tracepoint_add_func+0x3b6/0x3f0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 1337 Comm: rtla Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-test-00018-ga867c441128e-dirty #73
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:tracepoint_add_func+0x3b6/0x3f0
Code: 48 8b 53 28 48 8b 73 20 4c 89 04 24 e8 23 59 11 00 4c 8b 04 24 e9 36 fe ff ff 0f 0b b8 ea ff ff ff 45 84 e4 0f 84 68 fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 61 fe ff ff 48 8b 7b 18 48 85 ff 0f 84 4f ff ff ff 49 8b
RSP: 0018:ffffb9b003a87ca0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000ffffffef RBX: ffffffff92f30860 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9bf59e91ccd0 RDI: ffffffff913b6410
RBP: 000000000000000a R08: 00000000000005c7 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: ffffb9b003a87ce0 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffffb9b003a87ce0 R14: ffffffffffffffef R15: 0000000000000008
FS: 00007fce81209240(0000) GS:ffff9bf6fdd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055e99b728000 CR3: 00000001277c0002 CR4: 0000000000172ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn.cold+0xb7/0x14d
? tracepoint_add_func+0x3b6/0x3f0
? report_bug+0xea/0x170
? handle_bug+0x58/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? __pfx_trace_sched_migrate_callback+0x10/0x10
? tracepoint_add_func+0x3b6/0x3f0
? __pfx_trace_sched_migrate_callback+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_trace_sched_migrate_callback+0x10/0x10
tracepoint_probe_register+0x78/0xb0
? __pfx_trace_sched_migrate_callback+0x10/0x10
osnoise_workload_start+0x2b5/0x370
timerlat_tracer_init+0x76/0x1b0
tracing_set_tracer+0x244/0x400
tracing_set_trace_write+0xa0/0xe0
vfs_write+0xfc/0x570
? do_sys_openat2+0x9c/0xe0
ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21727

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
padata: fix UAF in padata_reorder
A bug was found when run ltp test:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in padata_find_next+0x29/0x1a0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88bbfe003524 by task kworker/u113:2/3039206
CPU: 0 PID: 3039206 Comm: kworker/u113:2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.6.0+
Workqueue: pdecrypt_parallel padata_parallel_worker
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x32/0x50
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x6b/0x3d0
print_report+0xdd/0x2c0
kasan_report+0xa5/0xd0
padata_find_next+0x29/0x1a0
padata_reorder+0x131/0x220
padata_parallel_worker+0x3d/0xc0
process_one_work+0x2ec/0x5a0
If 'mdelay(10)' is added before calling 'padata_find_next' in the
'padata_reorder' function, this issue could be reproduced easily with
ltp test (pcrypt_aead01).
This can be explained as bellow:
pcrypt_aead_encrypt
...
padata_do_parallel
refcount_inc(&pd->refcnt); // add refcnt
...
padata_do_serial
padata_reorder // pd
while (1) {
padata_find_next(pd, true); // using pd
queue_work_on
...
padata_serial_workercrypto_del_alg
padata_put_pd_cnt // sub refcnt
padata_free_shell
padata_put_pd(ps->pd);
// pd is freed
// loop again, but pd is freed
// call padata_find_next, UAF
}
In the padata_reorder function, when it loops in 'while', if the alg is
deleted, the refcnt may be decreased to 0 before entering
'padata_find_next', which leads to UAF.
As mentioned in [1], do_serial is supposed to be called with BHs disabled
and always happen under RCU protection, to address this issue, add
synchronize_rcu() in 'padata_free_shell' wait for all _do_serial calls
to finish.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221028160401.cccypv4euxikusiq@parnassus.localdomain/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/jfjz5d7zwbytztackem7ibzalm5lnxldi2eofeiczqmqs2m7o6@fq426cwnjtkm/

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21723

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpi3mr: Fix possible crash when setting up bsg fails
If bsg_setup_queue() fails, the bsg_queue is assigned a non-NULL value.
Consequently, in mpi3mr_bsg_exit(), the condition "if(!mrioc->bsg_queue)"
will not be satisfied, preventing execution from entering
bsg_remove_queue(), which could lead to the following crash:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000041c
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mpi3mr_bsg_exit+0x1f/0x50 [mpi3mr]
mpi3mr_remove+0x6f/0x340 [mpi3mr]
pci_device_remove+0x3f/0xb0
device_release_driver_internal+0x19d/0x220
unbind_store+0xa4/0xb0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11f/0x200
vfs_write+0x1fc/0x3e0
ksys_write+0x67/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21719

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmr: do not call mr_mfc_uses_dev() for unres entries
syzbot found that calling mr_mfc_uses_dev() for unres entries
would crash [1], because c->mfc_un.res.minvif / c->mfc_un.res.maxvif
alias to "struct sk_buff_head unresolved", which contain two pointers.
This code never worked, lets remove it.
[1]
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff5fff2d536613
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xfffefff96a9b3098-0xfffefff96a9b309f]
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 7321 Comm: syz.0.16 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-syzkaller-g1950a0af2d55 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : mr_mfc_uses_dev net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:290 [inline]
pc : mr_table_dump+0x5a4/0x8b0 net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:334
lr : mr_mfc_uses_dev net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:289 [inline]
lr : mr_table_dump+0x694/0x8b0 net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:334
Call trace:
mr_mfc_uses_dev net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:290 [inline] (P)
mr_table_dump+0x5a4/0x8b0 net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:334 (P)
mr_rtm_dumproute+0x254/0x454 net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:382
ipmr_rtm_dumproute+0x248/0x4b4 net/ipv4/ipmr.c:2648
rtnl_dump_all+0x2e4/0x4e8 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4327
rtnl_dumpit+0x98/0x1d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6791
netlink_dump+0x4f0/0xbc0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2317
netlink_recvmsg+0x56c/0xe64 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1973
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1033 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1055 [inline]
sock_read_iter+0x2d8/0x40c net/socket.c:1125
new_sync_read fs/read_write.c:484 [inline]
vfs_read+0x740/0x970 fs/read_write.c:565
ksys_read+0x15c/0x26c fs/read_write.c:708

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21708

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: rtl8150: enable basic endpoint checking
Syzkaller reports [1] encountering a common issue of utilizing a wrong
usb endpoint type during URB submitting stage. This, in turn, triggers
a warning shown below.
For now, enable simple endpoint checking (specifically, bulk and
interrupt eps, testing control one is not essential) to mitigate
the issue with a view to do other related cosmetic changes later,
if they are necessary.
[1] Syzkaller report:
usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2586 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503 usb_submit_urb+0xe4b/0x1730 driv>
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2586 Comm: dhcpcd Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller-00069-gfc88bb11617>
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xe4b/0x1730 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503
Code: 84 3c 02 00 00 e8 05 e4 fc fc 4c 89 ef e8 fd 25 d7 fe 45 89 e0 89 e9 4c 89 f2 48 8>
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000441f740 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888112487a00 RCX: ffffffff811a99a9
RDX: ffff88810df6ba80 RSI: ffffffff811a99b6 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff8881023bf0a8 R14: ffff888112452a20 R15: ffff888112487a7c
FS: 00007fc04eea5740(0000) GS:ffff8881f6300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0a1de9f870 CR3: 000000010dbd0000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rtl8150_open+0x300/0xe30 drivers/net/usb/rtl8150.c:733
__dev_open+0x2d4/0x4e0 net/core/dev.c:1474
__dev_change_flags+0x561/0x720 net/core/dev.c:8838
dev_change_flags+0x8f/0x160 net/core/dev.c:8910
devinet_ioctl+0x127a/0x1f10 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1177
inet_ioctl+0x3aa/0x3f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1003
sock_do_ioctl+0x116/0x280 net/socket.c:1222
sock_ioctl+0x22e/0x6c0 net/socket.c:1341
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fc04ef73d49
...
This change has not been tested on real hardware.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2025-21634

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup/cpuset: remove kernfs active break
A warning was found:
WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 3486953 at fs/kernfs/file.c:828
CPU: 10 PID: 3486953 Comm: rmdir Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
RIP: 0010:kernfs_should_drain_open_files+0x1a1/0x1b0
RSP: 0018:ffff8881107ef9e0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000080000002 RBX: ffff888154738c00 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888154738c04
RBP: ffff888154738c04 R08: ffffffffaf27fa15 R09: ffffed102a8e7180
R10: ffff888154738c07 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888154738c08
R13: ffff888750f8c000 R14: ffff888750f8c0e8 R15: ffff888154738ca0
FS: 00007f84cd0be740(0000) GS:ffff8887ddc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000555f9fbe00c8 CR3: 0000000153eec001 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
kernfs_drain+0x15e/0x2f0
__kernfs_remove+0x165/0x300
kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x7b/0xc0
cgroup_rm_file+0x154/0x1c0
cgroup_addrm_files+0x1c2/0x1f0
css_clear_dir+0x77/0x110
kill_css+0x4c/0x1b0
cgroup_destroy_locked+0x194/0x380
cgroup_rmdir+0x2a/0x140
It can be explained by:
rmdir echo 1 > cpuset.cpus
kernfs_fop_write_iter // active=0
cgroup_rm_file
kernfs_remove_by_name_nskernfs_get_active // active=1
__kernfs_remove // active=0x80000002
kernfs_draincpuset_write_resmask
wait_event
//waiting (active == 0x80000001)
kernfs_break_active_protection
// active = 0x80000001
// continue
kernfs_unbreak_active_protection
// active = 0x80000002
...
kernfs_should_drain_open_files
// warning occurs
kernfs_put_active
This warning is caused by 'kernfs_break_active_protection' when it is
writing to cpuset.cpus, and the cgroup is removed concurrently.
The commit 3a5a6d0c2b03 ("cpuset: don't nest cgroup_mutex inside
get_online_cpus()") made cpuset_hotplug_workfn asynchronous, This change
involves calling flush_work(), which can create a multiple processes
circular locking dependency that involve cgroup_mutex, potentially leading
to a deadlock. To avoid deadlock. the commit 76bb5ab8f6e3 ("cpuset: break
kernfs active protection in cpuset_write_resmask()") added
'kernfs_break_active_protection' in the cpuset_write_resmask. This could
lead to this warning.
After the commit 2125c0034c5d ("cgroup/cpuset: Make cpuset hotplug
processing synchronous"), the cpuset_write_resmask no longer needs to
wait the hotplug to finish, which means that concurrent hotplug and cpuset
operations are no longer possible. Therefore, the deadlock doesn't exist
anymore and it does not have to 'break active protection' now. To fix this
warning, just remove kernfs_break_active_protection operation in the
'cpuset_write_resmask'.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-58090

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/core: Prevent rescheduling when interrupts are disabled
David reported a warning observed while loop testing kexec jump:
Interrupts enabled after irqrouter_resume+0x0/0x50
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 560 at drivers/base/syscore.c:103 syscore_resume+0x18a/0x220
kernel_kexec+0xf6/0x180
__do_sys_reboot+0x206/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
The corresponding interrupt flag trace:
hardirqs last enabled at (15573): [<ffffffffa8281b8e>] __up_console_sem+0x7e/0x90
hardirqs last disabled at (15580): [<ffffffffa8281b73>] __up_console_sem+0x63/0x90
That means __up_console_sem() was invoked with interrupts enabled. Further
instrumentation revealed that in the interrupt disabled section of kexec
jump one of the syscore_suspend() callbacks woke up a task, which set the
NEED_RESCHED flag. A later callback in the resume path invoked
cond_resched() which in turn led to the invocation of the scheduler:
__cond_resched+0x21/0x60
down_timeout+0x18/0x60
acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x4c/0x80
acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x3d/0x100
acpi_ns_get_node+0x27/0x60
acpi_ns_evaluate+0x1cb/0x2d0
acpi_rs_set_srs_method_data+0x156/0x190
acpi_pci_link_set+0x11c/0x290
irqrouter_resume+0x54/0x60
syscore_resume+0x6a/0x200
kernel_kexec+0x145/0x1c0
__do_sys_reboot+0xeb/0x240
do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
This is a long standing problem, which probably got more visible with
the recent printk changes. Something does a task wakeup and the
scheduler sets the NEED_RESCHED flag. cond_resched() sees it set and
invokes schedule() from a completely bogus context. The scheduler
enables interrupts after context switching, which causes the above
warning at the end.
Quite some of the code paths in syscore_suspend()/resume() can result in
triggering a wakeup with the exactly same consequences. They might not
have done so yet, but as they share a lot of code with normal operations
it's just a question of time.
The problem only affects the PREEMPT_NONE and PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY scheduling
models. Full preemption is not affected as cond_resched() is disabled and
the preemption check preemptible() takes the interrupt disabled flag into
account.
Cure the problem by adding a corresponding check into cond_resched().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57952

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "libfs: fix infinite directory reads for offset dir"
The current directory offset allocator (based on mtree_alloc_cyclic)
stores the next offset value to return in octx->next_offset. This
mechanism typically returns values that increase monotonically over
time. Eventually, though, the newly allocated offset value wraps
back to a low number (say, 2) which is smaller than other already-
allocated offset values.
Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> reports that, after commit 64a7ce76fb90
("libfs: fix infinite directory reads for offset dir"), if a
directory's offset allocator wraps, existing entries are no longer
visible via readdir/getdents because offset_readdir() stops listing
entries once an entry's offset is larger than octx->next_offset.
These entries vanish persistently -- they can be looked up, but will
never again appear in readdir(3) output.
The reason for this is that the commit treats directory offsets as
monotonically increasing integer values rather than opaque cookies,
and introduces this comparison:
if (dentry2offset(dentry) >= last_index) {
On 64-bit platforms, the directory offset value upper bound is
2^63 - 1. Directory offsets will monotonically increase for millions
of years without wrapping.
On 32-bit platforms, however, LONG_MAX is 2^31 - 1. The allocator
can wrap after only a few weeks (at worst).
Revert commit 64a7ce76fb90 ("libfs: fix infinite directory reads for
offset dir") to prepare for a fix that can work properly on 32-bit
systems and might apply to recent LTS kernels where shmem employs
the simple_offset mechanism.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-57883

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: hugetlb: independent PMD page table shared count
The folio refcount may be increased unexpectly through try_get_folio() by
caller such as split_huge_pages. In huge_pmd_unshare(), we use refcount
to check whether a pmd page table is shared. The check is incorrect if
the refcount is increased by the above caller, and this can cause the page
table leaked:
BUG: Bad page state in process sh pfn:109324
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x66 pfn:0x109324
flags: 0x17ffff800000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xfffff)
page_type: f2(table)
raw: 017ffff800000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000066 0000000000000000 00000000f2000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
...
CPU: 31 UID: 0 PID: 7515 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B 6.13.0-rc2master+ #7
Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call trace:
show_stack+0x20/0x38 (C)
dump_stack_lvl+0x80/0xf8
dump_stack+0x18/0x28
bad_page+0x8c/0x130
free_page_is_bad_report+0xa4/0xb0
free_unref_page+0x3cc/0x620
__folio_put+0xf4/0x158
split_huge_pages_all+0x1e0/0x3e8
split_huge_pages_write+0x25c/0x2d8
full_proxy_write+0x64/0xd8
vfs_write+0xcc/0x280
ksys_write+0x70/0x110
__arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38
invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
el0_svc+0x34/0x128
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xd0
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198
The issue may be triggered by damon, offline_page, page_idle, etc, which
will increase the refcount of page table.
1. The page table itself will be discarded after reporting the
"nonzero mapcount".
2. The HugeTLB page mapped by the page table miss freeing since we
treat the page table as shared and a shared page table will not be
unmapped.
Fix it by introducing independent PMD page table shared count. As
described by comment, pt_index/pt_mm/pt_frag_refcount are used for s390
gmap, x86 pgds and powerpc, pt_share_count is used for x86/arm64/riscv
pmds, so we can reuse the field as pt_share_count.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56629

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: fix when get product name maybe null pointer
Due to incorrect dev->product reporting by certain devices, null
pointer dereferences occur when dev->product is empty, leading to
potential system crashes.
This issue was found on EXCELSIOR DL37-D05 device with
Loongson-LS3A6000-7A2000-DL37 motherboard.
Kernel logs:
[ 56.470885] usb 4-3: new full-speed USB device number 4 using ohci-pci
[ 56.671638] usb 4-3: string descriptor 0 read error: -22
[ 56.671644] usb 4-3: New USB device found, idVendor=056a, idProduct=0374, bcdDevice= 1.07
[ 56.671647] usb 4-3: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3
[ 56.678839] hid-generic 0003:056A:0374.0004: hiddev0,hidraw3: USB HID v1.10 Device [HID 056a:0374] on usb-0000:00:05.0-3/input0
[ 56.697719] CPU 2 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000000000, era == 90000000066e35c8, ra == ffff800004f98a80
[ 56.697732] Oops[#1]:
[ 56.697734] CPU: 2 PID: 2742 Comm: (udev-worker) Tainted: G OE 6.6.0-loong64-desktop #25.00.2000.015
[ 56.697737] Hardware name: Inspur CE520L2/C09901N000000000, BIOS 2.09.00 10/11/2024
[ 56.697739] pc 90000000066e35c8 ra ffff800004f98a80 tp 9000000125478000 sp 900000012547b8a0
[ 56.697741] a0 0000000000000000 a1 ffff800004818b28 a2 0000000000000000 a3 0000000000000000
[ 56.697743] a4 900000012547b8f0 a5 0000000000000000 a6 0000000000000000 a7 0000000000000000
[ 56.697745] t0 ffff800004818b2d t1 0000000000000000 t2 0000000000000003 t3 0000000000000005
[ 56.697747] t4 0000000000000000 t5 0000000000000000 t6 0000000000000000 t7 0000000000000000
[ 56.697748] t8 0000000000000000 u0 0000000000000000 s9 0000000000000000 s0 900000011aa48028
[ 56.697750] s1 0000000000000000 s2 0000000000000000 s3 ffff800004818e80 s4 ffff800004810000
[ 56.697751] s5 90000001000b98d0 s6 ffff800004811f88 s7 ffff800005470440 s8 0000000000000000
[ 56.697753] ra: ffff800004f98a80 wacom_update_name+0xe0/0x300 [wacom]
[ 56.697802] ERA: 90000000066e35c8 strstr+0x28/0x120
[ 56.697806] CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE)
[ 56.697816] PRMD: 0000000c (PPLV0 +PIE +PWE)
[ 56.697821] EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE)
[ 56.697827] ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7)
[ 56.697831] ESTAT: 00010000 [PIL] (IS= ECode=1 EsubCode=0)
[ 56.697835] BADV: 0000000000000000
[ 56.697836] PRID: 0014d000 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A6000)
[ 56.697838] Modules linked in: wacom(+) bnep bluetooth rfkill qrtr nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 snd_hda_codec_conexant snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore input_leds mousedev led_class joydev deepin_netmonitor(OE) fuse nfnetlink dmi_sysfs ip_tables x_tables overlay amdgpu amdxcp drm_exec gpu_sched drm_buddy radeon drm_suballoc_helper i2c_algo_bit drm_ttm_helper r8169 ttm drm_display_helper spi_loongson_pci xhci_pci cec xhci_pci_renesas spi_loongson_core hid_generic realtek gpio_loongson_64bit
[ 56.697887] Process (udev-worker) (pid: 2742, threadinfo=00000000aee0d8b4, task=00000000a9eff1f3)
[ 56.697890] Stack : 0000000000000000 ffff800004817e00 0000000000000000 0000251c00000000
[ 56.697896] 0000000000000000 00000011fffffffd 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 56.697901] 0000000000000000 1b67a968695184b9 0000000000000000 90000001000b98d0
[ 56.697906] 90000001000bb8d0 900000011aa48028 0000000000000000 ffff800004f9d74c
[ 56.697911] 90000001000ba000 ffff800004f9ce58 0000000000000000 ffff800005470440
[ 56.697916] ffff800004811f88 90000001000b98d0 9000000100da2aa8 90000001000bb8d0
[ 56.697921] 0000000000000000 90000001000ba000 900000011aa48028 ffff800004f9d74c
[ 56.697926] ffff8000054704e8 90000001000bb8b8 90000001000ba000 0000000000000000
[ 56.697931] 90000001000bb8d0
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56617

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cacheinfo: Allocate memory during CPU hotplug if not done from the primary CPU
Commit
5944ce092b97 ("arch_topology: Build cacheinfo from primary CPU")
adds functionality that architectures can use to optionally allocate and
build cacheinfo early during boot. Commit
6539cffa9495 ("cacheinfo: Add arch specific early level initializer")
lets secondary CPUs correct (and reallocate memory) cacheinfo data if
needed.
If the early build functionality is not used and cacheinfo does not need
correction, memory for cacheinfo is never allocated. x86 does not use
the early build functionality. Consequently, during the cacheinfo CPU
hotplug callback, last_level_cache_is_valid() attempts to dereference
a NULL pointer:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000100
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEPMT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID 19 Comm: cpuhp/0 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc2 #1
RIP: 0010: last_level_cache_is_valid+0x95/0xe0a
Allocate memory for cacheinfo during the cacheinfo CPU hotplug callback
if not done earlier.
Moreover, before determining the validity of the last-level cache info,
ensure that it has been allocated. Simply checking for non-zero
cache_leaves() is not sufficient, as some architectures (e.g., Intel
processors) have non-zero cache_leaves() before allocation.
Dereferencing NULL cacheinfo can occur in update_per_cpu_data_slice_size().
This function iterates over all online CPUs. However, a CPU may have come
online recently, but its cacheinfo may not have been allocated yet.
While here, remove an unnecessary indentation in allocate_cache_info().
[ bp: Massage. ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56594

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: set the right AMDGPU sg segment limitation
The driver needs to set the correct max_segment_size;
otherwise debug_dma_map_sg() will complain about the
over-mapping of the AMDGPU sg length as following:
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 1964 at kernel/dma/debug.c:1178 debug_dma_map_sg+0x2dc/0x370
[ 364.049444] Modules linked in: veth amdgpu(OE) amdxcp drm_exec gpu_sched drm_buddy drm_ttm_helper ttm(OE) drm_suballoc_helper drm_display_helper drm_kms_helper i2c_algo_bit rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 nfs lockd grace netfs xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink xfrm_user xfrm_algo iptable_nat xt_addrtype iptable_filter br_netfilter nvme_fabrics overlay nfnetlink_cttimeout nfnetlink openvswitch nsh nf_conncount nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 libcrc32c bridge stp llc amd_atl intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common sunrpc sch_fq_codel snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_scodec_component snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg edac_mce_amd binfmt_misc snd_hda_codec snd_pci_acp6x snd_hda_core snd_acp_config snd_hwdep snd_soc_acpi kvm_amd snd_pcm kvm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel sha512_ssse3 snd_rawmidi sha256_ssse3 sha1_ssse3 aesni_intel snd_seq nls_iso8859_1 crypto_simd snd_seq_device cryptd snd_timer rapl input_leds snd
[ 364.049532] ipmi_devintf wmi_bmof ccp serio_raw k10temp sp5100_tco soundcore ipmi_msghandler cm32181 industrialio mac_hid msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport drm efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables pci_stub crc32_pclmul nvme ahci libahci i2c_piix4 r8169 nvme_core i2c_designware_pci realtek i2c_ccgx_ucsi video wmi hid_generic cdc_ether usbnet usbhid hid r8152 mii
[ 364.049576] CPU: 6 PID: 1964 Comm: rocminfo Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-custom #492
[ 364.049579] Hardware name: AMD Majolica-RN/Majolica-RN, BIOS RMJ1009A 06/13/2021
[ 364.049582] RIP: 0010:debug_dma_map_sg+0x2dc/0x370
[ 364.049585] Code: 89 4d b8 e8 36 b1 86 00 8b 4d b8 48 8b 55 b0 44 8b 45 a8 4c 8b 4d a0 48 89 c6 48 c7 c7 00 4b 74 bc 4c 89 4d b8 e8 b4 73 f3 ff <0f> 0b 4c 8b 4d b8 8b 15 c8 2c b8 01 85 d2 0f 85 ee fd ff ff 8b 05
[ 364.049588] RSP: 0018:ffff9ca600b57ac0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 364.049590] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88b7c132b0c8 RCX: 0000000000000027
[ 364.049592] RDX: ffff88bb0f521688 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88bb0f521680
[ 364.049594] RBP: ffff9ca600b57b20 R08: 000000000000006f R09: ffff9ca600b57930
[ 364.049596] R10: ffff9ca600b57928 R11: ffffffffbcb46328 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 364.049597] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88b7c19c0700 R15: ffff88b7c9059800
[ 364.049599] FS: 00007fb2d3516e80(0000) GS:ffff88bb0f500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 364.049601] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 364.049603] CR2: 000055610bd03598 CR3: 00000001049f6000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[ 364.049605] Call Trace:
[ 364.049607] <TASK>
[ 364.049609] ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80
[ 364.049614] ? __warn+0x8c/0x140
[ 364.049618] ? debug_dma_map_sg+0x2dc/0x370
[ 364.049621] ? report_bug+0x193/0x1a0
[ 364.049627] ? handle_bug+0x46/0x80
[ 364.049631] ? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80
[ 364.049635] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
[ 364.049642] ? debug_dma_map_sg+0x2dc/0x370
[ 364.049647] __dma_map_sg_attrs+0x90/0xe0
[ 364.049651] dma_map_sgtable+0x25/0x40
[ 364.049654] amdgpu_bo_move+0x59a/0x850 [amdgpu]
[ 364.049935] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 364.049939] ? amdgpu_ttm_tt_populate+0x5d/0xc0 [amdgpu]
[ 364.050095] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xc3/0x180 [ttm]
[ 364.050103] ttm_bo_validate+0xc1/0x160 [ttm]
[ 364.050108] ? amdgpu_ttm_tt_get_user_pages+0xe5/0x1b0 [amdgpu]
[ 364.050263] amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_alloc_memory_of_gpu+0xa12/0xc90 [amdgpu]
[ 364.050473] kfd_ioctl_alloc_memory_of_gpu+0x16b/0x3b0 [amdgpu]
[ 364.050680] kfd_ioctl+0x3c2/0x530 [amdgpu]
[ 364.050866] ? __pfx_kfd_ioctl_alloc_memory_of_gpu+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[ 364.05105
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56592

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Call free_htab_elem() after htab_unlock_bucket()
For htab of maps, when the map is removed from the htab, it may hold the
last reference of the map. bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() will invoke
bpf_map_free_id() to free the id of the removed map element. However,
bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() is invoked while holding a bucket lock
(raw_spin_lock_t), and bpf_map_free_id() attempts to acquire map_idr_lock
(spinlock_t), triggering the following lockdep warning:
=============================
[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
6.11.0-rc4+ #49 Not tainted
-----------------------------
test_maps/4881 is trying to lock:
ffffffff84884578 (map_idr_lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: bpf_map_free_id.part.0+0x21/0x70
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{5:5}
2 locks held by test_maps/4881:
#0: ffffffff846caf60 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0xf9/0x270
#1: ffff888149ced148 (&htab->lockdep_key#2){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x178/0xa80
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 4881 Comm: test_maps Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), ...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xb0
dump_stack+0x10/0x20
__lock_acquire+0x73e/0x36c0
lock_acquire+0x182/0x450
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x43/0x70
bpf_map_free_id.part.0+0x21/0x70
bpf_map_put+0xcf/0x110
bpf_map_fd_put_ptr+0x9a/0xb0
free_htab_elem+0x69/0xe0
htab_map_update_elem+0x50f/0xa80
bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0x131/0x270
htab_map_update_elem+0x50f/0xa80
bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0x131/0x270
bpf_map_update_value+0x266/0x380
__sys_bpf+0x21bb/0x36b0
__x64_sys_bpf+0x45/0x60
x64_sys_call+0x1b2a/0x20d0
do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
One way to fix the lockdep warning is using raw_spinlock_t for
map_idr_lock as well. However, bpf_map_alloc_id() invokes
idr_alloc_cyclic() after acquiring map_idr_lock, it will trigger a
similar lockdep warning because the slab's lock (s->cpu_slab->lock) is
still a spinlock.
Instead of changing map_idr_lock's type, fix the issue by invoking
htab_put_fd_value() after htab_unlock_bucket(). However, only deferring
the invocation of htab_put_fd_value() is not enough, because the old map
pointers in htab of maps can not be saved during batched deletion.
Therefore, also defer the invocation of free_htab_elem(), so these
to-be-freed elements could be linked together similar to lru map.
There are four callers for ->map_fd_put_ptr:
(1) alloc_htab_elem() (through htab_put_fd_value())
It invokes ->map_fd_put_ptr() under a raw_spinlock_t. The invocation of
htab_put_fd_value() can not simply move after htab_unlock_bucket(),
because the old element has already been stashed in htab->extra_elems.
It may be reused immediately after htab_unlock_bucket() and the
invocation of htab_put_fd_value() after htab_unlock_bucket() may release
the newly-added element incorrectly. Therefore, saving the map pointer
of the old element for htab of maps before unlocking the bucket and
releasing the map_ptr after unlock. Beside the map pointer in the old
element, should do the same thing for the special fields in the old
element as well.
(2) free_htab_elem() (through htab_put_fd_value())
Its caller includes __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem(),
htab_map_delete_elem() and __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch().
For htab_map_delete_elem(), simply invoke free_htab_elem() after
htab_unlock_bucket(). For __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), just
like lru map, linking the to-be-freed element into node_to_free list
and invoking free_htab_elem() for these element after unlock. It is safe
to reuse batch_flink as the link for node_to_free, because these
elements have been removed from the hash llist.
Because htab of maps doesn't support lookup_and_delete operation,
__htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem() doesn't have the problem, so kept
it as
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-56588

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: hisi_sas: Create all dump files during debugfs initialization
For the current debugfs of hisi_sas, after user triggers dump, the
driver allocate memory space to save the register information and create
debugfs files to display the saved information. In this process, the
debugfs files created after each dump.
Therefore, when the dump is triggered while the driver is unbind, the
following hang occurs:
[67840.853907] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a0
[67840.862947] Mem abort info:
[67840.865855] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[67840.869713] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[67840.875125] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[67840.878291] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[67840.881545] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[67840.886528] Data abort info:
[67840.889524] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[67840.895117] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[67840.900284] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[67840.905709] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000002803a1f000
[67840.912263] [00000000000000a0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
[67840.919177] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[67840.996435] pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[67841.003628] pc : down_write+0x30/0x98
[67841.007546] lr : start_creating.part.0+0x60/0x198
[67841.012495] sp : ffff8000b979ba20
[67841.016046] x29: ffff8000b979ba20 x28: 0000000000000010 x27: 0000000000024b40
[67841.023412] x26: 0000000000000012 x25: ffff20202b355ae8 x24: ffff20202b35a8c8
[67841.030779] x23: ffffa36877928208 x22: ffffa368b4972240 x21: ffff8000b979bb18
[67841.038147] x20: ffff00281dc1e3c0 x19: fffffffffffffffe x18: 0000000000000020
[67841.045515] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffa368b128a530 x15: ffffffffffffffff
[67841.052888] x14: ffff8000b979bc18 x13: ffffffffffffffff x12: ffff8000b979bb18
[67841.060263] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffa368b1289b18
[67841.067640] x8 : 0000000000000012 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 00000000000003a9
[67841.075014] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff002818c5cb00 x3 : 0000000000000001
[67841.082388] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff002818c5cb00 x0 : 00000000000000a0
[67841.089759] Call trace:
[67841.092456] down_write+0x30/0x98
[67841.096017] start_creating.part.0+0x60/0x198
[67841.100613] debugfs_create_dir+0x48/0x1f8
[67841.104950] debugfs_create_files_v3_hw+0x88/0x348 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]
[67841.111447] debugfs_snapshot_regs_v3_hw+0x708/0x798 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]
[67841.118111] debugfs_trigger_dump_v3_hw_write+0x9c/0x120 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]
[67841.125115] full_proxy_write+0x68/0xc8
[67841.129175] vfs_write+0xd8/0x3f0
[67841.132708] ksys_write+0x70/0x108
[67841.136317] __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38
[67841.140440] invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128
[67841.144385] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0
[67841.149273] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
[67841.152773] el0_svc+0x38/0xd8
[67841.156009] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8
[67841.160361] el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
[67841.164189] Code: b9000882 d2800002 d2800023 f9800011 (c85ffc05)
[67841.170443] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
To fix this issue, create all directories and files during debugfs
initialization. In this way, the driver only needs to allocate memory
space to save information each time the user triggers dumping.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-49875

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: map the EBADMSG to nfserr_io to avoid warning
Ext4 will throw -EBADMSG through ext4_readdir when a checksum error
occurs, resulting in the following WARNING.
Fix it by mapping EBADMSG to nfserr_io.
nfsd_buffered_readdir
iterate_dir // -EBADMSG -74
ext4_readdir // .iterate_shared
ext4_dx_readdir
ext4_htree_fill_tree
htree_dirblock_to_tree
ext4_read_dirblock
__ext4_read_dirblock
ext4_dirblock_csum_verify
warn_no_space_for_csum
__warn_no_space_for_csum
return ERR_PTR(-EFSBADCRC) // -EBADMSG -74
nfserrno // WARNING
[ 161.115610] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 161.116465] nfsd: non-standard errno: -74
[ 161.117315] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 780 at fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c:878 nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[ 161.118596] Modules linked in:
[ 161.119243] CPU: 1 PID: 780 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 5.10.0-00014-g79679361fd5d #138
[ 161.120684] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qe
mu.org 04/01/2014
[ 161.123601] RIP: 0010:nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[ 161.124676] Code: 0f 87 da 30 dd 00 83 e3 01 b8 00 00 00 05 75 d7 44 89 ee 48 c7 c7 c0 57 24 98 89 44 24 04 c6
05 ce 2b 61 03 01 e8 99 20 d8 00 <0f> 0b 8b 44 24 04 eb b5 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 a0 6d a4 99 e8 cc 15 33
[ 161.127797] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000e2f9c0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 161.128794] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 161.130089] RDX: 1ffff1103ee16f6d RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: fffff520001c5f2a
[ 161.131379] RBP: 0000000000000022 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8881f70c1827
[ 161.132664] R10: ffffed103ee18304 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000021
[ 161.133949] R13: 00000000ffffffb6 R14: ffff8881317c0000 R15: ffffc90000e2fbd8
[ 161.135244] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881f7080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 161.136695] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 161.137761] CR2: 00007fcaad70b348 CR3: 0000000144256006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 161.139041] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 161.140291] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 161.141519] PKRU: 55555554
[ 161.142076] Call Trace:
[ 161.142575] ? __warn+0x9b/0x140
[ 161.143229] ? nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[ 161.143872] ? report_bug+0x125/0x150
[ 161.144595] ? handle_bug+0x41/0x90
[ 161.145284] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[ 161.146009] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20
[ 161.146816] ? nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[ 161.147487] nfsd_buffered_readdir+0x28b/0x2b0
[ 161.148333] ? nfsd4_encode_dirent_fattr+0x380/0x380
[ 161.149258] ? nfsd_buffered_filldir+0xf0/0xf0
[ 161.150093] ? wait_for_concurrent_writes+0x170/0x170
[ 161.151004] ? generic_file_llseek_size+0x48/0x160
[ 161.151895] nfsd_readdir+0x132/0x190
[ 161.152606] ? nfsd4_encode_dirent_fattr+0x380/0x380
[ 161.153516] ? nfsd_unlink+0x380/0x380
[ 161.154256] ? override_creds+0x45/0x60
[ 161.155006] nfsd4_encode_readdir+0x21a/0x3d0
[ 161.155850] ? nfsd4_encode_readlink+0x210/0x210
[ 161.156731] ? write_bytes_to_xdr_buf+0x97/0xe0
[ 161.157598] ? __write_bytes_to_xdr_buf+0xd0/0xd0
[ 161.158494] ? lock_downgrade+0x90/0x90
[ 161.159232] ? nfs4svc_decode_voidarg+0x10/0x10
[ 161.160092] nfsd4_encode_operation+0x15a/0x440
[ 161.160959] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x718/0xe90
[ 161.161818] nfsd_dispatch+0x18e/0x2c0
[ 161.162586] svc_process_common+0x786/0xc50
[ 161.163403] ? nfsd_svc+0x380/0x380
[ 161.164137] ? svc_printk+0x160/0x160
[ 161.164846] ? svc_xprt_do_enqueue.part.0+0x365/0x380
[ 161.165808] ? nfsd_svc+0x380/0x380
[ 161.166523] ? rcu_is_watching+0x23/0x40
[ 161.167309] svc_process+0x1a5/0x200
[ 161.168019] nfsd+0x1f5/0x380
[ 161.168663] ? nfsd_shutdown_threads+0x260/0x260
[ 161.169554] kthread+0x1c4/0x210
[ 161.170224] ? kthread_insert_work_sanity_check+0x80/0x80
[ 161.171246] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46788

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/osnoise: Use a cpumask to know what threads are kthreads
The start_kthread() and stop_thread() code was not always called with the
interface_lock held. This means that the kthread variable could be
unexpectedly changed causing the kthread_stop() to be called on it when it
should not have been, leading to:
while true; do
rtla timerlat top -u -q & PID=$!;
sleep 5;
kill -INT $PID;
sleep 0.001;
kill -TERM $PID;
wait $PID;
done
Causing the following OOPS:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 885 Comm: timerlatu/5 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-test-00002-gbc754cc76d1b-dirty #125 a533010b71dab205ad2f507188ce8c82203b0254
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:hrtimer_active+0x58/0x300
Code: 48 c1 ee 03 41 54 48 01 d1 48 01 d6 55 53 48 83 ec 20 80 39 00 0f 85 30 02 00 00 49 8b 6f 30 4c 8d 75 10 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 <0f> b6 3c 10 4c 89 f0 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 40 38 f8 7c 09 40 84 ff 0f
RSP: 0018:ffff88811d97f940 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88823c6b5b28 RCX: ffffed10478d6b6b
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffffed10478d6b6c RDI: ffff88823c6b5b28
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88823c6b5b58 R09: ffff88823c6b5b60
R10: ffff88811d97f957 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: 00000000000a801d
R13: ffff88810d8b35d8 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: ffff88823c6b5b28
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88823c680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000561858ad7258 CR3: 000000007729e001 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die_addr+0x40/0xa0
? exc_general_protection+0x154/0x230
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
? hrtimer_active+0x58/0x300
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_locks_remove_file+0x10/0x10
hrtimer_cancel+0x15/0x40
timerlat_fd_release+0x8e/0x1f0
? security_file_release+0x43/0x80
__fput+0x372/0xb10
task_work_run+0x11e/0x1f0
? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0
? __pfx_task_work_run+0x10/0x10
? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x170
? do_exit+0x7a0/0x24b0
do_exit+0x7bd/0x24b0
? __pfx_migrate_enable+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_do_exit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_read_tsc+0x10/0x10
? ktime_get+0x64/0x140
? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x86/0xe0
do_group_exit+0xb0/0x220
get_signal+0x17ba/0x1b50
? vfs_read+0x179/0xa40
? timerlat_fd_read+0x30b/0x9d0
? __pfx_get_signal+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_timerlat_fd_read+0x10/0x10
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x8c/0x570
? __pfx_arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x10/0x10
? vfs_read+0x179/0xa40
? ksys_read+0xfe/0x1d0
? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xbc/0x130
do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110
? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
? fpregs_restore_userregs+0xdb/0x1e0
? fpregs_restore_userregs+0xdb/0x1e0
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x116/0x130
? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110
? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110
? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79
RIP: 0033:0x7ff0070eca9c
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7ff0070eca72.
RSP: 002b:00007ff006dff8c0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007ff0070eca9c
RDX: 0000000000000400 RSI: 00007ff006dff9a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ff006dffde0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ff000000ba0
R10: 00007ff007004b08 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 00007ff006dff9a0 R14: 0000000000000007 R15: 0000000000000008
</TASK>
Modules linked in: snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
This is because it would mistakenly call kthread_stop() on a user space
thread making it "exit" before it actually exits.
Since kthread
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-46765

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: protect XDP configuration with a mutex
The main threat to data consistency in ice_xdp() is a possible asynchronous
PF reset. It can be triggered by a user or by TX timeout handler.
XDP setup and PF reset code access the same resources in the following
sections:
* ice_vsi_close() in ice_prepare_for_reset() - already rtnl-locked
* ice_vsi_rebuild() for the PF VSI - not protected
* ice_vsi_open() - already rtnl-locked
With an unfortunate timing, such accesses can result in a crash such as the
one below:
[ +1.999878] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 14
[ +2.002992] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 18
[Mar15 18:17] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: NETDEV WATCHDOG: CPU: 38: transmit queue 14 timed out 80692736 ms
[ +0.000093] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout: VSI_num: 6, Q 14, NTC: 0x0, HW_HEAD: 0x0, NTU: 0x0, INT: 0x4000001
[ +0.000012] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout recovery level 1, txqueue 14
[ +0.394718] ice 0000:b1:00.0: PTP reset successful
[ +0.006184] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098
[ +0.000045] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ +0.000023] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ +0.000023] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ +0.000018] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ +0.000023] CPU: 38 PID: 7540 Comm: kworker/38:1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7 #1
[ +0.000031] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0014.082620210524 08/26/2021
[ +0.000036] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice]
[ +0.000183] RIP: 0010:ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice]
[...]
[ +0.000013] Call Trace:
[ +0.000016] <TASK>
[ +0.000014] ? __die+0x1f/0x70
[ +0.000029] ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4f0
[ +0.000029] ? schedule+0x3b/0xd0
[ +0.000027] ? exc_page_fault+0x7b/0x180
[ +0.000022] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ +0.000031] ? ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice]
[ +0.000194] ice_free_tx_ring+0xe/0x60 [ice]
[ +0.000186] ice_destroy_xdp_rings+0x157/0x310 [ice]
[ +0.000151] ice_vsi_decfg+0x53/0xe0 [ice]
[ +0.000180] ice_vsi_rebuild+0x239/0x540 [ice]
[ +0.000186] ice_vsi_rebuild_by_type+0x76/0x180 [ice]
[ +0.000145] ice_rebuild+0x18c/0x840 [ice]
[ +0.000145] ? delay_tsc+0x4a/0xc0
[ +0.000022] ? delay_tsc+0x92/0xc0
[ +0.000020] ice_do_reset+0x140/0x180 [ice]
[ +0.000886] ice_service_task+0x404/0x1030 [ice]
[ +0.000824] process_one_work+0x171/0x340
[ +0.000685] worker_thread+0x277/0x3a0
[ +0.000675] ? preempt_count_add+0x6a/0xa0
[ +0.000677] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x50
[ +0.000679] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000653] kthread+0xf0/0x120
[ +0.000635] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000616] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[ +0.000612] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000604] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[ +0.000604] </TASK>
The previous way of handling this through returning -EBUSY is not viable,
particularly when destroying AF_XDP socket, because the kernel proceeds
with removal anyway.
There is plenty of code between those calls and there is no need to create
a large critical section that covers all of them, same as there is no need
to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() with rtnl_lock().
Add xdp_state_lock mutex to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() and ice_xdp().
Leaving unprotected sections in between would result in two states that
have to be considered:
1. when the VSI is closed, but not yet rebuild
2. when VSI is already rebuild, but not yet open
The latter case is actually already handled through !netif_running() case,
we just need to adjust flag checking a little. The former one is not as
trivial, because between ice_vsi_close() and ice_vsi_rebuild(), a lot of
hardware interaction happens, this can make adding/deleting rings exit
with an error. Luckily, VSI rebuild is pending and can apply new
configuration for us in a managed fashion.
Therefore, add an additional VSI state flag ICE_VSI_REBUILD_PENDING to
indicate that ice_x
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-45012

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nouveau/firmware: use dma non-coherent allocator
Currently, enabling SG_DEBUG in the kernel will cause nouveau to hit a
BUG() on startup, when the iommu is enabled:
kernel BUG at include/linux/scatterlist.h:187!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 7 PID: 930 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.9.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ #30
Hardware name: MSI MS-7A39/A320M GAMING PRO (MS-7A39), BIOS 1.I0 01/22/2019
RIP: 0010:sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
Code: 69 88 32 01 83 e1 03 f6 c3 03 75 20 a8 01 75 1e 48 09 cb 41 89 54
24 08 49 89 1c 24 41 89 6c 24 0c 5b 5d 41 5c e9 7b b9 88 00 <0f> 0b 0f 0b
0f 0b 48 8b 05 5e 46 9a 01 eb b2 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
RSP: 0018:ffffa776017bf6a0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa77600d87000 RCX: 000000000000002b
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa77680d87000
RBP: 000000000000e000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff98f4c46aa508 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff98f4c46aa508
R13: ffff98f4c46aa008 R14: ffffa77600d4a000 R15: ffffa77600d4a018
FS: 00007feeb5aae980(0000) GS:ffff98f5c4dc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f22cb9a4520 CR3: 00000001043ba000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die+0x36/0x90
? do_trap+0xdd/0x100
? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70
? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
nvkm_firmware_ctor+0x14a/0x250 [nouveau]
nvkm_falcon_fw_ctor+0x42/0x70 [nouveau]
ga102_gsp_booter_ctor+0xb4/0x1a0 [nouveau]
r535_gsp_oneinit+0xb3/0x15f0 [nouveau]
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? nvkm_udevice_new+0x95/0x140 [nouveau]
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? ktime_get+0x47/0xb0
Fix this by using the non-coherent allocator instead, I think there
might be a better answer to this, but it involve ripping up some of
APIs using sg lists.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-43817

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: missing check virtio
Two missing check in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() allowed syzbot
to crash kernels again
1. After the skb_segment function the buffer may become non-linear
(nr_frags != 0), but since the SKBTX_SHARED_FRAG flag is not set anywhere
the __skb_linearize function will not be executed, then the buffer will
remain non-linear. Then the condition (offset >= skb_headlen(skb))
becomes true, which causes WARN_ON_ONCE in skb_checksum_help.
2. The struct sk_buff and struct virtio_net_hdr members must be
mathematically related.
(gso_size) must be greater than (needed) otherwise WARN_ON_ONCE.
(remainder) must be greater than (needed) otherwise WARN_ON_ONCE.
(remainder) may be 0 if division is without remainder.
offset+2 (4191) > skb_headlen() (1116)
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5084 at net/core/dev.c:3303 skb_checksum_help+0x5e2/0x740 net/core/dev.c:3303
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 5084 Comm: syz-executor336 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc3-syzkaller-00014-gdf60cee26a2e #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/10/2023
RIP: 0010:skb_checksum_help+0x5e2/0x740 net/core/dev.c:3303
Code: 89 e8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 52 01 00 00 44 89 e2 2b 53 74 4c 89 ee 48 c7 c7 40 57 e9 8b e8 af 8f dd f8 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 e9 87 fe ff ff e8 40 0f 6e f9 e9 4b fa ff ff 48 89 ef
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a9f338 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888025125780 RCX: ffffffff814db209
RDX: ffff888015393b80 RSI: ffffffff814db216 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff8880251257f4 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 000000000000045c
R13: 000000000000105f R14: ffff8880251257f0 R15: 000000000000105d
FS: 0000555555c24380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000002000f000 CR3: 0000000023151000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ip_do_fragment+0xa1b/0x18b0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:777
ip_fragment.constprop.0+0x161/0x230 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:584
ip_finish_output_gso net/ipv4/ip_output.c:286 [inline]
__ip_finish_output net/ipv4/ip_output.c:308 [inline]
__ip_finish_output+0x49c/0x650 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:295
ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]
ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433
dst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline]
ip_local_out+0xaf/0x1a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129
iptunnel_xmit+0x5b4/0x9b0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:82
ipip6_tunnel_xmit net/ipv6/sit.c:1034 [inline]
sit_tunnel_xmit+0xed2/0x28f0 net/ipv6/sit.c:1076
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3545 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x13d/0x6d0 net/core/dev.c:3561
__dev_queue_xmit+0x7c1/0x3d60 net/core/dev.c:4346
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x257/0x380 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3087 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x24ca/0x5240 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x180 net/socket.c:745
__sys_sendto+0x255/0x340 net/socket.c:2190
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2202 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2198 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2198
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-43802

Description:

Vim is an improved version of the unix vi text editor. When flushing the typeahead buffer, Vim moves the current position in the typeahead buffer but does not check whether there is enough space left in the buffer to handle the next characters. So this may lead to the tb_off position within the typebuf variable to point outside of the valid buffer size, which can then later lead to a heap-buffer overflow in e.g. ins_typebuf(). Therefore, when flushing the typeahead buffer, check if there is enough space left before advancing the off position. If not, fall back to flush current typebuf contents. It's not quite clear yet, what can lead to this situation. It seems to happen when error messages occur (which will cause Vim to flush the typeahead buffer) in comnination with several long mappgins and so it may eventually move the off position out of a valid buffer size. Impact is low since it is not easily reproducible and requires to have several mappings active and run into some error condition. But when this happens, this will cause a crash. The issue has been fixed as of Vim patch v9.1.0697. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.

Locations:

vim-filesystem-2:8.0.1763-19.el8_6.4
vim-minimal-2:8.0.1763-19.el8_6.4

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-42321

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: flow_dissector: use DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE
The following splat is easy to reproduce upstream as well as in -stable
kernels. Florian Westphal provided the following commit:
d1dab4f71d37 ("net: add and use __skb_get_hash_symmetric_net")
but this complementary fix has been also suggested by Willem de Bruijn
and it can be easily backported to -stable kernel which consists in
using DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE instead to silence the following splat
given __skb_get_hash() is used by the nftables tracing infrastructure to
to identify packets in traces.
[69133.561393] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[69133.561404] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 43576 at net/core/flow_dissector.c:1104 __skb_flow_dissect+0x134f/
[...]
[69133.561944] CPU: 0 PID: 43576 Comm: socat Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7+ #379
[69133.561959] RIP: 0010:__skb_flow_dissect+0x134f/0x2ad0
[69133.561970] Code: 83 f9 04 0f 84 b3 00 00 00 45 85 c9 0f 84 aa 00 00 00 41 83 f9 02 0f 84 81 fc ff
ff 44 0f b7 b4 24 80 00 00 00 e9 8b f9 ff ff <0f> 0b e9 20 f3 ff ff 41 f6 c6 20 0f 84 e4 ef ff ff 48 8d 7b 12 e8
[69133.561979] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000006fc0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[69133.561988] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff82f33e20 RCX: ffffffff81ab7e19
[69133.561994] RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffffc90000007388 RDI: ffff888103a1b418
[69133.562001] RBP: ffffc90000007310 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[69133.562007] R10: ffffc90000007388 R11: ffffffff810cface R12: ffff888103a1b400
[69133.562013] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffff82f33e2a R15: ffffffff82f33e28
[69133.562020] FS: 00007f40f7131740(0000) GS:ffff888390800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[69133.562027] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[69133.562033] CR2: 00007f40f7346ee0 CR3: 000000015d200001 CR4: 00000000001706f0
[69133.562040] Call Trace:
[69133.562044] <IRQ>
[69133.562049] ? __warn+0x9f/0x1a0
[ 1211.841384] ? __skb_flow_dissect+0x107e/0x2860
[...]
[ 1211.841496] ? bpf_flow_dissect+0x160/0x160
[ 1211.841753] __skb_get_hash+0x97/0x280
[ 1211.841765] ? __skb_get_hash_symmetric+0x230/0x230
[ 1211.841776] ? mod_find+0xbf/0xe0
[ 1211.841786] ? get_stack_info_noinstr+0x12/0xe0
[ 1211.841798] ? bpf_ksym_find+0x56/0xe0
[ 1211.841807] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x2a/0x70
[ 1211.841819] nft_trace_init+0x1b9/0x1c0 [nf_tables]
[ 1211.841895] ? nft_trace_notify+0x830/0x830 [nf_tables]
[ 1211.841964] ? get_stack_info+0x2b/0x80
[ 1211.841975] ? nft_do_chain_arp+0x80/0x80 [nf_tables]
[ 1211.842044] nft_do_chain+0x79c/0x850 [nf_tables]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-41047

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: Fix XDP program unloading while removing the driver
The commit 6533e558c650 ("i40e: Fix reset path while removing
the driver") introduced a new PF state "__I40E_IN_REMOVE" to block
modifying the XDP program while the driver is being removed.
Unfortunately, such a change is useful only if the ".ndo_bpf()"
callback was called out of the rmmod context because unloading the
existing XDP program is also a part of driver removing procedure.
In other words, from the rmmod context the driver is expected to
unload the XDP program without reporting any errors. Otherwise,
the kernel warning with callstack is printed out to dmesg.
Example failing scenario:
1. Load the i40e driver.
2. Load the XDP program.
3. Unload the i40e driver (using "rmmod" command).
The example kernel warning log:
[ +0.004646] WARNING: CPU: 94 PID: 10395 at net/core/dev.c:9290 unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x7a9/0x870
[...]
[ +0.010959] RIP: 0010:unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x7a9/0x870
[...]
[ +0.002726] Call Trace:
[ +0.002457] <TASK>
[ +0.002119] ? __warn+0x80/0x120
[ +0.003245] ? unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x7a9/0x870
[ +0.005586] ? report_bug+0x164/0x190
[ +0.003678] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80
[ +0.003503] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[ +0.003846] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ +0.004200] ? unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x7a9/0x870
[ +0.005579] ? unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x3cc/0x870
[ +0.005586] unregister_netdevice_queue+0xf7/0x140
[ +0.004806] unregister_netdev+0x1c/0x30
[ +0.003933] i40e_vsi_release+0x87/0x2f0 [i40e]
[ +0.004604] i40e_remove+0x1a1/0x420 [i40e]
[ +0.004220] pci_device_remove+0x3f/0xb0
[ +0.003943] device_release_driver_internal+0x19f/0x200
[ +0.005243] driver_detach+0x48/0x90
[ +0.003586] bus_remove_driver+0x6d/0xf0
[ +0.003939] pci_unregister_driver+0x2e/0xb0
[ +0.004278] i40e_exit_module+0x10/0x5f0 [i40e]
[ +0.004570] __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x197/0x310
[ +0.005153] do_syscall_64+0x85/0x170
[ +0.003684] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x69/0x220
[ +0.004886] ? do_syscall_64+0x95/0x170
[ +0.003851] ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180
[ +0.003932] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79
[ +0.005064] RIP: 0033:0x7f59dc9347cb
[ +0.003648] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 65 16 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83
c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f
05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 35 16 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ +0.018753] RSP: 002b:00007ffffac99048 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
[ +0.007577] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559b9bb2f6e0 RCX: 00007f59dc9347cb
[ +0.007140] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559b9bb2f748
[ +0.007146] RBP: 00007ffffac99070 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000
[ +0.007133] R10: 00007f59dc9a5ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
[ +0.007141] R13: 00007ffffac992d8 R14: 0000559b9bb2f6e0 R15: 0000000000000000
[ +0.007151] </TASK>
[ +0.002204] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Fix this by checking if the XDP program is being loaded or unloaded.
Then, block only loading a new program while "__I40E_IN_REMOVE" is set.
Also, move testing "__I40E_IN_REMOVE" flag to the beginning of XDP_SETUP
callback to avoid unnecessary operations and checks.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-41000

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block/ioctl: prefer different overflow check
Running syzkaller with the newly reintroduced signed integer overflow
sanitizer shows this report:
[ 62.982337] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 62.985692] cgroup: Invalid name
[ 62.986211] UBSAN: signed-integer-overflow in ../block/ioctl.c:36:46
[ 62.989370] 9pnet_fd: p9_fd_create_tcp (7343): problem connecting socket to 127.0.0.1
[ 62.992992] 9223372036854775807 + 4095 cannot be represented in type 'long long'
[ 62.997827] 9pnet_fd: p9_fd_create_tcp (7345): problem connecting socket to 127.0.0.1
[ 62.999369] random: crng reseeded on system resumption
[ 63.000634] GUP no longer grows the stack in syz-executor.2 (7353): 20002000-20003000 (20001000)
[ 63.000668] CPU: 0 PID: 7353 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-00035-gb3ef86b5a957 #1
[ 63.000677] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 63.000682] Call Trace:
[ 63.000686] <TASK>
[ 63.000731] dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
[ 63.000919] __get_user_pages+0x903/0xd30
[ 63.001030] __gup_longterm_locked+0x153e/0x1ba0
[ 63.001041] ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x17/0x50
[ 63.001072] ? try_get_folio+0x29c/0x2d0
[ 63.001083] internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x1119/0x1530
[ 63.001109] iov_iter_extract_pages+0x23b/0x580
[ 63.001206] bio_iov_iter_get_pages+0x4de/0x1220
[ 63.001235] iomap_dio_bio_iter+0x9b6/0x1410
[ 63.001297] __iomap_dio_rw+0xab4/0x1810
[ 63.001316] iomap_dio_rw+0x45/0xa0
[ 63.001328] ext4_file_write_iter+0xdde/0x1390
[ 63.001372] vfs_write+0x599/0xbd0
[ 63.001394] ksys_write+0xc8/0x190
[ 63.001403] do_syscall_64+0xd4/0x1b0
[ 63.001421] ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x3a/0x60
[ 63.001479] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
[ 63.001535] RIP: 0033:0x7f7fd3ebf539
[ 63.001551] Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 14 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 63.001562] RSP: 002b:00007f7fd32570c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 63.001584] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7fd3ff3f80 RCX: 00007f7fd3ebf539
[ 63.001590] RDX: 4db6d1e4f7e43360 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000004
[ 63.001595] RBP: 00007f7fd3f1e496 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 63.001599] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 63.001604] R13: 0000000000000006 R14: 00007f7fd3ff3f80 R15: 00007ffd415ad2b8
...
[ 63.018142] ---[ end trace ]---
Historically, the signed integer overflow sanitizer did not work in the
kernel due to its interaction with `-fwrapv` but this has since been
changed [1] in the newest version of Clang; It was re-enabled in the
kernel with Commit 557f8c582a9ba8ab ("ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow
sanitizer").
Let's rework this overflow checking logic to not actually perform an
overflow during the check itself, thus avoiding the UBSAN splat.
[1]: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/82432

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-39479

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/hwmon: Get rid of devm
When both hwmon and hwmon drvdata (on which hwmon depends) are device
managed resources, the expectation, on device unbind, is that hwmon will be
released before drvdata. However, in i915 there are two separate code
paths, which both release either drvdata or hwmon and either can be
released before the other. These code paths (for device unbind) are as
follows (see also the bug referenced below):
Call Trace:
release_nodes+0x11/0x70
devres_release_group+0xb2/0x110
component_unbind_all+0x8d/0xa0
component_del+0xa5/0x140
intel_pxp_tee_component_fini+0x29/0x40 [i915]
intel_pxp_fini+0x33/0x80 [i915]
i915_driver_remove+0x4c/0x120 [i915]
i915_pci_remove+0x19/0x30 [i915]
pci_device_remove+0x32/0xa0
device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200
unbind_store+0x9c/0xb0
and
Call Trace:
release_nodes+0x11/0x70
devres_release_all+0x8a/0xc0
device_unbind_cleanup+0x9/0x70
device_release_driver_internal+0x1c1/0x200
unbind_store+0x9c/0xb0
This means that in i915, if use devm, we cannot gurantee that hwmon will
always be released before drvdata. Which means that we have a uaf if hwmon
sysfs is accessed when drvdata has been released but hwmon hasn't.
The only way out of this seems to be do get rid of devm_ and release/free
everything explicitly during device unbind.
v2: Change commit message and other minor code changes
v3: Cleanup from i915_hwmon_register on error (Armin Wolf)
v4: Eliminate potential static analyzer warning (Rodrigo)
Eliminate fetch_and_zero (Jani)
v5: Restore previous logic for ddat_gt->hwmon_dev error return (Andi)

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-38594

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: move the EST lock to struct stmmac_priv
Reinitialize the whole EST structure would also reset the mutex
lock which is embedded in the EST structure, and then trigger
the following warning. To address this, move the lock to struct
stmmac_priv. We also need to reacquire the mutex lock when doing
this initialization.
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 505 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 505 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-00053-g0106679839f7-dirty #29
Hardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT)
pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
lr : __mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
sp : ffffffc0864e3570
x29: ffffffc0864e3570 x28: ffffffc0817bdc78 x27: 0000000000000003
x26: ffffff80c54f1808 x25: ffffff80c9164080 x24: ffffffc080d723ac
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffffc083bc3000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
x17: ffffffc08117b080 x16: 0000000000000002 x15: ffffff80d2d40000
x14: 00000000000002da x13: ffffff80d2d404b8 x12: ffffffc082b5a5c8
x11: ffffffc082bca680 x10: ffffffc082bb2640 x9 : ffffffc082bb2698
x8 : 0000000000017fe8 x7 : c0000000ffffefff x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffffff8178fe0d48 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000027
x2 : ffffff8178fe0d50 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
__mutex_lock+0xd84/0x1068
mutex_lock_nested+0x28/0x34
tc_setup_taprio+0x118/0x68c
stmmac_setup_tc+0x50/0xf0
taprio_change+0x868/0xc9c

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-36938

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, skmsg: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
Fix NULL pointer data-races in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue() which
syzbot reported [1].
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sk_psock_drop / sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
write to 0xffff88814b3278b8 of 8 bytes by task 10724 on cpu 1:
sk_psock_stop_verdict net/core/skmsg.c:1257 [inline]
sk_psock_drop+0x13e/0x1f0 net/core/skmsg.c:843
sk_psock_put include/linux/skmsg.h:459 [inline]
sock_map_close+0x1a7/0x260 net/core/sock_map.c:1648
unix_release+0x4b/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048
__sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
sock_close+0x68/0x150 net/socket.c:1421
__fput+0x2c1/0x660 fs/file_table.c:422
__fput_sync+0x44/0x60 fs/file_table.c:507
__do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline]
__se_sys_close+0x101/0x1b0 fs/open.c:1541
__x64_sys_close+0x1f/0x30 fs/open.c:1541
do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
read to 0xffff88814b3278b8 of 8 bytes by task 10713 on cpu 0:
sk_psock_data_ready include/linux/skmsg.h:464 [inline]
sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue+0x32d/0x390 net/core/skmsg.c:555
sk_psock_skb_ingress_self+0x185/0x1e0 net/core/skmsg.c:606
sk_psock_verdict_apply net/core/skmsg.c:1008 [inline]
sk_psock_verdict_recv+0x3e4/0x4a0 net/core/skmsg.c:1202
unix_read_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:2546 [inline]
unix_stream_read_skb+0x9e/0xf0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2682
sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0x77/0x220 net/core/skmsg.c:1223
unix_stream_sendmsg+0x527/0x860 net/unix/af_unix.c:2339
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x140/0x180 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x312/0x410 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x1e9/0x280 net/socket.c:2667
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x46/0x50 net/socket.c:2674
do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
value changed: 0xffffffff83d7feb0 -> 0x0000000000000000
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 10713 Comm: syz-executor.4 Tainted: G W 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024
Prior to this, commit 4cd12c6065df ("bpf, sockmap: Fix NULL pointer
dereference in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready()") fixed one NULL pointer
similarly due to no protection of saved_data_ready. Here is another
different caller causing the same issue because of the same reason. So
we should protect it with sk_callback_lock read lock because the writer
side in the sk_psock_drop() uses "write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);".
To avoid errors that could happen in future, I move those two pairs of
lock into the sk_psock_data_ready(), which is suggested by John Fastabend.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35995

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: CPPC: Use access_width over bit_width for system memory accesses
To align with ACPI 6.3+, since bit_width can be any 8-bit value, it
cannot be depended on to be always on a clean 8b boundary. This was
uncovered on the Cobalt 100 platform.
SError Interrupt on CPU26, code 0xbe000011 -- SError
CPU: 26 PID: 1510 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.15.2.1-13 #1
Hardware name: MICROSOFT CORPORATION, BIOS MICROSOFT CORPORATION
pstate: 62400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : cppc_get_perf_caps+0xec/0x410
lr : cppc_get_perf_caps+0xe8/0x410
sp : ffff8000155ab730
x29: ffff8000155ab730 x28: ffff0080139d0038 x27: ffff0080139d0078
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0080139d0058 x24: 00000000ffffffff
x23: ffff0080139d0298 x22: ffff0080139d0278 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: ffff00802b251910 x19: ffff0080139d0000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffdc7e111bad04 x15: ffff00802b251008
x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: ffff013f1fd63300 x12: 0000000000000006
x11: ffffdc7e128f4420 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffdc7e111badec
x8 : ffff00802b251980 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff0080139d0028
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff0080139d0018 x3 : 00000000ffffffff
x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : ffff8000155ab7a0 x0 : 0000000000000000
Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt
CPU: 26 PID: 1510 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted
5.15.2.1-13 #1
Hardware name: MICROSOFT CORPORATION, BIOS MICROSOFT CORPORATION
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1e0
show_stack+0x24/0x30
dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8
dump_stack+0x18/0x34
panic+0x16c/0x384
add_taint+0x0/0xc0
arm64_serror_panic+0x7c/0x90
arm64_is_fatal_ras_serror+0x34/0xa4
do_serror+0x50/0x6c
el1h_64_error_handler+0x40/0x74
el1h_64_error+0x7c/0x80
cppc_get_perf_caps+0xec/0x410
cppc_cpufreq_cpu_init+0x74/0x400 [cppc_cpufreq]
cpufreq_online+0x2dc/0xa30
cpufreq_add_dev+0xc0/0xd4
subsys_interface_register+0x134/0x14c
cpufreq_register_driver+0x1b0/0x354
cppc_cpufreq_init+0x1a8/0x1000 [cppc_cpufreq]
do_one_initcall+0x50/0x250
do_init_module+0x60/0x27c
load_module+0x2300/0x2570
__do_sys_finit_module+0xa8/0x114
__arm64_sys_finit_module+0x2c/0x3c
invoke_syscall+0x78/0x100
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x180/0x1a0
do_el0_svc+0x84/0xa0
el0_svc+0x2c/0xc0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x12c
el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
Instead, use access_width to determine the size and use the offset and
width to shift and mask the bits to read/write out. Make sure to add a
check for system memory since pcc redefines the access_width to
subspace id.
If access_width is not set, then fall back to using bit_width.
[ rjw: Subject and changelog edits, comment adjustments ]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35979

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
raid1: fix use-after-free for original bio in raid1_write_request()
r1_bio->bios[] is used to record new bios that will be issued to
underlying disks, however, in raid1_write_request(), r1_bio->bios[]
will set to the original bio temporarily. Meanwhile, if blocked rdev
is set, free_r1bio() will be called causing that all r1_bio->bios[]
to be freed:
raid1_write_request()
r1_bio = alloc_r1bio(mddev, bio); -> r1_bio->bios[] is NULL
for (i = 0; i < disks; i++) -> for each rdev in conf
// first rdev is normal
r1_bio->bios[0] = bio; -> set to original bio
// second rdev is blocked
if (test_bit(Blocked, &rdev->flags))
break
if (blocked_rdev)
free_r1bio()
put_all_bios()
bio_put(r1_bio->bios[0]) -> original bio is freed
Test scripts:
mdadm -CR /dev/md0 -l1 -n4 /dev/sd[abcd] --assume-clean
fio -filename=/dev/md0 -ioengine=libaio -rw=write -bs=4k -numjobs=1 \
-iodepth=128 -name=test -direct=1
echo blocked > /sys/block/md0/md/rd2/state
Test result:
BUG bio-264 (Not tainted): Object already free
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Allocated in mempool_alloc_slab+0x24/0x50 age=1 cpu=1 pid=869
kmem_cache_alloc+0x324/0x480
mempool_alloc_slab+0x24/0x50
mempool_alloc+0x6e/0x220
bio_alloc_bioset+0x1af/0x4d0
blkdev_direct_IO+0x164/0x8a0
blkdev_write_iter+0x309/0x440
aio_write+0x139/0x2f0
io_submit_one+0x5ca/0xb70
__do_sys_io_submit+0x86/0x270
__x64_sys_io_submit+0x22/0x30
do_syscall_64+0xb1/0x210
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74
Freed in mempool_free_slab+0x1f/0x30 age=1 cpu=1 pid=869
kmem_cache_free+0x28c/0x550
mempool_free_slab+0x1f/0x30
mempool_free+0x40/0x100
bio_free+0x59/0x80
bio_put+0xf0/0x220
free_r1bio+0x74/0xb0
raid1_make_request+0xadf/0x1150
md_handle_request+0xc7/0x3b0
md_submit_bio+0x76/0x130
__submit_bio+0xd8/0x1d0
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x1eb/0x5c0
submit_bio_noacct+0x169/0xd40
submit_bio+0xee/0x1d0
blkdev_direct_IO+0x322/0x8a0
blkdev_write_iter+0x309/0x440
aio_write+0x139/0x2f0
Since that bios for underlying disks are not allocated yet, fix this
problem by using mempool_free() directly to free the r1_bio.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35976

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: validate user input for XDP_{UMEM|COMPLETION}_FILL_RING
syzbot reported an illegal copy in xsk_setsockopt() [1]
Make sure to validate setsockopt() @optlen parameter.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888028c6cde3 by task syz-executor.0/7549
CPU: 0 PID: 7549 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420
do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
RIP: 0033:0x7fb40587de69
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fb40665a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb4059abf80 RCX: 00007fb40587de69
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 000000000000011b RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007fb4058ca47a R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020001980 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fb4059abf80 R15: 00007fff57ee4d08
</TASK>
Allocated by task 7549:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3966 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x233/0x4a0 mm/slub.c:3979
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:632 [inline]
__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd2f/0x1040 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869
do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888028c6cde0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 1 bytes to the right of
allocated 2-byte region [ffff888028c6cde0, ffff888028c6cde2)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea0000a31b00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888028c6c9c0 pfn:0x28c6c
anon flags: 0xfff00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 00fff00000000800 ffff888014c41280 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
raw: ffff888028c6c9c0 0000000080800057 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x112cc0(GFP_USER|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 6648, tgid 6644 (syz-executor.0), ts 133906047828, free_ts 133859922223
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1ea/0x210 mm/page_alloc.c:1533
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35961

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Register devlink first under devlink lock
In case device is having a non fatal FW error during probe, the
driver will report the error to user via devlink. This will trigger
a WARN_ON, since mlx5 is calling devlink_register() last.
In order to avoid the WARN_ON[1], change mlx5 to invoke devl_register()
first under devlink lock.
[1]
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 227 at net/devlink/health.c:483 devlink_recover_notify.constprop.0+0xb8/0xc0
CPU: 5 PID: 227 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc5_for_upstream_min_debug_2023_06_12_12_38 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: mlx5_health0000:08:00.0 mlx5_fw_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core]
RIP: 0010:devlink_recover_notify.constprop.0+0xb8/0xc0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x79/0x120
? devlink_recover_notify.constprop.0+0xb8/0xc0
? report_bug+0x17c/0x190
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x60
? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? devlink_recover_notify.constprop.0+0xb8/0xc0
devlink_health_report+0x4a/0x1c0
mlx5_fw_reporter_err_work+0xa4/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x1bb/0x3c0
? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0
worker_thread+0x4d/0x3c0
? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0
kthread+0xc6/0xf0
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35934

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: reduce rtnl pressure in smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list()
Many syzbot reports show extreme rtnl pressure, and many of them hint
that smc acquires rtnl in netns creation for no good reason [1]
This patch returns early from smc_pnet_net_init()
if there is no netdevice yet.
I am not even sure why smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list() even exists,
because smc_pnet_netdev_event() is also calling
smc_pnet_add_base_pnetid() when handling NETDEV_UP event.
[1] extract of typical syzbot reports
2 locks held by syz-executor.3/12252:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.4/12253:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.1/12257:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.2/12261:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.0/12265:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.3/12268:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.4/12271:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.1/12274:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878
2 locks held by syz-executor.2/12280:
#0: ffffffff8f369610 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_net_ns+0x4c7/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:491
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_create_pnetids_list net/smc/smc_pnet.c:809 [inline]
#1: ffffffff8f375b88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: smc_pnet_net_init+0x10a/0x1e0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:878

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35931

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Skip do PCI error slot reset during RAS recovery
Why:
The PCI error slot reset maybe triggered after inject ue to UMC multi times, this
caused system hang.
[ 557.371857] amdgpu 0000:af:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset succeeded, trying to resume
[ 557.373718] [drm] PCIE GART of 512M enabled.
[ 557.373722] [drm] PTB located at 0x0000031FED700000
[ 557.373788] [drm] VRAM is lost due to GPU reset!
[ 557.373789] [drm] PSP is resuming...
[ 557.547012] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_err_detected Device state = 1 pci_status: 0. Exit, result = 3, need reset
[ 557.547067] [drm] PCI error: detected callback, state(1)!!
[ 557.547069] [drm] No support for XGMI hive yet...
[ 557.548125] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_slot_reset Device state = 1 pci_status: 0. Enter
[ 557.607763] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: wait vital counter value 0x16b5b after 1 iterations
[ 557.607777] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_slot_reset Device state = 1 pci_status: 1. Exit, err = 0, result = 5, recovered
[ 557.610492] [drm] PCI error: slot reset callback!!
...
[ 560.689382] amdgpu 0000:3f:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset(2) succeeded!
[ 560.689546] amdgpu 0000:5a:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset(2) succeeded!
[ 560.689562] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x5f080b54534f611f: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 560.701008] CPU: 16 PID: 2361 Comm: kworker/u448:9 Tainted: G OE 5.15.0-91-generic #101-Ubuntu
[ 560.712057] Hardware name: Microsoft C278A/C278A, BIOS C2789.5.BS.1C11.AG.1 11/08/2023
[ 560.720959] Workqueue: amdgpu-reset-hive amdgpu_ras_do_recovery [amdgpu]
[ 560.728887] RIP: 0010:amdgpu_device_gpu_recover.cold+0xbf1/0xcf5 [amdgpu]
[ 560.736891] Code: ff 41 89 c6 e9 1b ff ff ff 44 0f b6 45 b0 e9 4f ff ff ff be 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 76 c9 8b ff 44 0f b6 45 b0 e9 3c fd ff ff <48> 83 ba 18 02 00 00 00 0f 84 6a f8 ff ff 48 8d 7a 78 be 01 00 00
[ 560.757967] RSP: 0018:ffa0000032e53d80 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 560.763848] RAX: ffa00000001dfd10 RBX: ffa0000000197090 RCX: ffa0000032e53db0
[ 560.771856] RDX: 5f080b54534f5f07 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ff11000128100010
[ 560.779867] RBP: ffa0000032e53df0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffffe77f08
[ 560.787879] R10: 0000000000ffff0a R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 560.795889] R13: ffa0000032e53e00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 560.803889] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff11007e7e800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 560.812973] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 560.819422] CR2: 000055a04c118e68 CR3: 0000000007410005 CR4: 0000000000771ee0
[ 560.827433] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 560.835433] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 560.843444] PKRU: 55555554
[ 560.846480] Call Trace:
[ 560.849225] <TASK>
[ 560.851580] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2ea
[ 560.856488] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2ea
[ 560.861379] ? amdgpu_ras_do_recovery+0x1b2/0x210 [amdgpu]
[ 560.867778] ? show_regs.part.0+0x23/0x29
[ 560.872293] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
[ 560.876502] ? die_addr+0x3e/0x60
[ 560.880238] ? exc_general_protection+0x1c5/0x410
[ 560.885532] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30
[ 560.891025] ? amdgpu_device_gpu_recover.cold+0xbf1/0xcf5 [amdgpu]
[ 560.898323] amdgpu_ras_do_recovery+0x1b2/0x210 [amdgpu]
[ 560.904520] process_one_work+0x228/0x3d0
How:
In RAS recovery, mode-1 reset is issued from RAS fatal error handling and expected
all the nodes in a hive to be reset. no need to issue another mode-1 during this procedure.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35927

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: Check output polling initialized before disabling
In drm_kms_helper_poll_disable() check if output polling
support is initialized before disabling polling. If not flag
this as a warning.
Additionally in drm_mode_config_helper_suspend() and
drm_mode_config_helper_resume() calls, that re the callers of these
functions, avoid invoking them if polling is not initialized.
For drivers like hyperv-drm, that do not initialize connector
polling, if suspend is called without this check, it leads to
suspend failure with following stack
[ 770.719392] Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.001 seconds) done.
[ 770.720592] printk: Suspending console(s) (use no_console_suspend to debug)
[ 770.948823] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 770.948824] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 17197 at kernel/workqueue.c:3162 __flush_work.isra.0+0x212/0x230
[ 770.948831] Modules linked in: rfkill nft_counter xt_conntrack xt_owner udf nft_compat crc_itu_t nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables nfnetlink vfat fat mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core mlx5_core intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common kvm_amd ccp mlxfw kvm psample hyperv_drm tls drm_shmem_helper drm_kms_helper irqbypass pcspkr syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt hv_balloon hv_utils joydev drm fuse xfs libcrc32c pci_hyperv pci_hyperv_intf sr_mod sd_mod cdrom t10_pi sg hv_storvsc scsi_transport_fc hv_netvsc serio_raw hyperv_keyboard hid_hyperv crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel hv_vmbus ghash_clmulni_intel dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[ 770.948863] CPU: 1 PID: 17197 Comm: systemd-sleep Not tainted 5.14.0-362.2.1.el9_3.x86_64 #1
[ 770.948865] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 05/09/2022
[ 770.948866] RIP: 0010:__flush_work.isra.0+0x212/0x230
[ 770.948869] Code: 8b 4d 00 4c 8b 45 08 89 ca 48 c1 e9 04 83 e2 08 83 e1 0f 83 ca 02 89 c8 48 0f ba 6d 00 03 e9 25 ff ff ff 0f 0b e9 4e ff ff ff <0f> 0b 45 31 ed e9 44 ff ff ff e8 8f 89 b2 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
[ 770.948870] RSP: 0018:ffffaf4ac213fb10 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 770.948871] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8c992857
[ 770.948872] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff9aad82b00330
[ 770.948873] RBP: ffff9aad82b00330 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9aad87ee3d10
[ 770.948874] R10: 0000000000000200 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9aad82b00330
[ 770.948874] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 770.948875] FS: 00007ff1b2f6bb40(0000) GS:ffff9aaf37d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 770.948878] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 770.948878] CR2: 0000555f345cb666 CR3: 00000001462dc005 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[ 770.948879] Call Trace:
[ 770.948880] <TASK>
[ 770.948881] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[ 770.948884] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[ 770.948886] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x103/0x190
[ 770.948887] ? __flush_work.isra.0+0x212/0x230
[ 770.948889] ? __warn+0x81/0x110
[ 770.948891] ? __flush_work.isra.0+0x212/0x230
[ 770.948892] ? report_bug+0x10a/0x140
[ 770.948895] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
[ 770.948898] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[ 770.948899] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 770.948903] ? __flush_work.isra.0+0x212/0x230
[ 770.948905] __cancel_work_timer+0x103/0x190
[ 770.948907] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xa/0x30
[ 770.948910] drm_kms_helper_poll_disable+0x1e/0x40 [drm_kms_helper]
[ 770.948923] drm_mode_config_helper_suspend+0x1c/0x80 [drm_kms_helper]
[ 770.948933] ? __pfx_vmbus_suspend+0x10/0x10 [hv_vmbus]
[ 770.948942] hyperv_vmbus_suspend+0x17/0x40 [hyperv_drm]
[ 770.948944] ? __pfx_vmbus_suspend+0x10/0x10 [hv_vmbus]
[ 770.948951] dpm_run_callback+0x4c/0x140
[ 770.948954] __device_suspend_noir
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35886

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: Fix infinite recursion in fib6_dump_done().
syzkaller reported infinite recursive calls of fib6_dump_done() during
netlink socket destruction. [1]
From the log, syzkaller sent an AF_UNSPEC RTM_GETROUTE message, and then
the response was generated. The following recvmmsg() resumed the dump
for IPv6, but the first call of inet6_dump_fib() failed at kzalloc() due
to the fault injection. [0]
12:01:34 executing program 3:
r0 = socket$nl_route(0x10, 0x3, 0x0)
sendmsg$nl_route(r0, ... snip ...)
recvmmsg(r0, ... snip ...) (fail_nth: 8)
Here, fib6_dump_done() was set to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done, and the next call
of inet6_dump_fib() set it to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3]. syzkaller stopped
receiving the response halfway through, and finally netlink_sock_destruct()
called nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done().
fib6_dump_done() calls fib6_dump_end() and nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() if it
is still not NULL. fib6_dump_end() rewrites nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() by
nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3], but it has the same function, not NULL, calling
itself recursively and hitting the stack guard page.
To avoid the issue, let's set the destructor after kzalloc().
[0]:
FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0
CPU: 1 PID: 432110 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117)
should_fail_ex (lib/fault-inject.c:52 lib/fault-inject.c:153)
should_failslab (mm/slub.c:3733)
kmalloc_trace (mm/slub.c:3748 mm/slub.c:3827 mm/slub.c:3992)
inet6_dump_fib (./include/linux/slab.h:628 ./include/linux/slab.h:749 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:662)
rtnl_dump_all (net/core/rtnetlink.c:4029)
netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2269)
netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988)
____sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1046 net/socket.c:2801)
___sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:2846)
do_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:2943)
__x64_sys_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:3041 net/socket.c:3034 net/socket.c:3034)
[1]:
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at 00000000f2fa9af1 (stack is 00000000b7912430..000000009a436beb)
stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 223719 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events netlink_sock_destruct_work
RIP: 0010:fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:570)
Code: 3c 24 e8 f3 e9 51 fd e9 28 fd ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd <53> 48 8d 5d 60 e8 b6 4d 07 fd 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d980000 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff84405990 RCX: ffffffff844059d3
RDX: ffff8881028e0000 RSI: ffffffff84405ac2 RDI: ffff88810c02f358
RBP: ffff88810c02f358 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000224 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff888007c82c78 R14: ffff888007c82c68 R15: ffff888007c82c68
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffc9000d97fff8 CR3: 0000000102309002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<#DF>
</#DF>
<TASK>
fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1))
fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1))
...
fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1))
fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1))
netlink_sock_destruct (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:401)
__sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2177 (discriminator 2))
sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2224)
__sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2235)
sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2246)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3259)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3329 kernel/workqueue.
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35860

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: support deferring bpf_link dealloc to after RCU grace period
BPF link for some program types is passed as a "context" which can be
used by those BPF programs to look up additional information. E.g., for
multi-kprobes and multi-uprobes, link is used to fetch BPF cookie values.
Because of this runtime dependency, when bpf_link refcnt drops to zero
there could still be active BPF programs running accessing link data.
This patch adds generic support to defer bpf_link dealloc callback to
after RCU GP, if requested. This is done by exposing two different
deallocation callbacks, one synchronous and one deferred. If deferred
one is provided, bpf_link_free() will schedule dealloc_deferred()
callback to happen after RCU GP.
BPF is using two flavors of RCU: "classic" non-sleepable one and RCU
tasks trace one. The latter is used when sleepable BPF programs are
used. bpf_link_free() accommodates that by checking underlying BPF
program's sleepable flag, and goes either through normal RCU GP only for
non-sleepable, or through RCU tasks trace GP *and* then normal RCU GP
(taking into account rcu_trace_implies_rcu_gp() optimization), if BPF
program is sleepable.
We use this for multi-kprobe and multi-uprobe links, which dereference
link during program run. We also preventively switch raw_tp link to use
deferred dealloc callback, as upcoming changes in bpf-next tree expose
raw_tp link data (specifically, cookie value) to BPF program at runtime
as well.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-35794

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-raid: really frozen sync_thread during suspend
1) commit f52f5c71f3d4 ("md: fix stopping sync thread") remove
MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN from __md_stop_writes() and doesn't realize that
dm-raid relies on __md_stop_writes() to frozen sync_thread
indirectly. Fix this problem by adding MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN in
md_stop_writes(), and since stop_sync_thread() is only used for
dm-raid in this case, also move stop_sync_thread() to
md_stop_writes().
2) The flag MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN doesn't mean that sync thread is frozen,
it only prevent new sync_thread to start, and it can't stop the
running sync thread; In order to frozen sync_thread, after seting the
flag, stop_sync_thread() should be used.
3) The flag MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN doesn't mean that writes are stopped, use
it as condition for md_stop_writes() in raid_postsuspend() doesn't
look correct. Consider that reentrant stop_sync_thread() do nothing,
always call md_stop_writes() in raid_postsuspend().
4) raid_message can set/clear the flag MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN at anytime,
and if MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN is cleared while the array is suspended,
new sync_thread can start unexpected. Fix this by disallow
raid_message() to change sync_thread status during suspend.
Note that after commit f52f5c71f3d4 ("md: fix stopping sync thread"), the
test shell/lvconvert-raid-reshape.sh start to hang in stop_sync_thread(),
and with previous fixes, the test won't hang there anymore, however, the
test will still fail and complain that ext4 is corrupted. And with this
patch, the test won't hang due to stop_sync_thread() or fail due to ext4
is corrupted anymore. However, there is still a deadlock related to
dm-raid456 that will be fixed in following patches.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-27057

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: ipc4-pcm: Workaround for crashed firmware on system suspend
When the system is suspended while audio is active, the
sof_ipc4_pcm_hw_free() is invoked to reset the pipelines since during
suspend the DSP is turned off, streams will be re-started after resume.
If the firmware crashes during while audio is running (or when we reset
the stream before suspend) then the sof_ipc4_set_multi_pipeline_state()
will fail with IPC error and the state change is interrupted.
This will cause misalignment between the kernel and firmware state on next
DSP boot resulting errors returned by firmware for IPC messages, eventually
failing the audio resume.
On stream close the errors are ignored so the kernel state will be
corrected on the next DSP boot, so the second boot after the DSP panic.
If sof_ipc4_trigger_pipelines() is called from sof_ipc4_pcm_hw_free() then
state parameter is SOF_IPC4_PIPE_RESET and only in this case.
Treat a forced pipeline reset similarly to how we treat a pcm_free by
ignoring error on state sending to allow the kernel's state to be
consistent with the state the firmware will have after the next boot.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-27004

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: Get runtime PM before walking tree during disable_unused
Doug reported [1] the following hung task:
INFO: task swapper/0:1 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Not tainted 5.15.149-21875-gf795ebc40eb8 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:swapper/0 state:D stack: 0 pid: 1 ppid: 0 flags:0x00000008
Call trace:
__switch_to+0xf4/0x1f4
__schedule+0x418/0xb80
schedule+0x5c/0x10c
rpm_resume+0xe0/0x52c
rpm_resume+0x178/0x52c
__pm_runtime_resume+0x58/0x98
clk_pm_runtime_get+0x30/0xb0
clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x58/0x208
clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x38/0x208
clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x38/0x208
clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x38/0x208
clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x38/0x208
clk_disable_unused+0x4c/0xe4
do_one_initcall+0xcc/0x2d8
do_initcall_level+0xa4/0x148
do_initcalls+0x5c/0x9c
do_basic_setup+0x24/0x30
kernel_init_freeable+0xec/0x164
kernel_init+0x28/0x120
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
INFO: task kworker/u16:0:9 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Not tainted 5.15.149-21875-gf795ebc40eb8 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:kworker/u16:0 state:D stack: 0 pid: 9 ppid: 2 flags:0x00000008
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
__switch_to+0xf4/0x1f4
__schedule+0x418/0xb80
schedule+0x5c/0x10c
schedule_preempt_disabled+0x2c/0x48
__mutex_lock+0x238/0x488
__mutex_lock_slowpath+0x1c/0x28
mutex_lock+0x50/0x74
clk_prepare_lock+0x7c/0x9c
clk_core_prepare_lock+0x20/0x44
clk_prepare+0x24/0x30
clk_bulk_prepare+0x40/0xb0
mdss_runtime_resume+0x54/0x1c8
pm_generic_runtime_resume+0x30/0x44
__genpd_runtime_resume+0x68/0x7c
genpd_runtime_resume+0x108/0x1f4
__rpm_callback+0x84/0x144
rpm_callback+0x30/0x88
rpm_resume+0x1f4/0x52c
rpm_resume+0x178/0x52c
__pm_runtime_resume+0x58/0x98
__device_attach+0xe0/0x170
device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28
bus_probe_device+0x3c/0x9c
device_add+0x644/0x814
mipi_dsi_device_register_full+0xe4/0x170
devm_mipi_dsi_device_register_full+0x28/0x70
ti_sn_bridge_probe+0x1dc/0x2c0
auxiliary_bus_probe+0x4c/0x94
really_probe+0xcc/0x2c8
__driver_probe_device+0xa8/0x130
driver_probe_device+0x48/0x110
__device_attach_driver+0xa4/0xcc
bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xd8
__device_attach+0xf8/0x170
device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28
bus_probe_device+0x3c/0x9c
deferred_probe_work_func+0x9c/0xd8
process_one_work+0x148/0x518
worker_thread+0x138/0x350
kthread+0x138/0x1e0
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
The first thread is walking the clk tree and calling
clk_pm_runtime_get() to power on devices required to read the clk
hardware via struct clk_ops::is_enabled(). This thread holds the clk
prepare_lock, and is trying to runtime PM resume a device, when it finds
that the device is in the process of resuming so the thread schedule()s
away waiting for the device to finish resuming before continuing. The
second thread is runtime PM resuming the same device, but the runtime
resume callback is calling clk_prepare(), trying to grab the
prepare_lock waiting on the first thread.
This is a classic ABBA deadlock. To properly fix the deadlock, we must
never runtime PM resume or suspend a device with the clk prepare_lock
held. Actually doing that is near impossible today because the global
prepare_lock would have to be dropped in the middle of the tree, the
device runtime PM resumed/suspended, and then the prepare_lock grabbed
again to ensure consistency of the clk tree topology. If anything
changes with the clk tree in the meantime, we've lost and will need to
start the operation all over again.
Luckily, most of the time we're simply incrementing or decrementing the
runtime PM count on an active device, so we don't have the chance to
schedule away with the prepare_lock held. Let's fix this immediate
problem that can be
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26962

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-raid456, md/raid456: fix a deadlock for dm-raid456 while io concurrent with reshape
For raid456, if reshape is still in progress, then IO across reshape
position will wait for reshape to make progress. However, for dm-raid,
in following cases reshape will never make progress hence IO will hang:
1) the array is read-only;
2) MD_RECOVERY_WAIT is set;
3) MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN is set;
After commit c467e97f079f ("md/raid6: use valid sector values to determine
if an I/O should wait on the reshape") fix the problem that IO across
reshape position doesn't wait for reshape, the dm-raid test
shell/lvconvert-raid-reshape.sh start to hang:
[root@fedora ~]# cat /proc/979/stack
[<0>] wait_woken+0x7d/0x90
[<0>] raid5_make_request+0x929/0x1d70 [raid456]
[<0>] md_handle_request+0xc2/0x3b0 [md_mod]
[<0>] raid_map+0x2c/0x50 [dm_raid]
[<0>] __map_bio+0x251/0x380 [dm_mod]
[<0>] dm_submit_bio+0x1f0/0x760 [dm_mod]
[<0>] __submit_bio+0xc2/0x1c0
[<0>] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x17f/0x450
[<0>] submit_bio_noacct+0x2bc/0x780
[<0>] submit_bio+0x70/0xc0
[<0>] mpage_readahead+0x169/0x1f0
[<0>] blkdev_readahead+0x18/0x30
[<0>] read_pages+0x7c/0x3b0
[<0>] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1ab/0x280
[<0>] force_page_cache_ra+0x9e/0x130
[<0>] page_cache_sync_ra+0x3b/0x110
[<0>] filemap_get_pages+0x143/0xa30
[<0>] filemap_read+0xdc/0x4b0
[<0>] blkdev_read_iter+0x75/0x200
[<0>] vfs_read+0x272/0x460
[<0>] ksys_read+0x7a/0x170
[<0>] __x64_sys_read+0x1c/0x30
[<0>] do_syscall_64+0xc6/0x230
[<0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74
This is because reshape can't make progress.
For md/raid, the problem doesn't exist because register new sync_thread
doesn't rely on the IO to be done any more:
1) If array is read-only, it can switch to read-write by ioctl/sysfs;
2) md/raid never set MD_RECOVERY_WAIT;
3) If MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN is set, mddev_suspend() doesn't hold
'reconfig_mutex', hence it can be cleared and reshape can continue by
sysfs api 'sync_action'.
However, I'm not sure yet how to avoid the problem in dm-raid yet. This
patch on the one hand make sure raid_message() can't change
sync_thread() through raid_message() after presuspend(), on the other
hand detect the above 3 cases before wait for IO do be done in
dm_suspend(), and let dm-raid requeue those IO.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26857

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
geneve: make sure to pull inner header in geneve_rx()
syzbot triggered a bug in geneve_rx() [1]
Issue is similar to the one I fixed in commit 8d975c15c0cd
("ip6_tunnel: make sure to pull inner header in __ip6_tnl_rcv()")
We have to save skb->network_header in a temporary variable
in order to be able to recompute the network_header pointer
after a pskb_inet_may_pull() call.
pskb_inet_may_pull() makes sure the needed headers are in skb->head.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in IP_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:302 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_rx drivers/net/geneve.c:279 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_udp_encap_recv+0x36f9/0x3c10 drivers/net/geneve.c:391
IP_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:302 [inline]
geneve_rx drivers/net/geneve.c:279 [inline]
geneve_udp_encap_recv+0x36f9/0x3c10 drivers/net/geneve.c:391
udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x1d39/0x1f20 net/ipv4/udp.c:2108
udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x6ae/0x6e0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2186
udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x184/0x4b0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2346
__udp4_lib_rcv+0x1c6b/0x3010 net/ipv4/udp.c:2422
udp_rcv+0x7d/0xa0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2604
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x264/0x1300 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2b8/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
ip_local_deliver+0x21f/0x490 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254
dst_input include/net/dst.h:461 [inline]
ip_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
ip_rcv+0x46f/0x760 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5534 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5648
process_backlog+0x480/0x8b0 net/core/dev.c:5976
__napi_poll+0xe3/0x980 net/core/dev.c:6576
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6645 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x8b8/0x1870 net/core/dev.c:6778
__do_softirq+0x1b7/0x7c5 kernel/softirq.c:553
do_softirq+0x9a/0xf0 kernel/softirq.c:454
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x9b/0xa0 kernel/softirq.c:381
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:820 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2768/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4378
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3819 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5cb/0xbc0 mm/slub.c:3903
kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:560
__alloc_skb+0x352/0x790 net/core/skbuff.c:651
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1296 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbd0 net/core/skbuff.c:6394
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa80/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2783
packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2930 [inline]
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3024 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x70c2/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26758

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: Don't ignore suspended array in md_check_recovery()
mddev_suspend() never stop sync_thread, hence it doesn't make sense to
ignore suspended array in md_check_recovery(), which might cause
sync_thread can't be unregistered.
After commit f52f5c71f3d4 ("md: fix stopping sync thread"), following
hang can be triggered by test shell/integrity-caching.sh:
1) suspend the array:
raid_postsuspend
mddev_suspend
2) stop the array:
raid_dtr
md_stop
__md_stop_writes
stop_sync_thread
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread_directly(mddev->sync_thread);
wait_event(..., !test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING, &mddev->recovery))
3) sync thread done:
md_do_sync
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_DONE, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread(mddev->thread);
4) daemon thread can't unregister sync thread:
md_check_recovery
if (mddev->suspended)
return; -> return directly
md_read_sync_thread
clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING, &mddev->recovery);
-> MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING can't be cleared, hence step 2 hang;
This problem is not just related to dm-raid, fix it by ignoring
suspended array in md_check_recovery(). And follow up patches will
improve dm-raid better to frozen sync thread during suspend.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26757

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: Don't ignore read-only array in md_check_recovery()
Usually if the array is not read-write, md_check_recovery() won't
register new sync_thread in the first place. And if the array is
read-write and sync_thread is registered, md_set_readonly() will
unregister sync_thread before setting the array read-only. md/raid
follow this behavior hence there is no problem.
After commit f52f5c71f3d4 ("md: fix stopping sync thread"), following
hang can be triggered by test shell/integrity-caching.sh:
1) array is read-only. dm-raid update super block:
rs_update_sbs
ro = mddev->ro
mddev->ro = 0
-> set array read-write
md_update_sb
2) register new sync thread concurrently.
3) dm-raid set array back to read-only:
rs_update_sbs
mddev->ro = ro
4) stop the array:
raid_dtr
md_stop
stop_sync_thread
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread_directly(mddev->sync_thread);
wait_event(..., !test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING, &mddev->recovery))
5) sync thread done:
md_do_sync
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_DONE, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread(mddev->thread);
6) daemon thread can't unregister sync thread:
md_check_recovery
if (!md_is_rdwr(mddev) &&
!test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED, &mddev->recovery))
return;
-> -> MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING can't be cleared, hence step 4 hang;
The root cause is that dm-raid manipulate 'mddev->ro' by itself,
however, dm-raid really should stop sync thread before setting the
array read-only. Unfortunately, I need to read more code before I
can refacter the handler of 'mddev->ro' in dm-raid, hence let's fix
the problem the easy way for now to prevent dm-raid regression.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26756

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: Don't register sync_thread for reshape directly
Currently, if reshape is interrupted, then reassemble the array will
register sync_thread directly from pers->run(), in this case
'MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING' is set directly, however, there is no guarantee
that md_do_sync() will be executed, hence stop_sync_thread() will hang
because 'MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING' can't be cleared.
Last patch make sure that md_do_sync() will set MD_RECOVERY_DONE,
however, following hang can still be triggered by dm-raid test
shell/lvconvert-raid-reshape.sh occasionally:
[root@fedora ~]# cat /proc/1982/stack
[<0>] stop_sync_thread+0x1ab/0x270 [md_mod]
[<0>] md_frozen_sync_thread+0x5c/0xa0 [md_mod]
[<0>] raid_presuspend+0x1e/0x70 [dm_raid]
[<0>] dm_table_presuspend_targets+0x40/0xb0 [dm_mod]
[<0>] __dm_destroy+0x2a5/0x310 [dm_mod]
[<0>] dm_destroy+0x16/0x30 [dm_mod]
[<0>] dev_remove+0x165/0x290 [dm_mod]
[<0>] ctl_ioctl+0x4bb/0x7b0 [dm_mod]
[<0>] dm_ctl_ioctl+0x11/0x20 [dm_mod]
[<0>] vfs_ioctl+0x21/0x60
[<0>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xb9/0xe0
[<0>] do_syscall_64+0xc6/0x230
[<0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74
Meanwhile mddev->recovery is:
MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING |
MD_RECOVERY_INTR |
MD_RECOVERY_RESHAPE |
MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN
Fix this problem by remove the code to register sync_thread directly
from raid10 and raid5. And let md_check_recovery() to register
sync_thread.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26742

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: smartpqi: Fix disable_managed_interrupts
Correct blk-mq registration issue with module parameter
disable_managed_interrupts enabled.
When we turn off the default PCI_IRQ_AFFINITY flag, the driver needs to
register with blk-mq using blk_mq_map_queues(). The driver is currently
calling blk_mq_pci_map_queues() which results in a stack trace and possibly
undefined behavior.
Stack Trace:
[ 7.860089] scsi host2: smartpqi
[ 7.871934] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 238 at block/blk-mq-pci.c:52 blk_mq_pci_map_queues+0xca/0xd0
[ 7.889231] Modules linked in: sd_mod t10_pi sg uas smartpqi(+) crc32c_intel scsi_transport_sas usb_storage dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler fuse
[ 7.924755] CPU: 0 PID: 238 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 4.18.0-372.88.1.el8_6_smartpqi_test.x86_64 #1
[ 7.944336] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen10/ProLiant DL380 Gen10, BIOS U30 03/08/2022
[ 7.963026] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
[ 7.978275] RIP: 0010:blk_mq_pci_map_queues+0xca/0xd0
[ 7.978278] Code: 48 89 de 89 c7 e8 f6 0f 4f 00 3b 05 c4 b7 8e 01 72 e1 5b 31 c0 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 7d df 73 00 31 c0 e9 76 df 73 00 <0f> 0b eb bc 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 49 89 ff 41 56 41 55 41 54
[ 7.978280] RSP: 0018:ffffa95fc3707d50 EFLAGS: 00010216
[ 7.978283] RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000010
[ 7.978284] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9190c32d4310
[ 7.978286] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffa95fc3707d38 R09: ffff91929b81ac00
[ 7.978287] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffa95fc3707ac0 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 7.978288] R13: ffff9190c32d4000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: ffff9190c4c950a8
[ 7.978290] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9193efc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 7.978292] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 8.172814] CR2: 000055d11166c000 CR3: 00000002dae10002 CR4: 00000000007706f0
[ 8.172816] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 8.172817] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 8.172818] PKRU: 55555554
[ 8.172819] Call Trace:
[ 8.172823] blk_mq_alloc_tag_set+0x12e/0x310
[ 8.264339] scsi_add_host_with_dma.cold.9+0x30/0x245
[ 8.279302] pqi_ctrl_init+0xacf/0xc8e [smartpqi]
[ 8.294085] ? pqi_pci_probe+0x480/0x4c8 [smartpqi]
[ 8.309015] pqi_pci_probe+0x480/0x4c8 [smartpqi]
[ 8.323286] local_pci_probe+0x42/0x80
[ 8.337855] work_for_cpu_fn+0x16/0x20
[ 8.351193] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
[ 8.364462] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 8.379252] worker_thread+0x1ce/0x390
[ 8.392623] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 8.406295] kthread+0x10a/0x120
[ 8.418428] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
[ 8.431532] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 8.444137] ---[ end trace 1bf0173d39354506 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26721

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/dsc: Fix the macro that calculates DSCC_/DSCA_ PPS reg address
Commit bd077259d0a9 ("drm/i915/vdsc: Add function to read any PPS
register") defines a new macro to calculate the DSC PPS register
addresses with PPS number as an input. This macro correctly calculates
the addresses till PPS 11 since the addresses increment by 4. So in that
case the following macro works correctly to give correct register
address:
_MMIO(_DSCA_PPS_0 + (pps) * 4)
However after PPS 11, the register address for PPS 12 increments by 12
because of RC Buffer memory allocation in between. Because of this
discontinuity in the address space, the macro calculates wrong addresses
for PPS 12 - 16 resulting into incorrect DSC PPS parameter value
read/writes causing DSC corruption.
This fixes it by correcting this macro to add the offset of 12 for PPS
>=12.
v3: Add correct paranthesis for pps argument (Jani Nikula)
(cherry picked from commit 6074be620c31dc2ae11af96a1a5ea95580976fb5)

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26700

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Fix MST Null Ptr for RV
The change try to fix below error specific to RV platform:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 4 PID: 917 Comm: sway Not tainted 6.3.9-arch1-1 #1 124dc55df4f5272ccb409f39ef4872fc2b3376a2
Hardware name: LENOVO 20NKS01Y00/20NKS01Y00, BIOS R12ET61W(1.31 ) 07/28/2022
RIP: 0010:drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper]
Code: 01 00 00 48 8b 85 60 05 00 00 48 63 80 88 00 00 00 3b 43 28 0f 8d 2e 01 00 00 48 8b 53 30 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 c2 48 8b 40 18 <48> 8>
RSP: 0018:ffff960cc2df77d8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8afb87e81280 RCX: 0000000000000224
RDX: ffff8afb9ee37c00 RSI: ffff8afb8da1a578 RDI: ffff8afb87e81280
RBP: ffff8afb83d67000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8afb9652f850
R10: ffff960cc2df7908 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8afb8d7688a0 R14: ffff8afb8da1a578 R15: 0000000000000224
FS: 00007f4dac35ce00(0000) GS:ffff8afe30b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000010ddc6000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x23/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0
? plist_add+0xbe/0x100
? exc_page_fault+0x7c/0x180
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
? drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper 0e67723696438d8e02b741593dd50d80b44c2026]
? drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x28/0x260 [drm_display_helper 0e67723696438d8e02b741593dd50d80b44c2026]
compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_link+0x2ff/0xa40 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
? fill_plane_buffer_attributes+0x419/0x510 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_state+0x1e1/0x250 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
amdgpu_dm_atomic_check+0xecd/0x1190 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
drm_atomic_check_only+0x5c5/0xa40
drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x76e/0xbc0
? _copy_to_user+0x25/0x30
? drm_ioctl+0x296/0x4b0
? __pfx_drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x10/0x10
drm_ioctl_kernel+0xcd/0x170
drm_ioctl+0x26d/0x4b0
? __pfx_drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x10/0x10
amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x4e/0x90 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x94/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90
? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x7f4dad17f76f
Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <89> c>
RSP: 002b:00007ffd9ae859f0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e255a55900 RCX: 00007f4dad17f76f
RDX: 00007ffd9ae85a90 RSI: 00000000c03864bc RDI: 000000000000000b
RBP: 00007ffd9ae85a90 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000c03864bc
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 000055e255a7fc60 R15: 000055e255a01eb0
</TASK>
Modules linked in: rfcomm snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq snd_seq_device ccm cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg joydev mousedev bnep >
typec libphy k10temp ipmi_msghandler roles i2c_scmi acpi_cpufreq mac_hid nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_mas>
CR2: 0000000000000008
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper]
Code: 01 00 00 48 8b 85 60 05 00 00 48 63 80 88 00 00 00 3b 43 28 0f 8d 2e 01 00 00 48 8b 53 30 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 c2 48 8b 40 18 <48> 8>
RSP: 0018:ffff960cc2df77d8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8afb87e81280 RCX: 0000000000000224
RDX: ffff8afb9ee37c00 RSI: ffff8afb8da1a578 RDI: ffff8afb87e81280
RBP: ffff8afb83d67000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8afb9652f850
R10: ffff960cc2df7908 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8afb8d7688a0 R14: ffff8afb8da1a578 R15: 0000000000000224
FS: 00007f4dac35ce00(0000) GS:ffff8afe30b00000(0000
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26695

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Fix null pointer dereference in __sev_platform_shutdown_locked
The SEV platform device can be shutdown with a null psp_master,
e.g., using DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE. Found using KASAN:
[ 137.148210] ccp 0000:23:00.1: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
[ 137.162647] ccp 0000:23:00.1: no command queues available
[ 137.170598] ccp 0000:23:00.1: sev enabled
[ 137.174645] ccp 0000:23:00.1: psp enabled
[ 137.178890] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000001e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
[ 137.182693] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000f0-0x00000000000000f7]
[ 137.182693] CPU: 93 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1+ #311
[ 137.182693] RIP: 0010:__sev_platform_shutdown_locked+0x51/0x180
[ 137.182693] Code: 08 80 3c 08 00 0f 85 0e 01 00 00 48 8b 1d 67 b6 01 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d bb f0 00 00 00 48 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 01 00 0f 85 fe 00 00 00 48 8b 9b f0 00 00 00 48 85 db 74 2c
[ 137.182693] RSP: 0018:ffffc900000cf9b0 EFLAGS: 00010216
[ 137.182693] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000001e
[ 137.182693] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 00000000000000f0
[ 137.182693] RBP: ffffc900000cf9c8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff58f5a66
[ 137.182693] R10: ffffc900000cf9c8 R11: ffffffffac7ad32f R12: ffff8881e5052c28
[ 137.182693] R13: ffff8881e5052c28 R14: ffff8881758e43e8 R15: ffffffffac64abf8
[ 137.182693] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff889de7000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 137.182693] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 137.182693] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001cf7c7e000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[ 137.182693] Call Trace:
[ 137.182693] <TASK>
[ 137.182693] ? show_regs+0x6c/0x80
[ 137.182693] ? __die_body+0x24/0x70
[ 137.182693] ? die_addr+0x4b/0x80
[ 137.182693] ? exc_general_protection+0x126/0x230
[ 137.182693] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x2b/0x30
[ 137.182693] ? __sev_platform_shutdown_locked+0x51/0x180
[ 137.182693] sev_firmware_shutdown.isra.0+0x1e/0x80
[ 137.182693] sev_dev_destroy+0x49/0x100
[ 137.182693] psp_dev_destroy+0x47/0xb0
[ 137.182693] sp_destroy+0xbb/0x240
[ 137.182693] sp_pci_remove+0x45/0x60
[ 137.182693] pci_device_remove+0xaa/0x1d0
[ 137.182693] device_remove+0xc7/0x170
[ 137.182693] really_probe+0x374/0xbe0
[ 137.182693] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 137.182693] __driver_probe_device+0x199/0x460
[ 137.182693] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0xd0
[ 137.182693] __driver_attach+0x191/0x3d0
[ 137.182693] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
[ 137.182693] bus_for_each_dev+0x100/0x190
[ 137.182693] ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10
[ 137.182693] ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20
[ 137.182693] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 137.182693] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x50
[ 137.182693] driver_attach+0x41/0x60
[ 137.182693] bus_add_driver+0x2a8/0x580
[ 137.182693] driver_register+0x141/0x480
[ 137.182693] __pci_register_driver+0x1d6/0x2a0
[ 137.182693] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 137.182693] ? esrt_sysfs_init+0x1cd/0x5d0
[ 137.182693] ? __pfx_sp_mod_init+0x10/0x10
[ 137.182693] sp_pci_init+0x22/0x30
[ 137.182693] sp_mod_init+0x14/0x30
[ 137.182693] ? __pfx_sp_mod_init+0x10/0x10
[ 137.182693] do_one_initcall+0xd1/0x470
[ 137.182693] ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
[ 137.182693] ? parameq+0x80/0xf0
[ 137.182693] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 137.182693] ? __kmalloc+0x3b0/0x4e0
[ 137.182693] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x92d/0x1050
[ 137.182693] ? kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte+0x171/0x190
[ 137.182693] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 137.182693] kernel_init_freeable+0xa64/0x1050
[ 137.182693] ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
[ 137.182693] kernel_init+0x24/0x160
[ 137.182693] ? __switch_to_asm+0x3e/0x70
[ 137.182693] ret_from_fork+0x40/0x80
[ 137.182693] ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x1
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26687

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen/events: close evtchn after mapping cleanup
shutdown_pirq and startup_pirq are not taking the
irq_mapping_update_lock because they can't due to lock inversion. Both
are called with the irq_desc->lock being taking. The lock order,
however, is first irq_mapping_update_lock and then irq_desc->lock.
This opens multiple races:
- shutdown_pirq can be interrupted by a function that allocates an event
channel:
CPU0 CPU1
shutdown_pirq {
xen_evtchn_close(e)
__startup_pirq {
EVTCHNOP_bind_pirq
-> returns just freed evtchn e
set_evtchn_to_irq(e, irq)
}
xen_irq_info_cleanup() {
set_evtchn_to_irq(e, -1)
}
}
Assume here event channel e refers here to the same event channel
number.
After this race the evtchn_to_irq mapping for e is invalid (-1).
- __startup_pirq races with __unbind_from_irq in a similar way. Because
__startup_pirq doesn't take irq_mapping_update_lock it can grab the
evtchn that __unbind_from_irq is currently freeing and cleaning up. In
this case even though the event channel is allocated, its mapping can
be unset in evtchn_to_irq.
The fix is to first cleanup the mappings and then close the event
channel. In this way, when an event channel gets allocated it's
potential previous evtchn_to_irq mappings are guaranteed to be unset already.
This is also the reverse order of the allocation where first the event
channel is allocated and then the mappings are setup.
On a 5.10 kernel prior to commit 3fcdaf3d7634 ("xen/events: modify internal
[un]bind interfaces"), we hit a BUG like the following during probing of NVMe
devices. The issue is that during nvme_setup_io_queues, pci_free_irq
is called for every device which results in a call to shutdown_pirq.
With many nvme devices it's therefore likely to hit this race during
boot because there will be multiple calls to shutdown_pirq and
startup_pirq are running potentially in parallel.
------------[ cut here ]------------
blkfront: xvda: barrier or flush: disabled; persistent grants: enabled; indirect descriptors: enabled; bounce buffer: enabled
kernel BUG at drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:499!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 44 PID: 375 Comm: kworker/u257:23 Not tainted 5.10.201-191.748.amzn2.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.11.amazon 08/24/2006
Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_reset_work
RIP: 0010:bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
Code: 5d 41 5e c3 cc cc cc cc 44 89 f7 e8 2b 55 ad ff 49 89 c5 48 85 c0 0f 84 64 ff ff ff 4c 8b 68 30 41 83 fe ff 0f 85 60 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00
RSP: 0000:ffffc9000d533b08 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffff888107419680 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff82d72b00
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000001ed
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 0000000000000002
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bc8b500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002610001 CR4: 00000000001706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9
? set_affinity_irq+0xdc/0x1c0
? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
? die+0x2b/0x50
? do_trap+0x90/0x110
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0x
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26681

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netdevsim: avoid potential loop in nsim_dev_trap_report_work()
Many syzbot reports include the following trace [1]
If nsim_dev_trap_report_work() can not grab the mutex,
it should rearm itself at least one jiffie later.
[1]
Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0:
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 PID: 32383 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-syzkaller-00031-g861c0981648f #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023
Workqueue: events nsim_dev_trap_report_work
RIP: 0010:bytes_is_nonzero mm/kasan/generic.c:89 [inline]
RIP: 0010:memory_is_nonzero mm/kasan/generic.c:104 [inline]
RIP: 0010:memory_is_poisoned_n mm/kasan/generic.c:129 [inline]
RIP: 0010:memory_is_poisoned mm/kasan/generic.c:161 [inline]
RIP: 0010:check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:180 [inline]
RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0x101/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
Code: 07 49 39 d1 75 0a 45 3a 11 b8 01 00 00 00 7c 0b 44 89 c2 e8 21 ed ff ff 83 f0 01 5b 5d 41 5c c3 48 85 d2 74 4f 48 01 ea eb 09 <48> 83 c0 01 48 39 d0 74 41 80 38 00 74 f2 eb b6 41 bc 08 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90012dcf998 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: fffffbfff258af1e RBX: fffffbfff258af1f RCX: ffffffff8168eda3
RDX: fffffbfff258af1f RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff92c578f0
RBP: fffffbfff258af1e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff258af1e
R10: ffffffff92c578f3 R11: ffffffff8acbcbc0 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: ffff88806db38400 R14: 1ffff920025b9f42 R15: ffffffff92c578e8
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000c00994e078 CR3: 000000002c250000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<NMI>
</NMI>
<TASK>
instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
atomic_read include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:32 [inline]
queued_spin_is_locked include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:57 [inline]
debug_spin_unlock kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:101 [inline]
do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x230 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:141
__raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:150 [inline]
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x22/0x70 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194
debug_object_activate+0x349/0x540 lib/debugobjects.c:726
debug_work_activate kernel/workqueue.c:578 [inline]
insert_work+0x30/0x230 kernel/workqueue.c:1650
__queue_work+0x62e/0x11d0 kernel/workqueue.c:1802
__queue_delayed_work+0x1bf/0x270 kernel/workqueue.c:1953
queue_delayed_work_on+0x106/0x130 kernel/workqueue.c:1989
queue_delayed_work include/linux/workqueue.h:563 [inline]
schedule_delayed_work include/linux/workqueue.h:677 [inline]
nsim_dev_trap_report_work+0x9c0/0xc80 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:842
process_one_work+0x886/0x15d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2633
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2706 [inline]
worker_thread+0x8b9/0x1290 kernel/workqueue.c:2787
kthread+0x2c6/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26680

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atlantic: Fix DMA mapping for PTP hwts ring
Function aq_ring_hwts_rx_alloc() maps extra AQ_CFG_RXDS_DEF bytes
for PTP HWTS ring but then generic aq_ring_free() does not take this
into account.
Create and use a specific function to free HWTS ring to fix this
issue.
Trace:
[ 215.351607] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 215.351612] DMA-API: atlantic 0000:4b:00.0: device driver frees DMA memory with different size [device address=0x00000000fbdd0000] [map size=34816 bytes] [unmap size=32768 bytes]
[ 215.351635] WARNING: CPU: 33 PID: 10759 at kernel/dma/debug.c:988 check_unmap+0xa6f/0x2360
...
[ 215.581176] Call Trace:
[ 215.583632] <TASK>
[ 215.585745] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[ 215.590114] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[ 215.594497] ? debug_dma_free_coherent+0x196/0x210
[ 215.599305] ? check_unmap+0xa6f/0x2360
[ 215.603147] ? __warn+0xca/0x1d0
[ 215.606391] ? check_unmap+0xa6f/0x2360
[ 215.610237] ? report_bug+0x1ef/0x370
[ 215.613921] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
[ 215.617423] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x50
[ 215.621269] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 215.625480] ? check_unmap+0xa6f/0x2360
[ 215.629331] ? mark_lock.part.0+0xca/0xa40
[ 215.633445] debug_dma_free_coherent+0x196/0x210
[ 215.638079] ? __pfx_debug_dma_free_coherent+0x10/0x10
[ 215.643242] ? slab_free_freelist_hook+0x11d/0x1d0
[ 215.648060] dma_free_attrs+0x6d/0x130
[ 215.651834] aq_ring_free+0x193/0x290 [atlantic]
[ 215.656487] aq_ptp_ring_free+0x67/0x110 [atlantic]
...
[ 216.127540] ---[ end trace 6467e5964dd2640b ]---
[ 216.132160] DMA-API: Mapped at:
[ 216.132162] debug_dma_alloc_coherent+0x66/0x2f0
[ 216.132165] dma_alloc_attrs+0xf5/0x1b0
[ 216.132168] aq_ring_hwts_rx_alloc+0x150/0x1f0 [atlantic]
[ 216.132193] aq_ptp_ring_alloc+0x1bb/0x540 [atlantic]
[ 216.132213] aq_nic_init+0x4a1/0x760 [atlantic]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26672

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Fix variable 'mca_funcs' dereferenced before NULL check in 'amdgpu_mca_smu_get_mca_entry()'
Fixes the below:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_mca.c:377 amdgpu_mca_smu_get_mca_entry() warn: variable dereferenced before check 'mca_funcs' (see line 368)
357 int amdgpu_mca_smu_get_mca_entry(struct amdgpu_device *adev,
enum amdgpu_mca_error_type type,
358 int idx, struct mca_bank_entry *entry)
359 {
360 const struct amdgpu_mca_smu_funcs *mca_funcs =
adev->mca.mca_funcs;
361 int count;
362
363 switch (type) {
364 case AMDGPU_MCA_ERROR_TYPE_UE:
365 count = mca_funcs->max_ue_count;
mca_funcs is dereferenced here.
366 break;
367 case AMDGPU_MCA_ERROR_TYPE_CE:
368 count = mca_funcs->max_ce_count;
mca_funcs is dereferenced here.
369 break;
370 default:
371 return -EINVAL;
372 }
373
374 if (idx >= count)
375 return -EINVAL;
376
377 if (mca_funcs && mca_funcs->mca_get_mca_entry)
^^^^^^^^^
Checked too late!

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26641

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6_tunnel: make sure to pull inner header in __ip6_tnl_rcv()
syzbot found __ip6_tnl_rcv() could access unitiliazed data [1].
Call pskb_inet_may_pull() to fix this, and initialize ipv6h
variable after this call as it can change skb->head.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7df/0x1e50 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321
__INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline]
INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline]
IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7df/0x1e50 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321
ip6ip6_dscp_ecn_decapsulate+0x178/0x1b0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:727
__ip6_tnl_rcv+0xd4e/0x1590 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:845
ip6_tnl_rcv+0xce/0x100 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:888
gre_rcv+0x143f/0x1870
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xda6/0x2a60 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438
ip6_input_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:483 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
ip6_input+0x15d/0x430 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:492
ip6_mc_input+0xa7e/0xc80 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:586
dst_input include/net/dst.h:461 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x5db/0x870 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0xda/0x390 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:310
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5532 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5646
netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5732 [inline]
netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5791
tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1555
tun_get_user+0x53af/0x66d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2002
tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2084 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
vfs_write+0x786/0x1200 fs/read_write.c:590
ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:643
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:652
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5e9/0xb10 mm/slub.c:3523
kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:560
__alloc_skb+0x318/0x740 net/core/skbuff.c:651
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbd0 net/core/skbuff.c:6334
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa80/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2787
tun_alloc_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1531 [inline]
tun_get_user+0x1e8a/0x66d0 drivers/net/tun.c:1846
tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2084 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
vfs_write+0x786/0x1200 fs/read_write.c:590
ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:643
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:652
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
CPU: 0 PID: 5034 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.7.0-syzkaller-00562-g9f8413c4a66f #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26611

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: fix usage of multi-buffer BPF helpers for ZC XDP
Currently when packet is shrunk via bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() and memory
type is set to MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL, null ptr dereference happens:
[1136314.192256] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address:
0000000000000034
[1136314.203943] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[1136314.213768] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[1136314.223550] PGD 0 P4D 0
[1136314.230684] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[1136314.239621] CPU: 8 PID: 54203 Comm: xdpsock Not tainted 6.6.0+ #257
[1136314.250469] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT,
BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019
[1136314.265615] RIP: 0010:__xdp_return+0x6c/0x210
[1136314.274653] Code: ad 00 48 8b 47 08 49 89 f8 a8 01 0f 85 9b 01 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f0 41 ff 48 34 75 32 4c 89 c7 e9 79 cd 80 ff 83 fe 03 75 17 <f6> 41 34 01 0f 85 02 01 00 00 48 89 cf e9 22 cc 1e 00 e9 3d d2 86
[1136314.302907] RSP: 0018:ffffc900089f8db0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[1136314.312967] RAX: ffffc9003168aed0 RBX: ffff8881c3300000 RCX:
0000000000000000
[1136314.324953] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI:
ffffc9003168c000
[1136314.336929] RBP: 0000000000000ae0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09:
0000000000010000
[1136314.348844] R10: ffffc9000e495000 R11: 0000000000000040 R12:
0000000000000001
[1136314.360706] R13: 0000000000000524 R14: ffffc9003168aec0 R15:
0000000000000001
[1136314.373298] FS: 00007f8df8bbcb80(0000) GS:ffff8897e0e00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[1136314.386105] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[1136314.396532] CR2: 0000000000000034 CR3: 00000001aa912002 CR4:
00000000007706f0
[1136314.408377] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:
0000000000000000
[1136314.420173] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
[1136314.431890] PKRU: 55555554
[1136314.439143] Call Trace:
[1136314.446058] <IRQ>
[1136314.452465] ? __die+0x20/0x70
[1136314.459881] ? page_fault_oops+0x15b/0x440
[1136314.468305] ? exc_page_fault+0x6a/0x150
[1136314.476491] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[1136314.484927] ? __xdp_return+0x6c/0x210
[1136314.492863] bpf_xdp_adjust_tail+0x155/0x1d0
[1136314.501269] bpf_prog_ccc47ae29d3b6570_xdp_sock_prog+0x15/0x60
[1136314.511263] ice_clean_rx_irq_zc+0x206/0xc60 [ice]
[1136314.520222] ? ice_xmit_zc+0x6e/0x150 [ice]
[1136314.528506] ice_napi_poll+0x467/0x670 [ice]
[1136314.536858] ? ttwu_do_activate.constprop.0+0x8f/0x1a0
[1136314.546010] __napi_poll+0x29/0x1b0
[1136314.553462] net_rx_action+0x133/0x270
[1136314.561619] __do_softirq+0xbe/0x28e
[1136314.569303] do_softirq+0x3f/0x60
This comes from __xdp_return() call with xdp_buff argument passed as
NULL which is supposed to be consumed by xsk_buff_free() call.
To address this properly, in ZC case, a node that represents the frag
being removed has to be pulled out of xskb_list. Introduce
appropriate xsk helpers to do such node operation and use them
accordingly within bpf_xdp_adjust_tail().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2024-26589

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject variable offset alu on PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS
For PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS, check_flow_keys_access() only uses fixed off
for validation. However, variable offset ptr alu is not prohibited
for this ptr kind. So the variable offset is not checked.
The following prog is accepted:
func#0 @0
0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
0: (bf) r6 = r1 ; R1=ctx() R6_w=ctx()
1: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r6 +144) ; R6_w=ctx() R7_w=flow_keys()
2: (b7) r8 = 1024 ; R8_w=1024
3: (37) r8 /= 1 ; R8_w=scalar()
4: (57) r8 &= 1024 ; R8_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,
smax=umax=smax32=umax32=1024,var_off=(0x0; 0x400))
5: (0f) r7 += r8
mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 5 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r8 stack= before 4: (57) r8 &= 1024
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r8 stack= before 3: (37) r8 /= 1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r8 stack= before 2: (b7) r8 = 1024
6: R7_w=flow_keys(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=1024,var_off
=(0x0; 0x400)) R8_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=1024,
var_off=(0x0; 0x400))
6: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) ; R0_w=scalar()
7: (95) exit
This prog loads flow_keys to r7, and adds the variable offset r8
to r7, and finally causes out-of-bounds access:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90014c80038
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1231 [inline]
__bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:651 [inline]
bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:658 [inline]
bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu include/linux/filter.h:675 [inline]
bpf_flow_dissect+0x15f/0x350 net/core/flow_dissector.c:991
bpf_prog_test_run_flow_dissector+0x39d/0x620 net/bpf/test_run.c:1359
bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4107 [inline]
__sys_bpf+0xf8f/0x4560 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5475
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5561 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5559 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x73/0xb0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5559
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
Fix this by rejecting ptr alu with variable offset on flow_keys.
Applying the patch rejects the program with "R7 pointer arithmetic
on flow_keys prohibited".

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-53031

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/imc-pmu: Fix use of mutex in IRQs disabled section
Current imc-pmu code triggers a WARNING with CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
and CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING enabled, while running a thread_imc event.
Command to trigger the warning:
# perf stat -e thread_imc/CPM_CS_FROM_L4_MEM_X_DPTEG/ sleep 5
Performance counter stats for 'sleep 5':
0 thread_imc/CPM_CS_FROM_L4_MEM_X_DPTEG/
5.002117947 seconds time elapsed
0.000131000 seconds user
0.001063000 seconds sys
Below is snippet of the warning in dmesg:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 2869, name: perf-exec
preempt_count: 2, expected: 0
4 locks held by perf-exec/2869:
#0: c00000004325c540 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: bprm_execve+0x64/0xa90
#1: c00000004325c5d8 (&sig->exec_update_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: begin_new_exec+0x460/0xef0
#2: c0000003fa99d4e0 (&cpuctx_lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: perf_event_exec+0x290/0x510
#3: c000000017ab8418 (&ctx->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: perf_event_exec+0x29c/0x510
irq event stamp: 4806
hardirqs last enabled at (4805): [<c000000000f65b94>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x94/0xd0
hardirqs last disabled at (4806): [<c0000000003fae44>] perf_event_exec+0x394/0x510
softirqs last enabled at (0): [<c00000000013c404>] copy_process+0xc34/0x1ff0
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
CPU: 36 PID: 2869 Comm: perf-exec Not tainted 6.2.0-rc2-00011-g1247637727f2 #61
Hardware name: 8375-42A POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:v7.0-16-g9b85f7d961 PowerNV
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x98/0xe0 (unreliable)
__might_resched+0x2f8/0x310
__mutex_lock+0x6c/0x13f0
thread_imc_event_add+0xf4/0x1b0
event_sched_in+0xe0/0x210
merge_sched_in+0x1f0/0x600
visit_groups_merge.isra.92.constprop.166+0x2bc/0x6c0
ctx_flexible_sched_in+0xcc/0x140
ctx_sched_in+0x20c/0x2a0
ctx_resched+0x104/0x1c0
perf_event_exec+0x340/0x510
begin_new_exec+0x730/0xef0
load_elf_binary+0x3f8/0x1e10
...
do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=2001 set at [<00000000fd63e7cf>] do_nanosleep+0x60/0x1a0
WARNING: CPU: 36 PID: 2869 at kernel/sched/core.c:9912 __might_sleep+0x9c/0xb0
CPU: 36 PID: 2869 Comm: sleep Tainted: G W 6.2.0-rc2-00011-g1247637727f2 #61
Hardware name: 8375-42A POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:v7.0-16-g9b85f7d961 PowerNV
NIP: c000000000194a1c LR: c000000000194a18 CTR: c000000000a78670
REGS: c00000004d2134e0 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G W (6.2.0-rc2-00011-g1247637727f2)
MSR: 9000000000021033 <SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48002824 XER: 00000000
CFAR: c00000000013fb64 IRQMASK: 1
The above warning triggered because the current imc-pmu code uses mutex
lock in interrupt disabled sections. The function mutex_lock()
internally calls __might_resched(), which will check if IRQs are
disabled and in case IRQs are disabled, it will trigger the warning.
Fix the issue by changing the mutex lock to spinlock.
[mpe: Fix comments, trim oops in change log, add reported-by tags]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-53028

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "wifi: mac80211: fix memory leak in ieee80211_if_add()"
This reverts commit 13e5afd3d773c6fc6ca2b89027befaaaa1ea7293.
ieee80211_if_free() is already called from free_netdev(ndev)
because ndev->priv_destructor == ieee80211_if_free
syzbot reported:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000004: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000020-0x0000000000000027]
CPU: 0 PID: 10041 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc2-syzkaller-00388-g55b98837e37d #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
RIP: 0010:pcpu_get_page_chunk mm/percpu.c:262 [inline]
RIP: 0010:pcpu_chunk_addr_search mm/percpu.c:1619 [inline]
RIP: 0010:free_percpu mm/percpu.c:2271 [inline]
RIP: 0010:free_percpu+0x186/0x10f0 mm/percpu.c:2254
Code: 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 f5 0e 00 00 48 8b 3b 48 01 ef e8 cf b3 0b 00 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 78 20 48 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 11 00 0f 85 3b 0e 00 00 48 8b 58 20 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc
RSP: 0018:ffffc90004ba7068 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88823ffe2b80 RCX: 0000000000000004
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffffffff81c1f4e7 RDI: 0000000000000020
RBP: ffffe8fffe8fc220 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 1ffffffff2179ab2 R12: ffff8880b983d000
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000607f450fc220 R15: ffff88823ffe2988
FS: 00007fcb349de700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32220000 CR3: 000000004914f000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
netdev_run_todo+0x6bf/0x1100 net/core/dev.c:10352
ieee80211_register_hw+0x2663/0x4040 net/mac80211/main.c:1411
mac80211_hwsim_new_radio+0x2537/0x4d80 drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c:4583
hwsim_new_radio_nl+0xa09/0x10f0 drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c:5176
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x1e6/0x2d0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:968
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1048 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x4ff/0x7e0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1065
netlink_rcv_skb+0x165/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1076
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1330 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x547/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1356
netlink_sendmsg+0x91b/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1932
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd3/0x120 net/socket.c:734
____sys_sendmsg+0x712/0x8c0 net/socket.c:2476
___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2530
__sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2559
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-53011

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: enable all safety features by default
In the original implementation of dwmac5
commit 8bf993a5877e ("net: stmmac: Add support for DWMAC5 and implement Safety Features")
all safety features were enabled by default.
Later it seems some implementations didn't have support for all the
features, so in
commit 5ac712dcdfef ("net: stmmac: enable platform specific safety features")
the safety_feat_cfg structure was added to the callback and defined for
some platforms to selectively enable these safety features.
The problem is that only certain platforms were given that software
support. If the automotive safety package bit is set in the hardware
features register the safety feature callback is called for the platform,
and for platforms that didn't get a safety_feat_cfg defined this results
in the following NULL pointer dereference:
[ 7.933303] Call trace:
[ 7.935812] dwmac5_safety_feat_config+0x20/0x170 [stmmac]
[ 7.941455] __stmmac_open+0x16c/0x474 [stmmac]
[ 7.946117] stmmac_open+0x38/0x70 [stmmac]
[ 7.950414] __dev_open+0x100/0x1dc
[ 7.954006] __dev_change_flags+0x18c/0x204
[ 7.958297] dev_change_flags+0x24/0x6c
[ 7.962237] do_setlink+0x2b8/0xfa4
[ 7.965827] __rtnl_newlink+0x4ec/0x840
[ 7.969766] rtnl_newlink+0x50/0x80
[ 7.973353] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x12c/0x374
[ 7.977557] netlink_rcv_skb+0x5c/0x130
[ 7.981500] rtnetlink_rcv+0x18/0x2c
[ 7.985172] netlink_unicast+0x2e8/0x340
[ 7.989197] netlink_sendmsg+0x1a8/0x420
[ 7.993222] ____sys_sendmsg+0x218/0x280
[ 7.997249] ___sys_sendmsg+0xac/0x100
[ 8.001103] __sys_sendmsg+0x84/0xe0
[ 8.004776] __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x24/0x30
[ 8.008983] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
[ 8.012840] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xcc/0xec
[ 8.017665] do_el0_svc+0x38/0xb0
[ 8.021071] el0_svc+0x2c/0x84
[ 8.024212] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xf4/0x120
[ 8.028598] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
Go back to the original behavior, if the automotive safety package
is found to be supported in hardware enable all the features unless
safety_feat_cfg is passed in saying this particular platform only
supports a subset of the features.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52994

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
acpi: Fix suspend with Xen PV
Commit f1e525009493 ("x86/boot: Skip realmode init code when running as
Xen PV guest") missed one code path accessing real_mode_header, leading
to dereferencing NULL when suspending the system under Xen:
[ 348.284004] PM: suspend entry (deep)
[ 348.289532] Filesystems sync: 0.005 seconds
[ 348.291545] Freezing user space processes ... (elapsed 0.000 seconds) done.
[ 348.292457] OOM killer disabled.
[ 348.292462] Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.104 seconds) done.
[ 348.396612] printk: Suspending console(s) (use no_console_suspend to debug)
[ 348.749228] PM: suspend devices took 0.352 seconds
[ 348.769713] ACPI: EC: interrupt blocked
[ 348.816077] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001c
[ 348.816080] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 348.816081] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 348.816083] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 348.816086] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 348.816089] CPU: 0 PID: 6764 Comm: systemd-sleep Not tainted 6.1.3-1.fc32.qubes.x86_64 #1
[ 348.816092] Hardware name: Star Labs StarBook/StarBook, BIOS 8.01 07/03/2022
[ 348.816093] RIP: e030:acpi_get_wakeup_address+0xc/0x20
Fix that by adding an optional acpi callback allowing to skip setting
the wakeup address, as in the Xen PV case this will be handled by the
hypervisor anyway.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52992

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Skip task with pid=1 in send_signal_common()
The following kernel panic can be triggered when a task with pid=1 attaches
a prog that attempts to send killing signal to itself, also see [1] for more
details:
Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b
CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 6.1.0-09652-g59fe41b5255f #148
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x178 lib/dump_stack.c:106
panic+0x2c4/0x60f kernel/panic.c:275
do_exit.cold+0x63/0xe4 kernel/exit.c:789
do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:950
get_signal+0x2460/0x2600 kernel/signal.c:2858
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x78/0x5d0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:306
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:168 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250 kernel/entry/common.c:203
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
So skip task with pid=1 in bpf_send_signal_common() to avoid the panic.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221222043507.33037-1-sunhao.th@gmail.com

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52986

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Check for any of tcp_bpf_prots when cloning a listener
A listening socket linked to a sockmap has its sk_prot overridden. It
points to one of the struct proto variants in tcp_bpf_prots. The variant
depends on the socket's family and which sockmap programs are attached.
A child socket cloned from a TCP listener initially inherits their sk_prot.
But before cloning is finished, we restore the child's proto to the
listener's original non-tcp_bpf_prots one. This happens in
tcp_create_openreq_child -> tcp_bpf_clone.
Today, in tcp_bpf_clone we detect if the child's proto should be restored
by checking only for the TCP_BPF_BASE proto variant. This is not
correct. The sk_prot of listening socket linked to a sockmap can point to
to any variant in tcp_bpf_prots.
If the listeners sk_prot happens to be not the TCP_BPF_BASE variant, then
the child socket unintentionally is left if the inherited sk_prot by
tcp_bpf_clone.
This leads to issues like infinite recursion on close [1], because the
child state is otherwise not set up for use with tcp_bpf_prot operations.
Adjust the check in tcp_bpf_clone to detect all of tcp_bpf_prots variants.
Note that it wouldn't be sufficient to check the socket state when
overriding the sk_prot in tcp_bpf_update_proto in order to always use the
TCP_BPF_BASE variant for listening sockets. Since commit
b8b8315e39ff ("bpf, sockmap: Remove unhash handler for BPF sockmap usage")
it is possible for a socket to transition to TCP_LISTEN state while already
linked to a sockmap, e.g. connect() -> insert into map ->
connect(AF_UNSPEC) -> listen().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000073b14905ef2e7401@google.com/

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52981

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: Fix request ref counting during error capture & debugfs dump
When GuC support was added to error capture, the reference counting
around the request object was broken. Fix it up.
The context based search manages the spinlocking around the search
internally. So it needs to grab the reference count internally as
well. The execlist only request based search relies on external
locking, so it needs an external reference count but within the
spinlock not outside it.
The only other caller of the context based search is the code for
dumping engine state to debugfs. That code wasn't previously getting
an explicit reference at all as it does everything while holding the
execlist specific spinlock. So, that needs updaing as well as that
spinlock doesn't help when using GuC submission. Rather than trying to
conditionally get/put depending on submission model, just change it to
always do the get/put.
v2: Explicitly document adding an extra blank line in some dense code
(Andy Shevchenko). Fix multiple potential null pointer derefs in case
of no request found (some spotted by Tvrtko, but there was more!).
Also fix a leaked request in case of !started and another in
__guc_reset_context now that intel_context_find_active_request is
actually reference counting the returned request.
v3: Add a _get suffix to intel_context_find_active_request now that it
grabs a reference (Daniele).
v4: Split the intel_guc_find_hung_context change to a separate patch
and rename intel_context_find_active_request_get to
intel_context_get_active_request (Tvrtko).
v5: s/locking/reference counting/ in commit message (Tvrtko)
(cherry picked from commit 3700e353781e27f1bc7222f51f2cc36cbeb9b4ec)

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52928

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Skip invalid kfunc call in backtrack_insn
The verifier skips invalid kfunc call in check_kfunc_call(), which
would be captured in fixup_kfunc_call() if such insn is not eliminated
by dead code elimination. However, this can lead to the following
warning in backtrack_insn(), also see [1]:
------------[ cut here ]------------
verifier backtracking bug
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 8646 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2756 backtrack_insn
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2756
__mark_chain_precision kernel/bpf/verifier.c:3065
mark_chain_precision kernel/bpf/verifier.c:3165
adjust_reg_min_max_vals kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10715
check_alu_op kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10928
do_check kernel/bpf/verifier.c:13821 [inline]
do_check_common kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16289
[...]
So make backtracking conservative with this by returning ENOTSUPP.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACkBjsaXNceR8ZjkLG=dT3P=4A8SBsg0Z5h5PWLryF5=ghKq=g@mail.gmail.com/

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52886

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: core: Fix race by not overwriting udev->descriptor in hub_port_init()
Syzbot reported an out-of-bounds read in sysfs.c:read_descriptors():
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_descriptors+0x263/0x280 drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c:883
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801e78b8c8 by task udevd/5011
CPU: 0 PID: 5011 Comm: udevd Not tainted 6.4.0-rc6-syzkaller-00195-g40f71e7cd3c6 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:351
print_report mm/kasan/report.c:462 [inline]
kasan_report+0x11c/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:572
read_descriptors+0x263/0x280 drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c:883
...
Allocated by task 758:
...
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:966 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x5e/0x190 mm/slab_common.c:979
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:563 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:680 [inline]
usb_get_configuration+0x1f7/0x5170 drivers/usb/core/config.c:887
usb_enumerate_device drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2407 [inline]
usb_new_device+0x12b0/0x19d0 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2545
As analyzed by Khazhy Kumykov, the cause of this bug is a race between
read_descriptors() and hub_port_init(): The first routine uses a field
in udev->descriptor, not expecting it to change, while the second
overwrites it.
Prior to commit 45bf39f8df7f ("USB: core: Don't hold device lock while
reading the "descriptors" sysfs file") this race couldn't occur,
because the routines were mutually exclusive thanks to the device
locking. Removing that locking from read_descriptors() exposed it to
the race.
The best way to fix the bug is to keep hub_port_init() from changing
udev->descriptor once udev has been initialized and registered.
Drivers expect the descriptors stored in the kernel to be immutable;
we should not undermine this expectation. In fact, this change should
have been made long ago.
So now hub_port_init() will take an additional argument, specifying a
buffer in which to store the device descriptor it reads. (If udev has
not yet been initialized, the buffer pointer will be NULL and then
hub_port_init() will store the device descriptor in udev as before.)
This eliminates the data race responsible for the out-of-bounds read.
The changes to hub_port_init() appear more extensive than they really
are, because of indentation changes resulting from an attempt to avoid
writing to other parts of the usb_device structure after it has been
initialized. Similar changes should be made to the code that reads
the BOS descriptor, but that can be handled in a separate patch later
on. This patch is sufficient to fix the bug found by syzbot.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52851

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/mlx5: Fix init stage error handling to avoid double free of same QP and UAF
In the unlikely event that workqueue allocation fails and returns NULL in
mlx5_mkey_cache_init(), delete the call to
mlx5r_umr_resource_cleanup() (which frees the QP) in
mlx5_ib_stage_post_ib_reg_umr_init(). This will avoid attempted double
free of the same QP when __mlx5_ib_add() does its cleanup.
Resolves a splat:
Syzkaller reported a UAF in ib_destroy_qp_user
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mkey_cache": -EINTR
infiniband mlx5_0: mlx5_mkey_cache_init:981:(pid 1642):
failed to create work queue
infiniband mlx5_0: mlx5_ib_stage_post_ib_reg_umr_init:4075:(pid 1642):
mr cache init failed -12
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ib_destroy_qp_user (drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:2073)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810da310a8 by task repro_upstream/1642
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:590)
ib_destroy_qp_user (drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:2073)
mlx5r_umr_resource_cleanup (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/umr.c:198)
__mlx5_ib_add (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4178)
mlx5r_probe (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4402)
...
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1642:
__kmalloc (./include/linux/kasan.h:198 mm/slab_common.c:1026
mm/slab_common.c:1039)
create_qp (./include/linux/slab.h:603 ./include/linux/slab.h:720
./include/rdma/ib_verbs.h:2795 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1209)
ib_create_qp_kernel (drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1347)
mlx5r_umr_resource_init (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/umr.c:164)
mlx5_ib_stage_post_ib_reg_umr_init (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4070)
__mlx5_ib_add (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4168)
mlx5r_probe (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4402)
...
Freed by task 1642:
__kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:1826 mm/slub.c:3809 mm/slub.c:3822)
ib_destroy_qp_user (drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:2112)
mlx5r_umr_resource_cleanup (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/umr.c:198)
mlx5_ib_stage_post_ib_reg_umr_init (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4076
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4065)
__mlx5_ib_add (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4168)
mlx5r_probe (drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c:4402)
...

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52833

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btusb: Add date->evt_skb is NULL check
fix crash because of null pointers
[ 6104.969662] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c8
[ 6104.969667] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 6104.969668] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 6104.969670] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 6104.969673] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 6104.969684] RIP: 0010:btusb_mtk_hci_wmt_sync+0x144/0x220 [btusb]
[ 6104.969688] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d681533d48 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 6104.969689] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ad560bb2000 RCX: 0000000000000006
[ 6104.969691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffb8d681533d08 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 6104.969692] RBP: ffffb8d681533d70 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 6104.969694] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000fa83b2da R12: ffff8ad461d1d7c0
[ 6104.969695] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8ad459618c18 R15: ffffb8d681533d90
[ 6104.969697] FS: 00007f5a1cab9d40(0000) GS:ffff8ad578200000(0000) knlGS:00000
[ 6104.969699] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 6104.969700] CR2: 00000000000000c8 CR3: 000000018620c001 CR4: 0000000000760ef0
[ 6104.969701] PKRU: 55555554
[ 6104.969702] Call Trace:
[ 6104.969708] btusb_mtk_shutdown+0x44/0x80 [btusb]
[ 6104.969732] hci_dev_do_close+0x470/0x5c0 [bluetooth]
[ 6104.969748] hci_rfkill_set_block+0x56/0xa0 [bluetooth]
[ 6104.969753] rfkill_set_block+0x92/0x160
[ 6104.969755] rfkill_fop_write+0x136/0x1e0
[ 6104.969759] __vfs_write+0x18/0x40
[ 6104.969761] vfs_write+0xdf/0x1c0
[ 6104.969763] ksys_write+0xb1/0xe0
[ 6104.969765] __x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20
[ 6104.969769] do_syscall_64+0x51/0x180
[ 6104.969771] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 6104.969773] RIP: 0033:0x7f5a21f18fef
[ 6104.9] RSP: 002b:00007ffeefe39010 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 6104.969780] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c10a7560a0 RCX: 00007f5a21f18fef
[ 6104.969781] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: 00007ffeefe39060 RDI: 0000000000000012
[ 6104.969782] RBP: 00007ffeefe39060 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000017
[ 6104.969784] R10: 00007ffeefe38d97 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000002
[ 6104.969785] R13: 00007ffeefe39220 R14: 00007ffeefe391a0 R15: 000055c10a72acf0

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52808

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: hisi_sas: Set debugfs_dir pointer to NULL after removing debugfs
If init debugfs failed during device registration due to memory allocation
failure, debugfs_remove_recursive() is called, after which debugfs_dir is
not set to NULL. debugfs_remove_recursive() will be called again during
device removal. As a result, illegal pointer is accessed.
[ 1665.467244] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: failed to init debugfs!
...
[ 1669.836708] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a0
[ 1669.872669] pc : down_write+0x24/0x70
[ 1669.876315] lr : down_write+0x1c/0x70
[ 1669.879961] sp : ffff000036f53a30
[ 1669.883260] x29: ffff000036f53a30 x28: ffffa027c31549f8
[ 1669.888547] x27: ffffa027c3140000 x26: 0000000000000000
[ 1669.893834] x25: ffffa027bf37c270 x24: ffffa027bf37c270
[ 1669.899122] x23: ffff0000095406b8 x22: ffff0000095406a8
[ 1669.904408] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffffa027bf37c310
[ 1669.909695] x19: 00000000000000a0 x18: ffff8027dcd86f10
[ 1669.914982] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1669.920268] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: ffffa0274014f870
[ 1669.925555] x13: 0000000000000040 x12: 0000000000000228
[ 1669.930842] x11: 0000000000000020 x10: 0000000000000bb0
[ 1669.936129] x9 : ffff000036f537f0 x8 : ffff80273088ca10
[ 1669.941416] x7 : 000000000000001d x6 : 00000000ffffffff
[ 1669.946702] x5 : ffff000008a36310 x4 : ffff80273088be00
[ 1669.951989] x3 : ffff000009513e90 x2 : 0000000000000000
[ 1669.957276] x1 : 00000000000000a0 x0 : ffffffff00000001
[ 1669.962563] Call trace:
[ 1669.965000] down_write+0x24/0x70
[ 1669.968301] debugfs_remove_recursive+0x5c/0x1b0
[ 1669.972905] hisi_sas_debugfs_exit+0x24/0x30 [hisi_sas_main]
[ 1669.978541] hisi_sas_v3_remove+0x130/0x150 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]
[ 1669.984175] pci_device_remove+0x48/0xd8
[ 1669.988082] device_release_driver_internal+0x1b4/0x250
[ 1669.993282] device_release_driver+0x28/0x38
[ 1669.997534] pci_stop_bus_device+0x84/0xb8
[ 1670.001611] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x24/0x40
[ 1670.007244] remove_store+0xfc/0x140
[ 1670.010802] dev_attr_store+0x44/0x60
[ 1670.014448] sysfs_kf_write+0x58/0x80
[ 1670.018095] kernfs_fop_write+0xe8/0x1f0
[ 1670.022000] __vfs_write+0x60/0x190
[ 1670.025472] vfs_write+0xac/0x1c0
[ 1670.028771] ksys_write+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1670.032071] __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30
[ 1670.035977] el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130
[ 1670.039710] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
[ 1670.043442] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
To fix this, set debugfs_dir to NULL after debugfs_remove_recursive().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52782

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Track xmit submission to PTP WQ after populating metadata map
Ensure the skb is available in metadata mapping to skbs before tracking the
metadata index for detecting undelivered CQEs. If the metadata index is put
in the tracking list before putting the skb in the map, the metadata index
might be used for detecting undelivered CQEs before the relevant skb is
available in the map, which can lead to a null-ptr-deref.
Log:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
CPU: 0 PID: 1243 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc4+ #108
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events mlx5e_rx_dim_work [mlx5_core]
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_ptp_napi_poll+0x9a4/0x2290 [mlx5_core]
Code: 8c 24 38 cc ff ff 4c 8d 3c c1 4c 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 42 80 3c 31 00 0f 85 97 0f 00 00 4d 8b 3f 49 8d 7f 28 48 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 <42> 80 3c 31 00 0f 85 8b 0f 00 00 49 8b 47 28 48 85 c0 0f 84 05 07
RSP: 0018:ffff8884d3c09c88 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000069 RBX: ffff8881160349d8 RCX: 0000000000000005
RDX: ffffed10218f48cf RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000028
RBP: ffff888122707700 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed109a781383
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff88810c7a7a40
R13: ffff888122707700 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8884d3c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f4f878dd6e0 CR3: 000000014d108002 CR4: 0000000000370eb0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? die_addr+0x3c/0xa0
? exc_general_protection+0x144/0x210
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
? mlx5e_ptp_napi_poll+0x9a4/0x2290 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5e_ptp_napi_poll+0x8f6/0x2290 [mlx5_core]
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa4/0x580
net_rx_action+0x460/0xb80
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x60
? __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x580/0x580
? tasklet_action_common.isra.0+0x2ef/0x760
__do_softirq+0x26c/0x827
irq_exit_rcu+0xc2/0x100
common_interrupt+0x7f/0xa0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
RIP: 0010:__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xb/0x330
Code: 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 8b 44 24 14 8b 4c 24 10 09 c8 eb d5 e8 b7 43 ca 01 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 <41> 56 41 89 d6 41 55 41 89 f5 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 83 e4 f0 48 83
RSP: 0018:ffff88812c4079c0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 1ffffffff083c7fe RBX: ffff888100042dc0 RCX: 0000000000000218
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 0000000000000dc0 RDI: ffff888100042dc0
RBP: ffff88812c4079c8 R08: ffffffffa0289f96 R09: ffffed1025880ea9
R10: ffff888138839f80 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000dc0
R13: 0000000000000100 R14: 000000000000008c R15: ffff8881271fc450
? cmd_exec+0x796/0x2200 [mlx5_core]
kmalloc_trace+0x26/0xc0
cmd_exec+0x796/0x2200 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_cmd_do+0x22/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_cmd_exec+0x17/0x30 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_core_modify_cq_moderation+0x139/0x1b0 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet+0x280/0x280 [mlx5_core]
? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190
? process_one_work+0x659/0x1220
mlx5e_rx_dim_work+0x9d/0x100 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x730/0x1220
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400
? max_active_store+0xf0/0xf0
? assign_work+0x168/0x240
worker_thread+0x70f/0x12d0
? __kthread_parkme+0xd1/0x1d0
? process_one_work+0x1220/0x1220
kthread+0x2d9/0x3b0
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork_as
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52750

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: Restrict CPU_BIG_ENDIAN to GNU as or LLVM IAS 15.x or newer
Prior to LLVM 15.0.0, LLVM's integrated assembler would incorrectly
byte-swap NOP when compiling for big-endian, and the resulting series of
bytes happened to match the encoding of FNMADD S21, S30, S0, S0.
This went unnoticed until commit:
34f66c4c4d5518c1 ("arm64: Use a positive cpucap for FP/SIMD")
Prior to that commit, the kernel would always enable the use of FPSIMD
early in boot when __cpu_setup() initialized CPACR_EL1, and so usage of
FNMADD within the kernel was not detected, but could result in the
corruption of user or kernel FPSIMD state.
After that commit, the instructions happen to trap during boot prior to
FPSIMD being detected and enabled, e.g.
| Unhandled 64-bit el1h sync exception on CPU0, ESR 0x000000001fe00000 -- ASIMD
| CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-00013-g34f66c4c4d55 #1
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 400000c9 (nZcv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : __pi_strcmp+0x1c/0x150
| lr : populate_properties+0xe4/0x254
| sp : ffffd014173d3ad0
| x29: ffffd014173d3af0 x28: fffffbfffddffcb8 x27: 0000000000000000
| x26: 0000000000000058 x25: fffffbfffddfe054 x24: 0000000000000008
| x23: fffffbfffddfe000 x22: fffffbfffddfe000 x21: fffffbfffddfe044
| x20: ffffd014173d3b70 x19: 0000000000000001 x18: 0000000000000005
| x17: 0000000000000010 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 00000000413e7000
| x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000001bcc x12: 0000000000000000
| x11: 00000000d00dfeed x10: ffffd414193f2cd0 x9 : 0000000000000000
| x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : ffffffffffffffc0 x6 : 0000000000000000
| x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0101010101010101 x3 : 000000000000002a
| x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : ffffd014171f2988 x0 : fffffbfffddffcb8
| Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception
| CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-00013-g34f66c4c4d55 #1
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| Call trace:
| dump_backtrace+0xec/0x108
| show_stack+0x18/0x2c
| dump_stack_lvl+0x50/0x68
| dump_stack+0x18/0x24
| panic+0x13c/0x340
| el1t_64_irq_handler+0x0/0x1c
| el1_abort+0x0/0x5c
| el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
| __pi_strcmp+0x1c/0x150
| unflatten_dt_nodes+0x1e8/0x2d8
| __unflatten_device_tree+0x5c/0x15c
| unflatten_device_tree+0x38/0x50
| setup_arch+0x164/0x1e0
| start_kernel+0x64/0x38c
| __primary_switched+0xbc/0xc4
Restrict CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN to a known good assembler, which is
either GNU as or LLVM's IAS 15.0.0 and newer, which contains the linked
commit.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52745

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/IPoIB: Fix legacy IPoIB due to wrong number of queues
The cited commit creates child PKEY interfaces over netlink will
multiple tx and rx queues, but some devices doesn't support more than 1
tx and 1 rx queues. This causes to a crash when traffic is sent over the
PKEY interface due to the parent having a single queue but the child
having multiple queues.
This patch fixes the number of queues to 1 for legacy IPoIB at the
earliest possible point in time.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000036b
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 4 PID: 209665 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.1.0_for_upstream_min_debug_2022_12_12_17_02 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_alloc+0xcb/0x450
Code: ce 7e 49 8b 50 08 49 83 78 10 00 4d 8b 28 0f 84 cb 02 00 00 4d 85 ed 0f 84 c2 02 00 00 41 8b 44 24 28 48 8d 4a
01 49 8b 3c 24 <49> 8b 5c 05 00 4c 89 e8 65 48 0f c7 0f 0f 94 c0 84 c0 74 b8 41 8b
RSP: 0018:ffff88822acbbab8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000070 RBX: ffff8881c28e3e00 RCX: 00000000064f8dae
RDX: 00000000064f8dad RSI: 0000000000000a20 RDI: 0000000000030d00
RBP: 0000000000000a20 R08: ffff8882f5d30d00 R09: ffff888104032f40
R10: ffff88810fade828 R11: 736f6d6570736575 R12: ffff88810081c000
R13: 00000000000002fb R14: ffffffff817fc865 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f9324ff9700(0000) GS:ffff8882f5d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000036b CR3: 00000001125af004 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_clone+0x55/0xd0
ip6_finish_output2+0x3fe/0x690
ip6_finish_output+0xfa/0x310
ip6_send_skb+0x1e/0x60
udp_v6_send_skb+0x1e5/0x420
udpv6_sendmsg+0xb3c/0xe60
? ip_mc_finish_output+0x180/0x180
? __switch_to_asm+0x3a/0x60
? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x60
sock_sendmsg+0x33/0x40
__sys_sendto+0x103/0x160
? _copy_to_user+0x21/0x30
? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0xd/0x10
? ktime_get_ts64+0x49/0xe0
__x64_sys_sendto+0x25/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7f9374f1ed14
Code: 42 41 f8 ff 44 8b 4c 24 2c 4c 8b 44 24 20 89 c5 44 8b 54 24 28 48 8b 54 24 18 b8 2c 00 00 00 48 8b 74 24 10 8b
7c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 34 89 ef 48 89 44 24 08 e8 68 41 f8 ff 48 8b
RSP: 002b:00007f9324ff7bd0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9324ff7cc8 RCX: 00007f9374f1ed14
RDX: 00000000000002fb RSI: 00007f93000052f0 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007f9324ff7d40 R09: 000000000000001c
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000012a05f200 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007f9374d57bdc
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52743

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Do not use WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag for workqueue
When both ice and the irdma driver are loaded, a warning in
check_flush_dependency is being triggered. This is due to ice driver
workqueue being allocated with the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag and the irdma one
is not.
According to kernel documentation, this flag should be set if the
workqueue will be involved in the kernel's memory reclamation flow.
Since it is not, there is no need for the ice driver's WQ to have this
flag set so remove it.
Example trace:
[ +0.000004] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM ice:ice_service_task [ice] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM infiniband:0x0
[ +0.000139] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 728 at kernel/workqueue.c:2632 check_flush_dependency+0x178/0x1a0
[ +0.000011] Modules linked in: bonding tls xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_cha
in_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink bridge stp llc rfkill vfat fat intel_rapl_msr intel
_rapl_common isst_if_common skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct1
0dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel rapl intel_cstate rpcrdma sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_srpt ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_
core_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_ssif irdma mei_me ib_uverbs
ib_core intel_uncore joydev pcspkr i2c_i801 acpi_ipmi mei lpc_ich i2c_smbus intel_pch_thermal ioatdma ipmi_si acpi_power_meter
acpi_pad xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 sg ahci ixgbe libahci ice i40e igb crc32c_intel mdio i2c_algo_bit liba
ta dca wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler fuse
[ +0.000161] [last unloaded: bonding]
[ +0.000006] CPU: 0 PID: 728 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G S 6.2.0-rc2_next-queue-13jan-00458-gc20aabd57164 #1
[ +0.000006] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0010.010620200716 01/06/2020
[ +0.000003] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice]
[ +0.000127] RIP: 0010:check_flush_dependency+0x178/0x1a0
[ +0.000005] Code: 89 8e 02 01 e8 49 3d 40 00 49 8b 55 18 48 8d 8d d0 00 00 00 48 8d b3 d0 00 00 00 4d 89 e0 48 c7 c7 e0 3b 08
9f e8 bb d3 07 01 <0f> 0b e9 be fe ff ff 80 3d 24 89 8e 02 00 0f 85 6b ff ff ff e9 06
[ +0.000004] RSP: 0018:ffff88810a39f990 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ +0.000005] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888141bc2400 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000004] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffffffffa1213a80
[ +0.000003] RBP: ffff888194bf3400 R08: ffffed117b306112 R09: ffffed117b306112
[ +0.000003] R10: ffff888bd983088b R11: ffffed117b306111 R12: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000003] R13: ffff888111f84d00 R14: ffff88810a3943ac R15: ffff888194bf3400
[ +0.000004] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888bd9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ +0.000003] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ +0.000003] CR2: 000056035b208b60 CR3: 000000017795e005 CR4: 00000000007706f0
[ +0.000003] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000003] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ +0.000002] PKRU: 55555554
[ +0.000003] Call Trace:
[ +0.000002] <TASK>
[ +0.000003] __flush_workqueue+0x203/0x840
[ +0.000006] ? mutex_unlock+0x84/0xd0
[ +0.000008] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000004] ? __pfx___flush_workqueue+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000006] ? mutex_lock+0xa3/0xf0
[ +0.000005] ib_cache_cleanup_one+0x39/0x190 [ib_core]
[ +0.000174] __ib_unregister_device+0x84/0xf0 [ib_core]
[ +0.000094] ib_unregister_device+0x25/0x30 [ib_core]
[ +0.000093] irdma_ib_unregister_device+0x97/0xc0 [irdma]
[ +0.000064] ? __pfx_irdma_ib_unregister_device+0x10/0x10 [irdma]
[ +0.000059] ? up_write+0x5c/0x90
[ +0.000005] irdma_remove+0x36/0x90 [irdma]
[ +0.000062] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x32/0x50
[ +0.000007] device_r
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52738

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/fence: Fix oops due to non-matching drm_sched init/fini
Currently amdgpu calls drm_sched_fini() from the fence driver sw fini
routine - such function is expected to be called only after the
respective init function - drm_sched_init() - was executed successfully.
Happens that we faced a driver probe failure in the Steam Deck
recently, and the function drm_sched_fini() was called even without
its counter-part had been previously called, causing the following oops:
amdgpu: probe of 0000:04:00.0 failed with error -110
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000090
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 609 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-gpiccoli #338
Hardware name: Valve Jupiter/Jupiter, BIOS F7A0113 11/04/2022
RIP: 0010:drm_sched_fini+0x84/0xa0 [gpu_sched]
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
amdgpu_fence_driver_sw_fini+0xc8/0xd0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_device_fini_sw+0x2b/0x3b0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_driver_release_kms+0x16/0x30 [amdgpu]
devm_drm_dev_init_release+0x49/0x70
[...]
To prevent that, check if the drm_sched was properly initialized for a
given ring before calling its fini counter-part.
Notice ideally we'd use sched.ready for that; such field is set as the latest
thing on drm_sched_init(). But amdgpu seems to "override" the meaning of such
field - in the above oops for example, it was a GFX ring causing the crash, and
the sched.ready field was set to true in the ring init routine, regardless of
the state of the DRM scheduler. Hence, we ended-up using sched.ops as per
Christian's suggestion [0], and also removed the no_scheduler check [1].
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/amd-gfx/984ee981-2906-0eaf-ccec-9f80975cb136@amd.com/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/amd-gfx/cd0e2994-f85f-d837-609f-7056d5fb7231@amd.com/

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52736

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: hda: Do not unset preset when cleaning up codec
Several functions that take part in codec's initialization and removal
are re-used by ASoC codec drivers implementations. Drivers mimic the
behavior of hda_codec_driver_probe/remove() found in
sound/pci/hda/hda_bind.c with their component->probe/remove() instead.
One of the reasons for that is the expectation of
snd_hda_codec_device_new() to receive a valid pointer to an instance of
struct snd_card. This expectation can be met only once sound card
components probing commences.
As ASoC sound card may be unbound without codec device being actually
removed from the system, unsetting ->preset in
snd_hda_codec_cleanup_for_unbind() interferes with module unload -> load
scenario causing null-ptr-deref. Preset is assigned only once, during
device/driver matching whereas ASoC codec driver's module reloading may
occur several times throughout the lifetime of an audio stack.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52632

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Fix lock dependency warning with srcu
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.5.0-kfd-yangp #2289 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/0:2/996 is trying to acquire lock:
(srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: __synchronize_srcu+0x5/0x1a0
but task is already holding lock:
((work_completion)(&svms->deferred_list_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
process_one_work+0x211/0x560
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #3 ((work_completion)(&svms->deferred_list_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
__flush_work+0x88/0x4f0
svm_range_list_lock_and_flush_work+0x3d/0x110 [amdgpu]
svm_range_set_attr+0xd6/0x14c0 [amdgpu]
kfd_ioctl+0x1d1/0x630 [amdgpu]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
-> #2 (&info->lock#2){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x99/0xc70
amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_restore_process_bos+0x54/0x740 [amdgpu]
restore_process_helper+0x22/0x80 [amdgpu]
restore_process_worker+0x2d/0xa0 [amdgpu]
process_one_work+0x29b/0x560
worker_thread+0x3d/0x3d0
-> #1 ((work_completion)(&(&process->restore_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
__flush_work+0x88/0x4f0
__cancel_work_timer+0x12c/0x1c0
kfd_process_notifier_release_internal+0x37/0x1f0 [amdgpu]
__mmu_notifier_release+0xad/0x240
exit_mmap+0x6a/0x3a0
mmput+0x6a/0x120
do_exit+0x322/0xb90
do_group_exit+0x37/0xa0
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x18/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x80
-> #0 (srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x1521/0x2510
lock_sync+0x5f/0x90
__synchronize_srcu+0x4f/0x1a0
__mmu_notifier_release+0x128/0x240
exit_mmap+0x6a/0x3a0
mmput+0x6a/0x120
svm_range_deferred_list_work+0x19f/0x350 [amdgpu]
process_one_work+0x29b/0x560
worker_thread+0x3d/0x3d0
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
srcu --> &info->lock#2 --> (work_completion)(&svms->deferred_list_work)
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock((work_completion)(&svms->deferred_list_work));
lock(&info->lock#2);
lock((work_completion)(&svms->deferred_list_work));
sync(srcu);

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52625

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Refactor DMCUB enter/exit idle interface
[Why]
We can hang in place trying to send commands when the DMCUB isn't
powered on.
[How]
We need to exit out of the idle state prior to sending a command,
but the process that performs the exit also invokes a command itself.
Fixing this issue involves the following:
1. Using a software state to track whether or not we need to start
the process to exit idle or notify idle.
It's possible for the hardware to have exited an idle state without
driver knowledge, but entering one is always restricted to a driver
allow - which makes the SW state vs HW state mismatch issue purely one
of optimization, which should seldomly be hit, if at all.
2. Refactor any instances of exit/notify idle to use a single wrapper
that maintains this SW state.
This works simialr to dc_allow_idle_optimizations, but works at the
DMCUB level and makes sure the state is marked prior to any notify/exit
idle so we don't enter an infinite loop.
3. Make sure we exit out of idle prior to sending any commands or
waiting for DMCUB idle.
This patch takes care of 1/2. A future patch will take care of wrapping
DMCUB command submission with calls to this new interface.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52570

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio/mdev: Fix a null-ptr-deref bug for mdev_unregister_parent()
Inject fault while probing mdpy.ko, if kstrdup() of create_dir() fails in
kobject_add_internal() in kobject_init_and_add() in mdev_type_add()
in parent_create_sysfs_files(), it will return 0 and probe successfully.
And when rmmod mdpy.ko, the mdpy_dev_exit() will call
mdev_unregister_parent(), the mdev_type_remove() may traverse uninitialized
parent->types[i] in parent_remove_sysfs_files(), and it will cause
below null-ptr-deref.
If mdev_type_add() fails, return the error code and kset_unregister()
to fix the issue.
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]
CPU: 2 PID: 10215 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W N 6.6.0-rc2+ #20
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__kobject_del+0x62/0x1c0
Code: 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 51 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6b 28 48 8d 7d 10 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 24 01 00 00 48 8b 75 10 48 89 df 48 8d 6b 3c e8
RSP: 0018:ffff88810695fd30 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffffa0270268 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000010
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10233a4ef1
R10: ffff888119d2778b R11: 0000000063666572 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: fffffbfff404e2d4 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffffffa0271660
FS: 00007fbc81981540(0000) GS:ffff888119d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc14a142dc0 CR3: 0000000110a62003 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
DR0: ffffffff8fb0bce8 DR1: ffffffff8fb0bce9 DR2: ffffffff8fb0bcea
DR3: ffffffff8fb0bceb DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die_addr+0x3d/0xa0
? exc_general_protection+0x144/0x220
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
? __kobject_del+0x62/0x1c0
kobject_del+0x32/0x50
parent_remove_sysfs_files+0xd6/0x170 [mdev]
mdev_unregister_parent+0xfb/0x190 [mdev]
? mdev_register_parent+0x270/0x270 [mdev]
? find_module_all+0x9d/0xe0
mdpy_dev_exit+0x17/0x63 [mdpy]
__do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x2fa/0x4b0
? module_flags+0x300/0x300
? __fput+0x4e7/0xa00
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7fbc813221b7
Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d d1 8c 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a1 8c 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffe780e0648 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe780e06a8 RCX: 00007fbc813221b7
RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 000055e214df9b58
RBP: 000055e214df9af0 R08: 00007ffe780df5c1 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007fbc8139ecc0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe780e0870
R13: 00007ffe780e0ed0 R14: 000055e214df9260 R15: 000055e214df9af0
</TASK>
Modules linked in: mdpy(-) mdev vfio_iommu_type1 vfio [last unloaded: mdpy]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:__kobject_del+0x62/0x1c0
Code: 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 51 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6b 28 48 8d 7d 10 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 24 01 00 00 48 8b 75 10 48 89 df 48 8d 6b 3c e8
RSP: 0018:ffff88810695fd30 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffffa0270268 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000010
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10233a4ef1
R10: ffff888119d2778b R11: 0000000063666572 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: fffffbfff404e2d4 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffffffa0271660
FS: 00007fbc81981540(0000) GS:ffff888119d00000(000
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52523

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Reject sk_msg egress redirects to non-TCP sockets
With a SOCKMAP/SOCKHASH map and an sk_msg program user can steer messages
sent from one TCP socket (s1) to actually egress from another TCP
socket (s2):
tcp_bpf_sendmsg(s1)// = sk_prot->sendmsg
tcp_bpf_send_verdict(s1)// __SK_REDIRECT case
tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(s2)
tcp_bpf_push_locked(s2)
tcp_bpf_push(s2)
tcp_rate_check_app_limited(s2) // expects tcp_sock
tcp_sendmsg_locked(s2) // ditto
There is a hard-coded assumption in the call-chain, that the egress
socket (s2) is a TCP socket.
However in commit 122e6c79efe1 ("sock_map: Update sock type checks for
UDP") we have enabled redirects to non-TCP sockets. This was done for the
sake of BPF sk_skb programs. There was no indention to support sk_msg
send-to-egress use case.
As a result, attempts to send-to-egress through a non-TCP socket lead to a
crash due to invalid downcast from sock to tcp_sock:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002f
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x60/0x70
? __die+0x1f/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x80/0x160
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2d7/0x800
? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50
? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x1c0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
? tcp_tso_segs+0x14/0xa0
tcp_write_xmit+0x67/0xce0
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0x32/0xf0
tcp_push+0x107/0x140
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x99f/0xbb0
tcp_bpf_push+0x19d/0x3a0
tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir+0x55/0xd0
tcp_bpf_send_verdict+0x407/0x550
tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x390
inet_sendmsg+0x6a/0x70
sock_sendmsg+0x9d/0xc0
? sockfd_lookup_light+0x12/0x80
__sys_sendto+0x10e/0x160
? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x20/0x60
? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x82/0x110
__x64_sys_sendto+0x1f/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Reject selecting a non-TCP sockets as redirect target from a BPF sk_msg
program to prevent the crash. When attempted, user will receive an EACCES
error from send/sendto/sendmsg() syscall.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52516

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dma-debug: don't call __dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() under free_entries_lock
__dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() calls into printk -> serial console
output (qcom geni) and grabs port->lock under free_entries_lock
spin lock, which is a reverse locking dependency chain as qcom_geni
IRQ handler can call into dma-debug code and grab free_entries_lock
under port->lock.
Move __dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() call out of free_entries_lock
scope so that we don't acquire serial console's port->lock under it.
Trimmed-down lockdep splat:
The existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (free_entries_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x80
dma_entry_alloc+0x38/0x110
debug_dma_map_page+0x60/0xf8
dma_map_page_attrs+0x1e0/0x230
dma_map_single_attrs.constprop.0+0x6c/0xc8
geni_se_rx_dma_prep+0x40/0xcc
qcom_geni_serial_isr+0x310/0x510
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x110/0x244
handle_irq_event_percpu+0x20/0x54
handle_irq_event+0x50/0x88
handle_fasteoi_irq+0xa4/0xcc
handle_irq_desc+0x28/0x40
generic_handle_domain_irq+0x24/0x30
gic_handle_irq+0xc4/0x148
do_interrupt_handler+0xa4/0xb0
el1_interrupt+0x34/0x64
el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
el1h_64_irq+0x64/0x68
arch_local_irq_enable+0x4/0x8
____do_softirq+0x18/0x24
...
-> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}-{2:2}:
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x80
qcom_geni_serial_console_write+0x184/0x1dc
console_flush_all+0x344/0x454
console_unlock+0x94/0xf0
vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c
vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48
vprintk+0xb4/0xbc
_printk+0x68/0x90
register_console+0x230/0x38c
uart_add_one_port+0x338/0x494
qcom_geni_serial_probe+0x390/0x424
platform_probe+0x70/0xc0
really_probe+0x148/0x280
__driver_probe_device+0xfc/0x114
driver_probe_device+0x44/0x100
__device_attach_driver+0x64/0xdc
bus_for_each_drv+0xb0/0xd8
__device_attach+0xe4/0x140
device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28
bus_probe_device+0x44/0xb0
device_add+0x538/0x668
of_device_add+0x44/0x50
of_platform_device_create_pdata+0x94/0xc8
of_platform_bus_create+0x270/0x304
of_platform_populate+0xac/0xc4
devm_of_platform_populate+0x60/0xac
geni_se_probe+0x154/0x160
platform_probe+0x70/0xc0
...
-> #0 (console_owner){-...}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0xdf8/0x109c
lock_acquire+0x234/0x284
console_flush_all+0x330/0x454
console_unlock+0x94/0xf0
vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c
vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48
vprintk+0xb4/0xbc
_printk+0x68/0x90
dma_entry_alloc+0xb4/0x110
debug_dma_map_sg+0xdc/0x2f8
__dma_map_sg_attrs+0xac/0xe4
dma_map_sgtable+0x30/0x4c
get_pages+0x1d4/0x1e4 [msm]
msm_gem_pin_pages_locked+0x38/0xac [msm]
msm_gem_pin_vma_locked+0x58/0x88 [msm]
msm_ioctl_gem_submit+0xde4/0x13ac [msm]
drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x15c
drm_ioctl+0x2e8/0x3f4
vfs_ioctl+0x30/0x50
...
Chain exists of:
console_owner --> &port_lock_key --> free_entries_lock
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(free_entries_lock);
lock(&port_lock_key);
lock(free_entries_lock);
lock(console_owner);
*** DEADLOCK ***
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0xb4/0xf0
show_stack+0x20/0x30
dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x84
dump_stack+0x18/0x24
print_circular_bug+0x1cc/0x234
check_noncircular+0x78/0xac
__lock_acquire+0xdf8/0x109c
lock_acquire+0x234/0x284
console_flush_all+0x330/0x454
consol
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52481

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: errata: Add Cortex-A520 speculative unprivileged load workaround
Implement the workaround for ARM Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298. On an
affected Cortex-A520 core, a speculatively executed unprivileged load
might leak data from a privileged load via a cache side channel. The
issue only exists for loads within a translation regime with the same
translation (e.g. same ASID and VMID). Therefore, the issue only affects
the return to EL0.
The workaround is to execute a TLBI before returning to EL0 after all
loads of privileged data. A non-shareable TLBI to any address is
sufficient.
The workaround isn't necessary if page table isolation (KPTI) is
enabled, but for simplicity it will be. Page table isolation should
normally be disabled for Cortex-A520 as it supports the CSV3 feature
and the E0PD feature (used when KASLR is enabled).

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52474

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/hfi1: Fix bugs with non-PAGE_SIZE-end multi-iovec user SDMA requests
hfi1 user SDMA request processing has two bugs that can cause data
corruption for user SDMA requests that have multiple payload iovecs
where an iovec other than the tail iovec does not run up to the page
boundary for the buffer pointed to by that iovec.a
Here are the specific bugs:
1. user_sdma_txadd() does not use struct user_sdma_iovec->iov.iov_len.
Rather, user_sdma_txadd() will add up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from iovec
to the packet, even if some of those bytes are past
iovec->iov.iov_len and are thus not intended to be in the packet.
2. user_sdma_txadd() and user_sdma_send_pkts() fail to advance to the
next iovec in user_sdma_request->iovs when the current iovec
is not PAGE_SIZE and does not contain enough data to complete the
packet. The transmitted packet will contain the wrong data from the
iovec pages.
This has not been an issue with SDMA packets from hfi1 Verbs or PSM2
because they only produce iovecs that end short of PAGE_SIZE as the tail
iovec of an SDMA request.
Fixing these bugs exposes other bugs with the SDMA pin cache
(struct mmu_rb_handler) that get in way of supporting user SDMA requests
with multiple payload iovecs whose buffers do not end at PAGE_SIZE. So
this commit fixes those issues as well.
Here are the mmu_rb_handler bugs that non-PAGE_SIZE-end multi-iovec
payload user SDMA requests can hit:
1. Overlapping memory ranges in mmu_rb_handler will result in duplicate
pinnings.
2. When extending an existing mmu_rb_handler entry (struct mmu_rb_node),
the mmu_rb code (1) removes the existing entry under a lock, (2)
releases that lock, pins the new pages, (3) then reacquires the lock
to insert the extended mmu_rb_node.
If someone else comes in and inserts an overlapping entry between (2)
and (3), insert in (3) will fail.
The failure path code in this case unpins _all_ pages in either the
original mmu_rb_node or the new mmu_rb_node that was inserted between
(2) and (3).
3. In hfi1_mmu_rb_remove_unless_exact(), mmu_rb_node->refcount is
incremented outside of mmu_rb_handler->lock. As a result, mmu_rb_node
could be evicted by another thread that gets mmu_rb_handler->lock and
checks mmu_rb_node->refcount before mmu_rb_node->refcount is
incremented.
4. Related to #2 above, SDMA request submission failure path does not
check mmu_rb_node->refcount before freeing mmu_rb_node object.
If there are other SDMA requests in progress whose iovecs have
pointers to the now-freed mmu_rb_node(s), those pointers to the
now-freed mmu_rb nodes will be dereferenced when those SDMA requests
complete.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52468

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
class: fix use-after-free in class_register()
The lock_class_key is still registered and can be found in
lock_keys_hash hlist after subsys_private is freed in error
handler path.A task who iterate over the lock_keys_hash
later may cause use-after-free.So fix that up and unregister
the lock_class_key before kfree(cp).
On our platform, a driver fails to kset_register because of
creating duplicate filename '/class/xxx'.With Kasan enabled,
it prints a invalid-access bug report.
KASAN bug report:
BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in lockdep_register_key+0x19c/0x1bc
Write of size 8 at addr 15ffff808b8c0368 by task modprobe/252
Pointer tag: [15], memory tag: [fe]
CPU: 7 PID: 252 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W
6.6.0-mainline-maybe-dirty #1
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x1b0/0x1e4
show_stack+0x2c/0x40
dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0xe0
print_report+0x18c/0x4d8
kasan_report+0xe8/0x148
__hwasan_store8_noabort+0x88/0x98
lockdep_register_key+0x19c/0x1bc
class_register+0x94/0x1ec
init_module+0xbc/0xf48 [rfkill]
do_one_initcall+0x17c/0x72c
do_init_module+0x19c/0x3f8
...
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffff808b8c0100: 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a
ffffff808b8c0200: 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a 8a fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe
>ffffff808b8c0300: fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe
^
ffffff808b8c0400: 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
As CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC is not set, Kasan reports invalid-access
not use-after-free here.In this case, modprobe is manipulating
the corrupted lock_keys_hash hlish where lock_class_key is already
freed before.
It's worth noting that this only can happen if lockdep is enabled,
which is not true for normal system.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52452

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix accesses to uninit stack slots
Privileged programs are supposed to be able to read uninitialized stack
memory (ever since 6715df8d5) but, before this patch, these accesses
were permitted inconsistently. In particular, accesses were permitted
above state->allocated_stack, but not below it. In other words, if the
stack was already "large enough", the access was permitted, but
otherwise the access was rejected instead of being allowed to "grow the
stack". This undesired rejection was happening in two places:
- in check_stack_slot_within_bounds()
- in check_stack_range_initialized()
This patch arranges for these accesses to be permitted. A bunch of tests
that were relying on the old rejection had to change; all of them were
changed to add also run unprivileged, in which case the old behavior
persists. One tests couldn't be updated - global_func16 - because it
can't run unprivileged for other reasons.
This patch also fixes the tracking of the stack size for variable-offset
reads. This second fix is bundled in the same commit as the first one
because they're inter-related. Before this patch, writes to the stack
using registers containing a variable offset (as opposed to registers
with fixed, known values) were not properly contributing to the
function's needed stack size. As a result, it was possible for a program
to verify, but then to attempt to read out-of-bounds data at runtime
because a too small stack had been allocated for it.
Each function tracks the size of the stack it needs in
bpf_subprog_info.stack_depth, which is maintained by
update_stack_depth(). For regular memory accesses, check_mem_access()
was calling update_state_depth() but it was passing in only the fixed
part of the offset register, ignoring the variable offset. This was
incorrect; the minimum possible value of that register should be used
instead.
This tracking is now fixed by centralizing the tracking of stack size in
grow_stack_state(), and by lifting the calls to grow_stack_state() to
check_stack_access_within_bounds() as suggested by Andrii. The code is
now simpler and more convincingly tracks the correct maximum stack size.
check_stack_range_initialized() can now rely on enough stack having been
allocated for the access; this helps with the fix for the first issue.
A few tests were changed to also check the stack depth computation. The
one that fails without this patch is verifier_var_off:stack_write_priv_vs_unpriv.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2023-52435

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: prevent mss overflow in skb_segment()
Once again syzbot is able to crash the kernel in skb_segment() [1]
GSO_BY_FRAGS is a forbidden value, but unfortunately the following
computation in skb_segment() can reach it quite easily :
mss = mss * partial_segs;
65535 = 3 * 5 * 17 * 257, so many initial values of mss can lead to
a bad final result.
Make sure to limit segmentation so that the new mss value is smaller
than GSO_BY_FRAGS.
[1]
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000070-0x0000000000000077]
CPU: 1 PID: 5079 Comm: syz-executor993 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc4-syzkaller-00141-g1ae4cd3cbdd0 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/10/2023
RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x181d/0x3f30 net/core/skbuff.c:4551
Code: 83 e3 02 e9 fb ed ff ff e8 90 68 1c f9 48 8b 84 24 f8 00 00 00 48 8d 78 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 8a 21 00 00 48 8b 84 24 f8 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc900043473d0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000010046 RCX: ffffffff886b1597
RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffffff886b2520 RDI: 0000000000000070
RBP: ffffc90004347578 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 000000000000ffff
R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff888063202ac0
R13: 0000000000010000 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: 0000000000000046
FS: 0000555556e7e380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020010000 CR3: 0000000027ee2000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
udp6_ufo_fragment+0xa0e/0xd00 net/ipv6/udp_offload.c:109
ipv6_gso_segment+0x534/0x17e0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:120
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x290/0x610 net/core/gso.c:53
__skb_gso_segment+0x339/0x710 net/core/gso.c:124
skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline]
validate_xmit_skb+0x36c/0xeb0 net/core/dev.c:3626
__dev_queue_xmit+0x6f3/0x3d60 net/core/dev.c:4338
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x257/0x380 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3087 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x24c6/0x5220 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x180 net/socket.c:745
__sys_sendto+0x255/0x340 net/socket.c:2190
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2202 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2198 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2198
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
RIP: 0033:0x7f8692032aa9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 d1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff8d685418 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f8692032aa9
RDX: 0000000000010048 RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000000f4240 R08: 0000000020000540 R09: 0000000000000014
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff8d685480
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007fff8d685480 R15: 0000000000000003
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x181d/0x3f30 net/core/skbuff.c:4551
Code: 83 e3 02 e9 fb ed ff ff e8 90 68 1c f9 48 8b 84 24 f8 00 00 00 48 8d 78 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 8a 21 00 00 48 8b 84 24 f8 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc900043473d0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000010046 RCX: ffffffff886b1597
RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffffff886b2520 RDI: 0000000000000070
RBP: ffffc90004347578 R0
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49663

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tunnels: do not assume mac header is set in skb_tunnel_check_pmtu()
Recently added debug in commit f9aefd6b2aa3 ("net: warn if mac header
was not set") caught a bug in skb_tunnel_check_pmtu(), as shown
in this syzbot report [1].
In ndo_start_xmit() paths, there is really no need to use skb->mac_header,
because skb->data is supposed to point at it.
[1] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 8604 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2784 skb_mac_header_len include/linux/skbuff.h:2784 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 8604 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2784 skb_tunnel_check_pmtu+0x5de/0x2f90 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:413
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 8604 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-syzkaller-00443-g8720bd951b8e #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:skb_mac_header_len include/linux/skbuff.h:2784 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_tunnel_check_pmtu+0x5de/0x2f90 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:413
Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 84 b9 fe ff ff 4c 89 ff e8 7c 0f d7 f9 e9 ac fe ff ff e8 c2 13 8a f9 <0f> 0b e9 28 fc ff ff e8 b6 13 8a f9 48 8b 54 24 70 48 b8 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90002e4f520 EFLAGS: 00010212
RAX: 0000000000000324 RBX: ffff88804d5fd500 RCX: ffffc90005b52000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff87f05e3e RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: ffffc90002e4f650 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 000000000000ffff
R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000ffff
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000ffcd R15: 000000000000001f
FS: 00007f3babba9700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000080 CR3: 0000000075319000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
geneve_xmit_skb drivers/net/geneve.c:927 [inline]
geneve_xmit+0xcf8/0x35d0 drivers/net/geneve.c:1107
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4805 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4819 [inline]
__dev_direct_xmit+0x500/0x730 net/core/dev.c:4309
dev_direct_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3007 [inline]
packet_direct_xmit+0x1b8/0x2c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:282
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3073 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x21f4/0x55d0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3104
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:734
____sys_sendmsg+0x6eb/0x810 net/socket.c:2489
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2543
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2572 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2581 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x132/0x220 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7f3baaa89109
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f3babba9168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3baab9bf60 RCX: 00007f3baaa89109
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000a00 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f3baaae305d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffe74f2543f R14: 00007f3babba9300 R15: 0000000000022000
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49623

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/xive/spapr: correct bitmap allocation size
kasan detects access beyond the end of the xibm->bitmap allocation:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _find_first_zero_bit+0x40/0x140
Read of size 8 at addr c00000001d1d0118 by task swapper/0/1
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-00001-g90df023b36dd #28
Call Trace:
[c00000001d98f770] [c0000000012baab8] dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0x108 (unreliable)
[c00000001d98f7b0] [c00000000068faac] print_report+0x37c/0x710
[c00000001d98f880] [c0000000006902c0] kasan_report+0x110/0x354
[c00000001d98f950] [c000000000692324] __asan_load8+0xa4/0xe0
[c00000001d98f970] [c0000000011c6ed0] _find_first_zero_bit+0x40/0x140
[c00000001d98f9b0] [c0000000000dbfbc] xive_spapr_get_ipi+0xcc/0x260
[c00000001d98fa70] [c0000000000d6d28] xive_setup_cpu_ipi+0x1e8/0x450
[c00000001d98fb30] [c000000004032a20] pSeries_smp_probe+0x5c/0x118
[c00000001d98fb60] [c000000004018b44] smp_prepare_cpus+0x944/0x9ac
[c00000001d98fc90] [c000000004009f9c] kernel_init_freeable+0x2d4/0x640
[c00000001d98fd90] [c0000000000131e8] kernel_init+0x28/0x1d0
[c00000001d98fe10] [c00000000000cd54] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
Allocated by task 0:
kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x70
__kasan_kmalloc+0xb4/0xf0
__kmalloc+0x268/0x540
xive_spapr_init+0x4d0/0x77c
pseries_init_irq+0x40/0x27c
init_IRQ+0x44/0x84
start_kernel+0x2a4/0x538
start_here_common+0x1c/0x20
The buggy address belongs to the object at c00000001d1d0118
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
8-byte region [c00000001d1d0118, c00000001d1d0120)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:c00c000000074740 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xc00000001d1d0558 pfn:0x1d1d
flags: 0x7ffff000000200(slab|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff)
raw: 007ffff000000200 c00000001d0003c8 c00000001d0003c8 c00000001d010480
raw: c00000001d1d0558 0000000001e1000a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
c00000001d1d0000: fc 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c00000001d1d0080: fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>c00000001d1d0100: fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
c00000001d1d0180: fc fc fc fc 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c00000001d1d0200: fc fc fc fc fc 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
This happens because the allocation uses the wrong unit (bits) when it
should pass (BITS_TO_LONGS(count) * sizeof(long)) or equivalent. With small
numbers of bits, the allocated object can be smaller than sizeof(long),
which results in invalid accesses.
Use bitmap_zalloc() to allocate and initialize the irq bitmap, paired with
bitmap_free() for consistency.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49606

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Fix sleep from invalid context BUG
Taking the qos_mutex to process RoCEv2 QP's on netdev events causes a
kernel splat.
Fix this by removing the handling for RoCEv2 in
irdma_cm_teardown_connections that uses the mutex. This handling is only
needed for iWARP to avoid having connections established while the link is
down or having connections remain functional after the IP address is
removed.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.
Call Trace:
kernel: dump_stack+0x66/0x90
kernel: ___might_sleep.cold.92+0x8d/0x9a
kernel: mutex_lock+0x1c/0x40
kernel: irdma_cm_teardown_connections+0x28e/0x4d0 [irdma]
kernel: ? check_preempt_curr+0x7a/0x90
kernel: ? select_idle_sibling+0x22/0x3c0
kernel: ? select_task_rq_fair+0x94c/0xc90
kernel: ? irdma_exec_cqp_cmd+0xc27/0x17c0 [irdma]
kernel: ? __wake_up_common+0x7a/0x190
kernel: irdma_if_notify+0x3cc/0x450 [irdma]
kernel: ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xb0
kernel: irdma_inet6addr_event+0xc6/0x150 [irdma]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49592

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: fix dma queue left shift overflow issue
When queue number is > 4, left shift overflows due to 32 bits
integer variable. Mask calculation is wrong for MTL_RXQ_DMA_MAP1.
If CONFIG_UBSAN is enabled, kernel dumps below warning:
[ 10.363842] ==================================================================
[ 10.363882] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in /build/linux-intel-iotg-5.15-8e6Tf4/
linux-intel-iotg-5.15-5.15.0/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac4_core.c:224:12
[ 10.363929] shift exponent 40 is too large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int'
[ 10.363953] CPU: 1 PID: 599 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 5.15.0-1003-intel-iotg
[ 10.363956] Hardware name: ADLINK Technology Inc. LEC-EL/LEC-EL, BIOS 0.15.11 12/22/2021
[ 10.363958] Call Trace:
[ 10.363960] <TASK>
[ 10.363963] dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x5f
[ 10.363971] dump_stack+0x10/0x12
[ 10.363974] ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x45
[ 10.363976] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x61/0x10e
[ 10.363979] ? wake_up_klogd+0x4a/0x50
[ 10.363983] ? vprintk_emit+0x8f/0x240
[ 10.363986] dwmac4_map_mtl_dma.cold+0x42/0x91 [stmmac]
[ 10.364001] stmmac_mtl_configuration+0x1ce/0x7a0 [stmmac]
[ 10.364009] ? dwmac410_dma_init_channel+0x70/0x70 [stmmac]
[ 10.364020] stmmac_hw_setup.cold+0xf/0xb14 [stmmac]
[ 10.364030] ? page_pool_alloc_pages+0x4d/0x70
[ 10.364034] ? stmmac_clear_tx_descriptors+0x6e/0xe0 [stmmac]
[ 10.364042] stmmac_open+0x39e/0x920 [stmmac]
[ 10.364050] __dev_open+0xf0/0x1a0
[ 10.364054] __dev_change_flags+0x188/0x1f0
[ 10.364057] dev_change_flags+0x26/0x60
[ 10.364059] do_setlink+0x908/0xc40
[ 10.364062] ? do_setlink+0xb10/0xc40
[ 10.364064] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x4c/0x1a0
[ 10.364068] __rtnl_newlink+0x597/0xa10
[ 10.364072] ? __nla_reserve+0x41/0x50
[ 10.364074] ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x1d0/0x4d0
[ 10.364079] ? pskb_expand_head+0x75/0x310
[ 10.364082] ? nla_reserve_64bit+0x21/0x40
[ 10.364086] ? skb_free_head+0x65/0x80
[ 10.364089] ? security_sock_rcv_skb+0x2c/0x50
[ 10.364094] ? __cond_resched+0x19/0x30
[ 10.364097] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x15a/0x420
[ 10.364100] rtnl_newlink+0x49/0x70
This change fixes MTL_RXQ_DMA_MAP1 mask issue and channel/queue
mapping warning.
BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216195

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49584

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ixgbe: Add locking to prevent panic when setting sriov_numvfs to zero
It is possible to disable VFs while the PF driver is processing requests
from the VF driver. This can result in a panic.
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000000000106c
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 8 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/8 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G I --------- -
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R740/06WXJT, BIOS 2.8.2 08/27/2020
RIP: 0010:ixgbe_msg_task+0x4c8/0x1690 [ixgbe]
Code: 00 00 48 8d 04 40 48 c1 e0 05 89 7c 24 24 89 fd 48 89 44 24 10 83 ff
01 0f 84 b8 04 00 00 4c 8b 64 24 10 4d 03 a5 48 22 00 00 <41> 80 7c 24 4c
00 0f 84 8a 03 00 00 0f b7 c7 83 f8 08 0f 84 8f 0a
RSP: 0018:ffffb337869f8df8 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: 0000000000001020 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000002b
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000029780
R10: 00006957d8f42832 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000001020
R13: ffff8a00e8978ac0 R14: 000000000000002b R15: ffff8a00e8979c80
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a07dfd00000(0000) knlGS:00000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000106c CR3: 0000000063e10004 CR4: 00000000007726e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x19/0x140
? try_to_wake_up+0x1cd/0x550
? ixgbevf_update_xcast_mode+0x71/0xc0 [ixgbevf]
ixgbe_msix_other+0x17e/0x310 [ixgbe]
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x40/0x180
handle_irq_event_percpu+0x30/0x80
handle_irq_event+0x36/0x53
handle_edge_irq+0x82/0x190
handle_irq+0x1c/0x30
do_IRQ+0x49/0xd0
common_interrupt+0xf/0xf
This can be eventually be reproduced with the following script:
while :
do
echo 63 > /sys/class/net/<devname>/device/sriov_numvfs
sleep 1
echo 0 > /sys/class/net/<devname>/device/sriov_numvfs
sleep 1
done
Add lock when disabling SR-IOV to prevent process VF mailbox communication.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49565

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/intel/lbr: Fix unchecked MSR access error on HSW
The fuzzer triggers the below trace.
[ 7763.384369] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x689
(tried to write 0x1fffffff8101349e) at rIP: 0xffffffff810704a4
(native_write_msr+0x4/0x20)
[ 7763.397420] Call Trace:
[ 7763.399881] <TASK>
[ 7763.401994] intel_pmu_lbr_restore+0x9a/0x1f0
[ 7763.406363] intel_pmu_lbr_sched_task+0x91/0x1c0
[ 7763.410992] __perf_event_task_sched_in+0x1cd/0x240
On a machine with the LBR format LBR_FORMAT_EIP_FLAGS2, when the TSX is
disabled, a TSX quirk is required to access LBR from registers.
The lbr_from_signext_quirk_needed() is introduced to determine whether
the TSX quirk should be applied. However, the
lbr_from_signext_quirk_needed() is invoked before the
intel_pmu_lbr_init(), which parses the LBR format information. Without
the correct LBR format information, the TSX quirk never be applied.
Move the lbr_from_signext_quirk_needed() into the intel_pmu_lbr_init().
Checking x86_pmu.lbr_has_tsx in the lbr_from_signext_quirk_needed() is
not required anymore.
Both LBR_FORMAT_EIP_FLAGS2 and LBR_FORMAT_INFO have LBR_TSX flag, but
only the LBR_FORMAT_EIP_FLAGS2 requirs the quirk. Update the comments
accordingly.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49557

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/fpu: KVM: Set the base guest FPU uABI size to sizeof(struct kvm_xsave)
Set the starting uABI size of KVM's guest FPU to 'struct kvm_xsave',
i.e. to KVM's historical uABI size. When saving FPU state for usersapce,
KVM (well, now the FPU) sets the FP+SSE bits in the XSAVE header even if
the host doesn't support XSAVE. Setting the XSAVE header allows the VM
to be migrated to a host that does support XSAVE without the new host
having to handle FPU state that may or may not be compatible with XSAVE.
Setting the uABI size to the host's default size results in out-of-bounds
writes (setting the FP+SSE bits) and data corruption (that is thankfully
caught by KASAN) when running on hosts without XSAVE, e.g. on Core2 CPUs.
WARN if the default size is larger than KVM's historical uABI size; all
features that can push the FPU size beyond the historical size must be
opt-in.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate+0x86/0x130
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888011e33a00 by task qemu-build/681
CPU: 1 PID: 681 Comm: qemu-build Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-KASAN-amd64 #1
Hardware name: /DG35EC, BIOS ECG3510M.86A.0118.2010.0113.1426 01/13/2010
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x45
print_report.cold+0x45/0x575
kasan_report+0x9b/0xd0
fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate+0x86/0x130
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x72a/0x1c50 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x47f/0x7b0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x5de/0xc90
do_syscall_64+0x31/0x50
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>
Allocated by task 0:
(stack is not available)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888011e33800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
512-byte region [ffff888011e33800, ffff888011e33a00)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:0000000089cd4adb refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x11e30
head:0000000089cd4adb order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head|zone=1)
raw: 4000000000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888001041c80
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888011e33900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888011e33980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff888011e33a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888011e33a80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888011e33b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49552

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix combination of jit blinding and pointers to bpf subprogs.
The combination of jit blinding and pointers to bpf subprogs causes:
[ 36.989548] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000100000001
[ 36.990342] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
[ 36.990968] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
[ 36.994859] RIP: 0010:0x100000001
[ 36.995209] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffd7.
[ 37.004091] Call Trace:
[ 37.004351] <TASK>
[ 37.004576] ? bpf_loop+0x4d/0x70
[ 37.004932] ? bpf_prog_3899083f75e4c5de_F+0xe3/0x13b
The jit blinding logic didn't recognize that ld_imm64 with an address
of bpf subprogram is a special instruction and proceeded to randomize it.
By itself it wouldn't have been an issue, but jit_subprogs() logic
relies on two step process to JIT all subprogs and then JIT them
again when addresses of all subprogs are known.
Blinding process in the first JIT phase caused second JIT to miss
adjustment of special ld_imm64.
Fix this issue by ignoring special ld_imm64 instructions that don't have
user controlled constants and shouldn't be blinded.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49532

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: fix NULL pointer dereference in virtio_gpu_conn_get_modes
drm_cvt_mode may return NULL and we should check it.
This bug is found by syzkaller:
FAULT_INJECTION stacktrace:
[ 168.567394] FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 1
[ 168.567403] CPU: 1 PID: 6425 Comm: syz Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.19.90-vhulk2201.1.0.h1035.kasan.eulerosv2r10.aarch64 #1
[ 168.567406] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
[ 168.567408] Call trace:
[ 168.567414] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x310
[ 168.567418] show_stack+0x28/0x38
[ 168.567423] dump_stack+0xec/0x15c
[ 168.567427] should_fail+0x3ac/0x3d0
[ 168.567437] __should_failslab+0xb8/0x120
[ 168.567441] should_failslab+0x28/0xc0
[ 168.567445] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x50/0x640
[ 168.567454] drm_mode_create+0x40/0x90
[ 168.567458] drm_cvt_mode+0x48/0xc78
[ 168.567477] virtio_gpu_conn_get_modes+0xa8/0x140 [virtio_gpu]
[ 168.567485] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x3a4/0xd80
[ 168.567492] drm_mode_getconnector+0x2e0/0xa70
[ 168.567496] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x11c/0x1d8
[ 168.567514] drm_ioctl+0x558/0x6d0
[ 168.567522] do_vfs_ioctl+0x160/0xf30
[ 168.567525] ksys_ioctl+0x98/0xd8
[ 168.567530] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x50/0xc8
[ 168.567536] el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x320
[ 168.567540] el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160
[ 168.567544] el0_svc+0x10/0x218
KASAN stacktrace:
[ 168.567561] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in virtio_gpu_conn_get_modes+0xb4/0x140 [virtio_gpu]
[ 168.567565] Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000054 by task syz/6425
[ 168.567566]
[ 168.567571] CPU: 1 PID: 6425 Comm: syz Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.19.90-vhulk2201.1.0.h1035.kasan.eulerosv2r10.aarch64 #1
[ 168.567573] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
[ 168.567575] Call trace:
[ 168.567578] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x310
[ 168.567582] show_stack+0x28/0x38
[ 168.567586] dump_stack+0xec/0x15c
[ 168.567591] kasan_report+0x244/0x2f0
[ 168.567594] __asan_load4+0x58/0xb0
[ 168.567607] virtio_gpu_conn_get_modes+0xb4/0x140 [virtio_gpu]
[ 168.567612] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x3a4/0xd80
[ 168.567617] drm_mode_getconnector+0x2e0/0xa70
[ 168.567621] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x11c/0x1d8
[ 168.567624] drm_ioctl+0x558/0x6d0
[ 168.567628] do_vfs_ioctl+0x160/0xf30
[ 168.567632] ksys_ioctl+0x98/0xd8
[ 168.567636] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x50/0xc8
[ 168.567641] el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x320
[ 168.567645] el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160
[ 168.567649] el0_svc+0x10/0x218

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49520

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: compat: Do not treat syscall number as ESR_ELx for a bad syscall
If a compat process tries to execute an unknown system call above the
__ARM_NR_COMPAT_END number, the kernel sends a SIGILL signal to the
offending process. Information about the error is printed to dmesg in
compat_arm_syscall() -> arm64_notify_die() -> arm64_force_sig_fault() ->
arm64_show_signal().
arm64_show_signal() interprets a non-zero value for
current->thread.fault_code as an exception syndrome and displays the
message associated with the ESR_ELx.EC field (bits 31:26).
current->thread.fault_code is set in compat_arm_syscall() ->
arm64_notify_die() with the bad syscall number instead of a valid ESR_ELx
value. This means that the ESR_ELx.EC field has the value that the user set
for the syscall number and the kernel can end up printing bogus exception
messages*. For example, for the syscall number 0x68000000, which evaluates
to ESR_ELx.EC value of 0x1A (ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC) the kernel prints this error:
[ 18.349161] syscall[300]: unhandled exception: ERET/ERETAA/ERETAB, ESR 0x68000000, Oops - bad compat syscall(2) in syscall[10000+50000]
[ 18.350639] CPU: 2 PID: 300 Comm: syscall Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 #79
[ 18.351249] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT)
[..]
which is misleading, as the bad compat syscall has nothing to do with
pointer authentication.
Stop arm64_show_signal() from printing exception syndrome information by
having compat_arm_syscall() set the ESR_ELx value to 0, as it has no
meaning for an invalid system call number. The example above now becomes:
[ 19.935275] syscall[301]: unhandled exception: Oops - bad compat syscall(2) in syscall[10000+50000]
[ 19.936124] CPU: 1 PID: 301 Comm: syscall Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-00005-g7e08006d4102 #80
[ 19.936894] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT)
[..]
which although shows less information because the syscall number,
wrongfully advertised as the ESR value, is missing, it is better than
showing plainly wrong information. The syscall number can be easily
obtained with strace.
*A 32-bit value above or equal to 0x8000_0000 is interpreted as a negative
integer in compat_arm_syscal() and the condition scno < __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END
evaluates to true; the syscall will exit to userspace in this case with the
ENOSYS error code instead of arm64_notify_die() being called.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49501

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbnet: Run unregister_netdev() before unbind() again
Commit 2c9d6c2b871d ("usbnet: run unbind() before unregister_netdev()")
sought to fix a use-after-free on disconnect of USB Ethernet adapters.
It turns out that a different fix is necessary to address the issue:
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/18b3541e5372bc9b9fc733d422f4e698c089077c.1650177997.git.lukas@wunner.de/
So the commit was not necessary.
The commit made binding and unbinding of USB Ethernet asymmetrical:
Before, usbnet_probe() first invoked the ->bind() callback and then
register_netdev(). usbnet_disconnect() mirrored that by first invoking
unregister_netdev() and then ->unbind().
Since the commit, the order in usbnet_disconnect() is reversed and no
longer mirrors usbnet_probe().
One consequence is that a PHY disconnected (and stopped) in ->unbind()
is afterwards stopped once more by unregister_netdev() as it closes the
netdev before unregistering. That necessitates a contortion in ->stop()
because the PHY may only be stopped if it hasn't already been
disconnected.
Reverting the commit allows making the call to phy_stop() unconditional
in ->stop().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49476

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mt76: mt7921: fix kernel crash at mt7921_pci_remove
The crash log shown it is possible that mt7921_irq_handler is called while
devm_free_irq is being handled so mt76_free_device need to be postponed
until devm_free_irq is completed to solve the crash we free the mt76 device
too early.
[ 9299.339655] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
[ 9299.339705] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 9299.339735] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 9299.339768] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 9299.339786] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 9299.339812] CPU: 1 PID: 1624 Comm: prepare-suspend Not tainted 5.15.14-1.fc32.qubes.x86_64 #1
[ 9299.339863] Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.14.3 01/20/2022
[ 9299.339901] RIP: 0010:mt7921_irq_handler+0x1e/0x70 [mt7921e]
[ 9299.340048] RSP: 0018:ffffa81b80c27cb0 EFLAGS: 00010082
[ 9299.340081] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff98a4cb752020 RCX: ffffffffa96211c5
[ 9299.340123] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000d4204 RDI: ffff98a4cb752020
[ 9299.340165] RBP: ffff98a4c28a62a4 R08: ffff98a4c37a96c0 R09: 0000000080150011
[ 9299.340207] R10: 0000000040000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff98a4c4eaa080
[ 9299.340249] R13: ffff98a4c28a6360 R14: ffff98a4cb752020 R15: ffff98a4c28a6228
[ 9299.340297] FS: 00007260840d3740(0000) GS:ffff98a4ef700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 9299.340345] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 9299.340383] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000004c56001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 9299.340432] PKRU: 55555554
[ 9299.340449] Call Trace:
[ 9299.340467] <TASK>
[ 9299.340485] __free_irq+0x221/0x350
[ 9299.340527] free_irq+0x30/0x70
[ 9299.340553] devm_free_irq+0x55/0x80
[ 9299.340579] mt7921_pci_remove+0x2f/0x40 [mt7921e]
[ 9299.340616] pci_device_remove+0x3b/0xa0
[ 9299.340651] __device_release_driver+0x17a/0x240
[ 9299.340686] device_driver_detach+0x3c/0xa0
[ 9299.340714] unbind_store+0x113/0x130
[ 9299.340740] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x124/0x1b0
[ 9299.340775] new_sync_write+0x15c/0x1f0
[ 9299.340806] vfs_write+0x1d2/0x270
[ 9299.340831] ksys_write+0x67/0xe0
[ 9299.340857] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 9299.340887] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49443

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
list: fix a data-race around ep->rdllist
ep_poll() first calls ep_events_available() with no lock held and checks
if ep->rdllist is empty by list_empty_careful(), which reads
rdllist->prev. Thus all accesses to it need some protection to avoid
store/load-tearing.
Note INIT_LIST_HEAD_RCU() already has the annotation for both prev
and next.
Commit bf3b9f6372c4 ("epoll: Add busy poll support to epoll with socket
fds.") added the first lockless ep_events_available(), and commit
c5a282e9635e ("fs/epoll: reduce the scope of wq lock in epoll_wait()")
made some ep_events_available() calls lockless and added single call under
a lock, finally commit e59d3c64cba6 ("epoll: eliminate unnecessary lock
for zero timeout") made the last ep_events_available() lockless.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in do_epoll_wait / do_epoll_wait
write to 0xffff88810480c7d8 of 8 bytes by task 1802 on cpu 0:
INIT_LIST_HEAD include/linux/list.h:38 [inline]
list_splice_init include/linux/list.h:492 [inline]
ep_start_scan fs/eventpoll.c:622 [inline]
ep_send_events fs/eventpoll.c:1656 [inline]
ep_poll fs/eventpoll.c:1806 [inline]
do_epoll_wait+0x4eb/0xf40 fs/eventpoll.c:2234
do_epoll_pwait fs/eventpoll.c:2268 [inline]
__do_sys_epoll_pwait fs/eventpoll.c:2281 [inline]
__se_sys_epoll_pwait+0x12b/0x240 fs/eventpoll.c:2275
__x64_sys_epoll_pwait+0x74/0x80 fs/eventpoll.c:2275
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff88810480c7d8 of 8 bytes by task 1799 on cpu 1:
list_empty_careful include/linux/list.h:329 [inline]
ep_events_available fs/eventpoll.c:381 [inline]
ep_poll fs/eventpoll.c:1797 [inline]
do_epoll_wait+0x279/0xf40 fs/eventpoll.c:2234
do_epoll_pwait fs/eventpoll.c:2268 [inline]
__do_sys_epoll_pwait fs/eventpoll.c:2281 [inline]
__se_sys_epoll_pwait+0x12b/0x240 fs/eventpoll.c:2275
__x64_sys_epoll_pwait+0x74/0x80 fs/eventpoll.c:2275
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0xffff88810480c7d0 -> 0xffff888103c15098
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 1799 Comm: syz-fuzzer Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc7-syzkaller-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49436

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/papr_scm: Fix leaking nvdimm_events_map elements
Right now 'char *' elements allocated for individual 'stat_id' in
'papr_scm_priv.nvdimm_events_map[]' during papr_scm_pmu_check_events(), get
leaked in papr_scm_remove() and papr_scm_pmu_register(),
papr_scm_pmu_check_events() error paths.
Also individual 'stat_id' arent NULL terminated 'char *' instead they are fixed
8-byte sized identifiers. However papr_scm_pmu_register() assumes it to be a
NULL terminated 'char *' and at other places it assumes it to be a
'papr_scm_perf_stat.stat_id' sized string which is 8-byes in size.
Fix this by allocating the memory for papr_scm_priv.nvdimm_events_map to also
include space for 'stat_id' entries. This is possible since number of available
events/stat_ids are known upfront. This saves some memory and one extra level of
indirection from 'nvdimm_events_map' to 'stat_id'. Also rest of the code
can continue to call 'kfree(papr_scm_priv.nvdimm_events_map)' without needing to
iterate over the array and free up individual elements.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49414

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix race condition between ext4_write and ext4_convert_inline_data
Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON:
==================================================================
EXT4-fs error (device loop3): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:805: group 0,
block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 25 vs 31513 free clusters
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:53!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 25371 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.10.0+ #1
RIP: 0010:ext4_put_nojournal fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:53 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__ext4_journal_stop+0x10e/0x110 fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c:116
[...]
Call Trace:
ext4_write_inline_data_end+0x59a/0x730 fs/ext4/inline.c:795
generic_perform_write+0x279/0x3c0 mm/filemap.c:3344
ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x2e3/0x3d0 fs/ext4/file.c:270
ext4_file_write_iter+0x30a/0x11c0 fs/ext4/file.c:520
do_iter_readv_writev+0x339/0x3c0 fs/read_write.c:732
do_iter_write+0x107/0x430 fs/read_write.c:861
vfs_writev fs/read_write.c:934 [inline]
do_pwritev+0x1e5/0x380 fs/read_write.c:1031
[...]
==================================================================
Above issue may happen as follows:
cpu1 cpu2
__________________________|__________________________
do_pwritev
vfs_writev
do_iter_write
ext4_file_write_iter
ext4_buffered_write_iter
generic_perform_write
ext4_da_write_begin
vfs_fallocate
ext4_fallocate
ext4_convert_inline_data
ext4_convert_inline_data_nolock
ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock
clear EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA
ext4_map_blocks
ext4_ext_map_blocks
ext4_mb_new_blocks
ext4_mb_regular_allocator
ext4_mb_good_group_nolock
ext4_mb_init_group
ext4_mb_init_cache
ext4_mb_generate_buddy --> error
ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA)
ext4_restore_inline_data
set EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA
ext4_block_write_begin
ext4_da_write_end
ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA)
ext4_write_inline_data_end
handle=NULL
ext4_journal_stop(handle)
__ext4_journal_stop
ext4_put_nojournal(handle)
ref_cnt = (unsigned long)handle
BUG_ON(ref_cnt == 0) ---> BUG_ON
The lock held by ext4_convert_inline_data is xattr_sem, but the lock
held by generic_perform_write is i_rwsem. Therefore, the two locks can
be concurrent.
To solve above issue, we add inode_lock() for ext4_convert_inline_data().
At the same time, move ext4_convert_inline_data() in front of
ext4_punch_hole(), remove similar handling from ext4_punch_hole().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49407

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dlm: fix plock invalid read
This patch fixes an invalid read showed by KASAN. A unlock will allocate a
"struct plock_op" and a followed send_op() will append it to a global
send_list data structure. In some cases a followed dev_read() moves it
to recv_list and dev_write() will cast it to "struct plock_xop" and access
fields which are only available in those structures. At this point an
invalid read happens by accessing those fields.
To fix this issue the "callback" field is moved to "struct plock_op" to
indicate that a cast to "plock_xop" is allowed and does the additional
"plock_xop" handling if set.
Example of the KASAN output which showed the invalid read:
[ 2064.296453] ==================================================================
[ 2064.304852] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.306491] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800ef227d8 by task dlm_controld/7484
[ 2064.308168]
[ 2064.308575] CPU: 0 PID: 7484 Comm: dlm_controld Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0+ #9
[ 2064.310292] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
[ 2064.311618] Call Trace:
[ 2064.312218] dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x7b
[ 2064.313150] print_address_description.constprop.8+0x21/0x150
[ 2064.314578] ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.315610] ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.316595] kasan_report.cold.14+0x7f/0x11b
[ 2064.317674] ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.318687] dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.319629] ? dev_read+0x4a0/0x4a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.320713] ? bpf_lsm_kernfs_init_security+0x10/0x10
[ 2064.321926] vfs_write+0x17e/0x930
[ 2064.322769] ? __fget_light+0x1aa/0x220
[ 2064.323753] ksys_write+0xf1/0x1c0
[ 2064.324548] ? __ia32_sys_read+0xb0/0xb0
[ 2064.325464] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[ 2064.326387] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 2064.327606] RIP: 0033:0x7f807e4ba96f
[ 2064.328470] Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 39 87 f8 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 7c 87 f8 ff 48
[ 2064.332902] RSP: 002b:00007ffd50cfe6e0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 2064.334658] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055cc3886eb30 RCX: 00007f807e4ba96f
[ 2064.336275] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00007ffd50cfe7e0 RDI: 0000000000000010
[ 2064.337980] RBP: 00007ffd50cfe7e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 2064.339560] R10: 000055cc3886eb30 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000055cc3886eb80
[ 2064.341237] R13: 000055cc3886eb00 R14: 000055cc3886f590 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 2064.342857]
[ 2064.343226] Allocated by task 12438:
[ 2064.344057] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2064.345079] __kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0
[ 2064.345933] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13b/0x220
[ 2064.346953] dlm_posix_unlock+0xec/0x720 [dlm]
[ 2064.348811] do_lock_file_wait.part.32+0xca/0x1d0
[ 2064.351070] fcntl_setlk+0x281/0xbc0
[ 2064.352879] do_fcntl+0x5e4/0xfe0
[ 2064.354657] __x64_sys_fcntl+0x11f/0x170
[ 2064.356550] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[ 2064.358259] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 2064.360745]
[ 2064.361511] Last potentially related work creation:
[ 2064.363957] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2064.365811] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0
[ 2064.368100] call_rcu+0x11b/0xf70
[ 2064.369785] dlm_process_incoming_buffer+0x47d/0xfd0 [dlm]
[ 2064.372404] receive_from_sock+0x290/0x770 [dlm]
[ 2064.374607] process_recv_sockets+0x32/0x40 [dlm]
[ 2064.377290] process_one_work+0x9a8/0x16e0
[ 2064.379357] worker_thread+0x87/0xbf0
[ 2064.381188] kthread+0x3ac/0x490
[ 2064.383460] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 2064.385588]
[ 2064.386518] Second to last potentially related work creation:
[ 2064.389219] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2064.391043] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0
[ 2064.393303] call_rcu+0x11b/0xf70
[ 2064.394885] dlm_process_incoming_buffer+0x47d/0xfd0 [dlm]
[ 2064.397694] receive_from_sock+0x290/0x770
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49402

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Clean up hash direct_functions on register failures
We see the following GPF when register_ftrace_direct fails:
[ ] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address \
0x200000000000010: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
[...]
[ ] RIP: 0010:ftrace_find_rec_direct+0x53/0x70
[ ] Code: 48 c1 e0 03 48 03 42 08 48 8b 10 31 c0 48 85 d2 74 [...]
[ ] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000138bc10 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ ] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff813e0df0 RCX: 000000000000003b
[ ] RDX: 0200000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: ffffffff813e0df0
[ ] RBP: ffffffffa00a3000 R08: ffffffff81180ce0 R09: 0000000000000001
[ ] R10: ffffc9000138bc18 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffff813e0df0
[ ] R13: ffffffff813e0df0 R14: ffff888171b56400 R15: 0000000000000000
[ ] FS: 00007fa9420c7780(0000) GS:ffff888ff6a00000(0000) knlGS:000000000
[ ] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ ] CR2: 000000000770d000 CR3: 0000000107d50003 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[ ] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ ] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] <TASK>
[ ] register_ftrace_direct+0x54/0x290
[ ] ? render_sigset_t+0xa0/0xa0
[ ] bpf_trampoline_update+0x3f5/0x4a0
[ ] ? 0xffffffffa00a3000
[ ] bpf_trampoline_link_prog+0xa9/0x140
[ ] bpf_tracing_prog_attach+0x1dc/0x450
[ ] bpf_raw_tracepoint_open+0x9a/0x1e0
[ ] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90
[ ] ? lock_release+0x150/0x430
[ ] __sys_bpf+0xbd6/0x2700
[ ] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd8/0x130
[ ] __x64_sys_bpf+0x1c/0x20
[ ] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[ ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ ] RIP: 0033:0x7fa9421defa9
[ ] Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 9 f8 [...]
[ ] RSP: 002b:00007ffed743bd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
[ ] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000069d2480 RCX: 00007fa9421defa9
[ ] RDX: 0000000000000078 RSI: 00007ffed743bd80 RDI: 0000000000000011
[ ] RBP: 00007ffed743be00 R08: 0000000000bb7270 R09: 0000000000000000
[ ] R10: 00000000069da210 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[ ] R13: 00007ffed743c4b0 R14: 00000000069d2480 R15: 0000000000000001
[ ] </TASK>
[ ] Modules linked in: klp_vm(OK)
[ ] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
One way to trigger this is:
1. load a livepatch that patches kernel function xxx;
2. run bpftrace -e 'kfunc:xxx {}', this will fail (expected for now);
3. repeat #2 => gpf.
This is because the entry is added to direct_functions, but not removed.
Fix this by remove the entry from direct_functions when
register_ftrace_direct fails.
Also remove the last trailing space from ftrace.c, so we don't have to
worry about it anymore.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49353

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/papr_scm: don't requests stats with '0' sized stats buffer
Sachin reported [1] that on a POWER-10 lpar he is seeing a kernel panic being
reported with vPMEM when papr_scm probe is being called. The panic is of the
form below and is observed only with following option disabled(profile) for the
said LPAR 'Enable Performance Information Collection' in the HMC:
Kernel attempted to write user page (1c) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on write at 0x0000001c
Faulting instruction address: 0xc008000001b90844
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
<snip>
NIP [c008000001b90844] drc_pmem_query_stats+0x5c/0x270 [papr_scm]
LR [c008000001b92794] papr_scm_probe+0x2ac/0x6ec [papr_scm]
Call Trace:
0xc00000000941bca0 (unreliable)
papr_scm_probe+0x2ac/0x6ec [papr_scm]
platform_probe+0x98/0x150
really_probe+0xfc/0x510
__driver_probe_device+0x17c/0x230
<snip>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
On investigation looks like this panic was caused due to a 'stat_buffer' of
size==0 being provided to drc_pmem_query_stats() to fetch all performance
stats-ids of an NVDIMM. However drc_pmem_query_stats() shouldn't have been called
since the vPMEM NVDIMM doesn't support and performance stat-id's. This was caused
due to missing check for 'p->stat_buffer_len' at the beginning of
papr_scm_pmu_check_events() which indicates that the NVDIMM doesn't support
performance-stats.
Fix this by introducing the check for 'p->stat_buffer_len' at the beginning of
papr_scm_pmu_check_events().
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/6B3A522A-6A5F-4CC9-B268-0C63AA6E07D3@linux.ibm.com

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49352

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix warning in ext4_handle_inode_extension
We got issue as follows:
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_reserve_inode_write:5741: Out of memory
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_setattr:5462: inode #13: comm syz-executor.0: mark_inode_dirty error
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_setattr:5519: Out of memory
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_ind_map_blocks:595: inode #13: comm syz-executor.0: Can't allocate blocks for non-extent mapped inodes with bigalloc
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 4361 at fs/ext4/file.c:301 ext4_file_write_iter+0x11c9/0x1220
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 4361 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.10.0+ #1
RIP: 0010:ext4_file_write_iter+0x11c9/0x1220
RSP: 0018:ffff924d80b27c00 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: ffffffff815a3379 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000003b000000
RDX: ffff924d81601000 RSI: 00000000000009cc RDI: 00000000000009cd
RBP: 000000000000000d R08: ffffffffbc5a2c6b R09: 0000902e0e52a96f
R10: ffff902e2b7c1b40 R11: ffff902e2b7c1b40 R12: 000000000000000a
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff902e0e52aa10 R15: ffffffffffffff8b
FS: 00007f81a7f65700(0000) GS:ffff902e3bc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffff600400 CR3: 000000012db88001 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
do_iter_readv_writev+0x2e5/0x360
do_iter_write+0x112/0x4c0
do_pwritev+0x1e5/0x390
__x64_sys_pwritev2+0x7e/0xa0
do_syscall_64+0x37/0x50
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Above issue may happen as follows:
Assume
inode.i_size=4096
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize=4096
step 1: set inode->i_isize = 8192
ext4_setattr
if (attr->ia_size != inode->i_size)
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = attr->ia_size;
rc = ext4_mark_inode_dirty
ext4_reserve_inode_write
ext4_get_inode_loc
__ext4_get_inode_loc
sb_getblk --> return -ENOMEM
...
if (!error) ->will not update i_size
i_size_write(inode, attr->ia_size);
Now:
inode.i_size=4096
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize=8192
step 2: Direct write 4096 bytes
ext4_file_write_iter
ext4_dio_write_iter
iomap_dio_rw ->return error
if (extend)
ext4_handle_inode_extension
WARN_ON_ONCE(i_size_read(inode) < EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize);
->Then trigger warning.
To solve above issue, if mark inode dirty failed in ext4_setattr just
set 'EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize' with old value.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49322

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix sleeping function called from invalid context on RT kernel
When setting bootparams="trace_event=initcall:initcall_start tp_printk=1" in the
cmdline, the output_printk() was called, and the spin_lock_irqsave() was called in the
atomic and irq disable interrupt context suitation. On the PREEMPT_RT kernel,
these locks are replaced with sleepable rt-spinlock, so the stack calltrace will
be triggered.
Fix it by raw_spin_lock_irqsave when PREEMPT_RT and "trace_event=initcall:initcall_start
tp_printk=1" enabled.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
preempt_count: 2, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffffff8992303e>] try_to_wake_up+0x7e/0xba0
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.17.1-rt17+ #19 34c5812404187a875f32bee7977f7367f9679ea7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x8c
dump_stack+0x10/0x12
__might_resched.cold+0x11d/0x155
rt_spin_lock+0x40/0x70
trace_event_buffer_commit+0x2fa/0x4c0
? map_vsyscall+0x93/0x93
trace_event_raw_event_initcall_start+0xbe/0x110
? perf_trace_initcall_finish+0x210/0x210
? probe_sched_wakeup+0x34/0x40
? ttwu_do_wakeup+0xda/0x310
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x35/0x170
? map_vsyscall+0x93/0x93
do_one_initcall+0x217/0x3c0
? trace_event_raw_event_initcall_level+0x170/0x170
? push_cpu_stop+0x400/0x400
? cblist_init_generic+0x241/0x290
kernel_init_freeable+0x1ac/0x347
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x65/0x80
? rest_init+0xf0/0xf0
kernel_init+0x1e/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49297

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nbd: fix io hung while disconnecting device
In our tests, "qemu-nbd" triggers a io hung:
INFO: task qemu-nbd:11445 blocked for more than 368 seconds.
Not tainted 5.18.0-rc3-next-20220422-00003-g2176915513ca #884
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:qemu-nbd state:D stack: 0 pid:11445 ppid: 1 flags:0x00000000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x480/0x1050
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3e/0xb0
schedule+0x9c/0x1b0
blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0x9d/0xf0
? ipi_rseq+0x70/0x70
blk_mq_freeze_queue+0x2b/0x40
nbd_add_socket+0x6b/0x270 [nbd]
nbd_ioctl+0x383/0x510 [nbd]
blkdev_ioctl+0x18e/0x3e0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x120
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fd8ff706577
RSP: 002b:00007fd8fcdfebf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000040000000 RCX: 00007fd8ff706577
RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: 000000000000ab00 RDI: 000000000000000f
RBP: 000000000000000f R08: 000000000000fbe8 R09: 000055fe497c62b0
R10: 00000002aff20000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000006d
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffe82dc5e70 R15: 00007fd8fcdff9c0
"qemu-ndb -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_DISCONNECT' first, however, following
message was found:
block nbd0: Send disconnect failed -32
Which indicate that something is wrong with the server. Then,
"qemu-nbd -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_CLEAR_SOCK', however ioctl can't clear
requests after commit 2516ab1543fd("nbd: only clear the queue on device
teardown"). And in the meantime, request can't complete through timeout
because nbd_xmit_timeout() will always return 'BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER', which
means such request will never be completed in this situation.
Now that the flag 'NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT' can make sure requests won't
complete multiple times, switch back to call nbd_clear_sock() in
nbd_clear_sock_ioctl(), so that inflight requests can be cleared.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49287

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm: fix reference counting for struct tpm_chip
The following sequence of operations results in a refcount warning:
1. Open device /dev/tpmrm.
2. Remove module tpm_tis_spi.
3. Write a TPM command to the file descriptor opened at step 1.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1161 at lib/refcount.c:25 kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
Modules linked in: tpm_tis_spi tpm_tis_core tpm mdio_bcm_unimac brcmfmac
sha256_generic libsha256 sha256_arm hci_uart btbcm bluetooth cfg80211 vc4
brcmutil ecdh_generic ecc snd_soc_core crc32_arm_ce libaes
raspberrypi_hwmon ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine bcm2711_thermal snd_pcm
snd_timer genet snd phy_generic soundcore [last unloaded: spi_bcm2835]
CPU: 3 PID: 1161 Comm: hold_open Not tainted 5.10.0ls-main-dirty #2
Hardware name: BCM2711
[<c0410c3c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c040b580>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c040b580>] (show_stack) from [<c1092174>] (dump_stack+0xc4/0xd8)
[<c1092174>] (dump_stack) from [<c0445a30>] (__warn+0x104/0x108)
[<c0445a30>] (__warn) from [<c0445aa8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x74/0xb8)
[<c0445aa8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c08435d0>] (kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4)
[<c08435d0>] (kobject_get) from [<bf0a715c>] (tpm_try_get_ops+0x14/0x54 [tpm])
[<bf0a715c>] (tpm_try_get_ops [tpm]) from [<bf0a7d6c>] (tpm_common_write+0x38/0x60 [tpm])
[<bf0a7d6c>] (tpm_common_write [tpm]) from [<c05a7ac0>] (vfs_write+0xc4/0x3c0)
[<c05a7ac0>] (vfs_write) from [<c05a7ee4>] (ksys_write+0x58/0xcc)
[<c05a7ee4>] (ksys_write) from [<c04001a0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x4c)
Exception stack(0xc226bfa8 to 0xc226bff0)
bfa0: 00000000 000105b4 00000003 beafe664 00000014 00000000
bfc0: 00000000 000105b4 000103f8 00000004 00000000 00000000 b6f9c000 beafe684
bfe0: 0000006c beafe648 0001056c b6eb6944
---[ end trace d4b8409def9b8b1f ]---
The reason for this warning is the attempt to get the chip->dev reference
in tpm_common_write() although the reference counter is already zero.
Since commit 8979b02aaf1d ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device") the
extra reference used to prevent a premature zero counter is never taken,
because the required TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag is never set.
Fix this by moving the TPM 2 character device handling from
tpm_chip_alloc() to tpm_add_char_device() which is called at a later point
in time when the flag has been set in case of TPM2.
Commit fdc915f7f719 ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>")
already introduced function tpm_devs_release() to release the extra
reference but did not implement the required put on chip->devs that results
in the call of this function.
Fix this by putting chip->devs in tpm_chip_unregister().
Finally move the new implementation for the TPM 2 handling into a new
function to avoid multiple checks for the TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag in the
good case and error cases.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49268

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: Intel: Fix NULL ptr dereference when ENOMEM
Do not call snd_dma_free_pages() when snd_dma_alloc_pages() returns
-ENOMEM because it leads to a NULL pointer dereference bug.
The dmesg says:
[ T1387] sof-audio-pci-intel-tgl 0000:00:1f.3: error: memory alloc failed: -12
[ T1387] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[ T1387] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ T1387] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ T1387] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ T1387] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ T1387] CPU: 6 PID: 1387 Comm: alsa-sink-HDA A Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc4-superb-owl-00055-g80d47f5de5e3
[ T1387] Hardware name: HP HP Laptop 14s-dq2xxx/87FD, BIOS F.15 09/15/2021
[ T1387] RIP: 0010:dma_free_noncontiguous+0x37/0x80
[ T1387] Code: [... snip ...]
[ T1387] RSP: 0000:ffffc90002b87770 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ T1387] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ T1387] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888101db30d0
[ T1387] RBP: 00000000fffffff4 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ T1387] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffc90002b874d0 R12: 0000000000000001
[ T1387] R13: 0000000000058000 R14: ffff888105260c68 R15: ffff888105260828
[ T1387] FS: 00007f42e2ffd640(0000) GS:ffff888466b80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ T1387] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ T1387] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000014acf0003 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ T1387] PKRU: 55555554
[ T1387] Call Trace:
[ T1387] <TASK>
[ T1387] cl_stream_prepare+0x10a/0x120 [snd_sof_intel_hda_common 146addf995b9279ae7f509621078cccbe4f875e1]
[... snip ...]
[ T1387] </TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49209

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix memleak in tcp_bpf_sendmsg while sk msg is full
If tcp_bpf_sendmsg() is running while sk msg is full. When sk_msg_alloc()
returns -ENOMEM error, tcp_bpf_sendmsg() goes to wait_for_memory. If partial
memory has been alloced by sk_msg_alloc(), that is, msg_tx->sg.size is
greater than osize after sk_msg_alloc(), memleak occurs. To fix we use
sk_msg_trim() to release the allocated memory, then goto wait for memory.
Other call paths of sk_msg_alloc() have the similar issue, such as
tls_sw_sendmsg(), so handle sk_msg_trim logic inside sk_msg_alloc(),
as Cong Wang suggested.
This issue can cause the following info:
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 7950 at net/core/stream.c:208 sk_stream_kill_queues+0xd4/0x1a0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x55/0x110
__tcp_close+0x279/0x470
tcp_close+0x1f/0x60
inet_release+0x3f/0x80
__sock_release+0x3d/0xb0
sock_close+0x11/0x20
__fput+0x92/0x250
task_work_run+0x6a/0xa0
do_exit+0x33b/0xb60
do_group_exit+0x2f/0xa0
get_signal+0xb6/0x950
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xac/0x2a0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xa9/0x200
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x46/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2094 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:155 inet_sock_destruct+0x13c/0x260
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__sk_destruct+0x24/0x1f0
sk_psock_destroy+0x19b/0x1c0
process_one_work+0x1b3/0x3c0
kthread+0xe6/0x110
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49207

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix memleak in sk_psock_queue_msg
If tcp_bpf_sendmsg is running during a tear down operation we may enqueue
data on the ingress msg queue while tear down is trying to free it.
sk1 (redirect sk2) sk2
------------------- ---------------
tcp_bpf_sendmsg()
tcp_bpf_send_verdict()
tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir()
bpf_tcp_ingress()
sock_map_close()
lock_sock()
lock_sock() ... blocking
sk_psock_stop
sk_psock_clear_state(psock, SK_PSOCK_TX_ENABLED);
release_sock(sk);
lock_sock()
sk_mem_charge()
get_page()
sk_psock_queue_msg()
sk_psock_test_state(psock, SK_PSOCK_TX_ENABLED);
drop_sk_msg()
release_sock()
While drop_sk_msg(), the msg has charged memory form sk by sk_mem_charge
and has sg pages need to put. To fix we use sk_msg_free() and then kfee()
msg.
This issue can cause the following info:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9202 at net/core/stream.c:205 sk_stream_kill_queues+0xc8/0xe0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x55/0x110
tcp_rcv_state_process+0xe5f/0xe90
? sk_filter_trim_cap+0x10d/0x230
? tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x161/0x250
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x161/0x250
tcp_v4_rcv+0xc3a/0xce0
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x3d/0x230
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x54/0x60
ip_local_deliver+0xfd/0x110
? ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x230/0x230
ip_rcv+0xd6/0x100
? ip_local_deliver+0x110/0x110
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x85/0xa0
process_backlog+0xa4/0x160
__napi_poll+0x29/0x1b0
net_rx_action+0x287/0x300
__do_softirq+0xff/0x2fc
do_softirq+0x79/0x90
</IRQ>
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 531 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:154 inet_sock_destruct+0x175/0x1b0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__sk_destruct+0x24/0x1f0
sk_psock_destroy+0x19b/0x1c0
process_one_work+0x1b3/0x3c0
? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0
worker_thread+0x30/0x350
? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0
kthread+0xe6/0x110
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49204

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix more uncharged while msg has more_data
In tcp_bpf_send_verdict(), if msg has more data after
tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir():
tcp_bpf_send_verdict()
tosend = msg->sg.size //msg->sg.size = 22220
case __SK_REDIRECT:
sk_msg_return() //uncharged msg->sg.size(22220) sk->sk_forward_alloc
tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir() //after tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir, msg->sg.size=11000
goto more_data;
tosend = msg->sg.size //msg->sg.size = 11000
case __SK_REDIRECT:
sk_msg_return() //uncharged msg->sg.size(11000) to sk->sk_forward_alloc
The msg->sg.size(11000) has been uncharged twice, to fix we can charge the
remaining msg->sg.size before goto more data.
This issue can cause the following info:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9860 at net/core/stream.c:208 sk_stream_kill_queues+0xd4/0x1a0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x55/0x110
__tcp_close+0x279/0x470
tcp_close+0x1f/0x60
inet_release+0x3f/0x80
__sock_release+0x3d/0xb0
sock_close+0x11/0x20
__fput+0x92/0x250
task_work_run+0x6a/0xa0
do_exit+0x33b/0xb60
do_group_exit+0x2f/0xa0
get_signal+0xb6/0x950
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xac/0x2a0
? vfs_write+0x237/0x290
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xa9/0x200
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x46/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2136 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:155 inet_sock_destruct+0x13c/0x260
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__sk_destruct+0x24/0x1f0
sk_psock_destroy+0x19b/0x1c0
process_one_work+0x1b3/0x3c0
worker_thread+0x30/0x350
? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0
kthread+0xe6/0x110
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49175

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PM: core: keep irq flags in device_pm_check_callbacks()
The function device_pm_check_callbacks() can be called under the spin
lock (in the reported case it happens from genpd_add_device() ->
dev_pm_domain_set(), when the genpd uses spinlocks rather than mutexes.
However this function uncoditionally uses spin_lock_irq() /
spin_unlock_irq(), thus not preserving the CPU flags. Use the
irqsave/irqrestore instead.
The backtrace for the reference:
[ 2.752010] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 2.756769] raw_local_irq_restore() called with IRQs enabled
[ 2.762596] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 1 at kernel/locking/irqflag-debug.c:10 warn_bogus_irq_restore+0x34/0x50
[ 2.772338] Modules linked in:
[ 2.775487] CPU: 4 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G S 5.17.0-rc6-00384-ge330d0d82eff-dirty #684
[ 2.781384] Freeing initrd memory: 46024K
[ 2.785839] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 2.785841] pc : warn_bogus_irq_restore+0x34/0x50
[ 2.785844] lr : warn_bogus_irq_restore+0x34/0x50
[ 2.785846] sp : ffff80000805b7d0
[ 2.785847] x29: ffff80000805b7d0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000002
[ 2.785850] x26: ffffd40e80930b18 x25: ffff7ee2329192b8 x24: ffff7edfc9f60800
[ 2.785853] x23: ffffd40e80930b18 x22: ffffd40e80930d30 x21: ffff7edfc0dffa00
[ 2.785856] x20: ffff7edfc09e3768 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 2.845775] x17: 6572206f74206465 x16: 6c696166203a3030 x15: ffff80008805b4f7
[ 2.853108] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffffd40e809550b0 x12: 00000000000003d8
[ 2.860441] x11: 0000000000000148 x10: ffffd40e809550b0 x9 : ffffd40e809550b0
[ 2.867774] x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffffd40e809ad0b0 x6 : ffffd40e809ad0b0
[ 2.875107] x5 : 000000000000bff4 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 2.882440] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff7edfc03a8000
[ 2.889774] Call trace:
[ 2.892290] warn_bogus_irq_restore+0x34/0x50
[ 2.896770] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x94/0xa0
[ 2.901690] genpd_unlock_spin+0x20/0x30
[ 2.905724] genpd_add_device+0x100/0x2d0
[ 2.909850] __genpd_dev_pm_attach+0xa8/0x23c
[ 2.914329] genpd_dev_pm_attach_by_id+0xc4/0x190
[ 2.919167] genpd_dev_pm_attach_by_name+0x3c/0xd0
[ 2.924086] dev_pm_domain_attach_by_name+0x24/0x30
[ 2.929102] psci_dt_attach_cpu+0x24/0x90
[ 2.933230] psci_cpuidle_probe+0x2d4/0x46c
[ 2.937534] platform_probe+0x68/0xe0
[ 2.941304] really_probe.part.0+0x9c/0x2fc
[ 2.945605] __driver_probe_device+0x98/0x144
[ 2.950085] driver_probe_device+0x44/0x15c
[ 2.954385] __device_attach_driver+0xb8/0x120
[ 2.958950] bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xd0
[ 2.962896] __device_attach+0xd8/0x180
[ 2.966843] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
[ 2.971144] bus_probe_device+0x9c/0xa4
[ 2.975092] device_add+0x380/0x88c
[ 2.978679] platform_device_add+0x114/0x234
[ 2.983067] platform_device_register_full+0x100/0x190
[ 2.988344] psci_idle_init+0x6c/0xb0
[ 2.992113] do_one_initcall+0x74/0x3a0
[ 2.996060] kernel_init_freeable+0x2fc/0x384
[ 3.000543] kernel_init+0x28/0x130
[ 3.004132] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 3.007817] irq event stamp: 319826
[ 3.011404] hardirqs last enabled at (319825): [<ffffd40e7eda0268>] __up_console_sem+0x78/0x84
[ 3.020332] hardirqs last disabled at (319826): [<ffffd40e7fd6d9d8>] el1_dbg+0x24/0x8c
[ 3.028458] softirqs last enabled at (318312): [<ffffd40e7ec90410>] _stext+0x410/0x588
[ 3.036678] softirqs last disabled at (318299): [<ffffd40e7ed1bf68>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x158/0x174
[ 3.045607] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49157

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix premature hw access after PCI error
After a recoverable PCI error has been detected and recovered, qla driver
needs to check to see if the error condition still persist and/or wait
for the OS to give the resume signal.
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 124606 at qla_tmpl.c:440
qla27xx_fwdt_entry_t266+0x55/0x60 [qla2xxx]
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: RIP: 0010:qla27xx_fwdt_entry_t266+0x55/0x60
[qla2xxx]
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: Call Trace:
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? qla27xx_walk_template+0xb1/0x1b0 [qla2xxx]
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? qla27xx_execute_fwdt_template+0x12a/0x160
[qla2xxx]
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? qla27xx_fwdump+0xa0/0x1c0 [qla2xxx]
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? qla2xxx_pci_mmio_enabled+0xfb/0x120
[qla2xxx]
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? report_mmio_enabled+0x44/0x80
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? report_slot_reset+0x80/0x80
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? pci_walk_bus+0x70/0x90
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? aer_dev_correctable_show+0xc0/0xc0
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? pcie_do_recovery+0x1bb/0x240
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? aer_recover_work_func+0xaa/0xd0
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: ? process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
..
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: qla2xxx [0000:42:00.2]-8041:22: detected PCI
disconnect.
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: qla2xxx [0000:42:00.2]-107ff:22:
qla27xx_fwdt_entry_t262: dump ram MB failed. Area 5h start 198013h end 198013h
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: qla2xxx [0000:42:00.2]-107ff:22: Unable to
capture FW dump
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: qla2xxx [0000:42:00.2]-1015:22: cmd=0x0,
waited 5221 msecs
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: qla2xxx [0000:42:00.2]-680d:22: mmio
enabled returning.
Sep 8 22:26:03 localhost kernel: qla2xxx [0000:42:00.2]-d04c:22: MBX
Command timeout for cmd 0, iocontrol=ffffffff jiffies=10140f2e5
mb[0-3]=[0xffff 0xffff 0xffff 0xffff]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49155

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Suppress a kernel complaint in qla_create_qpair()
[ 12.323788] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: systemd-udevd/1020
[ 12.332297] caller is qla2xxx_create_qpair+0x32a/0x5d0 [qla2xxx]
[ 12.338417] CPU: 7 PID: 1020 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G I --------- --- 5.14.0-29.el9.x86_64 #1
[ 12.348827] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R610/0F0XJ6, BIOS 6.6.0 05/22/2018
[ 12.356356] Call Trace:
[ 12.358821] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[ 12.362514] check_preemption_disabled+0xd9/0xe0
[ 12.367164] qla2xxx_create_qpair+0x32a/0x5d0 [qla2xxx]
[ 12.372481] qla2x00_probe_one+0xa3a/0x1b80 [qla2xxx]
[ 12.377617] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x40
[ 12.384284] local_pci_probe+0x42/0x80
[ 12.390162] ? pci_match_device+0xd7/0x110
[ 12.396366] pci_device_probe+0xfd/0x1b0
[ 12.402372] really_probe+0x1e7/0x3e0
[ 12.408114] __driver_probe_device+0xfe/0x180
[ 12.414544] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
[ 12.420685] __driver_attach+0xc0/0x1c0
[ 12.426536] ? __device_attach_driver+0xe0/0xe0
[ 12.433061] ? __device_attach_driver+0xe0/0xe0
[ 12.439538] bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0
[ 12.445294] bus_add_driver+0x12b/0x1e0
[ 12.451021] driver_register+0x8f/0xe0
[ 12.456631] ? 0xffffffffc07bc000
[ 12.461773] qla2x00_module_init+0x1be/0x229 [qla2xxx]
[ 12.468776] do_one_initcall+0x44/0x200
[ 12.474401] ? load_module+0xad3/0xba0
[ 12.479908] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x45/0x410
[ 12.486268] do_init_module+0x5c/0x280
[ 12.491730] __do_sys_init_module+0x12e/0x1b0
[ 12.497785] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 12.503029] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 12.509764] RIP: 0033:0x7f554f73ab2e

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49070

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: Fix unregistering of framebuffers without device
OF framebuffers do not have an underlying device in the Linux
device hierarchy. Do a regular unregister call instead of hot
unplugging such a non-existing device. Fixes a NULL dereference.
An example error message on ppc64le is shown below.
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000060
Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000080dfa4
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
[...]
CPU: 2 PID: 139 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.17.0-ae085d7f9365 #1
NIP: c00000000080dfa4 LR: c00000000080df9c CTR: c000000000797430
REGS: c000000004132fe0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.17.0-ae085d7f9365)
MSR: 8000000002009033 <SF,VEC,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28228282 XER: 20000000
CFAR: c00000000000c80c DAR: 0000000000000060 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c00000000080df9c c000000004133280 c00000000169d200 0000000000000029
GPR04: 00000000ffffefff c000000004132f90 c000000004132f88 0000000000000000
GPR08: c0000000015658f8 c0000000015cd200 c0000000014f57d0 0000000048228283
GPR12: 0000000000000000 c00000003fffe300 0000000020000000 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000113fc4a40 0000000000000005 0000000113fcfb80
GPR20: 000001000f7283b0 0000000000000000 c000000000e4a588 c000000000e4a5b0
GPR24: 0000000000000001 00000000000a0000 c008000000db0168 c0000000021f6ec0
GPR28: c0000000016d65a8 c000000004b36460 0000000000000000 c0000000016d64b0
NIP [c00000000080dfa4] do_remove_conflicting_framebuffers+0x184/0x1d0
[c000000004133280] [c00000000080df9c] do_remove_conflicting_framebuffers+0x17c/0x1d0 (unreliable)
[c000000004133350] [c00000000080e4d0] remove_conflicting_framebuffers+0x60/0x150
[c0000000041333a0] [c00000000080e6f4] remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers+0x134/0x1b0
[c000000004133450] [c008000000e70438] drm_aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers+0x90/0x100 [drm]
[c000000004133490] [c008000000da0ce4] bochs_pci_probe+0x6c/0xa64 [bochs]
[...]
[c000000004133db0] [c00000000002aaa0] system_call_exception+0x170/0x2d0
[c000000004133e10] [c00000000000c3cc] system_call_common+0xec/0x250
The bug [1] was introduced by commit 27599aacbaef ("fbdev: Hot-unplug
firmware fb devices on forced removal"). Most firmware framebuffers
have an underlying platform device, which can be hot-unplugged
before loading the native graphics driver. OF framebuffers do not
(yet) have that device. Fix the code by unregistering the framebuffer
as before without a hot unplug.
Tested with 5.17 on qemu ppc64le emulation.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-49065

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Fix the svc_deferred_event trace class
Fix a NULL deref crash that occurs when an svc_rqst is deferred
while the sunrpc tracing subsystem is enabled. svc_revisit() sets
dr->xprt to NULL, so it can't be relied upon in the tracepoint to
provide the remote's address.
Unfortunately we can't revert the "svc_deferred_class" hunk in
commit ece200ddd54b ("sunrpc: Save remote presentation address in
svc_xprt for trace events") because there is now a specific check
of event format specifiers for unsafe dereferences. The warning
that check emits is:
event svc_defer_recv has unsafe dereference of argument 1
A "%pISpc" format specifier with a "struct sockaddr *" is indeed
flagged by this check.
Instead, take the brute-force approach used by the svcrdma_qp_error
tracepoint. Convert the dr::addr field into a presentation address
in the TP_fast_assign() arm of the trace event, and store that as
a string. This fix can be backported to -stable kernels.
In the meantime, commit c6ced22997ad ("tracing: Update print fmt
check to handle new __get_sockaddr() macro") is now in v5.18, so
this wonky fix can be replaced with __sockaddr() and friends
properly during the v5.19 merge window.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48890

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: storvsc: Fix swiotlb bounce buffer leak in confidential VM
storvsc_queuecommand() maps the scatter/gather list using scsi_dma_map(),
which in a confidential VM allocates swiotlb bounce buffers. If the I/O
submission fails in storvsc_do_io(), the I/O is typically retried by higher
level code, but the bounce buffer memory is never freed. The mostly like
cause of I/O submission failure is a full VMBus channel ring buffer, which
is not uncommon under high I/O loads. Eventually enough bounce buffer
memory leaks that the confidential VM can't do any I/O. The same problem
can arise in a non-confidential VM with kernel boot parameter
swiotlb=force.
Fix this by doing scsi_dma_unmap() in the case of an I/O submission
error, which frees the bounce buffer memory.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48825

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qedf: Add stag_work to all the vports
Call trace seen when creating NPIV ports, only 32 out of 64 show online.
stag work was not initialized for vport, hence initialize the stag work.
WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 645 at kernel/workqueue.c:1635 __queue_delayed_work+0x68/0x80
CPU: 8 PID: 645 Comm: kworker/8:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G IOE --------- --
4.18.0-348.el8.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge MX740c/0177V9, BIOS 2.12.2 07/09/2021
Workqueue: events fc_lport_timeout [libfc]
RIP: 0010:__queue_delayed_work+0x68/0x80
Code: 89 b2 88 00 00 00 44 89 82 90 00 00 00 48 01 c8 48 89 42 50 41 81
f8 00 20 00 00 75 1d e9 60 24 07 00 44 89 c7 e9 98 f6 ff ff <0f> 0b eb
c5 0f 0b eb a1 0f 0b eb a7 0f 0b eb ac 44 89 c6 e9 40 23
RSP: 0018:ffffae514bc3be40 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: ffff8d25d6143750 RBX: 0000000000000202 RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: ffff8d2e31383748 RSI: ffff8d25c000d600 RDI: ffff8d2e31383788
RBP: ffff8d2e31380de0 R08: 0000000000002000 R09: ffff8d2e31383750
R10: ffffffffc0c957e0 R11: ffff8d2624800000 R12: ffff8d2e31380a58
R13: ffff8d2d915eb000 R14: ffff8d25c499b5c0 R15: ffff8d2e31380e18
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d2d1fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055fd0484b8b8 CR3: 00000008ffc10006 CR4: 00000000007706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
queue_delayed_work_on+0x36/0x40
qedf_elsct_send+0x57/0x60 [qedf]
fc_lport_enter_flogi+0x90/0xc0 [libfc]
fc_lport_timeout+0xb7/0x140 [libfc]
process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
worker_thread+0x30/0x390
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
kthread+0x116/0x130
? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
---[ end trace 008f00f722f2c2ff ]--
Initialize stag work for all the vports.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48823

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qedf: Fix refcount issue when LOGO is received during TMF
Hung task call trace was seen during LOGO processing.
[ 974.309060] [0000:00:00.0]:[qedf_eh_device_reset:868]: 1:0:2:0: LUN RESET Issued...
[ 974.309065] [0000:00:00.0]:[qedf_initiate_tmf:2422]: tm_flags 0x10 sc_cmd 00000000c16b930f op = 0x2a target_id = 0x2 lun=0
[ 974.309178] [0000:00:00.0]:[qedf_initiate_tmf:2431]: portid=016900 tm_flags =LUN RESET
[ 974.309222] [0000:00:00.0]:[qedf_initiate_tmf:2438]: orig io_req = 00000000ec78df8f xid = 0x180 ref_cnt = 1.
[ 974.309625] host1: rport 016900: Received LOGO request while in state Ready
[ 974.309627] host1: rport 016900: Delete port
[ 974.309642] host1: rport 016900: work event 3
[ 974.309644] host1: rport 016900: lld callback ev 3
[ 974.313243] [0000:61:00.2]:[qedf_execute_tmf:2383]:1: fcport is uploading, not executing flush.
[ 974.313295] [0000:61:00.2]:[qedf_execute_tmf:2400]:1: task mgmt command success...
[ 984.031088] INFO: task jbd2/dm-15-8:7645 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[ 984.031136] Not tainted 4.18.0-305.el8.x86_64 #1
[ 984.031166] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 984.031209] jbd2/dm-15-8 D 0 7645 2 0x80004080
[ 984.031212] Call Trace:
[ 984.031222] __schedule+0x2c4/0x700
[ 984.031230] ? unfreeze_partials.isra.83+0x16e/0x1a0
[ 984.031233] ? bit_wait_timeout+0x90/0x90
[ 984.031235] schedule+0x38/0xa0
[ 984.031238] io_schedule+0x12/0x40
[ 984.031240] bit_wait_io+0xd/0x50
[ 984.031243] __wait_on_bit+0x6c/0x80
[ 984.031248] ? free_buffer_head+0x21/0x50
[ 984.031251] out_of_line_wait_on_bit+0x91/0xb0
[ 984.031257] ? init_wait_var_entry+0x50/0x50
[ 984.031268] jbd2_journal_commit_transaction+0x112e/0x19f0 [jbd2]
[ 984.031280] kjournald2+0xbd/0x270 [jbd2]
[ 984.031284] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
[ 984.031291] ? commit_timeout+0x10/0x10 [jbd2]
[ 984.031294] kthread+0x116/0x130
[ 984.031300] ? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
[ 984.031305] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
There was a ref count issue when LOGO is received during TMF. This leads to
one of the I/Os hanging with the driver. Fix the ref count.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48801

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: buffer: Fix file related error handling in IIO_BUFFER_GET_FD_IOCTL
If we fail to copy the just created file descriptor to userland, we
try to clean up by putting back 'fd' and freeing 'ib'. The code uses
put_unused_fd() for the former which is wrong, as the file descriptor
was already published by fd_install() which gets called internally by
anon_inode_getfd().
This makes the error handling code leaving a half cleaned up file
descriptor table around and a partially destructed 'file' object,
allowing userland to play use-after-free tricks on us, by abusing
the still usable fd and making the code operate on a dangling
'file->private_data' pointer.
Instead of leaving the kernel in a partially corrupted state, don't
attempt to explicitly clean up and leave this to the process exit
path that'll release any still valid fds, including the one created
by the previous call to anon_inode_getfd(). Simply return -EFAULT to
indicate the error.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48800

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: vmscan: remove deadlock due to throttling failing to make progress
A soft lockup bug in kcompactd was reported in a private bugzilla with
the following visible in dmesg;
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#33 stuck for 26s! [kcompactd0:479]
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#33 stuck for 52s! [kcompactd0:479]
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#33 stuck for 78s! [kcompactd0:479]
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#33 stuck for 104s! [kcompactd0:479]
The machine had 256G of RAM with no swap and an earlier failed
allocation indicated that node 0 where kcompactd was run was potentially
unreclaimable;
Node 0 active_anon:29355112kB inactive_anon:2913528kB active_file:0kB
inactive_file:0kB unevictable:64kB isolated(anon):0kB isolated(file):0kB
mapped:8kB dirty:0kB writeback:0kB shmem:26780kB shmem_thp:
0kB shmem_pmdmapped: 0kB anon_thp: 23480320kB writeback_tmp:0kB
kernel_stack:2272kB pagetables:24500kB all_unreclaimable? yes
Vlastimil Babka investigated a crash dump and found that a task
migrating pages was trying to drain PCP lists;
PID: 52922 TASK: ffff969f820e5000 CPU: 19 COMMAND: "kworker/u128:3"
Call Trace:
__schedule
schedule
schedule_timeout
wait_for_completion
__flush_work
__drain_all_pages
__alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.114
__alloc_pages
alloc_migration_target
migrate_pages
migrate_to_node
do_migrate_pages
cpuset_migrate_mm_workfn
process_one_work
worker_thread
kthread
ret_from_fork
This failure is specific to CONFIG_PREEMPT=n builds. The root of the
problem is that kcompact0 is not rescheduling on a CPU while a task that
has isolated a large number of the pages from the LRU is waiting on
kcompact0 to reschedule so the pages can be released. While
shrink_inactive_list() only loops once around too_many_isolated, reclaim
can continue without rescheduling if sc->skipped_deactivate == 1 which
could happen if there was no file LRU and the inactive anon list was not
low.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48769

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
efi: runtime: avoid EFIv2 runtime services on Apple x86 machines
Aditya reports [0] that his recent MacbookPro crashes in the firmware
when using the variable services at runtime. The culprit appears to be a
call to QueryVariableInfo(), which we did not use to call on Apple x86
machines in the past as they only upgraded from EFI v1.10 to EFI v2.40
firmware fairly recently, and QueryVariableInfo() (along with
UpdateCapsule() et al) was added in EFI v2.00.
The only runtime service introduced in EFI v2.00 that we actually use in
Linux is QueryVariableInfo(), as the capsule based ones are optional,
generally not used at runtime (all the LVFS/fwupd firmware update
infrastructure uses helper EFI programs that invoke capsule update at
boot time, not runtime), and not implemented by Apple machines in the
first place. QueryVariableInfo() is used to 'safely' set variables,
i.e., only when there is enough space. This prevents machines with buggy
firmwares from corrupting their NVRAMs when they run out of space.
Given that Apple machines have been using EFI v1.10 services only for
the longest time (the EFI v2.0 spec was released in 2006, and Linux
support for the newly introduced runtime services was added in 2011, but
the MacbookPro12,1 released in 2015 still claims to be EFI v1.10 only),
let's avoid the EFI v2.0 ones on all Apple x86 machines.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/6D757C75-65B1-468B-842D-10410081A8E4@live.com/

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48764

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Free kvm_cpuid_entry2 array on post-KVM_RUN KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}
Free the "struct kvm_cpuid_entry2" array on successful post-KVM_RUN
KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} to fix a memory leak, the callers of kvm_set_cpuid()
free the array only on failure.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810963a800 (size 2048):
comm "syz-executor025", pid 3610, jiffies 4294944928 (age 8.080s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0d 00 00 00 ................
47 65 6e 75 6e 74 65 6c 69 6e 65 49 00 00 00 00 GenuntelineI....
backtrace:
[<ffffffff814948ee>] kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline]
[<ffffffff814948ee>] kvmalloc_node+0x3e/0x100 mm/util.c:580
[<ffffffff814950f2>] kvmalloc include/linux/slab.h:732 [inline]
[<ffffffff814950f2>] vmemdup_user+0x22/0x100 mm/util.c:199
[<ffffffff8109f5ff>] kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid2+0x8f/0xf0 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c:423
[<ffffffff810711b9>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xb99/0x1e60 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5251
[<ffffffff8103e92d>] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4ad/0x950 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4066
[<ffffffff815afacc>] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
[<ffffffff815afacc>] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:874 [inline]
[<ffffffff815afacc>] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:860 [inline]
[<ffffffff815afacc>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:860
[<ffffffff844a3335>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
[<ffffffff844a3335>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
[<ffffffff84600068>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48763

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled
Forcibly leave nested virtualization operation if userspace toggles SMM
state via KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS or KVM_SYNC_X86_EVENTS. If userspace
forces the vCPU out of SMM while it's post-VMXON and then injects an SMI,
vmx_enter_smm() will overwrite vmx->nested.smm.vmxon and end up with both
vmxon=false and smm.vmxon=false, but all other nVMX state allocated.
Don't attempt to gracefully handle the transition as (a) most transitions
are nonsencial, e.g. forcing SMM while L2 is running, (b) there isn't
sufficient information to handle all transitions, e.g. SVM wants access
to the SMRAM save state, and (c) KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS must precede
KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE during state restore as the latter disallows putting
the vCPU into L2 if SMM is active, and disallows tagging the vCPU as
being post-VMXON in SMM if SMM is not active.
Abuse of KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS manifests as a WARN and memory leak in nVMX
due to failure to free vmcs01's shadow VMCS, but the bug goes far beyond
just a memory leak, e.g. toggling SMM on while L2 is active puts the vCPU
in an architecturally impossible state.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3606 at free_loaded_vmcs arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2665 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3606 at free_loaded_vmcs+0x158/0x1a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2656
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 3606 Comm: syz-executor725 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:free_loaded_vmcs arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2665 [inline]
RIP: 0010:free_loaded_vmcs+0x158/0x1a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2656
Code: <0f> 0b eb b3 e8 8f 4d 9f 00 e9 f7 fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 92 4d 9f 00
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x72/0x2f0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11123
kvm_vcpu_destroy arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:441 [inline]
kvm_destroy_vcpus+0x11f/0x290 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:460
kvm_free_vcpus arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11564 [inline]
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x2e8/0x470 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11676
kvm_destroy_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1217 [inline]
kvm_put_kvm+0x4fa/0xb00 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1250
kvm_vm_release+0x3f/0x50 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1273
__fput+0x286/0x9f0 fs/file_table.c:311
task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:32 [inline]
do_exit+0xb29/0x2a30 kernel/exit.c:806
do_group_exit+0xd2/0x2f0 kernel/exit.c:935
get_signal+0x4b0/0x28c0 kernel/signal.c:2862
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x2a9/0x1c40 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:868
handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x17d/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:207
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:289 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:300
do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48761

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: xhci-plat: fix crash when suspend if remote wake enable
Crashed at i.mx8qm platform when suspend if enable remote wakeup
Internal error: synchronous external abort: 96000210 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 244 Comm: kworker/u12:6 Not tainted 5.15.5-dirty #12
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QM MEK (DT)
Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
pstate: 600000c5 (nZCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : xhci_disable_hub_port_wake.isra.62+0x60/0xf8
lr : xhci_disable_hub_port_wake.isra.62+0x34/0xf8
sp : ffff80001394bbf0
x29: ffff80001394bbf0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff00081193b578
x26: ffff00081193b570 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: ffff00081193a29c x22: 0000000000020001 x21: 0000000000000001
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff800014e90490 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000002 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000960 x9 : ffff80001394baa0
x8 : ffff0008145d1780 x7 : ffff0008f95b8e80 x6 : 000000001853b453
x5 : 0000000000000496 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff00081193a29c
x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000814591620
Call trace:
xhci_disable_hub_port_wake.isra.62+0x60/0xf8
xhci_suspend+0x58/0x510
xhci_plat_suspend+0x50/0x78
platform_pm_suspend+0x2c/0x78
dpm_run_callback.isra.25+0x50/0xe8
__device_suspend+0x108/0x3c0
The basic flow:
1. run time suspend call xhci_suspend, xhci parent devices gate the clock.
2. echo mem >/sys/power/state, system _device_suspend call xhci_suspend
3. xhci_suspend call xhci_disable_hub_port_wake, which access register,
but clock already gated by run time suspend.
This problem was hidden by power domain driver, which call run time resume before it.
But the below commit remove it and make this issue happen.
commit c1df456d0f06e ("PM: domains: Don't runtime resume devices at genpd_prepare()")
This patch call run time resume before suspend to make sure clock is on
before access register.
Testeb-by: Abel Vesa <abel.vesa@nxp.com>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48758

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: bnx2fc: Flush destroy_work queue before calling bnx2fc_interface_put()
The bnx2fc_destroy() functions are removing the interface before calling
destroy_work. This results multiple WARNings from sysfs_remove_group() as
the controller rport device attributes are removed too early.
Replace the fcoe_port's destroy_work queue. It's not needed.
The problem is easily reproducible with the following steps.
Example:
$ dmesg -w &
$ systemctl enable --now fcoe
$ fipvlan -s -c ens2f1
$ fcoeadm -d ens2f1.802
[ 583.464488] host2: libfc: Link down on port (7500a1)
[ 583.472651] bnx2fc: 7500a1 - rport not created Yet!!
[ 583.490468] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 583.538725] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'rport-2:0-0'
[ 583.568814] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 192 at fs/sysfs/group.c:279 sysfs_remove_group+0x6f/0x80
[ 583.607130] Modules linked in: dm_service_time 8021q garp mrp stp llc bnx2fc cnic uio rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 ...
[ 583.942994] CPU: 3 PID: 192 Comm: kworker/3:2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-39.el9.x86_64 #1
[ 583.984105] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL120 G7, BIOS J01 07/01/2013
[ 584.016535] Workqueue: fc_wq_2 fc_rport_final_delete [scsi_transport_fc]
[ 584.050691] RIP: 0010:sysfs_remove_group+0x6f/0x80
[ 584.074725] Code: ff 5b 48 89 ef 5d 41 5c e9 ee c0 ff ff 48 89 ef e8 f6 b8 ff ff eb d1 49 8b 14 24 48 8b 33 48 c7 c7 ...
[ 584.162586] RSP: 0018:ffffb567c15afdc0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 584.188225] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8eec4220 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 584.221053] RDX: ffff8c1586ce84c0 RSI: ffff8c1586cd7cc0 RDI: ffff8c1586cd7cc0
[ 584.255089] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb567c15afc00
[ 584.287954] R10: ffffb567c15afbf8 R11: ffffffff8fbe7f28 R12: ffff8c1486326400
[ 584.322356] R13: ffff8c1486326480 R14: ffff8c1483a4a000 R15: 0000000000000004
[ 584.355379] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8c1586cc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 584.394419] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 584.421123] CR2: 00007fe95a6f7840 CR3: 0000000107674002 CR4: 00000000000606e0
[ 584.454888] Call Trace:
[ 584.466108] device_del+0xb2/0x3e0
[ 584.481701] device_unregister+0x13/0x60
[ 584.501306] bsg_unregister_queue+0x5b/0x80
[ 584.522029] bsg_remove_queue+0x1c/0x40
[ 584.541884] fc_rport_final_delete+0xf3/0x1d0 [scsi_transport_fc]
[ 584.573823] process_one_work+0x1e3/0x3b0
[ 584.592396] worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0
[ 584.609256] ? rescuer_thread+0x370/0x370
[ 584.628877] kthread+0x149/0x170
[ 584.643673] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
[ 584.662909] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 584.680002] ---[ end trace 53575ecefa942ece ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48755

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc64/bpf: Limit 'ldbrx' to processors compliant with ISA v2.06
Johan reported the below crash with test_bpf on ppc64 e5500:
test_bpf: #296 ALU_END_FROM_LE 64: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0x67452301 jited:1
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 4 [#1]
BE PAGE_SIZE=4K SMP NR_CPUS=24 QEMU e500
Modules linked in: test_bpf(+)
CPU: 0 PID: 76 Comm: insmod Not tainted 5.14.0-03771-g98c2059e008a-dirty #1
NIP: 8000000000061c3c LR: 80000000006dea64 CTR: 8000000000061c18
REGS: c0000000032d3420 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.14.0-03771-g98c2059e008a-dirty)
MSR: 0000000080089000 <EE,ME> CR: 88002822 XER: 20000000 IRQMASK: 0
<...>
NIP [8000000000061c3c] 0x8000000000061c3c
LR [80000000006dea64] .__run_one+0x104/0x17c [test_bpf]
Call Trace:
.__run_one+0x60/0x17c [test_bpf] (unreliable)
.test_bpf_init+0x6a8/0xdc8 [test_bpf]
.do_one_initcall+0x6c/0x28c
.do_init_module+0x68/0x28c
.load_module+0x2460/0x2abc
.__do_sys_init_module+0x120/0x18c
.system_call_exception+0x110/0x1b8
system_call_common+0xf0/0x210
--- interrupt: c00 at 0x101d0acc
<...>
---[ end trace 47b2bf19090bb3d0 ]---
Illegal instruction
The illegal instruction turned out to be 'ldbrx' emitted for
BPF_FROM_[L|B]E, which was only introduced in ISA v2.06. Guard use of
the same and implement an alternative approach for older processors.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48752

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/perf: Fix power_pmu_disable to call clear_pmi_irq_pending only if PMI is pending
Running selftest with CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG enabled in kernel
triggered below warning:
[ 172.851380] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 172.851391] WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 2901 at arch/powerpc/include/asm/hw_irq.h:246 power_pmu_disable+0x270/0x280
[ 172.851402] Modules linked in: dm_mod bonding nft_ct nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables rfkill nfnetlink sunrpc xfs libcrc32c pseries_rng xts vmx_crypto uio_pdrv_genirq uio sch_fq_codel ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvscsi ibmveth scsi_transport_srp fuse
[ 172.851442] CPU: 8 PID: 2901 Comm: lost_exception_ Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5-03218-g798527287598 #2
[ 172.851451] NIP: c00000000013d600 LR: c00000000013d5a4 CTR: c00000000013b180
[ 172.851458] REGS: c000000017687860 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.16.0-rc5-03218-g798527287598)
[ 172.851465] MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48004884 XER: 20040000
[ 172.851482] CFAR: c00000000013d5b4 IRQMASK: 1
[ 172.851482] GPR00: c00000000013d5a4 c000000017687b00 c000000002a10600 0000000000000004
[ 172.851482] GPR04: 0000000082004000 c0000008ba08f0a8 0000000000000000 00000008b7ed0000
[ 172.851482] GPR08: 00000000446194f6 0000000000008000 c00000000013b118 c000000000d58e68
[ 172.851482] GPR12: c00000000013d390 c00000001ec54a80 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 172.851482] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000000015d5c708 c0000000025396d0
[ 172.851482] GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c00000000a3bbf40 0000000000000003
[ 172.851482] GPR24: 0000000000000000 c0000008ba097400 c0000000161e0d00 c00000000a3bb600
[ 172.851482] GPR28: c000000015d5c700 0000000000000001 0000000082384090 c0000008ba0020d8
[ 172.851549] NIP [c00000000013d600] power_pmu_disable+0x270/0x280
[ 172.851557] LR [c00000000013d5a4] power_pmu_disable+0x214/0x280
[ 172.851565] Call Trace:
[ 172.851568] [c000000017687b00] [c00000000013d5a4] power_pmu_disable+0x214/0x280 (unreliable)
[ 172.851579] [c000000017687b40] [c0000000003403ac] perf_pmu_disable+0x4c/0x60
[ 172.851588] [c000000017687b60] [c0000000003445e4] __perf_event_task_sched_out+0x1d4/0x660
[ 172.851596] [c000000017687c50] [c000000000d1175c] __schedule+0xbcc/0x12a0
[ 172.851602] [c000000017687d60] [c000000000d11ea8] schedule+0x78/0x140
[ 172.851608] [c000000017687d90] [c0000000001a8080] sys_sched_yield+0x20/0x40
[ 172.851615] [c000000017687db0] [c0000000000334dc] system_call_exception+0x18c/0x380
[ 172.851622] [c000000017687e10] [c00000000000c74c] system_call_common+0xec/0x268
The warning indicates that MSR_EE being set(interrupt enabled) when
there was an overflown PMC detected. This could happen in
power_pmu_disable since it runs under interrupt soft disable
condition ( local_irq_save ) and not with interrupts hard disabled.
commit 2c9ac51b850d ("powerpc/perf: Fix PMU callbacks to clear
pending PMI before resetting an overflown PMC") intended to clear
PMI pending bit in Paca when disabling the PMU. It could happen
that PMC gets overflown while code is in power_pmu_disable
callback function. Hence add a check to see if PMI pending bit
is set in Paca before clearing it via clear_pmi_pending.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48746

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix handling of wrong devices during bond netevent
Current implementation of bond netevent handler only check if
the handled netdev is VF representor and it missing a check if
the VF representor is on the same phys device of the bond handling
the netevent.
Fix by adding the missing check and optimizing the check if
the netdev is VF representor so it will not access uninitialized
private data and crashes.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000036c
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
Workqueue: eth3bond0 bond_mii_monitor [bonding]
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_is_uplink_rep+0xc/0x50 [mlx5_core]
RSP: 0018:ffff88812d69fd60 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881cf800000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88812d69fe10 RSI: 000000000000001b RDI: ffff8881cf800880
RBP: ffff8881cf800000 R08: 00000445cabccf2b R09: 0000000000000008
R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000008 R12: ffff88812d69fe10
R13: 00000000fffffffe R14: ffff88820c0f9000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88846fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000036c CR3: 0000000103d80006 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
mlx5e_eswitch_uplink_rep+0x31/0x40 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_rep_is_lag_netdev+0x94/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_rep_esw_bond_netevent+0xeb/0x3d0 [mlx5_core]
raw_notifier_call_chain+0x41/0x60
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x34/0x80
netdev_lower_state_changed+0x4e/0xa0
bond_mii_monitor+0x56b/0x640 [bonding]
process_one_work+0x1b9/0x390
worker_thread+0x4d/0x3d0
? rescuer_thread+0x350/0x350
kthread+0x124/0x150
? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48731

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/kmemleak: avoid scanning potential huge holes
When using devm_request_free_mem_region() and devm_memremap_pages() to
add ZONE_DEVICE memory, if requested free mem region's end pfn were
huge(e.g., 0x400000000), the node_end_pfn() will be also huge (see
move_pfn_range_to_zone()). Thus it creates a huge hole between
node_start_pfn() and node_end_pfn().
We found on some AMD APUs, amdkfd requested such a free mem region and
created a huge hole. In such a case, following code snippet was just
doing busy test_bit() looping on the huge hole.
for (pfn = start_pfn; pfn < end_pfn; pfn++) {
struct page *page = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
if (!page)
continue;
...
}
So we got a soft lockup:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#6 stuck for 26s! [bash:1221]
CPU: 6 PID: 1221 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.15.0-custom #1
RIP: 0010:pfn_to_online_page+0x5/0xd0
Call Trace:
? kmemleak_scan+0x16a/0x440
kmemleak_write+0x306/0x3a0
? common_file_perm+0x72/0x170
full_proxy_write+0x5c/0x90
vfs_write+0xb9/0x260
ksys_write+0x67/0xe0
__x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
I did some tests with the patch.
(1) amdgpu module unloaded
before the patch:
real 0m0.976s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.968s
after the patch:
real 0m0.981s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.973s
(2) amdgpu module loaded
before the patch:
real 0m35.365s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m35.354s
after the patch:
real 0m1.049s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m1.042s

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48729

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/hfi1: Fix panic with larger ipoib send_queue_size
When the ipoib send_queue_size is increased from the default the following
panic happens:
RIP: 0010:hfi1_ipoib_drain_tx_ring+0x45/0xf0 [hfi1]
Code: 31 e4 eb 0f 8b 85 c8 02 00 00 41 83 c4 01 44 39 e0 76 60 8b 8d cc 02 00 00 44 89 e3 be 01 00 00 00 d3 e3 48 03 9d c0 02 00 00 <c7> 83 18 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b bb 30 01 00 00 e8 25 af a7 e0
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000798f4a0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000008000 RBX: ffffc9000aa0f000 RCX: 000000000000000f
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88810ff08000 R08: ffff88889476d900 R09: 0000000000000101
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffc90006590ff8 R12: 0000000000000200
R13: ffffc9000798fba8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fd0f79cc3c0(0000) GS:ffff88885fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffc9000aa0f118 CR3: 0000000889c84001 CR4: 00000000001706e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
hfi1_ipoib_napi_tx_disable+0x45/0x60 [hfi1]
hfi1_ipoib_dev_stop+0x18/0x80 [hfi1]
ipoib_ib_dev_stop+0x1d/0x40 [ib_ipoib]
ipoib_stop+0x48/0xc0 [ib_ipoib]
__dev_close_many+0x9e/0x110
__dev_change_flags+0xd9/0x210
dev_change_flags+0x21/0x60
do_setlink+0x31c/0x10f0
? __nla_validate_parse+0x12d/0x1a0
? __nla_parse+0x21/0x30
? inet6_validate_link_af+0x5e/0xf0
? cpumask_next+0x1f/0x20
? __snmp6_fill_stats64.isra.53+0xbb/0x140
? __nla_validate_parse+0x47/0x1a0
__rtnl_newlink+0x530/0x910
? pskb_expand_head+0x73/0x300
? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x109/0x280
? __nla_put+0xc/0x20
? cpumask_next_and+0x20/0x30
? update_sd_lb_stats.constprop.144+0xd3/0x820
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x25/0x37
? __wake_up_common_lock+0x87/0xc0
? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x3d/0x3d0
rtnl_newlink+0x43/0x60
The issue happens when the shift that should have been a function of the
txq item size mistakenly used the ring size.
Fix by using the item size.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48728

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/hfi1: Fix AIP early init panic
An early failure in hfi1_ipoib_setup_rn() can lead to the following panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001b0
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
RIP: 0010:try_to_grab_pending+0x2b/0x140
Code: 1f 44 00 00 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 d5 53 48 89 fb 9c 58 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 c2 fa 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 55 00 40 84 f6 75 77 <f0> 48 0f ba 2b 00 72 09 31 c0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d c3 48 89 df e8 6c
RSP: 0018:ffffb6b3cf7cfa48 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: 00000000000001b0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000246 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000000001b0
RBP: ffffb6b3cf7cfa70 R08: 0000000000000f09 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffb6b3cf7cfa90 R14: ffffffff9b2fbfc0 R15: ffff8a4fdf244690
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a527f400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000001b0 CR3: 00000017e2410003 CR4: 00000000007706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
__cancel_work_timer+0x42/0x190
? dev_printk_emit+0x4e/0x70
iowait_cancel_work+0x15/0x30 [hfi1]
hfi1_ipoib_txreq_deinit+0x5a/0x220 [hfi1]
? dev_err+0x6c/0x90
hfi1_ipoib_netdev_dtor+0x15/0x30 [hfi1]
hfi1_ipoib_setup_rn+0x10e/0x150 [hfi1]
rdma_init_netdev+0x5a/0x80 [ib_core]
? hfi1_ipoib_free_rdma_netdev+0x20/0x20 [hfi1]
ipoib_intf_init+0x6c/0x350 [ib_ipoib]
ipoib_intf_alloc+0x5c/0xc0 [ib_ipoib]
ipoib_add_one+0xbe/0x300 [ib_ipoib]
add_client_context+0x12c/0x1a0 [ib_core]
enable_device_and_get+0xdc/0x1d0 [ib_core]
ib_register_device+0x572/0x6b0 [ib_core]
rvt_register_device+0x11b/0x220 [rdmavt]
hfi1_register_ib_device+0x6b4/0x770 [hfi1]
do_init_one.isra.20+0x3e3/0x680 [hfi1]
local_pci_probe+0x41/0x90
work_for_cpu_fn+0x16/0x20
process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
worker_thread+0x1cf/0x390
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
kthread+0x116/0x130
? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
The panic happens in hfi1_ipoib_txreq_deinit() because there is a NULL
deref when hfi1_ipoib_netdev_dtor() is called in this error case.
hfi1_ipoib_txreq_init() and hfi1_ipoib_rxq_init() are self unwinding so
fix by adjusting the error paths accordingly.
Other changes:
- hfi1_ipoib_free_rdma_netdev() is deleted including the free_netdev()
since the netdev core code deletes calls free_netdev()
- The switch to the accelerated entrances is moved to the success path.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48721

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: Forward wakeup to smc socket waitqueue after fallback
When we replace TCP with SMC and a fallback occurs, there may be
some socket waitqueue entries remaining in smc socket->wq, such
as eppoll_entries inserted by userspace applications.
After the fallback, data flows over TCP/IP and only clcsocket->wq
will be woken up. Applications can't be notified by the entries
which were inserted in smc socket->wq before fallback. So we need
a mechanism to wake up smc socket->wq at the same time if some
entries remaining in it.
The current workaround is to transfer the entries from smc socket->wq
to clcsock->wq during the fallback. But this may cause a crash
like this:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000100: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.16.0+ #107
RIP: 0010:__wake_up_common+0x65/0x170
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__wake_up_common_lock+0x7a/0xc0
sock_def_readable+0x3c/0x70
tcp_data_queue+0x4a7/0xc40
tcp_rcv_established+0x32f/0x660
? sk_filter_trim_cap+0xcb/0x2e0
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x10b/0x260
tcp_v4_rcv+0xd2a/0xde0
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x3b/0x1d0
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x54/0x60
ip_local_deliver+0x6a/0x110
? tcp_v4_early_demux+0xa2/0x140
? tcp_v4_early_demux+0x10d/0x140
ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x49/0x60
ip_sublist_rcv+0x19d/0x230
ip_list_rcv+0x13e/0x170
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1c2/0x240
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1e6/0x320
napi_complete_done+0x11d/0x190
mlx5e_napi_poll+0x163/0x6b0 [mlx5_core]
__napi_poll+0x3c/0x1b0
net_rx_action+0x27c/0x300
__do_softirq+0x114/0x2d2
irq_exit_rcu+0xb4/0xe0
common_interrupt+0xba/0xe0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
The crash is caused by privately transferring waitqueue entries from
smc socket->wq to clcsock->wq. The owners of these entries, such as
epoll, have no idea that the entries have been transferred to a
different socket wait queue and still use original waitqueue spinlock
(smc socket->wq.wait.lock) to make the entries operation exclusive,
but it doesn't work. The operations to the entries, such as removing
from the waitqueue (now is clcsock->wq after fallback), may cause a
crash when clcsock waitqueue is being iterated over at the moment.
This patch tries to fix this by no longer transferring wait queue
entries privately, but introducing own implementations of clcsock's
callback functions in fallback situation. The callback functions will
forward the wakeup to smc socket->wq if clcsock->wq is actually woken
up and smc socket->wq has remaining entries.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48713

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/intel/pt: Fix crash with stop filters in single-range mode
Add a check for !buf->single before calling pt_buffer_region_size in a
place where a missing check can cause a kernel crash.
Fixes a bug introduced by commit 670638477aed ("perf/x86/intel/pt:
Opportunistically use single range output mode"), which added a
support for PT single-range output mode. Since that commit if a PT
stop filter range is hit while tracing, the kernel will crash because
of a null pointer dereference in pt_handle_status due to calling
pt_buffer_region_size without a ToPA configured.
The commit which introduced single-range mode guarded almost all uses of
the ToPA buffer variables with checks of the buf->single variable, but
missed the case where tracing was stopped by the PT hardware, which
happens when execution hits a configured stop filter.
Tested that hitting a stop filter while PT recording successfully
records a trace with this patch but crashes without this patch.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48705

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7921e: fix crash in chip reset fail
In case of drv own fail in reset, we may need to run mac_reset several
times. The sequence would trigger system crash as the log below.
Because we do not re-enable/schedule "tx_napi" before disable it again,
the process would keep waiting for state change in napi_diable(). To
avoid the problem and keep status synchronize for each run, goto final
resource handling if drv own failed.
[ 5857.353423] mt7921e 0000:3b:00.0: driver own failed
[ 5858.433427] mt7921e 0000:3b:00.0: Timeout for driver own
[ 5859.633430] mt7921e 0000:3b:00.0: driver own failed
[ 5859.633444] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 5859.633446] WARNING: CPU: 6 at kernel/kthread.c:659 kthread_park+0x11d
[ 5859.633717] Workqueue: mt76 mt7921_mac_reset_work [mt7921_common]
[ 5859.633728] RIP: 0010:kthread_park+0x11d/0x150
[ 5859.633736] RSP: 0018:ffff8881b676fc68 EFLAGS: 00010202
......
[ 5859.633766] Call Trace:
[ 5859.633768] <TASK>
[ 5859.633771] mt7921e_mac_reset+0x176/0x6f0 [mt7921e]
[ 5859.633778] mt7921_mac_reset_work+0x184/0x3a0 [mt7921_common]
[ 5859.633785] ? mt7921_mac_set_timing+0x520/0x520 [mt7921_common]
[ 5859.633794] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 5859.633802] process_one_work+0x7ee/0x1320
[ 5859.633810] worker_thread+0x53c/0x1240
[ 5859.633818] kthread+0x2b8/0x370
[ 5859.633824] ? process_one_work+0x1320/0x1320
[ 5859.633828] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x30/0x30
[ 5859.633834] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 5859.633842] </TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48704

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/radeon: add a force flush to delay work when radeon
Although radeon card fence and wait for gpu to finish processing current batch rings,
there is still a corner case that radeon lockup work queue may not be fully flushed,
and meanwhile the radeon_suspend_kms() function has called pci_set_power_state() to
put device in D3hot state.
Per PCI spec rev 4.0 on 5.3.1.4.1 D3hot State.
> Configuration and Message requests are the only TLPs accepted by a Function in
> the D3hot state. All other received Requests must be handled as Unsupported Requests,
> and all received Completions may optionally be handled as Unexpected Completions.
This issue will happen in following logs:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00008800e0008010
CPU 0 kworker/0:3(131): Oops 0
pc = [<ffffffff811bea5c>] ra = [<ffffffff81240844>] ps = 0000 Tainted: G W
pc is at si_gpu_check_soft_reset+0x3c/0x240
ra is at si_dma_is_lockup+0x34/0xd0
v0 = 0000000000000000 t0 = fff08800e0008010 t1 = 0000000000010000
t2 = 0000000000008010 t3 = fff00007e3c00000 t4 = fff00007e3c00258
t5 = 000000000000ffff t6 = 0000000000000001 t7 = fff00007ef078000
s0 = fff00007e3c016e8 s1 = fff00007e3c00000 s2 = fff00007e3c00018
s3 = fff00007e3c00000 s4 = fff00007fff59d80 s5 = 0000000000000000
s6 = fff00007ef07bd98
a0 = fff00007e3c00000 a1 = fff00007e3c016e8 a2 = 0000000000000008
a3 = 0000000000000001 a4 = 8f5c28f5c28f5c29 a5 = ffffffff810f4338
t8 = 0000000000000275 t9 = ffffffff809b66f8 t10 = ff6769c5d964b800
t11= 000000000000b886 pv = ffffffff811bea20 at = 0000000000000000
gp = ffffffff81d89690 sp = 00000000aa814126
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Trace:
[<ffffffff81240844>] si_dma_is_lockup+0x34/0xd0
[<ffffffff81119610>] radeon_fence_check_lockup+0xd0/0x290
[<ffffffff80977010>] process_one_work+0x280/0x550
[<ffffffff80977350>] worker_thread+0x70/0x7c0
[<ffffffff80977410>] worker_thread+0x130/0x7c0
[<ffffffff80982040>] kthread+0x200/0x210
[<ffffffff809772e0>] worker_thread+0x0/0x7c0
[<ffffffff80981f8c>] kthread+0x14c/0x210
[<ffffffff80911658>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x18/0x20
[<ffffffff80981e40>] kthread+0x0/0x210
Code: ad3e0008 43f0074a ad7e0018 ad9e0020 8c3001e8 40230101
<88210000> 4821ed21
So force lockup work queue flush to fix this problem.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48702

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: emu10k1: Fix out of bounds access in snd_emu10k1_pcm_channel_alloc()
The voice allocator sometimes begins allocating from near the end of the
array and then wraps around, however snd_emu10k1_pcm_channel_alloc()
accesses the newly allocated voices as if it never wrapped around.
This results in out of bounds access if the first voice has a high enough
index so that first_voice + requested_voice_count > NUM_G (64).
The more voices are requested, the more likely it is for this to occur.
This was initially discovered using PipeWire, however it can be reproduced
by calling aplay multiple times with 16 channels:
aplay -r 48000 -D plughw:CARD=Live,DEV=3 -c 16 /dev/zero
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in sound/pci/emu10k1/emupcm.c:127:40
index 65 is out of range for type 'snd_emu10k1_voice [64]'
CPU: 1 PID: 31977 Comm: aplay Tainted: G W IOE 6.0.0-rc2-emu10k1+ #7
Hardware name: ASUSTEK COMPUTER INC P5W DH Deluxe/P5W DH Deluxe, BIOS 3002 07/22/2010
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
dump_stack+0x10/0x16
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x3f
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49
snd_emu10k1_playback_hw_params+0x3bc/0x420 [snd_emu10k1]
snd_pcm_hw_params+0x29f/0x600 [snd_pcm]
snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x188/0x1410 [snd_pcm]
? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x35/0x170
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x50
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x35/0x170
snd_pcm_ioctl+0x27/0x40 [snd_pcm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48694

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Fix drain SQ hang with no completion
SW generated completions for outstanding WRs posted on SQ
after QP is in error target the wrong CQ. This causes the
ib_drain_sq to hang with no completion.
Fix this to generate completions on the right CQ.
[ 863.969340] INFO: task kworker/u52:2:671 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
[ 863.979224] Not tainted 5.14.0-130.el9.x86_64 #1
[ 863.986588] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 863.996997] task:kworker/u52:2 state:D stack: 0 pid: 671 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000
[ 864.007272] Workqueue: xprtiod xprt_autoclose [sunrpc]
[ 864.014056] Call Trace:
[ 864.017575] __schedule+0x206/0x580
[ 864.022296] schedule+0x43/0xa0
[ 864.026736] schedule_timeout+0x115/0x150
[ 864.032185] __wait_for_common+0x93/0x1d0
[ 864.037717] ? usleep_range_state+0x90/0x90
[ 864.043368] __ib_drain_sq+0xf6/0x170 [ib_core]
[ 864.049371] ? __rdma_block_iter_next+0x80/0x80 [ib_core]
[ 864.056240] ib_drain_sq+0x66/0x70 [ib_core]
[ 864.062003] rpcrdma_xprt_disconnect+0x82/0x3b0 [rpcrdma]
[ 864.069365] ? xprt_prepare_transmit+0x5d/0xc0 [sunrpc]
[ 864.076386] xprt_rdma_close+0xe/0x30 [rpcrdma]
[ 864.082593] xprt_autoclose+0x52/0x100 [sunrpc]
[ 864.088718] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x3c0
[ 864.094170] worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0
[ 864.099109] ? rescuer_thread+0x370/0x370
[ 864.104473] kthread+0x149/0x170
[ 864.109022] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
[ 864.114713] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48691

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: clean up hook list when offload flags check fails
splice back the hook list so nft_chain_release_hook() has a chance to
release the hooks.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810180b100 (size 96):
comm "syz-executor133", pid 3619, jiffies 4294945714 (age 12.690s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
28 64 23 02 81 88 ff ff 28 64 23 02 81 88 ff ff (d#.....(d#.....
90 a8 aa 83 ff ff ff ff 00 00 b5 0f 81 88 ff ff ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff83a8c59b>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:600 [inline]
[<ffffffff83a8c59b>] nft_netdev_hook_alloc+0x3b/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1901
[<ffffffff83a9239a>] nft_chain_parse_netdev net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1998 [inline]
[<ffffffff83a9239a>] nft_chain_parse_hook+0x33a/0x530 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2073
[<ffffffff83a9b14b>] nf_tables_addchain.constprop.0+0x10b/0x950 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2218
[<ffffffff83a9c41b>] nf_tables_newchain+0xa8b/0xc60 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2593
[<ffffffff83a3d6a6>] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xa46/0xd20 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:517
[<ffffffff83a3db79>] nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:638 [inline]
[<ffffffff83a3db79>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x1f9/0x220 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:656
[<ffffffff83a13b17>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
[<ffffffff83a13b17>] netlink_unicast+0x397/0x4c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
[<ffffffff83a13fd6>] netlink_sendmsg+0x396/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
[<ffffffff83865ab6>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
[<ffffffff83865ab6>] sock_sendmsg+0x56/0x80 net/socket.c:734
[<ffffffff8386601c>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x36c/0x390 net/socket.c:2482
[<ffffffff8386a918>] ___sys_sendmsg+0xa8/0x110 net/socket.c:2536
[<ffffffff8386aaa8>] __sys_sendmsg+0x88/0x100 net/socket.c:2565
[<ffffffff845e5955>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
[<ffffffff845e5955>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
[<ffffffff84800087>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48673

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: Fix possible access to freed memory in link clear
After modifying the QP to the Error state, all RX WR would be completed
with WC in IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR status. Current implementation does not
wait for it is done, but destroy the QP and free the link group directly.
So there is a risk that accessing the freed memory in tasklet context.
Here is a crash example:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff8f220860
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD f7300e067 P4D f7300e067 PUD f7300f063 PMD 8c4e45063 PTE 800ffff08c9df060
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S OE 5.10.0-0607+ #23
Hardware name: Inspur NF5280M4/YZMB-00689-101, BIOS 4.1.20 07/09/2018
RIP: 0010:native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x176/0x1b0
Code: f3 90 48 8b 32 48 85 f6 74 f6 eb d5 c1 ee 12 83 e0 03 83 ee 01 48 c1 e0 05 48 63 f6 48 05 00 c8 02 00 48 03 04 f5 00 09 98 8e <48> 89 10 8b 42 08 85 c0 75 09 f3 90 8b 42 08 85 c0 74 f7 48 8b 32
RSP: 0018:ffffb3b6c001ebd8 EFLAGS: 00010086
RAX: ffffffff8f220860 RBX: 0000000000000246 RCX: 0000000000080000
RDX: ffff91db1f86c800 RSI: 000000000000173c RDI: ffff91db62bace00
RBP: ffff91db62bacc00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c00000010000028b
R10: 0000000000055198 R11: ffffb3b6c001ea58 R12: ffff91db80e05010
R13: 000000000000000a R14: 0000000000000006 R15: 0000000000000040
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff91db1f840000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffff8f220860 CR3: 00000001f9580004 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x30/0x40
mlx5_ib_poll_cq+0x4c/0xc50 [mlx5_ib]
smc_wr_rx_tasklet_fn+0x56/0xa0 [smc]
tasklet_action_common.isra.21+0x66/0x100
__do_softirq+0xd5/0x29c
asm_call_irq_on_stack+0x12/0x20
</IRQ>
do_softirq_own_stack+0x37/0x40
irq_exit_rcu+0x9d/0xa0
sysvec_call_function_single+0x34/0x80
asm_sysvec_call_function_single+0x12/0x20

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48662

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/gem: Really move i915_gem_context.link under ref protection
i915_perf assumes that it can use the i915_gem_context reference to
protect its i915->gem.contexts.list iteration. However, this requires
that we do not remove the context from the list until after we drop the
final reference and release the struct. If, as currently, we remove the
context from the list during context_close(), the link.next pointer may
be poisoned while we are holding the context reference and cause a GPF:
[ 4070.573157] i915 0000:00:02.0: [drm:i915_perf_open_ioctl [i915]] filtering on ctx_id=0x1fffff ctx_id_mask=0x1fffff
[ 4070.574881] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000100: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 4070.574897] CPU: 1 PID: 284392 Comm: amd_performance Tainted: G E 5.17.9 #180
[ 4070.574903] Hardware name: Intel Corporation NUC7i5BNK/NUC7i5BNB, BIOS BNKBL357.86A.0052.2017.0918.1346 09/18/2017
[ 4070.574907] RIP: 0010:oa_configure_all_contexts.isra.0+0x222/0x350 [i915]
[ 4070.574982] Code: 08 e8 32 6e 10 e1 4d 8b 6d 50 b8 ff ff ff ff 49 83 ed 50 f0 41 0f c1 04 24 83 f8 01 0f 84 e3 00 00 00 85 c0 0f 8e fa 00 00 00 <49> 8b 45 50 48 8d 70 b0 49 8d 45 50 48 39 44 24 10 0f 85 34 fe ff
[ 4070.574990] RSP: 0018:ffffc90002077b78 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 4070.574995] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 4070.575000] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffc90002077b20 RDI: ffff88810ddc7c68
[ 4070.575004] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffff888103242648 R09: fffffffffffffffc
[ 4070.575008] R10: ffffffff82c50bc0 R11: 0000000000025c80 R12: ffff888101bf1860
[ 4070.575012] R13: dead0000000000b0 R14: ffffc90002077c04 R15: ffff88810be5cabc
[ 4070.575016] FS: 00007f1ed50c0780(0000) GS:ffff88885ec80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 4070.575021] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 4070.575025] CR2: 00007f1ed5590280 CR3: 000000010ef6f005 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[ 4070.575029] Call Trace:
[ 4070.575033] <TASK>
[ 4070.575037] lrc_configure_all_contexts+0x13e/0x150 [i915]
[ 4070.575103] gen8_enable_metric_set+0x4d/0x90 [i915]
[ 4070.575164] i915_perf_open_ioctl+0xbc0/0x1500 [i915]
[ 4070.575224] ? asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
[ 4070.575232] ? i915_oa_init_reg_state+0x110/0x110 [i915]
[ 4070.575290] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x85/0x110
[ 4070.575296] ? update_load_avg+0x5f/0x5e0
[ 4070.575302] drm_ioctl+0x1d3/0x370
[ 4070.575307] ? i915_oa_init_reg_state+0x110/0x110 [i915]
[ 4070.575382] ? gen8_gt_irq_handler+0x46/0x130 [i915]
[ 4070.575445] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x3c4/0x8d0
[ 4070.575451] ? __do_softirq+0xaa/0x1d2
[ 4070.575456] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
[ 4070.575461] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 4070.575467] RIP: 0033:0x7f1ed5c10397
[ 4070.575471] Code: 3c 1c e8 1c ff ff ff 85 c0 79 87 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a9 da 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 4070.575478] RSP: 002b:00007ffd65c8d7a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[ 4070.575484] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 00007f1ed5c10397
[ 4070.575488] RDX: 00007ffd65c8d7c0 RSI: 0000000040106476 RDI: 0000000000000006
[ 4070.575492] RBP: 00005620972f9c60 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 0000000000000005
[ 4070.575496] R10: 000000000000000d R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000a
[ 4070.575500] R13: 000000000000000d R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffd65c8d7c0
[ 4070.575505] </TASK>
[ 4070.575507] Modules linked in: nls_ascii(E) nls_cp437(E) vfat(E) fat(E) i915(E) x86_pkg_temp_thermal(E) intel_powerclamp(E) crct10dif_pclmul(E) crc32_pclmul(E) crc32c_intel(E) aesni_intel(E) crypto_simd(E) intel_gtt(E) cryptd(E) ttm(E) rapl(E) intel_cstate(E) drm_kms_helper(E) cfbfillrect(E) syscopyarea(E) cfbimgblt(E) intel_uncore(E) sysfillrect(E) mei_me(E) sysimgblt(E) i2c_i801(E) fb_sys_fops(E) mei(E) intel_pch_thermal(E) i2c_smbus
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48658

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: slub: fix flush_cpu_slab()/__free_slab() invocations in task context.
Commit 5a836bf6b09f ("mm: slub: move flush_cpu_slab() invocations
__free_slab() invocations out of IRQ context") moved all flush_cpu_slab()
invocations to the global workqueue to avoid a problem related
with deactivate_slab()/__free_slab() being called from an IRQ context
on PREEMPT_RT kernels.
When the flush_all_cpu_locked() function is called from a task context
it may happen that a workqueue with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM bit set ends up
flushing the global workqueue, this will cause a dependency issue.
workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM nvme-delete-wq:nvme_delete_ctrl_work [nvme_core]
is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM events:flush_cpu_slab
WARNING: CPU: 37 PID: 410 at kernel/workqueue.c:2637
check_flush_dependency+0x10a/0x120
Workqueue: nvme-delete-wq nvme_delete_ctrl_work [nvme_core]
RIP: 0010:check_flush_dependency+0x10a/0x120[ 453.262125] Call Trace:
__flush_work.isra.0+0xbf/0x220
? __queue_work+0x1dc/0x420
flush_all_cpus_locked+0xfb/0x120
__kmem_cache_shutdown+0x2b/0x320
kmem_cache_destroy+0x49/0x100
bioset_exit+0x143/0x190
blk_release_queue+0xb9/0x100
kobject_cleanup+0x37/0x130
nvme_fc_ctrl_free+0xc6/0x150 [nvme_fc]
nvme_free_ctrl+0x1ac/0x2b0 [nvme_core]
Fix this bug by creating a workqueue for the flush operation with
the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM bit set.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48651

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvlan: Fix out-of-bound bugs caused by unset skb->mac_header
If an AF_PACKET socket is used to send packets through ipvlan and the
default xmit function of the AF_PACKET socket is changed from
dev_queue_xmit() to packet_direct_xmit() via setsockopt() with the option
name of PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS, the skb->mac_header may not be reset and
remains as the initial value of 65535, this may trigger slab-out-of-bounds
bugs as following:
=================================================================
UG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ipvlan_xmit_mode_l2+0xdb/0x330 [ipvlan]
PU: 2 PID: 1768 Comm: raw_send Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4+ #6
ardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33
all Trace:
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1d/0x160
print_report.cold+0x4f/0x112
kasan_report+0xa3/0x130
ipvlan_xmit_mode_l2+0xdb/0x330 [ipvlan]
ipvlan_start_xmit+0x29/0xa0 [ipvlan]
__dev_direct_xmit+0x2e2/0x380
packet_direct_xmit+0x22/0x60
packet_snd+0x7c9/0xc40
sock_sendmsg+0x9a/0xa0
__sys_sendto+0x18a/0x230
__x64_sys_sendto+0x74/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The root cause is:
1. packet_snd() only reset skb->mac_header when sock->type is SOCK_RAW
and skb->protocol is not specified as in packet_parse_headers()
2. packet_direct_xmit() doesn't reset skb->mac_header as dev_queue_xmit()
In this case, skb->mac_header is 65535 when ipvlan_xmit_mode_l2() is
called. So when ipvlan_xmit_mode_l2() gets mac header with eth_hdr() which
use "skb->head + skb->mac_header", out-of-bound access occurs.
This patch replaces eth_hdr() with skb_eth_hdr() in ipvlan_xmit_mode_l2()
and reset mac header in multicast to solve this out-of-bound bug.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48647

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sfc: fix TX channel offset when using legacy interrupts
In legacy interrupt mode the tx_channel_offset was hardcoded to 1, but
that's not correct if efx_sepparate_tx_channels is false. In that case,
the offset is 0 because the tx queues are in the single existing channel
at index 0, together with the rx queue.
Without this fix, as soon as you try to send any traffic, it tries to
get the tx queues from an uninitialized channel getting these errors:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/tx.c:540 efx_hard_start_xmit+0x12e/0x170 [sfc]
[...]
RIP: 0010:efx_hard_start_xmit+0x12e/0x170 [sfc]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dev_hard_start_xmit+0xd7/0x230
sch_direct_xmit+0x9f/0x360
__dev_queue_xmit+0x890/0xa40
[...]
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
[...]
RIP: 0010:efx_hard_start_xmit+0x153/0x170 [sfc]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dev_hard_start_xmit+0xd7/0x230
sch_direct_xmit+0x9f/0x360
__dev_queue_xmit+0x890/0xa40
[...]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48640

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: fix NULL deref in bond_rr_gen_slave_id
Fix a NULL dereference of the struct bonding.rr_tx_counter member because
if a bond is initially created with an initial mode != zero (Round Robin)
the memory required for the counter is never created and when the mode is
changed there is never any attempt to verify the memory is allocated upon
switching modes.
This causes the following Oops on an aarch64 machine:
[ 334.686773] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff2c91ac905000
[ 334.694703] Mem abort info:
[ 334.697486] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 334.701234] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 334.706536] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 334.709579] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 334.712719] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 334.717586] Data abort info:
[ 334.720454] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 334.724288] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 334.727244] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000008044d662000
[ 334.733944] [ffff2c91ac905000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
[ 334.740734] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 334.745602] Modules linked in: bonding tls veth rfkill sunrpc arm_spe_pmu vfat fat acpi_ipmi ipmi_ssif ixgbe igb i40e mdio ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler arm_cmn arm_dsu_pmu cppc_cpufreq acpi_tad fuse zram crct10dif_ce ast ghash_ce sbsa_gwdt nvme drm_vram_helper drm_ttm_helper nvme_core ttm xgene_hwmon
[ 334.772217] CPU: 7 PID: 2214 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4-00133-g64ae13ed4784 #4
[ 334.779950] Hardware name: GIGABYTE R272-P31-00/MP32-AR1-00, BIOS F18v (SCP: 1.08.20211002) 12/01/2021
[ 334.789244] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 334.796196] pc : bond_rr_gen_slave_id+0x40/0x124 [bonding]
[ 334.801691] lr : bond_xmit_roundrobin_slave_get+0x38/0xdc [bonding]
[ 334.807962] sp : ffff8000221733e0
[ 334.811265] x29: ffff8000221733e0 x28: ffffdbac8572d198 x27: ffff80002217357c
[ 334.818392] x26: 000000000000002a x25: ffffdbacb33ee000 x24: ffff07ff980fa000
[ 334.825519] x23: ffffdbacb2e398ba x22: ffff07ff98102000 x21: ffff07ff981029c0
[ 334.832646] x20: 0000000000000001 x19: ffff07ff981029c0 x18: 0000000000000014
[ 334.839773] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffdbacb1004364 x15: 0000aaaabe2f5a62
[ 334.846899] x14: ffff07ff8e55d968 x13: ffff07ff8e55db30 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 334.854026] x11: ffffdbacb21532e8 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : ffffdbac857178ec
[ 334.861153] x8 : ffff07ff9f6e5a28 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000007c2b3742
[ 334.868279] x5 : ffff2c91ac905000 x4 : ffff2c91ac905000 x3 : ffff07ff9f554400
[ 334.875406] x2 : ffff2c91ac905000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffff07ff981029c0
[ 334.882532] Call trace:
[ 334.884967] bond_rr_gen_slave_id+0x40/0x124 [bonding]
[ 334.890109] bond_xmit_roundrobin_slave_get+0x38/0xdc [bonding]
[ 334.896033] __bond_start_xmit+0x128/0x3a0 [bonding]
[ 334.901001] bond_start_xmit+0x54/0xb0 [bonding]
[ 334.905622] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xb4/0x220
[ 334.909798] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1a0/0x720
[ 334.913799] arp_xmit+0x3c/0xbc
[ 334.916932] arp_send_dst+0x98/0xd0
[ 334.920410] arp_solicit+0xe8/0x230
[ 334.923888] neigh_probe+0x60/0xb0
[ 334.927279] __neigh_event_send+0x3b0/0x470
[ 334.931453] neigh_resolve_output+0x70/0x90
[ 334.935626] ip_finish_output2+0x158/0x514
[ 334.939714] __ip_finish_output+0xac/0x1a4
[ 334.943800] ip_finish_output+0x40/0xfc
[ 334.947626] ip_output+0xf8/0x1a4
[ 334.950931] ip_send_skb+0x5c/0x100
[ 334.954410] ip_push_pending_frames+0x3c/0x60
[ 334.958758] raw_sendmsg+0x458/0x6d0
[ 334.962325] inet_sendmsg+0x50/0x80
[ 334.965805] sock_sendmsg+0x60/0x6c
[ 334.969286] __sys_sendto+0xc8/0x134
[ 334.972853] __arm64_sys_sendto+0x34/0x4c
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48635

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsdax: Fix infinite loop in dax_iomap_rw()
I got an infinite loop and a WARNING report when executing a tail command
in virtiofs.
WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 964 at fs/iomap/iter.c:34 iomap_iter+0x3a2/0x3d0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 10 PID: 964 Comm: tail Not tainted 5.19.0-rc7
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dax_iomap_rw+0xea/0x620
? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
fuse_dax_read_iter+0x47/0x80
fuse_file_read_iter+0xae/0xd0
new_sync_read+0xfe/0x180
? 0xffffffff81000000
vfs_read+0x14d/0x1a0
ksys_read+0x6d/0xf0
__x64_sys_read+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The tail command will call read() with a count of 0. In this case,
iomap_iter() will report this WARNING, and always return 1 which casuing
the infinite loop in dax_iomap_rw().
Fixing by checking count whether is 0 in dax_iomap_rw().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48634

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/gma500: Fix BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context errors
gma_crtc_page_flip() was holding the event_lock spinlock while calling
crtc_funcs->mode_set_base() which takes ww_mutex.
The only reason to hold event_lock is to clear gma_crtc->page_flip_event
on mode_set_base() errors.
Instead unlock it after setting gma_crtc->page_flip_event and on
errors re-take the lock and clear gma_crtc->page_flip_event it
it is still set.
This fixes the following WARN/stacktrace:
[ 512.122953] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:870
[ 512.123004] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1253, name: gnome-shell
[ 512.123031] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
[ 512.123048] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
[ 512.123066] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ 512.123080] irq event stamp: 0
[ 512.123094] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[ 512.123134] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff8d0ec28c>] copy_process+0x9fc/0x1de0
[ 512.123176] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8d0ec28c>] copy_process+0x9fc/0x1de0
[ 512.123207] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[ 512.123233] Preemption disabled at:
[ 512.123241] [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[ 512.123275] CPU: 3 PID: 1253 Comm: gnome-shell Tainted: G W 5.19.0+ #1
[ 512.123304] Hardware name: Packard Bell dot s/SJE01_CT, BIOS V1.10 07/23/2013
[ 512.123323] Call Trace:
[ 512.123346] <TASK>
[ 512.123370] dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x77
[ 512.123412] __might_resched.cold+0xff/0x13a
[ 512.123458] ww_mutex_lock+0x1e/0xa0
[ 512.123495] psb_gem_pin+0x2c/0x150 [gma500_gfx]
[ 512.123601] gma_pipe_set_base+0x76/0x240 [gma500_gfx]
[ 512.123708] gma_crtc_page_flip+0x95/0x130 [gma500_gfx]
[ 512.123808] drm_mode_page_flip_ioctl+0x57d/0x5d0
[ 512.123897] ? drm_mode_cursor2_ioctl+0x10/0x10
[ 512.123936] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa1/0x150
[ 512.123984] drm_ioctl+0x21f/0x420
[ 512.124025] ? drm_mode_cursor2_ioctl+0x10/0x10
[ 512.124070] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb/0x60
[ 512.124104] ? lock_release+0x1ef/0x2d0
[ 512.124161] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8d/0xd0
[ 512.124203] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80
[ 512.124239] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 512.124267] ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x55/0xe0
[ 512.124300] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 512.124340] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x10/0x80
[ 512.124377] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 512.124411] RIP: 0033:0x7fcc4a70740f
[ 512.124442] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <89> c2 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 18 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 00
[ 512.124470] RSP: 002b:00007ffda73f5390 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[ 512.124503] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055cc9e474500 RCX: 00007fcc4a70740f
[ 512.124524] RDX: 00007ffda73f5420 RSI: 00000000c01864b0 RDI: 0000000000000009
[ 512.124544] RBP: 00007ffda73f5420 R08: 000055cc9c0b0cb0 R09: 0000000000000034
[ 512.124564] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000c01864b0
[ 512.124584] R13: 0000000000000009 R14: 000055cc9df484d0 R15: 000055cc9af5d0c0
[ 512.124647] </TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48633

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/gma500: Fix WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock) error
psb_gem_unpin() calls dma_resv_lock() but the underlying ww_mutex
gets destroyed by drm_gem_object_release() move the
drm_gem_object_release() call in psb_gem_free_object() to after
the unpin to fix the below warning:
[ 79.693962] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 79.693992] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
[ 79.694015] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 240 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:582 __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x569/0xfb0
[ 79.694052] Modules linked in: rfcomm snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer qrtr bnep ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel ath3k snd_intel_dspcfg mac80211 snd_intel_sdw_acpi btusb snd_hda_codec btrtl btbcm btintel btmtk bluetooth at24 snd_hda_core snd_hwdep uvcvideo snd_seq libarc4 videobuf2_vmalloc ath videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common snd_seq_device videodev acer_wmi intel_powerclamp coretemp mc snd_pcm joydev sparse_keymap ecdh_generic pcspkr wmi_bmof cfg80211 i2c_i801 i2c_smbus snd_timer snd r8169 rfkill lpc_ich soundcore acpi_cpufreq zram rtsx_pci_sdmmc mmc_core serio_raw rtsx_pci gma500_gfx(E) video wmi ip6_tables ip_tables i2c_dev fuse
[ 79.694436] CPU: 0 PID: 240 Comm: plymouthd Tainted: G W E 6.0.0-rc3+ #490
[ 79.694457] Hardware name: Packard Bell dot s/SJE01_CT, BIOS V1.10 07/23/2013
[ 79.694469] RIP: 0010:__ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x569/0xfb0
[ 79.694496] Code: ff 85 c0 0f 84 15 fb ff ff 8b 05 ca 3c 11 01 85 c0 0f 85 07 fb ff ff 48 c7 c6 30 cb 84 aa 48 c7 c7 a3 e1 82 aa e8 ac 29 f8 ff <0f> 0b e9 ed fa ff ff e8 5b 83 8a ff 85 c0 74 10 44 8b 0d 98 3c 11
[ 79.694513] RSP: 0018:ffffad1dc048bbe0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 79.694623] RAX: 0000000000000028 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 79.694636] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffaa8b0ffc RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[ 79.694650] RBP: ffffad1dc048bc80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffad1dc048ba90
[ 79.694662] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffffaad62fe8 R12: ffff9ff302103138
[ 79.694675] R13: ffff9ff306ec8000 R14: ffff9ff307779078 R15: ffff9ff3014c0270
[ 79.694690] FS: 00007ff1cccf1740(0000) GS:ffff9ff3bc200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 79.694705] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 79.694719] CR2: 0000559ecbcb4420 CR3: 0000000013210000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 79.694734] Call Trace:
[ 79.694749] <TASK>
[ 79.694761] ? __schedule+0x47f/0x1670
[ 79.694796] ? psb_gem_unpin+0x27/0x1a0 [gma500_gfx]
[ 79.694830] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe3/0x140
[ 79.694864] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x38/0xa0
[ 79.694885] ? __cond_resched+0x1c/0x30
[ 79.694902] ww_mutex_lock+0x38/0xa0
[ 79.694925] psb_gem_unpin+0x27/0x1a0 [gma500_gfx]
[ 79.694964] psb_gem_unpin+0x199/0x1a0 [gma500_gfx]
[ 79.694996] drm_gem_object_release_handle+0x50/0x60
[ 79.695020] ? drm_gem_object_handle_put_unlocked+0xf0/0xf0
[ 79.695042] idr_for_each+0x4b/0xb0
[ 79.695066] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x60
[ 79.695095] drm_gem_release+0x1c/0x30
[ 79.695118] drm_file_free.part.0+0x1ea/0x260
[ 79.695150] drm_release+0x6a/0x120
[ 79.695175] __fput+0x9f/0x260
[ 79.695203] task_work_run+0x59/0xa0
[ 79.695227] do_exit+0x387/0xbe0
[ 79.695250] ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90
[ 79.695275] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
[ 79.695304] do_group_exit+0x33/0xb0
[ 79.695331] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x14/0x20
[ 79.695353] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80
[ 79.695376] ? up_read+0x17/0x20
[ 79.695401] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe3/0x140
[ 79.695429] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 79.695450] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
[ 79.695473] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 79.695493] RIP: 0033:0x7ff1ccefe3f1
[ 79.695516] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7ff1ccefe3c7.
[ 79.695607] RSP: 002b:00007ffed4413378 EFLAGS:
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48631

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix bug in extents parsing when eh_entries == 0 and eh_depth > 0
When walking through an inode extents, the ext4_ext_binsearch_idx() function
assumes that the extent header has been previously validated. However, there
are no checks that verify that the number of entries (eh->eh_entries) is
non-zero when depth is > 0. And this will lead to problems because the
EXT_FIRST_INDEX() and EXT_LAST_INDEX() will return garbage and result in this:
[ 135.245946] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 135.247579] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents.c:2258!
[ 135.249045] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 135.250320] CPU: 2 PID: 238 Comm: tmp118 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8+ #4
[ 135.252067] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
[ 135.255065] RIP: 0010:ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xc20/0xcb0
[ 135.256475] Code:
[ 135.261433] RSP: 0018:ffffc900005939f8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 135.262847] RAX: 0000000000000024 RBX: ffffc90000593b70 RCX: 0000000000000023
[ 135.264765] RDX: ffff8880038e5f10 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffff8880046e922c
[ 135.266670] RBP: ffff8880046e9348 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888002ca580c
[ 135.268576] R10: 0000000000002602 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000024
[ 135.270477] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000024 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 135.272394] FS: 00007fdabdc56740(0000) GS:ffff88807dd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 135.274510] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 135.276075] CR2: 00007ffc26bd4f00 CR3: 0000000006261004 CR4: 0000000000170ea0
[ 135.277952] Call Trace:
[ 135.278635] <TASK>
[ 135.279247] ? preempt_count_add+0x6d/0xa0
[ 135.280358] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x55/0xb0
[ 135.281612] ? _raw_read_unlock+0x18/0x30
[ 135.282704] ext4_map_blocks+0x294/0x5a0
[ 135.283745] ? xa_load+0x6f/0xa0
[ 135.284562] ext4_mpage_readpages+0x3d6/0x770
[ 135.285646] read_pages+0x67/0x1d0
[ 135.286492] ? folio_add_lru+0x51/0x80
[ 135.287441] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x124/0x170
[ 135.288510] filemap_get_pages+0x23d/0x5a0
[ 135.289457] ? path_openat+0xa72/0xdd0
[ 135.290332] filemap_read+0xbf/0x300
[ 135.291158] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x17/0x40
[ 135.292192] new_sync_read+0x103/0x170
[ 135.293014] vfs_read+0x15d/0x180
[ 135.293745] ksys_read+0xa1/0xe0
[ 135.294461] do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80
[ 135.295284] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
This patch simply adds an extra check in __ext4_ext_check(), verifying that
eh_entries is not 0 when eh_depth is > 0.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2022-48628

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: drop messages from MDS when unmounting
When unmounting all the dirty buffers will be flushed and after
the last osd request is finished the last reference of the i_count
will be released. Then it will flush the dirty cap/snap to MDSs,
and the unmounting won't wait the possible acks, which will ihold
the inodes when updating the metadata locally but makes no sense
any more, of this. This will make the evict_inodes() to skip these
inodes.
If encrypt is enabled the kernel generate a warning when removing
the encrypt keys when the skipped inodes still hold the keyring:
WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 168846 at fs/crypto/keyring.c:242 fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0
CPU: 4 PID: 168846 Comm: umount Tainted: G S 6.1.0-rc5-ceph-g72ead199864c #1
Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5018R-WR/X10SRW-F, BIOS 2.0 12/17/2015
RIP: 0010:fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b277e28 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88810d52ac00 RCX: ffff88810b56aa00
RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffff822f3a09 RDI: ffff888108f59000
RBP: ffff8881d394fb88 R08: 0000000000000028 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 11ff4fe6834fcd91 R12: ffff8881d394fc40
R13: ffff888108f59000 R14: ffff8881d394f800 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fd83f6f1080(0000) GS:ffff88885fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f918d417000 CR3: 000000017f89a005 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
generic_shutdown_super+0x47/0x120
kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30
ceph_kill_sb+0x36/0x90 [ceph]
deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60
cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140
task_work_run+0x67/0xb0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x23d/0x240
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x60
do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7fd83dc39e9b
Later the kernel will crash when iput() the inodes and dereferencing
the "sb->s_master_keys", which has been released by the
generic_shutdown_super().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47639

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/mmu: Zap _all_ roots when unmapping gfn range in TDP MMU
Zap both valid and invalid roots when zapping/unmapping a gfn range, as
KVM must ensure it holds no references to the freed page after returning
from the unmap operation. Most notably, the TDP MMU doesn't zap invalid
roots in mmu_notifier callbacks. This leads to use-after-free and other
issues if the mmu_notifier runs to completion while an invalid root
zapper yields as KVM fails to honor the requirement that there must be
_no_ references to the page after the mmu_notifier returns.
The bug is most easily reproduced by hacking KVM to cause a collision
between set_nx_huge_pages() and kvm_mmu_notifier_release(), but the bug
exists between kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start() and memslot
updates as well. Invalidating a root ensures pages aren't accessible by
the guest, and KVM won't read or write page data itself, but KVM will
trigger e.g. kvm_set_pfn_dirty() when zapping SPTEs, and thus completing
a zap of an invalid root _after_ the mmu_notifier returns is fatal.
WARNING: CPU: 24 PID: 1496 at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:173 [kvm]
RIP: 0010:kvm_is_zone_device_pfn+0x96/0xa0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_set_pfn_dirty+0xa8/0xe0 [kvm]
__handle_changed_spte+0x2ab/0x5e0 [kvm]
__handle_changed_spte+0x2ab/0x5e0 [kvm]
__handle_changed_spte+0x2ab/0x5e0 [kvm]
zap_gfn_range+0x1f3/0x310 [kvm]
kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_invalidated_roots+0x50/0x90 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast+0x177/0x1a0 [kvm]
set_nx_huge_pages+0xb4/0x190 [kvm]
param_attr_store+0x70/0x100
module_attr_store+0x19/0x30
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x119/0x1b0
new_sync_write+0x11c/0x1b0
vfs_write+0x1cc/0x270
ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47623

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/fixmap: Fix VM debug warning on unmap
Unmapping a fixmap entry is done by calling __set_fixmap()
with FIXMAP_PAGE_CLEAR as flags.
Today, powerpc __set_fixmap() calls map_kernel_page().
map_kernel_page() is not happy when called a second time
for the same page.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at arch/powerpc/mm/pgtable.c:194 set_pte_at+0xc/0x1e8
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.16.0-rc3-s3k-dev-01993-g350ff07feb7d-dirty #682
NIP: c0017cd4 LR: c00187f0 CTR: 00000010
REGS: e1011d50 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.16.0-rc3-s3k-dev-01993-g350ff07feb7d-dirty)
MSR: 00029032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 42000208 XER: 00000000
GPR00: c0165fec e1011e10 c14c0000 c0ee2550 ff800000 c0f3d000 00000000 c001686c
GPR08: 00001000 b00045a9 00000001 c0f58460 c0f50000 00000000 c0007e10 00000000
GPR16: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
GPR24: 00000000 00000000 c0ee2550 00000000 c0f57000 00000ff8 00000000 ff800000
NIP [c0017cd4] set_pte_at+0xc/0x1e8
LR [c00187f0] map_kernel_page+0x9c/0x100
Call Trace:
[e1011e10] [c0736c68] vsnprintf+0x358/0x6c8 (unreliable)
[e1011e30] [c0165fec] __set_fixmap+0x30/0x44
[e1011e40] [c0c13bdc] early_iounmap+0x11c/0x170
[e1011e70] [c0c06cb0] ioremap_legacy_serial_console+0x88/0xc0
[e1011e90] [c0c03634] do_one_initcall+0x80/0x178
[e1011ef0] [c0c0385c] kernel_init_freeable+0xb4/0x250
[e1011f20] [c0007e34] kernel_init+0x24/0x140
[e1011f30] [c0016268] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
Instruction dump:
7fe3fb78 48019689 80010014 7c630034 83e1000c 5463d97e 7c0803a6 38210010
4e800020 81250000 712a0001 41820008 <0fe00000> 9421ffe0 93e1001c 48000030
Implement unmap_kernel_page() which clears an existing pte.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47619

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: Fix queues reservation for XDP
When XDP was configured on a system with large number of CPUs
and X722 NIC there was a call trace with NULL pointer dereference.
i40e 0000:87:00.0: failed to get tracking for 256 queues for VSI 0 err -12
i40e 0000:87:00.0: setup of MAIN VSI failed
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
RIP: 0010:i40e_xdp+0xea/0x1b0 [i40e]
Call Trace:
? i40e_reconfig_rss_queues+0x130/0x130 [i40e]
dev_xdp_install+0x61/0xe0
dev_xdp_attach+0x18a/0x4c0
dev_change_xdp_fd+0x1e6/0x220
do_setlink+0x616/0x1030
? ahci_port_stop+0x80/0x80
? ata_qc_issue+0x107/0x1e0
? lock_timer_base+0x61/0x80
? __mod_timer+0x202/0x380
rtnl_setlink+0xe5/0x170
? bpf_lsm_binder_transaction+0x10/0x10
? security_capable+0x36/0x50
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x121/0x350
? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x100/0x100
netlink_rcv_skb+0x50/0xf0
netlink_unicast+0x1d3/0x2a0
netlink_sendmsg+0x22a/0x440
sock_sendmsg+0x5e/0x60
__sys_sendto+0xf0/0x160
? __sys_getsockname+0x7e/0xc0
? _copy_from_user+0x3c/0x80
? __sys_setsockopt+0xc8/0x1a0
__x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f83fa7a39e0
This was caused by PF queue pile fragmentation due to
flow director VSI queue being placed right after main VSI.
Because of this main VSI was not able to resize its
queue allocation for XDP resulting in no queues allocated
for main VSI when XDP was turned on.
Fix this by always allocating last queue in PF queue pile
for a flow director VSI.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47617

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: pciehp: Fix infinite loop in IRQ handler upon power fault
The Power Fault Detected bit in the Slot Status register differs from
all other hotplug events in that it is sticky: It can only be cleared
after turning off slot power. Per PCIe r5.0, sec. 6.7.1.8:
If a power controller detects a main power fault on the hot-plug slot,
it must automatically set its internal main power fault latch [...].
The main power fault latch is cleared when software turns off power to
the hot-plug slot.
The stickiness used to cause interrupt storms and infinite loops which
were fixed in 2009 by commits 5651c48cfafe ("PCI pciehp: fix power fault
interrupt storm problem") and 99f0169c17f3 ("PCI: pciehp: enable
software notification on empty slots").
Unfortunately in 2020 the infinite loop issue was inadvertently
reintroduced by commit 8edf5332c393 ("PCI: pciehp: Fix MSI interrupt
race"): The hardirq handler pciehp_isr() clears the PFD bit until
pciehp's power_fault_detected flag is set. That happens in the IRQ
thread pciehp_ist(), which never learns of the event because the hardirq
handler is stuck in an infinite loop. Fix by setting the
power_fault_detected flag already in the hardirq handler.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47608

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix kernel address leakage in atomic fetch
The change in commit 37086bfdc737 ("bpf: Propagate stack bounds to registers
in atomics w/ BPF_FETCH") around check_mem_access() handling is buggy since
this would allow for unprivileged users to leak kernel pointers. For example,
an atomic fetch/and with -1 on a stack destination which holds a spilled
pointer will migrate the spilled register type into a scalar, which can then
be exported out of the program (since scalar != pointer) by dumping it into
a map value.
The original implementation of XADD was preventing this situation by using
a double call to check_mem_access() one with BPF_READ and a subsequent one
with BPF_WRITE, in both cases passing -1 as a placeholder value instead of
register as per XADD semantics since it didn't contain a value fetch. The
BPF_READ also included a check in check_stack_read_fixed_off() which rejects
the program if the stack slot is of __is_pointer_value() if dst_regno < 0.
The latter is to distinguish whether we're dealing with a regular stack spill/
fill or some arithmetical operation which is disallowed on non-scalars, see
also 6e7e63cbb023 ("bpf: Forbid XADD on spilled pointers for unprivileged
users") for more context on check_mem_access() and its handling of placeholder
value -1.
One minimally intrusive option to fix the leak is for the BPF_FETCH case to
initially check the BPF_READ case via check_mem_access() with -1 as register,
followed by the actual load case with non-negative load_reg to propagate
stack bounds to registers.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47607

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix kernel address leakage in atomic cmpxchg's r0 aux reg
The implementation of BPF_CMPXCHG on a high level has the following parameters:
.-[old-val] .-[new-val]
BPF_R0 = cmpxchg{32,64}(DST_REG + insn->off, BPF_R0, SRC_REG)
`-[mem-loc] `-[old-val]
Given a BPF insn can only have two registers (dst, src), the R0 is fixed and
used as an auxilliary register for input (old value) as well as output (returning
old value from memory location). While the verifier performs a number of safety
checks, it misses to reject unprivileged programs where R0 contains a pointer as
old value.
Through brute-forcing it takes about ~16sec on my machine to leak a kernel pointer
with BPF_CMPXCHG. The PoC is basically probing for kernel addresses by storing the
guessed address into the map slot as a scalar, and using the map value pointer as
R0 while SRC_REG has a canary value to detect a matching address.
Fix it by checking R0 for pointers, and reject if that's the case for unprivileged
programs.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47603

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
audit: improve robustness of the audit queue handling
If the audit daemon were ever to get stuck in a stopped state the
kernel's kauditd_thread() could get blocked attempting to send audit
records to the userspace audit daemon. With the kernel thread
blocked it is possible that the audit queue could grow unbounded as
certain audit record generating events must be exempt from the queue
limits else the system enter a deadlock state.
This patch resolves this problem by lowering the kernel thread's
socket sending timeout from MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT to HZ/10 and tweaks
the kauditd_send_queue() function to better manage the various audit
queues when connection problems occur between the kernel and the
audit daemon. With this patch, the backlog may temporarily grow
beyond the defined limits when the audit daemon is stopped and the
system is under heavy audit pressure, but kauditd_thread() will
continue to make progress and drain the queues as it would for other
connection problems. For example, with the audit daemon put into a
stopped state and the system configured to audit every syscall it
was still possible to shutdown the system without a kernel panic,
deadlock, etc.; granted, the system was slow to shutdown but that is
to be expected given the extreme pressure of recording every syscall.
The timeout value of HZ/10 was chosen primarily through
experimentation and this developer's "gut feeling". There is likely
no one perfect value, but as this scenario is limited in scope (root
privileges would be needed to send SIGSTOP to the audit daemon), it
is likely not worth exposing this as a tunable at present. This can
always be done at a later date if it proves necessary.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47597

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet_diag: fix kernel-infoleak for UDP sockets
KMSAN reported a kernel-infoleak [1], that can exploited
by unpriv users.
After analysis it turned out UDP was not initializing
r->idiag_expires. Other users of inet_sk_diag_fill()
might make the same mistake in the future, so fix this
in inet_sk_diag_fill().
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:121 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copyout lib/iov_iter.c:156 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x69d/0x25c0 lib/iov_iter.c:670
instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:121 [inline]
copyout lib/iov_iter.c:156 [inline]
_copy_to_iter+0x69d/0x25c0 lib/iov_iter.c:670
copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:155 [inline]
simple_copy_to_iter+0xf3/0x140 net/core/datagram.c:519
__skb_datagram_iter+0x2cb/0x1280 net/core/datagram.c:425
skb_copy_datagram_iter+0xdc/0x270 net/core/datagram.c:533
skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3657 [inline]
netlink_recvmsg+0x660/0x1c60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1974
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:944 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline]
sock_read_iter+0x5a9/0x630 net/socket.c:1035
call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:2156 [inline]
new_sync_read fs/read_write.c:400 [inline]
vfs_read+0x1631/0x1980 fs/read_write.c:481
ksys_read+0x28c/0x520 fs/read_write.c:619
__do_sys_read fs/read_write.c:629 [inline]
__se_sys_read fs/read_write.c:627 [inline]
__x64_sys_read+0xdb/0x120 fs/read_write.c:627
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:524 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3251 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe0c/0x1510 mm/slub.c:4974
kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:354 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x545/0xf90 net/core/skbuff.c:426
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1126 [inline]
netlink_dump+0x3d5/0x16a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2245
__netlink_dump_start+0xd1c/0xee0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2370
netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:254 [inline]
inet_diag_handler_cmd+0x2e7/0x400 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1343
sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x24a/0x620
netlink_rcv_skb+0x447/0x800 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2491
sock_diag_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/core/sock_diag.c:276
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x1095/0x1360 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
netlink_sendmsg+0x16f3/0x1870 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1916
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:724 [inline]
sock_write_iter+0x594/0x690 net/socket.c:1057
do_iter_readv_writev+0xa7f/0xc70
do_iter_write+0x52c/0x1500 fs/read_write.c:851
vfs_writev fs/read_write.c:924 [inline]
do_writev+0x63f/0xe30 fs/read_write.c:967
__do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1040 [inline]
__se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1037 [inline]
__x64_sys_writev+0xe5/0x120 fs/read_write.c:1037
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Bytes 68-71 of 312 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 312 starts at ffff88812ab54000
Data copied to user address 0000000020001440
CPU: 1 PID: 6365 Comm: syz-executor801 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47594

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: never allow the PM to close a listener subflow
Currently, when deleting an endpoint the netlink PM treverses
all the local MPTCP sockets, regardless of their status.
If an MPTCP listener socket is bound to the IP matching the
delete endpoint, the listener TCP socket will be closed.
That is unexpected, the PM should only affect data subflows.
Additionally, syzbot was able to trigger a NULL ptr dereference
due to the above:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]
CPU: 1 PID: 6550 Comm: syz-executor122 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0xd7d/0x54a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4897
Code: 0f 0e 41 be 01 00 00 00 0f 86 c8 00 00 00 89 05 69 cc 0f 0e e9 bd 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 da 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 f3 2f 00 00 48 81 3b 20 75 17 8f 0f 84 52 f3 ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001f2f818 EFLAGS: 00010016
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000018 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 000000000000000a R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff88801b98d700 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f177cd3d700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f177cd1b268 CR3: 000000001dd55000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5637 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1ab/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5602
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x39/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
finish_wait+0xc0/0x270 kernel/sched/wait.c:400
inet_csk_wait_for_connect net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:464 [inline]
inet_csk_accept+0x7de/0x9d0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:497
mptcp_accept+0xe5/0x500 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2865
inet_accept+0xe4/0x7b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:739
mptcp_stream_accept+0x2e7/0x10e0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3345
do_accept+0x382/0x510 net/socket.c:1773
__sys_accept4_file+0x7e/0xe0 net/socket.c:1816
__sys_accept4+0xb0/0x100 net/socket.c:1846
__do_sys_accept net/socket.c:1864 [inline]
__se_sys_accept net/socket.c:1861 [inline]
__x64_sys_accept+0x71/0xb0 net/socket.c:1861
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f177cd8b8e9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 b1 14 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f177cd3d308 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f177ce13408 RCX: 00007f177cd8b8e9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f177ce13400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f177ce1340c
R13: 00007f177cde1004 R14: 6d705f706374706d R15: 0000000000022000
</TASK>
Fix the issue explicitly skipping MPTCP socket in TCP_LISTEN
status.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47588

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sit: do not call ipip6_dev_free() from sit_init_net()
ipip6_dev_free is sit dev->priv_destructor, already called
by register_netdevice() if something goes wrong.
Alternative would be to make ipip6_dev_free() robust against
multiple invocations, but other drivers do not implement this
strategy.
syzbot reported:
dst_release underflow
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5059 at net/core/dst.c:173 dst_release+0xd8/0xe0 net/core/dst.c:173
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 5059 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:dst_release+0xd8/0xe0 net/core/dst.c:173
Code: 4c 89 f2 89 d9 31 c0 5b 41 5e 5d e9 da d5 44 f9 e8 1d 90 5f f9 c6 05 87 48 c6 05 01 48 c7 c7 80 44 99 8b 31 c0 e8 e8 67 29 f9 <0f> 0b eb 85 0f 1f 40 00 53 48 89 fb e8 f7 8f 5f f9 48 83 c3 a8 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000aa5faa0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: d6894a925dd15a00 RBX: 00000000ffffffff RCX: 0000000000040000
RDX: ffffc90005e19000 RSI: 000000000003ffff RDI: 0000000000040000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff816a1f42 R09: ffffed1017344f2c
R10: ffffed1017344f2c R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000607f462b1358
R13: 1ffffffff1bfd305 R14: ffffe8ffffcb1358 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 00007f66c71a2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f88aaed5058 CR3: 0000000023e0f000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dst_cache_destroy+0x107/0x1e0 net/core/dst_cache.c:160
ipip6_dev_free net/ipv6/sit.c:1414 [inline]
sit_init_net+0x229/0x550 net/ipv6/sit.c:1936
ops_init+0x313/0x430 net/core/net_namespace.c:140
setup_net+0x35b/0x9d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:326
copy_net_ns+0x359/0x5c0 net/core/net_namespace.c:470
create_new_namespaces+0x4ce/0xa00 kernel/nsproxy.c:110
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x11e/0x180 kernel/nsproxy.c:226
ksys_unshare+0x57d/0xb50 kernel/fork.c:3075
__do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3146 [inline]
__se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3144 [inline]
__x64_sys_unshare+0x34/0x40 kernel/fork.c:3144
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f66c882ce99
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f66c71a2168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f66c893ff60 RCX: 00007f66c882ce99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000048040200
RBP: 00007f66c8886ff1 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fff6634832f R14: 00007f66c71a2300 R15: 0000000000022000
</TASK>

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47578

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: scsi_debug: Don't call kcalloc() if size arg is zero
If the size arg to kcalloc() is zero, it returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR. Because of
that, for a following NULL pointer check to work on the returned pointer,
kcalloc() must not be called with the size arg equal to zero. Return early
without error before the kcalloc() call if size arg is zero.
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in sg_copy_buffer+0x138/0x240 lib/scatterlist.c:974
Write of size 4 at addr 0000000000000010 by task syz-executor.1/22789
CPU: 1 PID: 22789 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.15.0-syzk #1
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.13.0-2
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x89/0xb5 lib/dump_stack.c:106
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:446 [inline]
kasan_report.cold.14+0x112/0x117 mm/kasan/report.c:459
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x1a3/0x210 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
memcpy+0x3b/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:66
memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline]
sg_copy_buffer+0x138/0x240 lib/scatterlist.c:974
do_dout_fetch drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:2954 [inline]
do_dout_fetch drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:2946 [inline]
resp_verify+0x49e/0x930 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:4276
schedule_resp+0x4d8/0x1a70 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:5478
scsi_debug_queuecommand+0x8c9/0x1ec0 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:7533
scsi_dispatch_cmd drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1520 [inline]
scsi_queue_rq+0x16b0/0x2d40 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1699
blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0xb9b/0x2700 block/blk-mq.c:1639
__blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x28f/0x590 block/blk-mq-sched.c:325
blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x105/0x190 block/blk-mq-sched.c:358
__blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xe5/0x150 block/blk-mq.c:1761
__blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue+0x4f8/0x5c0 block/blk-mq.c:1838
blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x18d/0x350 block/blk-mq.c:1891
blk_mq_sched_insert_request+0x3db/0x4e0 block/blk-mq-sched.c:474
blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x16b/0x1c0 block/blk-exec.c:62
blk_execute_rq+0xdb/0x360 block/blk-exec.c:102
sg_scsi_ioctl drivers/scsi/scsi_ioctl.c:621 [inline]
scsi_ioctl+0x8bb/0x15c0 drivers/scsi/scsi_ioctl.c:930
sg_ioctl_common+0x172d/0x2710 drivers/scsi/sg.c:1112
sg_ioctl+0xa2/0x180 drivers/scsi/sg.c:1165
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:874 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:860 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x19d/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:860
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47576

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: scsi_debug: Sanity check block descriptor length in resp_mode_select()
In resp_mode_select() sanity check the block descriptor len to avoid UAF.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in resp_mode_select+0xa4c/0xb40 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:2509
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888026670f50 by task scsicmd/15032
CPU: 1 PID: 15032 Comm: scsicmd Not tainted 5.15.0-01d0625 #15
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x89/0xb5 lib/dump_stack.c:107
print_address_description.constprop.9+0x28/0x160 mm/kasan/report.c:257
kasan_report.cold.14+0x7d/0x117 mm/kasan/report.c:443
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:306
resp_mode_select+0xa4c/0xb40 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:2509
schedule_resp+0x4af/0x1a10 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:5483
scsi_debug_queuecommand+0x8c9/0x1e70 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:7537
scsi_queue_rq+0x16b4/0x2d10 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1521
blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0xb9b/0x2700 block/blk-mq.c:1640
__blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x28f/0x590 block/blk-mq-sched.c:325
blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x105/0x190 block/blk-mq-sched.c:358
__blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xe5/0x150 block/blk-mq.c:1762
__blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue+0x4f8/0x5c0 block/blk-mq.c:1839
blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x18d/0x350 block/blk-mq.c:1891
blk_mq_sched_insert_request+0x3db/0x4e0 block/blk-mq-sched.c:474
blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x16b/0x1c0 block/blk-exec.c:63
sg_common_write.isra.18+0xeb3/0x2000 drivers/scsi/sg.c:837
sg_new_write.isra.19+0x570/0x8c0 drivers/scsi/sg.c:775
sg_ioctl_common+0x14d6/0x2710 drivers/scsi/sg.c:941
sg_ioctl+0xa2/0x180 drivers/scsi/sg.c:1166
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x19d/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:52
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:113

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47566

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
proc/vmcore: fix clearing user buffer by properly using clear_user()
To clear a user buffer we cannot simply use memset, we have to use
clear_user(). With a virtio-mem device that registers a vmcore_cb and
has some logically unplugged memory inside an added Linux memory block,
I can easily trigger a BUG by copying the vmcore via "cp":
systemd[1]: Starting Kdump Vmcore Save Service...
kdump[420]: Kdump is using the default log level(3).
kdump[453]: saving to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/
kdump[458]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/
kdump[465]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt complete
kdump[467]: saving vmcore
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f2374e01000
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation
PGD 7a523067 P4D 7a523067 PUD 7a528067 PMD 7a525067 PTE 800000007048f867
Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 468 Comm: cp Not tainted 5.15.0+ #6
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.14.0-27-g64f37cc530f1-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:read_from_oldmem.part.0.cold+0x1d/0x86
Code: ff ff ff e8 05 ff fe ff e9 b9 e9 7f ff 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 38 3b 60 82 e8 f1 fe fe ff 83 fd 08 72 3c 49 8d 7d 08 4c 89 e9 89 e8 <49> c7 45 00 00 00 00 00 49 c7 44 05 f8 00 00 00 00 48 83 e7 f81
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000073be08 EFLAGS: 00010212
RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 00000000002fd000 RCX: 00007f2374e01000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: 00007f2374e01008
RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000073bc50
R10: ffffc9000073bc48 R11: ffffffff829461a8 R12: 000000000000f000
R13: 00007f2374e01000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807bd421e8
FS: 00007f2374e12140(0000) GS:ffff88807f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f2374e01000 CR3: 000000007a4aa000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0
Call Trace:
read_vmcore+0x236/0x2c0
proc_reg_read+0x55/0xa0
vfs_read+0x95/0x190
ksys_read+0x4f/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Some x86-64 CPUs have a CPU feature called "Supervisor Mode Access
Prevention (SMAP)", which is used to detect wrong access from the kernel
to user buffers like this: SMAP triggers a permissions violation on
wrong access. In the x86-64 variant of clear_user(), SMAP is properly
handled via clac()+stac().
To fix, properly use clear_user() when we're dealing with a user buffer.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47558

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: Disable Tx queues when reconfiguring the interface
The Tx queues were not disabled in situations where the driver needed to
stop the interface to apply a new configuration. This could result in a
kernel panic when doing any of the 3 following actions:
* reconfiguring the number of queues (ethtool -L)
* reconfiguring the size of the ring buffers (ethtool -G)
* installing/removing an XDP program (ip l set dev ethX xdp)
Prevent the panic by making sure netif_tx_disable is called when stopping
an interface.
Without this patch, the following kernel panic can be observed when doing
any of the actions above:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80001238d040
[....]
Call trace:
dwmac4_set_addr+0x8/0x10
dev_hard_start_xmit+0xe4/0x1ac
sch_direct_xmit+0xe8/0x39c
__dev_queue_xmit+0x3ec/0xaf0
dev_queue_xmit+0x14/0x20
[...]
[ end trace 0000000000000002 ]---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47554

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vdpa_sim: avoid putting an uninitialized iova_domain
The system will crash if we put an uninitialized iova_domain, this
could happen when an error occurs before initializing the iova_domain
in vdpasim_create().
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
...
RIP: 0010:__cpuhp_state_remove_instance+0x96/0x1c0
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
put_iova_domain+0x29/0x220
vdpasim_free+0xd1/0x120 [vdpa_sim]
vdpa_release_dev+0x21/0x40 [vdpa]
device_release+0x33/0x90
kobject_release+0x63/0x160
vdpasim_create+0x127/0x2a0 [vdpa_sim]
vdpasim_net_dev_add+0x7d/0xfe [vdpa_sim_net]
vdpa_nl_cmd_dev_add_set_doit+0xe1/0x1a0 [vdpa]
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x112/0x140
genl_rcv_msg+0xdf/0x1d0
...
So we must make sure the iova_domain is already initialized before
put it.
In addition, we may get the following warning in this case:
WARNING: ... drivers/iommu/iova.c:344 iova_cache_put+0x58/0x70
So we must make sure the iova_cache_put() is invoked only if the
iova_cache_get() is already invoked. Let's fix it together.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47536

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix wrong list_del in smc_lgr_cleanup_early
smc_lgr_cleanup_early() meant to delete the link
group from the link group list, but it deleted
the list head by mistake.
This may cause memory corruption since we didn't
remove the real link group from the list and later
memseted the link group structure.
We got a list corruption panic when testing:
[ 231.277259] list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffff8881398a8000, but was 0000000000000000
[ 231.278222] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 231.278726] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:53!
[ 231.279326] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 231.279803] CPU: 0 PID: 5 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 5.10.46+ #435
[ 231.280466] Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 8c24b4c 04/01/2014
[ 231.281248] Workqueue: events smc_link_down_work
[ 231.281732] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x70/0x90
[ 231.282258] Code: 4c 60 82 e8 7d cc 6a 00 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 88 4c
60 82 e8 6c cc 6a 00 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 c0 4c 60 82 e8 5b cc 6a 00 <0f>
0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 00 4d 60 82 e8 4a cc 6a 00 0f 0b cc cc cc
[ 231.284146] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000033d58 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 231.284685] RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff8881398a8000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 231.285415] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff88813bc18040 RDI: ffff88813bc18040
[ 231.286141] RBP: ffffffff8305ad40 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 231.286873] R10: ffffffff82803da0 R11: ffffc90000033b90 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 231.287606] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8881398a8000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 231.288337] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 231.289160] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 231.289754] CR2: 0000000000e72058 CR3: 000000010fa96006 CR4: 00000000003706f0
[ 231.290485] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 231.291211] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 231.291940] Call Trace:
[ 231.292211] smc_lgr_terminate_sched+0x53/0xa0
[ 231.292677] smc_switch_conns+0x75/0x6b0
[ 231.293085] ? update_load_avg+0x1a6/0x590
[ 231.293517] ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x17/0x150
[ 231.293907] ? update_load_avg+0x1a6/0x590
[ 231.294317] ? newidle_balance+0xca/0x3d0
[ 231.294716] smcr_link_down+0x50/0x1a0
[ 231.295090] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0x77/0x90
[ 231.295534] smc_link_down_work+0x46/0x60
[ 231.295933] process_one_work+0x18b/0x350

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47517

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: do not perform operations on net devices being unregistered
There is a short period between a net device starts to be unregistered
and when it is actually gone. In that time frame ethtool operations
could still be performed, which might end up in unwanted or undefined
behaviours[1].
Do not allow ethtool operations after a net device starts its
unregistration. This patch targets the netlink part as the ioctl one
isn't affected: the reference to the net device is taken and the
operation is executed within an rtnl lock section and the net device
won't be found after unregister.
[1] For example adding Tx queues after unregister ends up in NULL
pointer exceptions and UaFs, such as:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kobject_get+0x14/0x90
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801961248c by task ethtool/755
CPU: 0 PID: 755 Comm: ethtool Not tainted 5.15.0-rc6+ #778
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/014
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x72
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140
kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
kobject_get+0x14/0x90
kobject_add_internal+0x3d1/0x450
kobject_init_and_add+0xba/0xf0
netdev_queue_update_kobjects+0xcf/0x200
netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0xb4/0x310
veth_set_channels+0x1c3/0x550
ethnl_set_channels+0x524/0x610

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47496

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tls: Fix flipped sign in tls_err_abort() calls
sk->sk_err appears to expect a positive value, a convention that ktls
doesn't always follow and that leads to memory corruption in other code.
For instance,
[kworker]
tls_encrypt_done(..., err=<negative error from crypto request>)
tls_err_abort(.., err)
sk->sk_err = err;
[task]
splice_from_pipe_feed
...
tls_sw_do_sendpage
if (sk->sk_err) {
ret = -sk->sk_err; // ret is positive
splice_from_pipe_feed (continued)
ret = actor(...) // ret is still positive and interpreted as bytes
// written, resulting in underflow of buf->len and
// sd->len, leading to huge buf->offset and bogus
// addresses computed in later calls to actor()
Fix all tls_err_abort() callers to pass a negative error code
consistently and centralize the error-prone sign flip there, throwing in
a warning to catch future misuse and uninlining the function so it
really does only warn once.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47481

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Initialize the ODP xarray when creating an ODP MR
Normally the zero fill would hide the missing initialization, but an
errant set to desc_size in reg_create() causes a crash:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000800000000
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 5 PID: 890 Comm: ib_write_bw Not tainted 5.15.0-rc4+ #47
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x14/0x3b0 [mlx5_ib]
Code: 48 63 cd 4c 89 f7 48 89 0c 24 e8 37 30 03 e1 48 8b 0c 24 eb a0 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 30 <48> 8b 2f 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 28 31 c0 8b 87 c8
RSP: 0018:ffff88811afa3a60 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 000000000000001c RBX: 0000000800000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000800000000
RBP: 0000000800000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000fffff7ff
R10: ffff88811afa38f8 R11: ffff88811afa38f0 R12: ffffffffa02c7ac0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88811afa3cd8 R15: ffff88810772fa00
FS: 00007f47b9080740(0000) GS:ffff88852cd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000800000000 CR3: 000000010761e003 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
mlx5_ib_free_odp_mr+0x95/0xc0 [mlx5_ib]
mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x128/0x3b0 [mlx5_ib]
ib_dereg_mr_user+0x45/0xb0 [ib_core]
? xas_load+0x8/0x80
destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x1a/0x50 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x2f/0x150 [ib_uverbs]
uobj_destroy+0x3c/0x70 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x467/0xb00 [ib_uverbs]
? uverbs_finalize_object+0x60/0x60 [ib_uverbs]
? ttwu_queue_wakelist+0xa9/0xe0
? pty_write+0x85/0x90
? file_tty_write.isra.33+0x214/0x330
? process_echoes+0x60/0x60
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xa7/0x110 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x10d/0x8e0
? vfs_write+0x17f/0x260
do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Add the missing xarray initialization and remove the desc_size set.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47462

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mempolicy: do not allow illegal MPOL_F_NUMA_BALANCING | MPOL_LOCAL in mbind()
syzbot reported access to unitialized memory in mbind() [1]
Issue came with commit bda420b98505 ("numa balancing: migrate on fault
among multiple bound nodes")
This commit added a new bit in MPOL_MODE_FLAGS, but only checked valid
combination (MPOL_F_NUMA_BALANCING can only be used with MPOL_BIND) in
do_set_mempolicy()
This patch moves the check in sanitize_mpol_flags() so that it is also
used by mbind()
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __mpol_equal+0x567/0x590 mm/mempolicy.c:2260
__mpol_equal+0x567/0x590 mm/mempolicy.c:2260
mpol_equal include/linux/mempolicy.h:105 [inline]
vma_merge+0x4a1/0x1e60 mm/mmap.c:1190
mbind_range+0xcc8/0x1e80 mm/mempolicy.c:811
do_mbind+0xf42/0x15f0 mm/mempolicy.c:1333
kernel_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1483 [inline]
__do_sys_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1490 [inline]
__se_sys_mbind+0x437/0xb80 mm/mempolicy.c:1486
__x64_sys_mbind+0x19d/0x200 mm/mempolicy.c:1486
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Uninit was created at:
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3221 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3230 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x751/0xff0 mm/slub.c:3235
mpol_new mm/mempolicy.c:293 [inline]
do_mbind+0x912/0x15f0 mm/mempolicy.c:1289
kernel_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1483 [inline]
__do_sys_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1490 [inline]
__se_sys_mbind+0x437/0xb80 mm/mempolicy.c:1486
__x64_sys_mbind+0x19d/0x200 mm/mempolicy.c:1486
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
=====================================================
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_kmsan set ...
CPU: 0 PID: 15049 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G B 5.15.0-rc2-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1ff/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106
dump_stack+0x25/0x28 lib/dump_stack.c:113
panic+0x44f/0xdeb kernel/panic.c:232
kmsan_report+0x2ee/0x300 mm/kmsan/report.c:186
__msan_warning+0xd7/0x150 mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c:208
__mpol_equal+0x567/0x590 mm/mempolicy.c:2260
mpol_equal include/linux/mempolicy.h:105 [inline]
vma_merge+0x4a1/0x1e60 mm/mmap.c:1190
mbind_range+0xcc8/0x1e80 mm/mempolicy.c:811
do_mbind+0xf42/0x15f0 mm/mempolicy.c:1333
kernel_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1483 [inline]
__do_sys_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1490 [inline]
__se_sys_mbind+0x437/0xb80 mm/mempolicy.c:1486
__x64_sys_mbind+0x19d/0x200 mm/mempolicy.c:1486
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47452

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: skip netdev events generated on netns removal
syzbot reported following (harmless) WARN:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2648 at net/netfilter/core.c:468
nft_netdev_unregister_hooks net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:230 [inline]
nf_tables_unregister_hook include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h:1090 [inline]
__nft_release_basechain+0x138/0x640 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:9524
nft_netdev_event net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:351 [inline]
nf_tables_netdev_event+0x521/0x8a0 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:382
reproducer:
unshare -n bash -c 'ip link add br0 type bridge; nft add table netdev t ; \
nft add chain netdev t ingress \{ type filter hook ingress device "br0" \
priority 0\; policy drop\; \}'
Problem is that when netns device exit hooks create the UNREGISTER
event, the .pre_exit hook for nf_tables core has already removed the
base hook. Notifier attempts to do this again.
The need to do base hook unregister unconditionally was needed in the past,
because notifier was last stage where reg->dev dereference was safe.
Now that nf_tables does the hook removal in .pre_exit, this isn't
needed anymore.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47438

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix memory leak in mlx5_core_destroy_cq() error path
Prior to this patch in case mlx5_core_destroy_cq() failed it returns
without completing all destroy operations and that leads to memory leak.
Instead, complete the destroy flow before return error.
Also move mlx5_debug_cq_remove() to the beginning of mlx5_core_destroy_cq()
to be symmetrical with mlx5_core_create_cq().
kmemleak complains on:
unreferenced object 0xc000000038625100 (size 64):
comm "ethtool", pid 28301, jiffies 4298062946 (age 785.380s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
60 01 48 94 00 00 00 c0 b8 05 34 c3 00 00 00 c0 `.H.......4.....
02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 db 7d c1 00 00 00 c0 ..........}.....
backtrace:
[<000000009e8643cb>] add_res_tree+0xd0/0x270 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000e7cb8e6c>] mlx5_debug_cq_add+0x5c/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
[<000000002a12918f>] mlx5_core_create_cq+0x1d0/0x2d0 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000cef0a696>] mlx5e_create_cq+0x210/0x3f0 [mlx5_core]
[<000000009c642c26>] mlx5e_open_cq+0xb4/0x130 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000058dfa578>] mlx5e_ptp_open+0x7f4/0xe10 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000081839561>] mlx5e_open_channels+0x9cc/0x13e0 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000009cf05d4>] mlx5e_switch_priv_channels+0xa4/0x230
[mlx5_core]
[<0000000042bbedd8>] mlx5e_safe_switch_params+0x14c/0x300
[mlx5_core]
[<0000000004bc9db8>] set_pflag_tx_port_ts+0x9c/0x160 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000a0553443>] mlx5e_set_priv_flags+0xd0/0x1b0 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000a8f3d84b>] ethnl_set_privflags+0x234/0x2d0
[<00000000fd27f27c>] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x108/0x1d0
[<00000000f495e2bb>] genl_family_rcv_msg+0xe4/0x1f0
[<00000000646c5c2c>] genl_rcv_msg+0x78/0x120
[<00000000d53e384e>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x74/0x1a0

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47424

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: Fix freeing of uninitialized misc IRQ vector
When VSI set up failed in i40e_probe() as part of PF switch set up
driver was trying to free misc IRQ vectors in
i40e_clear_interrupt_scheme and produced a kernel Oops:
Trying to free already-free IRQ 266
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5 at kernel/irq/manage.c:1731 __free_irq+0x9a/0x300
Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
RIP: 0010:__free_irq+0x9a/0x300
Call Trace:
? synchronize_irq+0x3a/0xa0
free_irq+0x2e/0x60
i40e_clear_interrupt_scheme+0x53/0x190 [i40e]
i40e_probe.part.108+0x134b/0x1a40 [i40e]
? kmem_cache_alloc+0x158/0x1c0
? acpi_ut_update_ref_count.part.1+0x8e/0x345
? acpi_ut_update_object_reference+0x15e/0x1e2
? strstr+0x21/0x70
? irq_get_irq_data+0xa/0x20
? mp_check_pin_attr+0x13/0xc0
? irq_get_irq_data+0xa/0x20
? mp_map_pin_to_irq+0xd3/0x2f0
? acpi_register_gsi_ioapic+0x93/0x170
? pci_conf1_read+0xa4/0x100
? pci_bus_read_config_word+0x49/0x70
? do_pci_enable_device+0xcc/0x100
local_pci_probe+0x41/0x90
work_for_cpu_fn+0x16/0x20
process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
worker_thread+0x1cf/0x390
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
kthread+0x112/0x130
? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
The problem is that at that point misc IRQ vectors
were not allocated yet and we get a call trace
that driver is trying to free already free IRQ vectors.
Add a check in i40e_clear_interrupt_scheme for __I40E_MISC_IRQ_REQUESTED
PF state before calling i40e_free_misc_vector. This state is set only if
misc IRQ vectors were properly initialized.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47419

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_taprio: properly cancel timer from taprio_destroy()
There is a comment in qdisc_create() about us not calling ops->reset()
in some cases.
err_out4:
/*
* Any broken qdiscs that would require a ops->reset() here?
* The qdisc was never in action so it shouldn't be necessary.
*/
As taprio sets a timer before actually receiving a packet, we need
to cancel it from ops->destroy, just in case ops->reset has not
been called.
syzbot reported:
ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: hrtimer hint: advance_sched+0x0/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:22
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8441 at lib/debugobjects.c:505 debug_print_object+0x16e/0x250 lib/debugobjects.c:505
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 8441 Comm: syz-executor813 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x16e/0x250 lib/debugobjects.c:505
Code: ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 af 00 00 00 48 8b 14 dd e0 d3 e3 89 4c 89 ee 48 c7 c7 e0 c7 e3 89 e8 5b 86 11 05 <0f> 0b 83 05 85 03 92 09 01 48 83 c4 18 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000130f330 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88802baeb880 RSI: ffffffff815d87b5 RDI: fffff52000261e58
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff815d25ee R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff898dd020
R13: ffffffff89e3ce20 R14: ffffffff81653630 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 0000000000f0d300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffb64b3e000 CR3: 0000000036557000 CR4: 00000000001506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
__debug_check_no_obj_freed lib/debugobjects.c:987 [inline]
debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x301/0x420 lib/debugobjects.c:1018
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1603 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x171/0x240 mm/slub.c:1653
slab_free mm/slub.c:3213 [inline]
kfree+0xe4/0x540 mm/slub.c:4267
qdisc_create+0xbcf/0x1320 net/sched/sch_api.c:1299
tc_modify_qdisc+0x4c8/0x1a60 net/sched/sch_api.c:1663
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5571
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340
netlink_sendmsg+0x86d/0xdb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2403
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2457
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2486
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47413

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: chipidea: ci_hdrc_imx: Also search for 'phys' phandle
When passing 'phys' in the devicetree to describe the USB PHY phandle
(which is the recommended way according to
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/ci-hdrc-usb2.txt) the
following NULL pointer dereference is observed on i.MX7 and i.MX8MM:
[ 1.489344] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000098
[ 1.498170] Mem abort info:
[ 1.500966] ESR = 0x96000044
[ 1.504030] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1.509356] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1.512416] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1.515569] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 1.520458] Data abort info:
[ 1.523349] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000044
[ 1.527196] CM = 0, WnR = 1
[ 1.530176] [0000000000000098] user address but active_mm is swapper
[ 1.536544] Internal error: Oops: 96000044 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 1.542125] Modules linked in:
[ 1.545190] CPU: 3 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 5.14.0-dirty #3
[ 1.551901] Hardware name: Kontron i.MX8MM N801X S (DT)
[ 1.557133] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
[ 1.562984] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
[ 1.568998] pc : imx7d_charger_detection+0x3f0/0x510
[ 1.573973] lr : imx7d_charger_detection+0x22c/0x510
This happens because the charger functions check for the phy presence
inside the imx_usbmisc_data structure (data->usb_phy), but the chipidea
core populates the usb_phy passed via 'phys' inside 'struct ci_hdrc'
(ci->usb_phy) instead.
This causes the NULL pointer dereference inside imx7d_charger_detection().
Fix it by also searching for 'phys' in case 'fsl,usbphy' is not found.
Tested on a imx7s-warp board.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47387

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: schedutil: Use kobject release() method to free sugov_tunables
The struct sugov_tunables is protected by the kobject, so we can't free
it directly. Otherwise we would get a call trace like this:
ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x30
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 720 at lib/debugobjects.c:505 debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 720 Comm: a.sh Tainted: G W 5.14.0-rc1-next-20210715-yocto-standard+ #507
Hardware name: Marvell OcteonTX CN96XX board (DT)
pstate: 40400009 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
pc : debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
lr : debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
sp : ffff80001ecaf910
x29: ffff80001ecaf910 x28: ffff00011b10b8d0 x27: ffff800011043d80
x26: ffff00011a8f0000 x25: ffff800013cb3ff0 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: ffff80001142aa68 x22: ffff800011043d80 x21: ffff00010de46f20
x20: ffff800013c0c520 x19: ffff800011d8f5b0 x18: 0000000000000010
x17: 6e6968207473696c x16: 5f72656d6974203a x15: 6570797420746365
x14: 6a626f2029302065 x13: 303378302f307830 x12: 2b6e665f72656d69
x11: ffff8000124b1560 x10: ffff800012331520 x9 : ffff8000100ca6b0
x8 : 000000000017ffe8 x7 : c0000000fffeffff x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffff800011d8c000 x4 : ffff800011d8c740 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : ffff0001108301c0 x1 : ab3c90eedf9c0f00 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
__debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x1c0/0x230
debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x20/0x88
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x154/0x1c8
kfree+0x114/0x5d0
sugov_exit+0xbc/0xc0
cpufreq_exit_governor+0x44/0x90
cpufreq_set_policy+0x268/0x4a8
store_scaling_governor+0xe0/0x128
store+0xc0/0xf0
sysfs_kf_write+0x54/0x80
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x128/0x1c0
new_sync_write+0xf0/0x190
vfs_write+0x2d4/0x478
ksys_write+0x74/0x100
__arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x64/0x158
el0_svc+0x2c/0xb0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
irq event stamp: 5518
hardirqs last enabled at (5517): [<ffff8000100cbd7c>] console_unlock+0x554/0x6c8
hardirqs last disabled at (5518): [<ffff800010fc0638>] el1_dbg+0x28/0xa0
softirqs last enabled at (5504): [<ffff8000100106e0>] __do_softirq+0x4d0/0x6c0
softirqs last disabled at (5483): [<ffff800010049548>] irq_exit+0x1b0/0x1b8
So split the original sugov_tunables_free() into two functions,
sugov_clear_global_tunables() is just used to clear the global_tunables
and the new sugov_tunables_free() is used as kobj_type::release to
release the sugov_tunables safely.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47376

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Add oversize check before call kvcalloc()
Commit 7661809d493b ("mm: don't allow oversized kvmalloc() calls") add the
oversize check. When the allocation is larger than what kmalloc() supports,
the following warning triggered:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8408 at mm/util.c:597 kvmalloc_node+0x108/0x110 mm/util.c:597
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 8408 Comm: syz-executor221 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:kvmalloc_node+0x108/0x110 mm/util.c:597
Call Trace:
kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:806 [inline]
kvmalloc_array include/linux/mm.h:824 [inline]
kvcalloc include/linux/mm.h:829 [inline]
check_btf_line kernel/bpf/verifier.c:9925 [inline]
check_btf_info kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10049 [inline]
bpf_check+0xd634/0x150d0 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:13759
bpf_prog_load kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2301 [inline]
__sys_bpf+0x11181/0x126e0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4587
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4691 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x78/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47370

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: ensure tx skbs always have the MPTCP ext
Due to signed/unsigned comparison, the expression:
info->size_goal - skb->len > 0
evaluates to true when the size goal is smaller than the
skb size. That results in lack of tx cache refill, so that
the skb allocated by the core TCP code lacks the required
MPTCP skb extensions.
Due to the above, syzbot is able to trigger the following WARN_ON():
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 810 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:1366 mptcp_sendmsg_frag+0x1362/0x1bc0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1366
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 810 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:mptcp_sendmsg_frag+0x1362/0x1bc0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1366
Code: ff 4c 8b 74 24 50 48 8b 5c 24 58 e9 0f fb ff ff e8 13 44 8b f8 4c 89 e7 45 31 ed e8 98 57 2e fe e9 81 f4 ff ff e8 fe 43 8b f8 <0f> 0b 41 bd ea ff ff ff e9 6f f4 ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 b9 8e d2 f8 e9
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000531f6a0 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: 000000000000697f RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc90012107000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff88eac9e2 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: ffff888078b15780 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff88eac017 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88801de0a280
R13: 0000000000006b58 R14: ffff888066278280 R15: ffff88803c2fe9c0
FS: 00007fd9f866e700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007faebcb2f718 CR3: 00000000267cb000 CR4: 00000000001506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
__mptcp_push_pending+0x1fb/0x6b0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1547
mptcp_release_cb+0xfe/0x210 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3003
release_sock+0xb4/0x1b0 net/core/sock.c:3206
sk_stream_wait_memory+0x604/0xed0 net/core/stream.c:145
mptcp_sendmsg+0xc39/0x1bc0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1749
inet6_sendmsg+0x99/0xe0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:643
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724
sock_write_iter+0x2a0/0x3e0 net/socket.c:1057
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2163 [inline]
new_sync_write+0x40b/0x640 fs/read_write.c:507
vfs_write+0x7cf/0xae0 fs/read_write.c:594
ksys_write+0x1ee/0x250 fs/read_write.c:647
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x4665f9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fd9f866e188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056c038 RCX: 00000000004665f9
RDX: 00000000000e7b78 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000004bfcc4 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000056c038
R13: 0000000000a9fb1f R14: 00007fd9f866e300 R15: 0000000000022000
Fix the issue rewriting the relevant expression to avoid
sign-related problems - note: size_goal is always >= 0.
Additionally, ensure that the skb in the tx cache always carries
the relevant extension.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47350

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/mm: Fix lockup on kernel exec fault
The powerpc kernel is not prepared to handle exec faults from kernel.
Especially, the function is_exec_fault() will return 'false' when an
exec fault is taken by kernel, because the check is based on reading
current->thread.regs->trap which contains the trap from user.
For instance, when provoking a LKDTM EXEC_USERSPACE test,
current->thread.regs->trap is set to SYSCALL trap (0xc00), and
the fault taken by the kernel is not seen as an exec fault by
set_access_flags_filter().
Commit d7df2443cd5f ("powerpc/mm: Fix spurious segfaults on radix
with autonuma") made it clear and handled it properly. But later on
commit d3ca587404b3 ("powerpc/mm: Fix reporting of kernel execute
faults") removed that handling, introducing test based on error_code.
And here is the problem, because on the 603 all upper bits of SRR1
get cleared when the TLB instruction miss handler bails out to ISI.
Until commit cbd7e6ca0210 ("powerpc/fault: Avoid heavy
search_exception_tables() verification"), an exec fault from kernel
at a userspace address was indirectly caught by the lack of entry for
that address in the exception tables. But after that commit the
kernel mainly relies on KUAP or on core mm handling to catch wrong
user accesses. Here the access is not wrong, so mm handles it.
It is a minor fault because PAGE_EXEC is not set,
set_access_flags_filter() should set PAGE_EXEC and voila.
But as is_exec_fault() returns false as explained in the beginning,
set_access_flags_filter() bails out without setting PAGE_EXEC flag,
which leads to a forever minor exec fault.
As the kernel is not prepared to handle such exec faults, the thing to
do is to fire in bad_kernel_fault() for any exec fault taken by the
kernel, as it was prior to commit d3ca587404b3.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47349

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mwifiex: bring down link before deleting interface
We can deadlock when rmmod'ing the driver or going through firmware
reset, because the cfg80211_unregister_wdev() has to bring down the link
for us, ... which then grab the same wiphy lock.
nl80211_del_interface() already handles a very similar case, with a nice
description:
/*
* We hold RTNL, so this is safe, without RTNL opencount cannot
* reach 0, and thus the rdev cannot be deleted.
*
* We need to do it for the dev_close(), since that will call
* the netdev notifiers, and we need to acquire the mutex there
* but don't know if we get there from here or from some other
* place (e.g. "ip link set ... down").
*/
mutex_unlock(&rdev->wiphy.mtx);
...
Do similarly for mwifiex teardown, by ensuring we bring the link down
first.
Sample deadlock trace:
[ 247.103516] INFO: task rmmod:2119 blocked for more than 123 seconds.
[ 247.110630] Not tainted 5.12.4 #5
[ 247.115796] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 247.124557] task:rmmod state:D stack: 0 pid: 2119 ppid: 2114 flags:0x00400208
[ 247.133905] Call trace:
[ 247.136644] __switch_to+0x130/0x170
[ 247.140643] __schedule+0x714/0xa0c
[ 247.144548] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x88/0xf4
[ 247.149714] __mutex_lock_common+0x43c/0x750
[ 247.154496] mutex_lock_nested+0x5c/0x68
[ 247.158884] cfg80211_netdev_notifier_call+0x280/0x4e0 [cfg80211]
[ 247.165769] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x78
[ 247.170742] call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x68/0xa4
[ 247.176305] __dev_close_many+0x7c/0x138
[ 247.180693] dev_close_many+0x7c/0x10c
[ 247.184893] unregister_netdevice_many+0xfc/0x654
[ 247.190158] unregister_netdevice_queue+0xb4/0xe0
[ 247.195424] _cfg80211_unregister_wdev+0xa4/0x204 [cfg80211]
[ 247.201816] cfg80211_unregister_wdev+0x20/0x2c [cfg80211]
[ 247.208016] mwifiex_del_virtual_intf+0xc8/0x188 [mwifiex]
[ 247.214174] mwifiex_uninit_sw+0x158/0x1b0 [mwifiex]
[ 247.219747] mwifiex_remove_card+0x38/0xa0 [mwifiex]
[ 247.225316] mwifiex_pcie_remove+0xd0/0xe0 [mwifiex_pcie]
[ 247.231451] pci_device_remove+0x50/0xe0
[ 247.235849] device_release_driver_internal+0x110/0x1b0
[ 247.241701] driver_detach+0x5c/0x9c
[ 247.245704] bus_remove_driver+0x84/0xb8
[ 247.250095] driver_unregister+0x3c/0x60
[ 247.254486] pci_unregister_driver+0x2c/0x90
[ 247.259267] cleanup_module+0x18/0xcdc [mwifiex_pcie]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47333

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
misc: alcor_pci: fix null-ptr-deref when there is no PCI bridge
There is an issue with the ASPM(optional) capability checking function.
A device might be attached to root complex directly, in this case,
bus->self(bridge) will be NULL, thus priv->parent_pdev is NULL.
Since alcor_pci_init_check_aspm(priv->parent_pdev) checks the PCI link's
ASPM capability and populate parent_cap_off, which will be used later by
alcor_pci_aspm_ctrl() to dynamically turn on/off device, what we can do
here is to avoid checking the capability if we are on the root complex.
This will make pdev_cap_off 0 and alcor_pci_aspm_ctrl() will simply
return when bring called, effectively disable ASPM for the device.
[ 1.246492] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c0
[ 1.248731] RIP: 0010:pci_read_config_byte+0x5/0x40
[ 1.253998] Call Trace:
[ 1.254131] ? alcor_pci_find_cap_offset.isra.0+0x3a/0x100 [alcor_pci]
[ 1.254476] alcor_pci_probe+0x169/0x2d5 [alcor_pci]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47303

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Track subprog poke descriptors correctly and fix use-after-free
Subprograms are calling map_poke_track(), but on program release there is no
hook to call map_poke_untrack(). However, on program release, the aux memory
(and poke descriptor table) is freed even though we still have a reference to
it in the element list of the map aux data. When we run map_poke_run(), we then
end up accessing free'd memory, triggering KASAN in prog_array_map_poke_run():
[...]
[ 402.824689] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2/0x34e
[ 402.824698] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881905a7940 by task hubble-fgs/4337
[ 402.824705] CPU: 1 PID: 4337 Comm: hubble-fgs Tainted: G I 5.12.0+ #399
[ 402.824715] Call Trace:
[ 402.824719] dump_stack+0x93/0xc2
[ 402.824727] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x140
[ 402.824736] ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2/0x34e
[ 402.824740] ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2/0x34e
[ 402.824744] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8
[ 402.824752] ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2/0x34e
[ 402.824757] prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2/0x34e
[ 402.824765] bpf_fd_array_map_update_elem+0x124/0x1a0
[...]
The elements concerned are walked as follows:
for (i = 0; i < elem->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) {
poke = &elem->aux->poke_tab[i];
[...]
The access to size_poke_tab is a 4 byte read, verified by checking offsets
in the KASAN dump:
[ 402.825004] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881905a7800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
[ 402.825008] The buggy address is located 320 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff8881905a7800, ffff8881905a7c00)
The pahole output of bpf_prog_aux:
struct bpf_prog_aux {
[...]
/* --- cacheline 5 boundary (320 bytes) --- */
u32 size_poke_tab; /* 320 4 */
[...]
In general, subprograms do not necessarily manage their own data structures.
For example, BTF func_info and linfo are just pointers to the main program
structure. This allows reference counting and cleanup to be done on the latter
which simplifies their management a bit. The aux->poke_tab struct, however,
did not follow this logic. The initial proposed fix for this use-after-free
bug further embedded poke data tracking into the subprogram with proper
reference counting. However, Daniel and Alexei questioned why we were treating
these objects special; I agree, its unnecessary. The fix here removes the per
subprogram poke table allocation and map tracking and instead simply points
the aux->poke_tab pointer at the main programs poke table. This way, map
tracking is simplified to the main program and we do not need to manage them
per subprogram.
This also means, bpf_prog_free_deferred(), which unwinds the program reference
counting and kfrees objects, needs to ensure that we don't try to double free
the poke_tab when free'ing the subprog structures. This is easily solved by
NULL'ing the poke_tab pointer. The second detail is to ensure that per
subprogram JIT logic only does fixups on poke_tab[] entries it owns. To do
this, we add a pointer in the poke structure to point at the subprogram value
so JITs can easily check while walking the poke_tab structure if the current
entry belongs to the current program. The aux pointer is stable and therefore
suitable for such comparison. On the jit_subprogs() error path, we omit
cleaning up the poke->aux field because these are only ever referenced from
the JIT side, but on error we will never make it to the JIT, so its fine to
leave them dangling. Removing these pointers would complicate the error path
for no reason. However, we do need to untrack all poke descriptors from the
main program as otherwise they could race with the freeing of JIT memory from
the subprograms. Lastly, a748c6975dea3 ("bpf: propagate poke des
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47290

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: Fix NULL dereference on XCOPY completion
CPU affinity control added with commit 39ae3edda325 ("scsi: target: core:
Make completion affinity configurable") makes target_complete_cmd() queue
work on a CPU based on se_tpg->se_tpg_wwn->cmd_compl_affinity state.
LIO's EXTENDED COPY worker is a special case in that read/write cmds are
dispatched using the global xcopy_pt_tpg, which carries a NULL se_tpg_wwn
pointer following initialization in target_xcopy_setup_pt().
The NULL xcopy_pt_tpg->se_tpg_wwn pointer is dereferenced on completion of
any EXTENDED COPY initiated read/write cmds. E.g using the libiscsi
SCSI.ExtendedCopy.Simple test:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000001a8
RIP: 0010:target_complete_cmd+0x9d/0x130 [target_core_mod]
Call Trace:
fd_execute_rw+0x148/0x42a [target_core_file]
? __dynamic_pr_debug+0xa7/0xe0
? target_check_reservation+0x5b/0x940 [target_core_mod]
__target_execute_cmd+0x1e/0x90 [target_core_mod]
transport_generic_new_cmd+0x17c/0x330 [target_core_mod]
target_xcopy_issue_pt_cmd+0x9/0x60 [target_core_mod]
target_xcopy_read_source.isra.7+0x10b/0x1b0 [target_core_mod]
? target_check_fua+0x40/0x40 [target_core_mod]
? transport_complete_task_attr+0x130/0x130 [target_core_mod]
target_xcopy_do_work+0x61f/0xc00 [target_core_mod]
This fix makes target_complete_cmd() queue work on se_cmd->cpuid if
se_tpg_wwn is NULL.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47266

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/ipoib: Fix warning caused by destroying non-initial netns
After the commit 5ce2dced8e95 ("RDMA/ipoib: Set rtnl_link_ops for ipoib
interfaces"), if the IPoIB device is moved to non-initial netns,
destroying that netns lets the device vanish instead of moving it back to
the initial netns, This is happening because default_device_exit() skips
the interfaces due to having rtnl_link_ops set.
Steps to reporoduce:
ip netns add foo
ip link set mlx5_ib0 netns foo
ip netns delete foo
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 704 at net/core/dev.c:11435 netdev_exit+0x3f/0x50
Modules linked in: xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT
nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_counter nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack
nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink tun d
fuse
CPU: 1 PID: 704 Comm: kworker/u64:3 Tainted: G S W 5.13.0-rc1+ #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R630/02C2CP, BIOS 2.1.5 04/11/2016
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:netdev_exit+0x3f/0x50
Code: 48 8b bb 30 01 00 00 e8 ef 81 b1 ff 48 81 fb c0 3a 54 a1 74 13 48
8b 83 90 00 00 00 48 81 c3 90 00 00 00 48 39 d8 75 02 5b c3 <0f> 0b 5b
c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 0f 1f 44 00
RSP: 0018:ffffb297079d7e08 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: ffff8eb542c00040 RBX: ffff8eb541333150 RCX: 000000008010000d
RDX: 000000008010000e RSI: 000000008010000d RDI: ffff8eb440042c00
RBP: ffffb297079d7e48 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffff9fdeac00
R10: ffff8eb5003be000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffa1545620
R13: ffffffffa1545628 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffa1543b20
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ed37fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005601b5f4c2e8 CR3: 0000001fc8c10002 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
ops_exit_list.isra.9+0x36/0x70
cleanup_net+0x234/0x390
process_one_work+0x1cb/0x360
? process_one_work+0x360/0x360
worker_thread+0x30/0x370
? process_one_work+0x360/0x360
kthread+0x116/0x130
? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
To avoid the above warning and later on the kernel panic that could happen
on shutdown due to a NULL pointer dereference, make sure to set the
netns_refund flag that was introduced by commit 3a5ca857079e ("can: dev:
Move device back to init netns on owning netns delete") to properly
restore the IPoIB interfaces to the initial netns.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47265

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA: Verify port when creating flow rule
Validate port value provided by the user and with that remove no longer
needed validation by the driver. The missing check in the mlx5_ib driver
could cause to the below oops.
Call trace:
_create_flow_rule+0x2d4/0xf28 [mlx5_ib]
mlx5_ib_create_flow+0x2d0/0x5b0 [mlx5_ib]
ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow+0x4cc/0x624 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INVOKE_WRITE+0xd4/0x150 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs.isra.7+0xb28/0xc50 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x158/0x1d0 [ib_uverbs]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xd0/0xaf0
ksys_ioctl+0x84/0xb4
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0xc4
el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xa4/0x254
el0_svc_handler+0x84/0xa0
el0_svc+0x10/0x26c
Code: b9401260 f9615681 51000400 8b001c20 (f9403c1a)

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47262

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Ensure liveliness of nested VM-Enter fail tracepoint message
Use the __string() machinery provided by the tracing subystem to make a
copy of the string literals consumed by the "nested VM-Enter failed"
tracepoint. A complete copy is necessary to ensure that the tracepoint
can't outlive the data/memory it consumes and deference stale memory.
Because the tracepoint itself is defined by kvm, if kvm-intel and/or
kvm-amd are built as modules, the memory holding the string literals
defined by the vendor modules will be freed when the module is unloaded,
whereas the tracepoint and its data in the ring buffer will live until
kvm is unloaded (or "indefinitely" if kvm is built-in).
This bug has existed since the tracepoint was added, but was recently
exposed by a new check in tracing to detect exactly this type of bug.
fmt: '%s%s
' current_buffer: ' vmx_dirty_log_t-140127 [003] .... kvm_nested_vmenter_failed: '
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 140134 at kernel/trace/trace.c:3759 trace_check_vprintf+0x3be/0x3e0
CPU: 3 PID: 140134 Comm: less Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1-ce2e73ce600a-req #184
Hardware name: ASUS Q87M-E/Q87M-E, BIOS 1102 03/03/2014
RIP: 0010:trace_check_vprintf+0x3be/0x3e0
Code: <0f> 0b 44 8b 4c 24 1c e9 a9 fe ff ff c6 44 02 ff 00 49 8b 97 b0 20
RSP: 0018:ffffa895cc37bcb0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa895cc37bd08 RCX: 0000000000000027
RDX: 0000000000000027 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: ffff9766cfad74f8
RBP: ffffffffc0a041d4 R08: ffff9766cfad74f0 R09: ffffa895cc37bad8
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffc0a041d4
R13: ffffffffc0f4dba8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff976409f2c000
FS: 00007f92fa200740(0000) GS:ffff9766cfac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000559bd11b0000 CR3: 000000019fbaa002 CR4: 00000000001726e0
Call Trace:
trace_event_printf+0x5e/0x80
trace_raw_output_kvm_nested_vmenter_failed+0x3a/0x60 [kvm]
print_trace_line+0x1dd/0x4e0
s_show+0x45/0x150
seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x4c0
seq_read+0x106/0x150
vfs_read+0x98/0x180
ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x40/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47261

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/mlx5: Fix initializing CQ fragments buffer
The function init_cq_frag_buf() can be called to initialize the current CQ
fragments buffer cq->buf, or the temporary cq->resize_buf that is filled
during CQ resize operation.
However, the offending commit started to use function get_cqe() for
getting the CQEs, the issue with this change is that get_cqe() always
returns CQEs from cq->buf, which leads us to initialize the wrong buffer,
and in case of enlarging the CQ we try to access elements beyond the size
of the current cq->buf and eventually hit a kernel panic.
[exception RIP: init_cq_frag_buf+103]
[ffff9f799ddcbcd8] mlx5_ib_resize_cq at ffffffffc0835d60 [mlx5_ib]
[ffff9f799ddcbdb0] ib_resize_cq at ffffffffc05270df [ib_core]
[ffff9f799ddcbdc0] llt_rdma_setup_qp at ffffffffc0a6a712 [llt]
[ffff9f799ddcbe10] llt_rdma_cc_event_action at ffffffffc0a6b411 [llt]
[ffff9f799ddcbe98] llt_rdma_client_conn_thread at ffffffffc0a6bb75 [llt]
[ffff9f799ddcbec8] kthread at ffffffffa66c5da1
[ffff9f799ddcbf50] ret_from_fork_nospec_begin at ffffffffa6d95ddd
Fix it by getting the needed CQE by calling mlx5_frag_buf_get_wqe() that
takes the correct source buffer as a parameter.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47250

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv4: fix memory leak in netlbl_cipsov4_add_std
Reported by syzkaller:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888105df7000 (size 64):
comm "syz-executor842", pid 360, jiffies 4294824824 (age 22.546s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000e67ed558>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:590 [inline]
[<00000000e67ed558>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:720 [inline]
[<00000000e67ed558>] netlbl_cipsov4_add_std net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c:145 [inline]
[<00000000e67ed558>] netlbl_cipsov4_add+0x390/0x2340 net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c:416
[<0000000006040154>] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x20e/0x320 net/netlink/genetlink.c:739
[<00000000204d7a1c>] genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:783 [inline]
[<00000000204d7a1c>] genl_rcv_msg+0x2bf/0x4f0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:800
[<00000000c0d6a995>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x134/0x3d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504
[<00000000d78b9d2c>] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:811
[<000000009733081b>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
[<000000009733081b>] netlink_unicast+0x4a0/0x6a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340
[<00000000d5fd43b8>] netlink_sendmsg+0x789/0xc70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929
[<000000000a2d1e40>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
[<000000000a2d1e40>] sock_sendmsg+0x139/0x170 net/socket.c:674
[<00000000321d1969>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x658/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2350
[<00000000964e16bc>] ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
[<000000001615e288>] __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x190 net/socket.c:2433
[<000000004ee8b6a5>] do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
[<00000000171c7cee>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The memory of doi_def->map.std pointing is allocated in
netlbl_cipsov4_add_std, but no place has freed it. It should be
freed in cipso_v4_doi_free which frees the cipso DOI resource.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47247

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix use-after-free of encap entry in neigh update handler
Function mlx5e_rep_neigh_update() wasn't updated to accommodate rtnl lock
removal from TC filter update path and properly handle concurrent encap
entry insertion/deletion which can lead to following use-after-free:
[23827.464923] ==================================================================
[23827.469446] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core]
[23827.470971] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881d132228c by task kworker/u20:6/21635
[23827.472251]
[23827.472615] CPU: 9 PID: 21635 Comm: kworker/u20:6 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3+ #5
[23827.473788] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[23827.475639] Workqueue: mlx5e mlx5e_rep_neigh_update [mlx5_core]
[23827.476731] Call Trace:
[23827.477260] dump_stack+0xbb/0x107
[23827.477906] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x140
[23827.478896] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core]
[23827.479879] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core]
[23827.480905] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8
[23827.481701] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core]
[23827.482744] kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0
[23827.493112] mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core]
[23827.494054] ? mlx5e_tc_tun_encap_info_equal_generic+0x140/0x140 [mlx5_core]
[23827.495296] mlx5e_rep_neigh_update+0x41e/0x5e0 [mlx5_core]
[23827.496338] ? mlx5e_rep_neigh_entry_release+0xb80/0xb80 [mlx5_core]
[23827.497486] ? read_word_at_a_time+0xe/0x20
[23827.498250] ? strscpy+0xa0/0x2a0
[23827.498889] process_one_work+0x8ac/0x14e0
[23827.499638] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400
[23827.500537] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x2c0/0x2c0
[23827.501359] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
[23827.502116] worker_thread+0x53b/0x1220
[23827.502831] ? process_one_work+0x14e0/0x14e0
[23827.503627] kthread+0x328/0x3f0
[23827.504254] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40
[23827.505065] ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x90/0x90
[23827.505912] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[23827.506621]
[23827.506987] Allocated by task 28248:
[23827.507694] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[23827.508476] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90
[23827.509197] mlx5e_attach_encap+0xde1/0x1d40 [mlx5_core]
[23827.510194] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow+0x397/0xc40 [mlx5_core]
[23827.511218] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x519/0xb30 [mlx5_core]
[23827.512234] mlx5e_configure_flower+0x191c/0x4870 [mlx5_core]
[23827.513298] tc_setup_cb_add+0x1d5/0x420
[23827.514023] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x382/0x6a0 [cls_flower]
[23827.514975] fl_change+0x2ceb/0x4a51 [cls_flower]
[23827.515821] tc_new_tfilter+0x89a/0x2070
[23827.516548] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x644/0x8c0
[23827.517300] netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x340
[23827.518021] netlink_unicast+0x42b/0x700
[23827.518742] netlink_sendmsg+0x743/0xc20
[23827.519467] sock_sendmsg+0xb2/0xe0
[23827.520131] ____sys_sendmsg+0x590/0x770
[23827.520851] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x160
[23827.521552] __sys_sendmsg+0xb7/0x140
[23827.522238] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x70
[23827.522907] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[23827.523797]
[23827.524163] Freed by task 25948:
[23827.524780] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[23827.525488] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
[23827.526187] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
[23827.526968] __kasan_slab_free+0xed/0x130
[23827.527709] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xcf/0x1d0
[23827.528528] kmem_cache_free_bulk+0x33a/0x6e0
[23827.529317] kfree_rcu_work+0x55f/0xb70
[23827.530024] process_one_work+0x8ac/0x14e0
[23827.530770] worker_thread+0x53b/0x1220
[23827.531480] kthread+0x328/0x3f0
[23827.532114] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[23827.532785]
[23827.533147] Last potentially related work creation:
[23827.534007] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[23827.534710] kasan_record_aux_stack+0xab/0xc0
[23827.535492] kvfree_call_rcu+0x31/0x7b0
[23827.536206] mlx5e_tc_del
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47246

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix page reclaim for dead peer hairpin
When adding a hairpin flow, a firmware-side send queue is created for
the peer net device, which claims some host memory pages for its
internal ring buffer. If the peer net device is removed/unbound before
the hairpin flow is deleted, then the send queue is not destroyed which
leads to a stack trace on pci device remove:
[ 748.005230] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.2: wait_func:1094:(pid 12985): MANAGE_PAGES(0x108) timeout. Will cause a leak of a command resource
[ 748.005231] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.2: reclaim_pages:514:(pid 12985): failed reclaiming pages: err -110
[ 748.001835] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.2: mlx5_reclaim_root_pages:653:(pid 12985): failed reclaiming pages (-110) for func id 0x0
[ 748.002171] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 748.001177] FW pages counter is 4 after reclaiming all pages
[ 748.001186] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 12985 at drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/pagealloc.c:685 mlx5_reclaim_startup_pages+0x34b/0x460 [mlx5_core] [ +0.002771] Modules linked in: cls_flower mlx5_ib mlx5_core ptp pps_core act_mirred sch_ingress openvswitch nsh xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm ib_umad ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core overlay fuse [last unloaded: pps_core]
[ 748.007225] CPU: 1 PID: 12985 Comm: tee Not tainted 5.12.0+ #1
[ 748.001376] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 748.002315] RIP: 0010:mlx5_reclaim_startup_pages+0x34b/0x460 [mlx5_core]
[ 748.001679] Code: 28 00 00 00 0f 85 22 01 00 00 48 81 c4 b0 00 00 00 31 c0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 c7 c7 40 cc 19 a1 e8 9f 71 0e e2 <0f> 0b e9 30 ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 a0 cc 19 a1 e8 8c 71 0e e2 0f 0b e9
[ 748.003781] RSP: 0018:ffff88815220faf8 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 748.001149] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881b4900280 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 748.001445] RDX: 0000000000000027 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffed102a441f51
[ 748.001614] RBP: 00000000000032b9 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1054a15ee8
[ 748.001446] R10: ffff8882a50af73b R11: ffffed1054a15ee7 R12: fffffbfff07c1e30
[ 748.001447] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8881b492cba8 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 748.001429] FS: 00007f58bd08b580(0000) GS:ffff8882a5080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 748.001695] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 748.001309] CR2: 000055a026351740 CR3: 00000001d3b48006 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
[ 748.001506] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 748.001483] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 748.001654] Call Trace:
[ 748.000576] ? mlx5_satisfy_startup_pages+0x290/0x290 [mlx5_core]
[ 748.001416] ? mlx5_cmd_teardown_hca+0xa2/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
[ 748.001354] ? mlx5_cmd_init_hca+0x280/0x280 [mlx5_core]
[ 748.001203] mlx5_function_teardown+0x30/0x60 [mlx5_core]
[ 748.001275] mlx5_uninit_one+0xa7/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
[ 748.001200] remove_one+0x5f/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
[ 748.001075] pci_device_remove+0x9f/0x1d0
[ 748.000833] device_release_driver_internal+0x1e0/0x490
[ 748.001207] unbind_store+0x19f/0x200
[ 748.000942] ? sysfs_file_ops+0x170/0x170
[ 748.001000] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2bc/0x450
[ 748.000970] new_sync_write+0x373/0x610
[ 748.001124] ? new_sync_read+0x600/0x600
[ 748.001057] ? lock_acquire+0x4d6/0x700
[ 748.000908] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400
[ 748.001126] ? fd_install+0x1c9/0x4d0
[ 748.000951] vfs_write+0x4d0/0x800
[ 748.000804] ksys_write+0xf9/0x1d0
[ 748.000868] ? __x64_sys_read+0xb0/0xb0
[ 748.000811] ? filp_open+0x50/0x50
[ 748.000919] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1d/0x50
[ 748.001223] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x80
[ 748.000892] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 748.00
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47242

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix soft lookup in subflow_error_report()
Maxim reported a soft lookup in subflow_error_report():
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [swapper/0:0]
RIP: 0010:native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath
RSP: 0018:ffffa859c0003bc0 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 0000000000000101 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff9195c2772d88 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9195c2772d88
RBP: ffff9195c2772d00 R08: 00000000000067b0 R09: c6e31da9eb1e44f4
R10: ffff9195ef379700 R11: ffff9195edb50710 R12: ffff9195c2772d88
R13: ffff9195f500e3d0 R14: ffff9195ef379700 R15: ffff9195ef379700
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff91961f400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000c000407000 CR3: 0000000002988000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
_raw_spin_lock_bh
subflow_error_report
mptcp_subflow_data_available
__mptcp_move_skbs_from_subflow
mptcp_data_ready
tcp_data_queue
tcp_rcv_established
tcp_v4_do_rcv
tcp_v4_rcv
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu
ip_local_deliver_finish
__netif_receive_skb_one_core
netif_receive_skb
rtl8139_poll 8139too
__napi_poll
net_rx_action
__do_softirq
__irq_exit_rcu
common_interrupt
</IRQ>
The calling function - mptcp_subflow_data_available() - can be invoked
from different contexts:
- plain ssk socket lock
- ssk socket lock + mptcp_data_lock
- ssk socket lock + mptcp_data_lock + msk socket lock.
Since subflow_error_report() tries to acquire the mptcp_data_lock, the
latter two call chains will cause soft lookup.
This change addresses the issue moving the error reporting call to
outer functions, where the held locks list is known and the we can
acquire only the needed one.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47241

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: strset: fix message length calculation
Outer nest for ETHTOOL_A_STRSET_STRINGSETS is not accounted for.
This may result in ETHTOOL_MSG_STRSET_GET producing a warning like:
calculated message payload length (684) not sufficient
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 30967 at net/ethtool/netlink.c:369 ethnl_default_doit+0x87a/0xa20
and a splat.
As usually with such warnings three conditions must be met for the warning
to trigger:
- there must be no skb size rounding up (e.g. reply_size of 684);
- string set must be per-device (so that the header gets populated);
- the device name must be at least 12 characters long.
all in all with current user space it looks like reading priv flags
is the only place this could potentially happen. Or with syzbot :)

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47226

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer
Both Intel and AMD consider it to be architecturally valid for XRSTOR to
fail with #PF but nonetheless change the register state. The actual
conditions under which this might occur are unclear [1], but it seems
plausible that this might be triggered if one sibling thread unmaps a page
and invalidates the shared TLB while another sibling thread is executing
XRSTOR on the page in question.
__fpu__restore_sig() can execute XRSTOR while the hardware registers
are preserved on behalf of a different victim task (using the
fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx mechanism), and, in theory, XRSTOR could fail but
modify the registers.
If this happens, then there is a window in which __fpu__restore_sig()
could schedule out and the victim task could schedule back in without
reloading its own FPU registers. This would result in part of the FPU
state that __fpu__restore_sig() was attempting to load leaking into the
victim task's user-visible state.
Invalidate preserved FPU registers on XRSTOR failure to prevent this
situation from corrupting any state.
[1] Frequent readers of the errata lists might imagine "complex
microarchitectural conditions".

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47222

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: fix vlan tunnel dst refcnt when egressing
The egress tunnel code uses dst_clone() and directly sets the result
which is wrong because the entry might have 0 refcnt or be already deleted,
causing number of problems. It also triggers the WARN_ON() in dst_hold()[1]
when a refcnt couldn't be taken. Fix it by using dst_hold_safe() and
checking if a reference was actually taken before setting the dst.
[1] dmesg WARN_ON log and following refcnt errors
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 38 at include/net/dst.h:230 br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel+0x10b/0x134 [bridge]
Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp bridge stp llc bonding ipv6 virtio_net
CPU: 5 PID: 38 Comm: ksoftirqd/5 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 5.13.0-rc3+ #360
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel+0x10b/0x134 [bridge]
Code: e8 85 bc 01 e1 45 84 f6 74 90 45 31 f6 85 db 48 c7 c7 a0 02 19 a0 41 0f 94 c6 31 c9 31 d2 44 89 f6 e8 64 bc 01 e1 85 db 75 02 <0f> 0b 31 c9 31 d2 44 89 f6 48 c7 c7 70 02 19 a0 e8 4b bc 01 e1 49
RSP: 0018:ffff8881003d39e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffa01902a0
RBP: ffff8881040c6700 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 2ce93d0054fe0d00 R11: 54fe0d00000e0000 R12: ffff888109515000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000401
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88822bf40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f42ba70f030 CR3: 0000000109926000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
br_handle_vlan+0xbc/0xca [bridge]
__br_forward+0x23/0x164 [bridge]
deliver_clone+0x41/0x48 [bridge]
br_handle_frame_finish+0x36f/0x3aa [bridge]
? skb_dst+0x2e/0x38 [bridge]
? br_handle_ingress_vlan_tunnel+0x3e/0x1c8 [bridge]
? br_handle_frame_finish+0x3aa/0x3aa [bridge]
br_handle_frame+0x2c3/0x377 [bridge]
? __skb_pull+0x33/0x51
? vlan_do_receive+0x4f/0x36a
? br_handle_frame_finish+0x3aa/0x3aa [bridge]
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x539/0x7c6
? __list_del_entry_valid+0x16e/0x1c2
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x6d/0xd6
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1d9/0x1fa
gro_normal_list+0x22/0x3e
dev_gro_receive+0x55b/0x600
? detach_buf_split+0x58/0x140
napi_gro_receive+0x94/0x12e
virtnet_poll+0x15d/0x315 [virtio_net]
__napi_poll+0x2c/0x1c9
net_rx_action+0xe6/0x1fb
__do_softirq+0x115/0x2d8
run_ksoftirqd+0x18/0x20
smpboot_thread_fn+0x183/0x19c
? smpboot_unregister_percpu_thread+0x66/0x66
kthread+0x10a/0x10f
? kthread_mod_delayed_work+0xb6/0xb6
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
---[ end trace 49f61b07f775fd2b ]---
dst_release: dst:00000000c02d677a refcnt:-1
dst_release underflow

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47199

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: CT, Fix multiple allocations and memleak of mod acts
CT clear action offload adds additional mod hdr actions to the
flow's original mod actions in order to clear the registers which
hold ct_state.
When such flow also includes encap action, a neigh update event
can cause the driver to unoffload the flow and then reoffload it.
Each time this happens, the ct clear handling adds that same set
of mod hdr actions to reset ct_state until the max of mod hdr
actions is reached.
Also the driver never releases the allocated mod hdr actions and
causing a memleak.
Fix above two issues by moving CT clear mod acts allocation
into the parsing actions phase and only use it when offloading the rule.
The release of mod acts will be done in the normal flow_put().
backtrace:
[<000000007316e2f3>] krealloc+0x83/0xd0
[<00000000ef157de1>] mlx5e_mod_hdr_alloc+0x147/0x300 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000970ce4ae>] mlx5e_tc_match_to_reg_set_and_get_id+0xd7/0x240 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000067c5fa17>] mlx5e_tc_match_to_reg_set+0xa/0x20 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000d032eb98>] mlx5_tc_ct_entry_set_registers.isra.0+0x36/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000fd23b869>] mlx5_tc_ct_flow_offload+0x272/0x1f10 [mlx5_core]
[<000000004fc24acc>] mlx5e_tc_offload_fdb_rules.part.0+0x150/0x620 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000dc741c17>] mlx5e_tc_encap_flows_add+0x489/0x690 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000e92e49d7>] mlx5e_rep_update_flows+0x6e4/0x9b0 [mlx5_core]
[<00000000f60f5602>] mlx5e_rep_neigh_update+0x39a/0x5d0 [mlx5_core]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47197

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: nullify cq->dbg pointer in mlx5_debug_cq_remove()
Prior to this patch in case mlx5_core_destroy_cq() failed it proceeds
to rest of destroy operations. mlx5_core_destroy_cq() could be called again
by user and cause additional call of mlx5_debug_cq_remove().
cq->dbg was not nullify in previous call and cause the crash.
Fix it by nullify cq->dbg pointer after removal.
Also proceed to destroy operations only if FW return 0
for MLX5_CMD_OP_DESTROY_CQ command.
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x2000300004058: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 5 PID: 1228 Comm: python Not tainted 5.15.0-rc5_for_upstream_min_debug_2021_10_14_11_06 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:lockref_get+0x1/0x60
Code: 5d e9 53 ff ff ff 48 8d 7f 70 e8 0a 2e 48 00 c7 85 d0 00 00 00 02
00 00 00 c6 45 70 00 fb 5d c3 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 53 <48> 8b 17
48 89 fb 85 d2 75 3d 48 89 d0 bf 64 00 00 00 48 89 c1 48
RSP: 0018:ffff888137dd7a38 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888107d5f458 RCX: 00000000fffffffe
RDX: 000000000002c2b0 RSI: ffffffff8155e2e0 RDI: 0002000300004058
RBP: ffff888137dd7a88 R08: 0002000300004058 R09: ffff8881144a9f88
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881141d4000
R13: ffff888137dd7c68 R14: ffff888137dd7d58 R15: ffff888137dd7cc0
FS: 00007f4644f2a4c0(0000) GS:ffff8887a2d40000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055b4500f4380 CR3: 0000000114f7a003 CR4: 0000000000170ea0
Call Trace:
simple_recursive_removal+0x33/0x2e0
? debugfs_remove+0x60/0x60
debugfs_remove+0x40/0x60
mlx5_debug_cq_remove+0x32/0x70 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_core_destroy_cq+0x41/0x1d0 [mlx5_core]
devx_obj_cleanup+0x151/0x330 [mlx5_ib]
? __pollwait+0xd0/0xd0
? xas_load+0x5/0x70
? xa_load+0x62/0xa0
destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x20/0x80 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x3b/0x360 [ib_uverbs]
uobj_destroy+0x54/0xa0 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0xaf2/0x1160 [ib_uverbs]
? uverbs_finalize_object+0xd0/0xd0 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x1b0 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x3e4/0x8e0

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47196

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: Set send and receive CQ before forwarding to the driver
Preset both receive and send CQ pointers prior to call to the drivers and
overwrite it later again till the mlx4 is going to be changed do not
overwrite ibqp properties.
This change is needed for mlx5, because in case of QP creation failure, it
will go to the path of QP destroy which relies on proper CQ pointers.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in create_qp.cold+0x164/0x16e [mlx5_ib]
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880064c55c0 by task a.out/246
CPU: 0 PID: 246 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.15.0+ #291
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
create_qp.cold+0x164/0x16e [mlx5_ib]
mlx5_ib_create_qp+0x358/0x28a0 [mlx5_ib]
create_qp.part.0+0x45b/0x6a0 [ib_core]
ib_create_qp_user+0x97/0x150 [ib_core]
ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_CREATE+0x92c/0x1250 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1c38/0x3150 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x169/0x260 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x866/0x14d0
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Allocated by task 246:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0xa4/0xd0
create_qp.part.0+0x92/0x6a0 [ib_core]
ib_create_qp_user+0x97/0x150 [ib_core]
ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_CREATE+0x92c/0x1250 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1c38/0x3150 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x169/0x260 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x866/0x14d0
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Freed by task 246:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
__kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x150
slab_free_freelist_hook+0xb4/0x1b0
kfree+0xe7/0x2a0
create_qp.part.0+0x52b/0x6a0 [ib_core]
ib_create_qp_user+0x97/0x150 [ib_core]
ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_CREATE+0x92c/0x1250 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1c38/0x3150 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x169/0x260 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x866/0x14d0
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47191

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: scsi_debug: Fix out-of-bound read in resp_readcap16()
The following warning was observed running syzkaller:
[ 3813.830724] sg_write: data in/out 65466/242 bytes for SCSI command 0x9e-- guessing data in;
[ 3813.830724] program syz-executor not setting count and/or reply_len properly
[ 3813.836956] ==================================================================
[ 3813.839465] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x157/0x1e0
[ 3813.841773] Read of size 4096 at addr ffff8883cf80f540 by task syz-executor/1549
[ 3813.846612] Call Trace:
[ 3813.846995] dump_stack+0x108/0x15f
[ 3813.847524] print_address_description+0xa5/0x372
[ 3813.848243] kasan_report.cold+0x236/0x2a8
[ 3813.849439] check_memory_region+0x240/0x270
[ 3813.850094] memcpy+0x30/0x80
[ 3813.850553] sg_copy_buffer+0x157/0x1e0
[ 3813.853032] sg_copy_from_buffer+0x13/0x20
[ 3813.853660] fill_from_dev_buffer+0x135/0x370
[ 3813.854329] resp_readcap16+0x1ac/0x280
[ 3813.856917] schedule_resp+0x41f/0x1630
[ 3813.858203] scsi_debug_queuecommand+0xb32/0x17e0
[ 3813.862699] scsi_dispatch_cmd+0x330/0x950
[ 3813.863329] scsi_request_fn+0xd8e/0x1710
[ 3813.863946] __blk_run_queue+0x10b/0x230
[ 3813.864544] blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x1d8/0x400
[ 3813.865220] sg_common_write.isra.0+0xe61/0x2420
[ 3813.871637] sg_write+0x6c8/0xef0
[ 3813.878853] __vfs_write+0xe4/0x800
[ 3813.883487] vfs_write+0x17b/0x530
[ 3813.884008] ksys_write+0x103/0x270
[ 3813.886268] __x64_sys_write+0x77/0xc0
[ 3813.886841] do_syscall_64+0x106/0x360
[ 3813.887415] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
This issue can be reproduced with the following syzkaller log:
r0 = openat(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000040)='./file0\x00', 0x26e1, 0x0)
r1 = syz_open_procfs(0xffffffffffffffff, &(0x7f0000000000)='fd/3\x00')
open_by_handle_at(r1, &(0x7f00000003c0)=ANY=[@ANYRESHEX], 0x602000)
r2 = syz_open_dev$sg(&(0x7f0000000000), 0x0, 0x40782)
write$binfmt_aout(r2, &(0x7f0000000340)=ANY=[@ANYBLOB="00000000deff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000047f007af9e107a41ec395f1bded7be24277a1501ff6196a83366f4e6362bc0ff2b247f68a972989b094b2da4fb3607fcf611a22dd04310d28c75039d"], 0x126)
In resp_readcap16() we get "int alloc_len" value -1104926854, and then pass
the huge arr_len to fill_from_dev_buffer(), but arr is only 32 bytes. This
leads to OOB in sg_copy_buffer().
To solve this issue, define alloc_len as u32.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47183

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: lpfc: Fix link down processing to address NULL pointer dereference
If an FC link down transition while PLOGIs are outstanding to fabric well
known addresses, outstanding ABTS requests may result in a NULL pointer
dereference. Driver unload requests may hang with repeated "2878" log
messages.
The Link down processing results in ABTS requests for outstanding ELS
requests. The Abort WQEs are sent for the ELSs before the driver had set
the link state to down. Thus the driver is sending the Abort with the
expectation that an ABTS will be sent on the wire. The Abort request is
stalled waiting for the link to come up. In some conditions the driver may
auto-complete the ELSs thus if the link does come up, the Abort completions
may reference an invalid structure.
Fix by ensuring that Abort set the flag to avoid link traffic if issued due
to conditions where the link failed.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47182

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: core: Fix scsi_mode_sense() buffer length handling
Several problems exist with scsi_mode_sense() buffer length handling:
1) The allocation length field of the MODE SENSE(10) command is 16-bits,
occupying bytes 7 and 8 of the CDB. With this command, access to mode
pages larger than 255 bytes is thus possible. However, the CDB
allocation length field is set by assigning len to byte 8 only, thus
truncating buffer length larger than 255.
2) If scsi_mode_sense() is called with len smaller than 8 with
sdev->use_10_for_ms set, or smaller than 4 otherwise, the buffer length
is increased to 8 and 4 respectively, and the buffer is zero filled
with these increased values, thus corrupting the memory following the
buffer.
Fix these 2 problems by using put_unaligned_be16() to set the allocation
length field of MODE SENSE(10) CDB and by returning an error when len is
too small.
Furthermore, if len is larger than 255B, always try MODE SENSE(10) first,
even if the device driver did not set sdev->use_10_for_ms. In case of
invalid opcode error for MODE SENSE(10), access to mode pages larger than
255 bytes are not retried using MODE SENSE(6). To avoid buffer length
overflows for the MODE_SENSE(10) case, check that len is smaller than 65535
bytes.
While at it, also fix the folowing:
* Use get_unaligned_be16() to retrieve the mode data length and block
descriptor length fields of the mode sense reply header instead of using
an open coded calculation.
* Fix the kdoc dbd argument explanation: the DBD bit stands for Disable
Block Descriptor, which is the opposite of what the dbd argument
description was.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47163

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: wait and exit until all work queues are done
On some host, a crash could be triggered simply by repeating these
commands several times:
# modprobe tipc
# tipc bearer enable media udp name UDP1 localip 127.0.0.1
# rmmod tipc
[] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffc096bb00
[] Workqueue: events 0xffffffffc096bb00
[] Call Trace:
[] ? process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
[] ? worker_thread+0x30/0x390
[] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
[] ? kthread+0x116/0x130
[] ? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
[] ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
When removing the TIPC module, the UDP tunnel sock will be delayed to
release in a work queue as sock_release() can't be done in rtnl_lock().
If the work queue is schedule to run after the TIPC module is removed,
kernel will crash as the work queue function cleanup_beareri() code no
longer exists when trying to invoke it.
To fix it, this patch introduce a member wq_count in tipc_net to track
the numbers of work queues in schedule, and wait and exit until all
work queues are done in tipc_exit_net().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47162

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: skb_linearize the head skb when reassembling msgs
It's not a good idea to append the frag skb to a skb's frag_list if
the frag_list already has skbs from elsewhere, such as this skb was
created by pskb_copy() where the frag_list was cloned (all the skbs
in it were skb_get'ed) and shared by multiple skbs.
However, the new appended frag skb should have been only seen by the
current skb. Otherwise, it will cause use after free crashes as this
appended frag skb are seen by multiple skbs but it only got skb_get
called once.
The same thing happens with a skb updated by pskb_may_pull() with a
skb_cloned skb. Li Shuang has reported quite a few crashes caused
by this when doing testing over macvlan devices:
[] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:1970!
[] Call Trace:
[] skb_clone+0x4d/0xb0
[] macvlan_broadcast+0xd8/0x160 [macvlan]
[] macvlan_process_broadcast+0x148/0x150 [macvlan]
[] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
[] worker_thread+0x30/0x390
[] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
[] Call Trace:
[] __check_heap_object+0xd3/0x100
[] __check_object_size+0xff/0x16b
[] simple_copy_to_iter+0x1c/0x30
[] __skb_datagram_iter+0x7d/0x310
[] __skb_datagram_iter+0x2a5/0x310
[] skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x3b/0x90
[] tipc_recvmsg+0x14a/0x3a0 [tipc]
[] ____sys_recvmsg+0x91/0x150
[] ___sys_recvmsg+0x7b/0xc0
[] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:305!
[] Call Trace:
[] <IRQ>
[] kmem_cache_free+0x3ff/0x400
[] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x12c/0xc40
[] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x270
[] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x3d/0xb0
[] ? get_rx_page_info+0x8e/0xa0 [be2net]
[] be_poll+0x6ef/0xd00 [be2net]
[] ? irq_exit+0x4f/0x100
[] net_rx_action+0x149/0x3b0
...
This patch is to fix it by linearizing the head skb if it has frag_list
set in tipc_buf_append(). Note that we choose to do this before calling
skb_unshare(), as __skb_linearize() will avoid skb_copy(). Also, we can
not just drop the frag_list either as the early time.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47146

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mld: fix panic in mld_newpack()
mld_newpack() doesn't allow to allocate high order page,
only order-0 allocation is allowed.
If headroom size is too large, a kernel panic could occur in skb_put().
Test commands:
ip netns del A
ip netns del B
ip netns add A
ip netns add B
ip link add veth0 type veth peer name veth1
ip link set veth0 netns A
ip link set veth1 netns B
ip netns exec A ip link set lo up
ip netns exec A ip link set veth0 up
ip netns exec A ip -6 a a 2001:db8:0::1/64 dev veth0
ip netns exec B ip link set lo up
ip netns exec B ip link set veth1 up
ip netns exec B ip -6 a a 2001:db8:0::2/64 dev veth1
for i in {1..99}
do
let A=$i-1
ip netns exec A ip link add ip6gre$i type ip6gre \
local 2001:db8:$A::1 remote 2001:db8:$A::2 encaplimit 100
ip netns exec A ip -6 a a 2001:db8:$i::1/64 dev ip6gre$i
ip netns exec A ip link set ip6gre$i up
ip netns exec B ip link add ip6gre$i type ip6gre \
local 2001:db8:$A::2 remote 2001:db8:$A::1 encaplimit 100
ip netns exec B ip -6 a a 2001:db8:$i::2/64 dev ip6gre$i
ip netns exec B ip link set ip6gre$i up
done
Splat looks like:
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:110!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.12.0+ #891
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x15d/0x15f
Code: 92 fe 4c 8b 4c 24 10 53 8b 4d 70 45 89 e0 48 c7 c7 00 ae 79 83
41 57 41 56 41 55 48 8b 54 24 a6 26 f9 ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 6c 24 20 89
34 24 e8 4a 4e 92 fe 8b 34 24 48 c7 c1 20
RSP: 0018:ffff88810091f820 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000089 RBX: ffff8881086e9000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000089 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffed1020123efb
RBP: ffff888005f6eac0 R08: ffffed1022fc0031 R09: ffffed1022fc0031
R10: ffff888117e00187 R11: ffffed1022fc0030 R12: 0000000000000028
R13: ffff888008284eb0 R14: 0000000000000ed8 R15: 0000000000000ec0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888117c00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f8b801c5640 CR3: 0000000033c2c006 CR4: 00000000003706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600
? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600
skb_put.cold.104+0x22/0x22
ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x91/0xc0
mld_newpack+0x398/0x8f0
? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x600/0x600
? lock_contended+0xc40/0xc40
add_grhead.isra.33+0x280/0x380
add_grec+0x5ca/0xff0
? mld_sendpack+0xf40/0xf40
? lock_downgrade+0x690/0x690
mld_send_initial_cr.part.34+0xb9/0x180
ipv6_mc_dad_complete+0x15d/0x1b0
addrconf_dad_completed+0x8d2/0xbb0
? lock_downgrade+0x690/0x690
? addrconf_rs_timer+0x660/0x660
? addrconf_dad_work+0x73c/0x10e0
addrconf_dad_work+0x73c/0x10e0
Allowing high order page allocation could fix this problem.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47140

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Clear DMA ops when switching domain
Since commit 08a27c1c3ecf ("iommu: Add support to change default domain
of an iommu group") a user can switch a device between IOMMU and direct
DMA through sysfs. This doesn't work for AMD IOMMU at the moment because
dev->dma_ops is not cleared when switching from a DMA to an identity
IOMMU domain. The DMA layer thus attempts to use the dma-iommu ops on an
identity domain, causing an oops:
# echo 0000:00:05.0 > /sys/sys/bus/pci/drivers/e1000e/unbind
# echo identity > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:05.0/iommu_group/type
# echo 0000:00:05.0 > /sys/sys/bus/pci/drivers/e1000e/bind
...
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
...
Call Trace:
iommu_dma_alloc
e1000e_setup_tx_resources
e1000e_open
Since iommu_change_dev_def_domain() calls probe_finalize() again, clear
the dma_ops there like Vt-d does.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47136

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: zero-initialize tc skb extension on allocation
Function skb_ext_add() doesn't initialize created skb extension with any
value and leaves it up to the user. However, since extension of type
TC_SKB_EXT originally contained only single value tc_skb_ext->chain its
users used to just assign the chain value without setting whole extension
memory to zero first. This assumption changed when TC_SKB_EXT extension was
extended with additional fields but not all users were updated to
initialize the new fields which leads to use of uninitialized memory
afterwards. UBSAN log:
[ 778.299821] UBSAN: invalid-load in net/openvswitch/flow.c:899:28
[ 778.301495] load of value 107 is not a valid value for type '_Bool'
[ 778.303215] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc7+ #2
[ 778.304933] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 778.307901] Call Trace:
[ 778.308680] <IRQ>
[ 778.309358] dump_stack+0xbb/0x107
[ 778.310307] ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
[ 778.311167] __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value.cold+0x43/0x48
[ 778.312454] ? memset+0x20/0x40
[ 778.313230] ovs_flow_key_extract.cold+0xf/0x14 [openvswitch]
[ 778.314532] ovs_vport_receive+0x19e/0x2e0 [openvswitch]
[ 778.315749] ? ovs_vport_find_upcall_portid+0x330/0x330 [openvswitch]
[ 778.317188] ? create_prof_cpu_mask+0x20/0x20
[ 778.318220] ? arch_stack_walk+0x82/0xf0
[ 778.319153] ? secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xb0/0xbb
[ 778.320399] ? stack_trace_save+0x91/0xc0
[ 778.321362] ? stack_trace_consume_entry+0x160/0x160
[ 778.322517] ? lock_release+0x52e/0x760
[ 778.323444] netdev_frame_hook+0x323/0x610 [openvswitch]
[ 778.324668] ? ovs_netdev_get_vport+0xe0/0xe0 [openvswitch]
[ 778.325950] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x771/0x2db0
[ 778.327067] ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6f0
[ 778.328021] ? lock_acquire+0x565/0x720
[ 778.328940] ? generic_xdp_tx+0x4f0/0x4f0
[ 778.329902] ? inet_gro_receive+0x2a7/0x10a0
[ 778.330914] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0
[ 778.331867] ? udp4_gro_receive+0x4c4/0x13e0
[ 778.332876] ? lock_release+0x52e/0x760
[ 778.333808] ? dev_gro_receive+0xcc8/0x2380
[ 778.334810] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0
[ 778.335769] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x295/0x820
[ 778.336955] ? process_backlog+0x780/0x780
[ 778.337941] ? mlx5e_rep_tc_netdevice_event_unregister+0x20/0x20 [mlx5_core]
[ 778.339613] ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0xa7/0xc0
[ 778.341033] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x20
[ 778.342072] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x5f5/0xcb0
[ 778.343288] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x7a/0x90
[ 778.344234] ? mlx5e_handle_rx_cqe_mpwrq+0x9e0/0x9e0 [mlx5_core]
[ 778.345676] ? mlx5e_xmit_xdp_frame_mpwqe+0x14d0/0x14d0 [mlx5_core]
[ 778.347140] ? __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x820/0x820
[ 778.348351] ? mlx5e_post_rx_mpwqes+0xa6/0x25d0 [mlx5_core]
[ 778.349688] ? napi_gro_flush+0x26c/0x3c0
[ 778.350641] napi_complete_done+0x188/0x6b0
[ 778.351627] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x373/0x1b80 [mlx5_core]
[ 778.352853] __napi_poll+0x9f/0x510
[ 778.353704] ? mlx5_flow_namespace_set_mode+0x260/0x260 [mlx5_core]
[ 778.355158] net_rx_action+0x34c/0xa40
[ 778.356060] ? napi_threaded_poll+0x3d0/0x3d0
[ 778.357083] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x190
[ 778.358041] ? __common_interrupt+0x8e/0x1a0
[ 778.359045] __do_softirq+0x1ce/0x984
[ 778.359938] __irq_exit_rcu+0x137/0x1d0
[ 778.360865] irq_exit_rcu+0xa/0x20
[ 778.361708] common_interrupt+0x80/0xa0
[ 778.362640] </IRQ>
[ 778.363212] asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
[ 778.364204] RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10
[ 778.365273] Code: 4f ff ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 50 3f 40 fe e9 dc fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 43 3f 40 fe eb 90 cc e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 74 05 62 00 fb f4 <c3> 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 64 05 62 00 f4 c3 cc cc 0f 1f 44 00
[ 778.369355] RSP: 0018:ffffffff84407e48 EFLAGS: 00000246
[ 778.370570] RAX
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47133

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: amd_sfh: Fix memory leak in amd_sfh_work
Kmemleak tool detected a memory leak in the amd_sfh driver.
====================
unreferenced object 0xffff88810228ada0 (size 32):
comm "insmod", pid 3968, jiffies 4295056001 (age 775.792s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 20 73 1f 81 88 ff ff 00 01 00 00 00 00 ad de . s.............
22 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 01 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 "...............
backtrace:
[<000000007b4c8799>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x163/0x4f0
[<0000000005326893>] amd_sfh_get_report+0xa4/0x1d0 [amd_sfh]
[<000000002a9e5ec4>] amdtp_hid_request+0x62/0x80 [amd_sfh]
[<00000000b8a95807>] sensor_hub_get_feature+0x145/0x270 [hid_sensor_hub]
[<00000000fda054ee>] hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x215/0x460 [hid_sensor_iio_common]
[<0000000021279ecf>] hid_accel_3d_probe+0xff/0x4a0 [hid_sensor_accel_3d]
[<00000000915760ce>] platform_probe+0x6a/0xd0
[<0000000060258a1f>] really_probe+0x192/0x620
[<00000000fa812f2d>] driver_probe_device+0x14a/0x1d0
[<000000005e79f7fd>] __device_attach_driver+0xbd/0x110
[<0000000070d15018>] bus_for_each_drv+0xfd/0x160
[<0000000013a3c312>] __device_attach+0x18b/0x220
[<000000008c7b4afc>] device_initial_probe+0x13/0x20
[<00000000e6e99665>] bus_probe_device+0xfe/0x120
[<00000000833fa90b>] device_add+0x6a6/0xe00
[<00000000fa901078>] platform_device_add+0x180/0x380
====================
The fix is to freeing request_list entry once the processed entry is
removed from the request_list.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47094

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/mmu: Don't advance iterator after restart due to yielding
After dropping mmu_lock in the TDP MMU, restart the iterator during
tdp_iter_next() and do not advance the iterator. Advancing the iterator
results in skipping the top-level SPTE and all its children, which is
fatal if any of the skipped SPTEs were not visited before yielding.
When zapping all SPTEs, i.e. when min_level == root_level, restarting the
iter and then invoking tdp_iter_next() is always fatal if the current gfn
has as a valid SPTE, as advancing the iterator results in try_step_side()
skipping the current gfn, which wasn't visited before yielding.
Sprinkle WARNs on iter->yielded being true in various helpers that are
often used in conjunction with yielding, and tag the helper with
__must_check to reduce the probabily of improper usage.
Failing to zap a top-level SPTE manifests in one of two ways. If a valid
SPTE is skipped by both kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_all() and kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root(),
the shadow page will be leaked and KVM will WARN accordingly.
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3509 at arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c:46 [kvm]
RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu+0x3e/0x50 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x130/0x1b0 [kvm]
kvm_destroy_vm+0x162/0x2a0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_release+0x34/0x60 [kvm]
__fput+0x82/0x240
task_work_run+0x5c/0x90
do_exit+0x364/0xa10
? futex_unqueue+0x38/0x60
do_group_exit+0x33/0xa0
get_signal+0x155/0x850
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xed/0x750
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xc5/0x120
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x48/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
If kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_all() skips a gfn/SPTE but that SPTE is then zapped by
kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root(), KVM triggers a use-after-free in the form of
marking a struct page as dirty/accessed after it has been put back on the
free list. This directly triggers a WARN due to encountering a page with
page_count() == 0, but it can also lead to data corruption and additional
errors in the kernel.
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1995658 at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:171
RIP: 0010:kvm_is_zone_device_pfn.part.0+0x9e/0xd0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_set_pfn_dirty+0x120/0x1d0 [kvm]
__handle_changed_spte+0x92e/0xca0 [kvm]
__handle_changed_spte+0x63c/0xca0 [kvm]
__handle_changed_spte+0x63c/0xca0 [kvm]
__handle_changed_spte+0x63c/0xca0 [kvm]
zap_gfn_range+0x549/0x620 [kvm]
kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root+0x1b6/0x270 [kvm]
mmu_free_root_page+0x219/0x2c0 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_free_roots+0x1b4/0x4e0 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_unload+0x1c/0xa0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x1f2/0x5c0 [kvm]
kvm_put_kvm+0x3b1/0x8b0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_release+0x4e/0x70 [kvm]
__fput+0x1f7/0x8c0
task_work_run+0xf8/0x1a0
do_exit+0x97b/0x2230
do_group_exit+0xda/0x2a0
get_signal+0x3be/0x1e50
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x244/0x17f0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xcb/0x120
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x4d/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Note, the underlying bug existed even before commit 1af4a96025b3 ("KVM:
x86/mmu: Yield in TDU MMU iter even if no SPTES changed") moved calls to
tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched() to the beginning of loops, as KVM could still
incorrectly advance past a top-level entry when yielding on a lower-level
entry. But with respect to leaking shadow pages, the bug was introduced
by yielding before processing the current gfn.
Alternatively, tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched() could simply fall through, or
callers could jump to their "retry" label. The downside of that approach
is that tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched() _must_ be called before anything else
in the loop, and there's no easy way to enfornce that requirement.
Ideally, KVM would handling the cond_resched() fully within the iterator
macro (the code is actually quite clean) and avoid this entire class of
bugs, but that is extremely difficult do wh
---truncated---

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47077

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qedf: Add pointer checks in qedf_update_link_speed()
The following trace was observed:
[ 14.042059] Call Trace:
[ 14.042061] <IRQ>
[ 14.042068] qedf_link_update+0x144/0x1f0 [qedf]
[ 14.042117] qed_link_update+0x5c/0x80 [qed]
[ 14.042135] qed_mcp_handle_link_change+0x2d2/0x410 [qed]
[ 14.042155] ? qed_set_ptt+0x70/0x80 [qed]
[ 14.042170] ? qed_set_ptt+0x70/0x80 [qed]
[ 14.042186] ? qed_rd+0x13/0x40 [qed]
[ 14.042205] qed_mcp_handle_events+0x437/0x690 [qed]
[ 14.042221] ? qed_set_ptt+0x70/0x80 [qed]
[ 14.042239] qed_int_sp_dpc+0x3a6/0x3e0 [qed]
[ 14.042245] tasklet_action_common.isra.14+0x5a/0x100
[ 14.042250] __do_softirq+0xe4/0x2f8
[ 14.042253] irq_exit+0xf7/0x100
[ 14.042255] do_IRQ+0x7f/0xd0
[ 14.042257] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf
[ 14.042259] </IRQ>
API qedf_link_update() is getting called from QED but by that time
shost_data is not initialised. This results in a NULL pointer dereference
when we try to dereference shost_data while updating supported_speeds.
Add a NULL pointer check before dereferencing shost_data.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-47014

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_ct: fix wild memory access when clearing fragments
while testing re-assembly/re-fragmentation using act_ct, it's possible to
observe a crash like the following one:
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x0001000000000448-0x000100000000044f]
CPU: 50 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/50 Tainted: G S 5.12.0-rc7+ #424
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017
RIP: 0010:inet_frag_rbtree_purge+0x50/0xc0
Code: 00 fc ff df 48 89 c3 31 ed 48 89 df e8 a9 7a 38 ff 4c 89 fe 48 89 df 49 89 c6 e8 5b 3a 38 ff 48 8d 7b 40 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 20 00 75 59 48 8d bb d0 00 00 00 4c 8b 6b 40 48 89 f8 48
RSP: 0018:ffff888c31449db8 EFLAGS: 00010203
RAX: 0000200000000089 RBX: 000100000000040e RCX: ffffffff989eb960
RDX: 0000000000000140 RSI: ffffffff97cfb977 RDI: 000100000000044e
RBP: 0000000000000900 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1186289350
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffed1186289350 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: 000100000000040e R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888155e02160
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888c31440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005600cb70a5b8 CR3: 0000000a2c014005 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
inet_frag_destroy+0xa9/0x150
call_timer_fn+0x2d/0x180
run_timer_softirq+0x4fe/0xe70
__do_softirq+0x197/0x5a0
irq_exit_rcu+0x1de/0x200
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6b/0x80
</IRQ>
when act_ct temporarily stores an IP fragment, restoring the skb qdisc cb
results in putting random data in FRAG_CB(), and this causes those "wild"
memory accesses later, when the rbtree is purged. Never overwrite the skb
cb in case tcf_ct_handle_fragments() returns -EINPROGRESS.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-46997

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: entry: always set GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET during entry
Zenghui reports that booting a kernel with "irqchip.gicv3_pseudo_nmi=1"
on the command line hits a warning during kernel entry, due to the way
we manipulate the PMR.
Early in the entry sequence, we call lockdep_hardirqs_off() to inform
lockdep that interrupts have been masked (as the HW sets DAIF wqhen
entering an exception). Architecturally PMR_EL1 is not affected by
exception entry, and we don't set GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET in the PMR early in
the exception entry sequence, so early in exception entry the PMR can
indicate that interrupts are unmasked even though they are masked by
DAIF.
If DEBUG_LOCKDEP is selected, lockdep_hardirqs_off() will check that
interrupts are masked, before we set GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET in any of the
exception entry paths, and hence lockdep_hardirqs_off() will WARN() that
something is amiss.
We can avoid this by consistently setting GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET during
exception entry so that kernel code sees a consistent environment. We
must also update local_daif_inherit() to undo this, as currently only
touches DAIF. For other paths, local_daif_restore() will update both
DAIF and the PMR. With this done, we can remove the existing special
cases which set this later in the entry code.
We always use (GIC_PRIO_IRQON | GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET) for consistency with
local_daif_save(), as this will warn if it ever encounters
(GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF | GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET), and never sets this itself. This
matches the gic_prio_kentry_setup that we have to retain for
ret_to_user.
The original splat from Zenghui's report was:
| DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled())
| WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 125 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4258 lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0xe8
| Modules linked in:
| CPU: 3 PID: 125 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 5.12.0-rc8+ #463
| Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
| pstate: 604003c5 (nZCv DAIF +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
| pc : lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0xe8
| lr : lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0xe8
| sp : ffff80002a39bad0
| pmr_save: 000000e0
| x29: ffff80002a39bad0 x28: ffff0000de214bc0
| x27: ffff0000de1c0400 x26: 000000000049b328
| x25: 0000000000406f30 x24: ffff0000de1c00a0
| x23: 0000000020400005 x22: ffff8000105f747c
| x21: 0000000096000044 x20: 0000000000498ef9
| x19: ffff80002a39bc88 x18: ffffffffffffffff
| x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff800011c61eb0
| x15: ffff800011700a88 x14: 0720072007200720
| x13: 0720072007200720 x12: 0720072007200720
| x11: 0720072007200720 x10: 0720072007200720
| x9 : ffff80002a39bad0 x8 : ffff80002a39bad0
| x7 : ffff8000119f0800 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff
| x5 : ffff8000119f07a8 x4 : 0000000000000001
| x3 : 9bcdab23f2432800 x2 : ffff800011730538
| x1 : 9bcdab23f2432800 x0 : 0000000000000000
| Call trace:
| lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0xe8
| enter_from_kernel_mode.isra.5+0x7c/0xa8
| el1_abort+0x24/0x100
| el1_sync_handler+0x80/0xd0
| el1_sync+0x6c/0x100
| __arch_clear_user+0xc/0x90
| load_elf_binary+0x9fc/0x1450
| bprm_execve+0x404/0x880
| kernel_execve+0x180/0x188
| call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0xdc/0x158
| ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-46978

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: nVMX: Always make an attempt to map eVMCS after migration
When enlightened VMCS is in use and nested state is migrated with
vmx_get_nested_state()/vmx_set_nested_state() KVM can't map evmcs
page right away: evmcs gpa is not 'struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_hdr'
and we can't read it from VP assist page because userspace may decide
to restore HV_X64_MSR_VP_ASSIST_PAGE after restoring nested state
(and QEMU, for example, does exactly that). To make sure eVMCS is
mapped /vmx_set_nested_state() raises KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES
request.
Commit f2c7ef3ba955 ("KVM: nSVM: cancel KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES
on nested vmexit") added KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES clearing to
nested_vmx_vmexit() to make sure MSR permission bitmap is not switched
when an immediate exit from L2 to L1 happens right after migration (caused
by a pending event, for example). Unfortunately, in the exact same
situation we still need to have eVMCS mapped so
nested_sync_vmcs12_to_shadow() reflects changes in VMCS12 to eVMCS.
As a band-aid, restore nested_get_evmcs_page() when clearing
KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES in nested_vmx_vmexit(). The 'fix' is far
from being ideal as we can't easily propagate possible failures and even if
we could, this is most likely already too late to do so. The whole
'KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES' idea for mapping eVMCS after migration
seems to be fragile as we diverge too much from the 'native' path when
vmptr loading happens on vmx_set_nested_state().

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-46929

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: use call_rcu to free endpoint
This patch is to delay the endpoint free by calling call_rcu() to fix
another use-after-free issue in sctp_sock_dump():
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x36d9/0x4c20
Call Trace:
__lock_acquire+0x36d9/0x4c20 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3844
__raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:135 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_bh+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:168
spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:334 [inline]
__lock_sock+0x203/0x350 net/core/sock.c:2253
lock_sock_nested+0xfe/0x120 net/core/sock.c:2774
lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1492 [inline]
sctp_sock_dump+0x122/0xb20 net/sctp/diag.c:324
sctp_for_each_transport+0x2b5/0x370 net/sctp/socket.c:5091
sctp_diag_dump+0x3ac/0x660 net/sctp/diag.c:527
__inet_diag_dump+0xa8/0x140 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1049
inet_diag_dump+0x9b/0x110 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1065
netlink_dump+0x606/0x1080 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2244
__netlink_dump_start+0x59a/0x7c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2352
netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:216 [inline]
inet_diag_handler_cmd+0x2ce/0x3f0 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1170
__sock_diag_cmd net/core/sock_diag.c:232 [inline]
sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x31d/0x410 net/core/sock_diag.c:263
netlink_rcv_skb+0x172/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
sock_diag_rcv+0x2a/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:274
This issue occurs when asoc is peeled off and the old sk is freed after
getting it by asoc->base.sk and before calling lock_sock(sk).
To prevent the sk free, as a holder of the sk, ep should be alive when
calling lock_sock(). This patch uses call_rcu() and moves sock_put and
ep free into sctp_endpoint_destroy_rcu(), so that it's safe to try to
hold the ep under rcu_read_lock in sctp_transport_traverse_process().
If sctp_endpoint_hold() returns true, it means this ep is still alive
and we have held it and can continue to dump it; If it returns false,
it means this ep is dead and can be freed after rcu_read_unlock, and
we should skip it.
In sctp_sock_dump(), after locking the sk, if this ep is different from
tsp->asoc->ep, it means during this dumping, this asoc was peeled off
before calling lock_sock(), and the sk should be skipped; If this ep is
the same with tsp->asoc->ep, it means no peeloff happens on this asoc,
and due to lock_sock, no peeloff will happen either until release_sock.
Note that delaying endpoint free won't delay the port release, as the
port release happens in sctp_endpoint_destroy() before calling call_rcu().
Also, freeing endpoint by call_rcu() makes it safe to access the sk by
asoc->base.sk in sctp_assocs_seq_show() and sctp_rcv().
Thanks Jones to bring this issue up.
v1->v2:
- improve the changelog.
- add kfree(ep) into sctp_endpoint_destroy_rcu(), as Jakub noticed.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-46921

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
locking/qrwlock: Fix ordering in queued_write_lock_slowpath()
While this code is executed with the wait_lock held, a reader can
acquire the lock without holding wait_lock. The writer side loops
checking the value with the atomic_cond_read_acquire(), but only truly
acquires the lock when the compare-and-exchange is completed
successfully which isn’t ordered. This exposes the window between the
acquire and the cmpxchg to an A-B-A problem which allows reads
following the lock acquisition to observe values speculatively before
the write lock is truly acquired.
We've seen a problem in epoll where the reader does a xchg while
holding the read lock, but the writer can see a value change out from
under it.
Writer | Reader
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ep_scan_ready_list() |
|- write_lock_irq() |
|- queued_write_lock_slowpath() |
|- atomic_cond_read_acquire() |
| read_lock_irqsave(&ep->lock, flags);
--> (observes value before unlock) | chain_epi_lockless()
| | epi->next = xchg(&ep->ovflist, epi);
| | read_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->lock, flags);
| |
| atomic_cmpxchg_relaxed() |
|-- READ_ONCE(ep->ovflist); |
A core can order the read of the ovflist ahead of the
atomic_cmpxchg_relaxed(). Switching the cmpxchg to use acquire
semantics addresses this issue at which point the atomic_cond_read can
be switched to use relaxed semantics.
[peterz: use try_cmpxchg()]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-46915

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_limit: avoid possible divide error in nft_limit_init
div_u64() divides u64 by u32.
nft_limit_init() wants to divide u64 by u64, use the appropriate
math function (div64_u64)
divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 8390 Comm: syz-executor188 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:div_u64_rem include/linux/math64.h:28 [inline]
RIP: 0010:div_u64 include/linux/math64.h:127 [inline]
RIP: 0010:nft_limit_init+0x2a2/0x5e0 net/netfilter/nft_limit.c:85
Code: ef 4c 01 eb 41 0f 92 c7 48 89 de e8 38 a5 22 fa 4d 85 ff 0f 85 97 02 00 00 e8 ea 9e 22 fa 4c 0f af f3 45 89 ed 31 d2 4c 89 f0 <49> f7 f5 49 89 c6 e8 d3 9e 22 fa 48 8d 7d 48 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90009447198 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000200000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff875152e6 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: ffff888020f80908 R08: 0000200000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff875152d8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc90009447270
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 000000000097a300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000200001c4 CR3: 0000000026a52000 CR4: 00000000001506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
nf_tables_newexpr net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2675 [inline]
nft_expr_init+0x145/0x2d0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2713
nft_set_elem_expr_alloc+0x27/0x280 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:5160
nf_tables_newset+0x1997/0x3150 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:4321
nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0x85a/0x21b0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:456
nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:580 [inline]
nfnetlink_rcv+0x3af/0x420 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:598
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-46910

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ARM: 9063/1: mm: reduce maximum number of CPUs if DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL is enabled
The debugging code for kmap_local() doubles the number of per-CPU fixmap
slots allocated for kmap_local(), in order to use half of them as guard
regions. This causes the fixmap region to grow downwards beyond the start
of its reserved window if the supported number of CPUs is large, and collide
with the newly added virtual DT mapping right below it, which is obviously
not good.
One manifestation of this is EFI boot on a kernel built with NR_CPUS=32
and CONFIG_DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL=y, which may pass the FDT in highmem, resulting
in block entries below the fixmap region that the fixmap code misidentifies
as fixmap table entries, and subsequently tries to dereference using a
phys-to-virt translation that is only valid for lowmem. This results in a
cryptic splat such as the one below.
ftrace: allocating 45548 entries in 89 pages
8<--- cut here ---
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fc6006f0
pgd = (ptrval)
[fc6006f0] *pgd=80000040207003, *pmd=00000000
Internal error: Oops: a06 [#1] SMP ARM
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.11.0+ #382
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
PC is at cpu_ca15_set_pte_ext+0x24/0x30
LR is at __set_fixmap+0xe4/0x118
pc : [<c041ac9c>] lr : [<c04189d8>] psr: 400000d3
sp : c1601ed8 ip : 00400000 fp : 00800000
r10: 0000071f r9 : 00421000 r8 : 00c00000
r7 : 00c00000 r6 : 0000071f r5 : ffade000 r4 : 4040171f
r3 : 00c00000 r2 : 4040171f r1 : c041ac78 r0 : fc6006f0
Flags: nZcv IRQs off FIQs off Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none
Control: 30c5387d Table: 40203000 DAC: 00000001
Process swapper (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x(ptrval))
So let's limit CONFIG_NR_CPUS to 16 when CONFIG_DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL=y. Also,
fix the BUILD_BUG_ON() check that was supposed to catch this, by checking
whether the region grows below the start address rather than above the end
address.

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-4440

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/xen: Drop USERGS_SYSRET64 paravirt call
commit afd30525a659ac0ae0904f0cb4a2ca75522c3123 upstream.
USERGS_SYSRET64 is used to return from a syscall via SYSRET, but
a Xen PV guest will nevertheless use the IRET hypercall, as there
is no sysret PV hypercall defined.
So instead of testing all the prerequisites for doing a sysret and
then mangling the stack for Xen PV again for doing an iret just use
the iret exit from the beginning.
This can easily be done via an ALTERNATIVE like it is done for the
sysenter compat case already.
It should be noted that this drops the optimization in Xen for not
restoring a few registers when returning to user mode, but it seems
as if the saved instructions in the kernel more than compensate for
this drop (a kernel build in a Xen PV guest was slightly faster with
this patch applied).
While at it remove the stale sysret32 remnants.
[ pawan: Brad Spengler and Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
reported a problem with the 5.10 backport commit edc702b4a820
("x86/entry_64: Add VERW just before userspace transition").
When CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL=y, CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS is not executed in
syscall_return_via_sysret path as USERGS_SYSRET64 is runtime
patched to:
.cpu_usergs_sysret64 = { 0x0f, 0x01, 0xf8,
0x48, 0x0f, 0x07 }, // swapgs; sysretq
which is missing CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS. It turns out dropping
USERGS_SYSRET64 simplifies the code, allowing CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
to be explicitly added to syscall_return_via_sysret path. Below
is with CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL=y and this patch applied:
syscall_return_via_sysret:
...
<+342>: swapgs
<+345>: xchg %ax,%ax
<+347>: verw -0x1a2(%rip) <------
<+354>: sysretq
]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

References:

Security Advisory: CVE-2021-4439

Scandy Opinion:

This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel, but Red Hat's policy is to taint every subpackage built from the vulnerable source package with the same vulnerability. In this case, however, kernel-headers only contains C header files needed to build software that interfaces with the kernel. Consider a global exception for this vulnerability.

Description:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
isdn: cpai: check ctr->cnr to avoid array index out of bound
The cmtp_add_connection() would add a cmtp session to a controller
and run a kernel thread to process cmtp.
__module_get(THIS_MODULE);
session->task = kthread_run(cmtp_session, session, "kcmtpd_ctr_%d",
session->num);
During this process, the kernel thread would call detach_capi_ctr()
to detach a register controller. if the controller
was not attached yet, detach_capi_ctr() would
trigger an array-index-out-bounds bug.
[ 46.866069][ T6479] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in
drivers/isdn/capi/kcapi.c:483:21
[ 46.867196][ T6479] index -1 is out of range for type 'capi_ctr *[32]'
[ 46.867982][ T6479] CPU: 1 PID: 6479 Comm: kcmtpd_ctr_0 Not tainted
5.15.0-rc2+ #8
[ 46.869002][ T6479] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX,
1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
[ 46.870107][ T6479] Call Trace:
[ 46.870473][ T6479] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
[ 46.870974][ T6479] ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
[ 46.871458][ T6479] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x43/0x48
[ 46.872135][ T6479] detach_capi_ctr+0x64/0xc0
[ 46.872639][ T6479] cmtp_session+0x5c8/0x5d0
[ 46.873131][ T6479] ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x60/0x60
[ 46.873712][ T6479] ? cmtp_add_msgpart+0x120/0x120
[ 46.874256][ T6479] kthread+0x147/0x170
[ 46.874709][ T6479] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
[ 46.875248][ T6479] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 46.875773][ T6479]

Locations:

kernel-headers-4.18.0-553.50.1.el8_10

registry.access.redhat.com/ubi8/python-311

With RPM updates as of